Ex-vessel prices may not always rise after fishery rationalization
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2023
Details
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Journal Title:University of Copenhagen Department of Food and Resource Economics (IFRO)
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NOAA Program & Office:
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Description:Managing a fishery with individual fishing quotas (catch shares) creates the incentive to maximize the value of an individual’s fishery quota allocation; value can be created through a variety of mechanisms, including increasing product recovery rates, changing the production process and product mix to optimize differences in product value, targeting fish spatially and temporally to obtain the highest value, developing markets for byproducts or new products, decreasing the speed of fishing and processing to increase quality, or developing trade cooperatives or contracting. While theory suggests that increases in ex-vessels prices are one likely outcome of catch share management, empirically, prices may not always increase because market characteristics and the potential for drastic changes in product form vary widely by fishery. We provide an example of a fishery in which increases in ex-vessel prices may have been expected, but have not been realized in the first seven years after the implementation of catch shares.
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Source:IFRO Report No. 310, 132-144
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Rights Information:Other
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Compliance:Submitted
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Main Document Checksum:urn:sha-512:8b52d6d99e2a1533d4b4ba544cc59b49007fc966769ffc276c38076b4ecdbb1c51379f67209f0cc9fae0846d290dd2c3b616a3b2b9472b4ddb1c36ffd2134522
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