Collective Rights–Based Fishery Management: A Path to Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management
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Collective Rights–Based Fishery Management: A Path to Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management

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Details:

  • Journal Title:
    Annual Review of Resource Economics
  • Personal Author:
  • NOAA Program & Office:
  • Description:
    Fishery rents may be dissipated across margins not well defined or controlled by an individual transferable quota system. Collective rights–based fishery management (CRBFM), where catch rights are held by a group, can sometimes generate greater benefits and can also address external impacts of the fishery. I discuss potential failures of individual quotas and how these problems were addressed by CRBFM institutions. I then focus on the role of CRBFM in addressing environmental and social impacts external to the group of fishers, such as bycatch, habitat impacts, and spatial conflicts. The review suggests that CRBFM can effectively address both intrafishery and external impacts, provided there is sufficient incentive to do so, including maintaining access to preferred markets or the threat of further regulation. However, CRBFM can create moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and successful CRBFM institutions generally have homogeneous membership with well-aligned interests and/or formal contracts with monitoring and enforcement provisions.
  • Source:
    Annual Review of Resource Economics, 10(1), 469-485
  • DOI:
  • ISSN:
    1941-1340;1941-1359;
  • Format:
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  • Rights Information:
    CC0 Public Domain
  • Compliance:
    Library
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