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    Article type : Original Article
    article type : Original Article
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# Title

The mitigation hierarchy for sharks: a risk-based framework for reconciling trade-offs between shark conservation and fisheries objectives

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### Running title

A novel framework for shark management

# Abstract

Sharks and their cartilaginous relatives are one of the world's most threatened species groups. The primary cause is overfishing in targeted and bycatch fisheries. Reductions in fishing mortality are needed to halt shark population declines. However, this requires complex fisheries management decisions, which often entail trade-offs between conservation objectives and fisheries objectives. We propose the mitigation hierarchy (MH) - a step-wise precautionary approach for minimising the impacts of human activity on biodiversity - as a novel framework for supporting these management decisions. We outline a holistic conceptual model for risks to sharks in fisheries, which includes biophysical, operational and socio-economic considerations. We then demonstrate how this model, in conjunction with the MH, can support risk-based least-cost shark conservation. Through

This is the author manuscript accepted for publication and has undergone full peer review but has not been through the copyediting, typesetting, pagination and proofreading process, which may lead to differences between this version and the <u>Version of Record</u>. Please cite this article as <u>doi: 10.1111/FAF.12429</u>

providing examples from real-world fishery management problems we illustrate how the MH can be applied to a range of species, fisheries and contexts, and explore some of the opportunities and challenges hereto. Finally, we outline next steps for research and implementation. This is important in the context of increasing international regulation of shark fishing and trade, which must lead to reductions in shark mortality, whilst managing trade-offs between conservation objectives and the socio-economic value of fisheries.

**Key words:** adaptive management, conservation, decision-framework, elasmobranchs, fisheries management, socio-ecological systems

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### 9 1. Background

10 Sharks and their relatives (Class Chondrichthyes, herein 'sharks') are one of the world's most

11 threatened species groups (Dulvy et al., 2014). Overfishing in targeted and bycatch fisheries is the

primary cause of shark population declines (Baum et al., 2003; Dulvy et al., 2008). This is driven by international demand for shark-derived commodities, alongside a general expansion of global fisheries with high levels of unmanaged shark catch (Dulvy et al., 2017; Lack & Sant, 2011). Policy complexity, insufficient data, socio-economic concerns and limited political will have maintained a cycle of management inaction for sharks (Barker & Schluessel, 2005; Dulvy et al., 2017; Lack & Sant, 2011). Robust management is urgently required to halt population declines for many species.

18

There are various international frameworks concerned with improving shark management. Forty-19 one threatened and commercially important shark species are listed on the Convention on 20 International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) (UNEP-WCMC, 2019), 21 which provides a framework for regulating international trade in shark-derived products. The Food 22 and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)'s International Plan of Action for the Conservation and 23 Management of sharks (IPOA-SHARKS) sets a framework for countries to develop national and 24 25 regional plans of action for sharks (FAO, 1999), and Regional Fisheries Management Organisations 26 (RFMOs) have also banned retention of several shark species in fisheries. However, for these international policy efforts to drive conservation outcomes for sharks they must translate into 27 significant reductions in shark mortality in fisheries, and eventually population recovery 28 (Bräutigam et al., 2015). This requires comprehensive fisheries management reforms throughout 29 global fisheries. 30

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Fisheries management reforms for sharks need to be adapted to specific country and fishery 32 contexts, so that they are effective at the local level. Yet actions must also be scalable to manage 33 shark mortality at seascape, stock and global levels. This necessitates a framework that can guide a 34 coherent network of coordinated actions across multiple levels. Such a framework needs to 35 36 incorporate the biological and operational complexities of shark fisheries (i.e. many species, mixed 37 fisheries, multiple jurisdictions, compliance and enforcement challenges; Dulvy et al., 2017), and be capable of handling data paucity and uncertainty. In order to support the design of pragmatic 38 policy, management decision-making should also consider socio-economic factors, budgetary 39 constraints, and inevitable trade-offs between conservation objectives and human needs (e.g. food 40 security, livelihoods, income). 41

There is a need to think beyond silver-bullet technical solutions and direct regulation for shark conservation, towards creative approaches for feasible fisheries management, which can improve outcomes for sharks and people (Booth, Squires, & Milner-Gulland, 2019; Dulvy et al., 2017; Shiffman & Hammerschlag, 2016a, 2016b). Sharks can also serve as a flagship species for improved fisheries management across the globe.

47

Acknowledging these challenges and opportunities, this article proposes the mitigation hierarchy 48 (MH) as a framework for holistic, risk-based fisheries management for sharks. The MH is a step-wise 49 precautionary approach to reduce the impact of economic development activities on biodiversity 50 (BBOP, 2012). It has been most commonly been applied to development planning in terrestrial 51 ecosystems, however it has recently been proposed as a framework for least-cost management of 52 marine fisheries and bycatch mitigation (Milner-Gulland et al., 2018; Squires & Garcia, 2018). The 53 MH has also been recommended as a global framework to mitigate all negative impacts of human 54 activity on biodiversity, and implement the goal of No Net Loss (NNL) of biodiversity as part of the 55 Convention on Biological Diversity's Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework (Arlidge et al., 2018; 56 IUCN, 2018). 57

58

We build on efforts to translate the MH to marine fisheries (Milner-Gulland et al., 2018) and delve in 59 to the practical aspects of its application and operationalization for sharks, a challenging species 60 61 group in urgent need of better management. We develop a conceptual model for shark fishing 62 mortality, which decomposes risk in to several constituent elements. We propose a process for using the MH to make transparent, goal-oriented, data-driven management decisions for reducing 63 these risks. To illustrate its utility, we explore how the process could be applied to a range of 64 different species and contexts using examples from real-world fisheries. In doing so, we outline 65 how existing shark management measures correspond to different stages of the MH, and how 66 existing knowledge on the effectiveness of these measures can be synthesised to make informed 67 management decisions. We also explore practical challenges in applying the MH to sharks, and offer 68 workable solutions and priorities for future research. Overall, we demonstrate how the MH can help 69 to reconcile trade-offs between shark conservation goals and the important role of fisheries in 70 national economies and coastal livelihoods 71

72

### 73 2. The mitigation hierarchy for sharks

The mitigation hierarchy (MH) is a risk-based precautionary approach for limiting the negative impacts of human activities on biodiversity (Arlidge et al., 2018). The MH was designed for infrastructure development projects in terrestrial ecosystems with effectively irreversible impacts (e.g., housing developments, roads, plantations). It is increasingly incorporated in to infrastructure planning policy, and is most commonly applied as part of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), which seek to assess the environmental consequences of plans or projects prior to their implementation (Bennett, Gallant, & Ten Kate, 2017).

81

The MH typically proceeds in four sequential steps: (1) avoid, (2) minimise, (3) remediate and (4) compensate. The first step involves avoiding negative impacts on biodiversity from the outset,

such as setting damaging human activities away from biodiversity hotspots or critical habitat. The 84 second step requires that the extent of the negative impacts on biodiversity are minimized whilst 85 the damaging activity occurs. The third step involves remediating negative impacts on biodiversity 86 87 within the footprint of the damaging activity. The final step requires that any residual negative impacts are compensated for, through off-site conservation actions which improve the status of the 88 affected biodiversity elsewhere (Arlidge et al., 2018; CSBI, 2015; Milner-Gulland et al., 2018). If 89 applied successfully, the MH can lead to no net loss (NNL) of biodiversity or even net gain (BBOP, 90 2012; Bull, Suttle, Gordon, Singh, & Milner-Gulland, 2013; Gardner et al., 2013; Milner-Gulland et al., 91 2018; zu Ermgassen et al., 2019). For example, wetland mitigation banks in the United States have 92 shown to successfully achieve no-net-loss of wetland area through protection, restoration or 93 creation of wetlands in compensation for loss caused by development projects (Brown & Lant, 1999; 94 zu Ermgassen et al., 2019). 95

96

97 Recently, the MH has been proposed as a framework for managing marine fisheries and mitigating marine megafauna bycatch (Milner-Gulland et al., 2018; Squires & Garcia, 2018). In traditional 98 fisheries management the MH is not explicitly referred to and EIAs are rarely requested, yet the 99 ethos and process share many similarities (Squires & Garcia, 2018; Squires, Restrepo, Garcia, & 100 Dutton, 2018). Building on these similarities, the MH has already been applied to identify and 101 implement least-cost approaches for sea turtle bycatch mitigation (Squires & Garcia, 2018; Squires 102 et al., 2018). However, there is a need to further empirically demonstrate the utility of the MH for 103 other species and fisheries. 104

105

The MH is yet to be applied to shark management. However, risk assessments of the vulnerability of 106 107 sharks to fisheries are already commonly conducted, such as: Productivity-Susceptibility Analyses 108 (PSAs), Sustainability Assessment for Fishing Effects (SAFE) and Ecological Assessment of the Sustainable Impacts by Fisheries (EASI-Fish) (Griffiths, Kesner-Reyes, Garilao, Duffy, & Román, 2019; 109 Hobday et al., 2007; Zhou & Griffiths, 2008). These methods quantify the relative vulnerability of 110 species to fisheries based on susceptibility and productivity parameters, where susceptibility is 111 based on the risk of a species being captured, and productivity is based on intrinsic life history 112 parameters of the affected species. Derived vulnerability scores quantify the extent to which 113 fisheries exceed the species' biological ability to recover, which are used to prioritise management 114 action and research (Arrizabalaga et al., 2011; Braccini, Gillanders, & Walker, 2006; Cortés et al., 115 2010; Griffiths et al., 2019; Hobday et al., 2007). These assessments can be seen as analogous to EIAs 116 in terrestrial development projects, and the MH an extension of these widely accepted methods to 117 quantify and manage risk. However, the MH also offers several novel advantages. In particular, it 118 provides a framework for defining measurable goals, and structuring existing knowledge about 119

120 potential management measures to achieve those goals (Milner-Gulland et al., 2018). This can

- 121 facilitate transparent science-based management decisions, and highlight data gaps and
- 122 uncertainties which hinder decision-making. Through least-cost implementation, the MH also
- 123 enables socio-economic trade-offs to be explicitly factored in to decisions (Squires & Garcia, 2018).
- 124 The MH also provides room for tailored fishery-specific or location-specific management, which
- 125 can be combined to achieve net goals over a larger area or jurisdiction. This can encourage creative
- 126 thinking about management measures and their implementation, and a shift of focus towards
- 127 proactive creation of net outcomes for biodiversity as opposed to reactive avoidance of losses. The
- setting of measurables targets from the outset can also support monitoring of progress towards
- 129 goals, and adaptive management (Milner-Gulland et al., 2018). In this paper we seek to demonstrate
- 130 these advantages, as well as highlighting some challenges in applying the MH to sharks.
- 131

### 132 2.1. A conceptual model for risk to sharks in fisheries

Applying the MH to sharks requires an appropriate conceptual model for quantifying fishing
mortality and understanding risk. A general model for shark fishing mortality for species X at time
t (F<sub>x,t</sub>) can be defined as shark-relevant fishing effort (E<sub>x,t</sub>) multiplied by shark mortality per unit of
that effort (MPUE<sub>x,t</sub>; Equation 1, Figure 1).

- 137
- 138

$$F_{x,t} = E_{x,t} * MPUE_{x,t}$$
(1)

These components can be further decomposed in to several constituent variables (Figure 1). Sharkrelevant fishing effort  $(E_{X,t})$  is a subset of the overall effort of a fishery (E) that results in volumetric overlap with a population of shark species X within a certain time-period (t). This is a function of the areal overlap of fishing activity with the range of shark species X ( $P_{Ax}$ ) at time t, and the proportion of effort that will lead to an interaction between the gear and the population of species X (i.e. encounterability) ( $P_{Ex}$ ; Equation 2, Figure 1).

145

147

- 146  $E_{x,t} = E_t * P_{Ax,t} * P_{Ex,t}$  (2)
- Once shark-relevant effort is present for species X, the shark mortality per unit of that effort 148  $(MPUE_x)$  depends on the probability of being captured per unit effort  $(CPUE_x)$  and the probability of 149 mortality once captured  $(P_{Mx})$  (Equation 3, Figure 1). Mortality in fisheries occurs when caught 150 sharks are retained, discarded dead, or discarded alive but suffer post-release mortality (Worm et 151 al., 2013). Collateral mortality also occurs when dead sharks drop out of gears, are depredated after 152 153 capture, or escape but die later due to exhaustion or injury. The proportion of sharks suffering mortality can therefore be decomposed in to the proportion arriving dead on the vessel ( $P_{DOAx}$ ), the 154 proportion dying on the vessel  $(P_{DOVx})$ , the proportion dying after release  $(P_{DPRx})$  and the proportion 155

dying collaterally ( $P_{COLx}$ ). Mortality of sharks on the vessel ( $P_{DOVx}$ ) may be intentional (e.g. due to retention or finning) or unintentional (e.g. due to injury or exhaustion).

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- 160 161

 $Post-capture mortality (P_{Mx})$   $MPUE_{x} = CPUE_{x} * (P_{DOAx} + P_{DOVx} + P_{DPRx} + P_{COLx})$ (3)

162 The model can be used flexibly to account for targeted and non-targeted shark fishing, or multiple 163 species and scales. For example, for targeted shark fisheries  $E_{x,t}$  may be equal to  $E_t$ , such that the 164 proportion of fishing effort that overlaps with the range of species X approaches 1.  $E_{x,t}$  could also be 165 used for species-complexes in the same area with similar characteristics, or the equation could be 166 extended to sum across multiple species and gear types.

167

168 It should be noted that these equations do not represent bio-economic models. Rather we intend to 169 illustrate the different risk factors contributing to shark fishing mortality. In reality these factors 170 are unlikely have an additive, linear relationships, and shark mortality will also be subject to 171 random fluctuations in environmental factors and variation in technical efficiency and skipper skill 172 (Kirkley, Squires, & Strand, 1998).

173

The components of equations 1-3 are further influenced by a range of direct and indirect factors, 174 which may be operational, biophysical or socio-economic (Table 1). For example, shark-relevant 175 fishing effort, likelihood of capture and likelihood of mortality directly depend on the operational 176 characteristics of a fishery (e.g. fishing ground and gear specifications) the biophysical 177 characteristics of a species (e.g. size, respiratory physiology, locomotor performance), and dynamic 178 interactions between the two (Hobday et al., 2007) (Table 1). Operational factors are determined by 179 180 active decisions made by fishers and skippers (Figure 2), while biophysical factors are primarily passive (i.e. not actively caused or influenced by fishers). (Table 1). Fisher decisions are in turn 181 driven by indirect factors such as the market and regulatory environment, the perceived legitimacy 182 of regulations, the risk of enforcement, social norms and individual beliefs (Arias, Cinner, Jones, & 183 Pressey, 2015; Barnes, Lynham, Kalberg, & Leung, 2016; Campbell & Cornwell, 2008; Hall et al., 2007) 184 (Figure 2, Table 1). Together, these factors interact and combine to define the overall risk of 185 mortality for a species in a fishery. The primary source of risk will vary for different species and 186 fisheries, while different factors will act at different spatial and temporal scales. A holistic 187 understanding of these different sources of risks, as well as their magnitudes, influenceability, and 188 when and where they can be influenced, will help to identify points of leverage for effective 189 mortality mitigation (Figure 2, Table 1). 190

191

#### 192 2.2 Operationalising the mitigation hierarchy for sharks

A proposed strength of the MH is that it provides a transparent framework for structuring knowledge and monitoring progress towards goals (Milner-Gulland et al., 2018). However, for these benefits to be realised, high-level concepts need to be operationalised in practical terms. Userfriendly processes and definitions are required that allow managers to set goals and measurable targets, make informed decisions, and monitor progress. There is also a need for flexibility in order to handle complexity, data paucity and different management priorities.

199

We expand on the framework by Milner-Gulland et al. (2018) to suggest a process with five key
stages: 1) Define the problem, 2) Explore potential management measures, 3) Assess hypothetical
effectiveness of management measures, 4) Make decisions, 5) Implement, monitor and adapt (Table
2). This process draws on existing approaches for adaptive fisheries management, including
Management Strategy Evaluation (Bunnefeld, Hoshino, & Milner-Gulland, 2011; Fulton, Smith,
Smith, & Johnson, 2014) and feasibility assessments (Boo We incorporate the MH in to the process
as a framework for structuring knowledge and making decisions.

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#### 2.2.1 Defining the problem

#### 2.2.1.1 Preliminary information

Milner-Gulland et al. (2018) start with defining a goal. The goal is the high-level desired change in 210 biodiversity as a result of management. For sharks, the goal will depend on the level of the 211 212 management unit and the species and fishery(s) of concern. As such, preliminary information on the fishery and species of concern will be required to set reasonable goals and targets. Useful 213 preliminary information includes the species' biological characteristics, the fishery's operational 214 characteristics, the socio-economic context, and constraints such as budget for monitoring, 215 enforcement and implementation (Table 2). This information will help to define the overall 216 mortality risk for a given species-fishery combination, as per equations 1-3 and Table 1. Preliminary 217 information can be collected through a range of methods, including a review of available literature, 218 or primary data collection via on-board observers, landings surveys, socio-economic surveys or key 219 informant interviews (Rigby et al., 2019; Yulianto et al., 2018). 220

#### 221

#### 2.2.1.2 Goals

Once background information is clear, a management goal can be set. Goal setting can take place at different scales, from global-, to national-, to fishery-level, or even as a joint goal for RFMOs, shared stocks or the High Seas. The goal can be defined in terms of NNL, net gain, population stability, population recovery, sustainability or simply catch minimization, depending on what is practical given budgetary and operational constraints. For example, a national-level policy goal could be linked to CITES implementation for a species listed on Appendix II, such as silky sharks (*Carchahinus* 

228 falciformis, Carcharhinidae). The overall goal could be population stability, to avoid utilization of silky sharks that is incompatible with their survival. Another country may seek to restore 229 populations of critically endangered species, such as sawfish (*Pristis spp.*, Pristidae), with a goal of 230 net gain or population recovery. Corresponding goals can also be set at finer spatial scales, such as 231 the fishery level. To achieve a national-level goal of silky shark population stability, the goals for all 232 fisheries throughout a national jurisdiction could be no net loss of silky sharks. Alternatively, by 233 thinking in net terms, different goals can be set for different fisheries, acknowledging 234 heterogeneity in fishery impacts, dependence on sharks and adaptive capacity of fishers. For 235 example, vessels taking silky sharks as non-target catch in high-value commercial fisheries could be 236 required to achieve net gain through additional or multiplicative compensatory actions. Small-scale 237 fisheries that are more dependent on silky sharks for income and food security could then be 238 239 permitted to have a net negative impact on the national silky shark stock, provided the gains and losses across all fisheries combine to achieve net population stability at the national level. 240

#### 241 2.2.1.3 Targets

Goals must be operationalised through quantitative targets, for which metrics and baselines can be defined. Expanding on Equation 1, we can develop a general equation for a shark management target where  $\Delta_{\lambda T}$  is the target level of net damage inflicted on the species of concern with respect to a baseline (Equation 4).

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- 247
- $\Delta_{\lambda T} = f(M_{X}) C_{X}$  (4)
- 248 249

The term  $f(M_x)$  is the net damage inflicted by fishing on species X, which is a function of the effort directed at species X and the mortality thus caused.  $C_x$  is the net effect of compensatory conservation efforts to improve the viability of the stock or species elsewhere (Milner-Gulland et al., 2018). Milner-Gulland et al. (2018) propose that targets be defined in terms of net change in population growth rate (the metric) with respect to an agreed baseline. A  $\Delta_{\lambda T}$  of zero implies no change in population growth rate with respect to the baseline. A positive or negative  $\Delta_{\lambda T}$  implies increases or decreases in population growth rate, respectively.

257

To return to the silky shark example, if the overall goal is population stability a suitable quantitative target could be  $\Delta_{\lambda T} \ge 0$ , with a static baseline set at zero population growth rate. At fishery levels, a uniform target of  $\Delta_{\lambda T} \ge 0$  could also be set across all fisheries. Alternatively, to allow for heterogeneity in fisheries and goals as discussed above, commercial vessels that take silky sharks as non-target catch could be required to achieve  $\Delta_{\lambda T} \ge 0$ , while small-scale vessels more dependent on shark catch could be permitted  $\Delta_{\lambda T} < 0$ , with the net result summing to  $\Delta_{\lambda T} \ge 0$ . For

- sawfish recovery, net gain targets ( $\Delta_{\lambda T} > 0$ ) could be set for specific species-fishery combinations, depending on the area of occurrence of different species and the fishery threats.
- 266

In theory, once a desired  $\Delta_{\lambda T}$  is set, equation 4 can be solved to define acceptable levels of  $E_x$  and MPUE<sub>x</sub>, which could in turn inform effort or catch quotas. Further decomposition of  $E_x$  and MPUE<sub>x</sub> in to their constituent elements allows identification of management options to achieve to these

270 targets (See Section 2.1.2).

271

The benefit of adopting targets based on population growth rates is that they focus on the 272 aspirational goal of population health, with a direct relationship between the target and the 273 conservation status of the species. However, such targets require a good understanding of the 274 relationship between population growth rates and mortality. Yet sharks are a data poor group, with 275 limited understanding of population dynamics and fishing mortality for many species (Cashion, 276 Bailly, & Pauly, 2019; Dulvy et al., 2014, 2017). Data paucity is particularly challenging in lower 277 income countries, which represent many of the biggest priorities for management (Momigliano & 278 Harcourt, 2014). As such, targets based on population growth rate may need to be considered the 279 280 'gold standard' for data rich, high capacity situations. Simpler targets can be adopted in data poor, 281 lower capacity situations where population models and stock assessments are lacking. Targets could be based on abundance, catch or catch per unit effort, depending on what data is available 282 (Table 3). To return to the silky shark example, the target could be a total catch quota lower than 283 the level required to yield MSY, based on known biological reference points. For sawfish recovery, 284 the target could be based on abundance estimates. Crucially, the target should be quantitative and 285 measurable. In very data poor situations where this is not possible, an aspirational target could be 286 set while more data are collected to inform a revised target (Table 3). Targets can be adjusted over 287 time as the situation changes. 288

289

Finally, acknowledging trade-offs and societal limits, some targets may need to be set based on regulatory, cultural and economic constraints. For example, 'minimise mortality of species X whilst maintaining the economic viability of the fishery' or 'minimise mortality of species Y whilst maintaining income of vulnerable fishers'. For these targets, the equation for  $\Delta_{\lambda T}$  could be solved by expressing  $E_x$ , MPUE<sub>x</sub> and  $C_x$  as functions of cost, and including budgetary or socio-economic constraints. We discuss this further in Section 2.1.3.

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#### 297 2.2.2 Exploring management measures

298 Once goals and targets are set, management measures need to be identified and assessed. If the

data are adequate, this can be done quantitatively through solving equation 4 and considering the

 $\begin{array}{ll} 300 & \mbox{various determinants of } M_{X} \mbox{ and } C_{X}. \mbox{ However, in most cases, the data may be insufficient for a full} \\ 301 & \mbox{quantitative assessment.} \end{array}$ 

302

Existing measures for shark mortality mitigation can be categorised in to the first three steps in the 303 MH: avoid, minimise and remediate, as outlined in Table 4. These steps also correspond to the 304 different sources of fishing mortality risk outlined in equation 1-4 and Table 1, and the different 305 steps in fisher decision-making (Figure 2). Avoidance strategies are measures to reduce the 306 probability of encounter between potentially harmful gear and a potentially (by)-caught individual, 307 by separating fishing activity from individuals or stocks of concern. This can be considered 308 equivalent to a reduction in  $E_{x,t}$ . Examples of avoidance strategies include, no-fishing zones, depth 309 restrictions or closed seasons (Milner-Gulland et al., 2018, Table 4). To translate avoidance in to a 310 reasonable risk-based definition for sharks, we propose that measures leading to <5% probability of 311 a potentially harmful gear being within 1km of a shark stock of concern (for vessel i, during time t, 312 313 operating in spatial extent j) are considered avoidance. While measures such as marginal 314 reductions in fishing effort within an area of shark availability are minimization. Using this definition, fishing zonation or closures for avoidance could be defined according to overlap 315 between the spatial and temporal extent of the fishery and accepted habitat distribution maps for 316 the species of concern (Table 4). 317

318

Where avoidance is neither feasible nor necessary, minimisation strategies can reduce the 319 probability of sharks being captured, given that shark-relevant effort is present. These measures 320 are equivalent to a reduction in CPUE<sub>x</sub>. Minimisation strategies can reduce capture of species of 321 concern, while allowing for sustainable exploitation of co-occurring species with healthier 322 323 populations. Existing fisheries management measures that qualify as minimisation include 324 reductions in effort or technology and gear specifications to reduce capture of particular species 325 and sizes (Table 4). For example, in gill nets, modifications to net size and tension can minimise of susceptibility of certain species and life history stages to meshing and entanglement (Harry et al., 326 2011; Thorpe & Frierson, 2009). For purse seine vessels fishing on fish aggregation devices (FADs), 327 attractants, deterrents, backdown procedures and FAD design can reduce capture of pelagic sharks 328 (Restrepo et al., 2017) (Table 4). 329

330

Remediation strategies facilitate live release of individuals, their safe return to the sea, and their post-release survival (Table 4). Remediation includes pre- and post-haul measures that reduce the probability of mortality, given a shark is captured in a gear. This includes steps to increase pre-haul escape, and increase survival if brought on deck and subsequently released. Remediation is equivalent to reductions in P<sub>DOA</sub>, P<sub>DOV</sub>, P<sub>DPR</sub> and P<sub>COL</sub>. Examples of pre-haul remediation measures

include use of nylon monofilament leaders in pelagic longlines to allow sharks to bite off and escape 336 before haul back (Ward, Lawrence, Darbyshire, & Hindmarsh, 2008), and the use of exclusion 337 devices to allow escape of large sharks and rays from trawls (Brewer et al., 2006) (Table 4). Once on 338 the vessel, post-capture handling such as reducing time out of the water, cutting the line off quickly 339 and close to the hook, and gentle handling, can facilitate post-release survival (Kaplan, Cox, & 340 Kitchell, 2007) (Table 4). Use of circle hooks instead of J are also promote easy hook removal and 341 reduce severity of injury, and corrodible hooks may minimise long-term damage or injury once 342 sharks are released (Cooke & Suski, 2004). Finning bans or retention bans also apply to this 343 category, since they effectively reduce the probability of sharks dying on-board vessels (Table 4). 344 345

Finally, compensation occurs to offset unavoidable residual damage to the population once all 346 reasonable measures have been taken to avoid, minimise and remediate. Compensation may be 347 particularly important for high vulnerability, low survivability pelagic species, which are caught in 348 349 commercially important fisheries that cannot feasibly be closed. To our knowledge compensation 350 has not been applied in a shark management context, though it is used for sea turtle bycatch mitigation. A bycatch tax is levied on tuna processors via the International Seafood Sustainability 351 Foundation (ISSF), which then funds high-priority sea turtle conservation projects in the Atlantic, 352 Indian, Eastern Pacific, and Western and Central Pacific Oceans, including nesting site protection, 353 by catch and subsistence take reduction in small-scale fisheries, and educational and research 354 (Squires et al., 2018). Interestingly, these compensatory conservation efforts are estimated to have a 355 higher conservation benefit, in terms of turtle population growth rate, per dollar cost than other 356 measures to avoid and minimise capture (Gjertsen, Squires, Dutton, & Eguchi, 2014). A similar 357 mechanism could be adopted for shark mortality mitigation, through bycatch taxes on commercial 358 fisheries which are invested in conservation actions to improve the status of the fishing-affected 359 360 population elsewhere. For example, payments could be instituted to support the protection and management of pupping and nursery grounds, and reduce take in small-scale fisheries, as has been 361 demonstrated for sea turtles (Gjertsen et al., 2014; Squires et al., 2018). Though in order to be true 362 compensation, the increase in survival probability as a result of compensatory conservation must 363 be at least equivalent to the mortality probability of the harmful gear. To address this uncertainty, 364 high offset multipliers could be applied to bycatch taxes, as has proven to be a key success factor 365 for delivering ecological outcomes in terrestrial applications of compensatory mitigation (zu 366 Ermgassen et al., 2019). 367

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#### 369 2.2.3 Assessing effectiveness

Once potential management measures have been explored, the hypothetical effectiveness of
measures in achieving the target can be analysed. This should include an assessment of technical,
biophysical and socio-economic risks (Table 1), and how they can be alleviated.

373 2.2.3.1 Technical effectiveness

As illustrated in Table 4, different management measures have varying degrees of effectiveness

depending on the fishery and species. Assessments of technical effectiveness of can be conducted

by estimating quantities for the magnitude of avoidance (reduction in  $E_x$ ), minimization (reduction

in CPUE<sub>x</sub>), remediation (reduction in MPUE<sub>x</sub>) and compensation (increase in  $C_x$ ) that can be

achieved for a management measure or combination of measures (Figure 3).

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For some species-fisheries combinations, in which habitat, selectivity and survivability studies have 380 381 been conducted, data will be available to inform a quantitative technical assessment. For example: several studies identify specific geographic areas with higher catch rates for certain species (e.g. 382 Oliver et al., 2015; Yulianto et al., 2018). These data could help to identify priority areas for 383 avoidance, and quantify hypothetical reductions in E<sub>x</sub>. Catch and post-haul survival rates have been 384 quantified for several species caught in longlines and gill nets, as well as the impacts of operational 385 variables such as soak time and set depth on these rates (Braccini, Van Rijn, & Frick, 2012; Braccini 386 & Waltrick, 2019; Dapp, Huveneers, Walker, Drew, & Reina, 2016; Gallagher, Orbesen, 387 Hammerschlag, & Serafy, 2014; Gilman et al., 2008). Studies have also quantified the effectiveness of 388 389 different minimization approaches, such as by-catch reduction devices (BRDs) in prawn trawls (Brewer et al., 2006), and circle- hooks and nylon leader lines in longlines (Gilman et al., 2008; Ward 390 391 et al., 2008). These figures could be used to quantify the hypothetical effectiveness of these measures in terms of CPUE<sub>x</sub> and  $P_{Mx}$ . 392

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However, the effectiveness of many existing technical measures is not well quantified. For example, 394 the hypothetical effectiveness of compensation schemes may be particularly difficult to estimate 395 due to a limited understanding of how conservation actions quantitatively influence shark 396 populations, which gives rise to issues related to equivalence, additionality and time lags (Bull et al., 397 2013). Even for measures that are quantified, the observed or tested efficacy may not always be 398 replicated in practice, or may only apply to the conditions in which they were observed or tested 399 (Campbell & Cornwell, 2008). As such, quantitative assessments of the hypothetical impact of 400 401 management measure on a target will be challenging, particularly in small-scale fishery and low capacity contexts. In these situations, it may be necessary to elicit expert opinion or fisher 402 knowledge to explore hypothetical effectiveness. Methods such as the IDEA protocol (Hemming et 403 404 al., 2018), Value of Information Analysis and Bayesian belief networks (Milner-Gulland & Shea, 2017)

- 405 could be adopted as part of this process. During recommendations and implementation,
- 406 precautionary multipliers could be applied to technical measures to account for uncertainty. For
- 407 example, large offset areas relative to impacted areas are key factor in determining successful
- 408 ecological outcomes in terrestrial biodiversity compensation schemes (zu Ermgassen et al., 2019).
- 409 *2.2.3.2 Feasibility*

The conceptual model and management measures we have presented thus far predominantly focus 410 on the technical factors that influence risk of shark mortality. However, given the socio-economic 411 complexities of shark fisheries, shark management is much more than a biological and technical 412 issue: it is a human issue (Booth et al., 2019). Risk of post-capture mortality (P<sub>DOV</sub> and P<sub>DPR</sub>) and 413 choices about fishing locations and gear deployment will depend on the behaviour and decision-414 making of fishers and skippers (Figure 2). As such, management decisions need to consider the 415 fishery context and constraints, in order to avoid unintended consequences (Baum et al., 2003; 416 Jenkins, 2006; Sarmiento, 2006), unacceptable costs (Campbell & Cornwell, 2008; Gilman et al., 2007; 417 Jaiteh, Loneragan, & Warren, 2017) and implementation failure (Fulton, Smith, Smith, & Van 418 Putten, 2011). Accordingly, potential measures at different steps in the MH need to be assessed in 419 420 terms of their likely effect on people. Building on previous work on conservation opportunity, conservation likelihood and cost-effective conservation (e.g. Ban, Hansen, Jones, & Vincent, 2009; 421 Dickman, Hinks, Macdonald, Burnham, & Macdonald, 2015; Gjertsen et al., 2014; Knight, Cowling, 422 Difford, & Campbell, 2010) we define these considerations as feasibility (Booth et al., 2019). 423 Explicitly considering feasibility can highlight opportunities and barriers to implementation, as 424 well as identify where novel instruments such as financial incentives and intrinsic motivations may 425 be used to overcome implementation gaps (Booth et al., 2019; Gjertsen et al., 2014; Selinske et al., 426 2017; Ward-Paige & Worm, 2017). 427

428

Our proposed approach to feasibility assessments draws on principles from least-cost conservation, 429 430 which seeks to achieve desired conservation goals at lowest total cost to society (Gjertsen et al., 2014; Squires & Garcia, 2018; Squires et al., 2018). In this approach, the marginal costs of mitigation 431 measures (MC) are traded-off against the marginal benefits of biodiversity gains (MB). In principle, 432 the economically optimal level of conservation occurs when the MC of each additional unit of 433 mitigation reduction is equal to the MB of biodiversity gains (Figure 4). Though in practice, the 434 benefits of management measures will be based on physical conservation outcomes as opposed to 435 their economic value. For example, if population models are available MB could be measured in 436 terms of estimated increases in shark population growth rates as a result of mitigation measures, as 437 had been used in cost-effectiveness assessments for sea turtles (Gjertsen et al., 2014). Alternatively, 438 estimated reductions in shark mortality as a result of mitigation, such as estimated change in total 439 catch, catch per unit effort or bycatch ratios, could also be used as a measure of the conservation. 440

benefit. Summing and comparing ratios of MBs to MCs for different management measures can 441 help to identify which measures (and combinations of measures) are most cost-effective. The least-442 cost approach is powerful, as it acknowledges that most real-world conservation projects take place 443 within socio-economic constraints, and explicitly incorporates trade-offs in to the management 444 decision-making process (Figure 4). In the case of shark fisheries, feasibility can encompass the 445 direct economic costs of implementing a management measure for fishers (e.g. purchasing new 446 gear) and managers (e.g. monitoring, enforcement, compliance management), the opportunity 447 costs of profits foregone (e.g. from lost marketable catch), and the indirect and social costs (e.g. 448 intangible impacts on culture, social networks, livelihood and food security, and well-being). As 449 such, the MC curves illustrated in Figure 4 represent this holistic definition of cost (i.e. feasibility). 450

451

As with the technical assessment, quantifying feasibility poses a number of challenges in terms of 452 453 data availability and uncertainty. We propose a potential approach for assessing and quantifying 454 feasibility in shark fisheries in Booth et al. (2019), which could be applied here. This component of 455 the assessment would need to be informed by social research methods, such as socioeconomic surveys, focus group discussions and predictive conservation approaches (Travers et al., 2019). 456 As with goal and target setting, the methods used for assessing feasibility can be adapted to suit 457 different levels of data availability, capacity and budget. For example, costs could be defined 458 quantitatively in economic terms, based on statistically-robust surveys of household income from 459 shark fishing and market prices of shark products, or more qualitatively, based on fisher 460 perceptions of the likely impacts of management measures on their lives (e.g. using scenario 461 interviews or Likert scale questionnaires). 462

463

Feasibility assessments could be operationalised through a least-cost approach by considering catch 464 465 reduction per unit cost (Gjertsen et al., 2014; Squires & Garcia, 2018) or per unit feasibility (Booth et al., 2019). The equation for  $\Delta \lambda_{T}$  could be solved quantitatively by expressing E<sub>x</sub>, MPUE<sub>x</sub> and C<sub>x</sub> as 466 functions of cost. For example, if the direct and opportunity costs of management measures can be 467 468 estimated, in terms of income foregone due to reduced catches, then cost curves could be constructed for each unit of conservation benefit (i.e. mortality reduction (Figure 4)). This would 469 also allow for the cost-effectiveness of different management measures to be compared, as 470 conducted for the Pacific Leatherback Turtle (Gjertsen et al., 2014). However, caution should be 471 472 exercised with quantitative feasibility assessments. The methods used by Gjertsen et al. (2014) consider the overall economic costs to the fishing industry, yet there may be many intangible costs 473 of shark conservation to small-scale fisher communities, which can be highly heterogenous across 474 space, time and demographic groups. A holistic approach to social costs and benefits, which 475 captures the multiple facets of human well-being (Woodhouse et al., 2015) beyond income foregone 476

- 477 may be required to ensure that people are no worse off (Booth et al., 2019; Bull, Baker, Griffiths,
- 478 Jones, & Milner-Gulland, 2018). In principle, these holistic social costs could be calculated using
- 479 social prices, which are commonly applied in social cost-benefit analyses for development project
- 480 appraisals, and are calculated on a case-by-case basis to account for economic efficiency as well as
- 481 equity and distributional concerns (Drèze & Stern, 1990; Little & Mirrlees, 1990; Squires &
- Vestergaard, 2015). More work is required to apply social prices to a fisheries management context,
- 483 yet they have been applied to design equitable benefit sharing for deep sea mining, with potential
- lessons for fisheries management, particularly in high seas fisheries (Lodge, Segerson, & Squires,
- 485 2017).
- 486

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### 2.2.3.3 Determining thresholds

Combining these two types of analyses would help to explicitly acknowledge trade-offs between 488 shark conservation goals and socio-economic fisheries objectives, and thus define thresholds for 489 feasible mortality reduction. These thresholds are illustrated by the yellow arrows and lines in 490 Figures 3 and 4. Thresholds will be determined by what is technically possible, based on the biology 491 492 of the species, the operational characteristics of the fishery and available technical measures; and what is feasible, given the socio-economic context and key constraints. Determining thresholds and 493 constraints can identify which management measures are likely to be most impactful and cost 494 effective. In some cases, management measures which are technically possible may be unacceptably 495 costly or unfeasible. These cases may require hard choices or adjusted expectations regarding goals 496 and targets. However, through making socio-economic costs explicit in the planning phase, the MH 497 can help to identify potential causes of implementation failure, and facilitate creative thinking 498 about policies and instruments that could alleviate socio-economic constraints (e.g. training, 499 building institutions or establishing performance-based incentives) (Figure 4). 500

501

#### 502 2.2.4 Making decisions

Finally, all information and options need to be drawn together to make management decisions. 503 Acknowledging the inherent complexity and data paucity of shark management, we propose a 504 simple, low-tech approach for using the MH to make robust management decisions (Table 5). The 505 approach uses an integrated framework based on informed judgement. A simple high-to-low or 506 traffic light categorization system enables semi-quantitative assessments of effectiveness and 507 feasibility, which can be used flexibly to handle multiple types of information and uncertainty. A 508 semi-quantitative assessment is deemed appropriate here, as such approaches are already widely 509 applied to risk and stock assessments for sharks and other fish species (e.g. Braccini et al., 2006; 510 Cortés et al., 2008; Cortés et al., 2010; Arrizabalaga et al., 2011), and in other biological risk 511 assessments (e.g. the IUCN Red List Assessment (Mace et al., 2008); the World Organisation for 512

- 513 Animal Health risk assessment (Beauvais, Zuther, Villeneuve, Kock, & Guitian, 2018)). The
- framework can be used in conjunction with robust stock assessments and quantitative population
- 515 models under different management scenarios, or informed by expert elicitation and stakeholder
- 516 consultation where data is lacking. Populating the framework with available data can also help to
- 517 highlight key uncertainties and data gaps to inform management-relevant research priorities.
- 518

The utility of the framework is illustrated in Table 5. We offer worked examples from four real-519 world fishery problems: a commercial purse seine tuna fishery taking pelagic sharks as by-catch in 520 Western and Central Pacific Oceans, a small-scale coastal gillnet fishery taking wedgefish (Rhinidae 521 spp.) as valuable secondary catch in Aceh, Indonesia, a small-scale longline fishery taking pelagic 522 523 sharks as target catch in Lombok, Indonesia and commercial shrimp trawls taking sawfish as bycatch in the Gulf of Mexico, USA. This diversity of examples show how the MH can be used for a 524 range of species and fisheries, in complex socio-economic contexts, and with varying degrees of 525 data availability. For each fishery problem, management options at different levels of the MH are 526 527 listed sequentially, and assessed in terms of their technical effectiveness and feasibility, based on existing knowledge. For some species-gear combinations the technical effectiveness of different 528 measures can be quantified. For example, for silky sharks caught in tuna purse seines, studies have 529 shown that avoiding purse seine setting on schools of tuna less than 10 tons can reduce amount of 530 silky shark catch by 21%-41%, that at least 21% of silky shark by catch can be fished out of purse 531 seine nets and released, and that post-release survival of silky sharks in can increase by 20% with 532 good handling (Restrepo et al., 2017). This can be used to quantify or categorise to what degree a 533 given measure could contribute towards achieving the target (Table 5). In addition, the sequential 534 impact of these measures can be summed to estimate an overall technically achievable level of 535 536 mortality reduction, and how this would contribute towards achieving the management goal. 537 Where information is limited, it may be possible to make informed judgements based on studies for similar species. For example, while we are not aware of any studies on the effectiveness of by-catch 538 reduction devices for sawfish in trawls, Brewer et al. (2006) showed that turtle exclusion devices 539 (TEDs) can be effective at reducing catch rate of large sharks and rays, which could be used as a 540 reasonable proxy of effectiveness sawfish. If appropriate proxies are uncertain or unavailable 541 research priorities can be highlighted (Table 5). 542

543

544 Socio-economic context and practical constraints are explicitly considered through feasibility. This 545 can highlight areas where there are mis-matches between what is technically possible and socio-546 economically feasible. It can also highlight opportunities where incentives or new institutions 547 could be used, such as bycatch taxes in commercial fisheries or payments for ecosystem services in 548 small-scale fisheries (e.g. Gjertsen et al., 2014; Selinske et al., 2017), to address these mis-matches.

For example, rhinidae species exhibit fairly high post-capture survival rates (Ellis, McCully Phillips, 549 & Poisson, 2017; Fennessy, 1994). This suggests that remediation through post-capture release is 550 technically achievable for wedgefish captured in gillnets. However, in small-scale gillnet fisheries in 551 Indonesia, wedgefish represent high value secondary catch, and play an important role in income 552 and food security. As such, release protocols represent an unacceptable cost to fishers (Table 5). In 553 this case incentives such as payments for ecosystem services and collaborative research could 554 better align conservation objectives with fishers' socio-economic needs. Feasibility can also help to 555 highlight management measures that should not be pursued, since they are ineffective or non-556 implementable. For example, captured hammerhead sharks (Sphyrna spp., Sphyrnidae) exhibit high 557 at-vessel mortality and low post-release survival rates. In addition, in many fisheries, particularly 558 559 those targeting sharks, there are strong socio-economic incentives to retain them on board due to their high value. As such, post-capture remediation strategies for hammerhead sharks are unlikely 560 to yield meaningful impacts on fishing mortality. Management efforts should instead focus on 561 562 avoiding and minimising capture as far as possible (Table 5). For targeted shark fisheries this may 563 require measures which shift fishing effort away from hammerhead aggregation sites while allowing for sustainable increases in exploitation of less threatened species such as milk sharks 564 (Rhizoprionodon acutus, Carcharhinidae) and blue sharks (Prionace glauca, Carcharhinidae). 565

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These various pieces of information can then be drawn together to make an overall assessment and
management recommendation, which can include technical measures, policy design and research
needs (Table 5).

570 571

#### 2.2.5 Implement, monitor and adapt

Once a management decision has been made, measures need to be implemented. This will likely 572 entail a combination of technical measures, with appropriate policies and instruments to facilitate 573 574 uptake. Alongside this, research and monitoring can fill data gaps and assess progress towards 575 goals. Monitoring will enable continuous updating of models and assessments to verify assumptions and uncertainties and respond to dynamic changes in the socio-ecological system. This can inform 576 changes in management strategies based on updated information (i.e. adaptive management) and 577 progress towards more aspirational and quantifiable targets over time. On-going stakeholder 578 engagement will be crucial throughout to understand the socio-economic impacts of management 579 actions. This can help to ensure people are no worse off as a result of management, and drive 580 change and commitment towards bolder actions (Bull et al., 2018; Hall et al., 2007). In more 581 intractable cases, where trade-offs between social and ecological objectives are acute, the MH 582 583 approach can support incremental change, with goals becoming more ambitious over time. 584

#### 585 3 Conclusions

Many shark species and populations are threatened by overfishing (Dulvy et al., 2008, 2014). 586 Precautionary approaches for mitigating shark fishing mortality are required throughout global 587 fisheries. Yet robust science-based management is hindered by the inherent complexity, 588 uncertainty and data paucity of shark fisheries (Dulvy et al., 2017). A key source of complexity and 589 uncertainty in fisheries management stems from humans (Fulton et al., 2011). There is a need to 590 think more explicitly about the human dimensions of shark fisheries, and the trade-offs between 591 conservation objectives and socio-economic objectives, during management decision-making 592 (Booth et al., 2019) 593

594

We have presented a novel process and framework for holistic risk-based shark management which 595 can help to address this gap. It builds on efforts by Milner-Gulland et al. (2018) and Squires and 596 Garcia (2018) to apply the MH to marine fisheries management and by-catch mitigation, as well as 597 previous work by Hall (Hall, 1996; Hall, Alverson, & Metuzals, 2000) and BBOP (2012). The 598 framework draws from existing concepts of risk-based management for sharks (Arrizabalaga et al., 599 2011; Cortés et al., 2010; Griffiths et al., 2019; Zhou & Griffiths, 2008) and extinction risk assessments 600 (Dulvy et al., 2014), but offers several novel advantages. In particular, the MH encourages thinking 601 602 in net terms, and summation of different actions across multiple sites and scales to meet higherlevel aspirational goals. This can facilitate a move away from one-size-fits all policies for shark 603 conservation, towards context-specific fisheries management. The MH also provides a structured 604 framework to bring together a range of potential management measures. The process we propose 605 enables evaluation of each potential measure, in the context of the whole suite of measures, in 606 terms of their likely combined effectiveness in achieving a management goal. The framework can 607 highlight which measures could have the greatest conservation impact (e.g. Milner-Gulland et al., 608 2018; Shiode, Hu, Shiga, Yokota, & Tokai, 2005) and the lowest cost (e.g. Gjertsen et al., 2014), thus 609 facilitating practical science-based decision making. With quantitative targets and metrics, the 610 actual effectiveness of management actions can then be monitored to enable adaptive 611 management. The framework is also flexible and user-friendly. It can handle multiple types of 612 information, and can be adapted to different levels of data availability and capacity. Further, by 613 explicitly acknowledging uncertainty, the framework can highlight data gaps and research 614 priorities. Finally, by integrating socio-economic feasibility, the framework explicitly considers 615 trade-offs and constraints. This can facilitate creative thinking about least-cost shark conservation, 616 and identify novel instruments to improve implementation. As for any fisheries management issue, 617 poor regulation, limited capacity for monitoring and enforcement, and limited compliance could 618 619 hamper implementation. Yet we hope that taking constraints in to account during management planning can better align shark conservation objectives with the socio-economic needs and 620

621 constraints of fishers, and minimise implementation failure (Fulton et al., 2011; Hall et al., 2007;

622 Squires & Garcia, 2018).

623

624 Moving forwards, it will be important to provide a proof of concept for this framework by

625 empirically demonstrating its utility in real-world fisheries, particularly in data-poor situations.

626 This will require an inter-disciplinary approach, which incorporates fisheries science with social

627 science, and considers shark fisheries as integrated socio-ecological systems (Ostrom, 2009). As well

628 as filling data gaps on fundamental biological and fisheries factors to answer management

629 questions, there is a need to better understand the broader socio-economic factors that drive shark

630 fishing behaviour and fisher decisions. This holistic understanding will be crucial for designing

631 management measures that are tailored to context and create better outcomes for sharks and

632

people.

633

# 4 Acknowledgements

This work was supported by an Oxford NaturalMotion Graduate Scholarship from the University of Oxford to H.B., and the Pew Charitable Trusts through a Pew Marine Fellowship to E.J.M-G.

# 5 Data Availability Statement

No data have been made available for this manuscript, since no data have been used or analysed in its preparation.

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# 7 Tables

Table 1. Direct and indirect factors affecting shark mortality at the point of catch

Equation	1 components		Factors affecting components of fishing mortality							
				Op	perational (direct, active)	Bi	ophysical (passive)	Socio-economic (indirect)		
Shark-	Areal overlap of f	ishing activity v	vith shark	-	Target species	-	Geographic range			
relevant	population ( $P_{Ax,t}$ ).			-	Fishing location	-	Season			
fishing e	effort					-	Climate			
for speci	ies X Encounterability.	Proportion of e	ffort that will	-	Set depth	-	Maximum depth and	Availability and value of		
(Ex,,t)	lead to an interac	-		-	Gear type and specifications		depth range	marketable non-shark		
	population ( $P_{Ex,t}$ ).	Ũ		-	Soak time	- Habitat-type	Habitat-type	catch		
						-	Habitat use (e.g. site	- Economic value and		
	(V)						fidelity, schooling)	importance of sharks		
Mortality	<b>y Per</b> Number of sharks	s captured by ge	ar per unit of	-	Gear type and specifications	-	Size	for income or		
Unit Effo	ort shark-relevant eff	fort (CPUEx)		-	Soak time	-	Morphology	subsistence		
(MPUEx)				-	Mesh size	-	Locomotor	- Regulations, perceived		
			iving dead on		Hook size		performance	legitimacy and fairness		
	Proportion of	Proportion arr			Soak time	-	Morphology	of regulations, risk of		
	sharks that die	vessel (P <sub>DOAx</sub> )		-	Target species	-	Locomotor	enforcement		
	due to capture				Gear type, and specifications		performance	- Economic costs		
1	(P <sub>Mx</sub> )	Dreamantian	Unintentionally	-	Set depth	-	Respiratory and	- Incentives for		
		Proportion		-	Post-capture handling		metabolic physiology	compliance		
	$\triangleleft$	dying on vessel (P <sub>DOVx</sub> )	Intentionally (due to retention or finning)					_		

			D ( 1 11)		
	Proportion dying after release	-	Post-capture handling	-	Locomotor
	(P <sub>DPRx</sub> )	-	Gear type and specifications		performance
		-	Hook type	-	Respiratory and
0					metabolic physiology
	Proportion dying collaterally	-	Gear type and specifications	-	Size
	(P <sub>DOLx</sub> )	-	Soak time	-	Locomotor
$\mathbf{O}$					performance
ČO				-	Predators
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Sta	ge in the assessment	Key questions/considerations
1.	Define the problem	
	1.1. Understand the fishery	Fishery footprint, market-type, target species, targeting of sharks
	1.2. Define the species of management concern	Single species, taxonomic group or species complex
	1.3. Assess the risks	
	1.3.1. Biological (species)	Size, fecundity, biological reference points, extinction risk
	1.3.2. Technical (fishery)	Encounterability, catchability and survivability of species in fishery
	1.3.3. Socio-economic (context)	Uses and values of sharks, target markets
	1.3.4. Constraints (context)	Budget for monitoring, enforcement and implementation. Societal limits on acceptable damage to species or costs to people.
	1.4. Set goals and quantitative targets	
	1.4.1. Goal 1.4.2. Target	Desired change in biodiversity (e.g. no net loss, net gain, population recovery, mortality minimization, population stability, fishery sustainability). Quantitative target which operationalises the goal
	1.4.3. Metric 1.4.4. Baseline	Units to measure gains and losses in biodiversity to evaluate progress (e.g. population growth, total mortality, number of animals). Reference point against which progress is assessed.
	1.4.5. Counterfactual	Projected change in metric in business-as-usual scenario.
2.	Explore management measures	Which management options are available for achieving the target at each step? What data are available for estimating their impact on the target? What are the uncertainties? Options for avoiding encounters (i.e. reducing $E_x$ )
	2.2. Minimise	Options for minimising capture, given $E_x$ is present (i.e. reducing CPUE <sub>x</sub> )
	2.3. Remediate	Options for minimisng mortality, given sharks are captured (i.e. reducing MPUE <sub>x</sub> )
	2.4. Compensate	Options to compensate for residual mortality (i.e. increasing $C_{X})$

Table 2. A multi-stage process for using the mitigation hierarchy to make science-based management decisions for sharks at the fishery level

- 3. Assess hypothetical effectiveness of management measures
  - 3.1. Technical assessment
  - 3.2. Feasibility assessment



- 4. Make a management decision
- 5. Implement, monitor and adapt

Author Manus

To what degree could management measures reduce risks to the species, based on biophysical and operational factors?

To what degree could management measures be feasibly implemented, given costs, benefits, social context and resources for implementation? Is there scope for incentives to address gaps?

Which mix of measures and instruments are likely to have the greatest impact?

Implement measures and encourage uptake. Monitor progress towards target. Adapt management.

Key:  $F_{MSY}$  = fishing mortality that achieves maximum sustainable yield (MSY).  $F_{40\%}$  = fishing mortality at 40% MSY.

Example Fishery	Species of	Data availability	Goal	Target	Methods	Key references
-	management concern					references
Commercial mixed gear	Spiny dogfish	Very good –	Fishery	Total fishing mortality	Define based on stocks and	Simpfendorfer
fishery for spiny dogfish	(Squalus	population models,	sustainability	≤ F <sub>MSY</sub>	modelled projections of stocks	& Dulvy, 2017;
n Northwest Atlantic,	acanthias)	life-history and			under different fishing	Sosebee &
USA		total fishing			mortality rates. Monitor based	Rago, 2017
		mortality			on catch and mortality data.	
Commercial shrimp	Smalltooth	Good – abundance	Net gain	Abundance increases	Define and monitor based on	NOAA
rawls taking sawfish as	sawfish	estimates		at 2% per year relative	estimated abundance from	Fisheries,
oycatch in Gulf of	(Pristis			to baseline until 10%	shark tagging studies.	2019b
Mexico, USA	pectinata)			increase achieved.		
Commercial tuna purse	Silky sharks	Moderate – catch	Net gain	Total fishing mortality	Defined based on	Restrepo et
eine taking pelagic	(Carcharhinus	and catch per unit		< F <sub>40%</sub>	precautionary biological	al., 2017
harks as by-catch in	(curcharninus)	effort time series			reference points, monitor	
Western and Central	jaicijormisj				based on catch.	
Pacific Oceans						
Small-scale longlines	Scallonad	Moderate – catch	Population	$Catch \le F_{40\%}$	Defined based on	Yulianto et al.,
aking mixed pelagic	Scalloped hammerheads	and catch per unit	stability		precautionary biological	2018
sharks in Lombok,	(Sphyrna lewini)	effort time series			reference points, monitor	
ndonesia	(Spriyi nu tewini)				based on catch.	
Small-scale coastal gill	Wedgefish	Poor – patchy catch	Catch	Total wedgefish catch	Define and monitor based on	M. Ichsan pers

nets taking wedgefish as	(Rhynchobatus	data	minimization	and bycatch ratio	catch data and fisher	comm
secondary catch in	spp.)		while	decline by 30%, while	interviews.	
Aceh, Indonesia			maintaining	maintaining total		
			household	value of catch.		
			income of fishers			
		Very poor – no	Catch	Shark catch declines	Define based on fisher	Glaus et al.,
Artisanal multi-gear		catch data	minimization	by 10% each year,	interviews, monitor and refine	2018
fishers taking reef-	Reef sharks		while	while maintaining	based on catch data.	
associated species in Fiji			maintaining food	total catch weight.		
			security			
<b>management/policy for s</b> effort of species X, P <sub>DOA</sub> = pr	<b>harks, where appli</b> oportion of sharks de	<b>cable.</b> Key: LL = Longlin ead on arrival, P <sub>DOV</sub> = pro	nes; GN = gill nets, PS = pu oportion of sharks dying o	rse seine, TR = trawl. Ex = sho on vessel, P <sub>DPR</sub> proportion of s	<b>and examples of their use in existin</b> ark-relevant fishing effort for species X sharks dying after release, P <sub>COL</sub> proport	K, CPUEx = catch per unit
<b>management/policy for s</b> effort of species X, P <sub>DOA</sub> = pr collaterally, C <sub>X</sub> = the positiv	<b>harks, where appli</b> oportion of sharks de re impact of compens	<b>cable.</b> Key: LL = Longlin ead on arrival, P <sub>DOV</sub> = pro satory conservation med	nes; GN = gill nets, PS = pu oportion of sharks dying o asures for species X_FMP	rse seine, TR = trawl. Ex = sho on vessel, P <sub>DPR</sub> proportion of s = Fisheries Management Plan	ark-relevant fishing effort for species X sharks dying after release, P <sub>COL</sub> proport 1. FAD = Fish Aggregation Device.)	K, CPUEx = catch per unit
management/policy for s effort of species X, P <sub>DOA</sub> = pr collaterally, C <sub>X</sub> = the positiv perational fishery	harks, where appli oportion of sharks de re impact of compens Example effects	<b>cable.</b> Key: LL = Longlin ead on arrival, P <sub>DOV</sub> = pro satory conservation med <b>on sharks</b>	nes; GN = gill nets, PS = pu oportion of sharks dying o asures for species X_FMP	rse seine, TR = trawl. Ex = sho on vessel, P <sub>DPR</sub> proportion of s = Fisheries Management Plan <b>Examples of use in exist</b>	ark-relevant fishing effort for species X sharks dying after release, P <sub>COL</sub> proport	K, CPUEx = catch per unit
<b>management/policy for s</b> effort of species X, P <sub>DOA</sub> = pr collaterally, C <sub>X</sub> = the positiv	<b>harks, where appli</b> oportion of sharks de re impact of compens	<b>cable.</b> Key: LL = Longlin ead on arrival, P <sub>DOV</sub> = pro satory conservation med <b>on sharks</b>	nes; GN = gill nets, PS = pu oportion of sharks dying o asures for species X_FMP	rse seine, TR = trawl. Ex = sho on vessel, P <sub>DPR</sub> proportion of s = Fisheries Management Plan	ark-relevant fishing effort for species X sharks dying after release, P <sub>COL</sub> proport 1. FAD = Fish Aggregation Device.)	K, CPUEx = catch per unit
management/policy for s effort of species X, P <sub>DOA</sub> = pr collaterally, C <sub>X</sub> = the positiv perational fishery ariables	harks, where appli oportion of sharks de re impact of compens Example effects (Applicable gears	<b>cable.</b> Key: LL = Longlin ead on arrival, P <sub>DOV</sub> = pro satory conservation med <b>on sharks</b>	nes; GN = gill nets, PS = pu oportion of sharks dying o asures for species X . FMP	rse seine, TR = trawl. Ex = sho on vessel, P <sub>DPR</sub> proportion of s = Fisheries Management Plan <b>Examples of use in exist</b> <b>plans and policy</b>	ark-relevant fishing effort for species X sharks dying after release, P <sub>COL</sub> proport 1. FAD = Fish Aggregation Device.) <b>ing fisheries management</b>	K, CPUEx = catch per unit tion of sharks dying <b>Key references</b>
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management/policy for s effort of species X, P <sub>DOA</sub> = pr collaterally, C <sub>X</sub> = the positiv perational fishery ariables <u>voidance:</u> Avoid enco	harks, where appli oportion of sharks de re impact of compens Example effects (Applicable gears ounters of shark ially harmful ge	<b>cable.</b> Key: LL = Longlin ead on arrival, P <sub>DOV</sub> = pro- satory conservation med <b>on sharks</b> ;) <b>xs with fishing gea</b>	nes; GN = gill nets, PS = pu oportion of sharks dying of asures for species X. FMP <b>ar, given sharks are</b> <b>1km of a shark of m</b>	rse seine, TR = trawl. Ex = sho on vessel, P <sub>DPR</sub> proportion of s = Fisheries Management Plan Examples of use in exist plans and policy present. Equivalent to anagement concern)	ark-relevant fishing effort for species X sharks dying after release, P <sub>COL</sub> proport 1. FAD = Fish Aggregation Device.) <b>ing fisheries management</b>	K, CPUEx = catch per unit tion of sharks dying <b>Key references</b>
management/policy for s effort of species X, P <sub>DOA</sub> = pr collaterally, C <sub>X</sub> = the positiv perational fishery ariables <u>voidance:</u> Avoid enco robability of a potent	harks, where appli oportion of sharks de re impact of compens Example effects (Applicable gears ounters of shark ially harmful ge Spatial trends in	cable. Key: LL = Longlin ead on arrival, P <sub>DOV</sub> = pro satory conservation med on sharks s) ks with fishing gea ear being within <1	nes; GN = gill nets, PS = pu oportion of sharks dying of asures for species X. FMP <b>ar, given sharks are</b> <b>1km of a shark of m</b> habitat	rse seine, TR = trawl. Ex = sho on vessel, P <sub>DPR</sub> proportion of s = Fisheries Management Plan <b>Examples of use in exist</b> plans and policy <b>present. Equivalent to</b> <b>anagement concern)</b> No-take MPAs (e.g. Raja A	ark-relevant fishing effort for species X sharks dying after release, P <sub>COL</sub> proport n. FAD = Fish Aggregation Device.) <b>ing fisheries management</b>	K, CPUEx = catch per unit ion of sharks dying Key references fined as <5%

	behaviour (LL, GN, PS, TR).	management (e.g. time-area closures to protect gummy	Johnson, & Young, 2005;
		sharks migrating to pupping grounds in Australia).	Jaiteh et al., 2016; Oliver,
Depth of fishing activity Time of year or season of fishing activity	Depth trends in catch rates related to habitat preferences and movement patterns (LL, GN, PS, TR). Seasonal time/area closures avoid seasonally migrating or aggregating species (LL, GN, PS, TR).	- Direct regulation of fishing seasons (e.g. Canada's Atlantic Fisheries Regulation establishes closed seasons for commercial and recreational shark fishing), time-area closures once catch limits have been met (e.g. shark FMPs for Gulf of Alaska and NW Atlantic & Gulf of Mexico in USA).	<ul> <li>Braccini, Newman, &amp;</li> <li>Harvey, 2015; Poisson,</li> <li>Gaertner, Taquet, Durbec,</li> <li>&amp; Bigelow, 2010;</li> <li>Sepulveda &amp; Aalbers,</li> <li>2018; Shiffman &amp;</li> <li>Hammerschlag, 2016b;</li> <li>Sybersma, 2015; Ward-</li> <li>Paige &amp; Worm, 2017;</li> <li>Yulianto et al., 2018</li> </ul>
Minimisation: Minimi	se capture of individuals in fishing gear, given sharl	r-relevant effort is present. Equivalent to a reduction	
	Different total catch and bycatch ratios for different gears	Direct regulation of permitted gear (e.g. coastal GN ban in	Afonso, Santiago, Hazin,
	Different total catch and bycatch ratios for different gears	Direct regulation of permitted gear (e.g. coastal GN ban in California in 1994 led to increases in soupfin shark ( <i>Galeus</i>	Afonso, Santiago, Hazin, & Hazin, 2012; BMIS,
Gear type	Different total catch and bycatch ratios for different gears	Direct regulation of permitted gear (e.g. coastal GN ban in California in 1994 led to increases in soupfin shark ( <i>Galeus</i> <i>galeus</i> ) and leopard shark ( <i>Triakis semifasciata</i> ) numbers; ban on GN in Florida to minimize capture of smalltooth	Afonso, Santiago, Hazin, & Hazin, 2012; BMIS, 2015; Brill et al., 2009; Gilman et al., 2008; Gray, Johnson, Broadhurst, &
Gear type	Different total catch and bycatch ratios for different gears (LL, GN, PS, TR).	Direct regulation of permitted gear (e.g. coastal GN ban in California in 1994 led to increases in soupfin shark ( <i>Galeus</i> <i>galeus</i> ) and leopard shark ( <i>Triakis semifasciata</i> ) numbers; ban on GN in Florida to minimize capture of smalltooth	Afonso, Santiago, Hazin, & Hazin, 2012; BMIS, 2015; Brill et al., 2009; Gilman et al., 2008; Gray, Johnson, Broadhurst, &
Gear type Gear deployment depth	Different total catch and bycatch ratios for different gears (LL, GN, PS, TR). Species-specific effects of fishing depth on catch rate (LL,	Direct regulation of permitted gear (e.g. coastal GN ban in California in 1994 led to increases in soupfin shark ( <i>Galeus</i> <i>galeus</i> ) and leopard shark ( <i>Triakis semifasciata</i> ) numbers; ban on GN in Florida to minimize capture of smalltooth	Afonso, Santiago, Hazin, & Hazin, 2012; BMIS, 2015; Brill et al., 2009; Gilman et al., 2008; Gray, Johnson, Broadhurst, & Young, 2005; Harry et al., 2011; NOAA Fisheries,
Gear type Gear deployment depth Gear deployment time Bait	Different total catch and bycatch ratios for different gears (LL, GN, PS, TR). Species-specific effects of fishing depth on catch rate (LL, GN, PS, TR).	Direct regulation of permitted gear (e.g. coastal GN ban in California in 1994 led to increases in soupfin shark ( <i>Galeus</i> <i>galeus</i> ) and leopard shark ( <i>Triakis semifasciata</i> ) numbers; ban on GN in Florida to minimize capture of smalltooth	Afonso, Santiago, Hazin, & Hazin, 2012; BMIS, 2015; Brill et al., 2009; Gilman et al., 2008; Gray, Johnson, Broadhurst, & Young, 2005; Harry et al., 2011; NOAA Fisheries, - 2019a; Ramírez-Amaro &

Attractants/deterrents	Species-specific effects of chemical cues, light cues and	-	Wakefield et al., 2016;
	magnetic or electropositive metals on gear interactions		Ward et al., 2008; Watson,
<b>—</b>	(LL, GN, PS).		Epperly, Shah, & Foster,
Mesh size, design and	Mesh size and tension influences selectivity for species	-	- 2005; Yulianto et al., 2018
tension	and life history stage (GN)		
Fishing effort	Higher effort (vessels, gears, hook number) leads to	Direct regulation of fishing effort through limited entry	-
	higher catch rates (LL, GN, PS, TR).	and permits (e.g. U.S. Atlantic Highly Migratory FMP for	
0)		sharks requires fishers to obtain permits), direct	
		regulation of fishing outputs through quotas and trip	
		limits (e.g. U.S. Atlantic Highly Migratory Species shark	
<u> </u>		fishery has a trip limit of 36 large coastal sharks).	
FAD management	Setting on FADs can cause higher levels of shark catch.	Regulation of FAD design (e.g. several RFMOs require a	-
	Higher levels of collateral mortality associated with	transition to non-entangling FADs).	
$\geq$	entangling FADs (PS).		
Tickler chain	Tickler chain on bottom trawls increases catch rate of	-	-
	bottom-dwelling sharks and skates		
Remediation: Remedia	te individuals by ensuring their safe return to the	ocean and post-capture survival, given capture has o	ccurred. Includes steps
to increase escape if ca	aptured, prior to being brought on deck; and increa	ase survival if brought on deck and subsequently rele	eased. Equivalent to
reductions in $P_{DOA}$ , $P_{DO}$	$_{\rm V}$ , $P_{\rm DPR}$ and $P_{\rm COL}$ .		
Setting depth	Survival rates of some species vary with setting depth (LL,	-	Braccini, Van Rijn, &
cotting acptin			
	GN).		Frick, 2012; Brewer et al.,

	GN).		Eayrs, & Burridge, 1998;
Gear type	Survival rates of some species vary with gear type (LL, GN, PS, TR).	Direct regulation of authorised gears (e.g. Shark FMP for NW Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico establishes gear restrictions to reduce bycatch mortality).	Cooke & Suski, 2004; Dapp, Huveneers, Walker, Drew, & Reina, 2016; Gallagher, Orbesen,
Hook type	Circle hooks promote easy removal/reduce severity of injury. Corrodible hooks promote ejection and minimise negative impacts of hooks on released individuals (LL)	Direct regulation of hook type (e.g. Shark FMP for NW Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico stipulates that bottom LL vessels must have non-stainless-steel corrodible hooks)	Hammerschlag, & Serafy, 2014; Godin, Wimmer, Wang, & Worm, 2013;
Leader material	Nylon monofilament leaders can increase bite-off and escape of pelagic sharks (LL)	-	Kaplan et al., 2007; Kerstetter & Graves, 2006; NOAA Fisheries,
Exclusion/ escape devices	Exclusion devices reduce capture of large sharks and rays in TR, escape grates reduce capture of spiny dogfish ( <i>Squalus acanthias</i> ) in TR, escape panels may promote release of sharks in PS (PS, TR).	Direct regulation of gear specifications (e.g. All TR nets in Western Australia required bycatch reduction devices)	2019; Pacheco et al., 2011; Patterson, Hansen, & Larcombe, 2014; Poisson
Post-capture handling	Reducing time out of the water, cutting the line quickly and close to the hook in LLs, and gentle handling can increase post-capture survival (LL, GN, PS, TR).	Direct regulation of handling procedures or equipment on board to promote safe handling (e.g. Shark FMP for NW Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico stipulates that bottom LL vessels have dehooking device, line-cutters, and dipnet. All TR in Western Australia require onboard in-water sorting systems).	et al., 2010; Serafy, Orbesen, Snodgrass, Beerkircher, & Walter, 2012; Wakefield et al., 2016
Retention	Retaining sharks on board for landing and sale causes 100% mortality (LL, GN, PS, TR).	Retention bans, quotas.	
Finning	Removing fins and discarding carcass at sea causes 100% mortality (LL, GN, PS, TR).	Finning bans, fin-to-carcass ratios, or fins naturally attached.	

# <u>Compensate</u>: Compensate for residual damage caused through off-site conservation efforts that increase in the probability of another individual in the same stock living to the same age/stage. Equivalent to increases in $C_{x}$ .

By-catch tax or fines	Finance off-site conservation efforts within the range of	International Seafood Sustainability Foundation (ISSF)	Dutton & Squires, 2008;
$\bigcirc$	the catch- affected population	voluntary by-catch tax to finance sea turtle nesting	Finkelstein et al., 2008;
		habitat	Gjertsen et al., 2014; ISSF,
			2016; Milner-Gulland et
Payments in kind	Fisher time, resources and knowledge could contribute to	-	2010, Willier Oulland et
			al., 2018; Pascoe, Wilcox,
	monitoring, management and research within the range		
	of the catch- affected population.		& Donlan, 2011; Squires &
	of the catch affected population.		Garcia, 2018
			0a10ia, 2010

Table 5. A simple framework for using the MH to assess the effectiveness of potential measures and make management decisions, with real-world example case study fisheries. Key: A= Avoid, M= Minimise, R= Remediate, C= Compensate.  $[\checkmark] = low, [\checkmark\checkmark] = moderate, [\checkmark\checkmark\checkmark] = high. [\$] = potential for incentives. LL = longline, GN = gillnet, TR = trawl, PS = purse seine, FAD = fish aggregation device, TED = turtle exclusion device. SS = silky sharks, HH = hammerhead sharks, WF = wedgefish, SW = sawfish.$ 

Example fishery Example goal and target	MH Step	Potential measure	Tec	hnical assessment	Feas	ibility assessment	Overall assessment/ management recommendation
Commercial Silky sharks purse seine (Carcharhinus tuna fishery falciformis) taking pelagic sharks as by- Net gain	A	Spatio-temporal closures	✓ ✓	Parts of range could be closed to fishing, but species is wide- ranging, circum-global. Critical habitat and impact of closures on mortality unclear.	~	Direct overlap with target species, closure of large areas of fishing ground not economically viable. Off-shore monitoring and enforcement is costly.	A: Spatio-temporal closures where feasible. M: Species-specific fishing restrictions or low quota, with FAD regulations.

catch in (Total fishing Western and mortality < Central MSY) Pacific Oceans	М	Escape panel Make fewer sets on FADs, especially with low tuna abundance	?	Effectiveness varies – measure needs to be explored. Sets on tuna schools >10 tons can reduce SS catch by 21%-41%	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	Tested in some fisheries, commonly adopted to reduce dolphin bycatch. May lead to loss of target catch by 3-10%.	R: Best practice live release protocols. Trade interventions to reduce incentives to retain. C: Mandatory on-vessel monitoring. By-catch tax for mortality over and above quota to incentivize good performance
		Attract sharks away from FADs	?	50% of sharks can be lured away with bait, though not tested on sets.	✓ ✓	Luring requires time and resources.	and compensate for unavoidable mortality.
	R	Fish and release sharks	√ √	100% of fished and released sharks survive, though only 21% of those encircled could be fished.	✓ ✓	SS not target species, though are marketable catch. Some incentives	Needs: Research on effectiveness of escape panel, attractants and post-release survivability, and
S	ĸ	Use best handling and release protocols	√ √	High at-vessel mortality, post- release survival can increase by 20% with good handling.	✓ ✓	to retain. On-vessel monitoring and enforcement is costly.	conservation measures.
	С	By-catch tax	?	Off-site conservation measures to be assessed.	√ √	Commercial fishery has business risk and resources to pay, but requires costly monitoring. [\$]	
Small-scale coastal gillnet fishery taking spp.)	A	Spatio-temporal closures	<ul> <li>✓</li> <li>✓</li> <li>✓</li> </ul>	Known critical habitat could be closed to fishing.	√ √	WF co-occur with target species, degree of overlap needs to be confirmed.	A: Managed GN use in areas with highest by-catch ratios. M: Restrictions or low quota.
wedgefish as valuable secondary catch in Aceh, Indonesia	М	Mesh size and tension to reduce entanglement, electro-sensory deterrents	?	Species-specific effectiveness to be explored.	<ul> <li>✓</li> <li>✓</li> </ul>	Limited capacity to purchase new gear. Potential impacts on target species need to be understood. [\$]	R: Live release protocols and improved handling C: Compensation in kind Needs: Performance-based

Small-scale longline fishery taking pelagic sharks as target catch in Lombok, Indonesia	R	Live release protocols and improved handling	✓ ✓ ✓	WF robust to capture in GN, high survivability.	~	WF high value marketable catch. On-board monitoring of SSFs is challenging and costly [\$].	incentives – training and transitional payments to promote safe handling and release. Participatory research in
	С	Payments in kind	?	Fishers could contribute time and knowledge to conservation efforts.	√ √	Fishers have limited resources, but may be able to pay in kind.	to survivability. Free gear swaps with participatory testing. Trade interventions to reduce value.
	A	Spatio-temporal closures	√ √	HH co-occur with other target species, though exhibit schooling. Closures may be possible for aggregations.	√ √	HHs high value target species, though other species available. Off- shore monitoring and enforcement is costly.	A: Spatio-temporal closures at aggregation sites M: Vessel permits and species- specific catch quotas to reduce
	М	Hook number and setting depth	√ √	Hook number and setting depth influences CPUE.	√ √	HHs are high value target species, some cultural attachment to fishing gear. [\$]	E <sub>HH</sub> . Gear restrictions/modifications to minimize CPUE <sub>HH</sub> .
	R	Live release protocols and improved handling	~	High at-vessel mortality and low post-release survival.	~	HHs are high value, incentives to retain once on board. On-board monitoring and enforcement is costly.	C: Compensation in kind Needs: Performance-based group incentives to reduce mortality,
	С	Payments in kind	?	Fishers could contribute time and resources to protecting pupping grounds.	✓ ✓	Fishers have limited resources, but may be able to pay in kind	<ul> <li>individual awards for exceptional fishers/vessels. Gear swap. Trade interventions to reduce value.</li> </ul>
Commercial shrimp trawls taking sawfish as bycatch in Gulf of	A	Spatio-temporal closures	√ √ √	Critical habitat could be closed to fishing.	✓ ✓	Co-occurrence with target species, complete avoidance would close fishery. Enforcement is costly.	A: Spatio-temporal closures where feasible. M: Species-specific prohibitions
	М	By-catch reduction devices - TED	√ √	TEDs can reduce capture of large sharks and rays by >60%. SW specific effect unclear.	✓ ✓	Reduces capture of prawns by 2- 12%.	and gear-based regulations. R: Best practice live release protocols

Mexico, USA		By-catch reduction devices – tickler chain removal	√ √	Removal of tickler chain can increase escape of demersal sharks and rays by ~30%. SW specific effect unclear.	~	Reduces capture of other commercially valuable/marketable species.	C: By-catch tax or fines for failure to comply. Needs: Mandatory on-board
ISCRIP	R	Use best handling and release protocols	?	Post-release survival rates of SW unclear.	√ √ √	Prohibited species/non- marketable in USA.	monitoring. Research on effectiveness of TEDs, post- release survivability, and
	С	Fine or by-catch tax	✓ ✓	Funds for critical habitat protection, enforcement and abundance surveys.	√ √	Industry have resources to pay, requires monitoring and enforcement.	<ul> <li>potential conservation measures.</li> </ul>

### 8 Figure legends

Figure 1. A conceptual model for shark fishing mortality, to decompose risks to sharks in fisheries.


Figure 2. A schematic of the fisher decision-making process that leads to shark mortality. Fisher decisions influence the proximate technical causes of shark mortality, and fisher decisions are in turn influenced by a range of distal socio-economic factors (See Table 1 for factors).

**Figure 3. A step-wise decision framework for feasible shark management, based on the mitigation hierarchy (after BBOP (2012)).** Thresholds for feasibility at each step will be determined by species- and fishery-specific constraints, including what is technically possible and socio-economically acceptable.


Figure 4. Cost and benefit curves for assessing socio-economic feasibility of management measures at each step in the mitigation hierarchy (after Squires and Garcia (2018)). Solid white lines represent the marginal conservation benefit (MB) of management measures at (i.e. reduction in mortality) at a given step. Dotted white lines represent the full marginal cost (MC) to the fishery (i.e. economic and social) of implementing management measures at a given step. Thresholds for feasibility at each step will be determined by socio-economic constraints. These constraints influence the marginal costs of potential management measures, and the instrument mix required to mitigate costs and achieve a desired management target. For least-cost conservation, the optimal management strategy occurs where the desired conservation benefits are achieved at lowest total cost.

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
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


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