

For submission as a *Full-Length Article to Marine Policy*

Evaluating Bioeconomic Tradeoffs of Fishing Reserves Via Spatial Optimization

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Declarations of Interest: None

Acknowledgements

Funding provided by the NMFS-Sea Grant Population and Ecosystem Dynamics Fellowship (to ZSO) and NOAA award #NA10NMF4520163 (to ECF). This is University of Hawaii School of Ocean and Earth Science and Technology (SOEST) Publication Number ##### and Hawaii Institute of Marine Biology (HIMB) Contribution #####.

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Abstract

No-take marine reserves are common strategies used in spatial fisheries management. There are at least four general objectives for marine reserve design: (1) maximizing conservation, (2) minimizing total reserve area, (3) maximizing reserve compactness, and (4) minimizing socioeconomic opportunity cost (e.g., fisheries revenue). A spatial optimization model was developed to solve for reserve placements under those four objectives, while evaluating the bioeconomic tradeoffs and potential gaps of a subset of bottomfish restricted fishing areas (BRFAs) for the Hawaiian bottomfish fishery. Optimized reserve placements with minimal opportunity costs had little overlap (< 9%) with the placements of the BRFAs, opportunity cost values 50-83% less than that of the BRFAs with 40-54% higher potential conservation value. When reserve placements were optimized to provide a maximal opportunity cost, solutions had up to 49% overlap with the BRFAs, highlighting a potential drawback of the BRFA system with respect to socioeconomic impacts. When opportunity cost was instead calculated as total area, the optimized placements also had considerable overlap (up to 42%) with the BRFAs, highlighting the importance of socioeconomic data to the reserve design process. The solutions that provided maximal reserve compactness may be the most pragmatic for a reserve design team with specific area and/or conservation targets, as these solutions produced compact reserve placements that best matched those targets at a minimal opportunity cost. This analysis emphasized the use of spatial optimization models to not only guide the reserve design process, but to highlight tradeoffs of conflicting fisheries objectives in reserve design.

Keywords: Multiple-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM); Integer Linear Programming (ILP); Systematic Reserve Design; Marine Protected Areas; Fisheries

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1. Introduction

Marine reserves are spatial tools in marine conservation and fisheries management used globally to protect biodiversity, essential habitat features, and/or rebuild over-exploited populations (Lester et al. 2009; Edgar et al. 2014; Costello and Ballantine 2015). Networks of no-take marine protected areas (MPAs) can reflect a precautionary approach in fisheries management, hedging against the uncertainties of the statuses of exploited populations, management limitations, and long-term sustainability of fisheries (Lauck et al. 1998). Although MPAs are not the panacea for all fisheries management issues (Hilborn et al. 2004; Kaiser 2005; Hilborn et al. 2006), they have the potential to address key conservation goals in fisheries management related to fish biomass, average size, biomass of apex predators, and biodiversity (Halpern and Warner 2002; Friedlander et al. 2007; Lester et al. 2009; Molloy et al., 2009; Edgar et al. 2014) as well as resilience to climate change (Micheli et al. 2012).

The challenge of designing the placements of marine reserves in spatial fisheries management is addressing many diverse and often conflicting conservation, management, and socioeconomic objectives that define the fishery (Jennings et al. 2001; Gaines et al. 2010). For example, the conversion of fishing grounds to no-take restricted fishing areas may fulfill clear conservation goals, however at the expense of the social and economic value lost from those areas. Foregone fishing effort as a result can be either displaced to the open area, shifted to a different fishery, and/or dissipated completely (Horta e Costa et al. 2013; Stevenson et al. 2013). Accessibility and perceived sociocultural importance of fishing grounds are also opportunity costs that complement the economic opportunity costs of marine reserves (Hamel et al. 2018).

23 Systematic conservation planning is an approach that can guide the design and placement
24 of fishery reserves and other area-based management strategies (Margules and Pressey 2000;
25 Leslie 2005). Its purpose is to provide an objective framework that clearly states the objectives
26 and goals of the reserve design, analyzes the tradeoffs of these objectives, and involves
27 stakeholders in the design process (NRC 2001). For example, Marxan (Ball et al. 2009) is a
28 widely used software in natural resource management that utilizes simulated annealing to
29 heuristically place networks of minimum opportunity cost marine reserves according to user-
30 defined levels of conservation feature targets and reserve configurations (Airame et al. 2003;
31 Klein et al. 2008; Leathwick et al. 2008; Ball et al. 2009). The conceit of this modelling
32 framework is that networks of marine reserves can be optimized to protect specified levels of
33 various conservation features of interest (e.g., essential habitat, spawning aggregations, nursery
34 areas) at a minimal opportunity cost. Systematic approaches to marine reserve design have been
35 shown to provide higher representation of conservation targets (Hansen et al. 2011) and lower
36 potential economic impact to commercial users (Stewart and Possingham 2005; Klein et al.
37 2008) than reserves designed *ad hoc*.

38 Multiple-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) can be a useful approach to appropriately
39 assist fisheries managers of the tradeoffs among conflicting objectives in reserve design
40 (MCDM; see Romero and Rehman 2003 for technical details). There are a handful of MCDM
41 applications in fisheries (see reviews by Mardle and Pascoe 1999 and Leung 2005). Modern
42 applications of MCDM include, e.g., optimal fleet configurations (Pascoe and Mardle 2001),
43 tradeoffs between profit maximization and turtle interactions in the Hawaiian longline fisheries
44 (Pradhan and Leung 2006), and tradeoffs among rent, employment, and income in the Barents
45 Sea cod fishery (Leung et al. 2001). Pan et al. (2001) used a multi-objective programming model

46 to evaluate optimal considerations of fleet mix, harvest levels of multiple species, and
47 spatiotemporal distribution of fishing effort in the Hawaiian deepwater and pelagic fisheries.
48 Stigner et al. (2016) evaluated the tradeoffs of shorebird conservation and recreational activities
49 within a coastal protected area in the Moreton Bay Marine Park in Queensland, Australia and
50 found that shorebird conservation targets could be met while posing low recreational opportunity
51 costs.

52 The Hawaiian Deep Seven Bottomfish species complex is a federally and state-managed
53 group of six eteline snappers (*Etelis coruscans*, *E. carbunculus*, *Pristipomoides filamentosus*, *P.*
54 *sieboldii*, *P. zonatus*, and *Aphareus rutilans*) and one endemic grouper (*Hyporthodus quernus*).
55 The fishery is a primarily hook-and-line fishery with a fluid mixture of recreational, subsistence,
56 and part- and full-time commercial fishers (Hospital and Beavers 2012). From 1986-2004, the
57 statuses of bottomfish species were measured using spawning potential ratios (SPRs) calculated
58 from commercial logbook data. The Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996, an amendment to the
59 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA), instituted a
60 quantitative benchmark for characterizing for overfishing and overfished levels. This translated
61 to a definition of $SPR < 20\%$ as the overfished definition for the bottomfish fishery. Spawning
62 potential ratios calculated for the two *Etelis* spp. in the main Hawaiian Islands (MHI) were
63 consistently below this threshold during the 1980s and 1990s and when the MSFCMA was
64 amended, these two species were considered overfished. As part of the mandated rebuilding plan,
65 nineteen areas across the main Hawaiian Islands were designated as bottomfish restricted fishing
66 areas (BRFAs). In 2007, the number of BRFAs was reduced to 12 and the placements of the
67 BRFAs were revised to include more relevant aspects of the habitat (e.g. high relief, hard-bottom
68 areas) for all Hawaiian Deep Seven bottomfish species. Around this time, the stock assessment

69 of the Deep 7 complex shifted to surplus production modelling and biological reference points
70 based on maximum sustainable yield. The new configuration of the BRFAAs had clear biological
71 objectives relevant to reducing fishing mortality and rebuilding bottomfish biomass within the
72 BRFAAs, with the intention that the reserve-associated biomass and larval products can be
73 exported into the open areas, however socioeconomic tradeoffs were not considered in the
74 reserve design process. There has, since the implementation of the BRFAAs, not been a careful
75 consideration of the biological and socioeconomic tradeoffs of the current placement of the
76 BRFAAs.

77 A multi-objective binary linear programming model was developed to evaluate the
78 tradeoffs of the conflicting biological, socioeconomic, and management objectives relevant to
79 the current network of bottomfish restricted fishing areas (BRFAAs) for the Hawaiian deepwater
80 snapper-grouper fishery. The objectives included in the model were: (1) minimizing
81 socioeconomic opportunity cost, (2) maximizing conservation value, (3) minimizing total reserve
82 area, and (4) maximizing reserve aggregation. These solutions with respect to the four objectives
83 were compared to the placements of the BRFAAs to identify potential gaps and tradeoffs of the
84 current regulations. To investigate the hypothesis that the BRFAAs placed a maximal opportunity
85 cost to commercial fishers, a separate model run was conducted with the opportunity cost
86 function switched from minimization to maximization, and these solutions were also compared
87 to the placements of the BRFAAs. This tradeoff analysis emphasized the use of MCDM to not
88 only guide the reserve design process, but to highlight tradeoffs of conflicting fisheries
89 objectives in the reserve design problem.

90

91 **2. Methods**

92 **2.1 Study Area**

93 This analysis focused on the coast surrounding the most populated island in the MHI, Oahu, and
94 its two BRFAs (Figure 1). A 500 x 500 m grid of planning units (PUs) was superimposed within
95 the 50-400 m depth range of the coastline resulting in 4753 PUs. This depth range was chosen
96 because it contained the depth ranges of the species distribution maps that were used as data
97 inputs (see Section 2.2). A 500 m PU resolution was chosen a reasonable PU resolution, as
98 computation time was inversely related to the PU resolution.

99

100 **2.2 Data Sources**

101 Conservation feature data were derived from habitat-based species distribution maps created for
102 each of the Deep Seven Bottomfishes species (Oyafuso et al. 2017). The species distribution
103 maps for each of the Deep Seven Bottomfishes can be accessed from the Data Dryad Depository
104 (<https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.f78r6>). Mean probability of occurrence for each of the species was
105 calculated within each PU (Figure 1). Opportunity cost was defined as the per-PU gross revenue
106 of total Deep Seven bottomfishes. Catch revenue data were collected by the State of Hawaii
107 Division of Aquatic Resources by species and statistical fishery reporting area (see bottom-right
108 panel in Fig. 1). Data from 1990-1996 were used to represent the spatial distribution of fishing
109 activity before the implementation of the BRFAs. Trip cost data are very scarce for this fishery
110 (Hospital and Beavers, 2012) and were not available for the time period of interest. Annual total
111 gross revenue summed over the seven bottomfish species was tabulated for each statistical
112 fishery reporting area, then divided equally amongst the PUs within the fishery reporting area.
113 This calculation does not account for the spatial heterogeneity in fishing activity within a fishery
114 reporting area, but rather reflects the resolution that the data were collected.

115 [approximate location of Figure 1]

116

117 **2.3 Objective Functions**

118 A multi-objective binary integer linear programming model was constructed to select a set of

119 PUs under four objectives:

120 (1) Minimize opportunity cost:

$$121 \min \sum_{i=1}^N x_i c_i \tag{1}$$

122 Where x_i is a binary decision variable ($x_i = 1$ if the i^{th} PU is chosen, 0 otherwise), c_i is the
123 opportunity cost of reserving the i^{th} PU, and N is the total number of PUs. Total reserve set
124 opportunity cost is reported in the Results Section as a proportion of the total opportunity
125 cost of the PUs within the spatial domain.

126 (2) Maximize conservation value

$$127 \max \sum_{i=1}^N x_i r_{is} \tag{2}$$

128 Where r_{is} is the attribute, i.e., predicted probability of occurrence, for the s^{th} species
129 ($s: 1, 2, \dots, S$) in the i^{th} PU, and S is the total number of species (i.e., $S = 7$). There are S
130 objective functions representing each species feature. The conservation value of the reserve
131 set is reported in the Results Section as a proportion of the summed species attributes of the
132 PUs within the spatial domain, averaged across species.

133 (3) Maximize reserve aggregation

134 In most systematic reserve design exercises, it is advantageous for the decision maker to be
135 able to control the spatial arrangement of the PUs to favor more aggregated or connected
136 networks of reserves. The incorporation of interactions among PUs involves the addition of

137 non-linear terms, and thus is problematic in a linear programming framework. Beyer et al.
 138 (2016, but also see Billionnet 2013) described methods to linearize these non-linear terms by
 139 the addition of decision variable b_{ij} , with the following objective function:

$$140 \quad \max \sum_{(i,j) \in E} b_{ij} v_{ij} \quad (3)$$

141 Where b_{ij} is a binary decision variable that denotes the selection of adjacent PUs i and j . E is
 142 the set of adjacent cell interactions in the spatial domain of the PUs. v_{ij} is the length of the
 143 shared boundary between the i^{th} and j^{th} PUs. Note that in a lattice structure, v_{ij} is constant
 144 and thus can be removed. The addition of each decision variable is accompanied with three
 145 additional constraints to ensure that $x_i = x_j = 1$ if $b_{ij} = 1$.

$$146 \quad b_{ij} - x_i \leq 0 \quad (4)$$

$$147 \quad b_{ij} - x_j \leq 0 \quad (5)$$

$$148 \quad b_{ij} - x_i - x_j \leq -1 \quad (6)$$

149 The aggregation value of a reserve set is reported in the Results Section as a proportion of the
 150 total number of potential adjacent PU interactions.

151 (4) Minimize total reserve area

$$152 \quad \min \sum_{i=1}^N x_i a_i \quad (7)$$

153 Where a_i is the area of the i^{th} PU. Note that in a lattice structure, a_i is constant and thus can be
 154 removed. The total area of the reserve set is reported in the Results Section as a proportion of the
 155 total number of PUs in the spatial domain.

156

157 2.4 Structural Constraints

158 To directly compare the solutions with the placements of the BRFAs, additional structural
159 constraints on the objectives were included such that the chosen reserve set:

160 (1) did not exceed the total opportunity cost of the PUs contained within the boundaries of
161 the BRFAs (C)

$$162 \quad \sum_{i=1}^N x_i c_i \leq C \quad (8)$$

163 (2) did not exceed the total number of PUs contained within the boundaries of the BRFAs
164 (A)

$$165 \quad \sum_{i=1}^N x_i \leq A \quad (9)$$

166 (3) had summed species attribute values greater than or equal to those of the PUs contained
167 within the boundaries of the BRFAs (R_s) for each species.

$$168 \quad \sum_{i=1}^N x_i r_{is} \geq R_s \quad (10)$$

169

170 **2.4 Multi-Objective Integer Linear Programming Model**

171 The epsilon-constraint method is a classical technique in MCDM (Romero and Rehman 2003)
172 used to solve multi-objective optimization problems. Briefly, one of the objectives is solved in a
173 single-objective problem, transforming the other objectives as constraints. This process is
174 iterated using an interval of constraints across a user-defined range for each objective to generate
175 the Pareto set of efficient solutions. Compromise programming is a distance-based method to
176 assist the decision maker in narrowing down the set of feasible solutions on the Pareto frontier.
177 The best-compromise solution is defined as the solution that is closest to the ideal point, i.e., the
178 theoretical solution where all objectives are at their optimal values. When objectives are in
179 conflict, the ideal point is infeasible. The proximity of a solution to the ideal point is quantified

180 in the form of a family of L_p distance measures (Romero and Rehman 2003). Distance of the p^{th}
 181 degree is calculated using a generalization of the Euclidean distance:

$$182 \quad L_p = \left[\sum_{j=1}^J \left(W_j \frac{|Z_j^* - Z_j(\bar{x})|}{|Z_j^* - Z_{*j}|} \right)^p \right]^{\frac{1}{p}} \quad (11)$$

183 Where Z_j^* is the ideal value of the j^{th} objective, Z_{*j} is the anti-ideal (nadir) point of the j^{th}
 184 objective, $Z_j(\bar{x})$ is the value of the j^{th} objective of a reserve set \bar{x} , and W_j is the weight given to
 185 the j^{th} objective. J is the total number of objectives. The objectives are assumed to be equally
 186 weighted in the calculation of the distance metrics and were normalized by their respective
 187 distances between their ideal and nadir points. Both the L_1 and L_∞ distances (both referred to
 188 herein as “distance-based solutions”) were reported following Leung et al. (2001) as an efficient
 189 range of solutions. The binary integer linear program was solved using a branch and bound
 190 algorithm with a 1% gap tolerance using the Gurobi Optimizer (v.7.0) operated within the
 191 “gurobi” package in the R software environment following Beyer et al. (2016).

192

193 **2.5 Alternative Reserve Design Scenarios**

194 To evaluate the potential impact of the BRFA to fishers, three models of reserves placements
 195 under different reserve design perspectives regarding the opportunity cost objective were
 196 developed. For each scenario, the placements and objective attributes of the optimized reserves
 197 were compared to the placements of the BRFAs. First, total opportunity cost was calculated as
 198 total area, reflecting a management perspective that considers the opportunity cost across PUs to
 199 be uniform. This reduces the problem to a three-objective framework, as total area is equivalent
 200 to total opportunity cost.

201 Second, opportunity cost was defined as fisheries revenue as described in Section 2.2 and
202 opportunity cost is minimized as described in Section 2.3. This scenario represented a
203 management perspective similar to conventional systematic reserve design software (i.e.,
204 Marxan) that attempt to configure compact, minimal opportunity cost (i.e., foregone fisheries
205 revenue) reserve placements that meet specific species/conservation feature targets.

206 Third, the hypothesis that the BRFAs presented a high impact to fishers in terms of
207 potential forgone bottomfish revenue was investigated. This was achieved programmatically by
208 reversing the opportunity cost optimization from minimization to maximization. This
209 optimization represented a management perspective that opted to prioritize reserve placements in
210 areas where opportunities of fishing activity were the highest.

211

212 **3. Results**

213 **3.1 Scenario 1: Uniform Opportunity Cost, Opportunity Cost-Minimization Solutions**

214 The opportunity cost for these solutions was uniform across PUs (i.e., related to area), reducing
215 the model to a three-objective problem. The uniform-cost L_1 and L_∞ optimizations were sparse
216 networks of reserves around the western, southern, and eastern parts of the island (Figs. 2D, E).
217 The conservation values of the distance-based solutions were greater (L_1 : 0.270, L_∞ : 0.213) than
218 the BRFAs (0.145), however were smaller and less aggregated (Table 1A). Between 8-16% of
219 the PUs contained within the boundaries of the BRFAs were included in both distance-based
220 solutions. The solution with the highest aggregation objective value suggested a reserve network
221 of two large and compact areas, one on the western tip of the island overlapping almost entirely
222 with the western BRFA and one on the northeastern portion of the island (Fig. 2C). The objective
223 attribute values of the maximal aggregation solution were very similar to those of the BRFAs

224 (radar plot, Fig. 2C). The solutions with the highest conservation value and the smallest total area
225 were very sparse and distributed across the island except for the northern part of the island (Fig.
226 2A, B).

227 [approximate locations of Figure 2 and Table 1]

228

229 **3.2 Scenario 2: Non-Uniform Opportunity Cost, Opportunity Cost-Minimization Solutions**

230 The opportunity cost scenario for these solutions was proportional to foregone fisheries revenue

231 and the opportunity cost objective was minimized. The distance-based solutions suggested

232 reserve placements in the southern and northeastern parts of the island (Figs. 3E-F). These

233 solutions had conservation values higher than those of the BRFA's and opportunity cost values 2-

234 6X lower than the BRFA's, but were smaller and less aggregated than the BRFA's (Table 1B).

235 These solutions had little overlap (0% and 8.67% for the L_1 and L_∞ solutions, respectively) with

236 the PUs contained within the boundaries of the BRFA's. The reserve placement that maximized

237 conservation value was spread out over most of the coast and included areas within the

238 boundaries of the BRFA's (~15% overlap with the BRFA's Fig. 3A) but had the highest

239 opportunity cost of the four solutions of the payoff matrix (Table 1B). The solution that

240 maximized the aggregation objective had the lowest conservation value across the four solutions

241 of the payoff matrix and no overlap with the PUs contained within the boundaries of the BRFA's.

242 [approximate location of Figure 3]

243

244 **3.3 Scenario 3: Non-Uniform Opportunity Cost, Opportunity Cost-Maximization Solutions**

245 Similar to Section 3.2, the opportunity cost for these solutions was proportional to fisheries

246 revenue, except opportunity cost objective was maximized. The cost-maximizing L_1 and L_∞

247 solutions were sparsely placed on the western and eastern sides of the island, with some overlap
248 (9-11%, Table 1C) with the PUs contained in the BRFAs (Figs. 4E, F). The reserve placement
249 with the highest aggregation had similar objective function values to those of the BRFAs, had a
250 48.8% overlap with the PUs contained in the BRFAs (Table 1C), and was positioned on the
251 eastern side of the island, including the eastern BRFA (Fig. 4C). The reserve placements with
252 minimal area, maximal conservation value, and maximal opportunity cost (Figs. 4A, B, D) were
253 sparsely placed more towards the western and eastern portions of the islands, with moderate
254 overlap (9-18%) with the PUs contained in both BRFAs.

255 [approximate location of Figure 4]

256

257 **4. Discussion**

258 Optimizations were conducted under three opportunity cost scenarios to represent different
259 reserve design perspectives. First, opportunity cost was considered uniform across PUs, reducing
260 the exercise to a three-objective (i.e., area as opportunity cost, conservation value, and
261 aggregation) problem. This is a common tactic used in systematic reserve design problems (e.g.
262 Airame et al. 2003; Klein et al. 2008; Ban and Klein 2009). The major assumption under the first
263 scenario was that opportunity cost was proportional to area (i.e., spatial accessibility), and all
264 PUs posed the same opportunity cost. The first opportunity cost scenario may represent a
265 situation where spatial socioeconomic use data does not exist for the fishery or socioeconomic
266 opportunity costs are not considered in the reserve design criteria (e.g., Airame et al. 2003).
267 Under this opportunity cost scenario, reserves placements were within and/or adjacent to BRFAs
268 especially when maximizing for the aggregation objective, suggesting some agreement with this
269 design scenario and the placements of the BRFAs.

270 In the second opportunity cost scenario, opportunity cost was related to fisheries revenue,
271 and when minimized represented a compact reserve design that maximized species protection at
272 a minimal socioeconomic impact to fishers. This represented conventional frameworks of
273 systematic reserve design software like Marxan (Ball and Possingham 2009). The non-uniform
274 cost-minimization distance-based solutions identified areas that offered potentially similar
275 conservation value, were smaller in area and lower in opportunity cost, but were less compact
276 than the BRFA's (Table 1B). These placements were in different areas than the placement of the
277 BRFA's, suggesting that the design of the BRFA's did not fully incorporate or account for the
278 potential socioeconomic impacts of the reserve design or perhaps placed more emphasis on
279 reducing local fishing mortality by closing areas of high fisheries activity. Regardless of the
280 reason, the advantage of the MCDM approach used here is that the tradeoffs in fisheries
281 objectives that characterize the reserve design problem can be analyzed and the gaps in current
282 reserve placements can be objectively evaluated. *Ad hoc* reserves have been shown to impose a
283 high opportunity cost compared to reserves calculated under a systematic reserve design (Stewart
284 et al. 2003; Stewart and Possingham 2005). In this study, calculated reserves under this scenario
285 had up to one-half the opportunity cost than that of the current placement. Other gap analyses
286 have revealed that a systematic reserve design can suggest new reserve networks or
287 modifications of reserve networks that provide higher conservation feature coverage (Rondinini
288 et al. 2005; Hansen et al. 2011; Moore et al. 2016).

289 The inclusion of spatially explicit socioeconomic opportunity cost data into the design
290 process is generally thought to increase the robustness of the reserve design process (Stewart and
291 Possingham 2005; Ban et al. 2009; Teixeira et al. in press), and substantially changed the
292 placements of the reserve network when incorporated in this analysis (Scenario 1 vs Scenario 2).

293 Gross revenue was the only opportunity cost data available in this study. Net revenue would be a
294 more favorable quantity to use as it incorporates the various sources of costs incurred by fishers.
295 Stewart and Possingham (2005) also compared spatial optimizations of marine reserves using
296 different opportunity cost data inputs and found that using socioeconomic opportunity cost was
297 more effective in reducing socioeconomic impact as opposed to using total area as opportunity
298 cost. In this analysis, when opportunity cost was uniform across PUs, more PUs in areas of high
299 fishing activity were chosen than when opportunity cost was proportional to fisheries revenue.
300 Thus, although collecting information on socioeconomic use/impact may be costly in some
301 instances, its explicit use in systematic reserve design generally leads to more robust and less
302 user-impactful solutions (Teixeira et al. in press).

303 The last reserve design scenario was similar to the second scenario, except the opportunity
304 cost objective was maximized, representing a reserve design that prioritized closing popular
305 fishing areas, i.e., closing areas with presumably favorable fish habitat with high socioeconomic
306 impact to fishers. Opportunity cost maximization is intuitively not the goal of marine reserve
307 design but may mimic a management scenario where the prioritization of reserve placement was
308 informed by fisheries-dependent information on the spatial distribution of catches and trips,
309 which is similar to the design of the original placements of the BRFAs. This approach may
310 relieve local fishing pressure, but potentially ignores the socioeconomic impacts and implications
311 of closure. The non-uniform cost-maximization placements had considerable overlap with the
312 eastern BRFA, an area with historical and current high use in the fishery (Fig. 1; Parke 2007).
313 Formulating the reserve design process within an MCDM framework is useful in addressing the
314 socioeconomic impact of marine reserves by increasing the transparency of reserve tradeoffs
315 during the design process. Transparency and stakeholder inclusion in the reserve design process

316 supported by evidence-based systematic reserve design potentially reduces the potential “grab”
317 of resources from fishers via opaque regulatory processes (Bennett et al. 2015; Bennett 2016).

318 Conservation feature coverage and representation are major conservation objectives of the
319 marine reserve problem. The MCDM approach used here allowed for an exploration of the
320 range of possible levels of conservation value, including the maximal level of conservation value
321 under the constraints of the other objectives in the model. For example, across the three reserve
322 design scenarios, the maximum level of the conservation feature achieved under the distance-
323 based solutions was between 0.20-0.27, higher than the total conservation value of the BRFA
324 (0.145). The difference in conservation value between the optimized spatial configurations and
325 the BRFA describes the potential gap in the conservation objective. In other systematic reserve
326 design problems, the reserve set is programmed to represent various conservation features, the
327 targets of which are set *a priori* by either consensus of the reserve designers or through expert
328 recommendation. In the Marxan software, minimum coverage targets for each conservation
329 feature are defined *a priori*. For example, a reserve design exercise conducted by Moore et al.
330 (2016) applied a 10% minimum target coverage across 765 conservation features as
331 recommended by the Convention of Biological Diversity for a spatial planning design applied to
332 the marine waters within the Exclusive Economic Zone in northwest Australia. The authors that
333 used systematic reserve design for a network of marine reserves along the central California
334 coast under the Marine Life Protection Act Initiative used a 30% target for each conservation
335 feature as recommended by the IUCN (Klein et al. 2008).

336 Tradeoffs among objectives are difficult to visualize in higher dimensions, however can be
337 partially visualized via the payoff matrix. First, in all scenarios, maximizing conservation value
338 was generally associated with the highest total reserve area (Table 1). With a higher conservation

339 value requirement, more cells need to be included in the reserve set. However, the solutions with
340 the maximum levels of species protection were very sparse (Figs 2A, 3A, and 4A), reflecting the
341 patchiness of the distributions of the species with different habitat requirements (Fig. 1; also see
342 Oyafuso et al., 2017) . This highlights the second major tradeoff associated with aggregation and
343 area. Highly compact reserves were generally associated with higher area compared to loosely
344 aggregated reserves for a given level of conservation value. This was demonstrated clearly from
345 the uniform-cost reserve design scenario, where the minimum area and maximum aggregation
346 solutions offered similar levels of the conservation value objective (~0.16, Table 1A), but the
347 maximum aggregation solution was approximately double the area of the minimum area
348 solution. Given the patchy and restricted distributions of the species of interest (Figure 1), a
349 highly compact reserve will invariably contain areas with higher conservation value along with
350 adjacent areas with lower conservation value. Across reserve design scenarios, the solutions with
351 the maximum aggregation and maximum conservation value were similar in total area (~0.14)
352 but there was an inverse relationship between compactness and conservation value.

353 The solution that maximized aggregation was the only solution that matched the area,
354 aggregation, and conservation objectives of the BRFA (Figs. 2C, 3C, 4C). The reserve
355 aggregation objective is certainly an important reserve design attribute in terms of management
356 implementation and feasibility. When objectives were weighed equally, the compromise (*i.e.*,
357 distance-based) solution among objectives was a solution that partially fulfilled each objective,
358 thus solutions with intermediate levels of aggregation. If the design planning team of a marine
359 reserve network set specific area and conservation feature coverage levels, the solution with the
360 maximal aggregation objective under the method used here could be a potential
361 recommendation, as this is the solution that was shown to meet the specified area and

362 conservation targets, configure highly compact reserves, and produce the lowest opportunity
363 cost. Further, formulating the reserve design problem within a linear programming framework
364 (e.g., Cocks and Baird 1989; Williams and ReVelle 1998; Önal and Briers 2005) provides exact
365 and computationally fast solutions relative to heuristic approaches (Rodrigues and Gaston 2002;
366 Vanderkam et al. 2007; Beyer et al. 2016).

367 One drawback of this method is that these optimizations are static in their interpretation.
368 Thus, its usefulness as a fisheries management tool should be tested within a simulation
369 framework that incorporates uncertainties in fish populations, differences in fish life history (e.g.,
370 growth rates, longevity, movement rates, home range), environmental fluctuations, and fleet
371 dynamics over time and in response to the implementation of the reserves (e.g., Williams et al.
372 2004; Metcalfe et al. 2015; Kruek et al. 2017). Another avenue of research is to test via
373 simulation whether placements optimized within an MCDM framework can meet explicit
374 biological (e.g., population size, spawning potential) and socioeconomic (e.g., profit,
375 participation) objectives when implemented over time. For example, the solutions with the
376 highest aggregation objective values for the cost-minimization and cost-maximization scenarios
377 had similar aggregation, area, and conservation objective values. The differences between these
378 solutions were the opportunity cost and the placements of these solutions. Thus, from a
379 management perspective, these two reserve networks suggestions have the same conservation
380 potential but are expected to have different socioeconomic effects. The cost-maximization
381 solutions have potentially higher socioeconomic impacts to fishers because of the closure of
382 popular fishing grounds and the displacement of effort either to finding other fishing grounds in
383 the open area (Stevenson et al. 2013), other fisheries, or to other sources of income outside the

384 fishery. A simulation approach is most appropriate to test hypotheses of reserve design and their
385 effects on fish and fisher populations.

386

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
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Fig. 1: Data input layers: probability of occurrence for each of the seven species in the complex and opportunity cost were aggregated to each 500 x 500 m planning unit for the island of Oahu (Hawaii, USA). The two textured polygons denote the placement of the bottomfish restricted fishing areas used for comparison in the study. Fish illustrations by Les Hata[©], Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources.


Fig. 2: Reserve placements under uniform-cost minimization optimizations that represent A) maximum conservation value, B) minimum total reserve area, C) maximum aggregation, and solutions based on the minimum D) L_1 and E) L_∞ distance metrics. The two textured polygons denote the placement of the bottomfish restricted fishing areas (BRFAs) used for comparison in the study. A radar plot comparing the three objective values (Spp = conservation value, Area = area, Agg = aggregation) between the reserve solution (gray) and the current BRFAs (black) are provided in the upper-right corner of the plots. The distance between the center of the radar plot to the vertex of the radar polygon is proportional to the objective attribute value.

Fig. 3: Reserve placements under non-uniform cost minimization optimizations that represent A) maximum conservation value, B) minimum total reserve area, C) maximum aggregation, D) minimum opportunity cost, and solutions based on the minimum D) L_1 and E) L_∞ distance metrics. The two textured polygons denote the placement of the bottomfish restricted fishing areas (BRFAs) used for comparison in the study. A radar plot comparing the four objective values (Spp = conservation value, Area = area, Agg = aggregation, Cost = opportunity cost) between the reserve solution (gray) and the current BRFAs (black) are provided in the upper-right corner of the plots. The distance between the center of the radar plot to the vertex of the radar polygon is proportional to the objective attribute value.


Fig. 4: Reserve placements under non-uniform cost maximization optimizations that represent A) maximum conservation value, B) minimum total reserve area, C) maximum aggregation, D) minimum cost, and solutions based on the minimum D) L_1 and E) L_∞ distance metrics. The two textured polygons denote the placement of the bottomfish restricted fishing areas (BRFAs) used for comparison in the study. A radar plot comparing the four objective values (Spp = Conservation Value, Area = Area, Agg = Aggregation, Cost = Opportunity Cost) between the reserve solution (gray) and the current BRFAs (black) are provided in the upper-right corner of the plots. The distance between the center of the radar plot to the vertex of the radar polygon is proportional to the objective attribute value.






A) Maximize Conservation Value




B) Minimize Area




C) Maximize Aggregation

D) L_1 SolutionE) L_∞ Solution


A) Maximize Conservation Value






B) Minimize Area




C) Maximize Aggregation




D) Minimize Opportunity Cost

E) L_1 SolutionF) L_∞ Solution


A) Maximize Conservation Value



B) Minimize Area



C) Maximize Aggregation



D) Maximize Opportunity Cost




E) L_1 SolutionF) L_∞ Solution

Table 1: Payoff matrices of the three opportunity cost scenarios. Area, aggregation, opportunity cost, and conservation objective values are reported as proportion of their respective total values. The conservation objective attribute is reported as a mean across the seven species. The last column is the percentage of the planning units that were contained within the boundaries of the bottomfish restricted fishing areas (BRFAs). The diagonal elements (in bold) are the optimal values for each objective and comprise the ideal point solution. The last three rows are the objective values of the solutions with the lowest L_1 and L_∞ distance metrics and the current BRFAs.

1A) Uniform Cost, Cost Minimization					
	Area	Aggregation	Conservation	% BRFA Overlap	
Minimize Area	0.075	0.030	0.165	6.94	
Maximize Aggregation	0.140	0.140	0.164	41.91	
Maximize Conservation	0.143	0.091	0.276	17.20	
L_1	0.145	0.110	0.270	16.04	
L_∞	0.111	0.085	0.213	8.82	
BRFAs	0.146	0.145	0.145		
1B) Non-Uniform Cost, Cost Minimization					
	Area	Aggregation	Conservation	Cost	% BRFA Overlap

Minimize Area	0.080	0.036	0.162	0.026	2.31
Maximize Aggregation	0.140	0.135	0.155	0.030	0
Maximize Conservation	0.140	0.085	0.270	0.156	14.88
Minimize Cost	0.105	0.077	0.158	0.014	0
L_1	0.140	0.115	0.223	0.033	0
L_∞	0.110	0.085	0.204	0.093	8.67
BRFAs	0.146	0.145	0.145	0.190	

1C) Non-Uniform Cost, Cost Maximization

	Area	Aggregation	Conservation	Cost	% BRFA Overlap
Minimize Area	0.08	0.019	0.156	0.190	9.97
Maximize Aggregation	0.14	0.136	0.152	0.190	48.84
Maximize Conservation	0.14	0.085	0.270	0.190	18.21
Maximize Cost	0.10	0.005	0.156	0.190	14.88
L_1	0.140	0.115	0.246	0.190	9.68
L_∞	0.110	0.075	0.217	0.190	10.69
BRFAs	0.146	0.145	0.145	0.190	