

Towards the adaptability of coastal resilience: vulnerability analysis of underground gas pipeline system after hurricanes using LiDAR data

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1 **Abstract**

2 The coastal pipeline is subjected to threats after extreme coastal weather events,
3 however, most of the extant work fails to include pipeline risk assessment in the post-
4 disaster coastal resilience evaluation, because the labor-intensive and time-consuming
5 pipeline risk analysis techniques cannot be readily extended for disaster application. To
6 address this need, this study exploited Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) data for the
7 vulnerability analysis of underground gas pipeline system after hurricanes. Specifically,
8 compared to the prevailing work that is emphasized on the accuracy, this studied identified
9 three requirements for disaster response applications including rapidity, applicability, and
10 operability. Upon these requirements, we integrated LiDAR data with geospatial processing
11 tools in ArcGIS to identify the most vulnerable location in the pipeline system aftermath of
12 hurricanes in coastal community. The method is implemented to cope with four facets of
13 threats (vertical displacement, lateral deformation, flooding, and aging effect) and validated
14 using a hurricane Sandy case study in Ocean County, New Jersey. The results showed
15 that the proposed method not only satisfies the above three requirements in disaster
16 response, but also aligns with the observed hurricane-induced damage patterns, and
17 therefore deem appropriate for vulnerability analysis of underground gas pipeline system
18 after hurricanes.

19 **Keywords:** coastal resilience, gas pipeline, vulnerability, hurricane, risk assessment

20 **1. Introduction**

21 Volumes of scientific evidence and data suggest extreme coastal weather events will continue to
22 multiply and intensify (Hassanzadeh et al., 2020; Ting et al., 2019; Wang and Toumi, 2021), increasing
23 coastal resilience to these threats is a global concern (Barbier, 2014). Compared to extensive studies on
24 the resilience of communities (Huang et al., 2021) and building infrastructures (Zhou et al., 2019), the
25 resilience of underground pipeline systems is understudied. Although considered as the safest means for
26 transporting energy fuels (Zakikhani et al., 2020), in facing extreme events such as hurricanes, the
27 damage, and failure of the transmission pipeline networks can lead to life-threatening secondary hazards
28 (e.g. gas leak, gas explosion). For instance, the 1994 flooding in Houston, Texas exposed 17
29 underground pipelines, four of which broke (NTSB, 1996). Ignition from gasoline has caused 547 people
30 to receive burn and inhalation injuries causing an estimation of \$16 million losses. Moreover, increasing
31 demand for energy consumption is resulting in more extensions on the pipeline network systems as well
32 as more people living and working closer to pipelines. Given that hurricanes induced wind, flooding, and
33 storm surge, as well as internal corrosion could pose an undue threat to human lives and properties,

34 understanding the resilience of underground gas transmission system aftermath of an extreme coastal
35 event is of remarkable interest to improve the coastal resilience.

36 The extant studies on investigating the failure mechanism of the pipeline system can mainly be
37 categorized into five types including mechanical, operational, corrosion, natural causes, and third party
38 activity (Davis et al., 2006). Regardless of the type, these studies address the capability perspective of
39 coastal resilience by identifying the potential risk caused by the defect in design, malfunctions in
40 operation, and time-dependent deterioration through careful inspection, monitoring, testing, and analysis.
41 Upon such formulation, pipeline risk analysis requires an extensive in-line inspection and monitoring of
42 pipeline conditions to ensure accuracy and to minimize the uncertainties of the results (Zakikhani et al.,
43 2020). For instance, extensive studies are built based on high precision measuring tools (Lee et al., 2013;
44 Shi et al., 2015), comprehensive signal processing techniques (Chen et al., 2010; Saha et al., 2010), and
45 sophisticated failure analysis models (Farrag and Gong, 2016a; Jin et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2013).
46 Combined, these works provide a holistic view of underground pipeline system resilience from the
47 capability's perspective, however, few of them emphasize the other dimension of coastal resilience,
48 adaptability.

49 Differently, adaptability emphasizes the ability of a system to respond and adapt to changes caused
50 by natural disasters or incidents. Rather than accuracy, which is often time-consuming, adaptability
51 requires identifying the vulnerability of the pipeline system in an efficient way to develop coping
52 strategies. In such a sense, despite all efforts from the literature on capability-centric pipeline risk
53 assessment methods (Lee et al., 2013; Shi et al., 2015), they cannot be extended to address the
54 adaptability for disaster response applications. In all, the adaptability-centric analysis should address
55 three issues: rapidity (Linnenluecke and McKnight, 2017), applicability (Elaine Daily and Padjen, 2010),
56 and operability (Huang and Lien, 2012). Particularly, disaster is characterized by a highly time-sensitive
57 environment (Hu and Gong, 2019a). To make sufficient time to inform residents to respond, the rapidity
58 rather than the accuracy should be stressed. Moreover, the applicability requires that the methods need
59 to build upon the availability and feasibility of risk detection techniques. Put differently, tools such as
60 ultrasonic, magnetic flux are considered expensive, time-consuming, and unsafe to operate (Xie and
61 Tian, 2018), and therefore may not be applicable for pipeline risk assessment for the disaster response
62 purpose. Last, different from the laboratory experiments environment, the practicability demands that the
63 productivity of the method should be prioritized – this is to say a well-develop platform might be
64 considered as a baseline for the analysis.

65 Underneath the specific requirements that disaster response has to address, we find that integrating
66 geographic information systems (GIS) with remote sensing data may offer a solution. Regarding
67 operability, GIS is widely employed as decision support tools because the technology can support the
68 fusion of data from multiple sources and meanwhile has the capability of spatial analysis, visualization,
69 which is considered critical for disaster response (Gunes and Kovel, 2000). Moreover, compared to an
70 onsite survey or in-line inspection, spatial data are more widely available (Zerger and Smith, 2003) as

71 collecting remote sensing data has become a routine survey after major disasters (Huang et al., 2021).
72 For instance, in addressing Hurricane Sandy alone, within the three days of the disaster stroke, there are
73 at least three Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) datasets available, including pre and post-Sandy
74 LiDAR data from USGS EAARL-B (Experimental Advanced Airborne Research Lidar) Lidar system, post-
75 Sandy LiDAR data from USACE (United States Army Corps of Engineers) NCMP (National Coastal
76 Mapping Program). Regarding the practical perspective, the GIS system has proved successful and
77 productivity in numerous disaster scenarios such as flood risk mapping (Liu et al., 2003; Tran et al.,
78 2009), resource allocation (Chen et al., 2011; Fiedrich et al., 2000), evacuation planning (Font et al.,
79 2010; Kucera et al., 2004; Zou et al., 2006), landslide susceptibility mapping (Cevik and Topal, 2003), etc.
80 Drawing upon the rapidity, operability, and practicality for pipeline risk assessment during disasters, the
81 paper deals with an overarching research question:

82 *What is the pipeline risk assessment method to address the rapidity, operability, and practicality*
83 *requirements in disaster response?*

84 To address the research question, this study investigates the integrating of spatial data and GIS for
85 the pipeline risk assessment in disaster response. Building upon the five pipeline failure mechanism, the
86 assessment method exploits the remote sensing LiDAR data and inventory data to identify four facets of
87 damage patterns including vertical displacement caused by erosion and soil movement, wind and surge
88 induced horizontal displacement, flooding, and aging effect. Then, the proposed method is implemented
89 in GIS and empirically validated using Hurricane Sandy data.

90 The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Related literature is presented in Section Two,
91 followed by the introduction methodology of this study in Section Three. The proposed method is
92 validated through empirical data from Hurricane Sandy in Ocean County, New Jersey, which is presented
93 in Section Four. The results and discussion is presented in Section Five and the study is concluded
94 thereafter with implications in the final section.

95 **2. Literature review**

96 ***2.1 Defect detection based method***

97 Defect detection is a process of exploiting different types of tools to identify the damage cues, which
98 provide the first diagnosis of the gas pipeline system. Traditionally, the objective of this process is to
99 maximize the detection accuracy with minimum uncertainty (Zakikhani et al., 2020), which is relied on the
100 accuracy of the pipeline damage data obtained through inspection, monitoring, testing, and analysis
101 techniques. In doing so, numerous studies are exploring the state of art high-precision tools for pipeline
102 leakage detection such as magnetic flux (Gloria et al., 2009), ultrasonic (Alobaidi et al., 2015),
103 Electromagnetic acoustic transducers (EMAT) (Hirao and Ogi, 1999), etc. Nevertheless, these In-line
104 inspection technologies are proved accurate in defect profiling, there are limitations for extending them for
105 disaster response applications. First, the rapidity issue of employing these high-precision tools in pipeline
106 risk analysis in disaster response is unaddressed in literature. Specifically, disasters are characterized

107 with time-sensitive environment (Hu and Gong, 2019b) and there is only a narrow time window for
108 response actions (Standard, 2001), which in turn call for rapidly identifying the potential risk that could
109 lead to life-threatening secondary hazards (e.g. gas leak, gas explosion). On the other hand, high-
110 precision damage detection tools often require complex data collection procedures (e.g., frequent on-site
111 inspection, data validation), which is often accompanied by extensive time and intensive labor (Zakikhani
112 et al., 2020). To this end, these high-precision tools might address the rapidity for pipeline risk
113 assessment during disaster response at the first place. Second, the applicability of these tools is under
114 questioning because these tools are designed to focus on specific types of pipeline defect. For instance,
115 magnetic flux are typically applied to detect metal loss (e.g. corrosion). A review of current MFL
116 applications in detecting corrosion is elaborated in Vanaei et al. (2017). Crack, on the other hand, is best
117 detected using ultrasonic (Lee et al., 2010). and EMAT(Dixon et al., 2011). Regarding the disaster-
118 induced geometry changes, Xie and Tian (2018) argued that the feasibility of these technologies is
119 unravelled because in some studies these tools are reported to be capable of detecting this type of flaw
120 while in other studies not. In such a sense, alternative sensors for the geometry changes measurement
121 require further investigation. Last but not least, the operability demand in place algorithms and well-
122 developed platforms. Nevertheless, the analysis requires sophisticated signal processing algorithms,
123 such as wavelet transform (Saha et al., 2010), split-spectrum processing(Saniie et al., 2012), artificial
124 neural networks (ANNs) (Carvalho et al., 2006). Despite their success in the experiment stage, the
125 validation in practise is understudied. All combined, the rapidity, applicability and operability implies that
126 high precision tools are not the candidate to address the pipeline risk assessment aftermath a disaster.

127 **2.2 Risk analysis based method**

128 Alternatively, other scholars integrate historical data and expert experience into the risk analysis to
129 improve the understanding of the resilience of the underground pipeline system. Risk analysis aims to
130 estimate the probability of failure and assess its consequences (Aljaroudi et al., 2015). Depending on the
131 source of input data, risk analysis can be divided into quantitative methods and qualitative methods (Han
132 and Weng, 2011). While quantitative methods are mainly built upon objective data, qualitative methods
133 incorporate judgment from the experts to the analysis. The quantitative method assesses risk by
134 numerical simulation, including a quantitative calculation of possibilities and consequences of different
135 accidents (Han and Weng, 2011). Mathematic modeling is a quantitative method that relies largely on
136 objective data. For instance, Aljaroudi et al. (2015) and Jo and Ahn (2005) proposed quantitative risk
137 analysis models that integrating historical data with disaster data. However, both models are too
138 complicated to operate because more than 50 pipeline parameters are required as inputs and their
139 sources are not elaborated. Xie and Tian (2018) further underscored that the completion of the pipeline
140 data is a major concern because it requires a considerable amount of inputs even the pipeline operators
141 do not have. On the other hand, historical data are widely available, and therefore are fitted in prediction
142 models such as the markovian prediction model (Sinha and McKim, 2007), support vector machines
143 (SVM) (Lee et al., 2013), Genetic Algorithm (GA) based models (Tee et al., 2014) (208), finite element


144 model (FEM) (Jin et al., 2014). Nevertheless, given that coastal extreme events are more uncertain than
145 predictable (Lin et al., 2012), the historical data-centric model is deemed ineffective in reflecting the real
146 disaster situation. Admittedly, these models provide very detailed results if the input data is sufficient, the
147 feasibility of collecting a timely data environment remains unravelled in literature. Alternatively, expert
148 judgments are implemented into risk-based assessment for qualitative measurement. To obtain the
149 qualitative risk value, numerous approaches were proposed including Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)
150 (Cagno et al., 2000), Fuzzy logic method (FL) (Jamshidi et al., 2013), Fault Tree Model (FTM) (Yuhua and
151 Datao, 2005), etc. While these approaches are good at identifying the causes, Han and Weng (2011)
152 argued that they fall short in assessing the risk.

153 **2.3 Remote sensing based method**

154 Remote sensing data are increasingly deployed for coastal resilience applications because the
155 technique is capable of acquiring real-time or near-real-time disaster data for situational awareness (Hu
156 and Gong, 2018). Compared to the high-precision defect detection tool, remote sensing sensors that are
157 often mounted on aircraft are capable of covering thousands of miles. Therefore, it is deemed a solution
158 for pipeline risk assessment in disaster response (Roper and Dutta, 2005). Among all the remote sensing
159 techniques, light detection and ranging (LiDAR) is broadly studied for pipeline risk assessment because
160 of its high accuracy (Hodgson and Bresnahan, 2004) and visibility (Kumar et al., 2017). In addition to
161 visual inspection (Piciarelli et al., 2018), LiDAR is a method for determining ranges, which has already
162 been applied for quantifying the different types of morphologies in the coastal community such as
163 dunes (Rango et al., 2000), vegetation (Campbell et al., 2018), building infrastructure (Hatzikyriakou et al.,
164 2015), and water bodies (Canaz et al., 2015). Furthermore, by comparing two datasets (e.g., pre-disaster
165 and post-disaster), called change detection, the technique is able to identify the volumetric changes in the
166 morphology. For instance, Roper and Dutta (2006) proposed using change detection of before and after
167 aerial imagery data for pipeline damage assessment caused by ground deformation. Similar change
168 detection investigations are carried out using LiDAR data such as Tao and Hu (2002), Zhou et al.
169 (2016a). Besides, other scholars attempt to compare the pipeline damage correlations obtained from both
170 image data and LiDAR data (Toprak et al., 2018). In sum, remote sensing techniques have proved the
171 success of providing a reliable recording of the coastal morphologies and measurements of changes, it is
172 worthwhile mentioning that most of these metrics are built upon Vertical Displacement, investigation on
173 other geometric changes remains scant. Nevertheless, pipeline systems are also subjected to horizontal
174 loads (e.g., wind load, soil load) (Wang et al., 2020; Zeng et al., 2019), flooding loads (Li et al., 2017), and
175 the aging effect (Dahire et al., 2018), which requires further investigations.

176 **3. Methodology**

177 The methodology is articulated into two steps (as depicted in Figure 1) including threats measurement
178 and vulnerability analysis. The method is implemented through a Python procedure in ArcGIS.



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Figure 1 The methodology

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3.1 Threats measurement

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As mentioned earlier, high precision pipeline defect detection tools such as magnetic flux (Gloria et al., 2009), ultrasonic (Alobaidi et al., 2015) are proved high accuracy, however, they fail to address the rapidity, operability, and practicality issues associated with disasters. Alternatively, remote sensing data are deployed for real-time or near-real-time pipeline threats measurement. In sum, four types of threats are considered in this study to identify the most vulnerable location in the pipeline network (Table 1). These four threats are determined by both the capability of LiDAR data and the damage mechanism of hurricane disaster. On the one hand, a hurricane is considered as a combined wind and surge event (Lin et al., 2012), which will further introduce wind-induced vibration (Wang et al., 2020) and flooding load (Li et al., 2017) to the coastal zones. At the same time, the vertical soil movement (Zeng et al., 2019) such as the landslide and the aging effect (Dahire et al., 2018), of the pipeline system could also impose a risk on the resilience of the pipeline system. On the other hand, LiDAR data is deemed effective and efficient in morphology mapping, which is capable of capturing the disaster-induced geometry changes on the coastal zones (Tatui et al., 2019). By correlating the pipeline damage with the ground deformation, the disaster-induced pipeline risk can be identified (Roper and Dutta, 2006). The detailed methods to measuring the four threats are elaborated in the following sections.

197 Table 1 Threats from Extreme coastal weather events

Threat	Source of damage	Asset Type	Influencing Factors	Disaster Evidence
Vertical Displacement	Soil settlement, landslides	Underground mains & services; Aboveground gas meter sets & regulators.	Area topography and soil type, Pipe vicinity to hazard & orientation; Pipe type, size, and Age, Joint type.	Change Detection of Pre- and post-airborne LiDAR data
Lateral displacement	Wind-induced vibration or earth movement	Majorly aboveground gas meter sets; Underground pipeline	Tornado & hurricane risk areas; Facility's vicinity to hazards; Aboveground facility structure type	Integrating Iterative Closest Point (ICP) with kernel interpolation using Pre- and Post-Airborne LiDAR data
Flooding	Hydrostatic (buoyancy or flotation effect) , breaking wave	Underground mains & services; Aboveground gas meter sets & regulators.	Area topography and soil type; Pipe vicinity to hazards and soil; Cover; Gas meter height above ground; Cast iron Joint type and pressure	Flood inundation map (e.g., Interpolation from watermark, Satellite-Based Flood imagery)
Aging	Aging induced cracking and deterioration	Majorly underground pipeline; Aboveground gas meter sets	Pipe type, size, and Age, Joint type; Construction year.	Inventory Data

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199 3.1.1 Vertical Displacement

200 The vertical soil movement, such as settlement or landslides, is commonly occurring during natural
 201 disasters. These vertical movements may result in sudden pipe collapse, gas leak, or significant
 202 deformations that induce long-term stresses on the pipe. Secondary effects of the earth movement
 203 include scour, erosion, and reduced soil cover, which may lead to risk increasing in excavation damage
 204 and pipe exposure. An increase in the overburden stresses on the belowground pipes may also result
 205 from the accumulation of soil and debris above the pipe.

206 The Vertical Displacement of the soil is measured using change detection by the comparison of the
 207 pre and post-airborne LiDAR data. A detailed description of the procedure for our change detection is
 208 described in Zhou et al. (2016b). Both pre and post LiDAR datasets are classified as ground and non-
 209 ground objects using a progressive morphological filter algorithm (Zhang et al., 2003). Then, a point-to-
 210 point-based algorithm is adopted to calculate the distance between two data sets. The distance between
 211 two datasets $\{P, Q\}$ at location i is expressed by the following equation:

212
$$D_{vert,i} = \min_i \|p_i - q_{i'}\|$$

213 Where $p_i \in P, q_{i'} \in Q, i$ and i' are the corresponding location in the pre-disaster dataset P and post-
 214 disaster dataset Q , respectively.

215 $D_{vert,i}$ is the vertical displacement between pre and post datasets at location i .

216 3.1.2 Lateral Deformation

217 The lateral load, such as wind load or debris flow, exert three types of forces on the building envelop
 218 including uplift load, shear load, and lateral load. The deformation of the building will further cause
 219 collaborative damage to the pipeline system attached to them. Though there are numerous studies
 220 addressing the measuring of the earthquake-induced lateral deformation (Glisic and Yao, 2012; Toprak
 221 and Taskin, 2007), these studies cannot be extended for the hurricane-induced horizontal movement on
 222 the pipeline because the damage mechanism is significantly different. One exception is the work by Zhou
 223 et al. (2016b), who used change detection to identify the hurricane-induced horizontal deformation.
 224 However, the authors' assumption is that the pipeline facilities are considered to be rigidly attached to the
 225 building envelope, which only holds for the aboveground pipeline.

226 Compared to the Vertical Displacement, the lateral movement of the soil is more strenuous to obtain.
 227 This study adopted an Iterative Closest Point (ICP) algorithm proposed by Nissen et al. (2012). The
 228 lateral deformation is computed as the squared sum of the distances between each source point p_i ($p_i \in \mathbf{P}$)
 229 and its corresponding targeted point $q_{i'}$ ($q_{i'} \in \mathbf{Q}$). The distance lateral deformation is measured using
 230 the equation below:

$$231 \quad D_{lat,i} = \min\left(\sum_i \|(\phi p_i - q_{i'})n_i\|^2\right)$$

232 Where $p_i \in \mathbf{P}$, $q_{i'} \in \mathbf{Q}$, i and i' are the corresponding location in the pre-disaster dataset \mathbf{P} and post-
 233 disaster dataset \mathbf{Q} , respectively.

234 $D_{lat,i}$ is the lateral deformation between pre and post datasets at location i .

235 n_i denotes the normal to the tangent plane at $q_{i'}$;

236 ϕ denotes the rigid body transformation, here,

$$237 \quad \phi = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & -\gamma & \beta & t_x \\ \gamma & 1 & -\alpha & t_y \\ -\beta & \alpha & 1 & t_z \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

238 t_x, t_y, t_z are the translation in the x, y, z direction and α, β, γ are the rotation about the x, y, z axes
 239 respectively.

240 3.1.3 Flooding

241 Flood water can create loadings (e.g., hydrostatic, breaking wave, hydrodynamic, debris impact) on
 242 the underground pipeline. The flooding loads dependent on the flood depth. The rise of the water table in
 243 flooding zones can result in a net upward force on the buried pipe when the buoyancy force exceeds the
 244 downward weights of the pipe and soil column above the pipe. In particular, in low-pressure cast iron's
 245 mains pipeline, water may intrude inside the pipe through the joints if the water head above the line is
 246 higher than the internal pressure of the pipe. Water levels that cover gas service meters and regulators
 247 may also present safety risks. Besides, heavy rains may expose underground pipelines in areas

248 susceptible to soil erosion; thus subjecting the lines to other threats such as corrosion and excavation
249 damage.

250 Flooding height data are created from filed verified high watermarks and storm surge sensors. In this
251 study, the flooding height data is obtained from the FEMA Modelling Task Force (MOTF) map, in which a
252 flooding map is produced by interpolating the high water marks and surge sensors and then subtracting
253 them to the Digital Elevation Model (DEM).

254 3.1.4 Aging effect

255 Another threat to the pipeline network comes from the long-term aging effect. Aging infrastructure is a
256 common phenomenon in the U.S. Among them; it is reported that more than half of the U.S. gas pipelines
257 are over 45 years old. Danger lurks underground from these aging gas pipeline systems. The long-term
258 changes such as the construction of aboveground structures creep process in the soil as well as long-
259 term fluctuation of the temperature, could cause a pipeline bending strain. Once this strain is coincident
260 with other pipeline defects, the tensile strain may speed up the deterioration of the pipeline. In this study,
261 the age of the pipeline is obtained based on the inventory data.

262 **3.2 Vulnerability analysis**

263 In this study, service pipelines and main pipelines are evaluated differently in the risk analysis. For the
264 service pipelines that connect distribution pipelines to a meter and deliver natural gas to houses, only the
265 risk of their defect is considered. However, for main pipelines that connect high-pressure transmission
266 lines and low-pressure service lines, the risk is determined by their damage as well as the damage from
267 the adjacent service pipelines.

268 A Bayesian Network (BN) approach was used to integrate the above damage defects and produce the
269 overall damage probability. BN is favoured in this study because it can be used to model accident
270 scenarios and determine the probabilities of different scenarios using accident prior information.
271 Moreover, the observed damage defects information can be updated to the model.

272 In this study, a BN model is constructed using historical data. The joint probability of a set of n risk
273 indicators $U = \{R_1, R_1, \dots, R_n\}$ can be given by the product of the conditional probability tables specified in
274 the Bayesian networks as:

$$275 \quad P(U) = \prod_{i=1}^n P(R_i | Pa(R_i))$$

276 Where $Pa(R_i)$ denotes the parent of R_i in the Bayesian networks;

277 $P(U)$ denotes the properties of the Bayesian network.

278 To predict the risk probability of events given the conditions of the occurrence probability of the
279 observed defects (prior), called evidence E , to yield the consequence probability (posterior) using the
280 following equation:

$$281 \quad P(U|E) = \frac{P(U, E)}{P(E)} = \frac{P(U, E)}{\sum_U P(U, E)}$$

282 A high-risk heat map is prepared in ArcGIS to display the patterns of the distribution and service
283 pipeline risks. This heat map provides relevant, trustworthy statistics for decision-makers to understand
284 the potential risks related to the pipeline network system. In this study, the kernel density estimation (KDE)
285 is taken for generating the heat map. In statistics, KDE is a non-parametric way to estimate the probability
286 function of a random variable. In this study, we implemented the line KDE (Flahaut et al., 2003) in ArcGIS
287 for estimating the risk probability. The kernel estimator of the density of the risk is defined as:

$$288 \hat{f}(x) = \frac{1}{nh} \sum_{i=1}^n K\left(\frac{x - x_i}{h}\right)$$

289 Where x_i are a set of n random variables with density $f(x)$;

290 h is the smoothing parameter (bandwidth) that determines the window width of the function;


291 K denotes the kernel function, which determines the shape of the function, this study employs
292 standard normal density function as the kernel function.

293 **4. Results**

294 Lavallette, Ortley Beach, and Seaside Heights, located in the Barnegat Peninsula in Ocean Country,
295 New Jersey, were selected as the study scope because they took the major hit during hurricane Sandy
296 (Hu and Gong, 2019b). Figure 2 depicts the building damage maps during hurricane sandy. The data is
297 obtained from the FEMA Modelling Task Force (MOTF). Building conditions are classified into four levels:
298 affected, minor, major, and destroyed. Figure 2a displays a kernel density map of the building damage in
299 the entire New Jersey shoreline area. The map is constructed based on the kernel density function, which
300 is introduced in the previous section. Figure 2b depicts a detailed distribution of residential house damage
301 in the abovementioned municipalities.

302 **4.1 Threats measurement results**

303 The proposed method is implemented in ArcGIS and tested in a hurricane Sandy (2012) scenario.
304 Hurricane Sandy (2012) wreaked havoc on the Atlantic shoreline area in 2012, destroying housing and
305 infrastructure. Though no direct incidents are reported to be caused by the pipeline damage, the aging
306 pipeline after the formidable forces from nature (e.g., storm surge, flooding, etc.) are posing life-
307 threatening risks to the people in this area. Identifying the risk of the pipeline system and making
308 corresponding and response planning is a necessity to improve the coastal resilience aftermath of an
309 extreme event.




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Figure 2 Hurricane Sandy Building Damage Map

312 4.1.1 Vertical Displacement

313 The vertical displacement from change detection in the three municipalities before and after hurricane
 314 Sandy struck is depicted in Figure 3. The red colors indicate the decrease of elevation height as a result
 315 of terrain morphology changes (e.g., dune erosion). The result suggests the dunes in all three
 316 communities are subject to substantial erosion as a result of the storm surge. On the other hand, the blue
 317 colors indicate the increase in the elevation, which is majorly attributed to the pipeline of foodborne
 318 debris, which is consisting of dune sand, vegetation, and other street furniture that is transported by
 319 moving water to the inland area. This piling debris could impose additional loading, and resulting in
 320 increasing the bending movement of the underground distribution pipeline. In Figure 3, it can be obtained
 321 that in Ortley Beach, the flood-borne debris is majorly from the ocean side while in Lavallette, the debris is
 322 from the bayside as indicated by the concentration of blue colors (increase in elevation.).



323
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Figure 3 Elevation Change during Hurricane Sandy

325 4.1.2 Lateral Deformation

326 Table 2 depicts the rigid body transformation matrix at six random locations including inland, bayside,
 327 and oceanfront. In the matrix, m_{14} , m_{24} represent a transformation in the x-axis and y-axis respectively.
 328 After the transformation of n ($n=50$) random points are determined, a kernel interpolation analysis is
 329 performed in ArcGIS for mapping the Lateral Deformation in the study scope.


330 Different from the vertical displacement that varies across communities, the lateral deformation
 331 significantly reduces from the oceanfront to the bayside. This aligns with the fact that most of the lateral
 332 loads are from the ocean side (e.g. wind load, debris flow). The ocean water is continuously eroding the
 333 dune, resulting in descending in the crest of the oceanfront dune in Ortley Beach. The breach in the dune
 334 forms a channel for high-velocity water to enter. This high-speed water entrains sand and other objects in
 335 their path, forming debris flow. Debris flow moves from the oceanfront of Ortley Beach to the Inland area
 336 causing significant lateral deformation. Meanwhile, the wind flow pressures can rip off roofing and cause
 337 racking of walls, which results in building deformation.

338 Table 2 Rigid body transformation matrix at different Random Locations

Bayside	$\phi_1 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & -0.017 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0.006 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0.001 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, \phi_2 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0.065 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0.014 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0.007 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$
Inland	$\phi_0 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & -0.001 & -0.001 & 0.234 \\ 0.001 & 1 & 0 & 0.456 \\ 0.001 & 0 & 1 & -0.120 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, \phi_3 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0.193 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & -0.025 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & -0.005 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$
Oceanfront	$\phi_5 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0.002 & 0.009 & 2.1749 \\ -0.002 & 1 & -0.001 & -1.018 \\ -0.009 & 0.001 & 1 & 0.229 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, \phi_6 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0.002 & -0.006 & 6.384 \\ -0.002 & 1 & 0 & -0.1625 \\ 0.006 & 0 & 1 & 2.816 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$

339 4.1.3 Flooding

340 Figure 4 displays the mapping of flooding height. The deep color indicates a higher flooding level while
 341 the light color indicates the lower flooding level. Comparatively, the color on the bayside is deeper than
 342 the color from the oceanfront, indicating the bayside might be subjected to more server flooding damage.
 343 The explanation for this phenomenon is two folds. First, the flood height in the oceanfront is less because
 344 the area is under the sheltering protection of the dune structures. By contrast, water is prone to intrude
 345 into the inland area from the bayside, where there exists no water breaking or water preventing
 346 structures. Second, the ground elevation in the oceanfront is much higher than the bayside. Flooding
 347 water is flowing from higher elevations (oceanfront) to lower elevations (bayside) and eventually reaches
 348 the lowland.



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Figure 4 Flooding height map

351 4.1.4 Aging effect

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
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Figure 5 depicts the KDE-based age distribution map of the pipeline networks. In the figure, the deeper color indicates an elder age while the lighter color indicates a relatively younger age. In all, according to the inventory data, a considerable amount (46.87%) of pipeline ages 40 or older while over 20% of them ages 70 and older in the study area. Particularly, the pipelines were built across multiple decades, leading to varying aging effects on the pipelines. The uneven distribution of the pipelines suggests that we cannot the entire pipeline as a whole for the aging effect analysis, but should be assessed separately according to their construction year to identify high-risk pipelines. This further highlights the need for our aging effect analysis. Specifically, two high-risk areas are identified. First, the northeast end of the Lavallete was identified as the high-aging risk area. This could be the result of a combination of dense and aging pipelines. Second, most of the deep colors are concentrated along the distribution pipeline, suggesting that the distribution pipeline is prone to be subjected to stronger aging risk. All combined, the threats from the aging effect are non-negligible.



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365

Figure 5 KDE based aging map

366 **4.2 Vulnerability analysis results**

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
In sum, a total of 11 attributes (Table 3), including 7 pipeline characteristics from inventory data and the above four threats, are integrated into a BN model (Farrag and Gong, 2016b) as depicted in Figure 6.

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Table 3 Risk analysis attributes

Attributes	Categories
History data	

Pipe Material	(1) Plastic pipe; (2) Steel pipe; (3) Cast iron pipe.
Line Type	(1) Service lines; (2) Main
Pipe Size	(1) ≤ 1 inch; (2) 1 to 4 inch; (3) 4 to 6 inch; (4) > 6 inch.
Mechanical Coupling	(1)Yes; (2) No; (3) Unknown.
Soil Type	(1) Sand; (2) Silt & Clay; (3) Unknown.
Depth of cover	(1) ≤ 2 inch; (2) 2 to 4 inch; (3) > 4 inch; (4) Unknown.
Leak History	(1) Low Rate; (2) Medium Rate; (3)High rate.
Disaster Data	
Horizontal Displacement	(1) <12 inch; (3) 12-24 inch; (4) 24-36 inch; (5) 36-48 inch; (6) >48 inch
Vertical Displacement	(1) <12 inch; (3) 12-24 inch; (4) 24-36 inch; (5) 36-48 inch; (6) >48 inch
Length of Displaced soil	(1) Short (≤ 30 ft); (2) Long (≥ 30 ft); (3) Unknown
Flood Water Level	(1) No Flood; (2)0-6 ft.; (3) >6 ft.



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Figure 6 Bayesian network for pipeline risk analysis (adopted from Farrag and Gong (2016a))

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
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To visualize the risk distribution, Figure 7 shows the kernel interpolation map of the high-risk underground pipeline. The deeper color indicates higher risks while the lighter color indicates lower risks. Regarding the distribution, the high-risk pipeline is located in the east end of Lavallette, the entire Ortley Beach as well as the Bayside of the Seaside Heights. These high dense risk pipeline locations can result from different reasons. For instance, the risk of the pipeline in the east end of Lavallette and bayside of

377 the Seaside Heights could have resulted majorly from the aging effect. It is observed in Figure 5, both
378 areas have the densest aging pipeline. On the other hand, in Ortley Beach, the risk could be the result of
379 a combined effort of Vertical Displacement, Lateral Deformation, and flooding. Regarding the type of
380 pipeline, it is observed that the main gas pipelines extending from Ortley beach to Lavallette are attributed
381 to higher risks. In addition to the fact that the main distribution gas pipelines bear greater risk, this implies
382 that the necessity of assessing the risk of the main pipelines from a holistic view: the integrity of the entire
383 main pipelines requires further exploration.



384
385

Figure 7 Consequence analysis results

386 5. Discussion

387 Traditional pipeline risk analysis has relied on high-precision pipeline detection tools that emphasized
388 accuracy (Fang et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2020), which cannot be extended to enhance the adaptability of
389 the coastal resilience because the requirements are deemed different. Improving adaptability requires
390 identifying the vulnerability of the community within a narrow time window. In light of this, the accuracy is
391 less a concern because the high accuracy of the high-precision pipeline detection tools is often
392 accompanied by extensive labor and intensive time (Zakikhani et al., 2020), which impose additional
393 difficulties on the vulnerability analysis. Therefore, we argued that the adaptability-centric pipeline risk
394 analysis has different requirements. First, Rodríguez-Espíndola et al. (2018) argued that improvisation is
395 important in disaster response, which is based on speedy assessment. Put differently, the rapidity of the
396 assessment could be a premise for any further decision-making. Furthermore, Quarantelli and Dynes
397 (1977) stressed that the appropriateness of response is as important as the speed of response. Here,
398 appropriateness refers to the applicability (Elaine Daily and Padjen, 2010), and operability (Huang and
399 Lien, 2012) of the assessment. In terms of applicability, Xie and Tian (2018) argued the anticipation of
400 high-precision defect detection tools (e.g., ultrasonic, magnetic flux) is simply impossible during disaster
401 response because these tools are considered expensive, time-consuming, and unsafe to operate. In
402 terms of operability, adaptability-centric pipeline vulnerability tools require stable and productive tools. To
403 this end, rapidity, applicability, and operability are deemed appropriate for addressing the pipeline risk
404 need in disaster response.

405 The proposed methodology in this study is carried out to address the above three requirements.
406 Regarding the rapidity, compared to the labor-intensive and time-consuming pipeline detection tools
407 (Alobaidi et al., 2015; Gloria et al., 2009), the proposed method is built high efficiency remote sensing
408 LiDAR data (Hu and Gong, 2018), which has substantial progress in the time efficiency in capture the
409 real-time or near real-time damage defects. Regarding the applicability, the four threats that we
410 considered for the vulnerability analysis are considered as the major threats to the pipeline system after
411 hurricanes which are evidenced in other work such as (Dahire et al., 2018; Li et al., 2017; Wang et al.,
412 2020; Zeng et al., 2019). Regarding the operability, the proposed method is built by integrating a serial of
413 already-in-place geospatial analysis tools (e.g., Iterative Closest Point, Kernel Interpolation), which has
414 already proved stable and productive in numerous fields (Flahaut et al., 2003; Nissen et al., 2012).

415 The contribution of this study is two-fold. Theoretically, this study complements existing literature on
416 coastal resilience by emphasizing the need for underground gas pipeline risk assessment after a
417 hurricane strikes, which enhances our understanding of improving the adaptability perspective of coastal
418 resilience. Specifically for coastal resilience applications, we further summarized three requirements
419 (rapidity, applicability, and operability), which may point to another branch of pipeline risk analysis.
420 Practically, compared to traditional pipeline risk analysis that focuses on accuracy, we leveraged LiDAR
421 data and in place geospatial tools in ArcGIS for the timely risk assessment. We further developed
422 methods to identify the risk of pipeline based on four facets of damage mechanisms (vertical
423 displacement, lateral deformation, flooding, and aging effect). This study provides a preliminary attempt to
424 exploit remote sensing data for assessing pipeline risks after a disaster, which is expected to encourage
425 the emergence of more relevant research.

426 There are also limitations of this study. Due to the lacking of precise risk data, we were unable to
427 pairwise verify our analytic result with the actual risk. However, we argue that the four geometry changes
428 based on damage sources deem reasonable representing the damage mechanism after hurricanes. First,
429 all the houses are subjected to severe wind load from the ocean side. By comparison, houses (Lavallette
430 and Seaside Heights) under the protection of a strong dune are evidenced with less server damage than
431 those (Oretely Beach) without the protection. Second, flooding load attributes another damage source. In
432 Lavallette and Seaside Heights, the majority of damage is concentrated on the bayside rather than the
433 oceanfront, indicating that flooding force could be the main cause. Moreover, the damage in the house,
434 the erosion of the sand, the formulation of debris flow would inevitably cause vertical soil movement,
435 imposing threats to the gas pipeline system beneath the ground. Last, from the inventory data, more than
436 50% of the pipelines aged 40 years and older as depicted in Figure 5, the risk of the aging pipeline is self-
437 explanatory.

438 Regarding the future work, in the absence of matching datasets, we are not able to quantitatively
439 identify the accuracy of the analysis in this analysis, which is worthy of further investigation. Meanwhile,
440 given that the airborne datasets that we used are considered as relatively low density (Hodgson and
441 Bresnahan, 2004), the ability of accuracy improvement if higher quantity datasets are deployed

442 determines the extendibility of the proposed method to broader application scenarios. Furthermore, due
443 to the limitation of LiDAR accuracy, small deformation damage defects (e.g., crack) (Laefer et al., 2010)
444 cannot be readily identified. However, these minor defects could also create huge risks to the pipeline
445 system, which is to be addressed in future work.

446 **6. Conclusions**

447 This study is motivated by practical needs. Based on the literature analysis, we identified a gap that
448 the extant coastal resilience research that pipeline risk analysis is largely understudied. Specifically, while
449 the capability of community resilience can be enhanced using high-precision defect detection tools, the
450 studies on the adaptability perspective of community resilience are understudied. To improve the
451 adaptability, we first summarized three requirements for identifying the pipeline vulnerability in disaster
452 response including, rapidity, applicability, and operability. Drawing upon these requirements, we further
453 investigated the hurricane-induced pipeline damage and identified four facets of the damage mechanism
454 including (1) vertical displacement, (2) lateral deformation, (3) flooding, and (4) aging effect. To identify
455 the vulnerability of the pipeline, the risk associated with these four damage mechanisms were assessed
456 by integrating remote sensing LiDAR data and geospatial analytic tools in ArcGIS. The methodology is
457 validated through a hurricane Sandy case study in Ocean County, New Jersey. We found that the
458 proposed method not only satisfies the above three requirements in disaster response, but also aligns
459 with the observed hurricane-induced geometry change patterns, and therefore deem appropriate for the
460 rapid assessment of pipeline risk after extreme weather events.

461

462 **Data Availability Statement**

463 Airborne LiDAR data used in this study are available online from NOAA digital Coast
464 (<https://coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/>) in accordance with funder data retention policies. Some or all data,
465 models, or codes that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon
466 reasonable request. The GIS toolbox code that supports the findings of this study is available from the
467 corresponding author upon reasonable request.

468

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
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668

669

Threats Measurement

Vertical Deformation



Post Data

Pre Data

Change Detection

Lateral Displacement

$$\phi = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & -\gamma & \beta & t_x \\ \gamma & 1 & -\alpha & t_y \\ -\beta & \alpha & 1 & t_z \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Iterative Closest Point

Flooding



Interpolating the high water marks and surge sensors

Aging Effect




Inventory Data



Vulnerability Analysis

$$P(U) = \prod_{i=1}^n P(R_i | Pa(R_i))$$

Bayesian network



Kernel Density-based Vulnerability Map

Vulnerability analysis of underground gas pipeline system after hurricanes using LiDAR data