

1 Why does the public support or oppose agricultural nutrient runoff regulations? The effects of
2 political orientation, environmental worldview, and policy specific beliefs

3 Tian Guo ^a, Victoria Campbell-Arvai^b, Bradley L. Cardinale ^b

4 a. Cooperative Institute for Great Lakes Research (CIGLR), University of Michigan, 440 Church
5 Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109, USA

6 b. School for Environment and Sustainability, University of Michigan, 440 Church Street, Ann
7 Arbor, Michigan 48109, USA

8

9 **Corresponding author:** Tian Guo, tianguo@umich.edu, Cooperative Institute for Great Lakes
10 Research (CIGLR), University of Michigan, 4840 S. State Rd, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104,
11 USA

12

13 **Highlights:**

- 14 • Two models of public support for regulation to reduce agricultural runoff in Ohio
15 • Public support was moderated by regulatory-specific beliefs
16 • Autonomy beliefs decrease support for regulations on agricultural runoff
17 • Accountability beliefs increase support for regulations on agricultural runoff
18 • Environmental worldview indirectly affect support for regulations on agricultural runoff

19

20

21 Abstract:

22 This research examines public acceptability of regulations to reduce agricultural nutrient runoff
23 and curb Harmful Algal Blooms (HABs). We tested the effects of two novel policy specific
24 beliefs including support for farmers' autonomy and support for external accountability. We also
25 simultaneously tested the direct and indirect effects of political orientation and environmental
26 worldview through a Direct Effect Model and a Mediation Model using structural equation
27 modelling. Survey data were collected from 729 Ohio residents collected in November 2018.
28 The specific regulatory policy measure we targeted is fines on excessive agricultural runoff. As
29 hypothesized, autonomy beliefs negatively affect, and accountability positively affect support for
30 fines. Both models revealed good fits. the direct effects of environmental worldviews political
31 orientation were not supported. Instead, environmental worldviews indirectly increased support
32 for fines through increased accountability beliefs and diminished autonomy beliefs. From the
33 results, we suggest that when proposing suitable regulations for specific sites, policy makers and
34 interest groups should be aware of differences in public support for farmer autonomy and
35 external accountability, and that such differences are likely rooted in environmental worldviews.
36 The study also suggests a need for coupled ecological and social studies that assess the
37 likelihood of regional agricultural producers voluntarily adopting conservation practices and
38 forecast the effectiveness of potential accountability measures.

39 Keywords: policy acceptability; Great Lakes; Environmental values

40

41

1. Introduction

42 Facing increasing threats of nutrient pollution from agricultural runoff and the ensuing
43 harmful algal blooms (HABs), governments in different parts of the world are using diverse
44 methods, including regulatory policies to induce wide-spread changes in farming practices.
45 However, people disagree on whether regulatory policies should be used in addition to existing
46 market-based, educational, and technical assistance programs (Garnache, Swinton, Herriges,
47 Lupi, & Stevenson, 2016; Shortle & Horan, 2013; Smith et al., 2018). In cultures that emphasize
48 individual freedom, including the United States, regulations such as penalties, mandatory actions,
49 and monitoring are often less acceptable than policy approaches designed to promote voluntary
50 behavioral changes or that rely on market-based solutions (Rissman, Kohl, & Wardropper, 2017;
51 Steg, Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2006; 2016; de Groot & Schuitema, 2012; Howard, Roe, Nisbet,
52 & Martin, 2017). A better understanding of why individuals support or oppose regulations on the
53 agricultural industry will provide insight into public support for on-farm nutrient management
54 practices and inform related policy discussion and development.

55 In this study, we investigate the drivers of support for regulations to reduce nutrient
56 pollution by testing the effects of two policy specific beliefs, political orientation, and
57 environmental worldview with survey data from residents in Ohio, United States. We set out to
58 advance the understanding on public support for regulations in three ways: (1) testing the effects
59 of two novel regulation-specific beliefs, support for autonomy and support for external
60 accountability, (2) simultaneously examining the effects of political orientation and
61 environmental worldviews, and (3) comparing the direct and indirect effects of political
62 orientation and environmental worldview using model selection techniques. In the next sections,
63 we summarized relevant past studies on public acceptability of environmental regulations

64 including the effects of political orientation and environmental worldview. We proposed two
65 models that test the direct and indirect effects of political orientation and environmental
66 worldview.

67 2. Literature Review

68 2.1 Support for Farmers' Autonomy and External Accountability

69 We propose that two novel policy-specific beliefs, support for *autonomy* and support for
70 *external accountability*, play a critical role in determining individual support or opposition to a
71 specific regulatory policy measure. Autonomy refers to farmers' ability to make decisions that
72 they think are right for their farm, and accountability describes farmers' responsibility for their
73 farm management outcomes. Particularly, farmers' self-regulation and intention to steward
74 farmlands are the manifestation of farmers' autonomy in reducing nutrient runoff. The extent to
75 which the public supports farmer autonomy may affect their support for regulation of common
76 agricultural practices. As researchers discovered, the perception of infringements on individual
77 freedom of choice (i.e., infringement on individual autonomy) is a key source of the unpopularity
78 of many regulations (Eriksson, Garvill, & Nordlund, 2018; Steg, Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2006;
79 Jagers, Haring, & Matti, 2018). In other words, if the polluters are self-motivated and able to
80 change their actions on their own, it is more desirable to avoid regulation (Steg, et al., 2006).
81 Thus, support for autonomy is linked with decreased support for regulations. In comparison,
82 support for external accountability is likely to increase support for regulations. As noted by
83 Jagers et al. (2018), "examples of people voluntarily cooperating on a larger scale, involving a
84 widely dispersed and mutually anonymous multitude of people, are strikingly rare." (p. 86)
85 Environmental groups often advocate for regulations as means to ensure external accountability,

86 especially when the desired behavior change may impose economic losses on the polluter or
87 requires effort to carry out.

88 Nevertheless, beliefs about farmers' autonomy and external accountability have not been
89 explicitly tested in the policy acceptability literature. In our attempt to conceptualize these two
90 complicated concepts, we consider public support for farmers' autonomy and external
91 accountabilities as latent constructs, which consist of specific beliefs about farmers' intention
92 and behaviors. Specifically, the conceptualization of autonomy beliefs is informed by research
93 on trust. Guo, Gill, Johengen, and Cardinale (2019) found that residents who trust farmers and
94 their judgements related to water quality are less likely to support state government efforts to
95 introduce fines on excessive agricultural runoff. Others have found that low trust in business
96 actors explains why people in some countries demand more regulations (Aghion, Algan, Cahuc,
97 & Shleifer, 2010; Harring, 2018). The conceptualization of accountability beliefs is informed by
98 policy discussion around mitigating agricultural runoff to Lake Erie (Coleman, 2016; Guo et al.,
99 2019).

100 We predict that increasing autonomy beliefs result in a decrease in support for regulations,
101 while increasing accountability beliefs result in an increase in support for regulations.

102 H1. Autonomy beliefs will have a direct effect on support for regulation, with increasing
103 strength of autonomy beliefs resulting in a decrease in support for regulations.

104 H2. Accountability beliefs will have a direct effect on support for regulation, with
105 increasing strength of accountability beliefs resulting in an increase in support for
106 regulations.

107 2.2 Political Orientation and Environmental Worldview

108 People’s attitudes towards environmental regulation are thought to be rooted in their
109 political orientation and environmental worldviews (Dietz et al 2007; Jagers et al 2018; Van
110 Boven et al 2018). Political orientation describes a person’s beliefs and opinions about
111 characteristics of the political and economic system (political ideology) and often manifests as
112 their affiliation with political parties (Cruz, 2017; Haring, Jagers, & Matti, 2017). The most
113 common scale to measure individual political ideology is along the strongly liberal to strongly
114 conservative spectrum. People who place themselves towards the 'strongly liberal' end on the
115 scale tend to support an active, non-neutral state, a more regulated market, and universal welfare
116 policies. Those who identify with the strongly conservative end of the scale tend to be prefer a
117 passive neutral state, an unregulated market, and limited social policy interventions (Haring, et
118 al., 2017). Environmental worldviews, on the other hand, reflect beliefs about a human’s
119 relationship with the natural environment (Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000). The most
120 widely used measure for environmental worldview is the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP),
121 which measures individuals positions on belief statements such as "human activities impact the
122 balance of nature," "human beings have the right to modify and control the natural environment",
123 and “an eco-crisis is possible” (Hawcroft & Milfont, 2010). Conceptually, political orientation
124 and environmental worldview are two related components of an individual’s fundamental view
125 of the world (Ziegler, 2017).

126 Overall, those who endorse a liberal political ideology, or pro-environmental worldview,
127 tend to support more stringent regulation and 'stick'-type policies (bans, penalties), those who are
128 more conservative politically and individualistic in their worldview favor market-based
129 approaches and more 'carrot'-type policies (incentives and credits) (Jagers et al 2018; Rissman et

130 al 2017; Tosun et al 2020; Attari et al 2008; Merrill & Sintov 2016; Milman et al 2018).
131 However, few studies of policy support have examined political orientation and environmental
132 worldview simultaneously (Harring et al., 2017; Ziegler, 2017). Those studies that have been
133 conducted reveal somewhat mixed findings about the relative strengths of political orientation
134 and environmental worldviews in predicting policy support. While some have found that when
135 environmental worldview is included in the model, political orientation is no longer a significant
136 predictor of policy support (Attari et al., 2009; Harring & Jager, 2013; Shwom et al., 2010),
137 others have shown both environmental worldview and political ideology as significant
138 independent predictors (Zeigler 2017). Our hypotheses predict environmental worldview and
139 political ideology both directly affect support for regulations, yet we acknowledging that the
140 literature is inconclusive on these relationships.

141 H3. Political orientation will have a direct effect on support for regulation, with
142 conservative political orientation associated with decreased support for regulations.

143 H4. Environmental worldview will have a direct effect on support for regulations, with a
144 stronger pro-environmental worldview associated with greater support for regulations.

145 Our last sets of hypotheses expect political orientation and environmental worldview
146 affecting the autonomy beliefs and the accountability beliefs. Those who endorse a strong
147 environmental worldview may be resistant to the idea that industrial agricultural practices can
148 have positive environmental outcomes (Heise & Theuvsen 2016; Tosun et al 2020), and thus be
149 inclined to hold a low level of support for farmer autonomy but high level of support for farmer
150 accountability. Conversely, those who self-identify as politically conservative may have a high
151 level of support for farmer autonomy, consistent with their beliefs in free market, while having a

152 low level of support for farmer accountability, consistent with their reservations with
153 government intervention (Jagers et al, 2018).

154 H5. Political orientation will have a direct effect on policy-related beliefs, with autonomy
155 beliefs increasing and accountability beliefs decreasing with increasingly conservative
156 political orientation.


157 H6. Environmental worldview will have a direct effect on policy-related beliefs, with
158 autonomy beliefs decreasing and accountability beliefs increasing with increasingly
159 pro-environmental worldview.

160 3. Materials and Methods

161 We tested these hypotheses through two alternative models. Our analyses are based on the
162 data collected from an online survey of Ohio residents that was conducted in November 2018.
163 The survey gauged public awareness of and preferences for solutions to harmful algal blooms in
164 Lake Erie, one of the Laurentian Great Lakes. In this section, we first introduced the models and
165 then summarized the data and analyses we used to test the models.

166 3.1 Models


167 We tested two alternative models about the effects of autonomy beliefs, accountability
168 beliefs, political orientation, and environmental worldview on support for specific regulatory
169 policies. The first model only includes the direct effects of the autonomy belief, accountability
170 belief, political orientation, and environmental worldview on regulation support (Figure 1). This
171 model emphasizes that political orientation and environmental worldview operate independently
172 and directly, and not through policy beliefs.



173

174 Figure 1. Model 1 is a direct effect model describing how political orientation, environmental
 175 worldview, and policy-specific beliefs affect support for environmental policies.

176 In comparison, the second model only includes the indirect effects of political orientation
 177 and environmental worldview on regulation support (Figure 2). The model emphasizes that
 178 political orientation and environmental worldview operate through the policy-related beliefs. In
 179 other words, the autonomy belief and the accountability belief are hypothesized to fully mediate
 180 the effects of political orientation and environmental worldview on regulation support.



181

182 Figure 2. Model 2 is a mediation model describing how political orientation, environmental
183 worldview, and policy-specific beliefs affect support for environmental policies.

184 We propose to compare the two models statistically to test whether the two policy
185 specific beliefs fully mediate the effects of political orientation and environmental worldview.
186 Traditionally, researchers directly fit a partial mediation model but test the full mediation
187 hypotheses through qualitatively assessing the significance of the direct and indirect paths. In
188 comparison, our multiple model approach will quantify which model specification best fits the
189 data, and by how much. Any detected difference in the model fit statistics results directly from
190 whether political orientation and environmental worldview are specified as directly or indirectly
191 affect regulation support. Although the multiple model approach is a standard practice in natural
192 science fields such as ecology (Johnson & Omland, 2004), it is less common in the mechanism
193 studies about public support for environmental policies. Due to insufficient prior evidence we do
194 not have a hypothesis about which model will perform better. Nevertheless, with using this
195 “novel” approach, we attempt to expand on how pathways for public policy support can be tested.

196 3.2 Study Case

197 The frequency, extent, and peak severity of toxin forming HABs in Western Lake Erie have
198 increased since the mid-1990s (Michalak et al., 2013; Stumpf et al., 2012). Annual economic
199 loss due to blooms in Western Lake Erie is estimated at \$65 to \$71 million (Bingham, Sinha, &
200 Lupi, 2015). In 2016, under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, the U.S. and Canada
201 Government set a target of reducing nutrient loading in Lake Erie by 40% (Maccoux, Dove,
202 Backus, & Dolan, 2016; Scavia, DePinto, & Bertani, 2016; Stumpf, et al., 2016). Most of these
203 reductions need to occur in agricultural runoff. Regulations on agricultural runoff—including

204 fines for excessive agricultural runoff—are considered one tool that might ensure accountability
205 but face strong opposition from the farming community (Garnache et al., 2016; Shortle & Horan,
206 2013; Guo et al., 2019^a). The center of the discussion is in the Midwestern state of Ohio, a state
207 that receives the most impacts from HABs in Lake Erie but also contributes the most agricultural
208 nutrient loading to the Lake (Maccounx, et al., 2016). In this situation, Ohio residents' support
209 for (or resistance to) regulations on agricultural nutrient runoff may motivate (or discourage)
210 politicians to introduce regulatory policies to address the HAB problem in Lake Erie.

211 3.3 Survey implementation

212 We collected public opinion data through survey firm YouGov (For YouGov's
213 recruitment and non-probability sampling methodology see Twyman, 2008). One thousand (1000)
214 Ohio residents enrolled in YouGov's online panel completed the survey. These cases matched to
215 a target sample that was drawn from a constructed sample frame using results from the American
216 Community Survey. The matching criteria were gender, age, race and education. The sample was
217 also set to represent the five Ohio EPA districts that are managed by the Central District Office,
218 Northwest District Office, Southeast District Office, Northeast District Office and the Southwest
219 District Office (<https://epa.ohio.gov/Districts>). Weights were calculated using propensity scores
220 and were used in all descriptive and modeling analyses.

221 3.4 Measures

222 *Support for regulation.* We selected penalties on excessive agricultural runoff as a specific
223 example of regulations because it is intuitive for respondents to understand without detailed
224 explanations. Respondents were asked "If the education, technical assistance and cost-share
225 programs reduced fertilizer runoff to Lake Erie by 5% (instead of the 40% target), how much

226 would you support state government introduction of fines for farmers who allow too much
227 agricultural runoff" using a seven-point scale with one (1) meaning strongly oppose and seven (7)
228 meaning strongly support. The question set up a scenario in which voluntary policies (i.e.,
229 education, technical assistance, and cost) were not effective in reducing agricultural runoff.

230 *Support for farmer autonomy.* We used three questions to measure individual support for farmer
231 autonomy. The first question measure respondents' self-reported trust-level, "In general, to what
232 extent do you trust Ohio farmers to manage the land well?", with one (1) meaning strongly
233 distrust and seven (7) meaning strongly trust. The other two questions are Likert Scale questions
234 asking respondents to rate their levels of agreement with two statements "Ohio farmers are
235 generally sensitive to the concerns of Lake Erie water quality," and "Most Ohio farmers have
236 been careful in applying fertilizer to their lands." For these two questions, selecting one (1)
237 meant strongly agree, and seven (7) indicated strongly disagree.

238 *Support for external accountability.* We asked respondents to rate their levels of agreement with
239 three statements" With the threat of penalty, farmers are more likely to adopt best management
240 practices to reduce fertilizer runoff," "Farmers have too much freedom to do what they want on
241 their land," and "Regulations are necessary to keep farmers accountable for their land
242 management practices." For these questions, seven (7) indicated strong agreement, and one (1)
243 indicated strong disagreement.

244 *Political orientation.* Political orientation was measured using two questions following Ziegler's
245 (2017) approach. For political ideology, respondents were asked: "In general, how would you
246 describe you own political viewpoint" on a five-point scale with one (1) meaning very liberal and
247 five (5) meaning very conservative. Respondents' party affiliation was measured on a seven-

248 point scale with one (1) meaning strong Democrat and seven (7) meaning strong Republican.

249 These two items were used as the indicator for the latent variable political orientation in the SEM
250 models.

251 *Environmental worldview.* We measured the environmental worldview using the revised 15-item
252 NEP scale (Dunlap, et al. 2000). Respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement to
253 statements such as "The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop
254 them" and "If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological
255 catastrophe." Responses were selected from a seven-point scale with one (1) meaning strongly
256 disagree and seven (7) meaning strongly agree. Eight of the items are consistent with an
257 environment-centric worldview while the other seven items were worded to represent a human-
258 centric worldview (Dunlap, et al., 2000).

259 3.5 Data Analysis

260 The hypotheses were tested with Structural Equation Modeling package LAVAAN in R
261 ver. 3.6.3. Given the variables were measured by Likert scales, we used robust Maximum
262 Likelihood Estimator (specifying "estimator=mlr" in R) to account for the impacts of
263 measurement on the multi-normality assumption (Li, 2016; Rhemtulla & Savalei, 2012). For
264 environmental worldview, we followed Dunlap's et al. (2000) scale reduction method and
265 conducted Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with anti-NEP items reverse coded. We used
266 the factor score of the first principle component as people's environmental worldview scores,
267 with higher scores indicating a stronger pro-environmental worldview¹. To specify

¹ There is an ongoing debate about the latent factor structure of the NEP scale. Some researchers used a single NEP scale score while others argued for three-factor, four-factor, and even five-factor structure (Hawcraft & Milfont, 2010; Amburburkey & Thoman, 2012, Xiao & Buhrmann,

268 environmental worldview as a latent variable with a single indicator (NEP score), we set the
269 variance of the latent variable as $(1 - \lambda)$ the variance of the single indicator, where λ is the
270 reliability of the single item in measuring the latent variable (Petrescu, 2013). We set the λ to be
271 a conservative value of 0.9, informed by the reliability of the NEP scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.90$).
272 The value of λ is lower than the value of 0.95 suggested by Anderson and Gerbing (1988) when
273 the estimate for the error variance of the single indicator is absent. We used five goodness of fit
274 criteria, including p-value of chi-square > 0.05 , CFI > 0.9 , TLI > 0.9 , RMSEA < 0.06 , SRMR < 0.05
275 (Bentler, 1990; Hu & Bentler, 1999). Cases with missing values were deleted from the analyses.
276 We compared the Direct Effect Model and the Mediation Model using likelihood ratio test,
277 Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The models with
278 smaller AIC and BIC indicate a better fit to the data.

279 4. Results

280 The survey collected 1,000 completed surveys. Some of the survey had missing answers
281 for select questions. After using listwise deletion, the resulting sample size for model testing was
282 729. In the following sections, we first describe the sample, after which we summarize the
283 modeling results.

284 4.1 Respondents profile

285 The weighted sample descriptions were as follows: 52.8% female, 82.2% white alone,
286 11.8% African American, 93.1% 25 years old and over, among whom 27.5% has bachelor's
287 degree or higher. Geospatially, 14.8% of the sample was from Northwest Ohio, 32.8% from
288 Northeast Ohio, 24.5% from Southwest Ohio, 18.1% from Central Ohio, and 9.8% from

2017). We tested a five-factor structure and a second-order factor structure of NEP, but neither measurement model fit the data. Instead, we followed Dunlap's suggestion (Dunlap, et al., 2000), and used NEP score as a single indicator for the latent variable of environmental worldview

289 Southeast Ohio. In the sample, 9.7% respondents work or have previously worked in the
 290 agricultural industry. It is considerably higher than the estimated number of employments per
 291 1,000 jobs in Ohio for combined farming, fishing and forestry occupations (0.935, equivalent to
 292 0.09%) (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018). Less than ten percent respondents (6.0%) work
 293 or previously worked on or near Lake Erie in industries such as fishing industry, tourism,
 294 recreation, and shipping. About a third of respondents (33.9%) used Lake Erie for recreational
 295 purposes. On average, respondents rated their knowledge of farming in Ohio as less than
 296 intermediate but more than novice (mean = 2.9, S.D.= 1.5, on a seven-point scale).

297 When voluntary programs were projected to achieve a nutrient loading reduction of 5%,
 298 respondents, on average, somewhat supported the state government to introduce fines on
 299 excessive agricultural runoff (Table 1).

300 Table 1. Mean and Standard deviation of items measuring fine support, autonomy beliefs,
 301 accountability belief, environmental worldview, and political orientation.

Items	N	Mean	S.D.*
Support for fines on excessive agricultural runoff	1000	4.7	1.7
<i>Autonomy belief</i>			
Auto1: General level of trust in Ohio farmers to manage the land well	1000	4.6	1.4
Auto2: Ohio farmers are generally sensitive to the concerns of Lake Erie water quality	884	4.3	1.4
Auto3: Most Ohio farmers have been careful in applying fertilizer to their lands	860	4.3	1.5
<i>Accountability belief</i>			
Acco1: With the threat of penalty, farmers are more likely to adopt best management practices to reduce fertilizer runoff	936	5.0	1.4
Acco2: Farmers have too much freedom to do what they want on their land	893	3.6	1.6
Acco3: Regulations are necessary to keep farmers accountable for their land management practices	947	5.1	1.5
<i>Environmental worldview – NEP score</i>	998	4.7	1.0
<i>Political orientation</i>			
Ideology	927	3.2	1.2
Party ID	973	3.8	2.2

302 * S.D. Standard Deviation

303 Note. The beliefs items using a seven-point scale, with one indicating strongly disagree, and
304 seven indicating strongly agree.

305 The explanatory factor analysis for the six items of autonomy belief and accountability
306 belief suggested two latent factors with eigenvalues larger than one and the item-loading pattern
307 was as expected. We then calculated the mean of each scale as a proxy for the belief score. The
308 correlation between the two belief scores was significant but weak ($r = -0.21$, $p\text{-value} < .0001$),
309 suggesting the two beliefs were distinct constructs (More details on the relationship between the
310 two beliefs are in the supplementary materials).

311 Both political ideology and Party ID significantly correlated with individual support for
312 fines on excessive agricultural runoff. Residents who held more conservative ideology ($r = -0.31$,
313 $p\text{-value} < .0001$) or identified with the Republican Party more strongly ($r = -0.20$, $p\text{-value} < .0001$)
314 were less likely to support fines, even under the scenario that voluntary nutrient reduction
315 programs were deemed ineffective. Similarly, respondents who held stronger pro-environmental
316 worldview showed stronger support for fines on excessive agricultural runoff when voluntary
317 programs were deemed ineffective ($r = .46$, $p\text{-value} < .0001$).

318 4.2 Modeling Results

319 The initial measurement model consisted of political worldview, environmental
320 worldview, autonomy beliefs, and accountability beliefs revealed acceptable values of CFI
321 (0.960), TLI (0.941), RMSEA (0.070), and SRMR (0.056), but the chi-square was significant
322 ($\chi^2 = 130.013$, $df = 45$, $p\text{-value} < .001$), indicating poor model fit to the data. Therefore,
323 we used the Modification Index (MI) to improve model fit. MI calculated by the LAVAAN
324 package in R suggested five changes, including adding correlated errors between three pairs of
325 items, and adding two items to additional latent variables (For details of measurement model re-


326 specification see Supplementary materials). The re-specified model was a significant fit to the
 327 data (Chi-square = 21.62, $df=17$, p-value = 0.2).

328 Using the re-specified measurement model, Model 1 (the Direct Effect Model) fit the data
 329 well (Robust Chi-square = 28.837, $df = 22$, p-value = .153, Robust CFI=.996, Robust TLI=.991,
 330 Robust RMSEA=.028, SRMR=.030, Table 2). It explained 44.9% of the variance in support for
 331 fines. Model 2 (the Mediation Model) also fit the data (Robust Chi-square = 29.31, $df = 23$, p-
 332 value = .17, Robust CFI=.996, Robust TLI=.992, Robust RMSEA=.027, SRMR=.029). It
 333 explained 44.5% of the variance in support for fines.

334 Table 2. Model Fit Results

Model	Chi-square	df	p-value	Robust CFI	Robust TLI	Robust RMSEA	SRMR	AIC	BIC
Model 1: Direct Effect	28.837	22	.150	.996	.991	.028	.030	23387	23538
Model 2: Mediation	30.086	25	.221	.997	.994	.023	.030	23386	23523

335
 336 In Model 1, autonomy belief (Standardized $\beta = -.20$, p-value= .001) and accountability beliefs
 337 (Standardized $\beta = .62$, p-value <.001) significantly predicted individual support for fines,
 338 supporting H1 and H2 (Figure 3). Conversely, political orientation (Standardized $\beta = -.05$, p-
 339 value =.377) and environmental worldview (Standardized $\beta = -.08$, p-value=.384) did not
 340 directly predict support for fines, rejecting H3 and H4.




(Direct Effect Model)

341

342 Figure 3. Model 1: standardized coefficients of the significant paths in the direct effect model

343 In Model 2, autonomy beliefs (Standardized $\beta = -.17$, p-value= .002) and accountability
 344 beliefs (Standardized $\beta = .59$, p-value <.001) remained significant predictors of individual
 345 support for fines, supporting H1 and H2 (Figure 4). Environmental worldviews significantly
 346 predicted the autonomy beliefs (Standardized $\beta = -.42$, p-value <.001) and the accountability
 347 beliefs (Standardized $\beta = .68$, p-value <.001). As we hypothesized, individuals who hold stronger
 348 pro-environmental worldview were more likely to support external accountability, while less
 349 likely to trust the autonomy of farmers in reducing nutrient runoff (supporting H6). However,
 350 different from our expectation, political orientation did not significantly predict autonomy belief
 351 (Standardized $\beta = .07$, p-value= .342) or accountability belief (Standardized $\beta = -.06$, p-
 352 value= .439) (rejecting H5).



353

354 Figure 4. Model 2: standardized coefficients of the significant paths in the mediation model

355 When comparing the two models, the likelihood ratio test suggested no significant
 356 difference between the two models (Chi-square difference = 1.817, Degree of Freedom
 357 difference = 3, p-value = .6113). The AIC and BIC of the models were also similar, suggesting
 358 neither the Direct Effect model nor the Mediation Model fit the data better (For extended
 359 modelling efforts, including the test on a partially mediated model, please see Supplementary
 360 Materials).

361

5. Discussion

362 In this paper, we used survey data from Ohio residents to analyze how autonomy beliefs,
 363 accountability beliefs, political orientation and environmental worldview influence individual
 364 support for specific regulatory policies to reduce agricultural nutrient runoff. We fitted a direct
 365 effect model (Model 1) and a mediation model (Model 2), with the two beliefs fully mediating
 366 the effects of political orientation and environmental worldview on support for regulations. The
 367 results supported the direct effects of autonomy beliefs and accountability beliefs on support for
 368 fines but did not support the direct effect of political orientation or environmental worldview.
 369 Environmental worldview had an indirect effect on support for fines for excessive agricultural

370 runoff through autonomy and accountability beliefs. There were no significant indirect effects of
371 political orientation.

372 As hypothesized, autonomy beliefs and accountability beliefs appear to play a significant
373 role in determining individual support for specific regulations. Our measurement of autonomy
374 beliefs reflects trust in the agriculture industry (Guo et al, 2019), and results are consistent with
375 other studies showing that trust in the targets of regulation (in this case, agricultural producers)
376 decreases individual support for environmental regulations (Aghion et al, 2010; Harring, 2018).
377 The modelling results also suggest accountability beliefs play a larger role in determining
378 support for regulations than the effects of autonomy belief. In other words, a key driver for
379 public support of environmental regulations may be a desire for external accountability. This
380 finding follows similar conclusions from Tosun et al (2020), who documented growing public
381 awareness of aquatic pollution, an ascription of responsibility to agriculture and industry actors,
382 and increased support for strong top-down regulation of these sectors.

383 When comparing the effects of political orientation and environmental worldview,
384 neither directly predicted individual support fines on excessive agricultural runoff. However,
385 environmental worldview showed indirect effects on support for fines through autonomy beliefs
386 and accountability beliefs. As predicted, people who held a strong pro-environmental worldview
387 showed high levels of support for external accountability but low levels of support for farmer
388 autonomy. These results are consistent with biased information processing and motivated
389 reasoning (Hart, Nisbet, & Myers et al., 2015). Environmental worldview may affect how people
390 view the intentions and willingness of agricultural producers to solve the HABs problem. The
391 different views on farmers then played a critical role in individual attitude formation toward
392 stringent regulatory policy.

393 We found that there were no direct or indirect effects of political orientation on support
394 for fines. Our results add to the mixed findings from other studies that have simultaneously
395 tested the effects of environmental worldview and political orientation (Attari, et al., 2009;
396 Haring & Jager, 2013; Ziegler 2017). The results from our study suggest that environmental
397 worldview may be a more salient factor in the formation of autonomy beliefs, accountability
398 beliefs, and support for fines, as compared to political orientation. One speculation for this
399 difference was that the HABs issue in Lake Erie was not as politically polarized as other
400 environmental issues like climate change. People’s policy preference for HABs may instead be
401 more in tune with their views on human’s relationship with the natural environment, and their
402 observations of the potential vulnerability of Lake Erie to human stressors. Another possibility is
403 that political orientation and environmental worldview measured by NEP are highly correlated,
404 and thus political orientation did not make a significant independent contribution to the
405 explanatory power of the model. In addition, conservative political orientation might decrease
406 support for regulations through other mediators such as decreasing news exposure and risk
407 perceptions (Guo, et al, 2019). Political orientation may moderate the effects of environmental
408 worldview on autonomy beliefs and accountability beliefs. These alternative explanations of the
409 lack of effects of political orientation are worth investigating in future research.

410 Lastly, although autonomy and accountability beliefs fully mediated the effects of
411 environmental worldview on support for regulations, the model-comparison methods were
412 inconclusive. Overall, the strengths of this study include a representative sample with 729 cases
413 and a rigorous modelling approach. We were able to achieve our first and second contributions,
414 but left questions for future studies to discern the specific nature of the effects of political
415 ideology and environmental worldview on environmental policy.

416 5.1 Limitation and Future Research

417 The study has limitations that are worth acknowledging. First, we used cross-sectional
418 data and Structural Equation Modeling to infer the causal effects of political orientation,
419 environmental worldviews, autonomy beliefs, and accountability beliefs, on support for fines.
420 Although our results revealed strong signals for some of the effects, confirming causality
421 requires longitudinal studies or controlled experiments with interventions (Dunning 2008).
422 Second, there may be additional variables which play a role in mediating the effects of political
423 orientation on support for fines, and which were not included in this study, such as perceived
424 efficacy of the fine and risk perceptions (Hart, et al., 2011). Third, as with other studies that used
425 the NEP scale to measure environmental worldviews, we encountered difficulty in discerning the
426 factor structure of the scale. In this study, environmental worldview was aggregated into a single
427 measure and thus it was not possible to parse out which specific aspects of environmental
428 worldview might determine a person's views on autonomy, accountability, and support for fines.

429 Lastly, our measurements for autonomy beliefs and accountability beliefs have not been
430 tested in previous studies. The validity and reliability of the measurement requires further tests.
431 We acknowledge that the latent construct approach may appear less intuitive than a single item
432 approach (e.g., "Farmers should be able to make the decisions they think are right for their
433 farm"), but we believe it adds useful details about public beliefs related to farmer autonomy
434 which can inform more effective policy-related messaging. In spite of these limitations, the study
435 provides insight into the role of autonomy beliefs, accountability beliefs, political orientation,
436 and environmental worldview in support or opposition for specific environmental regulations.

437 Looking to future research, we believe it would be beneficial to continue this line of work
438 on environmental regulations through comparing the Direct Effect Model and Mediation Model

439 with additional fundamental beliefs and goals such as environmental values (de Groot & Steg,
440 2006) and cultural worldviews (Rissman, et al., 2017). This would allow for integration of
441 research on different dispositional factors (e.g., environmental values, cultural worldviews,
442 religious beliefs) and how they affect the tending to and processing information and formation of
443 environmental attitudes. In a separate line of economic research, studies have shown that the
444 costs, benefits, and perceived efficacy of a policy affect individual policy preferences (Howard,
445 et al., 2017). One can argue the autonomy beliefs and accountability beliefs are closely
446 correlated with the effectiveness of regulatory policies, or even tapping into the same construct.
447 Comparing the relative strengths of different policy specific beliefs and specifying the conditions
448 under which individual policy specific beliefs may play a larger or smaller role can shed more
449 light on the dynamic and nuanced process of policy attitudes formation.

450

451 5.2 Implications for Policymakers and Practitioners

452 Overall, this study demonstrates the importance of autonomy and accountability beliefs in
453 the public support for regulatory policies. For the study site of Lake Erie, our results revealed
454 moderate support for fines on excessive agricultural runoff to curb HABs. We suspect such
455 moderate level of support will not be sufficient to motivate policy makers to push a proposal for
456 fines given the political costs and existing oppositions. Other regulatory policies, such as
457 mandated nutrient management planning and soil testing, should be assessed in terms of its
458 public acceptability. When such suitable regulations are identified, our results have implications
459 for how to improve the acceptability of specific measures. Policy makers and interest groups
460 should take into account public trust in the agricultural industry, meaning perceptions of how
461 likely farmers will adopt conservation practices without external requirements. Further, policy

462 makers and interest groups should partner with natural and social scientists and provide best
463 available information on agriculture industry's self-regulation measures and historical adoption
464 rates for conservation practices. Projections about adoption rates with or without the proposed
465 regulation can also help the public calibrate their trust or distrust in the agricultural industry.
466 Coupled ecological and social studies are needed to assess the likelihood of the agricultural
467 industry voluntarily adopting conservation practices and forecasting the effectiveness of potential
468 accountability measures in reducing nutrient runoff, such as mandated nutrient management plan
469 and soil testing.

470 It is worth recognizing that presented with similar information, individuals may form
471 different autonomy and accountability beliefs because of differences in environmental worldview.
472 During policy development and implementation stages, policy makers should give greater
473 consideration to biased information processing and motivated reasoning among the public.
474 Individuals with stronger pro-environmental worldview are most predisposed to support
475 environmental regulations, and thus may be more attentive and receptive to evidence that
476 reinforces these policy preferences. Identifying such differences in Ohio residents is important,
477 policy agencies need to craft tailored outreach messages that will resonate individuals with
478 different environmental worldviews (Hart, et al., 2011). These suggestions may apply to other
479 regions that have problem with agricultural nutrient runoff and see increasing public polarization
480 along political ideology and environmental worldview.

481 5.3 Conclusion

482 The goal of the study was to examine drivers of support for regulations in the context of
483 agricultural nutrient runoff in Ohio and HABs in Lake Erie. We found belief about farmer
484 autonomy and belief about external accountability significantly predicted individual support for

485 regulations on agricultural runoff. Both beliefs were rooted in individual environmental
486 worldview but not in their political ideology. When tested simultaneously, environmental
487 worldview showed stronger effects on support for regulations than political orientation. We
488 believe that improvements in Lake Erie water quality (including reductions in the frequency and
489 intensity of HABs) can be achieved—in part—by building support for regulatory policies across
490 a broad spectrum of the Ohio public and by tailoring related communication and outreach to the
491 diversity of policy-specific beliefs and environmental worldviews that underlie this support.

References

- Attari, S. Z., Schoen, M., Davidson, C. I., DeKay, M. L., Bruine de Bruin, W., Dawes, R., & Small, M. J. (2009). Preferences for change: Do individuals prefer voluntary actions, soft regulations, or hard regulations to decrease fossil fuel consumption? *Ecological Economics*, 68(6), 1701–1710.
- Barnett, M. D., Archuleta, W. P., & Cantu, C. (2019). Politics, concern for future generations, and the environment: Generativity mediates political conservatism and environmental attitudes. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 49(10), 647–654.
- Bentler, P. M. (1990). Comparative fit indices in structural models. *Psychological Bulletin*, 107, 238–246.
- Bingham, M., Sinha, S. K., & Lupi, F. (2015). *Economic benefits of reducing harmful algal blooms in Lake Erie*. Retrieved from http://ijc.org/files/tiny_mce/uploaded/Publications/Economic-Benefits-Due-to-Reduction-in-HABs-October-2015.pdf
- Birch, S. (2019). Political polarization and environmental attitudes: a cross-national analysis. *Environmental Politics*, 4016.
- Coleman, L. (2016). Message in a water bottle: The call for a tri-state TMDL for Western Lake Erie. *William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review*, 40, 565–590.
- Cruz, S. M. (2017). The relationships of political ideology and party affiliation with environmental concern: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 53, 81–91.

Eriksson, L., Garvill, J., & Nordlund, A. M. (2008). Acceptability of single and combined transport policy measures: The importance of environmental and policy specific beliefs.

Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 42(8), 1117–1128.

Dunlap, R. E., McCright, A. M., & Yarosh, J. H. (2016). The political divide on Climate Change:

Partisan polarization widens in the U.S. *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development*, 58(5), 4–23.

Dunlap, R. E., Van Liere, K. D., Mertig, A. G., & Jones, R. E. (2000). New trends in measuring

environmental attitudes: Measuring endorsement of the New Ecological Paradigm: A Revised NEP Scale. *Journal of Social Issues*, 56(3), 425–442.

Dunning, T. (2008). Improving Causal Inference: Strengths and Limitations of Natural

Experiments. *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(2), 282–293.

Feinholdt, A., Schuck, A. R. T., Lecheler, S. K., & De Vreese, C. H. (2017). Shifting frames:

Conditional indirect effects of contested issues on perceived effectiveness through multiple emotions. *Journal of Media Psychology*, 29(2), 81–91.

Fischer, A., & Glenk, K. (2011). One model fits all? - On the moderating role of emotional

engagement and confusion in the elicitation of preferences for climate change adaptation policies. *Ecological Economics*, 70(6), 1178–1188.

Garnache, C., Swinton, S. M., Herriges, J. A., Lupi, F., & Stevenson, R. J. (2016). Solving the

phosphorus pollution puzzle: Synthesis and directions for future research. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 98(5), 1334–1359.

Guo, T., Nisbet, E. C., & Martin, J. F. (2019)^a. Identifying mechanisms of environmental decision-making: How ideology and geographic proximity influence public support for managing agricultural runoff to curb harmful algal blooms. *Journal of Environmental Management*, 241(April), 264–272.

Guo, T., Gill, D., Johengen, T. H., & Cardinale, B. L. (2019)^b. What determines the public's support for water quality regulations to mitigate agricultural runoff? *Environmental Science & Policy*, 101(September), 323–330.

Harring, N., & Jagers, S. C. (2013). Should we trust in values? Explaining public support for pro-environmental taxes. *Sustainability (Switzerland)*, 5(1), 210–227.

Hart, P. S., Nisbet, E. C., & Myers, T. A. (2015). Public attention to science and political news and support for climate change mitigation. *Nature Climate Change*, 5(6), 541–545.

Hart, P. S., Nisbet, E. C., & Shanahan, J. E. (2011). Environmental Values and the Social Amplification of Risk: An Examination of How Environmental Values and Media Use Influence Predispositions for Public Engagement in Wildlife Management Decision Making. *Society and Natural Resources*, 24(3), 276–291.

Heise, H., & Theuvsen, L. (2016). What do consumers think about farm animal welfare in modern agriculture? Attitudes and shopping behaviour. *International Food and Agribusiness Management Review*, 20(3), 379-399.

- Hornsey, M. J., E. A. Harris, and K. S. Fielding. 2018. Relationships among conspiratorial beliefs, conservatism and climate scepticism across nations. *Nature Climate Change* 8:614-620.
- Hu, S., Jia, X., Zhang, X., Zheng, X., & Zhu, J. (2017). How political ideology affects climate perception: Moderation effects of time orientation and knowledge. *Resources, Conservation and Recycling*, 127, 124–131.
- Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. *Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal*, 6(1), 1–55.
- Jagers, S. C., Harring, N., & Matti, S. (2018). Environmental management from left to right—on ideology, policy-specific beliefs and pro-environmental policy support. *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management*, 61(1), 86–104.
- Jakobsson, C., Fujii, S., & Gärling, T. (2000). Determinants of car owners' acceptance of road pricing. *Transport Policy*, 7(2), 153–158.
- Johnson, J.B. & Omland, K.S. (2004) Model selection in ecology and evolution. *Trends in Ecology and Evolution*, 19(2) 101-108.
- Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. *Psychological Bulletin*, 108, 480-498.

- Leiserowitz, A. (2006). Climate change risk perception and policy preferences: The role of affect, imagery, and values. *Climatic Change*, 77(1–2), 45–72.
- Liu, X., Vedlitz, A., & Shi, L. (2014). Examining the determinants of public environmental concern: Evidence from national public surveys. *Environmental Science and Policy*, 39, 77–94.
- Lubell, M., Vedlitz, A., Zahran, S., & Alston, L. T. (2006). Collective action, environmental activism, and air quality policy. *Political Research Quarterly*, 59(1), 149–160.
- Michalak, A. M., Anderson, E. J., Beletsky, D., Boland, S., Bosch, N. S., Bridgeman, T. B., ... Zagorski, M. A. (2013). Record-setting algal bloom in Lake Erie caused by agricultural and meteorological trends consistent with expected future conditions. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 110(16), 6448–6452.
- Milman, A., Warner, B., Chapman, D. and Short Gianotti, A. (2018), Identifying and quantifying landowner perspectives on integrated flood risk management. *J Flood Risk Management*, 11: 34-47.
- Merrill, R., and N. Sintov. 2016. An Affinity-to-Commons Model of Public Support For Environmental Energy Policy. *Energy Policy* 99:88-99.
- Mueller, J. T., & Mullenbach, L. E. (2018). Looking for a White Male Effect in Generation Z: Race, Gender, and Political Effects on Environmental Concern and Ambivalence. *Society and Natural Resources*, 31(8), 925–941.

Pliskin, R., Bar-Tal, D., Sheppes, G., & Halperin, E. (2014). Are Leftists More Emotion-Driven Than Rightists? The Interactive Influence of Ideology and Emotions on Support for Policies. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 40(12), 1681–1697.

Rissman, A. R., Kohl, P. A., & Wardropper, C. B. (2017). Public support for carrot, stick, and no-government water quality policies. *Environmental Science and Policy*, 76(November 2016), 82–89.

Shortle, J.S., & Horan, R. D. (2013). Policy instruments for water quality protection. *Annual Review of Resource Economics*, 5(1), 111–138.

Shortle, J. S., Ribaudó, M., Horan, R. D., & Blandford, D. (2012). Reforming agricultural nonpoint pollution policy in an increasingly budget-constrained environment. *Environmental Science and Technology*, 46(3), 1316–1325.

Shwom, R., Bidwell, D., Dan, A., & Dietz, T. (2010). Understanding U.S. public support for domestic climate change policies. *Global Environmental Change*, 20(3), 472–482.

Smith, N., & Leiserowitz, A. (2014). The role of emotion in global warming policy support and opposition. *Risk Analysis*, 34(5), 937–948.

Smith, D. R., Wilson, R. S., King, K. W., Zwonitzer, M., McGrath, J. M., Harmel, R. D., ...

Johnson, L. T. (2018). Lake Erie, phosphorus, and microcystin: Is it really the farmer's fault? *Journal of Soil and Water Conservation*, 73(1), 48–57.

- Stern, P. C. (2000). Toward a coherent theory of environmentally significant behavior. *Journal of Social Issues*, 56(3), 407–424.
- Stern, P. C., Dietz, T., Abel, T., Guagnano, G. a., & Kalof, L. (1999). A value-belief-norm theory of support for social movements: The case of environmentalism. *Human Ecology Review*, 6(2), 81–97.
- Stoutenborough, J. W., Sturgess, S. G., & Vedlitz, A. (2013). Knowledge, risk, and policy support: Public perceptions of nuclear power. *Energy Policy*, 62, 176–184.
- Stumpf, R. P., Wynne, T. T., Baker, D. B., & Fahnenstiel, G. L. (2012). Interannual variability of cyanobacterial blooms in Lake Erie. *PLoS ONE*, 7(8).
- Tam, J., & McDaniels, T. L. (2013). Understanding individual risk perceptions and preferences for climate change adaptations in biological conservation. *Environmental Science and Policy*, 27, 114–123.
- Tosun, J., Schaub, S., & Fleig, A. (2020). What determines regulatory preferences? Insights from micropollutants in surface waters. *Environmental Science and Policy*, 106(February), 136–144.
- U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2018) May 2018 State Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates Ohio. Retrieved from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics website:
https://www.bls.gov/oes/2018/may/oes_oh.htm#45-0000
- Van Boven, L., Ehret, P. J., & Sherman, D. K. (2018). Psychological barriers to bipartisan public support for climate policy. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 13(4), 492–507.

Wang, S., Leviston, Z., Hurlstone, M., Lawrence, C., & Walker, I. (2018). Emotions predict policy support: Why it matters how people feel about climate change. *Global Environmental Change*, 50(August 2017), 25–40.

Ziegler, A. (2017). Political orientation, environmental values, and climate change beliefs and attitudes: An empirical cross-country analysis. *Energy Economics*, 63, 144–153.