{"Bibliographic":{"Title":"Final fishery management plan for Atlantic tunas, swordfish, and sharks","Authors":"","Publication date":"1999","Publisher":""},"Administrative":{"Date created":"08-16-2023","Language":"English","Rights":"CC 0","Size":"0001487046"},"Pages":["Final Fishery\nManagement Plan\nfor Atlantic Tunas,\nSwordfish and Sharks\nVolume I\nSH\n351\n.T8\nF55\n1999\nApril 1999\nv.1\nIncluding:\nthe Revised Final Environmental Impact Statement\nthe Final Regulatory Impact Review\nthe Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis\nthe Final Social Impact Assessment\nDEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE\nNORA","ATMOSPHERIC\nAND\nDECENDE\nNOAA\nFinal Fishery\nCOMMERCE\nManagement Plan\nOF\nfor Atlantic Tunas,\nSwordfish and Sharks\nApril 1999\nAND ATMOSPHERIC\nOF\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE\nWilliam M. Daley, Secretary\nNational Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration\nD. James Baker, Under Secretary\nNational Marine Fisheries Service\nPenelope D. Dalton, Assistant Administrator\nOffice of Sustainable Fisheries\nGary C. Matlock, Director\nPrepared by:\nHighly Migratory Species Management Division\nRebecca Lent, Chief\nSilver Spring, MD\nCover: Designed by Barbara Comstock, NMFS\nPhoto Credit: Jill Stevenson, NMFS; Wes Pratt, NMFS; and William L Papoulias, NMFS","Final Fishery Management Plan\nFor\nAtlantic Tuna,\nSwordfish,\nand Sharks\nLIBRARY\nAUG 28 2006\nJocalic &\nAtmospheric Administration\nApril 1999\nU.S. Dept. of Commerce\nSH\nIncluding\n351\nthe Revised Final Environmental Impact Statement,\nT8\nthe Final Regulatory Impact Review,\nthe Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis,\nF55\nand the Final Social Impact Assessment\n1999\nV. /\nPrepared by the\nHighly Migratory Species Management Division,\nOffice of Sustainable Fisheries,\nNational Marine Fisheries Service\nSilver Spring, Maryland","TABLE OF CONTENTS\nVOLUME 1\nExecutive Summary\nChapter 1: Introduction\n1.1\nPurpose and Need\n1.1.1\nThe HMS Process and History\n1.1.2\nIssues/Problems for Resolution\n1.1.3\nDomestic Considerations\n1.1.4 International Considerations\n1.1.5 Objectives\n1.2 Conservation and Management Measures\n1.3 Management Units\n1.4 Scientific Data and Research Needs\n1.5 Development of Fishery Resources\n1.6\nTotal Allowable Level of Foreign Fishing\n1.7 Relationship to International Agreements, Applicable Laws, and Other Fishery Management Plans\n1.7.1\nICCAT and its relationship to ATCA and the Magnuson-Stevens Act\n1.7.2\nThe United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and HMS\n1.7.3 Other Fishery Management Plans\n1.7.4\nRelationship of this FMP to Existing HMS Management Measures\n1.7.5 Paperwork Reduction Act\n1.7.6 Coastal Zone Management\n1.7.7 Endangered Species Act\n1.7.8 Marine Mammal Protection Act\n1.7.9 Federalism\n1.7.10 Executive Order 12866 (E.O. 12866)\n1.8\nWhat's in the HMS FMP\n1.9 Relationship of the HMS FMP to the Magnuson-Stevens Act Requirements\n1.10 List of Preparers\n1.11 List of Agencies and Organizations Consulted\nChapter 2: Description of HMS Fisheries\n2.1\nAn Introduction to HMS Quotas, Total Allowable Catches, and Discards\n2.2 Atlantic Tunas\n2.2.1 Life History and Status of the Stocks: Atlantic Tunas\n2.2.2\nInternational Aspects of the Atlantic Tuna Fishery\n2.2.3\nDomestic Aspects of the Atlantic Tuna Fishery\n2.2.4\nSocial and Economic Aspects of the Domestic Atlantic Tuna Fishery\n2.2.4.1 Bluefin Tuna\n2.2.4.2 BAYS Tunas\n2.3\nAtlantic Swordfish\n2.3.1\nLife History and Status of the Stocks\n2.3.2\nInternational Aspects of the Atlantic Swordfish Fishery\n2.3.3\nDomestic Aspects of the Atlantic Swordfish Fishery\n2.3.4\nSocial and Economic Aspects of the Domestic Atlantic Swordfish Fishery\ni","2.4\nAtlantic Sharks\nLife History and Status of the Stocks\n2.4.1\n2.4.1.1 Status of the Stocks\n2.4.1.2 Status of the Stocks - Small Coastal Sharks\n2.4.1.3 Status of the Stocks - Pelagic Sharks\n2.4.2 International Aspects of the Atlantic Shark Fisheries\nDomestic Aspects of the Atlantic Shark Fisheries\n2.4.3\nSocial and Economic Aspects of the Domestic Atlantic Shark Fisheries\n2.4.4\n2.5 HMS Gear Types\n2.5.1 Pelagic Longlines\n2.5.2 Bottom Longlines\n2.5.3 Atlantic Pelagic Driftnets\n2.5.4 Atlantic Coastal Driftnets\n2.5.5\nSoutheast Shark Drift Gillnets\n2.5.6 Sink Gillnets\n2.5.7 Purse Seines\n2.5.8\nHandgear (Rod and Reel, Handline and Harpoon)\n2.6 Current Permitting, Reporting, Data Collection Requirements and Fisheries Monitoring\n2.6.1\nMonitoring and Reporting in the Commercial Fishery\n2.6.2 Monitoring and Reporting in the Recreational Fishery\n2.6.3 Other Data Collection Programs\n2.7 Existing Time/Area Closures under MMPA and Other Laws\nChapter 3: Rebuilding and Maintaining HMS Fisheries\n3.1 Management Under National Standard 1: The Maximum Sustainable Yield Control Rule\n3.1.1\nThe Maximum Fishing Mortality Threshold\n3.1.2\nThe Minimum Stock Size Threshold\n3.2 Overfished Stocks: Managing for Recovery\n3.2.1\nBiomass Target During Rebuilding\nRecovery Period: The Rebuilding Trajectory\n3.2.2\nTarget Control Rule During Rebuilding\n3.2.3\n3.3 Healthy Stocks: Managing for FOY\nTarget Control Rule for Healthy Stocks\n3.3.1\n3.3.2 Biomass Approaching Overfished Designation: the Minimum Biomass Flag\nManagement Measures for Directed Fishing\n3.4\n3.4.1 Quota Alternatives\n3.4.1.1 Atlantic Tunas\n3.4.1.1.1 Bluefin Tuna Quota Alternatives\n3.4.1.1.2 Bluefin Tuna Domestic Allocation\nBluefin Tuna Quota Transfer Criteria\n3.4.1.1.3\n3.4.1.1.4 Bigeye Tuna Quota Alternatives\n3.4.1.2 North Atlantic Swordfish\n3.4.1.2.1 North Atlantic Swordfish Quota Alternatives\n3.4.1.2.2 Swordfish Domestic Allocation\n3.4.1.3 Atlantic Sharks\nCommercial Quota Alternatives for Large Coastal Sharks\n3.4.1.3.1\n3.4.1.3.2 Pelagic Sharks Commercial Quota Alternatives\n3.4.1.3.3 Small Coastal Sharks Commercial Quota Alternatives\n3.4.1.3.4 Fishery Operations\n3.4.1.3.5 Overharvest/Underharvest Adjustments\nPublic Display and Scientific Quota\n3.4.1.3.6\nii","3.4.2\nEffort Controls, Retention Limits, and Other Management Measures\n3.4.2.1 Atlantic Tunas\n3.4.2.1.1\nBluefin Tuna Effort Controls\n3.4.2.1.2\nBluefin Tuna Recreational Retention Limits\n3.4.2.1.3\nBluefin Tuna Size Limits\n3.4.2.1.4\nYellowfin Tuna Size Limits\n3.4.2.1.5\nYellowfin Tuna Recreational Retention Limits\n3.4.2.1.6\nBigeye Tuna Size Limits\n3.4.2.2 North Atlantic - Swordfish Rebuilding\n3.4.2.2.1\nSwordfish Size Limits\n3.4.2.2.2\nSwordfish Retention Limits\n3.4.2.3 Atlantic Sharks\n3.4.2.3.1 Prohibited Species\n3.4.2.3.2 Shark Recreational Retention and Size Limits\n3.4.2.3.3\nRecreational Landing Condition for Sharks\n3.4.2.3.4 Prohibition on Finning of Sharks\n3.4.2.3.5 Directed Large Coastal Shark Commercial Retention Limit\n3.4.3\nAuthorized Gears\n3.4.3.1 Atlantic Tunas\n3.4.4\nFishing Year\n3.5\nA Strategy for Bycatch Reduction in HMS Fisheries\n3.5.1 Introduction\n3.5.1.1 Bycatch Reduction and The Magnuson-Stevens Act\n3.5.1.2 Bycatch Reduction and the Marine Mammal Protection Act\n3.5.1.3 Bycatch Reduction and the Endangered Species Act\n3.5.2\nEvaluation and Monitoring of Bycatch\n3.5.2.1 Bycatch of HMS in All Fisheries\n3.5.2.2 Finfish Bycatch in HMS Fisheries\n3.5.2.3 Marine Mammal Bycatch in HMS Fisheries\n3.5.2.4 Sea Turtle Bycatch in HMS Fisheries\n3.5.2.5 Sea Bird Bycatch in HMS Fisheries\n3.5.2.6 Summary of Bycatch Issues\n3.5.3\nManagement Measures to Address Bycatch Problems\n3.5.4.1 Reducing HMS Bycatch and Bycatch Mortality\n3.5.4.1.1 Bluefin Tuna\n3.5.4.1.2 Swordfish Bycatch Reduction Measures\n3.4.4.1.3 Sharks\n3.5.4.1.4 Billfish\n3.5.4.1.5 General Bycatch Reduction Measures\n3.5.4.2 Reducing Protected Species Bycatch and Bycatch Mortality\n3.5.4\nA Strategy for Future Bycatch Reduction\n3.6 Interim Milestones (During Recovery)\n3.7\nUncertainty Issues\n3.8 Monitoring, Permitting and Reporting\n3.8.1 Introduction\n3.8.2\nMonitoring, Permitting and Reporting Measures\n3.9 Safety of Human Life At Sea\n3.9.1 Fishery Access and Weather-Related Vessel Safety\n3.9.2 Procedures for Consideration of Management Adjustments\n3.9.3\nOther Safety Issues\n3.10 Ongoing Management\n3.10.1 An Introduction to FMP amendments and Frameworks\n3.10.2 Stock Assessment and Fishery Evaluation Report\n3.10.3 Advisory Panel and Continuing Fishery Management\niii","3.10.4 Procedure for Adjusting the Management Measures\n3.10.5 Shark Operations Team\nChapter 4: Limited Access\n4.1 Background\n4.2 Purpose and Need for Action\n4.3 Limitations on Access\n4.4\nLimitations on Number of Permitted Vessels\n4.5\nInitial Permit Issuance\n4.5.1 Permit Eligibility Period - Historic\n4.5.2 Landings Eligibility Period\n4.5.3\nPermit Eligibility Period - Recent\n4.5.4 Directed Landings Thresholds\n4.5.5 Incidental Landings Threshold\n4.5.6 Swordfish Handgear\n4.5.7 BAYS Tuna Fishery\n4.5.8 Appeals\n4.5.8.1\nProcess\n4.5.8.2 Hardship\n4.5.9\nExemptions\n4.6\nHarvest Limits\n4.6.1\nLimits for Swordfish Directed Permit Holders During Directed Fishery Closures\n4.6.2\nLimits for Incidental Limited Access Permit Holders\n4.7\nTransferability of Permits\n4.7.1\nTransferability Restrictions\n4.7.2\nUpgrading Restrictions\n4.7.3 Ownership Restrictions\n4.8 Environmental Consequences\n4.8.1 Number of Permit Categories\n4.8.2\nLimits the Number of Vessels Permitted\n4.8.3\nEligibility to Participate in the Directed and Incidental Fisheries\n4.8.4 Appeals Process\n4.8.5 Transferability Restrictions\n4.8.6 Upgrading Restrictions\n4.8.7 Ownership Restrictions\n4.8.8\nHarvest Limits\n4.8.9 Impacts on Marine Mammal and Endangered Species\n4.8.10 Mitigating Measures\n4.8.11 Unavoidable Adverse Impacts\n4.8.12 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources\nVOLUME II\nChapter 5: HMS Habitat Provisions\n5.1 Introduction\n5.2 Regulatory Requirements\n5.2.1\nDescription and Identification of EFH\n5.2.2 Fishing Activities That May Adversely Affect EFH\n5.2.3\nNon-Fishing Activities That May Adversely Affect EFH and Respective Conservation Measures\n5.2.4 Cumulative Impacts Analysis\n5.2.5 Habitat Areas of Particular Concern\n5.2.6 Research and Information Needs\niv","5.3 Habitat Goals\n5.4\nHMS Habitat Types and Distributions\n5.4.1\nAtlantic\n5.4.2 Gulf of Mexico\n5.4.3\nU.S. Caribbean\nChapter 6: HMS Essential Fish Habitat Provisions\n6.1 Introduction\n6.2\nEFH Identification Processes\n6.2.1\nProcess Used for Identification of EFH for Tuna and Swordfish\n6.2.2 Process Used for Identification of EFH for Atlantic Sharks\n6.2.3\nMethodology for Identification of EFH for HMS\n6.3\nLife History Accounts and Essential Fish Habitat Descriptions\n6.3.1 Tuna\n6.3.1.1 Atlantic Albacore (Thunnus alalunga)\n6.3.1.2 Atlantic Bigeye Tuna (Thunnus obesus)\n6.3.1.3 Atlantic Bluefin Tuna (Thunnus thynnus)\n6.3.1.4 Atlantic Skipjack Tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis)\n6.3.1.5 Atlantic Yellowfin Tuna (Thunnus albacares)\n6.3.2\nSwordfish (Xiphias gladius)\n6.3.3 Large Coastal Sharks\n6.3.3.1 Basking Sharks\n6.3.3.2 Hammerhead Sharks\n6.3.3.3 Mackerel Sharks\n6.3.3.4 Nurse Sharks\n6.3.3.5 Requiem Sharks\n6.3.3.6 Sand Tiger Sharks\n6.3.3.7\nWhale Sharks\n6.3.4\nSmall Coastal Sharks\n6.3.4.1\nAngel Sharks\n6.3.4.2\nHammerhead Sharks\n6.3.4.3\nRequiem Sharks\n6.3.5 Pelagic Sharks\n6.3.5.1\nCow sharks\n6.3.5.2 Mackerel Sharks\n6.3.5.3 Requiem Sharks\n6.3.5.4 Thresher Sharks\n6.4\nSummary Tables of Life History and Habitat Associations\n6.5\nEssential Fish Habitat Maps (by species and life stage)\n6.6\nThreats to Essential Fish Habitat\n6.6.1 Fishing Activities That May Adversely Affect EFH\n6.6.2 Non-fishing Threats to EFH\n6.6.2.1 Marine Sand and Minerals Mining\n6.6.2.2 Offshore Oil and Gas Operations\n6.6.2.3 Coastal Development\n6.6.2.4 Dredging and Disposal of Dredge Material\n6.6.2.5 Agriculture (and Silviculture)\n6.6.2.6 Aquaculture and Mariculture\n6.6.2.7 Navigation\n6.6.2.8 Marinas and Recreational Boating\n6.6.2.9\nOcean Dumping\n6.6.3\nCumulative Impacts\nV","6.7\nResearch and Information Needs\n6.7.1 Tuna and swordfish\n6.7.2 Sharks\n6.8\nReview and Revision of FMP EFH Components\nVOLUME III\nChapter 7: Final Regulatory Impact Review and Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis\n7.1\nBackground\n7.1.1 Net Economic Benefit\n7.1.2 Economic Impact\n7.1.3\nCommon Misconceptions\n7.1.4\nPresent Value Analyses\n7.1.5\nRIR versus RFA\n7.2\nThe Need for Action\n7.3\nObjectives of the FMP\nDescription of the Compliance and Reporting Requirements\n7.4\nRelevant Federal Rules which May Conflict with the Final Actions\n7.5\n7.6\nFinal Regulatory Impact Review\nEconomic Impacts of the Bluefin Tuna Rebuilding Alternatives\n7.6.1\n7.6.1.1 Estimated Commercial Gross Revenues\n7.6.1.2 Estimated Commercial Net Revenues\n7.6.1.3 Estimated Angler Consumer Surplus\nEconomic Impacts of the Alternatives to Minimize Bluefin Tuna Dead Discards\n7.6.2\nEconomic Impacts of the Swordfish Rebuilding Alternatives\n7.6.3\n7.6.3.1 Estimated Gross Revenues\n7.6.3.2 Estimated Net Revenues\nEconomic Impacts of Shark Rebuilding Alternatives\n7.6.4\n7.6.4.1 Present Value Analysis for Large Coastal Sharks\n7.6.4.2 Shark Angler Consumer Surplus\n7.6.5\nUnavoidable Adverse Impacts\nIrreversible and Irretrievable Commitments of Resources\n7.6.6\n7.6.7\nSummary of Expected Changes in Net Benefits\n7.7\nFinal Regulatory Flexibility Analysis\n7.7.1 RFA Requirements\n7.7.2 The NOAA Guidelines\nDescription of Small Entities to which the Final Actions May Apply\n7.7.3\nThe Final Management Measures and Fishing Costs\n7.7.4\n7.7.4.1 Financial Conditions of Different Fishing Sectors\n7.7.4.2 Costs Resulting from the Final Management Measures\n7.7.5 The Final Management Measures and Gross Revenues\nMinimizing Impacts on Small Entities\n7.7.6\nIssues Raised During the Comment Period\n7.7.7\n7.7.8 Conclusion\nChapter 8: Revised Final Environmental Impact Statement\n8.1 Introduction\n8.2\nPurpose and Need for Action\n8.2.1\nProblems for Resolution\n8.2.2\nManagement Objectives\n8.3 Final Actions\n8.4 Affected Environment\nvi","8.5 Environmental Consequences of Fisheries Actions: Effects of the Fishery on the Environment\n8.6\nUnavoidable Adverse Effects\n8.7\nIrreversible or Irretrievable Commitment of Resources\n8.8 Mitigating Measures\n8.9 List of Preparers and Agencies Consulted\nChapter 9: Community Profiles of HMS Fisheries\n9.1 Introduction to the Community Profiles\n9.2 Methodology\n9.3 Massachusetts Community Profiles\n9.3.1\nGloucester\n9.3.2\nNew Bedford\n9.4 New Jersey Community Profiles\n9.4.1\nBarnegat Light\n9.4.2\nBrielle/Point Pleasant\n9.5 North Carolina Community Profiles\n9.5.1 Hatteras\n9.5.2 Wanchese\n9.6 Florida Community Profiles\n9.6.1 Islamorada\n9.6.2\nPompano Beach\n9.6.3\nMadeira Beach\n9.6.4\nPanama City\n9.7\nLouisiana Community Profiles\n9.7.1 Dulac\n9.7.2\nVenice\n9.8 Conclusion\nAppendix I: HMS Advisory Panel Members\nAppendix II: Selected ICCAT Management Recommendations and Year Adopted\nAppendix III: 1999 General Category Effort Control Specifications for Atlantic Bluefin Tuna\nAppendix IV: Atlantic Sharks: Executive Summary of the 1998 Shark Evaluation Workshop\nAppendix V: Abbreviations and Acronyms Used in the HMS FMP\nAppendix VI: Analyses of Options Considered for the Bluefin Tuna Time/area Closure\nAppendix VII: Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document\nAppendix VIII: Comments and Responses\nvii","EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\nThis is the executive summary for the Fishery Management Plan (FMP) for Atlantic tuna,\nswordfish, and sharks, highly migratory species (HMS) that inhabit the Atlantic Ocean and\nadjacent waters. The HMS FMP replaces the existing Atlantic Shark and Atlantic Swordfish\nFMPs, and establishes an FMP for Atlantic tuna. Atlantic HMS are managed by the National\nMarine Fisheries Service (NMFS) under the authority of the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary),\nwith consideration of the domestic and international aspects of these fisheries. This summary is\nonly a summary of the regulations implemented in the HMS FMP. For a full description of the\nregulations implemented, please see the HMS FMP.\nThe Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act)\nis the primary domestic legislation governing management of the nation's marine fisheries. To\ndate, Atlantic sharks and Atlantic swordfish have been managed under the authority of the\nMagnuson-Stevens Act by separate FMPs. This first FMP for Atlantic tuna will bring the\nmanagement of tuna under the authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Act as well.\nIn 1996, the United States Congress reauthorized the Magnuson-Stevens Act. This re-\nauthorization included a new emphasis on the precautionary approach in U.S. fishery\nmanagement policy. New provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act require managers to halt\noverfishing; to rebuild overfished fisheries; to minimize bycatch and bycatch mortality, to the\nextent practicable; and to identify and protect essential fish habitat (EFH). These provisions are\ncoupled with the recognition that management of HMS requires international cooperation and\nthat rebuilding programs must reflect traditional participation in the fisheries by U.S. fishermen,\nrelative to foreign fleets. Besides the Magnuson-Stevens Act, U.S. fisheries management must\nbe consistent with the requirements of other regulations including the Marine Mammal\nProtection Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and several other\nFederal laws. These laws are described in Chapter 1 of this document. This FMP addresses\nthese new requirements, as well as the requirements of other applicable legislation, and\nincorporates the best available scientific information into Atlantic HMS management.\nDomestic management of these species presents several interesting challenges for fishery\nmanagers. First, several Atlantic HMS have been identified as \"overfished\" (west Atlantic\nbluefin tuna, Atlantic bigeye tuna, north Atlantic swordfish, and large coastal sharks). Although\nnorth Atlantic albacore was not listed by NMFS as overfished in the 1998 Report to Congress,\nthis species meets the status determination criteria adopted in this FMP. Building and\nmaintaining sustainable HMS fisheries is particularly challenging given the fact that many\nnations fish for these species. For most Atlantic HMS fisheries, the United States accounts for a\nfraction, and in several cases, a small fraction, of total fishing-related mortality of the species.\nConsistency in implementation and enforcement of conservation and management measures by\nall fishing nations is a significant concern that affects domestic HMS management and is\nconsidered in this FMP. Also, bycatch mortality of Atlantic HMS can further depress overfished\nstocks which slows rebuilding and represents an opportunity cost to users of the resource. Other\nviii","issues under consideration are common to many fisheries: assuring optimal data collection and\nstreamlining and updating the management program. These management problems are addressed\nthrough a set of objectives for the FMP that can be found in Section 1.1.\nIn addition to domestic management concerns, HMS must to be managed in an international\ncontext. The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) is the\nmulti-national cooperative management body that provides scientific information and\nmanagement recommendations for stocks of Atlantic tuna, swordfish, and billfish (billfish are\nmanaged under a separate FMP). In the United States, ICCAT recommendations are\nimplemented under the authority of the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act (ATCA). At this time, no\ninternational management regimes currently exist for Atlantic sharks, although several\ninternational groups collect biological and trade data. In February, 1999, the United States was a\nleading participant in the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Consultation on Shark\nConservation and Management and successfully negotiated with the world's fishing nations on\nconcrete steps to improve shark conservation in its Global Plan of Action. The Global Plan of\nAction builds upon the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, encompasses all shark\nfisheries (both target and non-target), and specifies action on education of fishermen, exchange\nof information on shark fisheries and studies, assessments on levels of non-target catch of sharks,\nand assessments of the effectiveness of management measures.\nWhenever possible, implementing regulations for this FMP are issued under the dual\nauthority of the Magnuson-Stevens Act and ATCA. This FMP integrates management for the\nAtlantic tuna, swordfish, and shark fisheries, replacing the existing FMPs. This FMP was\ndeveloped in coordination with Amendment 1 to the Atlantic Billfish FMP. Billfish (blue\nmarlin, white marlin, longbill spearfish, and sailfish) are managed under a separate FMP, given\nthe unique characteristics of the billfish fishery. It should be noted, however, that the strategies\nand objectives of the domestic billfish management program are similar to and consistent with\nthose of this FMP. Indeed, several final actions in the billfish and HMS FMPs are\ncomplementary, particularly those addressing bycatch.\nDevelopment of this FMP began in September 1997 with the formation of the HMS\nAdvisory Panel (AP). The HMS AP was established under a requirement of the Magnuson-\nStevens Act, and is composed of representatives of the commercial and recreational fishing\ncommunities, conservation and academic organizations, the five regional fishery management\ncouncils involved in Atlantic HMS management, the Atlantic and Gulf coastal states, and the\nU.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee. Members of the HMS AP and their affiliations are listed in\nAppendix 1. The HMS AP met seven times during development of this FMP, including once\nduring the public comment period on the draft FMP, and provided extensive guidance to NMFS.\nThe FMP does not necessarily reflect all of the views expressed by the AP members; however,\ninput from the advisory panels was extremely helpful in allowing NMFS to consider all aspects\nof the management issues. NMFS appreciates the contributions of each AP member to the\nHMS management process, and encourages fishery participants to communicate with AP\nrepresentatives regarding issues of concern in their fisheries. All AP meetings are open to the\npublic and NMFS holds AP meetings in communities throughout the HMS fishing region.\nix","In October 1997, NMFS prepared and distributed a scoping document, Issues and Options\nfor Management of Atlantic Highly Migratory Species, to serve as the starting point for\nconsideration of issues for this FMP. The scoping document described major issues in the\nfishery, legal requirements for management, and potential management measures that could be\nconsidered for adoption in the FMP. The scoping document was the subject of 21 public\nhearings that were held in October and November 1997 throughout the management area. The\nscoping meetings allowed NMFS to gather information from participants in the fisheries, and\nprovided a mechanism by which the public could provide input to NMFS early in the FMP\ndevelopment process.\nFollowing the scoping meetings, parts of the scoping document were reviewed several\ntimes by the HMS AP and interested members of the public. The issues and options in this\nscoping document were the first step in the preparation for the draft FMP. Early drafts of\nportions of the FMP that were considered by the HMS AP reflected new information in both the\nscientific (e.g., the June 1998 Shark Evaluation Workshop) and management (e.g., the final\nguidelines to implementation of the National Standards (NS) for fishery conservation and\nmanagement) spheres. However, some of the latest information, such as the results of the\nSeptember 1998 ICCAT stock assessment for bluefin tuna, was not available at the time of\npublication of the draft FMP. NMFS issued an addendum to the draft FMP in February 1999,\nwhich addresses the bluefin tuna rebuilding plan. New information on stock status and recovery\ntrajectories that became available since the publication of the draft FMP or Addendum is\nconsidered in this final FMP.\nIn October 1998, NMFS announced in the Federal Register the availability of the draft\nFMP. The comment period on the draft FMP lasted from October 25, 1998, to March 12, 1999.\nThe proposed rule that accompanied this draft FMP was published in the Federal Register on\nJanuary 20, 1999. The supplemental part of this rule relating to the bluefin tuna rebuilding\nprogram was published in the Federal Register on February 25, 1999. The comment period on\nthe proposed rule and the its supplement also went until March 12, 1999. Subsequent to the\nrelease of the proposed rule, NMFS held 27 public hearings in communities from Texas to Maine\nand the Caribbean. During the comment period, NMFS received several thousand comments\nfrom commercial and recreational fishermen, scientists, conservationists, and concerned\nindividuals. An HMS AP meeting was held toward the end of the comment period to allow\nHMS AP members to view most of the comments NMFS had received on the draft FMP and\naccompanying proposed rule. NMFS considered comments from the public and the AP when\npreparing this final FMP. Changes to the preferred alternatives from the draft FMP are due, in\nlarge part, to the information and comments received, concerns raised during the public comment\nperiod, and other new information or analyses subsequent to the draft FMP.\nThe FMP incorporates all existing management measures for Atlantic tuna and north\nAtlantic swordfish that have been issued previously under the authority of the ATCA. It also\nincorporates all existing management measures for north Atlantic swordfish and Atlantic sharks\nthat have been issued previously under the authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. Currently,\nsouth Atlantic swordfish and south Atlantic albacore tuna are managed only under ATCA;\nAtlantic sharks are managed only under the Magnuson-Stevens Act. Notable modifications or\nx","additions to the existing management program are discussed in this document. All existing\nmanagement measures are retained under this FMP; modifications to some measures are\nexplicitly discussed below. Should NMFS determine that further changes are necessary, they\nwill be made through the FMP amendment process or through rulemaking as described by the\nframework provisions (Section 3.10).\nNMFS received considerable comment regarding the proposed time/area closure to protect\nsmall swordfish in the Florida Straits. Most comments indicated that this area was too small to\nbe effective given the likely re-distribution of effort on the \"fringes\" of the closed area. NMFS\nhas therefore, chosen to reconsider a more effective time/area closure to protect small swordfish\nand has begun the necessary biological, social, and economic analyses necessary for proposing a\nlarger, more effective area or areas. In response to comments, and based on earlier analyses, the\nlarger areas include the Charleston Bump and the Florida Keys. Analyses may also continue to\nexamine areas in the Gulf of Mexico. NMFS will meet with the combined HMS and Billfish\nAPs in the summer of 1999 to discuss the results of new analyses that NMFS is undertaking.\nAfter that discussion, NMFS will select a preferred alternative and publish a proposed rule under\nthe framework of this FMP.\nThe FMP status determination criteria that allow managers to determine whether overfishing\nis occurring or a stock is overfished. The FMP also contains rebuilding programs for HMS that\nhave been designated as \"overfished.\" Other measures implemented in the HMS FMP are listed\nbelow. Section numbers where the alternative can be found follow each preferred alternative in\nparentheses. This partial list of final management measures is followed by a set of tables that\nsummarize current regulations. Tables 1 through 5 summarize the final actions by gear type.\nTables 6 and 7 summarize final measures affecting shark fishermen. Table 8 summarizes final\npermitting and reporting requirements for HMS dealers. Table 9 summarizes which limited\naccess permit qualifiers will receive and which limited access permit future participants will need\nto obtain. Table 10 summarizes the ecological, economic, and social impacts of each final\naction. Table 11 provides a list of abbreviations and acronyms used throughout the FMP; this\nlist is also included in Appendix 5.\nAdopt quotas and time periods to rebuild Atlantic bluefin tuna, bigeye tuna, north\nAtlantic swordfish, and large coastal sharks stocks (3.4.1);\nEstablish foundation for international development of quotas and time periods to\nsupport rebuilding of bigeye tuna and north Atlantic swordfish (3.4.1);\nLimit access to the commercial shark and swordfish fisheries; require both a shark and\nswordfish limited access permit to gain access to the commercial bigeye, albacore,\nyellowfin, and skipjack (BAYS) tuna pelagic longline fisheries (4.5 through 4.7);\nImplement observer coverage on all HMS charter/headboat vessels (3.8);\nProhibit the use of pelagic driftnets in Atlantic tuna fisheries (3.4.3);\nEstablish a \"School Reserve\" category in the bluefin tuna fishery (3.4.1);\nChange the fishing year for Atlantic tuna to June 1 through May 31 (3.4.4);\nxi","Require the use of a vessel monitoring system (VMS) for all HMS pelagic\nlongline vessels and require gear marking for all HMS commercial net and longline\nfisheries (3.5);\nChange the quota monitoring procedures for the Atlantic swordfish fishery including\ncounting dead discards against the quota (subject to ICCAT adoption) and accounting\nfor recreational fishing mortality (3.4.1);\nRequire all vessel operators who must complete logbooks to complete and submit\nthem within 48 hours of making a set but prior to offloading (3.8);\nDevelop and implement a bycatch and bycatch mortality reduction outreach strategy\nfor recreational HMS fishery participants.(3.5);\nAllow retention of only those shark species known or expected to be able to withstand\nspecified levels of fishing mortality (3.4.2);\nChange the system of opening and closing shark fisheries and make seasonal quota\nadjustments (3.4.1);\nReduce the recreational retention limit for sharks to one shark per vessel per trip with a\nminimum size of 4.5 feet and establish an allowance of one Atlantic sharpnose shark\nper person per trip (no minimum size on Atlantic sharpnose sharks) (3.4.2);\nRequire that all sharks harvested by recreational anglers have heads, tails, and fins\nattached (3.4.2);\nCreate a new management unit of deepwater/other sharks and extend the anti-finning\nprohibition to this management unit (3.4.2);\nCount dead discards and state landings after federal closures against federal quotas for\nall sharks (3.4.1);\nDissolve the Shark Operations Team (3.10);\nChange the quotas for pelagic and small coastal sharks and establish separate quotas\nfor porbeagle and for blue sharks (3.4.1);\nRequire all charterboat/headboat vessels to obtain an annual vessel permit and, if\nselected, to submit logbooks for all HMS trips (3.5);\nRequire registration for all HMS tournaments (3.5); and\nEstablish new permitting and reporting procedures for exempted fishing permits for\nsharks for the purposes of public display (3.8).\nxii","May 1-Dec. 31: 1 BFT with > 3500 lb\n15 swordfish per trip during closure of\n4,000 lb directed commercial retention\nJan 1 - April 30: 1 BFT with 1500\nNorth of 34° N: 1 BFT not to exceed\nincidental limited access permit holders: 5 large coastal sharks per trip; a total of 16 pelagic or small coastal sharks (all species combined) per vessel per trip. Or 5 swordfish per trip for otter\nProhibited for possession by pelagic and bottom longline fishermen: White marlin, blue marlin, sailfish, longbill spearfish, and the following sharks: sand tiger, bigeye sand tiger, whale, basking,\n'Obsever coverage and logbooks if selected; logbooks should be filled out within 48 hours of hauling set. In addition, VMS is required for pelagic longliners; Please contact NMFS before you\nwhite, dusky, night, bignose, Galapagos, Caribbean reef, narrowtooth, Caribbean sharpnose, smalltail, Atlantic angel, longfin mako, bigeye thresher, sevengill, sixgill, and bigeye sixgill sharks.\nNo directed commercial retention\nlimit; Incidental retention limits4\nlimit; Incidental retention limits4\ndirected north Atlantic fishery.\nlb of other target species\nRetention Limits\n5\nof other target species\nIncidental retention limits.\n2% of catch by weight\nno retention allowed\nSouth of 34° N:\nno\nno\nno\n73\" curved fork length\n27\" curved fork length\n29\" (73 cm) cleithrum\n(137 cm) fork length\nRidgebacks: 4.5 feet\nMinimum Size\nfor sale\nto keel\nN/A\nno\nno\nno\nFishing Year2\nJune 1 May 31\nJune 1 May 31\nJan. 1 to Dec. 31\n2NMFS will close a region in the mid-Atlantic to pelagic longline fishing in June to reduce dead discards of BFT.\nN/A\nN/A\nWhat the Final HMS FMP means to pelagic and bottom longline fishermen.\nAnnual\nQuota\nretention\nallowed\nyes3\nyes\nyes\nno\nno\nno\nno\n'Dead discards and state landings after federal closures will be counted against federal quotas.\nObserver coverage and\nObserver coverage and\nlogbook, if selected; in\naddition, BFT must be\nObserver coverage and\nObserver coverage and\nObserver coverage and\nObserver coverage and\nReporting and\nMonitoring\nRequired\nlogbook\nlogbook\nlogbook\nlogbook\nlogbook\ntagged\npurchase a vessel monitoring system to obtain the VMS specifications.\nno\nPermit Required\nyes; limited access\nyes; limited access\nswordfish, sharks,\nyes-Atlantic tuna\nyes-Atlantic tuna\nyes-Atlantic tuna\naccess permits\naccess permits\nswordfish and\nswordfish and\nshark limited\nshark limited\npermits for\nLL permit³\nLL permit,\nLL permit,\nshark\ntuna\nN/A\ntrawl, 2 swordfish per trip for all other gears.\nno\nLandings\nAllowed\nyes\nyes\nno\nLarge Coastal Sharks\nSmall Coastal Sharks\nDeepwater and Other\nBluefin Tuna (BFT)\nBigeye Tuna (BET)\nAlbacore, Skipjack\nProhibited Sharks5\nYellowfin Tuna\nSpecies\nPelagic Sharks\nSwordfish\nTable 1\n(YFT);\nSharks\nTuna\n4For","29\" (73 cm) cleithrum\nprohibited for possession by recreational fishermen include: sand tiger, bigeye sand tiger, whale, basking, white, dusky, night, bignose, Galapagos, Caribbean reef, narrowtooth. Caribbean\ndefined in Chapter 2.\nfor all sharks except\n4.5 feet fork length\nMinimum Size\nAtlantic sharpnose\n27\" curved fork\n27\" curved fork\nSize classes are\nto keel\nsharks\nlength\nlength\nnone\nN/A\nno\nJanuary 1 to Dec. 31\nFishing Year\nJune 1 to May 31\nJune 1 to May 31\nJune 1 to May 31\nJune 1 to May 31\n2 NC anglers are exempt from reporting via 1-888-USA-TUNA because they must take all landed bluefin tuna to a reporting center to be tagged.\nallowance for\nRetention\nno retention\nthroughout\n1 shark per\n3 YFT per\nperson per\nper person\nLimit\nvessel per\n1 Atlantic\nsharpnose\nspecies);\nvariable\nper trip.\nallowed\nseason3\ntrip (all\nday\nno\nno\nno\ncatch quota\nAnnual\nsubtracted\nIncidental\nQuota\nno, see\nbelow4\nfrom\nyes\nno\nno\nno\nno\nsharpnose, smalltail, Atlantic angel, longfin mako, bigeye thresher, sevengill, sixgill, and bigeye sixgill shark.\nTournament registration and reporting\nTournament registration and reporting\nTournament registration and reporting\nTournament registration and reporting\nCall-in reporting 888-USA-TUNA\nLarge Pelagics Survey (LPS) and\nStatistical Survey (MRFSS) only\nReporting Required\nMarine Recreational Fisheries\nWhat the Final HMS FMP means to recreational HMS fishermen.\nTo obtain an Atlantic Tuna permit, call 1-888-USA-TUNA or go to www.usatuna.com.\n3 Anglers are advised to call 1-888-USA-TUNA to check retention limits before fishing.\nNC tagging program\nLPS/MRFSS\nLPS/MRFSS\nLPS/MRFSS\nLPS/MRFSS\nKnown sources of mortality to be included in establishing retention limits.\nyes\nno\nno for private;\nRequired\ncharterboat/\nPermit\nheadboat\nyes for\nN/A\nyes\nyes\nyes\nno\nno\nLandings\nAllowed\nyes\nno\nAlbacore, Skipjack Tuna\nYellowfin Tuna (YFT),\nLarge Coastal Sharks\nSmall Coastal Sharks\nDeepwater and Other\nBigeye Tuna (BET)\nProhibited Sharks\nSpecies\nPelagic Sharks\nBluefin Tuna\nSwordfish\nTable 2\nSharks\nSharks\nI\n4\n5","Miscellaneous\nfishing for YFT\nMiscellaneous\nwhen BFT IVQ\nIncidental take\nGear marking\nallowed while\nGear marking\nand skipjack\nSeason ends\nis filled\nkeel or 33 lb\nMinimum Size\nMinimum\n29\" (73 cm)\ncleithrum to\n81\" curved fork\nfor 15% per trip\nYFT, BET: 27\"\n73\" curved\nfork length\nyear allowance\nincidental take\nalbacore: none\nlength, except\n<81\", and 1%\nSize\nand 10% per\nfor 73\" and\n<73\" per trip\ncurved fork\nSkipjack,\ndw\nlength.\nJune 1 May 31\nFishing Year\nJune 1 May 31\nAugust 15 to Dec.\nFishing Year\nFor each vessel,\n31 or date when\nJune 1 May 31\nIVQ is filled\nto < 81\": 1 fish per day\nHarpoon category: 73\"\nRetention Limit\n>73\": 1 fish per day\nincidental take (no\n15% per trip, 10%\nGeneral category:\nRetention Limit\n<73\": 1% per trip\n73\" and <81\":\n>81\": No limit\n81\": no limit\nsale) deducted\nfrom IVQ\nper year\nnone\nnone\nyes: subtracted\nHarpoon quota\nyes; Individual\nyes: Harpoon\nVessel Quota\nCategory or\nAnnual\nAnnual\nQuota\nQuota\nLongline/\nCategory\nWhat the Final HMS FMP means to commercial harpoon fishermen.\nGeneral\n(IVQ)\nfrom\nno\nWhat the Final HMS FMP means to purse seine fishermen.\nLogbook, observer\nLogbook, observer\nObserver coverage\nObserver coverage\nReporting and\nReporting and\nMonitoring\nMonitoring\nand logbook, if\nand logbook, if\nRequired\nRequired\ncoverage (if\nselected)\ncoverage\nselected\nselected\ncurrent vessels\nyes-limited to\ncurrent vessels\nyes-limited to\nreplacements\nreplacements\nRequired\nRequired\nyes; limited\nPermit\nPermit\nor their\nor their\naccess\nyes\nLandings\nLandings\nAllowed\nAllowed\nyes\nyes\nyes\nyes\nSpecies\nNorth Atlantic\nSpecies\nBluefin Tuna\nBluefin Tuna\nBAYS Tuna\nSwordfish\nTable 3\nTable 4","(see Appendix 3)\n4,000 lb directed\nMiscellaneous\nretention limits2\nretention limits2\nretention limits2\nretention limits2\nretention limit;\nretention limit;\nretention limit;\nFishing Days\ncommercial\nNo directed\nNo directed\nRestricted\nIncidental\nIncidental\nIncidental\nIncidental\nprohibited for possession by recreational fishermen include: sand tiger, bigeye sand tiger, whale, basking, white, dusky, night, bignose, Galapagos, Caribbean reef, narrowtooth,\nFor incidental limited access permit holders: 5 large coastal shark per trip; a total of 16 pelagic or small coastal sharks (all species combined) per vessel per trip. Or, for swordfish,\nMinimum\n4.5 feet (137\nRidgebacks:\n29\" (73 cm)\ncleithrum to\n73\" curved\nfork length\n27\" curved\nfork length\nSize\ncm) fork\nlength\nnone\nnone\nnone\nN/A\nkeel\nJune 1 to May 31 or\nuntil quota is filled\nFishing Year\nJune 1 to May 31\nJan. 1 to June 30;\nJuly 1 to Dec. 31\n1 BFT per day\nRetention\nno retention\nLimit\nCaribbean sharpnose, smalltail, Atlantic angel, longfin mako, bigeye thresher, sevengill, sixgill, and bigeye sixgill shark\nallowed\nWhat the Final HMS FMP means to commercial rod and reel/handline fishermen.\nno\nno\nno\nno retention\nyes; General\nAnnual\nQuota\ncategory\nallowed\nyes\nyes\nyes\nyes\nno\nno\nDead discards and state landings after federal closures will be counted against federal quotas.\nObserver coverage,\nLogbook, observer\nReporting and\nMonitoring\nLPS/MRFSS, if\nRequired\nlogbook and\ncoverage\nselected.\nRequired\nyes; limited\nPermit\naccess\nN/A\nyes\nyes\nyes\nLandings\nAllowed\nyes\nno\nAlbacore, Skipjack Tuna\nLarge Coastal Sharks\nSmall Coastal Sharks\nProhibited Sharks3\n2 swordfish per trip.\nSpecies\nYellowfin Tuna;\nPelagic Sharks\nBluefin Tuna\nBigeye Tuna\nSwordfish\nTable 5\nSharks\n3","Table 6 What the Final HMS FMP means to Atlantic shark fishermen.\nPROHIBITED SPECIES\nThe following sharks can not be kept commercially or recreationally: Whale, basking, sand tiger, bigeye sand tiger, white,\ndusky, night, bignose, Galapagos, Caribbean reef, narrowtooth, longfin mako, bigeye thresher, sevengill, sixgill, bigeye\nsixgill, Caribbean sharpnose, smalltail, and Atlantic angel sharks.\nCOMMERCIAL REGULATIONS\nManagement Unit\nSpecies that can be retained\nQuota\nSize Limit\nAuthorized Gears\n(mt dw)\nLarge Coastal Sharks\nRidgeback: Sandbar, silky, tiger\n622\n4.5 feet\nLL; Gillnet (100%\n- directed commercial\n(137 cm)\nobserver coverage\nretention limit of 4,000 lb\nfork length\nrequired);\ndw per trip\nRod and reel;\nNon-ridgeback: Blacktip, bull,\n196\nNone\n- incidental retention limit\nhandline; bandit gear\nspinner, lemon, nurse, smooth\nhammerhead, scalloped hammerhead,\ngreat hammerhead\nPelagic Sharks\nShortfin mako, thresher, oceanic\n488\nNone\nno directed retention limit\nwhitetip\n-\n- incidental retention limit\nPorbeagle\n92\nBlue\n273\nSmall Coastal Sharks\nAtlantic sharpnose, blacknose,\n359\nNone\n- no directed retention limit\nfinetooth, bonnethead\n- incidental retention limit\nDeepwater and Other Sharks\nCatsharks, dogfish sharks, sawsharks,\nNone\nNone\nsmoothhound sharks\nAdditional remarks:\nAll sharks not retained must be released in a manner that ensures the maximum probability of survival\nNo finning any sharks no matter what species\nFishing seasons January 1to June 30; July 1to December 31\nSeason-specific quota overharvest and underharvest adjustments; no reopening that year\nLimited access; Exempted Fishing Permit (EFP) requirements\nCount dead discards against federal quotas; Count state landing after federal closure against federal quota\nFor incidental limited access permit holders: 5 large coastal sharks per trip; a total of 16 pelagic or small coastal sharks\n(all species combined) per vessel per trip\nRECREATIONAL REGULATIONS\nManagement Unit\nSpecies that can be kept\nRetention Limit\nAuthorized Gear\nLarge Coastal, Pelagic, and Small\nLCS: Sandbar, silky, tiger, blacktip,\n1 shark per vessel per\nRod and reel;\nCoastal Sharks\nbull, spinner, lemon, nurse, smooth\ntrip (all species) with a\nhandline; bandit gear\nhammerhead, scalloped hammerhead,\n4.5 feet fork length\ngreat hammerhead\nminimum size;\nallowance forl Atlantic\nPelagic: shortfin mako, thresher,\nsharpnose per person\noceanic whiteip, porbeagle, blue\nper trip (no minimum\nsize)\nSCS: Atlantic sharpnose, blacknose,\nfinetooth, bonnethead\nAdditional remarks:\nHarvested sharks must have fins, head, and tail attached (can be bled and gutted if tail is still attached)\nNo recreational limits on deepwater and other sharks.\nxvii","If any listed whale is taken in gear, the\nfinal rule implementing the Large Whale Take Reduction Plan was published February 16, 1999 (64 FR 7529). Note there are inconsistencies between this rule, the final rule governing the\nvessel operator must contact NMFS\nnorthern right, blue, fin, sperm, and\nList of Fisheries and Gear under the Magnuson-Stevens Act (64 FR 4030), and the proposed rule to implement the HMS FMP (64 FR 3154) regarding the authorization of strike nets in the shark\nretention limit; Incidental retention\nimmediately. Listed whales in the\nnorth Atlantic include: humpback,\nNo directed commercial retention\nNo directed commercial retention\nlimit; Incidental retention limits3\nlimit; Incidental retention limits3\n4 Possession of the following sharks is prohibited: sand tiger, bigeye sand tiger, whale, basking, white, dusky, night, bignose, Galapagos, Caribbean reef, narrowtooth, Caribbean sharpnose,\nand cease all fishing activities\n4,000 lb directed commercial\nRetention Limits\nEntanglements\nno retention allowed\n3 For incidental limited access shark permit holders: 5 large coastal sharks per trip; a total of 16 pelagic or small coastal sharks (all species combined) per vessel per trip.\nlimits3\nsei.\n(C) nets must not be set within 3 nautical\nmiles of a right, humpback, fin or minke\nRidgebacks: 4.5 feet\n(137 cm) fork length\nwhale moves within 3 nautical miles of\n(D) If a right, humpback, fin or minke\nthe set gear, the gear must be removed\nMinimum Size\n(A) nets must not set at night or when\n(B) each set must be made under the\nStrikenet Provisions\nvisibility is less than 500 yards\nobservation of a spotter plane\nimmediately from the water\nno\nno\nno\nLarge Whale Take Reduction Plan Requirements\nJan. 1 to Dec. 31\nFishing Year\nwhale\nsmalltail, Atlantic angel, longfin mako, bigeye thresher, sevengill, sixgill, and bigeye sixgill sharks.\nextending from the shore eastward\nAnnual\nSavannah, GA) south to 27°51' N\nno fishing with shark gillnet gear,\nQuota\nattached to the vessel at one end\n(near Sebastian Inlet, FL) and\nAll shark gillnet gear must be\nyes2\ndrift gillnet fishery; NMFS will resolve these issues through future regulatory or other measures.\n2 Dead discards and state landings after federal closures will be counted against federal quotas.\nno\nArea from 32°00\" N (near\nRestricted Area\nprohibited if a NMFS\ncoverage at all times;\nWhat the Final HMS FMP means to shark gillnet fishermen.\nUse of gillnet gear in\nLogbook if selected\nexcept for strikenets\nReporting and\nNov 15 to Mar 31:\nobserver is not on\nMonitoring\nRequired\n100% observer\nshark fishery is\nto 80°00' W\nboard\nyes\nLogbooks should be filled out within 48 hours of hauling set.\nAll shark gillnet gear must be\nno fishing with shark gillnet\nattached to the vessel at one\nWest Palm Beach, FL) and\nextending out to 80°00' W\nRequired\nPermit\naccess shark\ncoast to 26°46.5' N (near\nRestricted area PLUS an\nadditional area along the\ngear without an observer\nyes; limited\nObserver Area\nNov 15 to Mar 31:\nN/A\nLandings\nAllowed\nend\nyes\nno\nMarks must be within\nLarge Coastal Sharks\nSmall Coastal Sharks\n2 feet of top of buoy\n4-inch marks placed\nProhibited Sharks4\nwithin 6 inches of\nand midway along\nNov 15 to Mar 31\nGear Marking\nSpecies\nPelagic Sharks\nblue and green\nObserver area:\nColor codes:\neach other\nTable 7\nlength\nThe\nI\n5","Directed bottom longline shark trips do not regularly encounter swordfish or\nNo ATCA restrictions currently apply. NOAA Form\nSome fisheries that encounter sharks incidentally to other operations do not\nI Refers to limited access permits issued by the HMS Division immediately upon implementation of the limited access regulations; standard permit renewals would still be handled through the\n370 required in certain instances (see Final rule).\nencounter swordfish or BAYS tuna; fisheries that do should be covered\nDirected swordfish trips regularly encounter sharks and BAYS tuna\nDirected BAYS tuna trips regularly encounter swordfish and sharks\nSignificant overlap in swordfish, shark, and BAYS tuna fisheries\nyes; Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document\nImported Fish\nyes; Certificate of Eligibility\nunder the swordfish and Atlantic tuna permits\n(for exports as well)\nReporting\nBAYS tuna, according to observer data\nno\nyes, if vessels are federally\nyes, if vessels are federally\nyes, if vessels are federally\nPurchases from U.S.\n2 After the initial issuance, fishermen wishing to enter these fisheries will be required to obtain these permits on their own.\nfishery vessels\nRationale:\nRationale:\nWhat the Final HMS FMP means for initial limited access permit issuance.\npermitted\npermitted\npermitted\nyes\nShark Incidental and Atlantic tuna longline\nShark Incidental and Atlantic tuna longline\nyes, including importers\nyes, including importers\nPermit required\nYou will ALSO be issued2:\nYou will ALSO be issued2:\nWhat the Final HMS FMP means to HMS dealers.\nand exporters\nSwordfish Incidental and\nyes\nyes\nShark Incidental\nBigeye, Albacore, Yellowfin, Skipjack Tuna\n--\n--\nSpecies\nAtlantic tuna incidental\nRegional Administrators.\nIf you already have:\nSwordfish Incidental\nIf you qualify for1:\nSwordfish Directed\nShark Incidental\nShark Directed\nBluefin Tuna\nSwordfish\nTable 8\nSharks\nTable 9","Likely continued conflict between the\nprocessors may be affected, but given\ncommunities are expected under this\nMinimal impacts expected as quotas\nrecreational and commercial sectors\nare the same or slightly higher than\nshort time span of closure, it is not\ndestabilizing impacts on fishing\ndomestic allocation alternatives\nalternative than under the other\ncommercial categories. Fewer\nof the BFT fishery and among\nSocial Impacts\nCommunities with seafood\nexpected to be significant.\ncurrent quotas.\nconsidered.\ncategory are capped. Under the IVQ\nother than bluefin tuna. Travel time,\nas well as costs for fuel, bait, and ice\nMinimal impacts expected as quotas\ntheir quota and revenues. Handgear\ncategory participants are assured of\nimpact on landings of target species\nare the same or slightly higher than\nincrease in revenues and/or Angler\nsuch as swordfish, sharks and tuna\ncategories could experience slight\nNot expected to have a significant\nConsumer Surplus (ACS) due to\nLandings, and potentially gross\nsystem, however, Purse Seine\nrevenues, for the Purse Seine\nEconomic Impacts\nTable 10 Summary of the biological, economic, and social impacts of the final actions in this FMP.\nPurse Seine cap.\ncurrent quotas.\nmay increase.\nAtlantic Tuna\nincreases slightly to 2,413 mt WW (3% more than\nVery little impact on size selectivity of catch and\n~20 years to rebuild to an MSY of 2,800 mt WW.\nSQ) per year. Under different stock-recruitment\nmarine mammals and other protected species (in\nindicates that recovery to one estimate of MSY\nincrease to levels which could support an MSY\nrecovery to one estimate of MSY (of 7,700 mt\nassessment projects that there is a 50% chance\nOverall west Atlantic quota remains the same\nww) is not possible under 2,500 mt WW TAC.\nIncludes measures to alter the TAC, the MSY\nanalysis, the effects varied depending on year\nrebuilding. Assuming status quo catch levels\nf7,700 mt) is not possible under status quo\ndisplacement of longline fleet. Displacement\nof 2,800 mt WW in 20 years. Under different\napproximately 55% Possible change in size\n(2,500 mt WW TAC), but U.S. landing quota\ntarget, and/or the rebuilding period based on\nand size selectivity of catch, the latest SCRS\nmay also have an effect on interactions with\nmodel, the latest assessment indicates that\nthat the BFT spawning stock biomass will\nstock-recruitment model, the assessment\ncomposition of swordfish catch, due to\nReduction of dead discards of BFT by\nEcological Impacts\n(2,500 mt TAC) catch levels.\nsubsequent scientific advice.\nanalyzed).\nclosure in NW Atlantic for\nAdopt the ICCAT Bluefin\nTuna Rebuilding Program\nSeine category cap of 250\npelagic longliners during\nImplement a time/area\nallocations with Purse\nAdopt status quo for\nFinal Action\nbluefin tuna quota\n(20 Years)\nmt ww\nJune","There are potential social costs of this\npelagic driftnet fishermen, though the\ncommunities of preventing expansion\nexploited to date. These social costs\ncommunities of speeding rebuilding.\nSocial costs of this alternative could\nof a fishery directed on fully fished\nopportunity that has not been fully\nparticipants, though these costs are\nalternative for the community of\nPositive impacts for bluefin tuna\nnot expected to be substantial or\nstocks and with potentially high\nare offset by benefits to fishing\nfishery participants and fishing\nbe borne by Angling category\ncosts are largely a foregone\nSocial Impacts\nMinimal impacts expected.\nMinimal impacts expected.\nbycatch rates.\nprolonged.\nCould reduce transfers to the Angling\nincome for vessels that are interested\nlimited and catch rates and locations\nThe current system, which relies on\ncategory, thus reducing ACS for\ninseason adjustments, is selected\n(bigeye tuna) fisheries. Loss of\nbecause the recreational quota is\n(yellowfin tuna) and overfished\novercapitalizing in fully-fished\nin catching tuna with driftnet.\nEconomic Impacts\nHowever, this is not a well-\nMinimal impacts expected.\ncharter/headboat vessels.\nReduces the chances of\nprivate recreational and\nestablished fishery.\nare highly variable.\nfully fished, or overfished, fishery is inconsistent\nin the yellowfin tuna fishery. Bycatch reduction\nUses precautionary approach and could result in\nwith the precautionary approach and an ICCAT\nrecommendation to limit effective fishing effort\nfor unmarketable finfish and marine mammals.\nCould result in tuna discards from drift gillnet\nAllowing expanded use of new gear type in a\nvessels directing effort on other species.\nEcological Impacts\nMinimal impacts expected.\nMinimal impacts expected.\nfaster BFT rebuilding.\nProhibit the use of pelagic\ntuna quota transfer criteria\nKeep status quo on bluefin\nKeep status quo on bluefin\nOverfishing\" as a bluefin\ndriftnets in the Atlantic\ntuna angling category\nrecreational retention\nFinal Action\nAdd \"Effects on\nRebuilding and\ntuna size limits\ntuna fisheries.\nlimits","Social impacts associated with a 6%\nSome loss of revenue to commercial\nfishery associated with regulatory\nNMFS is studying the affect of\nspotter planes on communities.\nreduction in landings could be\nSocial Impacts\nnegative in the short term.\ndiscards.\ncommercial fishery for bigeye tuna, if\nContinued positive economic impacts\nnot use aircraft assistance because the\nPositive impact through discouraging\noperators who use aircraft assistance\nthey may catch enough to offset this\nfishery may close more quickly than\na TAC is established at 1992 levels.\nimpacts on vessel operators who do\nsurplus for the recreational fishery.\nhigher gross revenues to the vessel\ncost. Continued potential negative\ntargeting of small fish and through\nfor spotter pilots, as they receive a\nreproductive age. However, could\nfrom fishery. Continued potential\nThis would result in at least a 6%\nportion of the revenues generated\nsome gross revenues to the plane,\nPossible reduction in charterboat\nrevenues and in angler consumer\nbecause, although operators lose\nEconomic Impacts\nreduction in revenues for the\nMinimal impacts expected.\nsurvival of released fish to\nif aircraft are prohibited.\nincrease discards.\nof juveniles in equatorial fisheries through limits\nUnited States from exceeding its quota of school\non FADS. Allows for increased catch following\naircraft. Inconsistent with OY goal of providing\nAtlantic-wide landings to 1992 levels ( ~85,000\nwhatever quota is in place would most likely be\ncurrent landings, as well as a reduction in catch\nreasonable fishing opportunities for the longest\nmt ww), approximately a 6% reduction from\nPositive impact from helping to prevent the\nSCRS has recommended a reduction of the\nMinimal impact on stock rebuilding since\nharvested with or without assistance from\nEcological Impacts\nMinimal impacts expected.\nrebuilding.\nBFT.\ntime.\nfor a 10-year international\nbigeye and yellowfin tuna\nrecommended by ICCAT\nspotter plane (status quo)\nStatus quo size limits for\nEstablish the foundation\nNo additional action on\nrebuilding program for\nat this time. This issue\nmay be addressed later\nbigeye tuna; adopt if\nunder the framework\nFinal Action\nEstablish a \"School\nReserve\" category\nprovisions.","measures is expected to allow fishery\nimpacts of this alternative, distributed\nSocial costs of this alternative may be\nfishing communities and participants\nlong-term conservation requirements\nin the short term, though these costs\nand goals of the fishery as mandated\nparticipants more time to plan their\nrealization of conservation goals of\ntarget swordfish on the Atlantic and\nare offset by achievement of long-\nnecessary, however, to achieve the\nSome negative social impacts for\nGulf coasts and in the Caribbean.\nterm stability for the fishery and\nthroughout the communities that\nThere could be negative social\nby the Magnuson-Stevens Act.\nBeneficial social impacts; this\nSocial Impacts\nfishing activities.\nthis FMP.\nindustries; this measure is expected to\nMinimal social and economic effects\nincrease the predictability of fishery.\ncommercial fishermen are successful\nBeneficial economic impacts for the\nReduces ex-vessel gross revenues in\ncurrent catches generally are within\nswordfish, economic impacts would\nswordfish revenues would likely be\nexpected, as most recreational trips\nbe mitigated. Recreational discards\nare unlikely to have any impacts on\nland less than 3 yellowfin tuna per\ncharter/headboats retain more than\nthis limit. Minimal social impacts\nHowever, this dislocation of effort\nfisheries or exit fishing altogether.\nrebuilds and directed fishing effort\nperson. May have some negative\nSome vessels that rely heavily on\ncommercial fishermen until stock\nforced to seek revenues in other\nwould be far smaller than under\nbecause LPS data indicate that\n1999 by 11.9% (proportion of\nEconomic Impacts\nrecreational and commercial\neither 3 or 6 year rebuilding.\nin reducing dead discards of\nincrease catch and discards.\ndiscards in 1997). If U.S.\nimpacts in areas where\nthis limit.\nAtlantic Swordfish\nNo ecological impacts expected because it would\nage classes of swordfish. In the long term, could\nwithin this limit. This alternative could prevent\nnot necessarily change any times or areas where\n~10 years to rebuild to MSY with a reduction in\nICCAT recommendation to limit effort at 1996\naway from other HMS that are subject to more\nquota to 2,320 mt WW per year, a reduction of\nindicate that current catch rates generally are\nreduce dead discards, thus protecting younger\nrestrictive rebuilding measures. Responds to\nAtlantic-wide quota to 8000 mt WW and U.S.\nMinimal ecological effect because LPS data\nyellowfin tuna in expectation of effort shifts\nReduces U.S. fishing, but not overfishing by\nprovide an incentive to increase post-release\nrebuilding and may encourage fishermen to\nother countries. Contributes to faster stock\nexpansion of the recreational fishery for\nEcological Impacts\n~27% from the status quo.\nfish are caught.\nsurvival.\nlevels.\nFishing year begins June 1\nand ends May 31 for tuna.\nadopt if recommended by\nnorth Atlantic swordfish;\nEstablish the foundation\nEstablish a recreational\nagainst swordfish quota\nrebuilding program for\nFinal Action\nCount dead discards\nfor an international\nretention limit of 3\n(subject to ICCAT\nyellowfin tuna/\nperson/day.\nadoption)\nICCAT.","particularly for commercial swordfish\ncommercial and recreational fisheries.\nfishery participants continued access\nThis alternative could have minimal\nconservation objectives by allowing\nto that part of the resource that can\nrequirement to discard undersized\nThis alternative helps mitigate the\nmost severe cuts necessitated by\nvessels, with long-term positive\nMinimal social impacts due to\nalternative is expected to have\nsustain fishing pressure. This\npositive long-term social and\nshort-term negative impacts,\ncommunity-leve impacts by\nSocial Impacts\nMinimal impacts expected.\nimpacts for stability of the\ncontributing to rebuilding.\nswordfish.\npursue other options for allocation of\nfishermen because dusky sharks are a\nother LCS, pelagic, and SCS fisheries\nIncidental quota each year. Unlikely\nLowers administrative costs because\nbecause only landings of uncommon\nto have any impacts on commercial\nrevenues estimated in 1997 to be in\nshark species. Minimal impacts for\ndirected recreational fishing effort\nexpands. At that time, NMFS will\nfishermen until stock rebuilds and\nrelatively important commercial\nincreased costs for commercial\nResulted in foregone ex-vessel\nPossible reduced revenues and\nlandings will be taken off the\nEconomic Impacts\nspecies would be eliminated.\nMinimal impacts expected.\nexcess of $2.9 million.\nrecreational quota.\nAtlantic Sharks\nFor the other commonly-landed LCS and pelagic\nCoupled with time/area closures, this alternative\nWould allow for faster rebuilding for dusky and\nContributes to rebuilding by keeping mortality\ncould reduce mortality on small size classes of\nnight sharks if bycatch mortality is not large.\nlevels consistent with SCRS recommended\nand SCS, sustainability of current fishing\nEcological Impacts\nMinimal impacts expected.\nmortality is uncertain.\nswordfish.\nlevels.\nIncidental Landings Quota\nyear: June 1 to May 31 for\ndusky and night sharks) in\nuncommon and seriously\nprohibited species; allow\ndepleted LCS (including\nretention of commonly-\nKeep status quo fishing\nminimum size limit for\ncommercial fishermen.\nProhibit possession of\naddition to 5 currently\nswordfish mortalities\nSubtract recreational\nlanded LCS, pelagic,\nFinal Action\nfrom the swordfish\non an annual basis.\nKeep the 33 lb dw\nand SCS; redefine\nmanagement unit\nrecreational and\nswordfish.\ncategories.","are mitigated to the extent practicable\npredictability for shark fishermen and\nthe season and lending some stability\nSocial and community level impacts\nof this alternative are expected to be\nnearshore fishery to primarily catch-\nof the fishery. These adverse social\nconservation objectives of this FMP\nand the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and\nLikely to have notable social effects\npractices, and changes in the nature\nWill have the benefit of prolonging\nsubstantial. Impacts could include\nimpacts are necessary to achieve\nemployment, changes in fishing\nby shifting the character of the\nSocial Impacts\nin order to allow continued\nreductions in revenue and\nparticipation of all fishing\nThis alternative increases\nto the fishery.\ncommunities.\nand-release.\ndealers.\nvessels offshore, however this may be\nMay increase fishing costs by forcing\noffset by higher prices for larger fish.\nfishing conditions, to a certain extent.\nSafety concerns in NC winter fishery\noffshore. This alternative may result\nMay reduce derby fishing conditions\nMinimal effect since most LCS trips\nMay decrease angler willingness to\npay in directed pelagic, trophy, and\nare already at this lower catch rate.\nin cessation of fishing activity by\nCould continue to mitigate derby\nNo additional economic impacts\ndue to increased fishing activity\nbecause fishermen are currently\noperating under this restriction.\nEconomic Impacts\npredictability of LCS fishery.\nand increase stability and\ntournament fisheries.\nsome participants.\nof fishing mortality on Atlantic sharpnose sharks\non most sensitive life stages/sizes. Sustainability\nSize limit will reduce effective fishing mortality\nsize will allow higher level of effective F while\nDue to RB size-depth segregation, a minimum\nregionally. No quota reduction is implemented\nalternative would result in an average of ~50%\nis unknown, but catch rates do not appear to be\nWould rebuild LCS consistent with \"zero plus\nreduction in RB landings by number, although\nNo direct ecological impacts. Indirect impacts\nmay be altered bycatch and bycatch mortality.\none mean generation time\" rebuilding period.\nsupporting stock growth to MSY levels. This\nfor RB under this alternative. More efficient\ntime to rebuilding due to species-specific\nthe magnitude of the reduction will vary\nEcological Impacts\nNo additional ecological impacts.\nmanagement.\ndecreasing.\nfor RB; reduce NRB quota\ncommercial retention limit\nSchedule fishery openings\n(any species) and establish\nimplement minimum size\nadjustments the following\nsharpnose/ person/trip (no\nridgeback (RB) and non-\nridgeback (NRB) sharks;\nminimum size of 4.5 feet\nwith no quota reduction\nNote: these quota levels\nof 137 cm FL (4.5 feet)\na bag limit of 1 Atlantic\nyear; no reopening that\nEstablish a recreational\nshark/vessel/trip with a\nto 218 mt dw per year.\ndo not account for the\npublic display quota.\nfor LCS (status quo).\nfor specified periods;\nFinal Action\n4,000 lb dw per trip\nretention limit of 1\nDivide LCS into\nseason-specific\nminimum size).\nseason","rebuilding. Adverse social impacts of\nachieve conservation objectives of the\neliminate potential inequities between\nSubstantial social impacts where dead\nfishery and of the Magnuson-Stevens\nincreasing competition in the fishery,\nThis alternative would have minimal\nregions in the allocation of available\nsocial impacts because it would not\nquota. This will have the effect of\nthis alternative are unavoidable to\nimplementation of limited access.\nThis alternative should reduce or\nportion of the currently available\nalternative could be mitigated by\ndiscards or state landings after a\nfederal closure comprise a large\nAct. Social concerns under this\npreclude anglers from bleeding\nalthough it would also hasten\nNo additional social impacts.\nNo additional social impacts.\nSocial Impacts\nsharks, and would support\nconservation objectives.\nquota.\nreduced. Depending on the degree of\nMinimal economic impacts. Anglers\nreporting and may reduce perception\nfisheries do not open. State landings\navailable quota may be substantially\nfishermen out of business as fishery\naccounting for over/underarvests in\nthe same season the following year.\nof LCS after federal closures have\nwould still be able to bleed fish to\nMay redistribute fishing effort by\nNo additional economic impacts.\nNo additional economic impacts.\nSignificant economic impacts as\nclosures may be extended or the\nquota reductions, may put some\nMay reduce incentive to delay\nof inequity between regions in\nranged from 32 to 52% of the\nEconomic Impacts\nprevent spoilage of meat.\navailable LCS quota.\nallocation of quota.\nfor LCS and maintenance of pelagics and SCS at\nOY levels. May increase regulatory discards if\nfishery closures are extended or the fisheries do\nWould eliminate unchecked quota overharvests\nWould result in faster rebuilding to MSY levels\nand deviations from the rebuilding schedule.\nEcological Impacts\nNo additional ecological impacts.\nNo additional ecological impacts.\nNo direct ecological impacts.\nnot open.\nfishing mortality in setting\nquotas, including counting\nSeason-specific quotas for\nAccount for all sources of\nAuthorized gear includes\nanglers have heads, tails,\ndead discards and state\nannual adjustments for\nrod and reel, handline,\nRequire that all sharks\nlanded by recreational\nNo time/area closures\nlandings after federal\nbandit gear, longline,\nFinal Action\ncommercial fishery;\nclosures against the\nrecreational fishery\nand fins attached.\nfederal quotas\n(status quo)\ngillnet.","delays of the current system, with few\nobservers can be provided by NMFS\nSocial impacts of this alternative are\nbut could be adverse and substantial\nMay have negative social impacts to\nthe extent that fishermen would not\nbe able to expand their porbeagle\nif observers cannot be provided.\nThis alternative would eliminate\nNo additional social impacts.\nexpected to be minimal when\nNo additional social impacts.\nSocial Impacts\nMinimal impact expected.\nother social impacts.\nshark operations.\nto the extent that fishermen would not\nMay decrease revenues for fishermen\nMay have negative economic impacts\nimpacts of decreasing administrative\nmanagement process through loss of\nof the gear is reduced due to lack of\nMinor economic impacts unless use\nMinor adverse impacts of reducing\nOT forum for scientific debate, but\nwho derive revenues from fins of\nNo additional economic impacts.\nRB and NRB quotas and positive\nNo additional economic impacts.\nNMFS believes the HMS AP can\nbe able to expand their porbeagle\nobservers. If observer coverage\nsignificant economic and social\ndelays. Increasing enforcement\ncannot be provided, may have\nEconomic Impacts\nMay decrease confidence in\nsharks outside the original\nprovide such a forum.\nmanagement units.\nshark operations.\ncapabilities.\nimpacts.\nMinimal ecological impacts of reducing waste of\nMay have variable ecological impacts depending\nbycatch and bycatch mortality if use of the gear\nor may contribute to stock declines if porbeagle\nguidelines if porbeagle sharks are at OY levels\nMinimal ecological impacts of ensuring better\nsharks outside the original management units.\non porbeagle stock status. May exceed NS 1\nNo direct ecological impacts. May reduce\ncompliance with authorized activities.\nis reduced due to lack of observers.\nEcological Impacts\nNo additional ecological impacts.\nNo direct ecological impacts.\nsharks are below OY levels.\nCreate a new management\nfor porbeagle sharks of 92\nunless a NMFS-approved\npublic display permitting\ncoverage in shark gillnet\nprohibition on finning to\nEstablish separate public\nshark quota by 92 mt dw\nsuperceded by HMS AP\nAdopt the Large Whale\nRequire 100% observer\nEstablish separate quota\nMagnuson-Stevens Act\nprohibit use of gillnets\ndisplay quota of 60 mt\nww; establish separate\nother sharks to extend\nunit of deepwater and\nmt dw; reduce pelagic\nregulations under the\nTake Reduction Plan\nand reporting system\nFinal Action\nobserver is on board\nfishery at all times;\nDissolve OT as\nto 488 mt dw\nall sharks.","because blue shark dead discards may\neffectiveness in enforcing rebuilding-\nMinimal social costs, with benefits to\nSubstantial one-time cost for pelagic\nrelated regulations; increased human\nMay have negative social impacts to\nMay have substantial social impacts\nthe fleet and fishing communities of\nSocial impacts of this alternative are\npelagic shark quota. Depending on\nthe extent that fishermen would not\ncost may be offset by several social\nlongline vessel owners, though this\nbusiness may increase for directed\ncommunication with other vessels\nrebuilding management measures.\nminimal, though the cost of doing\nthe magnitude of any reductions,\nexceed the quota and reduce the\nincreasing the enforceability of\noperations above 1997 levels.\nderby fishing conditions may\nbenefits including increased\nbe able to expand their SCS\nSocial Impacts\nsafety at sea; and increased\nswordfish vessels.\nand shore.\ndevelop.\nto the extent that fishermen would not\n$2.50 to $5/day could be increased by\nMay have negative economic impacts\nOne-time expenditure for fishery with\nWould cost $1,800 to 5,000 in capital\noffloading benefits for all vessels and\nmay develop and regulatory discards\nDepending on the magnitude of any\nreductions, derby fishing conditions\nNorth/South Atlantic transit benefit\ndiscards may exceed the quota and\ncosts unless the system was leased.\nbe able to expand their operations\nOngoing communication costs of\ncommunications with land-based\nimpacts because blue shark dead\nMay have substantial economic\ncontacts or other vessels. Costs\nreduce the pelagic shark quota.\nwould be mitigated by delayed\nMinimal impact because many\nfisherman's desire to improve\nEconomic Impacts\nminimal social and economic\nvessels already adhere to this\nfor distant-water vessels.\nabove 1997 levels.\nmay increase.\nGear modifications\nimpacts.\npractice.\nMinor ecological impacts as the SCS quota is not\nsharks if overharvests in the blue shark quota are\nIncreases the effectiveness of time/area closures\nMinor ecological impacts on blue shark stocks\npreventing directed fisheries from expanding.\nbecause most blue sharks are discarded alive.\nMay contribute to blue shark maintenance by\nWould result in increased enforcement of the\nAn estimated 40% reduction in serious injury\nand incidental mortality of strategic stocks of\ntime/area closures. No impacts on protected\nMay increase regulatory discards of pelagic\nspecies or other target or non-target finfish.\nand furthers the goal of bycatch reduction\nEcological Impacts\nmarine mammals.\nreduced.\nlarge.\n273 mt dw; reduce pelagic\noverharvests in blue shark\nlevels pending assessment\nlandings and dead discard\nCap commercial quota of\nRequire the use of VMS\nrequirements for pelagic\nquota for blue sharks of\nsmall coastal sharks at\n10% higher than 1997\non all pelagic longline\nentanglement with a\nFinal Action\nEstablish a separate\nprotected species\nlongline vessels\nMove after one\nshark quota by\nGear-marking\nvessels.\nquota","The social impacts of this alternative\nMinimal social impacts expected.\nMinimal social impacts expected.\nMinimal social impacts expected.\nMinimal social impacts expected.\nSocial Impacts\nare minimal.\nnot increase since longline vessels are\ninvolve billfish are already subject to\nInformation collection burden would\nalready required to submit logbooks;\nwith housing and feeding observers;\ngross revenues per pelagic longline\nCost to vessel operators associated\nimmediate completion of the form.\nBecause workshops are voluntary,\ntraining and employing observers.\nthose tournaments that target only\ntuna and sharks; tournaments that\nDifficult to enforce. May reduce\nsome additional inconvenience to\nInformation collection burden on\nminimal economic impacts are\ncost to NMFS associated with\nEconomic Impacts\noperators by requiring more\nthis reporting requirement.\nMonitoring, Permitting, and Reporting\nexpected.\nset.\nsame, thereby changing the fishing pattern of the\nReduces bycatch by demonstrating handling and\ncomposition and character of total catch (landed\neffectively decreasing number of hooks per set.\nHowever, the number of hooks may remain the\naccurately characterize bycatch in tournaments,\nassociated with delayed reporting on multi-day\nand discarded), enhancing the quality of stock\nrelease techniques; improves the accuracy of\nbycatch reporting to dockside and telephone\nImproves quality of data on discard rates by\nIncreases biological information about the\nMay reduce takes of marine mammals by\nFacilitates collection of catch and bycatch\ninformation in certain times/areas to more\nwhich differ from non-tournament fishing\nminimizing poor recollection that may be\nEcological Impacts\ngear (hooks closer together).\nassessments.\nfishing trips.\nsurveyors.\npatterns.\nincrease bycatch survival.\neducation workshops for\ncommercial fishermen to\nforms within 48 hours of\nrecreational tournaments\nobserver coverage in the\nRequire vessel operators\nobserver coverage of all\nregistration for all tuna,\nlongline to 24 nautical\nHMS charter/headboat\nmainline of a pelagic\nhauling a longline set\nmiles from Aug. 1 to\nImplement voluntary\nImplement voluntary\nswordfish, and shark\nBFT purse seine and\nFinal Action\nto complete logbook\nNov. 30 in the Mid-\nRequire tournament\nLimit the length of\nreduce bycatch and\nvessels; mandatory\nharpoon fisheries.\nAtlantic Bight","Table 11 List of Abbreviations and Acronyms used in the HMS FMP. This list is also provided in Appendix 5.\nAA:\nAssistant Administrator\nACCSP:\nAtlantic Coastal Cooperative Statistics Program\nACS:\nangler consumer surplus\nANPR:\nadvanced notice of proposed rulemaking\nAOCTRP:\nAtlantic Offshore Cetacean Take Reduction Plan\nAOCTRT:\nAtlantic Offshore Cetacean Take Reduction Team\nAP:\nadvisory panel\nATCA:\nAtlantic Tunas Convention Act\nAZAA:\nAmerican Zoological and Aquarium Association\nB:\nbiomass\nBAYS:\nbigeye, albacore, yellowfin, and skipjack tunas\nBET:\nbigeye tuna\nBFT:\nbluefin tuna\nBSD:\nBluefin Statistical Document\nBO:\nBiological Opinion\nBUM:\nblue marlin\nBWFA:\nBlue Water Fishermen's Association\nCFMC:\nCaribbean Fishery Management Council\nCFL:\ncurved fork length\nCFR:\nCode of Federal Regulations\nCITES:\nConvention on International Trade in Endangered Species\nCK:\ncleithrum to keel\nCOE:\ncertificate of eligibility\nCPUE:\ncatch per unit effort\nCTC:\nCooperative Tagging Center of NMFS, Southeast Fishery Science Center\nCV:\ncoefficient of variation\nDFO:\nDepartment of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada\nDNA:\ndeoxyribonucleic acid\nDOC:\nDepartment of Commerce\nDPUE:\ndiscards per unit effort\ndw:\ndressed weight\nEEZ:\nexclusive economic zone\nEFH:\nessential fish habitat\nEFP:\nexempted fishing permit\nEIS:\nenvironmental impact statement\nESA:\nEndangered Species Act\nFMR:\nfishing mortality rate\nFAA:\nFederal Aviation Administration\nFAD:\nfish aggregating device\nFAO:\nFood and Agriculture Organization\nxxx","FDA:\nFood and Drug Administration\nFEIS:\nfinal environmental impact statement\nFMP:\nfishery management plan\nFL:\nfork length\nFR:\nFederal Register\nFRFA:\nfinal regulatory flexibility analysis\nFTE:\nfull-time employee\nGCTA:\nGeneral Category Tuna Association\nGMFMC:\nGulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council\nGOM:\nGulf of Mexico\nGRT:\ngross registered tonnage\nGSAFDF:\nGulf and South Atlantic Fishery Development Foundation\nGWT:\ngross weight tons\nHAPC:\nhabitat area of particular concern\nHMS:\nhighly migratory species\nHP:\nhorsepower\nICCAT:\nInternational Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas\nILAP:\ninitial limited access permit\nI/O Paper:\nIssues/Options paper\nIQ:\nindividual quota\nIRFA:\ninitial regulatory flexibility analysis\nITQ:\nindividual transferable quota\nIVQ:\nindividual vessel quota\nk:\ncarrying capacity\nLCS:\nlarge coastal sharks\nLAP:\nlimited access permit\nLJFL:\nlower jaw fork length\nLL:\nlongline\nLOA:\nlength overall\nLPS:\nLarge Pelagic Survey\nLWTRP:\nLarge Whale Take Reduction Plan\nM:\nnatural mortality rate\nMAB:\nmid Atlantic bight\nMAFMC:\nMid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council\nMEY:\nmaximum economic yield\nMFMT:\nmaximum fishing mortality threshold\nMMPA:\nMarine Mammal Protection Act\nMRFSS:\nMarine Recreational Fisheries Statistical Survey\nMSC:\nmaximum sustainable catch\nMSFCMA:\nMagnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act\nMagnuson-Stevens Act: Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act\nMSST:\nminimum stock size threshold\nxxxi","MSY:\nmaximum sustainable yield\nmt:\nmetric ton\nN:\nnumber\nNAS:\nNational Academy of Sciences\nNEC:\nnortheast coastal\nNEFMC:\nNew England Fishery Management Council\nNEFSC:\nNortheast Fisheries Science Center, NMFS\nNEPA:\nNational Environmental Protection Act\nNERO:\nNortheast Regional Office, NMFS\nNMFS:\nNational Marine Fisheries Service\nNOAA:\nNational Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration\nNRB:\nnon-ridgeback large coastal shark\nNRC:\nNational Research Council\nNS:\nnational standard\nNSG:\nnational standard guideline\nNT:\nnet tonnage\nOCR:\noptical character recognition\nOT:\nOperations Team\nOY:\noptimum yield\nPBR:\npotential biological removal\nPRA:\nPaperwork Reduction Act\nPS:\npurse seine\nPVA:\npresent value analysis\nintrinsic rate of increase\nr:\nRB:\nridgeback large coastal shark\nRFA:\nRegulatory Flexibility Act\nRFD:\nrestricted fishing days\nRIR:\nregulatory impact review\nSAFE Report:\nStock Assessment and Fishery Evaluation Report\nSAFMC:\nSouth Atlantic Fishery Management Council\nSAI:\nsailfish\nSBA:\nUnited States Small Business Administration\nSCRS:\nStanding Committee on Science and Research\nSCS:\nsmall coastal shark\nSEC:\nsoutheast coastal\nSEFSC:\nSoutheast Fisheries Science Center, NMFS\nSERO:\nSoutheast Regional Office, NMFS\nSEW:\nShark Evaluation Workshop\nSPR:\nspawning stock biomass per recruit\nSSB:\nspawning stock biomass\nSUV:\nsubmerged aquatic vegetation\nTAC:\ntotal allowable catch\nxxxii","TALFF:\ntotal allowable level of foreign fishing\nTL:\ntotal length\nTXPWS:\nTexas Parks and Wildlife Recreational Fishing Survey\nU.N.:\nUnited Nations\nUSCG:\nUnited States Coast Guard\nVMS:\nvessel monitoring system\nVPA:\nvirtual population analysis\nWHM:\nwhite marlin\nwhole weight\nWW:\nxxxiii","Chapter 1\nINTRODUCTION\n1.1\nPurpose and Need\n2\n1.1.1\nThe HMS Process and History\n2\n1.1.2\nIssues/Problems for Resolution\n3\n1.1.3\nDomestic Considerations\n6\n1.1.4\nInternational Considerations\n7\n1.1.5 Objectives\n11\n1.2\nConservation and Management Measures\n13\n1.3\nManagement Units\n18\n1.4\nScientific Data and Research Needs\n21\n1.5\nDevelopment of Fishery Resources\n24\n1.6\nTotal Allowable Level of Foreign Fishing\n28\n1.7\nRelationship to International Agreements, Applicable Laws,\nand Other Fishery Management Plans\n28\n1.7.1\nICCAT and its Relationship to ATCA and the Magnuson-Stevens Act\n29\n1.7.2\nThe United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and HMS\n30\n1.7.3\nOther Fishery Management Plans\n31\n1.7.4\nRelationship of this FMP to Existing HMS Management Measures\n32\n1.7.5\nPaperwork Reduction Act\n32\n1.7.6\nCoastal Zone Management\n32\n1.7.7\nEndangered Species Act\n33\n1.7.8\nMarine Mammal Protection Act\n33\n1.7.9 Federalism\n34\n1.7.10 Executive Order 12866 (E.O. 12866)\n34\n1.8\nWhat's in the HMS FMP\n34\n1.9\nRelationship of the HMS FMP to the Magnuson-Stevens Act Requirements\n35\n1.10 List of Preparers\n40\n1.11 List of Agencies and Organizations Consulted\n41\nChapter 1 - Table of Contents - 1","1.1 Purpose and Need\n1.1.1 The HMS Process and History\nOn November 28, 1990, the President of the United States signed into law the Fishery\nConservation Amendments of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-627). This law amended the Magnuson Act\nand gave the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) the authority (effective January 1, 1992) to\nmanage tuna in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico,\nand Caribbean Sea under authority of the Magnuson Act (16 U.S.C. 1811). This law\nalso transferred from the Fishery Management Councils to the Secretary, effective\nNovember 28, 1990, the management authority for the other highly migratory species (HMS)\nin the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and Caribbean Sea (16 U.S.C. 1854(f)(3)). 1 At this\ntime, the Secretary delegated authority to manage these Atlantic HMS to the National Marine\nFisheries Service (NMFS). In order to accomplish this task an administrative process for\ncreating fishery management plans (FMPs) and other rulemaking was implemented (58 FR\n49966). This eight-phase administrative process was needed since the Fishery Management\nCouncils (FMCs) do not regulate HMS. This process is outlined below. In 1996, Congress\namended the Magnuson Act with the Sustainable Fisheries Act (Pub. L. 104-297, re-naming\nit the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens\nAct)), to require that NMFS establish advisory panels (APs) to assist in the development of\nFMPs and FMP amendments including those for Atlantic HMS.\nPhase 1 -- Planning and Scoping\n1.\na. Notice-of-intent to prepare an FMP or FMP amendment;\nb. Draft issues/options statement;\nC. Initial consultations; and\nd. Scoping meetings.\nPhase 2 -- Preparation of Draft Documents; Consultations and Meetings\n2.\na. Revised issues/options statement;\nb. Documents to be prepared;\nC. Preparation strategy;\nd. Document contents;\ne. International management recommendations;\nf. Timing; and\ng. Consultations; meetings with fishery interests.\nThe Magnuson-Stevens Act, at 16 U.S.C. 1802(14), defines the term \"highly migratory species\" as tuna species, marlin (Tetrapturus\n1\nand Makaira spp.), oceanic sharks, sailfishes (Istiophorus spp.), and swordfish (Xiphias gladius). Further, the Magnuson-Stevens bluefin tuna Act, at\nspp. 16 U.S.C. 1802(27), defines the term \"tuna species\" as albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga), bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus), (Thunnus\nthynnus), skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis), and yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares).\nChapter 1 - Purpose and Need - 2","Phase 3 -- Initial Public Review and Comment Period; NEPA Public Review and\n3.\nComment Period; ANPR Public Review and Comment Period if Applicable; and Public\nHearings\na. Notice of availability to the public; ANPR published if applicable;\nb. Review periods and comments; and\nC. Public hearings.\nPhase 4 -- Preparation of Revised Documents and Proposed Regulations; Consultations\n4.\nand Meetings\na. Documents to be prepared;\nb. Preparation strategy;\nC. Document contents;\nd. Timing; and\ne. Consultations; meetings with fishery interests.\nPhase 5 -- Final Public Review and Comment Period; Proposed Regulations Published\n5.\nfor Public Review and Comment\na. Notice of availability to the public and proposed regulations published; and\nb. Review periods and comments.\nPhase 6 -- Preparation of Final Documents and Final Regulations\n6.\na. Documents to be prepared and document contents; and\nb. Preparation strategy.\nPhase 7 - Approval and implementation\n7.\na. Approval procedures and timing.\nPhase 8 - Continuing and contingency fishery management\n8.\na. Framework management measures; and\nb. Contingency fishery management - emergency actions.\n1.1.2 Issues/Problems for Resolution\nThe fisheries for Atlantic tuna, swordfish and sharks share many similar management\nproblems. The following management problems will be addressed in this FMP. They are\nnot listed in any particular order.\nChapter 1 - Purpose and Need - 3","Overfished stocks of highly migratory species\nWhile there are numerous issues to consider in the management of HMS, in many\ncases rebuilding overfished stocks is the primary concern. In September 1997, and again in\nSeptember 1998, NMFS classified west Atlantic bluefin tuna, north Atlantic swordfish, and\nthe 22 species that comprised the large coastal shark management unit (the large coastal\nshark management unit is subdivided into ridgeback, non-ridgeback large coastal sharks,\nand prohibited species in this FMP) as overfished. In September 1998, NMFS classified\nAtlantic bigeye tuna as overfished. Although north Atlantic albacore was not listed by\nNMFS as overfished in the 1998 Report to Congress, this species meets the status\ndetermination criteria adopted in this FMP. These stocks have been, or are being, fished\nbeyond their ability to support maximum sustainable yield. Problems associated with\noverfishing and overfished stocks may include reduced population stability, lower or more\nunpredictable yields and concomitant difficulty sustaining viable commercial fishing and\ncharterboat operations, reduced availability to recreational anglers, higher costs to\nconsumers, economic losses to related businesses (e.g., marinas, tackle shops, restaurants),\nand shifts in ecosystem dynamics. Problems caused by overfishing of HMS are exacerbated\nby the fact that the United States shares most of these stocks with other countries and data\nshow that the United States is often responsible for only a small share of Atlantic-wide\nfishing mortality for these species.\nExcess fishing mortality caused by bycatch and discards\nBycatch and discards in HMS fisheries can be problematic because they further depress\noverfished stocks, impede stock rebuilding, and, in the case of target species, carry an\nopportunity cost of foregone harvest or enjoyment for all segments of the fisheries. Bycatch\nof Atlantic bluefin tuna, billfish, juvenile swordfish, sharks, marine mammals, and sea\nturtles is of particular concern in HMS fisheries. Bycatch in the pelagic longline and driftnet\nfisheries is well documented relative to that for other gear types. In all HMS fisheries, all\nsources of mortality, including bycatch, need to be described and managed. NMFS is\ncharged with national and international requirements to avoid and reduce bycatch and\nbycatch mortality under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act\n(MMPA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act,\nwhich provides the authority to implement ICCAT recommendations. The discard of\nbycatch or lower-valued fish (known as high-grading) is among the most difficult fishery\nmanagement challenges, making attainment of conservation and economic goals of fishery\nmanagers, the fishing industry, and the public problematic (Dewees and Ueber, 1990). In\nHMS fisheries, bycatch by non-selective harvesting gear may be more common than high-\ngrading. However, commercial and recreational retention limits may lead to high-grading.\nCatch and release in commercial and recreational fisheries also plays a role in the overall\nbalance of the ecosystem when considering the fate of released animals, predator-prey\nrelationships, and environmental quality.\nChapter 1 - Purpose and Need - 4","Inconsistencies and inadequacies in international compliance with conservation and\nmanagement measures\nAtlantic HMS are fished and managed by many nations. The International Commission\nfor the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas has adopted management recommendations for, inter\nalia, west Atlantic bluefin tuna, north Atlantic swordfish, Atlantic bigeye tuna, and Atlantic\nyellowfin tuna. However, international cooperation with ICCAT management measures is\nnecessary for adequate conservation and management of these species. With the exception\nof west Atlantic bluefin tuna, ICCAT recommendations, to date, have not adequately\naddressed rebuilding populations of overfished stocks to levels that would produce\nmaximum sustainable yield on a continuing basis. While the United States has complied\nstrictly with ICCAT recommendations, compliance by many other countries has not been as\nconsistent. U.S. fishery participants have expressed concern that they are subject to higher\nstandards, and greater loss of fishing income and recreation, when other nations do not\nimplement and adequately enforce conservation and management recommendations. The\nfailure of other fishing nations to implement and enforce comparable conservation and\nmanagement measures could impede achievement of the objectives of this FMP. At this\ntime, no international management regimes currently exist for Atlantic sharks.\nAssuring optimal data collection\nMonitoring the fishery and its stock requires the collection and timely analysis of\nfishery-dependent and -independent data. The fishery management program must include\nmeasures to ensure adequate social, economic, and biological data collection from all user\ngroups, including, as appropriate: permitting (of vessels, dealers, and importers), observer\nprograms, logbook reporting programs, other self-reporting mechanisms, dockside\nmonitoring, and telephone surveys.\nDomestic HMS management needs to be integrated and streamlined\nAtlantic tuna and swordfish are managed under the dual authority of the Magnuson-\nStevens Act and ATCA. Wherever possible, NMFS attempts to implement regulations\nunder the dual authority of both acts. To date, there has been no FMP for Atlantic tuna.\nUnder the authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, north Atlantic swordfish and Atlantic\nsharks are managed under FMPs. These management documents were created some time\nago by different organizations (i.e., the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council and the\nSecretary, respectively), in response to different management needs. Management of\nAtlantic HMS needs to be updated to reflect current management authority, practices in the\nfisheries, and statutory requirements. Furthermore, there is a great deal of overlap in the\nparticipants, issues, and target catches in the HMS fisheries and, in some instances,\nmanagement can be streamlined and simplified to acknowledge this overlap.\nChapter 1 - Purpose and Need - 5","Overcapitalization\nThere are many problems associated with open access fisheries. The greater the\nnumber of fishing vessels participating, the more likely it is that individual fishing\nenterprises will become unprofitable or marginal. Combined with limited quotas, this can\nlead to greater pressure to catch fish faster. The resulting \"race for the fish\" or derby fishery\nproduces market gluts, poor product quality, and safety concerns. Shortened fishing seasons\nalso mean that fresh fish may not be available to consumers for prolonged periods. This\ncould lead to either a market void or meeting the consumer demand with imported fish. If\nthe latter happens, the market niche for domestic fishermen could be lost. In the swordfish\nand shark commercial fisheries, there is a severe mismatch of harvest capacity and resource\nproductivity in that the number of permitted vessels is far in excess of the number of vessels\nthat are actually active in the fisheries. For example, in 1996 there were approximately\n2,257 shark permit holders, but mandatory logbook data indicate that only about 565 landed\nat least one large coastal shark. As progressively more Atlantic, Gulf, and Caribbean\nfisheries come under limited access, pressure on those fisheries that remain open access will\nincrease. There is already evidence that excess vessels are spilling over from other fisheries\nand that many fishermen are attempting to enhance their future security by developing a\ncatch history in alternative fisheries.\n1.1.3 Domestic Considerations\nAlthough NMFS must abide by all laws (see Section 1.7), the primary domestic\nlegislation guiding fishery management is the Magnuson-Stevens Act. This legislation\ncontains ten National Standards (NSs) which fishery managers must consider when\npreparing a Fishery Management Plan or Amendment. These NSs are:\nConservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on\n1.\na continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the U.S. fishing industry;\nConservation and management measures shall be based upon the best scientific\n2.\ninformation available;\n3. To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed as a unit\nthroughout its range, and interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or in\nclose coordination;\nConservation and management measures shall not discriminate between residents of\n4.\ndifferent states. If it becomes necessary to allocate or assign fishing privileges among\nvarious U.S. fishermen, such allocation shall be (A) fair and equitable to all such\nfishermen; (B) reasonable calculated to promote conservation; and (C) carried out in\nsuch manner that no particular individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an\nexcessive share of privileges;\nConservation and management measures shall, where practicable, consider efficiency in\n5.\nthe utilization of fishery resources; except that no such measure shall have economic\nallocation as its sole purpose;\nChapter 1 - Purpose and Need - 6","Conservation and management measures shall take into account and allow for\n6.\nvariations among, and contingencies in, fisheries, fishery resources, and catches;\nConservation and management measures shall, where practicable, minimize costs and\n7.\navoid unnecessary duplication;\nConservation and management measures shall, consistent with the conservation\n8.\nrequirements of the Act (including the prevention of overfishing and rebuilding of\noverfished stocks), take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing\ncommunities in order to (A) provide for the sustained participation of such\ncommunities, and (B) to the extent practicable, minimize adverse economic impacts on\nsuch communities;\nConservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, (A) minimize\n9.\nbycatch and (B) to the extent bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize the mortality of such\nbycatch; and,\n10. Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, promote the\nsafety of human life at sea.\nThe National Standard Guidelines (NSGs) on how NMFS follows the NSs are\npublished at 50 CFR Part 600 subpart D. In developing this final FMP, NMFS considered\nall of the NSs for each final action. In some cases, a section of this FMP includes the\nagency's consideration. For example, for NS9, Section 3.5 outlines the HMS bycatch\nreduction strategy.\n1.1.4 International Considerations\nDuring the development of this FMP, a principal discussion at AP meetings revolved\naround the relationship between international management and domestic management of\nAtlantic HMS. Since 1966, ICCAT has been responsible for international conservation and\nmanagement of tuna and tuna-like fishes. ICCAT's stated objective is to \"cooperate in\nmaintaining the populations of these fishes at levels which will permit the maximum\nsustainable catch for food and other purposes.\" All of the Atlantic HMS, including tuna,\nswordfish, and billfish, with the exception of the shark species, are currently subject to\nICCAT management authority.\nThe U.S. Congress, in amending the Magnuson-Stevens Act, was clearly aware that\nthese species support international fisheries. For instance, Congress included HMS in the\nrebuilding provisions of § 304, and directed the Secretary to address rebuilding of these\nstocks. Additionally, § 304(e) provides for consideration of recommendations by\ninternational organizations and specifies that rebuilding programs for HMS must reflect\ntraditional participation in the fishery, relative to other nations, by U.S. fishermen.\nChapter 1 - Purpose and Need - 7","International Rebuilding\nNMFS recognizes that there must be international cooperation to rebuild ICCAT-\nmanaged fisheries. For those species subject to ICCAT management authority, the U.S.\nshare of the total reported landings in 1997 is as follows: 61 percent of bluefin tuna catch in\nthe west Atlantic, 27 percent of swordfish landings in the north Atlantic, six percent of\nAtlantic yellowfin tuna catch, and one percent of Atlantic bigeye tuna catch. Unilateral\nreduction of the U.S. quota would not have a significant effect from a biological perspective\nif the international total allowable catch remained the same and the U.S. share were\nreallocated or otherwise harvested. Further, any unilateral action that would reduce U.S.\nfishing effort may not reflect traditional participation in the fishery relative to foreign\ncompetitors and thus may not be consistent with the Magnuson-Stevens Act. By law, the\nUnited States must provide its fishing vessels with a reasonable opportunity to harvest an\nallocation, quota of fish, or fishing mortality level specified by international agreement. The\nMagnuson-Stevens Act also requires the United States to minimize, to the extent practicable,\nany disadvantage to U.S. fishermen in relation to foreign competitors.\nNMFS has seriously considered the concerns of the AP as well as the requirements of\nthe Magnuson-Stevens Act in determining how to develop rebuilding plans for these\ninternationally fished stocks. This FMP addresses overfishing and rebuilding in the\ninternational context, in that it analyzes the international quota levels that would be\nnecessary to rebuild stocks that are subject to ICCAT management authority. While NMFS\nrecognizes that it cannot take unilateral quota action once it accepts an ICCAT quota\nrecommendation, NMFS believes that it is possible to comply with the Magnuson-Stevens\nAct by establishing a foundation for international rebuilding programs for negotiations at\nICCAT. Although ICCAT recommendations in the past have included minimum sizes,\nquotas, and compliance measures, these measures were not usually implemented as a\ncoordinated rebuilding plan. A formal rebuilding program must allow overfished stocks to\nrebuild to the appropriate level to produce maximum sustainable yield in a clearly specified\ntime period that is as short a time as possible within the international context. The\nrebuilding program must include targets for recovery, limits, and explicit interim milestones\nexpressed in terms of measurable improvement of the stock. In November 1998, ICCAT\nadopted a rebuilding program, consistent with the Magnuson-Stevens Act, for west Atlantic\nbluefin tuna. The development of this rebuilding program was due, in large part, to the\nefforts of the U.S. delegation. The United States has encouraged the development and\nadoption of rebuilding programs for Atlantic swordfish and bigeye tuna, and any other\noverfished species, including billfish. ICCAT has adopted resolutions presented by the\nUnited States to set the stage for the development of rebuilding plans for Atlantic swordfish,\nbigeye tuna, and billfish. While this FMP forms the foundation for U.S. policy, NMFS\nrecognizes that other factors may affect U.S. strategy in developing the U.S. position and\nnegotiating at ICCAT.\nIn addition to west Atlantic bluefin tuna, ICCAT has identified north Atlantic swordfish\nas over-exploited. In 1996, ICCAT's Standing Committee on Science and Research (SCRS)\nreported that total swordfish biomass corresponding to maximum sustainable yield levels in\nChapter 1 - Purpose and Need - 8","the north Atlantic may not be achieved in five or ten years without substantial reductions in\ncatch from current levels. Unless recruitment increases substantially, a constant quota for a\ndeclining stock implies ever-increasing levels of fishing mortality. The Committee has\nsuggested that target fishing mortality rates are less risky than constant catches for\nrebuilding over-fished stocks. These target fishing mortality rates are usually translated into\ncorresponding quotas which require adjustment after each assessment, depending on the\nstatus of the stock. In response to the findings of SCRS, ICCAT implemented a substantial\nreduction in quotas for 1997 to 1999. However, in order to allow for an increase in stock\nbiomass, SCRS has maintained that the level of harvest needs to be immediately reduced\nbelow the level of replacement yield. North Atlantic swordfish quotas will be re-evaluated\nby SCRS in 1999, and new management recommendations will be developed at the 1999\nICCAT meeting.\nAlthough the bigeye tuna stock has not been identified as over-exploited by ICCAT,\nSCRS has determined that under the current exploitation pattern, and assuming recruitment\nat recent average levels, yields would be expected to decline in the near future to levels\nbelow maximum sustainable yield. ICCAT has recognized the danger that could be\npresented by the recent increase in bigeye tuna catches, especially increased landings of\njuveniles in the equatorial fishery by non-U.S. vessels. An observer program was mandated\nin 1995 to determine the incidences of catches of undersized fish resulting from the use of\nfish aggregating devices, with special emphasis on time/area analyses. ICCAT requested\nthat, based on this program and other available information, SCRS determine the measures\nnecessary to reduce catches of undersized fish that threaten the sustainability of this fishery.\nFor Atlantic sharks, which are not managed pursuant to ICCAT recommendations, this\nFMP addresses rebuilding requirements through domestic measures. No international\nmanagement regimes currently exist; however, several international organizations do collect\nscientific and trade data on Atlantic sharks, including: SCRS, International Council for the\nExploration of the Sea, International Union for the Conservation of Nature Shark Specialist\nGroup, Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, Convention on International Trade in\nEndangered Species Animals Committee, and the Latin American Organization for Fishery\nDevelopment. NMFS recognizes that international cooperation is important, and the United\nStates is actively pursuing international management of sharks through the Food and\nAgriculture Organization (FAO) consultation process, and regional management of sharks\nthrough cooperative discussions with Canada and Mexico.\nIn February, 1999, the United States was a leading participant in the FAO Consultation\non Shark Conservation and Management and successfully negotiated with the world's\nfishing nations on concrete steps to improve shark conservation in its Global Plan of Action.\nThe Global Plan of Action builds upon the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries,\nencompasses all shark fisheries (both target and non-target), and specifies action on\neducation of fishermen, exchange of information on shark fisheries and studies, assessments\non levels of non-target catch of sharks, and assessments of the effectiveness of management\nmeasures. The Global Plan of Action calls for nations, entities, and/or regional management\nbodies to develop individual plans of action to: 1) control threats to shark populations by\nChapter 1 - Purpose and Need - 9","implementation of harvesting strategies consistent with the principles of biological\nsustainability and rational long-term economic use, and by protection of shark habitats; 2)\nimprove and develop frameworks for effective consultation involving all stakeholders in\nresearch, management, and educational initiatives within and between nations; 3) identify\nand pay special attention to particularly vulnerable or threatened species; and 4) protect\nbiodiversity and ecosystem structure and function.\nDespite the lack of international management beyond FAO's Global Plan of Action,\nNMFS believes that strong domestic management is warranted, and rebuilding possible due\nto the fact that several important nursery areas (notably Delaware Bay, Chesapeake Bay,\nBull's Bay, and Florida Bay) are located within U.S. waters. Therefore, proactive domestic\nmanagement should rebuild shark stocks by protecting the most sensitive juvenile and\nsubadult life history stages. As these stages are critical to rebuilding U.S. shark populations\nthat also migrate into international waters, domestic management is a critical element for\nsuccessful international shark management.\nInternational Compliance\nNMFS concurs with the AP's concern about the lack of international compliance with\nICCAT's management regimes. The Agency shares the concern of U.S. fishery participants\nthat their sacrifices may not result in the desired conservation effects when other nations fail\nto implement and enforce similar measures. Lack of compliance can ultimately diminish the\neffectiveness of ICCAT's recommendations and could impede the progress of any\nrebuilding plans that ICCAT develops. Thus, the United States has taken the lead in\ndeveloping measures to encourage compliance by both ICCAT member countries and non-\nmember countries.\nRecognizing that compliance with catch limits is essential to the conservation of\nAtlantic bluefin tuna and north Atlantic swordfish, ICCAT adopted a recommendation to\nthis effect in 1996. At the 1997 meeting, and each year thereafter, each ICCAT member\nnation with landings that exceed the catch limit for these species in the previous fishing year\nmust explain to the Compliance Committee how the overharvest occurred, and the actions\nalready taken, or to be taken, to prevent further overharvest. If, in the applicable\nmanagement period any member nation exceeds its catch limit, its catch limit will be\nreduced in the next subsequent management period by 100 percent of the amount in excess\nof such catch limit, and ICCAT may authorize other appropriate actions. If any member\nnation exceeds its catch limit during any two consecutive management periods, ICCAT will\nrecommend appropriate measures, which may include but are not limited to, reduction in the\ncatch limit equal to a minimum of 125 percent of the excess harvest, and if necessary, trade\nrestrictive measures. Any trade measures will be import restrictions on the subject species\nthat are consistent with each nation's international obligations. The trade measures will be\nof such duration and under such conditions as ICCAT may determine.\nICCAT has also approved a binding recommendation to improve compliance with\nminimum size regulations. Beginning at the 1998 meeting, and each year thereafter, each\nChapter 1 - Purpose and Need - 10","ICCAT member nation that has harvested any bluefin tuna weighing less that 1.8 kilograms,\nor whose harvest of any ICCAT stock exceeds the specified minimum size tolerance level\nmust explain: a) the magnitude of the overharvest; b) domestic measures implemented to\navoid further overharvest; c) monitoring of compliance with domestic measures; and d) any\nother actions to be taken to prevent further overharvest. Note that this absolute minimum\nsize for bluefin tuna was increased to 3.2 kilograms at the 1998 meeting, and thus\ncompliance evaluation will be relative to this size. Beginning at the 2000 meeting, if any\nmember nation's actions have failed to prevent further overharvest, ICCAT may recommend\nmeasures to reduce the harvest of undersized fish, which may include, but are not limited to,\ntime and area closures, assignment of small fish quotas, and/or gear restrictions.\nSeveral other measures have been designed by ICCAT to improve compliance with\nconservation and management measures, including resolutions on vessel sighting, port\ninspection, and a vessel monitoring system pilot program.\nAt the 1998 meeting, ICCAT made substantial progress under these compliance\nprovisions. Member nations that were responsible for overharvests under the terms of the\n1996 compliance recommendation, relative to the east Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery and the\nnorth Atlantic swordfish fishery, acknowledged these overharvests and pledged to reduce\ntheir quotas accordingly. ICCAT also agreed to adopt a standard reporting form, proposed\nby the United States, that will further facilitate the evaluation of compliance with ICCAT\nrecommendations at future meetings. Trade restrictions on bluefin tuna products from\nPanama, Belize, and Honduras that were approved by ICCAT in 1996 have been extended.\nICCAT also took a first step toward authorizing the use of trade measures on swordfish\nproducts from these three countries. Recognizing the problems associated with vessels\nfishing under flags of convenience, ICCAT adopted a measure to address unreported and\nunregulated catches of tuna by large-scale longline vessels. This measure could lead to the\nrevocation of the registration or fishing licences of vessels that are acting improperly and, if\nnecessary, the use of trade restrictive measures.\nConsistent with other applicable law, this FMP provides a framework to take necessary\naction under ICCAT compliance recommendations. However, while this FMP forms the\nfoundation for U.S. policy, other factors may affect U.S. strategy in negotiating at ICCAT.\nThis FMP will be reviewed on a continuing basis, and promptly whenever a\nrecommendation has been made by ICCAT, and conservation and management measures\nwill be revised as appropriate.\n1.1.5 Objectives\nThe management objectives of the FMP for Atlantic HMS are described below. They\napply to tuna, swordfish, and sharks. They are not listed in any particular order.\nTo prevent or end overfishing of Atlantic tuna, swordfish, and sharks and adopt the\nprecautionary approach to fishery management;\nChapter I - Purpose and Need - 11","To rebuild overfished fisheries in as short a time as possible and control all components\nof fishing mortality, both directed and incidental, SO as to ensure the long-term\nsustainability of the stocks and promote stock recovery of the management unit to the\nlevel at which the maximum sustainable yield can be supported on a continuing basis;\nTo minimize, to the extent practicable, economic displacement and other adverse\nimpacts on fishing communities during the transition from overfished fisheries to\nhealthy ones;\nTo minimize, to the extent practicable, bycatch of living marine resources and the\nmortality of such bycatch that cannot be avoided in the fisheries for Atlantic tuna,\nswordfish, and sharks;\nTo establish a foundation for international negotiation on conservation and management\nmeasures to rebuild overfished fisheries and to promote achievement of optimum yield\nfor these species throughout their range, both within and beyond the exclusive\neconomic zone. Optimum yield is the maximum sustainable yield from the fishery,\nreduced by any relevant social, economic, or ecological factors;\nTo provide a framework, consistent with other applicable law, to take necessary action\nunder ICCAT compliance recommendations;\nTo provide the data necessary for assessing the fish stocks and managing the fisheries,\nincluding addressing inadequacies in current collection and ongoing collection of\nsocial, economic, and bycatch data about HMS fisheries;\nConsistent with other objectives of this FMP, to manage Atlantic HMS fisheries for\ncontinuing optimum yield SO as to provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation,\nparticularly with respect to food production, providing recreational opportunities,\npreserving traditional fisheries, and taking into account the protection of marine\necosystems;\nTo better coordinate domestic conservation and management of the fisheries for\nAtlantic tuna, swordfish, sharks, and billfish, considering the multispecies nature of\nmany HMS fisheries, overlapping regional and individual participation, international\nmanagement concerns, historical fishing patterns and participation, and other relevant\nfactors;\nTo simplify and streamline HMS management while actively seeking input from\naffected constituencies, the general public, and the HMS AP;\nTo promote protection of areas identified as essential fish habitat for tuna, swordfish,\nand sharks;\nTo reduce latent effort and overcapitalization in HMS commercial fisheries;\nTo develop eligibility criteria for participation in the commercial shark and swordfish\nfisheries based on historical participation, including access for traditional swordfish\nhandgear fishermen to participate fully as the stock recovers; and\nTo create a management system to make fleet capacity commensurate with resource\nstatus SO as to achieve the dual goals of economic efficiency and biological\nconservation.\nChapter 1 - Purpose and Need - 12","1.2 Conservation and Management Measures\nThe following table compares the preferred alternatives in the draft FMP and Addendum\nwith the final management measures taken by NMFS in the final FMP to achieve the\nmanagement objectives and management concerns described in Section 1.1. All final actions are\ndescribed in Chapters 3 and 4.\nFinal Action in Final FMP\nPreferred Alternative in Draft FMP\nTunas\nSame, but allow the few vessels using coastal\nProhibit pelagic driftnets for tuna\ndriftnets to target dogfish, bluefish, monkfish, and\nweakfish to obtain experimental fishing permits\nfor tuna catch. This will allow collection of data;\nNMFS will re-examine later\nICCAT Rebuilding Program: 2,500 mt WW west Atlantic\nSame\nTAC, 1,387 mt WW landing quota for United States -\n20 year recovery\nRemain as proposed unless changed. Consult\nStatus quo percentage allocations, with Purse Seine category\nwith the HMS AP.\ncapped at 250 mt WW\nAdd \"Consider effects on rebuilding and overfishing\" as\nSame\nquota transfer criteria\nSame\nStatus quo on bluefin tuna size limits\nStatus quo: Bluefin Tuna Angling Category for recreational\nSame\nretention limits\nSmaller time/area closure with a different shape in\nTime/area closure in north mid-Atlantic for pelagic longlines\nnorth mid-Atlantic for pelagic longlines in June\nin June\n- 1x6 degree block: 39 to 40° N, 68 to 74° W\n- 4x4 degree block: 37 to 41° N, 70 to 74° W\nEstablish the foundation to develop an\n10-Year Recovery Program for bigeye tuna (if adopted by\ninternational 10-year rebuilding program for\nICCAT)\nAtlantic bigeye tuna;\nSame\nStatus quo minimum size for bigeye tuna\nSame, follow up in a separate rulemaking\nSpotter planes allowed\nSame\nEstablish a \"School Reserve\" Category\nSame\nStatus quo minimum size for yellowfin tuna\nEstablish a recreational retention limit of 3 yellowfin\nSame\ntuna/person/day\nFishing year begins June 1 and ends May 31 for tuna\nSame\nChapter 1 - Conservation/Management Measures - 13","Final Action in Final FMP\nPreferred Alternative in Draft FMP\nSwordfish\nEstablish the foundation to develop an\n10-year recovery period (8,000 mt ww)\ninternational 10-year rebuilding program for north\nAtlantic swordfish\nEstablish a foundation to account for dead\nAccount for dead discards in swordfish management\ndiscards in swordfish management; adopt if\n(Recreational and commercial fisheries)\nrecommended by ICCAT.\nSame\nCount recreational landings toward Incidental quota\nProhibit imports of Atlantic swordfish weighing less that the\nSame\nU.S. minimum size, (proposed under separate rulemaking,\ncontained in proposed rule that accompanied draft FMP)\nStatus Quo retention limits for the directed\nNeither preferred nor rejected as an alternative in draft\ncommercial fishery\nStatus Quo bycatch limits in incidental fisheries\nNeither preferred nor rejected as an alternative in draft\nStatus Quo retention limits in the recreational\nNeither preferred nor rejected as an alternative in draft\nfishery\nSame\nStatus quo minimum size\nPrepare a proposed rule that would implement a\nTime/area closure of Florida Straits to longline fishing from\nmore effective closure area to protect small\nJuly through September\nswordfish\nSame, but now includes prohibition of pelagic\nStatus Quo authorized gears (driftnet prohibition proposed\ndriftnet gear form separate rulemaking\nunder separate rulemaking, contained in proposed rule that\naccompanied draft FMP)\nFishing year begins June 1 and ends May 31 for swordfish\nSame\nSharks\nSame with a few exceptions; blue sharks are not\nProhibit possession of uncommon and seriously depleted\nprohibited. Also, oceanic whitetips have a ridge\nLCS in addition to the 5 currently prohibited species; allow\nbut are not a LCS. Therefore, landings of oceanic\nretention (consistent with established quotas and recreational\nwhitetip must include fins for proper\nretention limits) of certain commonly landed LCS (sandbar,\nidentification and enforcement.\nsilky, tiger, blacktip, spinner, lemon, bull, nurse, smooth\nhammerhead, scalloped hammerhead, great hammerhead),\n19 species\nProhibited sharks\npelagic sharks (shortfin mako, common thresher, porbeagle,\noceanic whitetip, blue) and SCS (Atlantic sharpnose,\nblacknose, finetooth, bonnethead) within federal waters.\nRedefine management unit categories accordingly\nSame, but lower quotas to take into account the\nSeparate LCS management unit into ridgeback and non-\npublic display quota.\nridgeback LCS with each subgroup having separate quotas;\nRidgeback quota = 622 mt dw.\nestablish a minimum size and maintain quota level of 642 mt\nNon-ridgeback quota = 196 mt dw.\ndw on ridgeback LCS; reduce the quota on non-ridgeback\nLCS to 218 mt dw\n3 species\nRidgeback large coastal sharks\nNon-ridgeback large coastal sharks\n8 species\nChapter 1 - Conservation/Management Measures - 14","Preferred Alternative in Draft FMP\nFinal Action in Final FMP\nEstablish a species-specific quota for porbeagle sharks of 30\nSame, but revised data so the species-specific\nmt dw; reduce pelagic shark quota by 30 mt dw to 550 mt dw\nquota for porbeagle sharks is 92 mt dw; the\npelagic shark quota is reduced by 92 mt dw to 488\nmt dw\nPelagic sharks\n5 species\nEstablish a separate dead discard quota for blue sharks of\nEstablish a separate blue shark quota of 273 mt\n273 mt dw (545 mt ww); reduce pelagic shark quota by\ndw for landings and dead discards; the pelagic\nshark quota will still be reduced by overharvests\noverharvests in blue shark quota\nin the blue shark quota.\nCap commercial SCS quota at 10% higher than 1997 levels\nSame\n(359 mt dw) pending future assessment\nSmall coastal sharks\n4 species\nSeason-specific quotas and adjustments for the commercial\nSame\nfisheries; annual recreational retention limits and adjustments\nfor recreational fisheries\nAccount for all sources of fishing mortality in establishing\nSame\nquota levels, including counting dead discards and landings\nin state waters after federal closures against the federal\nquotas\nEstablish separate public display quota of 60 mt ww (5% of\nSame\nLCS commercial quota); establish separate public display\npermitting and reporting system\nStatus quo commercial retention limit (4,000 lbs dw per trip\nSame\nfor LCS)\nSchedule fishery openings for specified periods; season-\nSame\nspecific adjustments for quota overharvests and\nunderharvests the following year (no reopening within that\nseason)\nEstablish catch and release only recreational fishing for LCS\nEstablish a recreational retention limit to 1 shark/\nand SCS and establish a recreational retention limit of 1\nvessel/trip with a minimum size of 4.5 feet (any\npelagic shark/vessel/trip\nspecies) and establish an allowance for 1 Atlantic\nsharpnose shark/person/trip (no minimum size)\nRequire that all sharks harvested by recreational anglers have\nSame\nheads, tails, and fins attached\nStatus quo (no time/area closures for shark nursery and\nSame\npupping areas)\nAdopt the Large Whale Take Reduction Plan Regulations\nSame\nunder the authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Act\nRequire 100% observer coverage in the shark\nNot preferred in draft\ndrift gillnet fishery at all times; prohibit the use of\ngillnet gear in Atlantic shark fisheries unless a\nNMFS-approved observer is on board\nChapter 1 - Conservation/Management Measures - 15","Final Action in Final FMP\nPreferred Alternative in Draft FMP\nCreate new management group of \"no finning\nExtend prohibition on finning to all sharks as condition of\nallowed\" species: deepwater and other (formerly\nfederal permit\ndata collection only)\n33 species\nDeepwater/other sharks\nSame\nDissolve OT as superceded by HMS AP\nSame\nFishing year begins January 1 and ends December 31 for\nsharks.\nAll Species\nSame\nRequire VMS for all pelagic longline vessels\nSame; but may mark gear with vessel name\nRequire all gear to be marked with vessel identification\nnumber\nSame\nMove after one entanglement with protected species\nSame\nLimit length of mainline in MAB (interim measure)\nNot selected; would require preemption of states\nClose critical right whale habitat to LL and driftnet vessels\nto implement under the Magnuson-Stevens Act\nVoluntary education workshops for all HMS\nMandatory education workshops for LL and driftnet vessels;\nfishermen. Re-examine need for mandatory\nVoluntary workshops for recreational fishermen\nworkshops for pelagic longline fishermen later.\nVoluntary observer coverage of HMS\nRequire observers on charterboats\ncharter/headboats. If enough data are not\ncollected, establish a mandatory observer\nprogram.\nSame; however, NMFS clarifies that this final\nRequire charter/headboat vessels to obtain an annual vessel\naction requires all tuna vessels, charter/headboat\npermit\nvessels, and commercial shark and swordfish\nvessels to obtain an annual vessel permit\n(previous authority for tuna, shark and swordfish\nvessels)\nSame; however NMFS clarifies that this final\nRequire Charter/headboat vessels to submit logbooks\naction requires commercial shark and swordfish,\nand charter/headboat vessel to submit logbooks, if\nselected (previous authority for shark and\nswordfish vessels).\nRequire tournament registration for all tournaments that land\nSame\nHMS\nComplete logbooks within 48 hours of each day's\nComplete logbooks within 24 hours of hauling a set\nfishing activities but prior to offloading.\nSame, except NMFS clarifies that this authority\nMandatory observer coverage for purse seine and harpoon\nalready exists for a broader group (i.e.,\nvessels, if selected\nmandatory observer coverage for all tuna vessels,\nand commercial shark and swordfish vessels, if\nselected.)\nChapter I - Conservation/Management Measures - 16","Final Action in Final FMP\nPreferred Alternative in Draft FMP\nLimited Access\nSame\nLimit access\nRequire a shark or swordfish permit during July 1, 1994,\nSame\nthrough December 31, 1997\nSame\nRequire landings between January 1, 1987, to\nDecember 31, 1997 (swordfish); January 1, 1991, to\nDecember 31, 1997 (shark)\nRequire a permit between June 1, 1998, to\nRequire a permit between June 1, 1998, to\nNovember 30, 1998 (swordfish); January 1, 1998,\nAugust 31, 1998 (swordfish); July 1, 1998, to\nto December 31, 1998 (shark)\nAugust 4, 1998 (shark)\nSame or provide documentation of 5,000 worth\nRequire landings of at least 25 swordfish or 102 sharks per\nof swordfish or shark landed per year\nyear in any two calendar years during the landing eligibility\nperiod\nTo qualify for an Atlantic swordfish directed or incidental\nSame\npermit, must obtain at least an Atlantic shark incidental\npermit\nRequire landings of at least 11 swordfish and establish a\nSame\nminimum earned income requirement of more than 50% of\ntheir earned income from commercial fishing through the\nharvest and first sale of fish or from charter/headboat fishing,\nor those who had gross sales of fish greater than $20,000\nharvested from their vessel, during any one of the last three\ncalendar years; require landings of at least seven sharks\nNo shark landings required if qualified for an initial directed\nSame\nor incidental swordfish limited access permit\nIssue a handgear permit to those fishermen who provide\nSame\ndocumentation of having been issued a swordfish permit for\nuse with harpoon gear or those who landed swordfish with\nhandgear as evidenced by logbook records, verifiable sales\nslips or receipts from registered dealers, or state landings\nrecords\nIssue directed fishery handgear permits to those applicants\nSame\nwho meet the earned income requirement, i.e., those who had\nderived more than 50% of their earned income from\ncommercial fishing through the harvest and first sale of fish\nor from charter/headboat fishing, or those who had gross\nsales of fish greater than $20,000 harvested from their vessel,\nduring one of the three calendar years preceding the\napplication\nIf qualify for an initial directed or incidental swordfish\nSame\nlimited access permit, an Atlantic tuna longline permit will\nbe issued by NMFS\nChapter 1 - Conservation/Management Measures - 17","Final Action in Final FMP\nPreferred Alternative in Draft FMP\nSame, but through December 31, 1998\nIf not eligible for an initial swordfish or shark directed or\nincidental limited access permit but had a valid Atlantic tuna\nincidental permit as of August 31, 1998, then NMFS will\nissue initial incidental swordfish and shark limited access\npermits; no fishing for Atlantic tuna with longlines would be\nallowed without these incidental limited access permits.\nSame\nWritten appeals only, no hardship cases heard\nAllow 15 swordfish per vessel per trip for directed swordfish\nSame\npermit holders until the incidental set-aside is filled\nFor swordfish incidental limited access permits, allow five\nSame\nswordfish per trip for squid trawl vessels or two swordfish\nper trip for all other gear types. For shark incidental limited\naccess permit holders, allow five large coastal shark per\nvessel per trip for all gear types, and a total of 16 pelagic or\nsmall coastal sharks, all species combined, per vessel per trip\nfor all gear types\nLimited access permits are transferable with or without the\nSame\nsale of the permitted vessel, or to a replacement vessel\nowned or purchased by the original permittee (subject to\nupgrading restrictions - see following section), but not under\nany other circumstances.\nSame, but collect data and consider other\nAdopt NEFMC and MAFMC upgrading restrictions\nmethods, including hold capacity, for future\nRestrict the number of Atlantic swordfish or shark permitted\nSame\nvessels that any one person or entity could own or control to\nno more than 5% of the directed swordfish or shark\npermitted vessels in the directed fisheries\n1.3 Management Units\nAs described in Section 1.1.1, the Magnuson-Stevens Act defines HMS to be tuna species,\nmarlin (Tetrapturus spp. and Makaira spp.), oceanic sharks, sailfishes (Istiophorus spp.), and\nswordfish (Xiphias gladius). Tuna species are further defined as albacore tuna (Thunnus\nalalunga), bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus), bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus), skipjack tuna\n(Katsuwonus pelamis), and yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares). Thus, the Secretary currently\nhas the authority to manage directly those species listed above without a Regional Fishery\nManagement Council's FMP.\nNational Standard (NS) 3 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act requires that \"to the extent\npracticable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed as a unit throughout its range, and\ninterrelated stocks of. fish shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination.\" This FMP\ndevelops U.S. policy and management for several interrelated stocks of fish and associated\nfisheries, throughout their ranges in the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent seas.\nFollowing these guidelines and based on the best scientific information available on the\nrange of the stocks, the HMS management unit consists of the populations of north Atlantic\nChapter 1 - Management Units - 18","swordfish (north of 5° N); west Atlantic bluefin tuna (west of 45° W above 10° N and at 25° W\nbelow the equator, with an eastward shift in the boundary between those parallels); Atlantic\nyellowfin tuna; Atlantic bigeye tuna; north Atlantic albacore tuna (north of 5° N); west Atlantic\nskipjack tuna; and the sharks that inhabit the northwest Atlantic Ocean. The management unit,\nand fishing activity for these species, extend across federal, and in some cases, state and\ninternational jurisdictional boundaries.\nSwordfish are separated from other billfish (blue marlin, white marlin, longbill spearfish,\nand sailfish) for purposes of management because the swordfish fishery is primarily a\ncommercial fishery, while the domestic fishery for billfish is recreational. Thus, billfish, other\nthan swordfish, are managed under a separate FMP. Nevertheless, the management measures in\nthe Billfish FMP and in the HMS FMP are designed to be complementary, particularly in the\narea of bycatch.\nThe species in the shark management sub-unit have traditionally been separated into three\nspecies groups for abundance assessments: large coastal sharks (22 species), small coastal sharks\n(seven species), and pelagic sharks (ten species) (see Table 1.1 for species included in the shark\nmanagement sub-unit). This FMP further divides the large coastal shark group into ridgeback\nand non-ridgeback species for more effective management ², shifts several species from the large\ncoastal sharks, small coastal sharks, and pelagic management sub-units to the prohibited species\nsub-unit, and establishes a deepwater/other management unit. Currently, sharks are not grouped\nby ecological factors; the groups are based on fisheries or where the species appear in the\nlandings. For example, the silky shark and the bignose shark are found in both the pelagic\nenvironment and in deeper coastal waters, but for management purposes they are placed in the\nlarge coastal species group. Other species may be included for enforcement reasons because they\nclosely resemble species in the management unit. The Galapagos shark and the bigeye sand tiger\nshark, for example, are rare in U.S. waters, but are similar to the commercially harvested dusky\nand sand tiger sharks, respectively and thus are included in the large coastal shark management\nsubunit.\nThirty-three shark species that were previously included only for data reporting are now\nincluded in the shark management unit (spiny dogfish, which are under joint management of the\nNew England and Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Councils, is not included in this FMP; see\nTable 1.2). This FMP prohibits finning for sharks in this new species group, called deepwater\nand other sharks. Many of these species tend to be small, deepwater species that are not targeted\nin HMS fisheries. Some of these species are taken incidentally in directed shark, tuna, or\nswordfish fisheries, while others, such as smooth dogfish, are the targets of directed fisheries.\nData are also collected on species that are caught and marketed as secondary target species in the\ndirected swordfish, tuna, and shark fisheries. None of these related species are included in\nmaximum sustainable yield estimates.\n2 A number of shark species in the large coastal sharks management unit are characterized by a mid-dorsal ridge that is easily identified\neven after the fish has been headed, gutted, and finned. This mid-dorsal ridge is useful as a diagnostic characteristic for management and\nenforcement purposes.\nChapter 1 - Management Units - 19","Table 1.1 Sharks in the management unit by species groups.\nProhibited Species\nSand tiger\nOdontaspis taurus\nBigeye sand tiger\nOdontaspis noronhai\nWhale\nRhincodon typus\nBasking\nCetorhinus maximus\nWhite\nCarcharodon carcharias\nDusky\nCarcharhinus obscurus\nBignose\nCarcharhinus altimus\nGalapagos\nCarcharhinus galapagensis\nNight\nCarcharhinus signatus\nCaribbean reef\nCarcharhinus perez\nNarrowtooth\nCarcharhinus brachyurus\nCaribbean sharpnose\nRhizoprionodon porosus\nSmalltail\nCarcharhinus porosus\nAtlantic angel\nSquatina dumerili\nLongfin mako\nIsurus paucus\nBigeye thresher\nAlopias superciliousus\nSevengill\nHeptranchias perlo\nSixgill\nHexanchus griseus\nBigeye sixgill\nHexanchus vitulus\nLarge Coastal Sharks\nRidgeback Species\nSandbar\nCarcharhinus plumbeus\nSilky\nCarcharhinus falciformis\nTiger\nGaleocerdo cuvieri\nNon-Ridgeback Species\nBlacktip\nCarcharhinus limbatus\nCarcharhinus brevipinna\nSpinner\nBull\nCarcharhinus leucas\nNegaprion brevirostris\nLemon\nNurse\nGinglymostoma cirratum\nScalloped hammerhead\nSphyrna lewini\nGreat hammerhead\nSphyrna mokarran\nSmooth hammerhead\nSphyrna zygaena\nSmall Coastal Sharks\nAtlantic sharpnose\nRhizoprionodon terraenovae\nFinetooth\nCarcharhinus isodon\nBlacknose\nCarcharhinus acronotus\nBonnethead\nSphyrna tiburo\nPelagic Sharks\nShortfin mako\nIsurus oxyrinchus\nPorbeagle\nLamna nasus\nAlopias vulpinus\nThresher\nOceanic whitetip\nCarcharhinus longimanus\nPrionace glauca\nBlue\nChapter 1 - Management Units - 20","Table 1.2 The new shark species group: Deepwater and other species. Sharks in this species group\nwere included for data reporting under the original shark FMP. Under this FMP, finning of\nthese sharks is prohibited. Spiny dogfish, Squalus acanthias, is not included because it is\nmanaged by the New England and Mid-Atlantic Councils.\nIceland cat shark\nApristurus laurussoni\nSmallfin cat shark\nApristurus parvipinnis\nDeepwater cat shark\nApristurus profundorum\nBroadgill cat shark\nApristurus riveri\nMarbled cat shark\nGaleus arae\nBlotched cat shark\nScyliorhinus meadi\nChain dogfish\nScyliorhinus retifer\nDwarf catshark\nScyliorhinus torrei\nJapanese gulper shark\nCentrophorus acuus\nGulper shark\nCentrophorus granulosus\nLittle gulper shark\nCentrophorus uyato\nKitefin shark\nDalatias licha\nFlatnose gulper shark\nDeania profundorum\nPortuguese shark\nCetroscymnus coelolepis\nGreenland shark\nSomniosus microcephalus\nLined lanternshark\nEtmopterus bullisi\nBroadband dogfish\nEtmopterus gracilispinnis\nCaribbean lanternshark\nEtmopterus hillianus\nGreat lanternshark\nEtmopterus princeps\nSmooth lanternshark\nEtmopterus pusillus\nFringefin lanternshark\nEtmopterus schultzi\nGreen lanternshark\nEtmopterus virens\nCookiecutter shark\nIsistius brasiliensis\nBigtooth cookiecutter\nIsistius plutodus\nSmallmouth velvet Dogfish\nScymnodon obscurus\nSqualiolus laticaudus\nPygmy shark\nRoughskin spiny dogfish\nSqualus asper\nBlainville's dogfish\nSqualus blainvillei\nCuban dogfish\nSqualus cubensis\nBramble shark\nEchinorhinus brucus\nAmerican sawshark\nPristiophorus schroederi\nFlorida smoothhound\nMustelus norrisi\nSmooth dogfish\nMustelus canis\n1.4 Scientific Data and Research Needs\nUnder § 971(i)(b), ATCA directs the Secretary to develop and implement a comprehensive\nresearch and monitoring program to support the conservation and management of Atlantic\nbluefin tuna and other HMS. To support the conservation and management of HMS as required\nby ATCA, NMFS developed a comprehensive research and monitoring plan. This plan is\nconsistent with the legal requirements of ATCA and with the NMFS Strategic Plan (May 1997)\nand the Strategic Plan for Fisheries Research (February 1998). It was developed after\nconsultation with the ICCAT Advisory Committee, relevant federal and state agencies, scientific\nand technical experts, commercial and recreational fishermen, and other interested persons,\npublic and private. NMFS intends to revise the plan annually. The objective of this\ncomprehensive research and monitoring plan is to ensure that NMFS science is of the highest\nquality and that it advances the agency's ability to make sound management decisions.\nChapter 1 - Scientific Data/Research Needs - 21","This research program provides for, but is not limited to:\nstatistically designed cooperative tagging studies;\ngenetic and biochemical stock analyses;\npopulation censuses carried out through aerial surveys of fishing grounds and known\nmigration areas;\nadequate observer coverage and port sampling of commercial and recreational fishing\nactivity;\ncollection of comparable real-time data on commercial and recreational catches and\nlandings through the use of permits, logbooks, landings reports for charter operations\nand fishing tournaments, and programs to provide reliable reporting of the catch by\nprivate anglers;\nstudies of the life history parameters of Atlantic bluefin tuna and other HMS;\nintegration of data from all sources and the preparation of data bases to support\nmanagement decisions; and\nother research as necessary.\nIn developing this program, the Secretary must ensure that the personnel and resources of\neach regional research center have substantial participation in the stock assessments and\nmonitoring of HMS that occur in the region. The plan shall provide for comparable monitoring\nof all U.S. fishermen, subject to the authority of ATCA, with respect to fishing effort and the\nspecies composition of catch and discards. Finally, ATCA specifies that, through the Secretary\nof State, the Secretary shall encourage other member nations to adopt a similar research and\nmonitoring program for Atlantic HMS.\nSection 303 (a)(8) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act requires NMFS to specify the scientific\ndata needed for effective implementation of this FMP. These research and data needs include but\nare not limited to the following:\ncontinue to participate in international research on stock identification and definition of\nthe management units, including mixing rates;\ncontinue to monitor fishery removals, including the size/sex/age and the disposition of\nthe catch (e.g., landings vs. discards);\ndetermine measures of relative or absolute abundance based on fisheries-dependent and\nfisheries-independent surveys;\ncontinue research on life history parameters including growth, natural mortality,\nreproductive rates and migration rates, and ecological/oceanographic interactions which\naffect these parameters;\ncontinue research on the ways in which life history parameters are related to stock\nidentification and the estimation of catch at age;\nconduct social and economic studies of HMS industries and fishing communities;\nChapter 1 - Scientific Data/Research Needs - 22","develop robust methods to characterize the risk to the stocks based on existing and\npotential fishery management measures;\nstudy the effects of alternative allocations and management tactics on fishing behavior;\nimprove data on the character and magnitude of bycatch to allow quantitative estimates\nof discards in the fisheries for use in stock assessments and making management\ndecisions;\nimprove gear handling techniques to reduce discard mortality;\nconduct research on gear-deployment methods that will reduce interactions with\nprotected species that encounter fishing gear;\nconduct research on ways to reduce bycatch and bycatch mortality of billfish captured\nin the directed fisheries for Atlantic HMS;\nconduct research on ways to reduce bycatch and bycatch mortality of undersized\nswordfish and tuna, including research on gear modifications;\nidentify swordfish spawning and nursery areas in the U.S. EEZ and beyond in order to\nevaluate possible time/area closures;\ndetermine bycatch and bycatch mortality rates of sharks, particularly prohibited species\nand juvenile (undersized) sharks, and conduct research on ways to minimize this\nmortality;\ndetermine post-release survival rates of HMS in recreational fisheries;\nimprove data collection and monitoring of the recreational tuna and shark communities;\nrevise U.S. historical landings records for Atlantic bigeye, albacore, yellowfin, and\nskipjack (BAYS) tuna;\ncontinue research to determine nursery areas and spatial and temporal use of nursery\nareas for sharks by size/stage and species; expand such research to other areas and\nspecies;\ncontinue data rescue projects for sharks, focusing on locating and compiling existing\nset-by-set data as well as data related to historical species composition;\ncontinue and expand fishery independent monitoring and tagging studies for all HMS;\nincrease observer sampling in all shark fisheries, particularly in the west Gulf of\nMexico and in the southeast shark drift gillnet fishery;\ncontinue to characterize Mexican, Canadian, and Caribbean shark catches;\nstandardize shark catch rate time series for factors thought to influence catch rates but\nnot related to abundance;\ncontinue development of size and stage based models for important shark species,\nincluding sandbar and blacktip sharks;\nconduct a stock assessment on small coastal sharks and species-specific assessments on\ndusky and sand tiger sharks;\npursue international research and assessment efforts on pelagic sharks;\nChapter 1 - Scientific Data/Research Needs - 23","work cooperatively with the fishing industry to transfer new knowledge and techniques\nbetween fishermen and researchers; and\ndevelop conversion equations for various measurements (e.g., total curved fork length\nto pectoral fin curved fork length, pectoral fin curved fork length, or to caudal keel\ncurved fork length) for all HMS.\nThe Endangered Species Act, through the process of the Section 7 Consultation and the\nBiological Opinion and Incidental Take Statement, requires NMFS to conduct research that\nwould reduce bycatch and bycatch mortality of threatened and endangered species. NMFS is\nrequired by the Biological Opinion (which contains the Incidental Take Statement), to:\nconduct a cost/benefit analysis to determine, by protected species, what levels of\nobserver coverage are necessary, and, considering economic realities, provide guidance\nregarding the course of action NMFS should pursue with respect to future levels of\ncoverage in this fishery;\nconduct an evaluation of existing data on turtle bycatch and consider the impacts on\nimplementing measures that may reduce takes of turtles in the pelagic longline fishery;\nsupport genetic research to quantify the segments of the sea turtle populations impacted\nby HMS fisheries;\nassess existing data on the effects of lightstick use on turtle interactions and determine\nwhether additional action would be effective in protecting sea turtles.\nFor additional research needs relative to HMS Essential Fish Habitat, refer to Section 6.7\n1.5 Development of Fishery Resources\nThis section of the Atlantic HMS FMP identifies fishery resources associated with tuna,\nswordfish, and shark stocks and their potential for future development by commercial or\nrecreational commercial fishing operations. Most stocks associated with Atlantic HMS are\nalready utilized to some degree in commercial and recreational fisheries, and some of these\nspecies are designated as fully fished (yellowfin tuna, pelagic sharks, small coastal sharks) or\noverfished (bluefin tuna, albacore, large coastal sharks, and north Atlantic swordfish, bigeye\ntuna, sailfish, blue marlin, white marlin (NMFS, 1998)). There is insufficient information\navailable to assess the status of other HMS target stocks, such as skipjack tuna. The\nprecautionary approach to management suggests that management should be conservative in the\nabsence of stock assessment data. As described below, opportunities for development of fishery\nresources associated with Atlantic HMS are very limited. Even if a related species could sustain\nincreased fishing pressure, bycatch effects on already overfished associated stocks could be\ndetrimental and would be contrary to the objectives of this FMP and to the precautionary\napproach to fisheries management.\nChapter 1 - Development of Fishery Resources - 24","Commercial Fishing - Dolphin fish\nThe common dolphin, Coryphaena hippurus, (also known as mahi mahi and dolphinfish),\nsubsequently referred to as dolphin, is often incidentally caught in directed commercial and\nrecreational fisheries for Atlantic swordfish, sharks, bluefin tuna, and BAYS tuna. Dolphin have\nhistorically been landed by offshore recreational fisherman who account for approximately\n90 to 95 percent of the annual harvest in the south Atlantic (Daniel, 1998). However, since\n1994, after shark and swordfish quotas have been met, longline vessels have increasingly adapted\ntheir gear to target and focus more effort on dolphin. Commercial landings have increased from\na level of approximately 45,000 pounds (lbs) dressed weight (dw) per year between 1970 and\n1988, to approximately 200,000 lbs dw per year from 1989 to 1994, to current annual landings\nthat exceed 450,000 lbs dw per year (SAFMC, 1996). In 1995, recreational landings of dolphin\nin the south Atlantic were slightly more than 12 million lbs while the commercial harvest was\napproximately 500,000 lbs dw (Daniel, 1998). These dolphin landings in 1995 constituted nearly\n16 percent by weight of the estimated catch by U.S. pelagic longline and driftnet vessels\n(Thompson, 1998).\nThe dolphin is an oceanic pelagic fish found worldwide in tropical and subtropical waters.\nIn the west Atlantic, dolphin range from Georges Bank, Nova Scotia to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil but\nare generally restricted by the 20°C isotherm. They exhibit high growth rates, early maturity,\nbatch spawning over an extended season, a short life span and a varied diet (Oxenford, 1998).\nThese life history characteristics make them able to withstand relatively high fishing rates.\nHowever, based upon a stock assessment in Barbados, the 1998 South Atlantic Fishery\nManagement Council (SAFMC) Dolphin/Wahoo Workshop noted that there is a high risk of\nstock depletion with little warning given that the fishery may remain feasible at low stock levels\nbecause of the tendency of the fish to aggregate, and the current trends for increasing fishing\neffort. There is also a potential for recruitment overfishing given that fish are economically\nvaluable before size at first maturity, and the high inter-annual variability in abundance,\napparently driven by environmental factors.\nManagement measures for dolphin have been considered previously in the public hearing\ndrafts for Amendments 5 and 8 to the FMP for Coastal Pelagic Resources, managed jointly by\nthe South Atlantic Fishery Management Council (SAFMC) and the Gulf of Mexico Fishery\nManagement Council (GMFMC). In each case, after reviewing public hearing testimony, both\nCouncils chose to forego any management for these species due to lack of public support for any\nspecific measures. However, recent increases in longline trips that target dolphin in the south\nAtlantic Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) have raised concerns in terms of potential billfish\nbycatch, dolphin overfishing, and historical allocation between recreational and commercial user\ngroups. As a result of these concerns, particularly in the State of South Carolina, the South\nAtlantic Fisheries Management Council (SAFMC) began developing a fishery management plan\nfor dolphin and wahoo.\nDuring the latter part of 1996 to early 1997, the SAFMC received correspondence\nexpressing concern over increased landings of dolphin by longliners and decreased recreational\ncatches off the coast of South Carolina. In August 1997, SAFMC approved a motion to begin\nChapter 1 - Development of Fishery Resources - 25","development of an FMP for dolphin and wahoo. The Council requested that a letter be sent to\nthe Secretary requesting true lead for the plan by the SAFMC. The Council also requested that a\ncontrol date be set for dolphin and wahoo upon publication in the Federal Register. Alternatives\nto be considered in the plan were also discussed and motions to include the following were made:\nconsider allocations between recreational and commercial fishermen (a complete range of\nallocation scenarios); develop a framework option to include other means of controlling fishing\nmortality: recreational retention limits, commercial retention limits, etc.; develop options to\nimplement reporting requirements; and finally to organize a workshop on dolphin and wahoo\nmanagement.\nOn September 11, 1997, the SAFMC requested that NMFS' Regional Administrator\ndesignate the SAFMC as the Regional Fishery Management Council responsible for preparation\nof an FMP and subsequent amendments for the fisheries for dolphin and wahoo throughout\ntheir range in the exclusive economic zone of the Atlantic Ocean, including the Gulf of Mexico\nand Caribbean Sea. A Federal Register notice of the SAFMC's request was published on\nMarch 9,1998 (63 FR 11422), with a comment period to end on April ,1998. On April 13,\n1998, an additional 45 days were added to the comment period, at the request of the GMFMC, to\nallow more time to fully consider the issues and impacts and develop and submit more specific\nand extensive comments on the proposal. A dolphin and wahoo management workshop was held\non May 6 to 8, 1998, in Charleston, SC, at which panel members from the Caribbean and the\nsoutheast United States discussed the current status of dolphin and wahoo research. The SAFMC\nhas created a Dolphin/Wahoo Committee and Advisory Panel to begin looking at possible\nmanagement measures. On June 19, 1998, the SAFMC wrote another letter to NMFS to reiterate\nits request for lead on management of dolphin and wahoo and to clarify its position regarding an\nIntercouncil Committee. At the December 1998 SAFMC meeting, the Council voted to accept a\nNMFS proposal that the SAFMC accept true lead for dolphin/wahoo management in the Atlantic\nand administrative lead for management in the Gulf and Caribbean. A letter was mailed\nDecember 16, 1998, outlining the Council's proposal. A NMFS response is expected in the\nnear future.\nThe SAFMC also submitted a letter to the Regional Administrator on July 9,1998,\nrequesting a control date for the commercial fishery for dolphin. That request when published in\nthe Federal Register will also include wahoo as the original motion intended. The GMFMC also\nsupports a control date for dolphin in the SAFMC area of jurisdiction. On September 8, 1998,\nthe Council submitted a letter to the Regional Administrator requesting data to be provided to\nstaff to complete the analysis of alternatives included in the dolphin/wahoo options paper.\nComplete analysis will be completed and distributed at the June 1999 Dolphin/Wahoo\nCommittee meeting in Key West, FL.\nCommercial fishing - Blue sharks\nBlue sharks account for approximately 15 percent, by number, of the 1995 total estimated\ncatch by U.S. longline and gillnet vessels. Despite the large number caught, 98 percent of blue\nsharks are discarded. The meat of blue sharks is not valuable due to its high urea content. In the\nPacific, many blue sharks are utilized only for their fins. After finning the sharks, the carcasses\nChapter 1 - Development of Fishery Resources - 26","are usually discarded, a practice that is prohibited for Atlantic sharks. Blue sharks can also be\nmarketed for their cartilage, and are used in several medicinal and food products in Asia (Rose,\n1996). In the Atlantic, however, where both carcasses and fins must be landed, most blue sharks\nare discarded whole because the value of their fins is not worth the space their carcasses occupy\non a vessel. Generally, sharks are vulnerable to overfishing because they produce few offspring,\nmature late in life, and live many years. Blue sharks are thought to be somewhat more resilient\nto fishing pressure than some other shark species; however, they share some of these basic life\nhistory traits. As opportunistic surface feeders, they are subject to high encounter rates with\nfishing operations and may be vulnerable to overfishing in this way, although, blue sharks are\noften released alive.\nIn addition to potential overfishing problems with development of a blue shark market,\nconflicts between commercial and recreational fishermen could also pose a potential problem.\nBlue sharks are often targeted by tournament anglers in the mid-Atlantic states and southern\nNew England, and anglers also generally discard their blue shark catches. Finally, other nations\nalso exert heavy fishing pressure on Atlantic blue sharks, and an assessment of the population\nhas not been conducted since 1992. The precautionary approach suggests that development of a\ndirected blue shark fishery would be inappropriate in the absence of more complete information\nabout total fishing effort and trends in the status of the stock. This FMP takes a precautionary\napproach by capping fishing mortality for blue sharks at recent levels, and counting all mortality\n(landings and dead discards) against this cap. This could allow some expansion in utilization of\nblue sharks if a market develops, but it will not allow an increase in fishing mortality. In April\n1999, SCRS will conduct an intersessional meeting on pelagic shark catch rates from fisheries\ntargeting tuna and tuna-like species in the Atlantic Ocean. Additional information on pelagic\nsharks and the status of blue sharks in particular may be available after that intersessional.\nCommercial fishing - Oilfish\nOilfish are also taken in the pelagic longline fishery and represent a little over two percent of\nthe total 1995 estimated catch, by number, by U.S. pelagic longline and gillnet vessels. There\nare two different species reported under this common name: Lepidocybium flavobrunheum\n(escolar) and Ruvettus pretiosus (oilfish). With roughly 40 percent of oilfish caught discarded,\nthey also appear to be underutilized. However, in 1992, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration\n(FDA) issued a recommendation to all U.S. fish dealers to not market oilfish in interstate\ncommerce following several complaints of their purgative properties. Consequently,\ndevelopment of oilfish markets could be very difficult.\nRecreational fishing - Billfish\nOpportunities for development of recreational fisheries associated with Atlantic HMS are\nequally limited. Atlantic billfish, which are managed under a complementary FMP, are targeted\nby private recreational fishing vessels as well as in sport tournaments. Billfish are also captured\nincidentally in the directed tuna/swordfish longline and driftnet fisheries. Retention of Atlantic\nbillfish by commercial fishing vessels is prohibited in the U.S. EEZ; thus, there is no potential\nfor development of a directed commercial fishery for billfish. Expansion of the recreational\nChapter 1 - Total Allowable Level - 27","fishery for billfish is also unlikely. Blue marlin, white marlin, and sailfish have been designated\nas overfished and there is little information available about the status of the spearfish population.\nFurthermore, the United States is currently implementing measures to meet an ICCAT\nrecommendation to reduce landings of blue and white marlin by at least 25 percent from\n1996 levels.\nMany billfish recreational fishermen attest there is no substitute for the experience of\ncatching a blue marlin. In a study of resident and non-resident participants in Puerto Rican\nbillfish tournaments, based on information collected through a mail questionnaire (Ditton and\nClark, 1994), 76 percent of respondents listed blue marlin and the generic category of marlin as\ntheir most preferred target species. Dolphin was the only other species specifically targeted by\nmore than ten percent of billfish anglers as their first choice. Second choices were most\nfrequently listed by billfish anglers as dolphin (38 percent) and sailfish (20 percent), while\ndolphin (26 percent) and wahoo (24 percent) were anglers' most frequently listed third\npreference. Therefore, potential decreases in angler satisfaction or loss of angler participation in\nthe billfish fishery could potentially impact the dolphin and wahoo recreational fisheries.\n1.6 Total Allowable Level of Foreign Fishing\nTitle II of the Magnuson-Stevens Act establishes the system for the regulation of foreign\nfishing within the U.S. EEZ. These regulations are published in 50 CFR 611. The regulations\nprovide for the setting of a total allowable level of foreign fishing (TALFF) for species based on\nthe portion of the optimum yield that will not be caught by U.S. vessels. At the present time, no\nTALFF is available, since the United States has the capacity to harvest up to the level of\noptimum yield of all species subject to this FMP. One objective of this FMP is to match\ndomestic fleet capacity with resource status (and thus, available quota) suggesting that no\nTALFF is likely to be available during or following rebuilding of overfished HMS stocks.\nAtlantic swordfish and tuna are managed internationally by ICCAT. Once the United States\nhas accepted a quota as recommended by ICCAT, NMFS may not change the quota allocated to\nU.S. fishermen. U.S. fishermen have the capacity to harvest the entire U.S. quota for these\nspecies. Therefore, the U.S. quota for these species is not available for foreign fishing. Large\ncoastal sharks are overfished and the fishery is severely overcapitalized such that U.S. fishermen\nhave the capacity to harvest more than the optimum yield for these species. Pelagic sharks and\nsmall coastal sharks are fully fished, and any increases in yield from foreign fishing would be\nexpected to result in overfishing. Therefore, no Atlantic sharks are available for foreign fishing.\nU.S. fish processors have the capacity to process all of the U.S. quota for Atlantic swordfish and\nbluefin tuna, and to process all of the optimum yield of Atlantic sharks and BAYS tuna.\n1.7 Relationship to International Agreements, Applicable Laws, and Other Fishery\nManagement Plans\nWhile the Magnuson-Stevens Act, Atlantic Tunas Convention Act, Marine Mammal\nProtection Act (MMPA), and Endangered Species Act (ESA) guide most basic fishery\nmanagement, these management programs must also be consistent with several other laws,\nChapter 1 - Other Agreements, Laws, and FMPs - 28","including the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Administrative Procedures Act\n(APA), the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), Executive Order 12866, and the Paperwork\nReduction Act (PRA). These applicable laws help ensure that NMFS considers the full range of\nalternative actions and their expected impacts on the marine environment, living marine\nresources, and the fishing businesses and communities that could be affected. This chapter\naddresses the requirements of these applicable laws. In addition, because they are fished by\nmany nations, Atlantic HMS are also subject to international agreements and their domestic\nimplementing legislation. This section discusses the relationship between management under\nthis FMP and requirements of these statutes. The Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA)\n(which is required by RFA) and the Final Regulatory Impact Review (RIR) (which is required by\nE.O. 12866) are contained in Chapter 7; the revised Final Environmental Impact Statement\n(FEIS) (which is required by NEPA) is contained in Chapter 8; and the Social Impact\nAssessment (SIA)/Fishery Impact Statement (FIS), required by the Magnuson-Stevens Act, is\ncontained in Chapter 9.\n1.7.1 ICCAT and its relationship to ATCA and the Magnuson-Stevens Act\nThe U.S. fisheries for Atlantic HMS are managed by NMFS, acting for the Secretary\nunder authority of ATCA and the Magnuson-Stevens Act. Since 1966, ICCAT has been\nresponsible for international conservation and management of tuna and tuna-like fishes.\nICCAT's stated objective is to \"cooperate in maintaining the populations of these fishes at\nlevels which will permit the maximum sustainable catch for food and other purposes.\" All of\nthe Atlantic HMS including tuna, swordfish and billfish, with the exception of the shark\nspecies, are currently subject to ICCAT management authority. Research and data collection\nrecommendations for sharks are considered by ICCAT's Subcommittee on Bycatch.\nThe conservation and management recommendations of ICCAT include total allowable\ncatches, sharing arrangements for member countries, minimum size limits, effort controls,\ntime/area closures, trade measures, compliance measures, and monitoring and inspection\nprograms. If the United States accepts an ICCAT recommendation, ATCA provides the\nSecretary with the necessary authority to implement these binding ICCAT recommendations\nin the United States. However, no regulation promulgated under ATCA may have the effect\nof increasing or decreasing any allocation or quota of fish or fishing mortality level to which\nthe United States agreed pursuant to a recommendation of ICCAT.\nSimilarly, the Magnuson-Stevens Act specifies that NMFS must provide fishing vessels\nof the United States with a reasonable opportunity to harvest any allocation or quota of an\nICCAT species to which the United States has agreed. The FMP or amendment must\nspecify a time period for ending overfishing and rebuilding the fishery that shall:\nbe as short as possible, taking into account the status and biology of the stock of fish,\nthe needs of fishing communities, recommendations by international organizations in\nwhich the United States participates, and the interaction of the overfished stock within\nthe marine ecosystem; and\nChapter 1 - Other Agreements, Laws, and FMPs - 29","not exceed ten years, except in cases where the biology of the stock of fish, other\nenvironmental conditions, or management measures under an international agreement\nin which the United States participates dictate otherwise.\nFurther, the Magnuson-Stevens Act requires NMFS to allocate both overfishing\nrestrictions and recovery benefits fairly and equitably among sectors of the fishery.\nFisheries managed under an international agreement must reflect traditional participation of\nU.S. fishermen in the fishery, relative to other nations. In preparing any FMP or amendment\nfor Atlantic HMS, NMFS must \"evaluate the likely effects, if any, of conservation and\nmanagement measures on participants in the affected fisheries, and minimize, to the extent\npracticable, any disadvantage to United States fishermen in relation to foreign competitors.\"\nTo date, Atlantic tuna have been managed under the authority of ATCA. However, the\nSecretary may exercise dual authority in the management of Atlantic tuna and issue\nregulations under both ATCA and the Magnuson-Stevens Act. This FMP and its\nimplementing regulations will incorporate all existing management measures for Atlantic\ntuna. In the future, the Secretary will implement Atlantic tuna regulations under the dual\nauthority of the Magnuson-Stevens Act and ATCA, whenever possible. North Atlantic\nswordfish will continue to be managed under dual authority of ATCA and the Magnuson-\nStevens Act following implementation of the combined HMS FMP. South Atlantic\nswordfish and south Atlantic albacore are regulated under ATCA only. Atlantic sharks are\nnot subject to ICCAT management recommendations, thus they are managed solely under\nauthority of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.\n1.7.2 The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and HMS\nOn December 4, 1995, the United States signed the Agreement for the Implementation\nof the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (U.N. Agreement)\nrelating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly\nMigratory Fish Stocks. The U.N. Agreement has its origins in Agenda 21, the detailed plan\nof action adopted by the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development. It builds\nupon certain fisheries-related provisions of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the\nSea, and reaffirms the central role of the Convention as the accepted foundation and\nframework for this critical body of international law. While all states have the right to\nengage in fishing on the high seas, the Convention qualifies this right with the duty to\nconserve high sea resources and to cooperate with other states in conservation efforts. In\nfulfilment of these obligations, multilateral fishery agreements and organizations such as\nICCAT have been established to conserve and manage high sea fisheries.\nThe U.N. Agreement is designed to strengthen and make more specific the provisions\nof the Convention, and back the provisions with effective enforcement techniques and\ncompulsory dispute settlement. This should give the international community mechanisms\nto reverse overfishing trends and create an opportunity to ensure sustainable marine\nfisheries. The Agreement recognizes that most of the actual conservation and management\nwork for highly migratory fish stocks must be carried out through regional fisheries\norganizations (e.g., ICCAT), and therefore recommends some specific measures to\nChapter 1 - Other Agreements, Laws, and FMPs - 30","strengthen the operations of such organizations. For example, Article 8(3) requires any state\nwhose fishermen wish to harvest a stock that is governed by such an organization either to\njoin or to agree to apply the conservation and management measures established by the\norganization. This rule, if properly implemented, could greatly reduce the problems\nassociated with \"non-contracting party\" fishing.\nThe U.N. Agreement sets forth general principles for fishery conservation and\nmanagement, including obligations to:\nensure the long-term sustainability of these stocks;\ntake measures that are based on the best scientific information available;\nassess relevant environmental impacts;\nadopt conservation and management measures for other stocks belonging to the same\necosystem;\nminimize catch of non-target species; and\ntake measures to prevent or eliminate overfishing and excess fishing capacity.\n1.7.3 Other Fishery Management Plans\nThe fisheries for Atlantic swordfish and Atlantic sharks are currently managed under\nFMPs published in 1985 and 1993, respectively. The HMS FMP replaces those management\nplans, incorporating all existing management measures that have been implemented under the\nauthority of the Magnuson-Stevens Act and the appropriate FMP. As discussed above,\nexisting regulations for Atlantic tuna will be incorporated into this FMP.\nThis FMP was developed in coordination with the Billfish FMP Amendment. The\nbillfish fishery has unique characteristics that were best served under a separate management\nplan. However, HMS fisheries are multi-species fisheries, with overlapping participants,\ntarget species, bycatch, and management concerns. Thus, NMFS will consider the Billfish\nFMP when developing and implementing management measures under this FMP. In\naddition, the FMP will address billfish bycatch in the pelagic longline fishery.\nManagement of the dolphin and dogfish fisheries may also affect the management of\nHMS under this FMP. The dolphin fishery is currently managed under the Coastal\nMigratory Pelagics of the Gulf of Mexico and South Atlantic FMP, prepared jointly by the\nSAFMC and GMFMC. There has not been a stock assessment conducted for dolphin in the\nAtlantic. The Councils have hired an independent contractor to conduct data analysis and\npresent the results at the June 1999 Committee meeting.\nSpiny dogfish are the subject of a management program under development by the\nNew England and Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Councils. On January 1998, the\n26th Northeast Regional Stock Assessment Workshop determined that the spiny dogfish\nstock is over-exploited based on evidence that mean lengths of spiny dogfish are declining\nrapidly, minimum biomass estimates of mature females have decreased by nearly 50 percent\nChapter 1 - Other Agreements, Laws, and FMPs - 31","since 1990, and fishing mortality rates are well above sustainable levels. On April 3, 1998,\nNMFS notified the Mid-Atlantic and New England Fishery Management Councils, which\nshare joint management responsibilities for spiny dogfish, that the fishery was overfished,\nthus initiating the one-year time frame for development of an FMP, as required under the\nMagnuson-Stevens Act. NMFS also published notice that spiny dogfish were being added\nto the list of overfished fisheries on April 10, 1998 (63 FR 17820). A draft FMP for spiny\ndogfish was released in August, 1998, and a final FMP is being prepared.\n1.7.4 Relationship of this FMP to Existing HMS Management Measures\nThis FMP incorporates all existing management measures for Atlantic tuna and north\nAtlantic swordfish that have been issued previously under the authority of ATCA. It also\nincorporates all existing management measures for north Atlantic swordfish and Atlantic\nsharks that have been issued previously under the authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.\nThis FMP replaces the existing FMPs for Atlantic swordfish and sharks and establishes an\nFMP for Atlantic tuna. Notable modifications or additions to the existing management\nprogram are discussed in this document. This FMP also includes measures that were\nmodified under the mandate to consolidate all HMS regulations, per the President's\nRegulatory Reinvention Initiative. All existing management measures are retained under this\nFMP; modifications to some measures are explicitly discussed below. Should NMFS\ndetermine that further changes are necessary, they will be made through the FMP amendment\nprocess or through rulemaking as described in the framework provisions (Section 3.10).\n1.7.5 Paperwork Reduction Act\nThe purpose of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) is to reduce the paperwork burden\non the public. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget has the authority to\nmanage information collection and record keeping requirements in order to reduce\npaperwork burdens. This authority encompasses the establishment of guidelines and\npolicies and the approval of information collection requests.\nThis FMP contains collection-of-information requirements subject to PRA. Fishing\ntournament registration and selective reporting in $644.5 is approved by OMB under control\nnumber 0648-0323 and is estimated at ten minutes per report. Amendment 1 to the Billfish\nFMP also includes a new collection-of-information requirement, in conjunction with the\ndraft HMS FMP, for permits and logbook submissions from charter/headboats targeting\nAtlantic HMS and other highly migratory species. The PRA packages for all requests for\ndata outlined in this FMP have been submitted to OMB for approval as required by law.\nMore information on PRA and the approved information collection requests can be found at\nhttp://www.nmfs.gov/sfa/prorules.html\n1.7.6 Coastal Zone Management\nNMFS has evaluated the final actions in this FMP relative to requirements of the\nCoastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) and determines that the final actions in this FMP\nChapter 1 - Other Agreements, Laws, and FMPs - 32","are consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the coastal zone management\nprograms of those Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, and Caribbean coastal states that have approved\ncoastal zone management programs. The draft HMS FMP, draft Billfish Amendment, and\ndraft Addendum to the HMS FMP were submitted to the responsible state agencies for their\nreview under Section 307 of the Coastal Zone Management Act. The States of New York,\nVirginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Louisiana certified that the HMS\nFMP and Billfish Amendment concur with their applicable CZMA regulations. The States\nof Rhode Island and Delaware certified that the HMS FMP concurs with their applicable\nCZMA regulations. The States of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New Jersey,\nGeorgia, and Texas certified that the Billfish Amendment concurs with their applicable\nCZMA regulations. The States of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Georgia certified that the\nAddendum concurs with their applicable CZMA regulations. NMFS presumes that the\nremaining states that did not respond also concur.\nThe State of Georgia objected to the HMS FMP based on the continuing operation of\nthe southeast shark drift gillnet fishery off its waters. NMFS shares the State of Georgia's\nconcern regarding bycatch and bycatch mortality rates in this fishery and is gathering\ninformation on the effect of gillnets in Atlantic shark fisheries on protected species, juvenile\nsharks, and other finfish. However, because of limited data at this time regarding bycatch\nand bycatch mortality of protected species, juvenile sharks, and other finfish in shark drift\ngillnets, and because bycatch of endangered species in this fishery is regulated under the\nEndangered Species Act already, NMFS is not prohibiting use of this gear in shark fisheries\nat this time. In this FMP, NMFS requires 100 percent observer coverage in the southeast\nshark drift gillnet fishery at all times to increase data on catch, effort, bycatch and bycatch\nmortality rates in this fishery. NMFS encourages the State of Georgia to submit any data\ncollected through state activities and will continue to work with the State to address the\nissues with this fishery.\n1.7.7 Endangered Species Act\nNMFS initiated consultation on the draft FMP in May 1998, in development of the\nFMP regarding the effects of proposed management measures on endangered species. A\nBiological Opinion was finalized in April, 1999. This Biological Opinion stated the final\nactions in the FMP did not justify a jeopardy opinion and that no irreversible or irretrievable\ncommitment of resources are anticipated to result from final actions in this final FMP.\n1.7.8 Marine Mammal Protection Act\nThis FMP contains final actions designed to meet the requirements of MMPA. In\ndevelopment of the FMP, NMFS entered into consultation in May 1998 regarding the\neffects of proposed management measures on marine mammals. In addition, this FMP\nimplements certain requirements of the Large Whale Take Reduction Team.\nChapter 1 - What's in the HMS FMP - 33","1.7.9 Federalism\nThis FMP does not contain policies with federalism implications sufficient to warrant\nthe preparation of an assessment under E.O. 12612. The affected states have been closely\ninvolved in developing the management measures through their participation in the HMS\nAP. The states were invited specifically to the February 1999 joint AP meeting to discuss\nstate and federal concerns.\n1.7.10 Executive Order 12866 (E.O. 12866)\nBased on the definition of \"significant regulatory action\" in Section 3(f) of E.O. 12866,\nNMFS concludes that the final actions in the HMS FMP are significant. The Office of\nInformation and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, was notified\nconcerning the final FMP and the agency's determination that this FMP is significant.\n1.8 What's in the HMS FMP\nThis final FMP is arranged differently than the draft FMP. Volume I contains the\nintroduction (Chapter 1); a description of the Paperwork Reduction Act (Chapter 1); the\nEndangered Species Act (ESA; Chapter 1); and the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA;\nChapter 1); the description of the fisheries (Chapter 2); management measures to rebuild and\nsustain sustainable fisheries (Chapter 3); and limited access (Chapter 4 4). Chapter 2 contains\ninformation on the status of the stocks; international, domestic, and economic aspects of HMS; a\ndescription of each gear type; the permitting and reporting regime before implementation of this\nFMP; and existing time/area closures. Chapter 3 contains management measures designed to\nrebuild overfished stocks and maintain the stocks that are rebuilt, along with the frameworking\nprocedure. Chapter 4 contains the limited access program for the commercial Atlantic swordfish\nand shark fisheries, along with the permit requirements for commercial vessel owners who wish\nto enter the BAYS longline fishery.\nVolume II, Chapters 5 and 6, contains the HMS essential fish habitat information. This\nincludes information on habitat, HMS life histories, threats to essential fish habitat, and research\nneeds.\nVolume III contains information on other applicable laws. These include the Regulatory\nImpact Review (RIR; Chapter 7) required under E.O. 12866; the Final Regulatory Flexibility\nAnalysis (FRFA; Chapter 7) required under the Regulatory Flexibility Act; the revised Final\nEnvironmental Impact Statement (FEIS; Chapter 8) required under the National Environment\nPolicy Act; and the Social Impact Assessment (SIA; Chapter 9) required under the Magnuson-\nStevens Act. Volume III also contains the appendices and the comments and response sections.\nChapter I - What's in the HMS FMP - 34","1.9 Relationship of the HMS FMP to the Magnuson-Stevens Act Requirements\nAs described in the sections above, the primary domestic legislation for HMS is the\nMagnuson-Stevens Act. This section lists the required provisions for a FMP. This FMP\nincorporates all of the required provisions and some of the discretionary ones.\nSEC. 303. CONTENTS OF FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLANS 16 U.S.C. 1853\n95-354, 99-659, 101-627, 104-297\n(a) REQUIRED PROVISIONS.- Any fishery management plan which is prepared by any\nCouncil, or by the Secretary, with respect to any fishery, shall--\n(1) contain the conservation and management measures, applicable to foreign fishing and\nfishing by vessels of the United States, which are--\n(A) necessary and appropriate for the conservation and management of the fishery to\nprevent overfishing and rebuild overfished stocks, and to protect, restore, and promote\nthe long-term health and stability of the fishery;\n(B) described in this subsection or subsection (b), or both; and\n(C) consistent with the national standards, the other provisions of this Act, regulations\nimplementing recommendations by international organizations in which the United\nStates participates (including but not limited to closed areas, quotas, and size limits),\nand any other applicable law;\n(2) contain a description of the fishery, including, but not limited to, the number of vessels\ninvolved, the type and quantity of fishing gear used, the species of fish involved and their\nlocation, the cost likely to be incurred in management, actual and potential revenues from\nthe fishery, any recreational interest in the fishery, and the nature and extent of foreign\nfishing and Indian treaty fishing rights, if any;\n(3) assess and specify the present and probable future condition of, and the maximum\nsustainable yield and optimum yield from, the fishery, and include a summary of the\ninformation utilized in making such specification;\n(4) assess and specify-\n(A) the capacity and the extent to which fishing vessels of the United States, on an\nannual basis, will harvest the optimum yield specified under paragraph (3),\n(B) the portion of such optimum yield which, on an annual basis, will not be harvested\nby fishing vessels of the United States and can be made available for foreign fishing, and\nChapter I - FMP and Magnuson-Stevens Act - 35","(C) the capacity and extent to which United States fish processors, on an annual basis,\nwill process that portion of such optimum yield that will be harvested by fishing vessels\nof the United States;\n(5) specify the pertinent data which shall be submitted to the Secretary with respect to\ncommercial, recreational, and charter fishing in the fishery, including, but not limited to,\ninformation regarding the type and quantity of fishing gear used, catch by species in\nnumbers of fish or weight thereof, areas in which fishing was engaged in, time of fishing,\nnumber of hauls, and the estimated processing capacity of, and the actual processing\ncapacity utilized by, United States fish processors;\n(6) consider and provide for temporary adjustments, after consultation with the Coast Guard\nand persons utilizing the fishery, regarding access to the fishery for vessels otherwise\nprevented from harvesting because of weather or other ocean conditions affecting the safe\nconduct of the fishery; except that the adjustment shall not adversely affect conservation\nefforts in other fisheries or discriminate among participants in the affected fishery;\n(7) describe and identify EFH for the fishery based on the guidelines established by the\nSecretary under section 305(b)(1)(A), minimize to the extent practicable adverse effects on\nsuch habitat caused by fishing, and identify other actions to encourage the conservation and\nenhancement of such habitat;\n(8) in the case of a fishery management plan that, after January 1, 1991, is submitted to the\nSecretary for review under section 304(a) (including any plan for which an amendment is\nsubmitted to the Secretary for such review) or is prepared by the Secretary, assess and\nspecify the nature and extent of scientific data which is needed for effective implementation\nof the plan;\n(9) include a fishery impact statement for the plan or amendment (in the case of a plan or\namendment thereto submitted to or prepared by the Secretary after October 1, 1990) which\nshall assess, specify, and describe the likely effects, if any, of the conservation and\nmanagement measures on-\n(A) participants in the fisheries and fishing communities affected by the plan or\namendment; and\n(B) participants in the fisheries conducted in adjacent areas under the authority of\nanother Council, after consultation with such Council and representatives of those\nparticipants;\n(10) specify objective and measurable criteria for identifying when the fishery to which the\nplan applies is overfished (with an analysis of how the criteria were determined and the\nrelationship of the criteria to the reproductive potential of stocks of fish in that fishery) and,\nin the case of a fishery which the Council or the Secretary has determined is approaching an\nChapter 1 - FMP and Magnuson-Stevens Act - 36","overfished condition or is overfished, contain conservation and management measures to\nprevent overfishing or end overfishing and rebuild the fishery;\n(11) establish a standardized reporting methodology to assess the amount and type of\nbycatch occurring in the fishery, and include conservation and management measures that,\nto the extent practicable and in the following priority-\n(A) minimize bycatch; and\n(B) minimize the mortality of bycatch which cannot be avoided;\n(12) assess the type and amount of fish caught and released alive during recreational fishing\nunder catch and release fishery management programs and the mortality of such fish, and\ninclude conservation and management measures that, to the extent practicable, minimize\nmortality and ensure the extended survival of such fish;\n(13) include a description of the commercial, recreational, and charter fishing sectors which\nparticipate in the fishery and, to the extent practicable, quantify trends in landings of the\nmanaged fishery resource by the commercial, recreational, and charter fishing sectors; and\n(14) to the extent that rebuilding plans or other conservation and management measures\nwhich reduce the overall harvest in a fishery are necessary, allocate any harvest restrictions\nor recovery benefits fairly and equitably among the commercial, recreational, and charter\nfishing sectors in the fishery.\n97-453, 99-659, 101-627, 102-251, 104-297\n(b) DISCRETIONARY PROVISIONS. Any fishery management plan which is prepared by any\nCouncil, or by the Secretary, with respect to any fishery, may--\n(1) require a permit to be obtained from, and fees to be paid to, the Secretary, with respect\nto--\n(A) any fishing vessel of the United States fishing, or wishing to fish, in the exclusive\neconomic zone [or special areas,]* or for anadromous species or Continental Shelf\nfishery resources beyond such zone [or areas]*;\n(B) the operator of any such vessel; or\n(C) any United States fish processor who first receives fish that are subject to the plan;\n(2) designate zones where, and periods when, fishing shall be limited, or shall not be\npermitted, or shall be permitted only by specified types of fishing vessels or with specified\ntypes and quantities of fishing gear;\nChapter 1 - FMP and Magnuson-Stevens Act - 37","(3) establish specified limitations which are necessary and appropriate for the conservation\nand management of the fishery on the-\n(A) catch of fish (based on area, species, size, number, weight, sex, bycatch, total\nbiomass, or other factors);\n(B) sale of fish caught during commercial, recreational, or charter fishing, consistent\nwith any applicable Federal and State safety and quality requirements; and\n(C) transshipment or transportation of fish or fish products under permits issued\npursuant to section 204;\n(4) prohibit, limit, condition, or require the use of specified types and quantities of fishing\ngear, fishing vessels, or equipment for such vessels, including devices which may be\nrequired to facilitate enforcement of the provisions of this Act;\n(5) incorporate (consistent with the national standards, the other provisions of this Act, and\nany other applicable law) the relevant fishery conservation and management measures of the\ncoastal States nearest to the fishery;\n(6) establish a limited access system for the fishery in order to achieve optimum yield if, in\ndeveloping such system, the Council and the Secretary take into account--\n(A) present participation in the fishery,\n(B) historical fishing practices in, and dependence on, the fishery,\n(C) the economics of the fishery,\n(D) the capability of fishing vessels used in the fishery to engage in other fisheries,\n(E) the cultural and social framework relevant to the fishery and any affected fishing\ncommunities, and\n(F) any other relevant considerations;\n(7) require fish processors who first receive fish that are subject to the plan to submit data\n(other than economic data) which are necessary for the conservation and management of the\nfishery;\n(8) require that one or more observers be carried on board a vessel of the United States\nengaged in fishing for species that are subject to the plan, for the purpose of collecting data\nnecessary for the conservation and management of the fishery; except that such a vessel\nshall not be required to carry an observer on board if the facilities of the vessel for the\nquartering of an observer, or for carrying out observer functions, are so inadequate or unsafe\nChapter 1 - FMP and Magnuson-Stevens Act - 38","that the health or safety of the observer or the safe operation of the vessel would be\njeopardized;\n(9) assess and specify the effect which the conservation and management measures of the\nplan will have on the stocks of naturally spawning anadromous fish in the region;\n(10) include, consistent with the other provisions of this Act, conservation and management\nmeasures that provide harvest incentives for participants within each gear group to employ\nfishing practices that result in lower levels of bycatch or in lower levels of the mortality of\nbycatch;\n(11) reserve a portion of the allowable biological catch of the fishery for use in scientific\nresearch; and\n(12) prescribe such other measures, requirements, or conditions and restrictions as are\ndetermined to be necessary and appropriate for the conservation and management of the\nfishery.\nSEC. 304. ACTION BY THE SECRETARY\n104-297\n(g) ATLANTIC HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES.--\n(1) PREPARATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PLAN OR PLAN\nAMENDMENT.-The Secretary shall prepare a fishery management plan or plan\namendment under subsection (c) with respect to any highly migratory species fishery to\nwhich section 302 (a) (3) applies. In preparing and implementing any such plan or\namendment, the Secretary shall --\n(A) consult with and consider the comments and views of affected Councils,\ncommissioners and advisory groups appointed under Acts implementing relevant\ninternational fishery agreements pertaining to highly migratory species, and the\nadvisory panel established under section 302 (g);\n(B) establish an advisory panel under section 302 (g) for each fishery management plan\nto be prepared under this paragraph;\n(C) evaluate the likely effects, if any, of conservation and management measures on\nparticipants in the affected fisheries and minimize, to the extent practicable, any\ndisadvantage to United States fishermen in relation to foreign competitors;\n(D) with respect to a highly migratory species for which the United States is authorized\nto harvest an allocation, quota, or at a fishing mortality level under a relevant\ninternational fishery agreement, provide fishing vessels of the United States with a\nChapter 1 - FMP and Magnuson-Stevens Act - 39","reasonable opportunity to harvest such allocation, quota, or at such fishing mortality\nlevel;\n(E) review, on a continuing basis (and promptly whenever a recommendation pertaining\nto fishing for highly migratory species has been made under a relevant international\nfishing agreement), and revise as appropriate, the conservation and management\nmeasures included in the plan;\n(F) diligently pursue, through international entities (such as the International\nCommission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas), comparable international fishery\nmanagement measures with respect to fishing for highly migratory species; and\n(G) ensure that conservation and management measures under this subsection-\n(i) promote international conservation of the affected fishery;\n(ii) take into consideration traditional fishing patterns of fishing vessels of the United\nStates and the operating requirements of the fisheries;\n(iii) are fair and equitable in allocating fishing privileges among United States\nfishermen and do not have economic allocation as the sole purpose; and\n(iv) promote, to the extent practicable, implementation of scientific research\nprograms that include the tagging and release of Atlantic highly migratory species.\n(2) CERTAIN FISH EXCLUDED FROM \"BYCATCH\" DEFINITION.- Notwithstanding\nsection 3 (2), fish harvested in a commercial fishery managed by the Secretary under this\nsubsection or the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975 (16 U.S.C. 971d) that are not\nregulatory discards and that are tagged and released alive under a scientific tagging and\nrelease program established by the Secretary shall not be considered bycatch for the\npurposes of the Act.\n1.10 List of Preparers\nThe development of this FMP involved input from numerous government agencies and\nconstituent groups, including: the NMFS Southeast Fisheries Science Center; the NMFS\nNortheast Fisheries Science Center; the NMFS Northeast Regional Office; the NMFS Southeast\nRegional Office; the NMFS Headquarters Staff (F/SF; F/PR; F/HC; F/ST; F/PA); and the\nU.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee. Staff members of the Highly Migratory Species Management\nDivision, Office of Sustainable Fisheries (F/SF), involved in preparing this FMP include:\nEric Barber\nRebecca Lent\nPat Scida\nKaryl Brewster-Geisz\nSarah McLaughlin\nJeron Stannard\nJill Stevenson\nCarol Douglas\nSteve Meyers\nKathy Goldsmith\nMark Murray-Brown\nBuck Sutter\nNeva Howard\nRon Rinaldo\nMaria Uitterhoeve\nChristopher Rogers\nRachel Husted\nPat Wilbert\nSari Kiraly\nMargo Schulze\nChapter 1 - List of Preparers - 40","Valuable assistance was provided by staff of other F/SF, NMFS, and NOAA offices. Staff\nmembers of these other offices who were greatly involved in the development of this FMP and\nthe rule are:\nGeorge Bell\nCynthia Fenyk\nWes Pratt\nGuy Bellamy\nMike Fraser\nEric Prince\nKimberly Blankenbeker\nMark Haflich\nPaul Raymond\nDonna Brewer\nRon Hill\nBill Richards\nEdward Burgess\nNancy Kohler\nRick Roberts\nJohn Carlson\nHerb Kumpf\nRamona Schreiber\nJose Castro\nDennis Lee\nJerry Scott\nDarryl Christensen\nCatherine Lewers\nRaymond Slagle\nDan Cohen\nPamela Mace\nPat Turner\nBarbara Comstock\nGary Matlock\nHelen Troupos\nTherese Conant\nMariam McCall\nTracy Thompson\nEnric Cortes\nLisa Natanson\nDoris Tucker\nJean Cramer\nJohn Poffenberger\nSteve Turner\nOtha Easley\nGreg Power\nKathy Wang\nCathy Eisele\nJoe Powers\nIn addition, a number of NMFS contractors and Sea Grant fellows helped develop and create\nthis FMP and rule including:\nPerry Allen\nElizabeth Lauck\nDan Utech\nLee Benaka\nJennifer Lee\nRobyn Wingrove\nRebecca Brudek\nBrad McHale\nDoug Wilson\nJohn Dunnigan\nAlicon Morgan\nKrista Woodley\nMonica Lara\nChris Perle\nBesides NMFS employees and contractors, NMFS consulted with and received comments\nfrom many groups and agencies. NMFS would like to thank the members of the HMS AP, the\nBillfish AP, and the Longline AP for their assistance both during the development phase and\nduring the comment phase in preparing this FMP. In addition, NMFS received valuable support\nin the development of this FMP from commercial and recreational fishermen who have provided\nNMFS with valuable comments, information about the fisheries, photographs, and data in the\nform of mandatory logbooks, voluntary economic information, and observer information for\nmany years. Comments received from the environmental community and other concerned\nconstituents were also helpful in the development of the alternatives considered in this FMP.\n1.11 List of Agencies and Organizations Consulted\nAs part of the HMS management process, \"consulting parties\" participate in the preparation\nand evaluation of draft FMP documents. The consulting parties include the U.S. Department of\nState (DOS); the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); the New England Fishery Management Council; the\nMid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council; the Caribbean Fishery Management Council; the\nChapter 1 - List of Agencies Consulted - 41","Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council; the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council;\nthe U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee; the ICCAT Commissioners; and the APs appointed under\nthe Magnuson-Stevens Act. Copies of the draft FMP were distributed to the consulting parties\nduring the public comment period. NMFS carefully considered all comments received from the\npublic and the consulting parties before developing the final actions in this FMP and rule.\nSeveral consulting parties (the regional fishery management councils and the U.S. ICCAT\nAdvisory Committee) are represented on the APs, providing them the opportunity to comment on\ndraft materials at several stages of the FMP development process. The HMS AP met seven times\nduring development of this document. The HMS AP is composed of representatives of the\ncommercial and recreational fisheries, the commercial trade sector, the charter/headboat sector,\nconservation organizations, academic institutions, regional fishery management councils, state\nfishery management agencies, and the U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee. The members of the\nHMS AP are listed in Appendix 1. HMS AP meetings are open to the public and each meeting\nincludes a public comment period.\nIn addition to AP members and NMFS staff, the following reviewers were asked to provide\nindependent reviews of the species information in the Essential Fish Habitat chapter for\naccuracy, clarity and completeness:\nSharks:\nGrant Gilmore\nTuna and Swordfish:\nE.D. Houde\nJack Musick\nD.P. de Sylva\nB.B. Collette\nNMFS would like to thank the members of the public, the fishermen, and the environmental\ncommunity for all the comments received during the public comment period. NMFS values and\nsupports the role of the public in the development of this FMP.\nChapter 1 - List of Agencies Consulted - 42","References Cited in Chapter 1\nAtlantic Tunas Convention Act. 16 U.S.C. §§ 971. et seq..\nDaniel, L. 1998. Marine Fisheries Commission Information Paper: Longline Fishery and Dolphin Trip Limits. In:\nSAFMC Dolphin/Wahoo Workshop Proceedings. SAFMC, 1 Southpark Circle, Suite 306, Charleston, SC.\nDewees, C.M. and E. Ueber, eds. 1990. Effects of different fishery management schemes on bycatch, joint catch\nand discards: summary of a national workshop. California Sea Grant College Program, University of\nCalifornia, La Jolla.\nDitton, R. B and D.J. Clark. 1994. Characteristics, Attitudes, Catch and Release Behavior, and Expenditures of\nBillfish Tournament Anglers in Puerto Rico. Report to the Billfish Foundation, Miami, Florida.\nMagnuson-Stevens Act. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801. et seq.\nNMFS 1998. Report to Congress on the Status of Fisheries. October, 1998. Silver Spring, MD.\nOxenford, H.A. 1998. Biological characteristics of the dolphinfish (Coryphaena hippurus) in the western central\nAtlantic: a review. In: SAFMC Dolphin/Wahoo Workshop Proceedings. SAFMC, 1 Southpark Circle, Suite\n306, Charleston, SC.\nRose, D. A. 1996. An overview of world trade in sharks and other cartilaginous fishes. TRAFFIC International.\n106 pp.\nSAFMC. 1998. SAFMC Dolphin/Wahoo Workshop Proceedings. SAFMC, 1 Southpark Circle, Suite 306,\nCharleston, SC.\nThompson, N. 1998. Characterization of the Dolphin Fish (Coyphaenidae, Pices) Fishery of the United States\nWestern North Atlantic Ocean. In: SAFMC Dolphin/Wahoo Workshop Proceedings. SAFMC, 1 Southpark\nCircle, Suite 306, Charleston, SC.\nChapter 1 - References - 43","Chapter 2\nDESCRIPTION OF HMS FISHERIES\n2.1\nAn Introduction to HMS Quotas, Total Allowable Catches, and Discards\n2\n2.2\nAtlantic Tunas\n3\n2.2.1\nLife History and Status of the Stocks: Atlantic Tunas\n3\n2.2.2\nInternational Aspects of the Atlantic Tuna Fishery\n9\n2.2.3\nDomestic Aspects of the Atlantic Tuna Fishery\n15\n2.2.4\nSocial and Economic Aspects of the Domestic Atlantic Tuna Fishery\n26\n2.2.4.1 Bluefin Tuna\n26\n2.2.4.2 BAYS Tunas\n36\n2.3\nAtlantic Swordfish\n38\n2.3.1\nLife History and Status of the Stocks\n38\n2.3.2\nInternational Aspects of the Atlantic Swordfish Fishery\n40\n2.3.3\nDomestic Aspects of the Atlantic Swordfish Fishery\n43\n2.3.4\nSocial and Economic Aspects of the Domestic Atlantic Swordfish Fishery\n46\n2.4\nAtlantic Sharks\n50\n2.4.1\nLife History and Status of the Stocks\n50\n2.4.1.1 Large Coastal Sharks\n53\n2.4.1.2 Small Coastal Sharks\n68\n2.4.1.3 Pelagic Sharks\n70\n2.4.2\nInternational Aspects of the Atlantic Shark Fisheries\n72\n2.4.3\nDomestic Aspects of the Atlantic Shark Fisheries\n73\n2.4.4\nSocial and Economic Aspects of the Domestic Atlantic Shark Fisheries\n83\n2.5\nHMS Gear Types\n87\n2.5.1\nPelagic Longlines\n88\n2.5.2\nBottom Longlines\n91\n2.5.3\nAtlantic Pelagic Driftnets\n92\n2.5.4\nAtlantic Coastal Driftnets\n93\n2.5.5\nSoutheast Shark Drift Gillnets\n94\n2.5.6\nSink Gillnets\n94\n2.5.7\nPurse Seines\n95\n2.5.8\nHandgear (Rod and Reel, Handline and Harpoon)\n96\n2.6\nCurrent Permitting, Reporting, Data Collection Requirements and Fisheries Monitoring\n98\n2.6.1\nMonitoring and Reporting in the Commercial Fishery\n98\n2.6.2\nMonitoring and Reporting in the Recreational Fishery\n103\n2.6.3\nOther Data Collection Programs\n106\n2.7 Existing Time/Area Closures under MMPA and Other Laws\n111\nChapter 2 - Table of Contents - 1","2.1 An Introduction to HMS Quotas, Total Allowable Catches, and Discards\nAccounting for all sources of fishing mortality is an essential part of managing fisheries for\nsustainability in the long term. In order to provide the most useful and reliable information for\nmaking management decisions, stock assessments should take into account all sources of fishing\nmortality. In turn, management decisions regarding how many fish can be landed each year\nshould be based upon the recognition that directed fishing mortality is not the only source of\nmortality for a stock. Generally, a stock assessment is conducted to give managers an estimate of\nthe total level of fishing mortality that a stock can support, usually on an annual basis. This\namount is the total allowable catch (TAC), and should include all sources of fishing mortality.\nUnder this FMP, NMFS intends to work both domestically and internationally to establish\nlandings quotas and discards as separate portions of the TAC. Currently, stock assessments for\nAtlantic tunas, swordfish, and sharks include dead discards in their calculations, although\ndiscards are treated differently in establishing landings quotas for these three species groups.\nThere are three basic approaches that are used to develop quotas for HMS based on the total\nallowable catch (TAC). Under the first approach, the TAC is divided into a landings quota and a\ndiscard allowance, each of which is allocated among fishing nations and/or user groups. NMFS\nthen implements U.S. landings quotas and the discard allowance, and tracks landings and\ndiscards through in-season monitoring, closing fisheries as necessary to keep within the quotas.\nThe west Atlantic bluefin tuna quota is now managed under this approach, with a dead discard\nallowance and landings quota, rather than a total quota.\nThe second approach is to calculate the TAC, subtract the estimated dead discards (from all\nfishing nations and/or user groups) and establish a landings quota, allocating only shares of the\nlandings quota to each fishing nation and/or user group. An example of this approach is the\nAtlantic shark fishery. NMFS subtracts dead discards and state landings after Federal closures\nfrom quotas when adjusting the commercial quota for sharks to account adequately for all\nsources of fishing mortality. Due to the delay in obtaining data for dead discards and landings\nbefore a closure, this adjustment is made at the beginning of each fishing year based on the\nprevious year's dead discards and state landings.\nThe third approach, which was used to manage all HMS quotas except bluefin tuna prior to\nimplementation of this FMP, is to account for all sources of mortality (e.g., directed and\nincidental) in the stock assessment, but to interpret the TAC as a \"landings\" quota. NMFS\nrejects the third approach and will account for dead discards in the Atlantic swordfish fishery\nusing either of the first two methods, pending ICCAT approval.\nChapter 2 - HMS Quotas, TACs, and Discards - 2","2.2 Atlantic Tunas\n2.2.1\nLife History and Status of the Stocks: Atlantic Tunas\nTunas and mackerel are members of the family Scombridae in the suborder\nScombroidei, which they share with swordfish (family Xiphiidae) and billfishes (family\nIstiophoridae). Atlantic tunas are wide-ranging in size; tunas in this management plan\ninclude the skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis) which is less than one meter (18 kg) as an\nadult, and the giant bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus) which can grow to more than three\nmeters in length (675 kg or 1485 lbs) (Collette and Nauen, 1983). The Atlantic tunas\ninclude some of the largest and fastest predators in the oceans, and their physiological\nadaptations reflect that role in the ocean's ecosystems. Tuna have among the highest\nmetabolic rates, fastest digestion rates, and the most extreme specializations for sustained\nlevels of rapid locomotion of any fish (Helfman et al, 1997).\nMany of these characteristics are common among HMS. The tunas' body shape, round\nor slightly compressed in cross section, minimizes drag as they move through the water.\nTheir lunate tails are deeply forked. These adaptations for speed are further enhanced by\ndepressions on the body surface which are shaped to hold the fins in a streamlined position.\nSmall dorsal and ventral finlets minimize turbulence and allow the tail to propel the fish\nforward more efficiently. Tunas utilize a respiratory mode known as ram gill ventilation,\nwhich differs from the more common mechanism whereby water is actively pumped across\nthe gills. Ram gill ventilation requires that the fish swim continuously with its mouth open\nto maintain water flow across the gill surfaces. It is believed that this system helps conserve\nenergy for voracious fishes like the tunas (Helfman et al., 1997).\nTunas are endothermic, with a physiological mechanism to control their body\ntemperature. These fishes maintain an elevated body temperature by conserving the heat\ngenerated by active swimming muscles. This enables tunas to dive into colder and deeper\nwater, giving them an edge in overtaking their prey. Heat conservation is accomplished\nthrough an adaptation of the circulatory system. The internal temperatures of these fishes\nremains fairly stable even as they move from surface waters to colder deep water. Bluefin\ntuna keep muscle temperatures between 28° and 33°C while swimming through waters\nranging from 7° to 30°C, while yellowfin and skipjack tunas maintain muscle temperatures\nat about 3°C or 4° to 7°C above ambient water temperatures, respectively.\nTunas move thousands of kilometers annually throughout the world's tropical,\nsubtropical, and temperate oceans and adjacent seas, primarily in the upper 100 to 200 meters\nof open ocean. As adults and juveniles, they feed on a variety of fishes, cephalopods, and\ncrustaceans, depending on seasonal prey availability. The foraging and movement patterns of\ntunas reflect the distribution and scarcity of appropriate prey in the open seas; these fishes\nmust cover vast expanses of the ocean in search of sufficient food resources. Consequently,\naggregations of tunas are often correlated with areas where higher densities of prey are found,\nsuch as current boundaries, convergence zones, and upwelling areas (Helfman et al., 1997).\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 3","Additional information on the life history and habitat of tuna species in the management unit\ncan be found in Chapter 6, HMS Essential Fish Habitat Provisions.\nBluefin Tuna\nIn west Atlantic waters, bluefin tuna reach maturity at about 196 cm (77 inches) straight\nfork length, and 145 kg (320 lbs). Bluefin tuna of this size are believed to be about eight\nyears old. Stock assessments assume that the spawning population consists of all bluefin\ntuna eight years and older. Although each spawning Atlantic bluefin tuna produces\napproximately 30 million eggs, natural mortality on juvenile bluefin tuna is high (National\nResearch Council, 1994). Bluefin tuna in the west Atlantic grow more slowly, generally\nreach a larger maximum size, and mature at an older age compared to bluefin tuna caught in\nthe east Atlantic, where they are believed to first spawn at age five (SCRS, 1997). This high\nage at maturity for west Atlantic bluefin tuna means that when the spawning stock has been\nreduced, it can take many years for it to rebuild, even with drastic reductions in fishing\nmortality.\nBluefin tuna have a relatively long life span (20 years or more), which means that the\nstock consists of several age classes, a condition that serves as a buffer against adverse\nenvironmental conditions and that confers some degree of stability on the stock. As\nopportunistic feeders that can migrate long distances in search of prey, bluefin tuna may also\nbe quite resilient to fluctuations in prey concentrations, although changes in prey availability\nmay greatly influence fishing patterns. Bluefin tuna are distributed from the Gulf of Mexico\nto Newfoundland in the west Atlantic, from roughly the Canary Islands to south of Iceland\nin the east Atlantic, and throughout the Mediterranean Sea. Bluefin tuna spend a large part\nof the year feeding in temperate waters, returning to the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico\nspawn (Helfman et al., 1997). Trans-Atlantic migrations are well-documented, although\nto\nmigration patterns and their significance to species life history are unknown.\nICCAT's Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS) was unable to arrive\nat a consensus as to which stock-recruitment assumption might better reflect the population\ndynamics of west Atlantic bluefin. As described above, the two models result in widely\ndisparate estimates of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and other parameters. An\nalternative to using one model over another would be to combine the results from both\nmodels, weighting each equally. Using this combined approach, FMSY is 0.173, and F97 is\n0.31, resulting in F97/FMSY = 2.38. For this combined model, maximum sustainable yield is\nestimated to be 3,400 mt, and current spawning stock biomass (SSB) is estimated to be at\napproximately 31 percent of levels necessary to produce maximum sustainable yield.\nCurrent spawning stock biomass is estimated to be 16 percent of 1975 levels, which had\nbeen used as a proxy for SSB MSY in past stock assessments. Using this combined model, the\nwest Atlantic total allowable catch would have to be reduced to below 2,000 mt in order for\nthe stock to rebuild to a level which would support maximum sustainable yield in 20 years.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 4","Over the past decade there has been contentious debate in scientific and fishing\ncommunities about the stock structure of Atlantic bluefin tuna. ICCAT currently manages\nbluefin based on a two-stock hypothesis, with the two management units separated at\n45° W above 10° N and at 25° W below the equator, with an eastward shift in the boundary\nbetween those parallels. The initial basis for the management units was primarily the\nexistence of separate spawning areas in the Gulf of Mexico and the Mediterranean Sea.\nAdditional evidence supporting the two-stock hypothesis included: 1) coastal abundance of\njuveniles on each side of the ocean; 2) the high proportion of juvenile bluefin tagged on one\nside of the Atlantic and at liberty for at least a year that were recaptured on the same side of\nthe ocean; and 3) relatively low catch rates by high seas longline vessels in the central\nAtlantic. This is also the most conservative assumption in the face of uncertain genetic\nevidence.\nBecause there is uncertainty regarding the two-stock hypothesis, SCRS carries out\nbiomass projections with sensitivity analyses to account for different potential levels of\nmixing. However, at the present time, the working hypothesis of two stocks remains the\nbest available science, for both stock assessments and bluefin tuna management. In its\n1998 report, SCRS acknowledges that while bluefin tuna stock assessments are based on the\nassumption of two distinct stocks, \"recent tagging information suggests that migratory\nbehavior may be complex\" and that \"even minor mixing could, in principle, have a marked\neffect on stock assessments based on two distinct stock assumptions, due to the difference in\npopulation size between the two stocks.\" SCRS has, in fact, investigated mixing assuming a\nvariety of migratory behaviors, the results of which have been \"either more optimistic or\npessimistic, depending on the model forms used.\" SCRS concluded that mixing models and\nthe available data are not yet considered sufficient to provide reliable prediction\", but\n\"nevertheless, the Committee believes that assessments assuming no mixing should be\nreasonably robust, if adequate management approaches are applied to both the eastern and\nwestern management units.\" (SCRS, 1998).\nThe latest stock assessment for west Atlantic bluefin tuna (1998) estimates FMSY at a\nlevel of 0.078 (Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment model) or 0.173 (two-line stock-\nrecruitment model). The corresponding fishing mortality rate in 1997 was .300 (two-line)\nor .320 (Beverton-Holt), resulting in F97/F MSY = 1.73 or F97/FMSY = 4.10, respectively. The\n1998 assessment showed that spawning stock biomass has increased slightly to about 14 to\n17 percent of 1975 levels, which had been the spawning stock biomass level used as a proxy\nfor SSBMSY- The 1998 assessment did estimate SSBMSY for the two stock-recruitment\nmodels. Using the two-line model, maximum sustainable yield is estimated to be 2,800 mt,\nand current spawning stock biomass is estimated to be at approximately 48 percent of levels\nnecessary to produce maximum sustainable yield. The two-line model assumes that\nrecruitment will not increase with spawning stock biomass. Using the Beverton-Holt model,\nmaximum sustainable yield is estimated to be 7,700 mt, and the current spawning stock\nbiomass is estimated to be at approximately seven percent of levels necessary to produce\nmaximum sustainable yield. This model indicates higher chances of good recruitment as\nspawning stock biomass increases.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 5","Some constituents have contended, based on regular and extensive experience with the\nresource, that the bluefin tuna stock is much larger and healthier than stock assessments\nindicate. Again, current stock assessments provide the best available science and must be\nused as the basis for management decisions. However, NMFS will continue to fund\nscientific studies on stock size, migration, spawning age and behavior of Atlantic bluefin\ntuna to investigate these challenges. Results of such studies are taken into consideration and\nbecome part of the spectrum of information on which NMFS bases conservation and\nmanagement decisions. The framework provisions of this FMP allow for future\nmodifications of quotas and rebuilding periods to incorporate results of new stock\nassessments and ICCAT negotiations.\nBigeye Tuna\nAtlantic bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus) are widely distributed in tropical and temperate\nwaters between 45° N and 45° S latitudes. Young bigeye tuna form schools near the sea\nsurface, mixing with other tuna such as yellowfin and skipjack tunas (Collette and Nauen,\n1983). Bigeye tuna reach sexual maturity at about four years of age, at which point they are\napproximately 100 cm long (40 inches). They spawn throughout the year in tropical waters\nfrom 15° N to 15° S. Catch information from the surface fisheries indicates that the Gulf of\nGuinea is a major nursery ground for the species. ICCAT recognizes a single Atlantic stock\nfor management purposes, although the possibility of other scenarios, such as north and\nsouth Atlantic stocks, should not be disregarded (SCRS, 1997).\nThe maximum sustainable yield for bigeye tuna is estimated to be between 70,000 mt\nand 90,000 mt. The most recent assessment suggests that current F estimates surpass FMSY\nby 50 to 120 percent while the biomass of bigeye tuna in 1997 (B1997) is somewhere between\n60 and 80 percent of BMSY, with the stock declining. Biomass is likely to decline further if\nfishing mortality rates continue to exceed FMSY. Except for 1997, annual bigeye tuna\nlandings have been near or greater than 100,000 mt since 1993, while the replacement yield\nis estimated to be between 60,000 and 80,000 mt (SCRS, 1998). SCRS estimates that\nmaintaining the current exploitation pattern would result in reductions in yield to levels\nbelow maximum sustainable yield in the near future. In 1998, ICCAT requested that SCRS\ndevelop rebuilding scenarios for bigeye tuna.\nICCAT has described bigeye tuna as fully-exploited and has expressed concern about\nrecent increases in landings, particularly of small fish. Recovery trajectories for Atlantic\nbigeye tuna are constrained by their life history strategies and international fishing efforts.\nBigeye tuna have a broad distribution range in the Atlantic Ocean between 50° N and\n45° S latitudes. Current estimates of bigeye tuna catches in the United States indicate that\nU.S. landings are approximately one percent of the reported catch of bigeye tuna in the\nAtlantic Ocean; thus, the international component of this fishery will complicate rebuilding\nof the stock.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 6","Albacore Tuna\nAlbacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga) are widely distributed throughout temperate waters of\nthe Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, ranging from 50° N to 40° S latitudes.\nAggregations are composed of similarly sized individuals, with those groups made up of the\nlargest individuals making the longest journeys. Groups may include other tuna species, such\nas skipjack, yellowfin, and bluefin. They reach maximum sizes of about 125 cm (50 inches)\nand maximum weights of about 40 kg (88 lbs). Atlantic albacore tuna are considered mature\nat the age of five years, corresponding to approximately 90 cm (35 inches) (SCRS, 1998).\nAlbacore tuna spawn in the spring and summer in tropical waters of the Atlantic (ICCAT,\n1997). Larvae are also found in the Mediterranean Sea and historically in the Black Sea\n(Vodyanitsky and Kazanovak, 1954).\nFor assessment purposes, the existence of three stocks is assumed: north and south\nAtlantic stocks (separated at 5° N) and a Mediterranean stock. The SCRS conducted stock\nassessments for north and south Atlantic stocks in 1998; the results were consistent with the\nresults of previous assessments. The SCRS has not reached a definitive conclusion\nregarding the outlook for the south Atlantic albacore tuna stock, although the current level\nof exploitation appears to be sustainable.\nEquilibrium yield analyses indicated that the current fishing mortality rate on the north\nAtlantic stock may be about 25 percent higher than that which would support the maximum\nsustainable yield, and an alternative assessment model indicated that the current F may be\n40 percent higher than that which would support the maximum sustainable yield (SCRS,\n1998). Although north Atlantic albacore was not listed by NMFS as overfished in the 1998\nReport to Congress, this species meets the status determination criteria adopted in this FMP.\nNMFS will analyze rebuilding alternatives for north Atlantic albacore in an amendment to\nthis FMP, which will establish the foundation that can be used to develop an international\nebuilding plan. Due to the small U.S. share of this international fishery, rebuilding will\nrequire a multi-lateral approach. The first step in establishing the foundation for an\ninternational rebuilding program is to ask SCRS to develop recovery scenarios for the stock.\nYellowfin Tuna\nYellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares) are fast-growing, reaching sexual maturity at a size\nof about 25 kg (55 lbs) and 110 cm (44 inches), corresponding to an age of about three years\n(SCRS, 1997). The maximum size of yellowfin tuna is over 200 cm fork length (Collette\nand Nauen, 1983). In the Atlantic, the greatest concentrations are found within 15° north or\nsouth of the equator. Yellowfin tuna may be found seasonally as far north and south as the\nnortheastern United States and Uruguay, with substantial concentrations occurring in the\nGulf of Mexico during spring and summer months. Their distribution is determined by\nwater temperature and the availability of prey species such as pelagic fishes and squids.\nYellowfin tuna is a schooling species, with juveniles found in schools at the surface mixing\nwith skipjack and bigeye tuna. Larger fish are found in deeper water and also extend their\nranges into higher latitudes than smaller individuals. The main spawning ground in the\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 7","Atlantic Ocean is the Gulf of Guinea near the equator, with spawning occurring from\nJanuary to April (SCRS, 1998). Individual fish may spawn repeatedly during a single\nspawning season. All individuals in the Atlantic probably comprise a single population, but\nmovement patterns are not well known (SCRS, 1997).\nThe most recent SCRS stock assessment estimates that the current (1997) fishing\nmortality rate may be close to the level of F max (above or below depending on the model\nused). Production model analyses imply that although yellowfin tuna catches are slightly\nlower than equilibrium MSY levels, effort may be either above or below the MSY levels. A\nnumber of different production model analyses were used to account for the relationship of\ncatch and effort in recent years to the equilibrium MSY and effort levels. Under a scenario of\na 3% annual increase in efficiency, current effort is somewhat below the MSY level, whereas\nunder a scenario of a five-percent annual increase in efficiency, it is somewhat above the\nMSY level. VPA analyses indicate that spawning stock biomass decreased in the early to\nmid-eighties, had recovered by 1990 due to reduced fishing mortality rates and somewhat\nhigher recruitment, but has subsequently declined back to levels similar to those of the mid-\n1980s. Although absolute numbers vary, the four VPA scenarios show very consistent\nrelative trends. Trends in fishing mortalities in recent years are less reliable due to estimation\nproblems common to all methods used.\nThe SCRS concluded that the current fishing mortality rate for yellowfin is probably\ngreater than that which would support MSY (SCRS, 1998). Therefore, it is critical to ensure\nthat effective fishing effort does not increase further. NMFS is concerned about the status of\nyellowfin tuna and the need to ensure consistency with the ICCAT recommendation to limit\nthe effective level of fishing effort. Yellowfin tuna is not considered overfished at this time.\nHowever, NMFS will update the status of yellowfin tuna relative to the status determination\ncriteria in the FMP as new scientific information becomes available.\nSkipjack Tuna\nSkipjack tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis) are found throughout tropical and warm-temperate\nseas. Skipjack is a schooling species, forming aggregations associated with hydrographic\nfronts (Collette and Nauen, 1983). Skipjack tuna spawn opportunistically throughout the\nyear in vast areas of the Atlantic Ocean. The size at first maturity is about 45 cm (18 inches),\nslightly smaller for females, which corresponds to about one to one and a half years of age\n(SCRS, 1997).\nThe stock structure of Atlantic skipjack tuna is not well known, and two management\nunits (east and west) have been established due to the development of fisheries on both sides\nof the Atlantic and to the lack of transatlantic recoveries of tagged skipjack tuna. Spawning\nstock biomass relative to BMSY and fishing mortality rates relative to FMSY are currently\nunknown. The 1997 SCRS report states that given characteristics of this species such as\nshort life span, rapid growth, and high natural mortality, the current levels of exploitation can\nprobably be maintained. However, with changes occurring in the east Atlantic purse seine\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 8","fisheries, skipjack tuna fisheries should be carefully monitored (SCRS, 1996b). SCRS plans\nto conduct the first stock assessment for west Atlantic skipjack tuna in 1999.\n2.2.2\nInternational Aspects of the Atlantic Tuna Fishery\nBluefin Tuna\nPeak yields of bluefin tuna from the west Atlantic (about 8,000 to 19,000 mt) occurred\nbetween 1963 and 1966 when much of the catch was taken by Asian longline vessels off\nBrazil. During the late 1960s and 1970s, yields averaged about 5,000 mt. By 1973, the\nUnited States and other nations began to express concern about the decrease in the abundance\nof bluefin tuna. In response to this concern, ICCAT recommended a minimum size limit in\n1974. After conducting a series of stock assessments, SCRS recommended in 1981 that\ncatches of west Atlantic bluefin tuna be reduced to as near zero as possible to stop the decline\nof the stock. Based on this recommendation, a scientific monitoring quota of 1,160 mt was\nadopted in 1982. The catch limit was increased to 2,660 mt in 1983, and was maintained at\nthat level through 1991.\nAt the 1991 meeting, ICCAT recommended additional measures to prevent further\ndeclines in the west Atlantic bluefin tuna stock, including a ten percent reduction in the total\nallowable catch. In 1993, the west Atlantic bluefin tuna quota was reduced further from\n2,394 mt in 1993 to 1,995 mt in 1994 and 1,200 mt in 1995. The SCRS projections in 1994\nindicated that the stock could support higher quota levels and still begin to rebuild, albeit\nmore slowly. Based on the new stock assessment, ICCAT members adopted a\nrecommendation to increase the annual bluefin tuna total allowable catch in the west Atlantic\nOcean from 1,995 mt to 2,200 mt. The share allocated to the United States was set at\n1,311 mt. At the 1996 meeting, ICCAT recommended an annual west Atlantic bluefin tuna\ntotal allowable catch of 2,354 mt for 1997 and 1998. The annual quota allocated to the\nUnited States for 1997 and 1998 was 1,344 mt, an increase of 33 mt over the 1995 and\n1996 levels.\nBased on the 1998 stock assessment, ICCAT adopted a Rebuilding Program for west\nAtlantic bluefin tuna with the goal of reaching stock levels to support maximum sustainable\nyield in 20 years. The annual west Atlantic bluefin tuna total allowable catch of 2500 mt is\nshared among the United States, Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom territory of Bermuda,\nand the French territories of St. Pierre and Miquelon (Table 2.1). The landings quota\nallocated to the United States was increased by 43 mt from 1,344 mt to 1,387 mt, to apply\nannually. The U.S. allowance for dead discards is an additional 68 mt. If there are dead\ndiscards in excess of this allowance, they must be counted against the following year's quota.\nIf there are fewer dead discards, then half of the underharvest may be added to the following\nyear's quota while the other half is conserved. The recommendation also allows four years to\nbalance the eight percent tolerance for bluefin tuna under 115 cm (young school and school\nbluefin tuna). The Rebuilding Program provides flexibility to alter the total allowable catch,\nthe maximum sustainable yield target, and/or the rebuilding period based on subsequent\nscientific advice. However, the annual total allowable catch of 2,500 mt will not be altered\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 9","unless there is evidence that a catch level greater than 2,700 mt or less than 2,300 mt would\nhave at least a 50 percent probability of rebuilding the stock to maximum sustainable yield\nwithin the 20-year time frame.\nThe dramatic increase in total bluefin tuna catches in 1994, 1995, and 1996 was due to\nincreases in the catch from the east Atlantic stock. A variety of vessel types participate in the\neast Atlantic bluefin tuna fisheries, with landing sites located in many countries (Table 2.2).\nIn 1996, highest catches were reported from baitboat, longline and traps in the east Atlantic,\nand primarily from purse seine and longline vessels in the Mediterranean. French purse seine\nactivity in the Mediterranean has increased significantly in recent years, and the number of\nlarge longline vessels, some of which do not identify themselves as fishing for any particular\nnation, has also increased dramatically. This fishery has developed largely in response to\nstrong market demand from the Japanese market. Baitboats are responsible for large catches\nof small fish ages one to three in the Bay of Biscay, in part due to the Spanish albacore tuna\nfleet redirecting effort toward east Atlantic bluefin tuna during the months of June and July.\nJapanese longliners have been exploiting a new fishing zone in the north Atlantic Ocean\naround 60° N and 20° W, in addition to the traditional sectors.\nThe SCRS projections indicate that current catch levels of bluefin tuna in the east\nAtlantic and Mediterranean are not sustainable. Although ICCAT recommended in 1974 that\nfishing mortality on bluefin tuna should not increase, this recommendation was not\nsuccessful in limiting catches in the east Atlantic and Mediterranean. ICCAT has since\nadopted additional management measures for the east Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin\ntuna fisheries. In 1998, ICCAT adopted a fixed total allowable catch and quotas for each\nmember fishing in the east Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin tuna fishery. Pursuant to\nICCAT compliance measures, the 1999 quotas will be reduced to account for quota overages\nin 1997. These quotas represent a significant reduction from recent catch levels that are\nwell in excess of the sustainable yield. The SCRS has noted that the condition of the east\nAtlantic stock and fishery could adversely affect recovery of the bluefin tuna stock in the\nwest Atlantic.\nTable 2.1\nReported catches of west Atlantic bluefin tuna, 1997. (SCRS, 1998)\n1997 Catch\nPercent of\nCountry\n(mt ww)\nWest Atlantic Catch\nUnited States (landings)\n1,331*\n61%\nUnited States (dead discards)\n51\nCanada (landings)\n503\n23%\nCanada (dead discards)\n6\nJapan\n329\n15%\nUnited Kingdom-Bermuda\n2\n1%\nTOTAL (All Countries)\n2,208\n100%\n* The draft HMS FMP showed preliminary 1997 landings as 1,317 mt, the amount reported to ICCAT in August 1998.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 10","Reported catches of east Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin tuna, 1997. (SCRS, 1998)\nTable 2.2\n1997 Catch\nPercent of East\nCountry\n(mt ww)\nAtlantic-Mediterranean Catch\nItaly\n9,548\n23%\nFrance\n8,470\n21%\nSpain\n8,047\n20%\n8%\nJapan\n3,198\nMorocco\n2,603\n6%\nTunisia\n2,200\n5%\nCroatia\n1,105\n3%\nOther Countries *\n3,446\n8%\nUnreported Catch\n2,636\n6%\nTOTAL (All Countries)\n41,253\n100%\n* Other countries catching less than 1000 mt of bluefin the east Atlantic and Mediterranean in 1997 include Portugal,\nKorea, Greece, Chinese-Taipei, Turkey, Malta, Algeria, Libya and the People's Republic of China.\nBigeye Tuna\nBigeye tuna is a primary target species for many longline and baitboat fisheries in the\ntropical waters of the Atlantic (Table 2.3). Japan and Chinese-Taipei (Taiwan) are\nresponsible for more than half of Atlantic-wide bigeye tuna longline catches by weight.\nTheir catch is comprised primarily of medium to large bigeye tuna. Major baitboat fisheries\ntargeting small to medium bigeye tuna are located near Ghana, Senegal, the Canary Islands,\nMadeira, and the Azores. Tropical purse seine fleets catch small bigeye tuna in the Gulf of\nGuinea and off Senegal in the east Atlantic, and off Venezuela in the west Atlantic. Total\nAtlantic bigeye tuna catch has increased substantially since 1990. ICCAT has not\nrecommended Atlantic-wide quotas for bigeye tuna. However, in 1998, ICCAT adopted two\nnew management recommendations that are designed to limit effort in commercial fisheries\nfor\nbigeye tuna throughout the Atlantic. ICCAT also adopted a resolution in 1998 that tasks\nSCRS with developing stock rebuilding scenarios for bigeye.\nAlthough ICCAT adopted a minimum size of 3.2 kg for bigeye tuna in 1979, a large\nnumber of undersized fish is still harvested by the surface fleets operating near the equator.\nSCRS estimates that approximately 70 percent by number of bigeye tuna landed are smaller\nthan the minimum size, well in excess of the 15 percent tolerance. Purse seine fleets in the\neast Atlantic have developed a fishery that targets schools of tuna near artificial floating\nobjects. These objects are also known as fish aggregating devices (FADs). This method of\nfishing has increased harvesting efficiency and contributed to excessive catch of undersized\nbigeye tuna. Favorable oceanographic conditions as well as the extensive use of sonar and\ndeeper nets have also contributed to increased bigeye tuna harvest in recent years. In 1998,\nICCAT established a mandatory time/area closure for purse seiners using fish aggregating\ndevices in equatorial waters.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 11","Table 2.3\nReported catches of Atlantic bigeye tuna, 1997. (SCRS, 1998)\n1997 Catch\nPercent of\nCountry\n(mt ww)\nAtlantic-wide Catch\nJapan\n27,427\n31%\nChinese-Taipei\n19,242\n22%\nSpain\n13,386\n15%\nGhana\n7,431\n8%\nFrance\n6,050\n7%\nPortugal\n5,437\n6%\nBrazil\n1,237\n1%\nUnited States\n1,095\n1%\nOther Countries\n2,454\n3%\nNot Reported\n5,800\n6%\nTOTAL (All Countries)\n89,559\n100%\nAlbacore Tuna\nThe primary nations targeting albacore tuna in the north Atlantic include Spain, France,\nand Chinese-Taipe (Table 2.4). The historical surface fisheries for albacore tuna in the\nnorth Atlantic include Spanish trolling in the Bay of Biscay as well as Spanish and\nPortuguese baitboats in the Bay of Biscay and near the Azores. Vessels from Chinese-\nTaipei target large albacore tuna with longline vessels in deeper waters of the central and\nwestern north Atlantic. Smaller albacore tuna are caught primarily by surface fishing gears\nsuch as driftnets and pelagic pair trawls. Ireland joined the driftnet fishery in the early\n1990s. Although albacore tuna harvests in the north Atlantic have declined since 1970,\ncatch and effort in newer surface fisheries have increased since 1987. SCRS has determined\nthat north Atlantic albacore tuna is at or near a level of full exploitation. In 1998, ICCAT\nadopted a recommendation to limit fishing capacity to the number of vessels in the directed\nalbacore tuna fishery during the years of 1993 to 1995.\nTraditionally, south Atlantic albacore tuna was exploited primarily by a South African\nsurface baitboat fishery off the west coast of South Africa. However, South African catch\ndecreased in 1996 and other countries including Namibia, Japan, Taiwan, and Brazil are\nnow major players in the fishery. Catch data indicate that small fish are making up an\nincreasing share of albacore tuna harvested in the south Atlantic. Although current catch\nlevels appear to be sustainable, ICCAT has established a catch limit that will be\nimplemented via existing cooperative arrangements among harvesting nations.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 12","Table 2.4 Reported catches of north Atlantic albacore tuna, 1997. (SCRS, 1998)\n1997 Catch\nPercent of\nCountry\n(mt ww)\nNorth Atlantic Catch\nSpain\n17,264\n63%\nFrance\n4,618\n17%\nChinese-Taipei\n3,330\n12%\nIreland\n874\n3%\nPortugal\n395\n1%\nUnited States\n339\n1%\nJapan\n325\n1%\nVenezuela\n309\n1%\nOther Countries\n72\n< 1%\nTOTAL (All Countries)\n27,526\n100%\nYellowfin Tuna\nYellowfin tuna are harvested by many nations between 45° N and 40° S using surface\ngears including purse seine, baitboat, troll and handline, and sub-surface gears such as\nlongline (Table 2.5). Purse seines are responsible for 80 percent of yellowfin tuna catch in\nthe east Atlantic. The French and Spanish purse seine fishery developed rapidly in the\n1970s, extending from coastal waters to the high seas especially in yellowfin tuna spawning\nareas around the Equator. In coastal areas, purse seines are very efficient in catching a wide\nrange of sizes, including juveniles in these mixed schools. Longline catches of yellowfin\ntuna are primarily incidental in the east Atlantic. The baitboat fishery, which has declined\nin\nimportance in recent years, has always targeted juvenile yellowfin tuna in coastal waters,\ntogether with juvenile bigeye tuna and some smaller tuna. These baitboat fisheries are still\nactive in the waters off Senegal, Ghana, the Canary Islands, Cape Verde, Madeira,\nVenezuela, and Brazil.\nICCAT has expressed concern over the high proportion of juvenile yellowfin tuna that\nare landed. In 1995, an estimated 50 percent by number of yellowfin tuna landed were less\nthan the minimum size of 3.2 kg, although the specified tolerance level is only 15 percent\n(SCRS, 1997). As in the bigeye tuna fisheries, these high catches of juveniles are largely a\nresult of the use of fish aggregating devices. Atlantic yellowfin tuna landings reached a\nrecord high in 1990, primarily due to increased landings in the east Atlantic. Since 1990,\ncatches across the Atlantic have declined somewhat and then remained stable. In 1993,\nICCAT recommended that there be no increase in the level of effective fishing effort over\n1992 levels.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 13","Table 2.5\nReported catches of Atlantic yellowfin tuna, 1997. (SCRS, 1998)\n1997 Catch\nPercent of\nCountry\n(mt ww)\nAtlantic-wide Catch\nFrance\n29,828\n23%\nSpain\n25,301\n19%\nGhana\n18,377\n14%\nVenezuela\n14,689\n11%\nUnited States\n7,625\n6%\nChinese-Taipei\n4,466\n3%\nRussia\n4,275\n3%\nJapan\n3,565\n3%\nBrazil\n2,705\n2%\nOther Countries\n5,618\n4%\nNot Reported\n14,355\n11%\nTOTAL (All Countries)\n130,804\n100%\nSkipjack Tuna\nThe stock structure of Atlantic skipjack tuna is uncertain; separate management units\nare maintained in the east and west Atlantic. Skipjack tuna fisheries have changed\nsignificantly since 1991, with the introduction of fishing on floating objects and the\nexpansion of the purse seine fishery towards the west Atlantic and closer to the equator. The\nuse of fish aggregating devices has directed effort into new areas, extending the fishing\ngrounds westward to 30° west and south of the equator.\nSkipjack tuna are harvested almost exclusively by surface gears. The west Atlantic\nfishery for skipjack tuna is dominated by the Brazilian baitboat fishery (Table 2.6).\nVenezuelan purse seiners participate in the west Atlantic to a lesser extent. A declining\ntrend in skipjack tuna landings has been observed in the east Atlantic since 1993. The most\nimportant fisheries are the purse seine fisheries, especially those of Spain and France. Other\npurse seine fleets that harvest skipjack tuna include Vanuatu, Malta, Morocco, Ghana,\nNetherlands Antilles, Panama, and St. Vincent. Skipjack tuna are also harvested by\nthe\nbaitboat fisheries of Ghana, Spain, and Portugal. A minor amount is taken as secondary\ntarget catch on longline vessels. SCRS has noted that additional research on skipjack tuna\nis needed.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 14","Table 2.6\nReported catches of west Atlantic skipjack tuna, 1997. (SCRS, 1998)\n1997 catch\nPercent of West\nCountry\n(mt ww)\nAtlantic Catch\nBrazil\n26,564\n84%\nVenezuela\n3,676\n12%\nCuba\n1,000\n3%\nDominican Republic\n146\n< 1%\nUnited States\n69\n< 1%\nTOTAL (All Countries)\n31,455\n100%\n2.2.3\nDomestic Aspects of the Atlantic Tuna Fishery\nBigeye, albacore, yellowfin, and skipjack (BAYS) tunas, as well as bluefin tuna have\nbeen exploited in the west Atlantic for many years. In the early 1900s, a sport fishery\ndeveloped for small and medium tunas off New York and New Jersey, and for giant bluefin\ntuna in the Gulf of Maine. The rod and reel fishery expanded rapidly during the 1950s and\n1960s, as hundreds of private, charter, and partyboats targeted tunas along the mid-Atlantic\ncoast. This recreational fishery continues today from Cape Hatteras to the Canadian border.\nIn addition, it is locally important in the Straits of Florida. Occasional sport catches are also\nmade in the Gulf of Mexico.\nUntil the late 1950s, the U.S. commercial fishery for tunas employed mostly harpoons,\nhandlines, and traps. There was no commercial market for bluefin tuna, and giant bluefin\ntuna (greater than 310 lbs) were regarded as a nuisance because of the damage they caused\nto fishing gear. Much of the bluefin tuna catch was incidental to operations targeting other\nspecies. In 1958, commercial purse seining for Atlantic tunas began with a single vessel in\nCape Cod Bay and expanded rapidly into the region between Cape Hatteras and Cape Cod\nduring the early 1960s. The purse seine fishery between Cape Hatteras and Cape Cod was\ndirected mainly at small and medium bluefin tuna, and at skipjack tuna, all for the canning\nindustry. North of Cape Cod, purse seining was directed at giant bluefin tuna. A pelagic\nlongline fishery for Atlantic tunas also developed rapidly during the 1960s, comprised\nmainly of Japanese vessels fishing in the Gulf of Mexico.\nHigh catches of juvenile bluefin tuna were sustained throughout the 1960s and into the\nearly 1970s. These high catch rates by U.S. purse seine and longline vessels, along with the\nintense longline fishery pursued by Japanese vessels in the 1970s, are believed to be\nresponsible for the decline in abundance during subsequent years. In the late 1970s,\napproximately 10,000 giant bluefin tuna were taken in one year alone out of the Gulf of\nMexico. An international market developed for giant bluefin tuna, with fresh bluefin tuna\nflown directly to Japan for processing into sushi or sashimi. By the late 1980s, high ex-\nvessel prices and the increased importance of the Japanese market had blurred the distinction\nbetween the sport and recreational fisheries for bluefin tuna and much of the traditionally\nrecreational catch for medium and giant bluefin tuna was being sold for shipment to Japan.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 15","In 1992, NMFS responded by banning the sale of school, large school, and small medium\nbluefin tuna (27 inches to less than 73 inches curved fork length).\nIn the United States, Atlantic tuna permits are currently issued in seven categories. The\ncommercial categories are: General, Angling, Charter/Headboat, Harpoon, Purse Seine,\nLongline and Trap. Directed fisheries for Atlantic tuna are limited by regulation to the\nfollowing gear types: rod and reel, handline, harpoon, bandit gear, and purse seine nets.\nLimited incidental catches of bluefin tuna are allowed for vessels fishing with longlines,\npurse seine nets, fixed gear, and traps. Although a control date for the Atlantic tuna fisheries\nwas published on September 1, 1994, the number of new permit applicants continues to rise.\nAs of October 31, 1998, there were 20,194 vessels permitted to participate in the Atlantic\ntuna fisheries, including 7,096 General category vessels; 10,668 Angling category vessels;\n2,047 Charter/Headboat category vessels; 319 Incidental category vessels; 59 Harpoon\ncategory vessels; and five Purse Seine category vessels. U.S. landings of Atlantic tunas by\nspecies are provided in tables 2.11 through 2.15.\nIn 1992, NMFS established base quotas for each permit category in the bluefin tuna\nfishery based upon the historical share of catch in each of these categories during the period\n1983 to 1991. These quotas were used in 1992, 1993, and 1994, with overharvests and\nunderharvests added and subtracted as required by ICCAT, as well as some inseason\ntransfers. The quotas were modified in 1995 when the Purse Seine category quota was\nreduced by 51 mt. Baseline domestic quota allocations in 1998 remained the same as in\n1995, with some adjustments. This allocation reflects recent trends in fleet size, effort and\nlandings by category, as well as the ICCAT recommendation which specifies that data\nshould be collected for broadest range of size-classes possible, given size restrictions.\nUnder ATCA, no regulation may have the effect of increasing or decreasing the ICCAT-\nrecommended quota for the United States. It should be noted that foreign fishing for\nAtlantic tunas is not authorized in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)\nThe U.S. handgear fishery for Atlantic tunas is mainly a summer and fall fishery. The\nrecreational fishery for bluefin tuna takes place mainly in the mid-Atlantic region and targets\nbluefin tuna between 27 and 73 inches in length. Private vessels targeting these fish are\npermitted in the Angling category, while the charter/headboats targeting these fish are\npermitted in the Charter/Headboat category. Many fishermen who might normally call\nthemselves \"recreational\" participate in the General category in New England waters during\nthe summer and fall; General category permit holders may sell bluefin tuna greater than\n73 inches. A 1998 regulation prohibiting the retention of bluefin tuna less than 73 inches\nby fishermen in the General category clarified the distinction between the commercial and\nrecreational fisheries. The commercial handgear fishery for bluefin tuna occurs mainly\nin\nNew England, with vessels targeting fish using handline, rod and reel, and harpoon. Table\n2.7 summarizes the traditional gear, area, size of fish, and seasonality of the domestic\nbluefin tuna fishery. Table 2.11 presents domestic Atlantic bluefin tuna landings, by\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 16","category for the years 1983 to 1998. Tables 2.12 to 2.15 present 1995 to 1997 domestic\nlandings by area and gear type for bigeye, albacore, yellowfin, and skipjack tunas,\nrespectively.\nIn most years, bluefin tuna first appear along the U.S. Atlantic coast (not including the\nspawning areas in the Gulf of Mexico) off the Virginia Capes in late May or early June.\nFishing for smaller bluefin tuna with rod and reel generally begins in early summer off\nVirginia, and the center of recreational activity moves northward into the New York Bight\nas the season progresses. Fishing usually takes place between eight to 200 km from shore.\nOccasionally, concentrations of larger bluefin tuna in \"hot spots\" appear off the mid-Atlantic\ncoast during June and July as these fish migrate north to their summer feeding grounds off\nNew England, where they are targeted by the commercial sector.\nRecently, a recreational fishery has developed off the coast of North Carolina as\nconcentrations of large bluefin tuna began appearing from January through March. Catch\nrates in 1996 and 1997 were extremely high as compared to catch rates off the New England\ncoast. Many bluefin tuna were tagged off North Carolina in 1996 and 1997, using the latest\ntechnology, such as pop-up and archival satellite tags. Catch rates in 1998 were low,\npossibly due to oceanographic conditions resulting from the 1998 El Niño event. In\ncontrast, 1999 catch rates have once again been high, and additional bluefin tuna have been\nreleased with archival tags. This rod and reel fishery is primarily catch and release; landings\nare restricted to one fish (27 to 73 inches) per vessel, with a no-sale provision. As part of\nthe program to monitor the recreational North Carolina fishery, anglers are required to fill\nout a catch reporting card in exchange for a landing tag, which is necessary for offloading\nbluefin tuna.\nGeneral Category\nMany anglers purchase a General category permit SO they can sell any bluefin tuna\nlarger than 73 inches which they might catch. The permit fee ($18 in 1997 and 1998) is\nsmall compared to the potential payoff if a commercial-sized bluefin tuna is landed. About\n7,100 General category permits were issued in 1998, although only a few of the permitted\nvessels actually catch and sell fish in that category. Given that the recreational Angling\ncategory permit allows anglers to retain one giant \"trophy\" bluefin tuna per season, which\nthey cannot sell, the preference for the General category permit clearly indicates an\neconomic interest in commercial-sized fish, in addition to a recreational interest.\nIn 1998, only 11 percent of General and Charter/Headboat category permit holders\nlanded a bluefin tuna measuring greater than 73 inches, and over 50 percent of those who\ndid land and sell a bluefin tuna in the General or Charter/Headboat category landed only one\nor two fish. The total number of vessels landing bluefin tuna decreased from 1,027 vessels\nin 1997 to 965 vessels in 1998. For those vessels that landed a bluefin tuna in 1998, the\naverage number of fish per vessel was 3.6 fish for the season. The General category figures\nare distorted somewhat, however, by the presence of recreational anglers holding General\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 17","category permits prior to the 1998 change in the permit regulations. The average weight per\nfish increased from 408 lbs in 1997 to 442 lbs in 1998.\nHarpoon Category\nWith only 21 vessels landing fish in 1998, the Harpoon category is the smallest of the\ndirected fishery categories in value and volume of landings. The average number of bluefin\ntuna sold per Harpoon category vessel landing bluefin tuna was approximately 17 fish, and\nover 80 percent landed more than five fish in 1998. In contrast, the General category\naveraged less than four fish per \"successful\" vessel and only 20 percent of vessels landed\nmore than five fish. Thus, \"successful\" vessels in the Harpoon category were \"more\nsuccessful\" on average than General category vessels (Table 2.8). The average weight of\neach Harpoon category bluefin tuna has declined recently, from 414 lbs in 1996, to 403 lbs\nin 1997, to 376 lbs in 1998. There is antecdotal evidence which indicates that harpoon\nfishermen may be targeting smaller fish (300 to 400 lbs ww), due to the increased market\ndemand in Japan and the higher prices received for these smaller giant bluefin.\nPurse Seine Category\nThe purse seine fleet, as indicated above, consists of five vessels, each of which holds\nan equal amount of bluefin tuna quota (50 mt each in 1997 and 1998). Only four Purse\nSeine category vessels landed bluefin tuna in 1998, as one vessel transferred its quota to\nother vessels. The average number of bluefin tuna harvested by each of the four vessels in\nthis category in 1998 was 366 fish. Each fish weighed an average of 373 lbs in 1998, down\nfrom the average of 433 lbs in 1997, and 456 lbs in 1996.\nIncidental Catch Category (Longline and Trap)\nIn 1998, 240 bluefin tuna were landed incidentally to other fishing operations, primarily\nin longline fisheries targeting yellowfin tuna and swordfish. Bluefin tuna landed in the\nincidental category averaged 439 lbs in 1998, down from 448 lbs in 1997, and 539 lbs in\n1996. Bluefin tuna were landed by 100 Incidental category permit holders in 1998. In\n1998, only eight percent of those vessels landing under the Incidental category landed more\nthan five fish. Target catch requirements on the incidental catch of bluefin tuna are intended\nto remove any incentive to target these bluefin tuna while minimizing dead discards. The\nannual U.S. allowance for dead discards is currently 68 mt. If there are dead discards in\nexcess of this allowance, they must be counted against the following year's quota. If there\nare fewer dead discards, then half of the underharvest may be added to the following year's\nquota while the other half is conserved.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 18","Angling Category\nNearly 8,000 vessels held Angling category permits\nin 1997, and over 10,000 vessels purchased or renewed\nAngling category permits for 1998. The ICCAT\nRebuilding Plan for bluefin tuna specifies that bluefin\ntuna less than 115 cm may account for no more than eight\npercent by weight of the total bluefin tuna quota on a\nnational basis. This recommendation provides additional\nflexibility to manage the eight percent limit over each\nfour-consecutive-year quota balancing period. The\nrecommendation also specifies that all countries must\ninstitute measures to deny economic gain to the fishermen\nfrom such fish; the United States has implemented this\nthrough a no-sale provision. Refer to Section 2.5.8 for a\nmore detailed description of the handgear fishery for tuna.\nRachel and Jim Husted with a tuna\nThe total number of trips targeting large pelagics in 1997,\ncaught on the Pickled Herring VI.\nPhoto credit: Joan Husted.\nby vessel type and by state, is shown in Table 2.9.\nThe number of recreational fishing trips targeting bluefin tuna in 1997 (Table 2.10) was\ncalculated as follows: Trips for which respondents identified bluefin tuna as the target\nspecies were estimated through the 1997 Large Pelagic Survey. The number of recreational\ntrips in North Carolina was estimated from a separate telephone survey conducted on the\nwinter fishery. All trips with bluefin tuna as the target from Virginia to Rhode Island were\nassumed to be recreational trips. Since there is no differentiation between recreational and\ncommercial trips in the Large Pelagic Survey, and the trips targeting bluefin tuna in\nMassachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine are mostly commercial General category trips,\nthe ratio of Angling category to General category permit holders in those states was used to\napproximate the percentage the total trips targeting bluefin tuna which were recreational.\nBecause 6.7 percent of the total number of Angling and General category permits in\nMassachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine are Angling category permits, 6.7 percent of the\ntotal number of bluefin tuna trips in those states were estimated to recreational trips. This\nprocedure led to an estimate of 16,868 recreational trips targeting bluefin tuna. One\npotential bias of this estimate is that the Large Pelagic Survey only allows for one target\nspecies to be identified. For example, a fisherman cannot respond \"yellowfin and bluefin\";\nit must be one or the other. Note that the methods used to calculate recreational catch of\nbluefin tuna use different assumptions to estimate landings of bluefin tuna.\nThe 1998 ICCAT Rebuilding Program for bluefin tuna reaffirmed the importance of\nproviding the best available data on the broadest range of age classes possible, given\nminimum size restrictions. Scientific surveys of the bluefin tuna fleet, especially the rod\nand reel fleet in the General and Angling categories, provide a basis for both indexing the\nabundance of bluefin tuna and for estimating the harvest levels for some age classes in the\nstock. Trends in catch per unit effort (CPUE), or the amount of effort (in terms of gear,\ntime, etc.) it takes to catch a certain quantity of fish, are used extensively in the stock\nassessments performed by SCRS, and can be important indicators of the health of the stock.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 19","It is important to keep the bluefin tuna fisheries that collect catch per unit effort information\n(i.e., the Angling and General categories) open over as long a time period and as large\na\ngeographic area as possible, because catch per unit effort can be influenced by many\nshort-term and local factors (e.g., weather, brief high or low concentrations of fish).\nCollecting data over a long period of time and wide geographic area can help eliminate or\nreduce the effects of these short-term factors on catch per unit effort.\nTable 2.7a Size classes for Atlantic bluefin tuna.\nSize Class\nCurved\nPectoral Fin\nApproximate\nFork Length\nCurved Fork Length\nWhole Weight\nYoung School\n<27\"\n<20\"\n<14 lbs.\nSchool\n27 <47\"\n20 <35\"\n14 <66 lbs.\nLarge School\n47 <59\"\n35 <44\"\n66 - <135 lbs.\nSmall Medium\n59 <73\"\n44 <54\"\n135 - <235 lbs.\nLarge Medium\n73 <81\"\n54 <60\"\n235 - <310 lbs.\nGiant\n81\" or >\n60\" or >\n310 lbs. or >\nSummary of patterns of fishing activities directed at Atlantic bluefin tuna in the United States.\nTable 2.7\nGear\nArea\nSize of Fish\nSeason\nHandline, Harpoon,\nCape Cod Bay and Gulf of Maine\nGiant\nJune - September\nand Rod and Reel\nMedium\nAugust - October\nSchool\nSummer\n(unpredictable)\nCape Hatteras to Cape Cod\nSchool\nJune October\nMedium\nJune October\nCoastal North Carolina\nLarge Medium and Giant\nDecember - March\nGulf of Mexico\nGiant\nJanuary June\nPurse Seine\nCape Hatteras to Cape Cod\nLarge Medium and Giant\nAugust - October\nCape Cod Bay\nLarge Medium and Giant\nAugust - October\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 20","Table 2.8\nBluefin tuna fleet size and success rate, 1998*. (NMFS Atlantic tuna vessel permit database)\nQuota Category\nNumber of Permitted\nSuccess Rate in 1998 (% of Vessels\nVessels in 1998\nlanding at least one BFT>73\")\nGeneral\n9,143**\n11%\nHarpoon\n59\n36%\nPurse Seine\n5\n80%\nIncidental\n319\n31%\nAngling.\n10,668\nNA\nTOTAL\n20,194\n11% (commercial only)\n*Since those fishermen not selling a tuna may in any case consider themselves participants in the fishery, the percentage of vessels\nlanding fish is referred to as the \"success rate.\" Success rate should not, however, be interpreted as synonymous with economic\nsuccess or performance, as costs are not being compared with returns.\n*Includes Charter/Headboat permitted vessels\nTable 2.9\nEstimated number of rod and reel/handline fishing trips targeting large pelagics, 1997 (by vessel\ntype and state)*. (1997 Large Pelagic Survey)\nState\nPrivate\nCharter\nAll Vessels\nNorth Carolina**\n1,335\n1,558\n2,893\nVirginia\n8,190\n2,470\n10,660\nMaryland to Delaware\n2,112\n5,761\n26,873\nNew Jersey\n39,813\n8,557\n48,370\nNew York\n26,568\n6,881\n33,449\nConnecticut to Rhode Island\n9,675\n3,449\n13,124\nMassachusetts\n46,068\n3,489\n49,557\nNew Hampshire to Maine\n23,177\n1,596\n24,773\nTOTAL\n175,938\n33,761\n209,699\n* All figures are preliminary; LPS estimates the number of fishing trips only in northeast Atlantic states from Maine through\nVirginia.\n** North Carolina estimates are from a separate telephone survey, for bluefin only.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 21","Estimated number of rod and reel/handline fishing trips targeting bluefin in 1997, by vessel type and\nTable 2.10\ngeographic area * (Large Pelagic Survey, 1997)\nCharter\nPrivate\nAll\nArea\nNorth Carolina **\n1,558\n1,335\n2,893\nVirginia to Rhode Island\n2,345\n8,509\n10,854\nMassachusetts to Maine\n182\n2,939\n3,121\nTOTAL\n4,085\n12,783\n16,868\n* All figures are preliminary; the LPS estimates the number of fishing trips only in the northeast Atlantic states from Maine through\nVirginia.\nNorth Carolina estimates from separate telephone survey, and are for bluefin only.\nDomestic Atlantic bluefin tuna landings by year and category (metric tons), 1983 - 1998.\nTable 2.11\n1992\n1993\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\n1998\nCategory\n1983\n1984\n1985\n1986\n1987\n1988\n1989\n1990\n1991\nGeneral\n743\n642\n690\n395\n401\n400\n627\n645\n624\n535.6\n608.7\n642\n558\n575\n679\n706\n58\n53\n60\nHarpoon\n73\n68\n74\n67\n56\n74\n62\n39\n59\n58.4\n56.6\n59\n57\n300.0\n295.3\n301\n249\n245\n250\n248\nPurse Seine\n374\n398\n377\n360\n367\n383\n385\n384\n236\n94\nIncidental\n116\n132\n133\n130\n139\n152\n112\n137\n177\n136.7\n84.9\n72\n65\n49\n48\n21\n20\n23\nNo. LL*\n25\n37\n12\n14\n8\n2\n31\n3\n8\n18.4\n26.5\n28\n31\n117.2\n56.7\n64\n40\n43\n27\n24\nSo. LL\n91\n92\n120\n115\n130\n149\n80\n133\n168\nOther\n0\n3\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1.1\n1.7\n2\n1\n1\n2\n1\n299 p\n184 p\nAngling\n65\n105\n149\n202\n426\n277\n228\n486\n431\n134.5\n297\n112\n402\n362\n1,343\n1,214\n1,340\n1,305\n1,331\n1,247\nTOTAL\n1,371\n1,345\n1,423\n1,154\n1,389\n1,286\n1,414\n1,691\n1,527\n1,165\n*\n- LL indicates longline gear.\np - Angling category figures for 1997 are preliminary\nSources: Landings data from Northeast Region mandatory dealer report program, except for Angling category landings which are survey-\nderived. Note that General category figures include school and medium fish sold by General category permit holders (up to July of 1992),\nand that Angling figures thus reflect school and medium fish caught and/or sold by non-permit holders.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 22","Table 2.12 Domestic landings of bigeye tuna by area and gear, 1995 - 1997. (National Report of the\nUnited States: 1998)\nTotal Landings of Bigeye Tuna (mt)\nArea\nGear\n1995\n1996\n1997\nNW Atlantic\nLongline\n659.8\n383.9\n476.3\nRod and Reel**\n19.8\n147.5\n292.5\nTroll\n8.7\n3.5\n3.9\nGillnet\n3.6\n2.6\n*\nHandline\n*\n15.0\n2.7\nPairtrawl\n193.6\n0.0\n0.0\nTrawl\n0.9\n0.4\n1.0\nUnclassified\n0.0\n0.0\n0.5\nGulf of Mexico\nLongline\n68.9\n29.3\n33.9\nRod and Reel**\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nHandline\n0.0\n0.0\n*\nCaribbean\nLongline\n122.5\n137.8\n50.0\nNC Area 94a***\nLongline\n130.0\n129.0\n91.8\nSW Atlantic\nLongline\n0.0\n32.7\n142.8\nTOTAL\nAll Gears\n1,207.8\n881.7\n1,095.5\n*\n0.05 MT\nRod and reel catches represent estimates of landings and dead discards based on statistical surveys of the U.S.\n**\nrecreational harvesting sector\nNumbered areas refer to an ICCAT system for reporting catches. Area 94a is primarily the Grand Banks but may also\ninclude other offshore areas which are outside the U.S. EEZ. Virtually all the U.S. effort in area 94a is longline effort.\nThe catch locations of landings data is often not precise enough to differentiate between catches from areas 92 and 94a.\nFor a diagram of these ICCAT catch areas, refer to SCRS, 1990.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 23","Table 2.13 Domestic landings of north Atlantic albacore tuna by area and gear, 1995 - 1997.\n(National Report of the United States: 1998)\nTotal Landings of Albacore Tuna (mt)\nArea\nGear\n1995\n1996\n1997\nNW Atlantic\nLongline\n238.8\n65.4\n140.0\nGillnet\n3.0\n30.5\n42.8\nHandline\n*\n2.1\n4.8\nTrawl\n0.0\n1.4\n2.6\nTroll\n1.1\n2.6\n1.6\nRod and Reel\n22.8\n246.6\n31.9\nPair Trawl\n144.9\n0.0\n0.0\nOther\n0.0\n3.5\n1.5\nGulf of Mexico\nLongline\n9.5\n4.7\n16.9\nRod and Reel\n***\n61.7\n65.2\nCaribbean\nLongline\n119.1\n40.5\n16.1\nNC Area 94a\nLongline\n6.1\n11.6\n11.4\nSW Atlantic\nLongline\n1.1\n4.7\n-\nAll Gears\n545.3\n471.6\n343.3\n*\n0.05 MT\n**\nRod and reel catches represent estimates of landings and dead discards based on statistical surveys of the U.S.\nrecreational harvesting sector\nNumbered areas refer to an ICCAT system for reporting catches. Area 94a is primarily the Grand Banks but may also\ninclude other offshore areas which are outside the U.S. EEZ. Virtually all the U.S. effort in area 94a is longline effort.\nThe catch locations of landings data is often not precise enough to differentiate between catches from areas 92 and 94a.\nFor a diagram of these ICCAT catch areas, refer to SCRS, 1990.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 24","Table 2.14 Domestic landings of Atlantic yellowfin tuna by area and gear, 1995 - 1997.\n(National Report of the United States: 1998)\nTotal Landings of Yellowfin Tuna (mt)\nArea\nGear\n1995\n1996\n1997.\nNW Atlantic\nLongline\n1,393.3\n750.6\n838.9\nRod and Reel\n4,024.7\n4,021.2\n3,519.8\nTroll\n289.8\n292.9\n218\nPurse Seine\n0.0\n6.8\n0.0\nGillnet\n3.6\n9.2\n1.3\nPairtrawl\n47.0\n0.0\n0.0\nTrawl\n1.2\n1.8\n1.9\nHarpoon\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nHandline\n69.3\n31.5\n34.3\nGulf of Mexico\nLongline\n1,846.9\n2,110.8\n2,571.3\nRod and Reel\n27.8\n11.2\n0.0\nHandline\n22.5\n49.7\n55.6\nCaribbean\nLongline\n388.3\n414.9\n135.4\nTroll\n0.0\n19.6\n-\nHandline\n0.0\n0.7\n-\nGillnet\n*\n-\n-\nTrap\n0.0\n0.1\nNC Area 94a\nLongline\n16.9\n6.7\n6.1\nSW Atlantic\nLongline\n36.2\n221.9\n-\nTOTAL\nAll Gears\n8,131.3\n7,743.4\n7,624.9\n*\n0.05 MT\n** Rod and reel catches represent estimates of landings and dead discards based on statistical surveys of the U.S.\nrecreational harvesting sector\nNumbered areas refer to an ICCAT system for reporting catches. Area 94a is primarily the Grand Banks but may also\ninclude other offshore areas which are outside the U.S. EEZ. Virtually all the U.S. effort in area 94a is longline effort.\nThe catch locations of landings data is often not precise enough to differentiate between catches from areas 92 and 94a.\nFor a diagram of these ICCAT catch areas, refer to SCRS, 1990.\nThese data are under review and may be revised a later date.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 25","Table 2.15 Domestic landings of west Atlantic skipjack tuna by area and gear, 1995 - 1997.\n(National Report of the United States: 1998)\nTotal Landings of Skipjack tuna (mt)\nArea\nGear\n1995\n1996\n1997\nNW Atlantic\nLongline\n0.0\n0.3\n1.0\nRod and Reel\n20.7\n46.7\n29.9\nTroll\n0.0\n0.8\n0.6\nPurse Seine\n0.0\n0.9\n0.0\nGillnet\n0.0\n0.0\n8.9\nTrawl\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nHandline\n0.0\n**\n0.1\nUnclassified\n60.2\n0.0\n0.0\nGulf of Mexico\nLongline\n0.0\n0.2\n1.3\nRod and Reel\n0.0\n34.8\n21.6\nCaribbean\nLongline\n0.0\n1.2\n-\nGillnet\n0.0\n0.2\n-\nTrap\n0.0\n**\n-\nTroll\n0.0\n7.3\n-\nTOTAL\nAll Gears\n80.9\n83.7\n72.2\n*\n0.05 MT\nRod and reel catches represent estimates of landings and dead discards based on statistical surveys of the U.S.\n**\nrecreational harvesting sector\nNumbered areas refer to an ICCAT system for reporting catches. Area 94a is primarily the Grand Banks but may also\ninclude other offshore areas which are outside the U.S. EEZ. Virtually all the U.S. effort in area 94a is longline effort.\nFor a diagram of these ICCAT catch areas, refer to SCRS, 1990.\nSocial and Economic Aspects of the Domestic Atlantic Tuna Fishery\n2.2.4\n2.2.4.1 Bluefin Tuna\nPrices and Markets in the Commercial Fishery\nThe ex-vessel price of bluefin tuna in the United States has increased substantially\nover the past two and a half decades, from roughly $0.20 per pound to approximately\n$8.00 per pound whole weight (ww). This increase is largely attributed to demand for\nfresh bluefin tuna in Japan, the principal consumer of bluefin tuna landed by U.S.\nfishermen. Prices in the late 1990s have declined somewhat as a result of the Asian\neconomic crisis. The prices paid to U.S. fishermen and exporters depend on a range of\nfactors including the preferences of Japanese consumers, supplies of competitive\nproduct in Japan (e.g., Atlantic bluefin tuna from other nations, Pacific bluefin tuna,\nbigeye tuna), packing and transportation costs, and the yen/SU.S. exchange rate.\nCarroll (1998) econometrically examined factors that influence ex-vessel prices of\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 26","U.S. Atlantic bluefin tuna and found that fish quality factors (fat content, shape, color)\nand other factors such as the yen/SU.S. exchange rate and quantity of fish on the\nJapanese market significantly affect U.S. ex-vessel prices. Variability in supply and\nprices demonstrate the volatility of the Japanese market and the difficulty in predicting\neven general price trends on a monthly basis. Although a fatter fish may fetch a higher\nprice whatever the market conditions, prices for lower quality bluefin tuna may be\nhigher if total supplies to the Japanese market are relatively low.\nAs mentioned above, in addition to market\nconditions, fish quality and condition are also\nimportant factors. Bluefin tuna are evaluated by\nexpert graders on the basis of four criteria: fat,\nfreshness, color and shape of the fish, with a letter\ngrade of A, B, or C for each of the criteria. Since\n1994, NMFS has asked dealers to supply, on a\nvoluntary basis, quality ratings on the individual\nfish they purchased. Because Atlantic bluefin tuna\ngain weight during the late summer months, the\ntime period of catches roughly reflects fat content,\nand thus can serve as a proxy for quality in\npredicting prices. Size can also be an important\ndeterminant of price per pound. According to\nindustry sources, prices offered for individual\nbluefin tuna peak in the range of 500 to 700 lbs WW\ndue to the costs and the risk of investing upwards\nof $10,000 or more for individual fish, as well as\nthe problems in physically handling larger fish.\nIndustry sources also indicate that with the recent\nAsian economic crisis, the Japanese market is more\nreceptive to smaller bluefin tuna of approximately\nA 900-lb giant bluefin tuna caught by rod and reel\nby the crew of the Tuna Hunter off Rockport, MA\n250 to 400 lbs ww, since they require less of an\non September 8, 1998. Pictured are Capt. Gary\nCannell (r), buyer William Raymond (I) and angler, investment by the purchaser in Japan and thus have\nJim Chambers. Photo credit: Jim Chambers.\na broader market.\nTable 2.16 shows average prices by commercial quota category for the U.S. bluefin\ntuna fishery for 1994 to 1998. Ex-vessel prices have been declining since 1995. For\nexample, prices in the General category averaged $14.45 per pound dressed weight (dw)\nin 1995, $10.89 per pound in 1996, $8.91 per pound in 1997, and $6.26 per pound in\n1998. This decline in prices may be due to the appreciation of the dollar relative to the\nyen over the last three years, as well as market supply conditions in Japan. In addition, a\nweak economy in Japan led to a decline in the demand for luxury goods such as top-\nquality sushi. Harpoon category prices, however, did not drop in 1997 from 1996, and\ndid not fall as low as General category prices in 1998. This may be due to favorable\nmarket conditions in late June and very early July when much of the Harpoon category\nquota is caught.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 27","Ex-vessel average nominal prices (per pound, dw) for Atlantic bluefin tuna by commercial\nTable 2.16\nfishing category, 1994 - 1998. (NERO Bluefin Dealer Report Database).\nCategory\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\n1998*\n6.26\nGeneral\n10.86\n14.45\n10.89\n8.91\nHarpoon\n14.88\n16.41\n9.62\n10.09\n7.13\n6.04\nIncidental\n8.48\n9.87\n5.99\n6.67\nPurse Seine\n10.23\n11.07\n11.05\n10.34\n7.23\n* 1998 data are preliminary\nEx-vessel revenues from recorded sales of bluefin tuna in all commercial categories\nfor 1994 to 1998 are presented in Table 2.17. General category gross revenues\nremained constant from 1996 to 1997, but decreased in 1998. Landings in 1998 were\nsimilar to 1997, but due to the reduction in average prices, ex-vessel revenues dropped.\nIn the Purse Seine category, the 17 percent quota decrease from 1994 to 1995 resulted\nin only a ten percent decline in gross revenues. Adjustments to purse seine operations\nmay have partially offset the economic effects of the quota decrease. For example,\nthere is evidence that over the past four seasons, purse seine operators attempted to\nslow the volume of their landings and to market more fresh product in order to increase\nex-vessel prices. In addition, cost-saving mechanisms could result in an even smaller\ndecline in actual producer surplus, particularly since purse seine quotas are now freely\ntradeable within the Purse Seine category. Transferable output quotas should result in\nincreased economic efficiency in fishing operations, and thus higher producer surplus,\nall else being equal.\nEx-vessel gross revenues in the U.S. Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery by commercial fishing\nTable 2.17\ncategory, 1994 - 1998. (NERO Bluefin Dealer Report Database)\n1998*\nCategory\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\n$7,411,803\nGeneral\n$12,279,518\n$13,933,311\n$10,781,388\n$10,567,634\n$715,752\n$1,568,566\n$919,717\n$900,108\nHarpoon\n$1,579,860\n$474,545\nIncidental\n$1,350,573\n$1,210,929\n$671,528\n$503,302\n$3,158,582\n$4,670,978\n$4,445,852\n$4,581,837\nPurse Seine\n$5,230,451\n$11,760,682\nTOTAL*\n$20,440,402\n$21,383,784\n$16,818,485\n$16,562,066\nMay include revenues from bluefin counted towards the Reserve quota\n1998 data are preliminary\nThe vast majority of commercial bluefin tuna are landed and sold in New England.\nTable 2.18 shows the landings and value for bluefin tuna for each state in which dealers\nreported purchases in 1997 and 1998. Massachusetts accounts for the vast majority of\nlandings and value. Commercial landings south of New York and in the Gulf of Mexico\nstates are almost exclusively those from the Incidental category quota on longline gear,\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 28","with the exception of a few General category fish landed between New Jersey and\nNorth Carolina.\nTable 2.18\nBluefin tuna landings and value by state of landing, 1997 - 1998. (NERO Bluefin Dealer\nReport Database)\n1997\n1998*\nLandings\nValue\nLandings\nValue\n(pounds, ww)\n(pounds, ww)\nMassachusetts\n1,734,97\n$12,986,205\n1,658,887\n$8,602,309\nMaine\n284,218\n$2,034,882\n396,507\n$1,817,880\nNew Hampshire\n143,362\n$1,012,588\n170,523\n$846,824\nLouisiana\n43,326\n$206,952\n33,209\n$157,330\nNew York\n13,798\n$79,392\n25,765\n$91,256\nFlorida\n11,027\n$28,686\n16,170\n$48,529\nNew Jersey\n19,028\n$97,868\n18,709\n$110,437\nNorth Carolina\n14,007\n$77,557\n26,752\n$28,550\nTexas\n7,142\n$17,700\n2,678\n$8,588\nMaryland\n1,655\n$5,874\n5,911\n$31,107\nRhode Island\n973\n$5,671\n2,065\n$12,836\nVirginia\n0\n0\n580\n$3,045\nSouth Carolina\n531\n$4,059\n638\n$2,040\nAlabama\n0\n0\n538\n$1,075\nPuerto Rico\n745\n$4,632\n668\n$1,297\nVirgin Islands\n0\n0\n588\n$1,645\nTOTAL\n2,274,783\n$16,562,066\n2,360,188\n$11,764,748\n1998 data are preliminary\nU.S. fishermen can sell their catch \"dockside\" for a negotiated price or have the\ntuna dealer sell their fish on consignment. When a dealer buys a bluefin tuna at a\nnegotiated dockside price, the dealer is bearing the market risk, but when a fish is sold\non consignment, the market risk is borne by the fisherman. Table 2.19 shows the\nnumber of bluefin tuna sold on consignment and dockside for 1996 through 1998. For\nthe Harpoon, General, and Incidental categories, most fish are sold on consignment, but\nthe number of fish being sold on consignment has dropped over the last few years as\nprices have fallen. This may be because fishermen are less willing to bear the market\nrisk in a market with a weak Japanese Yen and an ongoing Asian economic crisis.\nPurse Seine category fish are generally sold for a dockside price, and purse seine\nvessels have traditionally negotiated set prices with dealers before their season begins.\nThe relative number of Purse Seine category fish sold on consignment more than\nquadrupled from 1996 to 1998, however. This may be because dealers are unwilling to\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 29","take on all the risk of selling the fish in a weak market. While a higher percentage of\nbluefin tuna are still sold dockside in the Purse Seine category and more fish are sold on\nconsignment in the other categories, the difference is being reduced as neither dealers\nnor fishermen are willing to bear all the market risk. Table 2.20 shows that average\nprices for bluefin tuna sold on consignment are generally higher, but vary more than\ndockside prices (indicated by higher standard deviations).\nTable 2.19\nNumbers of bluefin tuna sold dockside vs. consignment, 1996 - 1998. (NERO Bluefin\nDealer Report Database)\nNon-Purse Seine\nPurse Seine\nDockside\nConsignment\nDockside\nConsignment\n1996\n857\n2,968\n1,032\n106\n1997\n962\n3,199\n1,000\n271\n1998*\n1,499\n2,347\n1,016\n448\n1998 data are preliminary\nTable 2.20\nAverage ex-vessel prices for bluefin tuna sold dockside and on consignment, 1996 - 1998.\n(NERO Bluefin Dealer Report Database)\nNon-Purse Seine\nPurse Seine\nDockside\nConsignment\nDockside\nConsignment\nStd.\nAverage\nStd.\nAverage\nStd.\nAverage\nAverage\nStd.\n$/lb.\nDev.\n$/lb.\nDev.\n$/lb.\nDev.\n$/lb.\nDev.\n1996\n7.24\n4.26\n8.68\n4.57\n8.54\n0.54\n9.41\n3.03\n1997\n6.36\n3.02\n7.35\n4.00\n8.53\n0.08\n7.60\n0.72\n1998*\n4.37\n2.59\n5.47\n3.30\n5.69\n0.54\n6.00\n1.32\n*1998 data are preliminary\nAn annual Atlantic tuna dealer permit is required for fish dealers who purchase,\nimport, or export bluefin tuna. In 1998, there were approximately 500 permitted\nAtlantic tuna dealers. However, only 68 of these dealers actually purchased a bluefin\ntuna in 1998. Table 2.21 shows the distribution of bluefin tuna purchases by dealers for\n1995 through 1998. While there are numerous bluefin tuna dealers, there appear to be\nfew who are handling large volumes of bluefin.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 30","Table 2.21\nDistribution of bluefin tuna ex-vessel purchases, 1995 - 1998. (NERO Bluefin\nDealer Report Database)\nNumber of Dealers\nNumber of BFT\nPurchased\n1995\n1996\n1997\n1998*\n<10\n40\n39\n34\n31\n11-20\n7\n7\n8\n10\n21-30\n5\n6\n3\n2\n31-50\n6\n4\n8\n4\n51-70\n2\n3\n2\n6\n71-100\n6\n4\n3\n3\n101-150\n6\n1\n3\n3\n151-200\n2\n3\n0\n1\n201-300\n1\n1\n0\n1\n301-600\n3\n4\n6\n5\n600\n2\n2\n3\n2\nTOTAL\n77\n75\n70\n68\n1998 data are preliminary\nCosts and Expenses in the Commercial Fishery\nCollection of cost data in the bluefin tuna fishery is difficult because of the seasonal\nnature of the fishery and the varying motivations of the participants (profit, fun, or a\ncombination of both). The variable costs of fishing for bluefin tuna are discussed\nseparately for each permit category. Fixed costs are not included in these calculations.\nThe level of capital investment in vessels, gear, and other equipment is considerable in\nboth the recreational and commercial fisheries for bluefin tuna. It is assumed that\ncommercial vessels will continue to fish as long as variable costs are covered, at least in\nthe short run, since fixed costs are incurred whether or not the vessel engages in fishing.\nFor both commercial and recreational vessels, it is assumed that a number of species\nmay be targeted, and the relevant decision is which species the vessel operator chooses\nto target.\nSome information about expenses in the General category is available from various\nsurveys. A non-random sample of 15 vessel owners in the General Category Tuna\nAssociation (GCTA) responded to a questionnaire on fishing costs and success.\nAverage variable cost per fishing trip for 1997 was estimated at $516 for those vessels\nproviding information, with an average of 3.8 trips taken per bluefin tuna landed. This\nestimate is substantially greater than estimates from a previous study of costs in the\nGeneral category which estimated average costs per trip for 1994 at $388 (Watson,\n1996). Previous studies of the Virginia and New Jersey recreational fisheries estimated\ncosts at an average of $375 per day (Lucy et al., 1990; Ofiara and Brown, 1987),\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 31","similar to estimates in the Final Environmental Impact Statement for Bluefin Tuna\n(NMFS, 1995). This difference may be explained by the fact that the GCTA survey\nrespondents are more active in the fishery than the average General category permit\nholder. For the purpose of the analyses in this FMP, information from the GCTA\nsurvey regarding the average variable cost and average number of trips per fish will be\nused. Average variable costs from the GCTA survey multiplied by the number of trips\nnecessary to land a fish (for those able to land a fish) result in an average variable cost\nper fish landed of approximately $1,960.\nDue to its seasonal nature and limited duration, the General category bluefin tuna\nfishery is rarely the sole source of a fishermen's income. Many commercial fishermen in\nthe General category fish commercially for other species (e.g., groundfish, lobster) during\nthe rest of the year, and use the bluefin tuna fishery as an additional source of income.\nAlthough the bluefin tuna season is short, it may provide a significant percentage of a\nfisherman's income due to the high price per pound relative to other species.\nAccording to the 1996 Watson study, average variable costs per trip for the\nHarpoon category were approximately $488 per trip in 1994, and the average Harpoon\ncategory vessel surveyed made 23 trips and landed ten bluefin tuna that year.\nMultiplying the average variable costs and number of trips necessary to land a bluefin\ntuna results in an average variable cost per fish of approximately $1,150 for the\nHarpoon category.\nThrough the cooperation of Purse Seine vessel owners, data were obtained for\n1994 seasonal fishing costs for the Purse Seine category. NMFS was unable to obtain\nupdated information for this FMP. Variable costs, including crew wages and payroll\ntaxes, fish spotting services, fuel, supplies, food, travel, lodging, and unloading, were\nestimated to be slightly over $ 1 million per vessel. Purse seiners indicate that their\nvariable fishing expenses when targeting bluefin tuna are approximately $1,750 per\nday, plus crew share costs. Given an annual average of 30 to 40 days for each vessel\nto fill its quota, and a share of 55 to 60 percent of the gross revenue to the crew\nmembers, an estimate of $10,580 of variable harvesting costs per metric ton was\ncalculated for bluefin tuna landed in the Purse Seine category. Fixed costs of insurance,\nprofessional fees, and office fees averaged just over $100,000 per vessel. Depreciation,\nopportunity costs of capital, dry docking, and the costs of activities in other fisheries\nwere not estimated.\nIf the \"incidental\" catch of a bluefin tuna is truly incidental (that is, if fishermen\nwould have made the same trip and fished in the same manner) then the cost of catching\na bluefin tuna incidentally is essentially zero. Only handling costs can be directly\nattributed to the catch of bluefin tuna, and these are assumed to be minimal. Rules that\nrequire minimum landings of a target species for every bluefin tuna landed are designed\nto minimize the incentive for Incidental category participants to target bluefin tuna.\nAlthough the possibility of catching a valuable bluefin tuna could still have some effect\non fishing practices, there are insufficient data to determine the nature or extent of this\neffect. Therefore, in this analysis the basic assumption is that bluefin tuna catches are\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 32","truly incidental and that the associated costs of incidental catch are zero. This\nassumption simplifies the calculation of producer surplus for the Incidental category,\nsince the profits are equal to gross revenues from the sales of bluefin tuna.\nExports and Imports\nMost Atlantic bluefin tuna landed by the U.S. commercial fishery are exported fresh\nto Japan for auction in a wholesale market, usually the large Tsukiji Central Wholesale\nMarket in Tokyo. The percentage of landings which are exported is lowest at the start of\nthe season when fat content is low, increasing to nearly 100 percent in late summer and\nearly fall. According to the East Coast Tuna Association, virtually all U.S. exports of\nAtlantic bluefin tuna are conducted by U.S. companies or agents; that is, Japanese\nownership of tuna landed by U.S. fishermen generally begins after first sale in Japan.\nAll bluefin tuna imported to, or exported from, the United States must be\naccompanied by a Bluefin Statistical Document (BSD) in order to meet the\nrequirements of ICCAT's Bluefin Statistical Document Program, which began in 1995.\nThe original (for imports) or a copy (for exports) of the completed BSD must be sent to\nthe NMFS Northeast Regional Office within 24 hours of the bluefin tuna shipment\nentering or leaving the United States. In 1998, the United States exported 658.6 mt dw\nof Atlantic bluefin tuna from a total of 849.1 mt dw landed. An additional 701 mt dw\nof Pacific bluefin tuna were reported as exported in 1998 through the BSD program,\nmuch of it in bulk shipments of frozen, gilled and gutted fish. Bluefin tuna exports\nfrom the United States for 1996 through 1998 are shown in Table 2.22. Many other\nnations, including Canada, Spain, Tunisia, and Australia also export appreciable\namounts of fresh bluefin tuna to Japan (southern bluefin tuna in the case of Australia).\nTable 2.22\nUnited States exports of bluefin tuna (Atlantic and Pacific), as reported through the Bluefin\nTuna Statistical Document Program, 1996 - 1998. (U.S. BSD Program, NMFS NERO)\nLandings of\nExports of\nExports of\nTotal U.S. Exports\nAtlantic BFT\nAtlantic BFT\nPacific BFT\nof BFT\n(mt, dw)\n(mt, dw)\n(mt, dw)\n(mt, dw)\n1996\n749.8\n661.7\n60.7\n722.4\n1997\n826.8\n698.7\n917.3\n1,616.0\n1998*\n849.1\n658.6\n701.0\n1,359.6\n1998 data are preliminary\nImporters of bluefin tuna are also required to obtain an annual tuna dealer permit\nand to report through the BSD program. Since 1997, NMFS has received U.S. Customs\ndata (derived from Entry Form 7501) on imports of fresh and frozen bluefin tuna and\nswordfish on a monthly basis. These data allow NMFS to track shipments of bluefin\ntuna and enforce dealer reporting requirements. United States imports and re-exports of\nbluefin tuna for 1996 through 1998, as reported through both U.S. Customs and the\nBSD program, are shown in Table 2.23.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 33","The U.S. Customs data indicate that 109.5 mt of bluefin tuna were imported into the\nUnited States from July through December of 1997, much more than the 5.7 mt\nreported as imported through the BSD program (imports plus re-exports). However, the\nU.S. Customs and preliminary BSD data match up more closely for 1998, with 225.6\nmt of imports reported through U.S. Customs and 101.7 mt reported through the BSD\nprogram (99.8 mt of imports and 1.9 mt of re-exports). The difference in import\nnumbers between the U.S. Customs and BSD data may be explained by a lack of\nknowledge and compliance with the BSD program by importers, especially those on the\nPacific coast.\nData transferral between NMFS and U.S. Customs helps NMFS to verify the\nbluefin tuna import data it currently receives from dealers and identify those importers\nwho are not in compliance with the BSD program. This is especially important as\nindustry sources report that imports of bluefin tuna into the United States are on the rise\nas the value of the dollar remains high compared to other currencies and the Asian\neconomic crisis continues.\nImports of bluefin tuna into the United States, as reported through the BSD program and\nTable 2.23\nU.S. Customs, 1996 - 1998 (U.S. BSD Program, NMFS NERO; and U.S. Customs)\nU.S. BSD Program\nU.S.\nCustoms Data\nImports (mt, dw)\nRe-exports (mt, dw)\n(mt, dw)\n1996\n1.9\n1.3\nN/A\n1997\n5.3\n0.4\n109.5\n225.6\n1998*\n99.8\n1.9\n*1998 data are preliminary\nProcessing and Trade\nTo maximize fish quality, much of the processing of export-quality Atlantic bluefin\ntuna in the commercial categories takes place on board the vessel. Fishermen maintain\nfreshness by gutting and bleeding the fish and protecting it from heat and sunlight,\npreferably by immersing it in ice or an ice brine. Following these procedures can be\nmore difficult for smaller vessels which may have to tow a fish to port, and for purse\nseiners due to their large harvests in one trip. Over the last two years, however, the\npurse seine vessels have done more at-sea processing (removing gill plates, gutting, and\nbleeding), than in the past in order to ensure quality and to receive higher prices.\nOnce landed, most Atlantic bluefin tuna are immediately graded and prepared for\nexport to Japan's fresh fish market. Export-quality fish are either refrigerated or placed\ninto an ice water bath until ready for export. Fish are then placed individually in\ninsulated crates, commonly known as \"coffins,\" filled with ice for transport to an\nairport and flight to Japan. Dealers earn a commission ranging from four percent to\nnine percent for consignment fish, and fishermen also pay expenses for shipping,\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 34","handling, tariffs, and customs (Weber, 1990). Industry sources report that for fish that\nare shipped on consignment, dealers charge approximately $3.00 to $3.50 per pound for\nshipping, handling, wharf fees, etc.\nCharter/Headboat Fishing\nIn 1997, the Large Pelagic Survey estimated 6,612 charterboat trips targeting\nbluefin tuna from Maine to North Carolina. Of these trips, 2,527 targeted commercial-\nsized bluefin tuna which, if caught, were sold under the General category quota.\nAssuming that charterboats charge about $800 per day, the gross revenues from bluefin\ntuna fishing would be about $5.3 million. These direct revenues represent greater than\n20 percent of the total gross revenues to the other commercial permit categories, and are\nlikely an underestimate of revenues accruing to the charterboat sector because some of\nthe large medium or giant bluefin tuna landed may be sold by the captain or mate.\nAdditionally, tips that are typically given to the mate (about $100 per trip), are not\nincluded. The producer surplus component of the bluefin tuna fishery would thus be\nthese gross revenues minus costs incurred in providing the charterboat services.\nVariable costs incurred in providing charterboat services are estimated at $392 per trip,\nas described below. This estimate results in a producer surplus for charterboat\noperations targeting bluefin tuna of $800 minus $392, or $408 per trip, not including\ntips. Assuming 6,612 charterboat trips targeted bluefin tuna, this results in a total\nproducer surplus for the charterboat bluefin tuna fishery of approximately $2.7 million\nin 1997.\nStudies in Virginia (Lucy et al., 1990) and New Jersey (Ofiara and Brown, 1987)\nreported costs associated with recreational fishing (including charterboats) for \"big\ngame\" fish. Average expenses were $375 per trip (in 1992 dollars), as reported by the\nvessel owner. In many cases, trip expenses were likely shared in some part among\nseveral passengers on board. In the New Jersey study, there were an average of 4.7\npeople on board; in the Virginia case there were 4.1 anglers per trip. The Ditton study\non the bluefin tuna fishery in North Carolina estimates average expenses of $1,184 per\ntrip (in 1997 dollars), with an average of 4.3 anglers on board.\nSince these studies combined data for private and charterboats, they do not draw\nindependent conclusions about the charter and recreational fisheries. In general,\ncharterboats are larger and more expensive to operate than private vessels. At a\nminimum, charterboat variable costs per trip will include private vessel costs, plus\nwages for the mate of about $80 per trip, for a total of $392 (Virginia and New Jersey\naveraged). Expenses for anglers on a charterboat (assuming the charterboat fee of\n$800 per trip is split between six anglers) would include the charter fee, meals and\nlodging expenses (estimated at about $100 per person), plus tips (10 to 15 percent of\ncharter cost), for a total of $260 per person. There were approximately 4,085\ncharterboat trips in 1997 that targeted recreational-sized bluefin tuna. An additional\n2,527 charterboat trips targeted commercial-sized bluefin tuna which, if caught, were\nsold by the vessel owner or operator under the General category quota.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 35","Recreational Fishing\nRevenue estimated through angler consumer surplus (ACS) in the private bluefin\ntuna fishery is $1,132 per fishing trip (NMFS, 1995). Using this estimate of angler\nconsumer surplus per trip and an estimated 16,868 recreational bluefin trips per year\n(based on 1997 Large Pelagic Survey data), total angler consumer surplus for the\nrecreational bluefin tuna fishery was $19,094,576 in 1997. In a recent study of the\nwinter recreational bluefin tuna fishery, angler expenditures in North Carolina were\nestimated to be $3.8 million in 1997 (Ditton et al., 1998). Angler \"willingness to pay\"\nabove trip costs was found to be $344 to $388 per person; multiplying this estimate by\nthe average number of anglers per trip (5.3) results in an estimated angler consumer\nsurplus of $1,479 to $1,668. The North Carolina bluefin tuna fishery is unique, as\nanglers travel great distances to participate in a primarily catch and release fishery for\nlarge bluefin tuna. However, for the purposes of the analyses in this FMP, NMFS'\nvalue of $1,132 will be used to represent angler consumer surplus per trip for the\nrecreational bluefin tuna fishery, coastwide.\nThe latest supplemental social and economic impacts survey of the Large Pelagic\nSurvey, conducted in 1993, indicated that average variable costs for a private vessel\ntargeting bluefin tuna were $315 per trip. Travel costs were estimated based on mileage\nbetween the home and the point where the vessel is moored, and averaged $27 per\nangler. According to the 1997 Large Pelagic Survey, an estimated 12,783 private\nvessel trips targeted bluefin tuna recreationally. Based on this number of trips, total\nexpenditures are estimated to be $4 million. Also, see the above section for studies that\nestimated the costs of both recreational fishing for private anglers and charterboats.\n2.2.4.2 BAYS Tunas\nCommercial Fishing\nBAYS tunas support substantial commercial fisheries along the coasts of the\nAtlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. Albacore and skipjack tunas are sold primarily to\nthe canning market, while bigeye and yellowfin tunas are sold primarily on the fresh\nmarket for domestic use and for export. As described in Section 2.3, there is significant\neconomic interdependence between the swordfish and tuna longline fisheries, and\nfishery management regulations adopted for one directed fishery have indirect impacts\non the other directed fishery (Taylor et al., 1995). As quotas have been reduced in the\nswordfish fishery, directed swordfish effort has declined and effort has increased in the\ntuna fishery. This trend is reflected in landings in the longline fishery, where landings\nof yellowfin and bigeye tunas have become an increasingly important component of\ntotal landings and gross revenues.\nThe longline fishery off the mid-Atlantic and southern New England is a multi-\nspecies fishery. Some vessels participate in the directed bigeye and yellowfin tuna\nfishery during the summer and fall months and then switch to bottom longline fisheries\nand/or shark fishing during the winter when the shark season is open. Fishing trips in\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 36","this fishery sector average 12 sets over 18 days. During the season, vessels primarily\noffload in the major ports of Fairhaven, MA; Montauk, NY; Barnegat Light, NJ;\nOcean City, MD; and Wanchese, NC. Average ex-vessel prices are shown in Table\n2.24. As mentioned earlier, estimates of recreational and commercial harvests of\nBAYS tunas continue to be reviewed and may be revised in the future.\nTable 2.24\nAverage ex-vessel prices for BAYS tunas (dressed weight), 1997 - 1998. (NMFS\nSoutheast Dealer Database)\n1997 Average\n1998 Average\nPrice/pound (dw)\nPrice/pound (dw)\nYellowfin tuna\n$2.44\n$2.21\nBigeye tuna\n$3.53\n$3.22\nOther tuna (includes skipjack,\n$0.75\n$0.67\nalbacore, blackfin, little tunny, bonito)\nRecreational and Charter/Headboat Fishing\nBAYS tunas support extensive recreational fisheries, and they are an important\nsource of direct income to charter/headboat vessels. The private recreational and\ncharter fisheries for BAYS tuna have become more important as stricter catch limits\nand shorter fishing seasons have been implemented\nfor bluefin tuna, and BAYS tuna have become a\nmore important component of these vessels'\noffshore catch. They are also an indirect source of\nincome to U.S. firms that supply recreational\nfishery participants with associated goods and\nservices. Non-market values are difficult to\nestimate, and involve either direct questioning\n(contingent valuation) or indirect survey techniques\nsuch as the travel cost method, as a basis for\nestimating demand (and thus consumer surplus) for\nrecreational fishing. (Refer to Chapter 7 for a more\nSALLIE J.\ncomplete description of the estimation process.)\nSTANSBURY FREEKEND\nThe economic importance of the recreational\nAtlantic tuna fisheries, including non-market\nA typical private recreational boat out\nbenefits, should be considered when examining the\nof Ocean City, MD.\ngross revenue, despite the difficulty in attaching a\nPhoto credit: Sallie J. Stevenson.\ndollar value to recreational fisheries.\nAngler consumer surplus estimates for bluefin and yellowfin tunas, although now\nsomewhat dated relative to changes in the regulations, indicate that net economic\nbenefits from the recreational fishery are significant. Estimates of anglers' \"willingness\nto pay\" for recreational offshore fishing trips can exceed $1,000 per trip above and\nbeyond the actual costs of their trip.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Tuna - 37","2.3 Atlantic Swordfish\n2.3.1\nLife History and Status of the Stocks\nSwordfish are members of the family Xiphiidae, in the suborder Scombroidei. They are\none of the largest and fastest predators in the Atlantic Ocean, reaching a maximum size of\n530 kg (1165 lbs). Like other highly migratory species, they have developed a number of\nspecialized anatomical, physiological, and behavioral adaptations (Helfman et al., 1997).\nSwordfish are distinguished by a long bill that grows forward from the upper jaw. This bill\ndiffers from that of marlins (family Istiophoridae) in that it is flattened rather than round in\ncross section, and smooth rather than rough. Swordfish capture prey by slashing this bill\nback and forth in schools of smaller fish or squid, stunning or injuring their prey in the\nprocess. They may also use the bill to spear prey, or as a defense during territorial\nencounters. Broken swordfish bills have been found embedded in vessel hulls and other\nobjects (Helfman et al., 1997; Moyle and Cech, Jr., 1996).\nSwordfish move thousands of kilometers annually throughout the world's tropical, sub-\ntropical, and temperate oceans and adjacent seas. They are pelagic fish, usually found in\nsurface waters but occasionally diving as deep as 650 meters. As adults and juveniles,\nswordfish feed at the highest levels of the trophic food chain, implying that their prey\nspecies occur at low densities. The foraging behavior of swordfish reflects the broad\ndistribution and scarcity of appropriate prey; they often aggregate in places where they are\nlikely to encounter high densities of prey, including areas near current boundaries,\nconvergence zones, and upwellings (Helfman et al., 1997).\nLike most large pelagic species, swordfish have adapted body contours that enable them\nto swim at high speeds. Their streamlined bodies are round or slightly compressed in cross\nsection (fusiform), and their stiff, deeply forked tails minimize drag. This streamlined\nphysical form is enhanced by depressions or grooves on the body surface into which the fins\ncan fit during swimming. The extremely small second dorsal and anal fins of the swordfish\nmay function like the finlets of tuna, reducing turbulence and enhancing swimming\nperformance. Their method of respiration, known as ram gill ventilation, requires\ncontinuous swimming with the mouth open to keep water flowing across the gill surfaces,\nthereby maintaining an oxygen supply. This respiratory process is believed to conserve\nenergy compared to the more common mechanism whereby water is actively pumped across\nthe gills (Helfman et al., 1997). In addition to the benefits of speed and efficiency, their\nsearch for prey is aided by coloring that provides camouflage in pelagic waters. This\nshading is darker along the dorsal side and lighter underneath, enhanced by silvery tones.\nSwordfish exhibit other physiological characteristics that enable them to extend their\nhunting range. For example, swordfish can maintain elevated body temperatures,\nconserving the heat generated by active swimming muscles. Swordfish have developed a\nheat exchange system that allows them to swim into colder, deep water in pursuit of prey.\nBecause warm muscles contract faster than cool ones, heat conservation is believed to\nenable these predatory fishes to channel more energy into swimming speed. The internal\ntemperatures of these fishes remains fairly stable even as they move from surface waters to\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Swordfish - 38","deep waters. Swordfish have also adapted specialized eye muscles for deep water hunting.\nBecause their eye muscles do not have the ability to contract, they produce heat when\nstimulated by the nervous system, locally warming both the brain and eye tissues (Helfman\net al., 1997). With this modification, swordfish are able to hunt in the frigid temperatures of\ndeep-water ocean environments without experiencing a decrease in brain and visual function\nthat might be expected under such harsh conditions.\nJuvenile swordfish are characterized as having exceptionally fast growth during the first\nyear (Prince et al., 1988). Adult swordfish exhibit dimorphic growth; females show faster\ngrowth rates and attain larger sizes than males (Ehrhardt et al., 1996). Fifty percent of all\nmales are mature between 112 cm (16 kg ww) and 129 cm (25 kg ww) lower jaw fork length\n(LJFL), an age of approximately 1.4 years, while 50 percent of all females are mature\nbetween 179 to 182 cm LJFL (72 to 74 kg ww), an age of approximately 5.5 years (Taylor\nand Murphy, 1992). All males are mature by 145 to 160 cm LJFL (37 to 50 kg ww),\napproximately age five, and all females are mature by 195 to 220 cm LJFL (93 to 136 kg\nww), approximately age nine. In general, swordfish reach 140 cm LJFL (33 kg ww) by age\nthree and are considered mature by age five (ICCAT, 1997). Individual females may spawn\nnumerous times throughout the year.\nSwordfish stocks consist of several age classes, a condition that may serve as a buffer\nagainst adverse environmental conditions and confer some degree of stability on the stocks.\nSince the distribution patterns of different size swordfish appear to be influenced by thermal\nconditions, abundance indices used in analytical assessments should account for these\nenvironmental factors (SCRS, 1996a). Swordfish are also at a high trophic level which may\nmake the species less vulnerable to short-term fluctuations in environmental conditions.\nThey are capable of migrating long distances to maximize prey availability and can prey\nupon various trophic levels during their daily vertical migrations. Additional information on\nthe life history and habitat of swordfish can be found in Chapter 6, HMS Essential Fish\nHabitat Provisions.\nWhen ICCAT's Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS) scientists assess\nthe status of Atlantic swordfish, the stock is split between the north Atlantic, south Atlantic,\nand Mediterranean Sea; a total Atlantic stock hypothesis is also examined. There is\nconsiderable uncertainty in stock structure. SCRS continues to examine existing information,\nincluding spawning data, tagging information, genetic studies, and abundance indices. For the\npurposes of domestic management, the swordfish population is considered to consist of two\ndiscrete stocks divided at 5° N. This FMP contains management measures for the north\nAtlantic stock only, managed under the dual authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Act and\nATCA. South Atlantic swordfish are managed domestically under the authority of ATCA.\nThe status of both the north and south Atlantic swordfish stocks was assessed most\nrecently in 1996 using both non-equilibrium stock production models and virtual population\nanalysis based on international catch and catch per unit effort data through 1995. The 1996\nassessment indicated that the north Atlantic swordfish stock had continued to decline despite\nreductions in total reported landings from peak values in 1987. The biomass at the\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Swordfish - 39","beginning of 1996 was estimated to be 58 percent of the biomass needed to produce\nmaximum sustainable yield (80 percent confidence interval: 41 to 104 percent). The\n1995 fishing mortality rate was estimated to be 2.05 times the fishing mortality rate at\nmaximum sustainable yield (80 percent confidence interval: 1.07 to 3.82). In 1996, the\nreplacement yield for north Atlantic swordfish was estimated to be about 11,300 mt ww,\nwhile maximum sustainable yield was estimated to be 13,000 mt WW (80 percent confidence\ninterval: 5,300 to 16,500 mt ww). Reported catches of north Atlantic swordfish totaled\nSSB/SSB MSY was estimated to be 0.25 (80 percent confidence\n12,\n961\nin\n1996.\nmt\nWW\ninterval: 0.22 to 0.29). These estimates were calculated by SCRS based on catch data\nthrough the 1995 calendar year; the next stock assessment will take place in September 1999\nand will consider catch data through the 1998 calendar year.\nUntil the new assessment is completed in 1999, the best scientific information available\nfor projecting the future status of swordfish stocks is contained in the 1996 assessment. The\nswordfish rebuilding projections in section 3.4.2 are based on 1999 as the first year of the\n\"new\" rebuilding quotas in the following analyses. Data updated since the 1996 assessment\nindicate similar trends to those in recent years with the exception of an increase in\nrecruitment in 1997. This improvement could allow for a more optimistic outlook in the\n1999 assessment if this year class is not heavily harvested until after it reaches spawning\nsize (SCRS, 1998). SCRS has been tasked with developing rebuilding plans with a 50-\npercent probability of rebuilding within five, ten, and 15 years and/or other appropriate\ntimes. The rebuilding plans should include scheduled assessments of progress toward\naccomplishing the rebuilding goals. NMFS has listed north Atlantic swordfish as overfished\nbecause the fishing mortality rate is higher than that required to keep a population at\nmaximum sustainable yield and because biomass is SO low.\nWhile not as drastic, the status of the south Atlantic swordfish stock indicates similar\nsigns of overfishing. A quantitative assessment of the south Atlantic stock in 1996 indicated\nthat although the biomass was estimated to be at 99 percent of that needed to produce\nmaximum sustainable yield, the 1995 fishing mortality rate was approximately 1.24 times\nthe fishing mortality rate at maximum sustainable yield. Reported landings in 1995\n(20,600 mt) and 1996 (18,000 mt) exceeded the estimated replacement yield of 14,600 mt,\nthus SCRS determined that it was likely the stock would decline further. If a total Atlantic\nstock was assumed, it is unlikely that the outlook for stock status would be improved\n(SCRS, 1998). ICCAT's Standing Committee on Research and Statistics plans to conduct\nan assessment of the south Atlantic swordfish stock along with that of the north Atlantic\nstock in September 1999. NMFS seeks to reduce fishing mortality rates which should\nincrease biomass in the long term and once rebuilt, sustain a healthy number of spawning\nage swordfish in these populations.\nInternational Aspects of the Atlantic Swordfish Fishery\n2.3.2\nThe two distinct management units for swordfish in the Atlantic Ocean, north and\nsouth, are divided at 5° N. Directed longline fisheries in the Atlantic have been operated by\nSpain, the United States, and Canada since the late 1950s or early 1960s. The Japanese tuna\nlongline fishery started in 1956 and has operated throughout the Atlantic since then, with\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Swordfish - 40","substantial bycatch of swordfish. There are other directed swordfish fisheries (e.g., Brazil,\nPortugal, Venezuela, Morocco, and Uruguay) and longline fisheries that take swordfish\nprimarily as bycatch (e.g., Chinese-Taipei, Korea, and France). There is no foreign fishing\nfor Atlantic swordfish in U.S. waters.\nICCAT established the first total allowable catch for the north Atlantic in 1991.\nSubsequent decreasing quotas were established for 1992 to 1997, although reported catch\nfrom 1989 to 1996 averaged 16,000 mt, well above replacement yield. In response to a\n1996 stock assessment indicating that biomass was only 58 percent of that needed to support\nmaximum sustainable yield, ICCAT further reduced north Atlantic quotas for 1997 through\n1999, although the TAC still exceeded replacement yield. In 1997, SCRS determined that\nthe failure to achieve significant overall reductions in north Atlantic fishing mortality, due in\npart to non-compliance by some fishing nations, had resulted in the need for more severe\nreductions in the future to achieve the recovery of this over-exploited species. ICCAT has\nalso taken steps in recent years to improve compliance with existing conservation and\nmanagement measures (see Section 1.1.4).\nSince 1996, the major ICCAT-member swordfish harvesting nations, including the\nUnited States, have decreased their north Atlantic swordfish landings in response to ICCAT\nrecommendations that establish catch quotas as shown in Table 2.25. Reduced landings of\nnorth Atlantic swordfish can be attributed, in part, to movement of some vessels out of the\nnorth Atlantic and into the south Atlantic or other waters. In addition, some fleets, including\nvessels from the United States, Spain, and Canada, have redirected effort to tuna and/or\nsharks to take advantage of market conditions and higher relative catch rates. There are\nsome developing swordfish longline fisheries, including South Africa and several Caribbean\nnations. ICCAT remains concerned about the unreported catches of non-member countries\nand flag-of-convenience fleets, and the negative effects these catches may be having upon\nthe swordfish stocks.\nTable 2.25 Reported catches of north Atlantic swordfish, 1997. (SCRS, 1998)\nCountry\n1997 Catch in mt ww\nPercent of Total Catch *\nSpain\n5,137\n40%\nUnited States (landings)\n2,988\n27%\nUnited States (discards)\n446\nJapan\n1,437\n11%\nCanada (landings)\n1,089\n8%\nCanada (discards)\n5\nPortugal\n903\n7%\nOther Countries\n965\n7%\nTOTAL (All Countries)\n12,970\n100%\n*\nThese are calendar year landings as reported to SCRS for stock assessment purposes. The United States implements swordfish quotas\nfor a fishing year of June 1 - May 31.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Swordfish - 41","A recent trend in the pelagic longline fishery for swordfish has been the expansion of\nfishing effort in the Caribbean Sea island nations, including Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago,\nAntigua, Grenada, and the British Virgin Islands, which have been exporting swordfish in\nincreasing numbers to the United States. This is due, in part, to an increased emphasis on\nfisheries development by the Caribbean nations. Part of this increase may also be\nattributable to fishermen, including U.S. fishermen, either re-flagging their vessels or\nlanding swordfish in the Caribbean for export to the United States (SAFMC, 1990). The\nconsequences of re-flagging vessels, shifting targeted fishing grounds, offloading in foreign\ncountries, and other dynamic characteristics of the pelagic longline fishery, will have to be\naddressed by domestic and international management entities.\nSwordfish landings reported in the south Atlantic were relatively low (generally less\nthan 3,750 mt dw) until the 1980s. The discovery of underutilized swordfish stocks in the\nsouth Atlantic Ocean by coastal state and distant water vessels resulted in increased landings\nthrough the 1980s and 1990s to a peak of 20,607 mt dw in 1995. With this increase in effort\nin the south Atlantic, the total Atlantic reported catch of swordfish (including discards)\nreached a historical high of 37,330 mt in 1995, while the estimated replacement yield is only\n14,600 mt. As in the north Atlantic fishery, compliance among contracting and no-\ncontracting parties is a concern. Preliminary analyses from SCRS have indicated that south\nAtlantic catches are not sustainable. In 1996, ICCAT established a 14,620 mt total\nallowable catch and country quotas for 1998 to 2000 in the south Atlantic fishery as shown\nin Table 2.26.\nTable 2.26 Atlantic-wide catch of south Atlantic swordfish, 1997. (SCRS, 1998)\nPercent of Total Catch *\nCountry\n1997 Catch in mt ww\nSpain\n8,461\n48%\nBrazil\n4,100\n23%\n11%\nChinese-Taipei\n1,847\n1,365\n8%\nJapan\nUruguay\n760\n4%\n3%\nPortugal\n441\n2%\nUnited States (landings)\n396\nUnited States (discards)\n21\n1%\nOther Countries\n174\n100%\nTOTAL (All Countries)\n17,565\n* These are calendar year landings as reported to SCRS for stock assessment purposes. The United States implements\nswordfish quotas for a fishing year of June 1 - May 31.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Swordfish - 42","2.3.3\nDomestic Aspects of the Atlantic Swordfish Fishery\nCommercial Fishery\nU.S. commercial swordfish fishing in the Atlantic Ocean is reported to have begun in\nthe early 1800s as a harpoon fishery off the coast of New England. Only large fish that\nfinned on the surface were available to the gear, some weighing as much as 600 lbs dw, but\naveraging about 225 to 300 lbs dw at the turn of the century. Because of the limited effort\ndirected towards large fish, the stock was sufficient to support a sustainable seasonal\nswordfish fishery for more than 150 years. Most swordfish caught in the United States in\nthe early 1900s were harvested with harpoons; harpoon landings declined from the 1940s\nthrough the 1960s.\nIn the early 1960s, domestic and international pelagic longline vessels began to target\nswordfish throughout the north Atlantic Ocean. Swordfish were targeted particularly during\ntheir annual migration along the Canadian and U.S. Atlantic coast from spawning areas in\nthe Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico to feeding areas off New England and Canada.\nLandings declined following a 1971 decision by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration\n(FDA) to limit the acceptable mercury content to 0.5 parts per million (ppm) for all\nswordfish landed or imported into the United States. The negative publicity concerning\nmercury levels had a significant impact on domestic and world swordfish demand. The\nFDA regulation was challenged in court in 1978, and based on more detailed analyses of\nseafood consumption patterns, the acceptable level of mercury was raised to 1.0 ppm\n(SAFMC, 1985). As consumers' fear of mercury contamination waned, average annual\nU.S. catches of swordfish increased to support the renewed demand (Lipton, 1986). The\nFDA continues to monitor mercury levels in imported swordfish.\nIn 1991, there were 586 vessels permitted in the U.S. fishery for Atlantic swordfish;\nby 1995, over 1,200 U.S. vessels had applied for permits. In July 1995, NMFS announced\nits intent to implement a limited access system, based on historical participation in the\nfishery, that would eliminate some of this latent effort. By 1997, there were 900 U.S.\nvessels left in the fishery, some holding a permit only in case of incidental swordfish\nlandings. Only 315 of these vessels landed one or more swordfish in 1997. Fishing effort\nby pelagic longline vessels has varied since 1992. Table 2.27 indicates the number of\nhooks, the number of longline sets, and the number of vessels that participated in this fishery\nbased on pelagic logbook data. As part of this FMP, NMFS has implemented a limited\naccess system in the swordfish fishery; approximately 198 permit holders will be eligible for\ndirected permits under the qualification criteria. Approximately 218 vessels that meet a\nlower threshold of historical landings will qualify for an incidental permit (See Chapter 4).\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Swordfish - 43","Table 2.27 Fishing effort in the Atlantic pelagic longline fishery 1992 - 1997.\n# of Sets\n# of Vessels\nYear\n# of Hooks\n15,458\n279\n1992\n8,351,250\n14,691\n299\n1993\n8,485,366\n15,257\n284\n1994\n9,046,432\n1995\n10,114,866\n15,929\n300\n1996\n10,612,835\n16,763\n273\n1997\n9,054,966\n14,248\n251\nThe U.S. directed fishery for north Atlantic swordfish is confined by regulation to\ntwo gear types: longline and handgear. Pelagic longlining accounts for approximately\n98 percent of U.S. directed swordfish landings (Table 2.28). Previously, driftnets were\nallocated two percent of the U.S. north Atlantic directed fishery quota. The use of driftnets\nin the Atlantic swordfish fishery was prohibited by NMFS in January 1999. Incidental\ncatches by fishing gears other than pelagic longline and handgear are restricted to incidental\ncommercial retention limits of two to five swordfish per trip depending on gear type, and are\ncounted against the incidental catch quota. Longline fishermen may only land 15 swordfish\nper trip during a directed fishery closure, creating a disincentive to target swordfish.\nNMFS can adjust these retention limits based on the availability of incidental catch quota.\nIncidental landings are made by otter trawl vessels fishing for squid, mackerel and butterfish\n(the primary prey species sought by swordfish).\nU.S. fishermen were allocated 3,277 mt WW of north Atlantic swordfish quota in 1997,\n3,190 mt WW in 1998, and 3,103 mt WW in 1999. The United States has implemented a\nsplit-year fishing season of June 1 to May 31, divided into two six-month seasons, to\nfacilitate management in response to changing quotas. In addition to quotas, all commercial\nand recreational fishermen must comply with a minimum size limit of 33 1b dw (119 cm\nlower jaw fork length, 29 inches cleithrum to keel). Commercial vessels and charter/\nheadboat vessels must accept on-board observers when selected, and must comply with the\npermitting and reporting requirements described in Section 2.6. Swordfish dealers and\nimporters are also subject to permitting and reporting requirements.\nDuring the 1997 fishing year (June 1, 1997, to May 31, 1998), approximately six to ten\nU.S. fishing vessels targeted south Atlantic swordfish. Because no part of that stock's range\n(south of 5° N) is in the U.S. EEZ, south Atlantic swordfish are not within the management\nauthority of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. However, the stock and its fishery are discussed\nbriefly in this FMP because south Atlantic swordfish are subject to ICCAT (and thus ATCA)\nmanagement authority and because fishermen who fish in the south Atlantic also fish for\nnorth Atlantic swordfish. United States commercial fishermen landed less than their 250 mt\nWW south Atlantic swordfish quota during the 1997 fishing year. NMFS has implemented\nsouth Atlantic quotas for the fishing years 1998 through 2000, with an annual quota of 289\nmt dw, negotiated through a sharing agreement. A split-year fishing season has also been\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Swordfish - 44","implemented in the south Atlantic Ocean, in combination with other management measures\ncomparable to those in the north Atlantic (permitting, reporting, observers, etc.).\nTable 2.28 U.S. catches of Atlantic swordfish for calendar years 1995 - 1997 in mt WW. (SCRS, 1998;\nNational Report of the United States, 1998)\nArea\nGear\n1995\n1996\n1997\nNW Atlantic\nLongline\n988.4\n954.2\n1,008.4\nLongline Discards\n292.2\n356.2\n253.8\nDriftnet\n74.0\n77.8\n0.4\nPair Trawl\n14.6\n0.0\n0.0\nHandline\n0.0\n0.1\n1.3\nTrawl\n9.8\n19.8\n8.0\nTroll\n7.3\n0.4\nUnclassified Discards\n6.8\n11.9\nHarpoon\n1.0\n0.5\n0.7\nGulf of Mexico\nLongline\n597.6\n780.4\n650.5\nLongline Discards\n43.5\n115.9\n109.4\nCaribbean\nLongline\n1,575.7\n1,137.0\n671.3\nLongline Discards\n65.7\n45.8\n17.6\nNC Atlantic\nLongline\n764.0\n585.0\n635.2\nLongline Discards\n124.3\n44.4\n53.0\nSW Atlantic\nLongline\n171.2\n396.5\nLongline Discards\n1.4\n21.4\nTOTAL\nAll Gears\n4,550.8\n4,320.1\n3,839.7\nRecreational/Charterboat Fishery\nThe swordfish recreational fishery has existed along the Atlantic coast since the 1920s,\nwhen small vessels caught swordfish off Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket by trolling,\nPrior to 1967, approximately 50 swordfish were caught annually with rod and reel in about\n1,000 attempts from Massachusetts to Long Island (SAFMC, 1985). During the 1970s,\nrecreational fishing for swordfish expanded all along the Atlantic coast due to new\ntechniques and the development of night fishing (SAFMC, 1985). Tournaments were held\nin a number of states including South Carolina and New Jersey in 1978 and in Florida from\n1977 through 1983. The recreational fishery began to decline in 1978 due to decreasing\ncatch rates (SAFMC, 1985).\nThere are minimal data available on current rod and reel fishing for swordfish. The\nMarine Recreational Fisheries Statistics Survey did not encounter any recreational fishermen\nwho caught a swordfish from 1994 to 1997, although 242,943 boat angler trips were\nrandomly sampled along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts during this time. In 1996, two\nswordfish were reported to the Large Pelagic Survey and retained by the fishermen. In\n1997, 16 swordfish were reported to the Large Pelagic Survey; ten were retained by the\nfishermen and six were released alive. In 1998, six swordfish were reported to the Large\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Swordfish - 45","Pelagic Survey; one was retained and five were released alive. Over this three-year period,\nmost of the swordfish documented by the Large Pelagic Survey were caught by anglers in\nNew Jersey and New York. Percentages of the Large Pelagic Survey dockside intercepts are\nindicative of the percentages of vessel trips targeting large pelagics that encounter\nswordfish. For example, the Large Pelagic Survey dockside sampling data indicate that less\nthan 0.2 percent of all vessel trips targeting large pelagic species with a hook and line or\nhandline actually landed a swordfish in 1997.\nBased on NMFS tournament data, swordfish\nare rarely encountered in tournaments targeting\nbillfish or other HMS. For example, in\ntournaments taking place along the Atlantic coast\nof Florida and the Florida Keys in 1994 to 1995, no\nswordfish were caught in 18,566 hours of fishing\neffort (NMFS, 1997d). The Cooperative Tagging\nCenter at the Southeast Fisheries Science Center\noccasionally encounters swordfish entries, although\nthey are considered rare event species caught\nincidental to other trolling recreational fisheries.\nThere are anecdotal reports of recreational\nfishermen catching swordfish. Fishermen have\nreported catching swordfish in the Hudson Canyon\nat night during the summer of 1997.\nBecause the recreational fishery has encountered\nSO few Atlantic swordfish in recent years, it was\nexempt from U.S. swordfish quotas prior to the\nimplementation of this FMP. One objective of this\n\" \"An exciting new recreational fishery\nFMP is to rebuild the swordfish stock such that\nfor swordfish has developed over the\nrecreational fishermen may enjoy an enhanced\npast couple of years\" - Oceanic Game\nrecreational experience through higher interactions\nFish Newsletter, 1978. Photo credit:\nwith swordfish. All recreational swordfish landings\nNOAA\nare now subtracted from the U.S. Incidental quota,\nand this mortality is reported to ICCAT.\nSocial and Economic Aspects of the Domestic Atlantic Swordfish Fishery\n2.3.4\nCommercial Fishery\nMany consumers consider swordfish to be a premier seafood product. Swordfish that\nmay bring $3.00 per pound to the vessel may the sell in some restaurants at prices of\n$30.00 for a six-ounce steak. Swordfish prices are affected by a number of factors,\nincluding the method of harvest, either by distant-water or inshore vessels, and by gear type;\nharpoon vs. pelagic longline. Generally, prices for fresh swordfish can be expected to vary\nduring the month due to the heavier fishing effort around the period of the full moon.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Swordfish - 46","Swordfish prices also vary by size and quality, with prices first increasing with size, up to\nabout 250 lbs, then decreasing due to higher handling costs for larger fish. \"Marker\"\nswordfish weighing 100 to 275 lbs are preferred by restaurants because uniform-sized dinner\nportions can be cut with a minimum of waste. Pups weighing 50 to 99 lbs dw are less\nexpensive than markers but the yield of uniformly sized portions is smaller. \"Rats\" (33 to\n49 lbs dw) are the least expensive but are generally not used by food service or retail buyers\nwho require large portions of uniform size.\nAlthough ICCAT quotas for Atlantic swordfish have decreased, U.S. prices have\nactually declined over the past four years (Table 2.29). The combination of decreased prices\nand decreased quota indicates that total gross revenues for the fleet as a whole have probably\ndeclined as well. Declining prices for swordfish may be the result of substitution with\nimports which occur during critical months of the year; imports of swordfish have increased\ndramatically in recent years. The relatively strong U.S. dollar and weak Japanese yen may\nbe drawing fish that were formerly marketed in Asia to the domestic market, including\nswordfish and steak-grade tuna that compete with U.S. domestic swordfish. NMFS has also\nreceived anecdotal reports of decreasing prices for swordfish due to a campaign supporting\nthe short-term boycott of swordfish until a rebuilding plan is in place, sponsored by a\nconsortium of marine conservation organizations.\nTable 2.29\nIndex of ex-vessel prices for swordfish, 1989 - 1997. Base year is 1982. (Fisheries of the\nUnited States, 1997)\nYear\n1989\n1990\n1991\n1992\n1993\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\nIndex\n119\n108\n102\n111\n92\n107\n104\n103\n91\nStudies demonstrate that ex-vessel gross revenues may rise as supply decreases and as\nU.S. consumer income rises (Gauvin 1990; Thunberg and Seale, 1992). Demand for\nswordfish was shown to be stronger during the second and third quarters of the year\n(Thunberg and Seale, 1992), reflecting the popularity of swordfish steaks during the\nbarbecue and seaside tourist seasons. Other factors, such as changes in the fleet in location\nand in targeted species (from swordfish to bigeye and yellowfin tuna) also affect the\ndynamics of the fishery. Further, closure dates due to quota limits may cause market gluts\nand the resulting low prices. Preliminary analyses conducted by NMFS since proposing\nlimited access indicate that approximately a third of current permit holders are substantially\ndependent on the swordfish fishery (see Chapter 4).\nThere are currently 213 dealers who are permitted to buy Atlantic swordfish from\nU.S. commercial fishermen; 148 of them are located in the Southeast (NMFS, 1998). About\n12 swordfish dealers also import swordfish. NMFS has extended dealer permitting and\nreporting requirements to all swordfish importers as well as dealers who buy domestic\nswordfish from the Atlantic. NMFS has identified about 200 swordfish importers. Dealers\nsubmit reports to NMFS on swordfish sales that include the weight and price of the fish. All\nbut 15 of the 213 Atlantic swordfish dealers also have dealer permits for other species and\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Swordfish - 47","are therefore probably not completely dependent\nupon their swordfish sales. Swordfish dealers are\nlocated along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts and in\nthe Caribbean.\nNMFS finalized regulations in March 1999\nthat enhance tracking of swordfish trade, including\ndealer permitting and reporting requirements for all\nswordfish importers, a documentation strategy that\nindicates the ocean of origin and flag of the\nharvesting vessel, and a prohibition of the import\nof all Atlantic swordfish weighing less than the\nU.S. minimum size of 33 pounds. Information\nSwordfish carcasses are inspected by NMFS\ncollected in the past did not provide accurate data\nOffice of Law Enforcement personnel.\nregarding the harvesting country as vessels may\nPhoto credit: Louis Jachimczyk, NMFS.\noffload in a port other than their home port due to\ndistant water fishing trip for swordfish, such that the exporting country may not be the same\nas the harvesting country. Therefore, it is difficult to track swordfish trade activities against\nICCAT quotas with great precision.\nThe processing and wholesale sectors are an integral part of the U.S. swordfish\nindustry. The primary processing sector includes firms that purchase the raw product from\nfishermen or importers and transform it into a consumer product. Secondary processors\nprovide restaurants and food service distributors with loins or \"wheels\" (large bone-in\nsections cut through the body). In 1995, U.S. processors handled 4,549 tons of fresh or\nfrozen swordfish valued at $53.4 million. Fillets accounted for 2,920 tons valued at\n$36.5 million while steaks were 1,629 tons worth $16.9 million (Folsom et al., 1997).\nThere are over 350 seafood processors along the Atlantic coast of the United States;\napproximately 50 of these processors are active in the swordfish fishery (Folsom et al.,\n1997; Beideman, N., BWFA, Barnegat Light, NJ, pers. comm.). Employment varies widely\namong processing firms. The average firm employs less than 40 people and employment\nmay be seasonal due to the nature of some fisheries. Most of these firms handle other\nspecies as well, reflecting the multi-species nature of the pelagic longline fishery.\nOther participants involved in the commercial trade sector of the Atlantic swordfish\nfishery include brokers, freight forwarders, carriers (primarily commercial airlines), and\nconsignees. Brokers are private individuals or companies who are hired by importers and\nexporters to help move their merchandise through U.S. Customs with the proper paperwork\nand payments. The broker must possess thorough knowledge of tariff schedules and\nU.S. Customs regulations and keep abreast of changes in the law and administrative\nregulations. Freight forwarders often arrange for land transportation and storage facilities\nfor the incoming shipment. The nominal or an ultimate consignee is the person who \"owns\"\nthe shipment of swordfish. From July through December 1997, there were 231 firms that\nwere listed as consignees on entry summary forms for 4,563 swordfish shipments. These\nconsignees were from 18 states, Guam, and six foreign countries.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Swordfish - 48","Swordfish is an important commodity on world markets, generating in excess of\n$100 million in export earnings in recent years (Folsom et al., 1997). Swordfish trade\nstatistics are tracked using separate product codes reported by importers on U.S. Customs\nforms. Import activity has followed fluctuations in supply and consumer demand for the\nproduct during the past several decades. A sharp rise in recent swordfish imports may be\ndue in part to the use of specific swordfish product codes on import forms, but is likely\ndue to a combination of factors, including increased consumer interest in imported\nswordfish. Swordfish imports generally increase throughout the summer and peak in\nAugust or September.\nSwordfish was imported into the United States from 37 countries in 1998. Seventy-\nseven percent of that swordfish (by weight) was exported from nations that are not\nmembers of ICCAT. Fifty-three percent of imported swordfish (steaks and other products\ncombined) was fresh (8,572 mt) in 1998. Chile, Brazil, Australia, and Canada were major\nsources of U.S. fresh swordfish imports in 1998. Of the 7,677 mt imported in frozen\nproduct, 94 percent (by weight) comes in as frozen fillets. Eighty-five percent (by weight)\nof all imported frozen swordfish comes from Singapore. Swordfish was imported into\n14 U.S. ports in 1998, with Miami, FL as the principal port of entry in terms of the number\nof shipments, and Los Angeles, CA the principal port by weight (Figures 2.1 and 2.2).\nFigure 2.1\nSwordfish Ports of Entry, 1998 (by number of shipments)\nAll others combined (0.48%)\nPortland, ME (6.05%)\nBoston, MA (5.75%)\nNew York, NY (12.40%)\nMiami, FL (44.29%)\nPhiladelphia, PA (0.18%)\nSan Diego, CA (5.31%)\nLos Angeles, CA (22.38%)\nHonolulu, HI (3.15%)\nFigure 2.2 Swordfish Ports of Entry, 1998 (by weight)\nAll others combined (1.09%)\nPortland, ME (5.20%)\nBoston, MA (5.47%)\nMiami, FL (25.36%)\nNew York, NY (7.69%)\nPhiladelphia, PA (0.11%)\nSan Diego, CA (5.68%)\nHonolulu, HI (1.34%)\nLos Angeles, CA (48.05%)\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Swordfish - 49","Charter/Headboat Fishing\nWhile few anglers are now targeting Atlantic swordfish, the recreational fishery was\nactive in the 1980s. At that time, recreational anglers spent between $200 and $800 for an\novernight fishing trip, depending on region and proximity to fishing grounds (SAFMC,\n1985). Generally, swordfishing grounds are 70 to 100 miles offshore along much of the\nAtlantic coast, making the costs for recreational fishing for swordfish much higher than for\nmost other species (SAFMC, 1985). As the north Atlantic stock rebuilds so that swordfish\nare more available, recreational anglers' catch rates are likely to increase, and tournaments\nmay again include swordfish on their list of prized gamefish. Given that swordfish are\nfound SO far offshore, the revival of this recreational fishery would most likely lead to\nincreased fishing opportunities and economic benefits for the charterboat industry, as well as\nbenefits to the coastal communities where recreational fishing occurs. Reports from anglers\nalong the mid-Atlantic coast during 1998 indicate rising rates of swordfish interactions.\n2.4 Atlantic Sharks\nLife History and Status of the Stocks\n2.4.1\nSharks belong to the class Chondrichthyes (cartilaginous fishes) that also includes\nrays, skates, and deepwater chimaeras (ratfishes). From an evolutionary perspective,\nsharks are an old group of fishes characterized by skeletons lacking true bones. The earliest\nknown sharks have been identified from fossils in the rocks of the Devonian period, over\n400 million years ago. These primitive sharks were small creatures, about 60 to 100 cm\nlong, that were preyed upon by larger armored fishes that dominated the seas. Sharks have\nsurvived competition for eons, evolving into the large and aggressive predators that\ndominate the seas today. The life span of sharks in the wild is not known, but it is believed\nthat many species may live 30 to 40 years or longer.\nSince sharks have evolved primarily as apex predators, they are not equipped to\nwithstand predation themselves - especially in the form of intense exploitation. Relative to\nother marine fish, sharks have a very low reproductive potential. Several important\ncommercial species, including large coastal carcharhinids such as sandbar (Casey et al.,\n1985; Sminkey and Musick, 1995; Heist et al., 1995), lemon (Brown and Gruber, 1988), and\nbull sharks (Branstetter and Stiles, 1987), do not reach maturity until 12 to 18 years of age.\nVarious factors determine this low reproductive rate: slow growth, late sexual maturity,\none- to two-year reproductive cycles, a small number of young per brood, and specific\nrequirements for nursery areas. These biological factors leave many species of sharks\nvulnerable to overfishing.\nThere is extreme diversity among the 350 species of sharks, ranging from tiny pygmy\nsharks of only 20 cm in length to the giant whale sharks, over 12 meters in length. There are\nfast-moving, streamlined species such as mako and thresher sharks, and sharks with\nflattened, ray-like bodies, such as angel sharks. The most commonly known sharks are large\napex predators including the white, mako; tiger, bull, and great hammerhead. Some shark\nspecies reproduce by laying eggs, others nourish their embryos through a placenta. Despite\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 50","their diversity in size, feeding habits, behavior and reproduction, many of these adaptations\nhave contributed greatly to the evolutionary success of sharks.\nSharks are generally aggressive predators feeding near the top of the food web. They\nhave extremely sensitive smell receptors, eyes that can adapt to dim light, lateral line\nreceptors that sense movement in the water, and electroreceptors that can detect prey buried\nin the sand even in the absence of scent or visual clues. In addition to their finely-tuned\nsenses, sharks are armed with a formidable set of teeth and jaws. The teeth are replaced\noften, so sharks always have a sharp set capable of inflicting a clean bite. The tiger shark\neats large turtles, and the tiny cookiecutter shark feeds by carving plugs of flesh out of large\nfishes and whales. Only basking sharks, whale sharks, and megamouth sharks feed by\nfiltering small organisms from the water.\nThe most significant reproductive adaptations of sharks are internal fertilization and the\nproduction of fully developed young or \"pups.\" These pups are large at birth, effectively\nreducing the number of potential predators and enhancing their chances of survival. During\nmating, the male shark inseminates the female with copulatory organs, known as claspers,\nthat develop on the pelvic fins. In most species, the embryos spend their entire\ndevelopmental period protected within their mother's body, although some species lay eggs.\nThe number of young produced by most shark species in each litter is small, usually ranging\nfrom two to 25, although large females of some species can produce litters of 100 or more\npups. The production of fully-developed pups requires great amounts of nutrients to nourish\nthe developing embryo. Traditionally, these adaptations have been grouped into three\nmodes of reproduction: oviparity, ovoviviparity, and viviparity.\nOviparity is the most primitive condition, although it is still different from the\nreproductive strategy of bony fishes. Oviparous sharks lay large eggs that contain sufficient\nyolk to nourish the embryo and allow it to emerge fully developed. These eggs are enclosed\nin leathery cases that are deposited on the sea bottom, usually attached to plants or rocks.\nThere is no parental care or brooding in sharks. The only protection for the embryo is its\ntough leathery case, composed of protein fibers. The development of these eggs is\ntemperature-dependent and hatching usually occurs in a few months to a year. The pups of\noviparous sharks are somewhat small because their growth is limited by the amount of\nnutrients stored in the egg. The embryos of the oviparous whale shark, the largest living\nfish, measure only 36 cm. Oviparity is found in four families of sharks: bullhead sharks\n(Heterodontidae), cat sharks (Scyliorhinidae), whale sharks (Rhinocodontidae), and some\nspecies of nurse sharks (Ginglymostomatidae).\nOvoviviparity, also known as aplacental viviparity, is the most common mode of\nreproduction in sharks. The eggs of ovoviviparous sharks hatch in the uterus before the\nembryos are fully developed. The embryos continue to grow in the uterus, nourished by the\nyolk sac, without forming a placental connection with the mother. The size of the litter is\nhighly variable, depending on the reproductive strategy of the species. In some\novoviviparous sharks, such as the sand tiger, the yolk is absorbed very early in development.\nThereafter, the embryos nourish themselves by swallowing unfertilized eggs and smaller\nembryos in the uterus, in a form of embryonic cannibalism called oophagy. Having eaten its\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 51","smaller siblings, usually only one embryo survives in each of the two uteri. Ovoviviparous\nsharks include cow, frill, sand tiger, goblin, mackerel, basking, thresher, false cat sharks,\nsaw, angel, squaloid, some nurse sharks, some smooth dogfishes, and some cat sharks.\nViviparity, or placental viviparity, is the most advanced mode of reproduction. The\nembryos of viviparous sharks are initially dependent on stored yolk but are later nourished\nby the mother through a placental connection. Once connected to the blood supply of the\nmother, the embryo has an abundant and continuous supply of nutrients. The embryo can\nthus be nurtured to a relatively large size at birth. Most placental sharks produce broods of\ntwo to a dozen, with a few exceptional pelagic species producing 20 to 40 young. Smooth\ndogfishes, requiem sharks, and hammerheads are all viviparous sharks.\nIn spite of the diversity of adaptations, sharks generally have a low reproductive\npotential. Most species of sharks have gestation periods and ovarian cycles that each last\nabout a year. These two cycles may or may not run concurrently. In most of the larger\ncarcharhinid sharks, the cycles follow sequentially. Most of these species reproduce only\nonce every two years. In other species, such as hammerheads and sharpnose sharks, the\novarian cycle and the gestation periods run concurrently. Females carry developing\nembryos and developing eggs at the same time; these species reproduce yearly. Other\nspecies have even longer gestation periods. The spiny dogfish has a gestation period of\nabout 24 months, the longest known of any living vertebrate.\nAdults usually congregate in specific areas to mate and females travel to specific\nnursery areas to pup. These nurseries are discrete geographic areas, usually in waters\nshallower than those inhabited by the adults. Frequently the nursery areas are in highly\nproductive coastal or estuarine waters where abundant small fishes and crustaceans provide\nfood for the growing pups. These areas also may have fewer large predators, thus enhancing\nthe chances of survival of the young sharks. In temperate zones, the young leave the nursery\nwith the onset of winter; in tropical areas, young sharks may stay in the nursery area for a\nfew years.\nShark habitat can be described in four broad categories: 1) coastal, 2) pelagic, 3) coastal-\npelagic, and 4) deep-dwelling. Coastal species inhabit estuaries, the nearshore and waters of\nthe continental shelves, e.g., blacktip, finetooth, bull, lemon, and sharpnose sharks (which are\nthought to enter wetland tidal creeks). Pelagic species, on the other hand, range widely in the\nupper zones of the oceans, often traveling over entire ocean basins. Examples include mako,\nblue, and oceanic whitetip sharks. Coastal-pelagic species are intermediate in that they occur\nboth inshore and beyond the continental shelves, but have not demonstrated mid-ocean or\ntransoceanic movements. Sandbar, scalloped hammerhead, and dusky sharks are examples of\ncoastal-pelagic species. Deep-dwelling species, e.g., most cat sharks and gulper sharks,\ninhabit the dark, cold waters of the continental slopes and deeper waters of the ocean basins.\nFor additional information on the life history and habitat of each shark species in the\nmanagement unit, see Chapter 6, HMS Essential Fish Habitat Provisions.\nSeventy-three species of sharks are known to inhabit the waters along the U.S. Atlantic\ncoast, including the Gulf of Mexico and the waters around Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 52","Islands. Seventy-two species are managed under this FMP; spiny dogfish also occur along\nthe U.S. coast, however management for this species is under the joint authority of the New\nEngland and Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Councils (see Chapter 1). Based on a\ncombination of ecology and fishery dynamics the sharks in the management unit have been\ndivided into five species groups for management: 1) large coastal species, 2) small coastal\nspecies, 3) pelagic species, 4) prohibited species, and 5) deepwater/other species (see\nChapter 1 and Section 3.4.2.3.1 for the classification of species.)\n2.4.1.1 Large Coastal Sharks\nThe most recent Shark Evaluation Workshop (SEW) for the species included in the\nlarge coastal sharks (LCS) management unit was held in June 1998 (for Executive\nSummary, see Appendix 4). All known sources of mortality were accounted for,\nincluding dead discards and state landings after federal closures. Through this final\nFMP and its implementing regulations, dead discards and state landings after federal\nseasons are counted against federal quotas. The 1998 SEW presented updated catch\nand catch rate information (Tables 2.30, 2.31, 2.32, 2.33 and Figure 2.3), the results of\nseveral population modeling papers, an analysis of the effectiveness of the recreational\nretention limits, several studies delineating shark nursery and pupping grounds, and\ndata on shark catches and species composition in Mexican fisheries. As in previous\nSEWs, several population modeling approaches were used due to the uncertainties in\nthe data and because the models had various strengths and weaknesses such that all\nprovide useful information. The 1998 SEW attempted to integrate several population\nmodeling approaches, including demographic methods, catch rate data, and production\nmodeling within a Bayesian framework.\nDue to concerns that the catch series for large coastal sharks from the mid 1980s to\nthe early 1990s substantially underestimates mortality from the commercial fishery, the\n1998 SEW conducted \"baseline catch\" series (unadjusted reported catches) as well as\n\"alternative catch\" series analyses to assess the sensitivity of the population models to\nchanges in the catch series. Additionally, due to concerns that management of species\naggregates can result in excessive regulation on some species and excessive risk of\noverfishing on others, the 1998 SEW developed and analyzed both the baseline and\nalternative catch histories of the two primary commercial and recreational species,\nsandbar and blacktip sharks, separately. Sandbar shark catches did not include an\nestimate of Mexican catches because sandbar sharks comprise only 0.6 percent of\nlandings (by number) in Mexican artisanal fisheries, which are thought to account for\n80 percent of shark production in the Mexican Gulf, and because only seven percent of\nall tagged sandbar shark returns are from Mexico (Castillo and Marquez, 1996; Bonfil,\n1997; Castillo et al., 1998), suggesting that these landings are not a major source of\nmortality. Both the baseline and alternative catch series for blacktip sharks included\nestimated Mexican catches due to the belief that blacktip sharks from the western\nGulf of Mexico are caught in both Mexican and U.S. waters (blacktip sharks comprise\n11 percent of shark landings in Mexican artisanal fisheries, see Castillo et al., 1998).\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 53","When large coastal shark were considered as an aggregate, the results were\nconsiderably more pessimistic than when the analyses considered sandbar and blacktip\nsharks separately. The mean estimates for large coastal shark indicate a slowing of the\ndecrease in stock size in recent years; whereas, the means for sandbar sharks show\nstabilization and perhaps an increase in recent years. Variability in the blacktip shark\nresults dominates any signal from these analyses. The alternative catch analyses of the\nlarge coastal and blacktip sharks were not substantially different from the baseline\nresults; however, the alternative catch analyses of the sandbar shark resulted in the most\noptimistic projection with a 50 percent probability that sandbar sharks could rebuild to\nmaximum sustainable yield within ten years under 1997 quota levels. However, the\n1998 SEW Report states \"[r]ecovery to MSY is likely to be a lengthy process under the\nbest of circumstances, and it is unlikely that full recovery of the resource to MSY stock\nlevel could occur within a decade under any catch scenario\" (p. 30).\nIn the analysis of the catch rate series, the SEW found that for large coastal sharks\nduring the period 1993 to 1997, three of seven catch rate indices exhibit negative slopes\n(two of which are statistically significant) and four indices exhibit positive slopes (one\nof which is statistically significant). The largest annual rate of increase from these\nindices during this period was 17 percent, while the largest decrease was 29 percent\n(Table 2.33).\nFor the large coastal sharks baseline catch series, results of the Bayesian model\nindicate that: the stock size had continuously declined from about 8.9 million fish in\n1974 to about 1.4 million fish in 1998; the maximum sustainable catch (MSC) was\n149,063 fish; the stock size in 1998 was only about 15 percent of carrying capacity or\n30 percent of maximum sustainable yield levels; the landings in 1997 were about\n2.2 times that which would produce maximum sustainable catch; and the 1997 fishing\nmortality rate was over six times higher than that which would produce maximum\nsustainable yield (Table 2.34). Projections indicate that the status quo policy (50 percent\nreduction in 1995 quota) would not allow recovery of the stock (Nfin/K = 0.01 after ten,\n20, and 30 years), with negligible probability that stock size after ten, 20, and 30 years\nwould be larger than the 1998 stock size. The zero-landings policy indicated that the\nstock would reach the maximum sustainable yield level (Nfin/K = 0.5) only after 30\nyears, with an associated probability of stock size after 30 years being larger than the\nmaximum sustainable yield level (Nfin greater than 0.5K) of 46 percent (see Chapter 3).\nFor the large coastal sharks alternative catch series, results indicate that the stock\nsize had continuously declined from about 11.3 million fish in 1974 to about 2.1 million\nfish in 1998; maximum sustainable catch was 142,766 fish; the stock size in 1998 was\nonly about 18 percent of carrying capacity or 36 percent of maximum sustainable yield\nlevels; the landings in 1997 were about 2.3 times that which would produce maximum\nsustainable catch; and the 1997 fishing mortality rate was over six times higher than that\nwhich would produce maximum sustainable yield (Table 2.34). Predictions under this\nscenario incorporating expanded landings did not differ much from the baseline catch\nseries scenario. In addition to the zero-landings policy, which indicated that the stock\nwould almost reach the maximum sustainable yield level (Nfin/K = = 0.47) only after 30\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 54","years, the ten percent of 1995 quota policy also showed a slowly recovering trajectory,\nwith stock size as a proportion of K increasing from 0.22 after ten years, to 0.27 after\n20 years, and to 0.34 after 30 years (see Chapter 3).\nTable 2.30\nEstimates of total landings and dead discards for large coastal sharks (numbers of fish in\nthousands). (1998 SEW Report)\nColumn 1\nColumn 2\nColumn 3\nColumn 4\nColumn 5\nColumn 6\nCommercial\nLongline\nRecreational\nUnreported\nCoastal\nYear\nLandings\nDiscards\nHarvest\nLandings\nDiscards\nTotal\n1981\n16.2\n0.9\n265.0\n282.1\n1982\n16.2\n0.9\n413.9\n431.0\n1983\n17.5\n0.9\n746.6\n765.0\n1984\n23.9\n1.3\n254.6\n279.8\n1985\n22.2\n1.2\n366.1\n389.6\n1986\n54.0\n2.9\n426.1\n24.9\n508.0\n1987\n104.7\n9.7\n314.4\n70.3\n499.0\n1988\n274.6\n11.4\n300.6\n113.3\n699.9\n1989\n351.0\n10.5\n221.1\n96.3\n678.8\n1990\n267.5\n8.0\n213.2\n52.1\n540.8\n1991\n200.2\n7.5\n293.3\n11.3\n512.3\n1992\n215.2\n20.9\n304.9\n541.1\n1993\n169.4\n7.3\n249.0\n17.6\n443.3\n1994\n228.0\n8.8\n160.9\n22.8\n420.5\n1995\n222.4\n6.1\n183.4\n22.2\n434.1\n1996\n164.5\n5.7\n184.5\n16.4\n371.1\n1997\n98.4\n5.6\n161.9\n9.8\n275.7\nColumn 1, commercial landings - These data are the landings reported under the established NMFS cooperative statistics program. (See\nPoffenberger, 1998, for a description of this data collection program.) The data are collected in landed or dressed weight. Various sources\nof weight per fish estimates were used to convert pounds to numbers of fish. For the period 1981 through 1985, a generic factor of 45 lbs\ndressed weight per fish was used. For 1986 through 1991, an average weight for all species was used. These averages are the ones that\nwere used in the 1992 assessment. For 1992 and 1993, average weights for coastal species observed in longline catches were used in\nPoffenberger, 1998, but the group felt that these weights were too high to apply to fish caught nearer shore in the directed large coastal\nfishery. Therefore, a weight of 40 lbs per fish was used for these two years. For 1994 through 1997, predicted weights from lengths based\non the observer program (Branstetter and Burgess, 1997) and data from the pelagic longline database were used.\nColumn 2, pelagic longline discards The data for this column are from the analyses of the discards by pelagic longline vessels (see\nCramer, 1996). The estimates prior to 1987 are calculated using the average ratio of the discards to commercial landings for the data for\n1987 through 1992 (discards as a fraction of combined landings and discards averaged 5.12% over this period). A fraction of 5.12% was\nalso assumed for the 1996 value since data to support a new estimate for 1996 are not yet available.\nColumn 3, recreational harvest - These data are reproduced from Scott et al., 1996, and include estimated harvest from the NMFS\nMRFSS, headboat and charterboat surveys and the Texas Parks and Wildlife recreational creel survey. The estimate for 1996 also included\nharvest from the same three sources (described below).\nColumn 4, unreported landings - These data are from a single source, which owned a fleet of vessels that fished in the Gulf of Mexico and\noff the coast of North Carolina. The estimate for 1988 was determined from company landings records. The estimates for other years were\nprorated based on the 1988 landings record and financial statements indexing income from shark fishing (Hudson, 1998). The Working\nGroup did not have any way of determining the amount, if any, of these landings that were included. Therefore, the Working Group made\nthe assumption that none of the landings were included and kept these data separate, listing them as unreported. The implicit assumption in\ndoing this is that the landings were off-loaded in Alabama docks, but not sold to Alabama dealers.\nColumn 5, discards by coastal fishery - These data are from the Gulf and South Atlantic Fisheries Development Foundation/University of\nFlorida observer program (GSAFDF, 1996) and show that slightly more than 10% of large coastal species were discarded by the directed\nfishery in 1994 and 1995. The calculated percentages for 1994 and 1995 were averaged and applied to the recorded landings for 1993 to\ngive an estimate of the discards in 1993. A 10% discard fraction was also assumed for 1996. The discarded species are non-marketable\nanimals that are included in the large coastal management unit.\nColumn 6, total The numbers in this column are the sum of columns 1-5\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 55","Modifications to estimates of total landings and dead discards for large coastal sharks\nTable 2.31\n(numbers of fish in thousands), to evaluate the sensitivity of assessment models using\nlandings data. Modifications from Table 2.30 are shown in italics. (1998 SEW Report)\nColumn 5\nColumn 6\nColumn 1\nColumn 2\nColumn 3\nColumn 4\nCommercial\nLongline\nRecreational\nUnreported\nCoastal\nDiscards\nTotal\nYear\nLandings\nDiscards\nHarvest\nLandings\n299.3\n1981\n24.3\n10.0\n265.0\n1982\n24.3\n10.0\n413.9\n448.2\n360.8\n1983\n26.2\n10.0\n324.6\n1984\n35.8\n10.0\n254.6\n300.4\n1985\n33.3\n10.0\n366.1\n409.4\n603.8\n1986\n108.0\n10.0\n426.1\n24.9\n1987\n209.4\n9.7\n314.4\n70.3\n499.0\n974.5\n1988\n549.2\n11.4\n300.6\n113.3\n1989\n702.0\n10.5\n221.1\n96.3\n1,029.9\n808.3\n1990\n535.0\n8.0\n213.2\n52.1\n1991\n400.4\n7.5\n293.3\n11.3\n712.5\n1992\n430.4\n20.9\n304.9\n756.2\n25.4\n535.8\n1993\n254.1\n7.3\n249.0\n22.8\n420.5\n1994\n228.0\n8.8\n160.9\n22.2\n434.1\n1995\n222.4\n6.1\n183.4\n16.4\n1996\n164.5\n5.7\n184.5\n371.1\n9.8\n275.7\n1997\n98.4\n5.6\n161.9\nColumn 1 - During the period 1981-1985, commercial landings were assumed under reported by 50% and thus the values\nin the baseline catch series table were multiplied by 1.5. For the period 1986-1992, commercial landings were assumed to\nbe under reported by 100% and thus the values in the baseline catch series table were multiplied by 2. For 1993, the\nlandings made prior to the mid-year implementation of the FMP were assumed under reported by 100% and thus the values\nin the baseline catch series table were multiplied by 1.5.\nColumn 2 For the period 1981-1986, longline dead discards were assumed to equal 10,000 fish per year.\nColumn 3 The 1983 recreational harvest estimate was assumed to be the geometric mean value of the 1982 and 1984\nestimates, although there is no obvious statistical or sampling theoretical reason to consider the 1993 harvest estimate less\naccurate than the neighboring years estimates.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 56","Table 2.32\nEstimated landings of Large Coastal Sharks in commercial and recreational fisheries for\n1996 and 1997. Note: landings of fins are included in the commercial estimate.\n(Scott et al., 1998)\nCommercial Landings\nRecreational Harvest\nSpecies\n(in pounds, dressed weight)\n(in numbers of fish)\n1996\n1997\n1996\n1997\nBignose\n41,428\n2,132\nBlacktip\n1,703,413\n1,503,356\n78,010\n68,284\nBull\n76,052\n40,247\n9,670\n1,254\nDusky\n270,751\n73,250\n14,732\n13,278\nGreat hammerhead\n3,197\n379\nHammerhead\n172,068\n62,955\n1,307\n618\nLemon\n41,872\n20,595\n5,935\n2,354\nNight\n6,421\n57\n379\n90\nNurse\n873\n8,864\n5,968\n7,859\nReef\n1,639\n3,548\n19\n10\nSand tiger\n7,433\n7,920\n321\n1,466\nSandbar\n1,609,922\n863,574\n35,180\n40,929\nScalloped hammerhead\n723\n3,320\nSilky\n42,070\n13,920\n371\n240\nSmooth hammerhead\n2,538\n2,176\nSpinner\n55,171\n6,039\n6,577\n3,342\nTiger\n45,845\n5,312\n22\n70\nWhale\n3,598\nWhite\n1,862\n1,315\nUnclassified\n1,185,494\n510,512\n19,611\n16,298\nTOTAL\n5,262,314\n3,127,223\n184,560\n161,967\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 57","Table 2.33 Recent (1993 - 1997 and 1990 - 1997) trends in catch rates. Slopes and standard deviations (SD) of the\nslopes are expressed relative to the mean of the data points (n) in the slope calculation. Slopes that are\nsignificantly different from zero at a 0.1 probability level are marked with an *. (1998 SEW Report)\n1993 1997 Data\n1990 1997 Data\nIndex\nslope\nSD\nslope\nSD\nn\nn\nLarge Coastal Sharks\nShark Observer\n4\n0.1367*\n0.0391\n4\n0.1367*\n0.0391\nVirginia LL\n4\n0.0975\n0.1005\n7\n0.1251*\n0.0436\nLPS\n5\n0.1753\n0.1488\n8\n-0.0969\n0.0867\nCharterboat\n3\n0.0470\n0.0373\n6\n-0.0095\n0.0241\nPelagic Logs\n5\n-0.2160*\n0.0628\n8\n-0.1821*\n0.0203\nLate Rec Surveys\n5\n-0.1163*\n0.0515\n5\n-0.1163*\n0.0515\nNMFS LL SE\n3\n-0.2870\n0.3999\n3\n-0.2870\n0.3999\nEarly Rec Surveys\n3\n0.1563*\n0.0063\n--\nNMFS LL NE\n3\n0.0161\n0.2057\n--\nTable 2.34 Expected posterior values of parameters and time series for large coastals from the Bayesian production\nmodel analyses. Note: K (carrying capacity), N (abundance), MSC (maximum sustainable catch) and C\n1975 - 1980 (landings in 1975 - 1980) are in thousands of sharks.\nLarge Coastals Baseline Catch Series\nLarge Coastals Alternative Catch Series\nParameter\nExpected Value\nCV\nExpected Value\nCV\nK\n9,535.00\n0.17\n11,754.00\n0.16\n0.07\n0.50\n0.05\n0.50\nr\nC1975-80\n284.00\n0.39\n327.00\n0.42\nMSC\n149.00\n0.38\n143.00\n0.40\nN(98)\n1,385.00\n0.20\n2,081.00\n0.22\nN(98)/K\n0.15\n0.24\n0.18\n0.23\nN(75)\n8,907.00\n0.16\n11,309.00\n0.14\nN(98)/N(75)\n0.16\n0.22\n0.18\n0.19\nLarge Coastals Baseline Catch Series\nLarge Coastals Alternative Catch Series\nF\nYear\nN\nN/K\nN/NMSY\nF/FM\nF\nYear\nN\nN/K\nN/NMS\nF/FMSY\n1974\n8,927\n0.95\n1.90\n1.12\n0.03\n1974\n11,299\n0.98\n1.96\n1.38\n0.03\n1975\n8,671\n0.92\n1.84\n1.15\n0.03\n1975\n10,984\n0.95\n1.90\n1.42\n0.03\n1976\n8,430\n0.90\n1.79\n1.19\n0.03\n1976\n10,685\n0.93\n1.86\n1.46\n0.03\n1.51\n0.03\n1977\n8,202\n0.87\n1.74\n1.23\n0.04\n1977\n10,399\n0.90\n1.80\n0.03\n1978\n7,985\n0.85\n1.70\n1.26\n0.04\n1978\n10,125\n0.88\n1.76\n1.56\n1979\n7,777\n0.83\n1.65\n1.30\n0.04\n1979\n9,862\n0.86\n1.72\n1.60\n0.03\n0.83\n1.66\n1.65\n0.03\n1980\n7,577\n0.81\n1.61\n1.34\n0.04\n1980\n9,607\n1.62\n1.55\n0.03\n1981\n7,387\n0.79\n1.57\n1.35\n0.04\n1981\n9,374\n0.81\n0.05\n1982\n7,130\n0.76\n1.52\n2.14\n0.06\n1982\n9,087\n0.79\n1.58\n2.39\n1983\n6,640\n0.71\n1.41\n4.08\n0.12\n1983\n8,780\n0.76\n1.52\n1.99\n0.04\n1984\n6,250\n0.66\n1.33\n1.59\n0.05\n1984\n8,553\n0.74\n1.48\n1.70\n0.04\n0.72\n1.44\n2.39\n0.05\n1985\n6,047\n0.64\n1.28\n2.28\n0.07\n1985\n8,307\n3.70\n0.08\n1986\n5,733\n0.61\n1.22\n3.14\n0.09\n1986\n7,915\n0.69\n1.38\n0.07\n1987\n5,371\n0.57\n1.14\n3.29\n0.09\n1987\n7,489\n0.65\n1.30\n3.23\n1988\n6,876\n0.60\n1.20\n6.87\n0.14\n1988\n4,913\n0.52\n1.04\n5.04\n0.15\n0.52\n1.04\n8.32\n0.17\n1989\n4,370\n0.46\n0.93\n5.51\n0.16\n1989\n6,010\n0.90\n7.51\n0.16\n1990\n3,906\n0.41\n0.83\n4.91\n0.14\n1990\n5,236\n0.45\n0.16\n1991\n3,520\n0.37\n0.75\n5.17\n0.15\n1991\n4,615\n0.40\n0.80\n7.52\n1992\n3,126\n0.33\n0.66\n6.16\n0.18\n1992\n4,010\n0.35\n0.70\n9.21\n0.19\n1993\n2,761\n3,492\n0.30\n0.60\n7.52\n0.16\n0.29\n0.59\n5.72\n0.17\n1993\n0.27\n0.54\n6.60\n0.14\n1994\n2,446\n0.26\n0.52\n6.14\n0.18\n1994\n3,131\n7.61\n0.16\n1995\n2,125\n0.23\n0.45\n7.32\n0.21\n1995\n2,811\n0.24\n0.48\n0.22\n0.44\n7.33\n0.15\n1996\n1,820\n0.19\n0.39\n7.36\n0.21\n1996\n2,509\n2,280\n0.20\n0.40\n6.03\n0.13\n1997\n1,585\n0.17\n0.34\n6.34\n0.18\n1997\n1998\n2,091\n0.18\n0.36\n1998\n1,387\n0.15\n0.29\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 58","98\n97\n96\nSELL\n95\nNELL\n94\n93\nNELL\n92\nPLL\n91\n90\nShk Obs.\nMRFSS 2\n0\n89\n88\n87\nYear\nYear\nMRFSS2\n86\nMRFSS 1\n85\n84\n83\nMRFSS 1\n82\nPLL\n81\nCatch per unit effort series for large coastal sharks. Note change in scale. (1998 SEW Report)\n80\nVALL\nVALL\n79\n78\n78\n77\n77\nB) Sandbar\n76\nD) Dusky\n76\n75\n75\n74\n74\n6\n5\n4\n3\n2\n1\n0\n7\n6\n5\n4\n3\n2\n1\n0\n98\n97\n70\n65\n60\n55\n50\n45\n40\n35\n30\n25\n20\n15\n10\n5\n0\n96\n98\n95\n97\nLPS\n96\n94\nNELL\n95\n93\nMRFSS I o MRFSS 2\n94\n92\n93\n91\nShk. Obs.\n92\n90\n91\n89\n90\n88\n89\nMRFSS2\n87\n88\nYear\n86\n87\nPel IL\nYear\n85\n86\n85\n84\nMRFSS 1\n84\n83\nVALL\n83\n82\n82\n81\n81\n80\nPLL\nShark Cbs.\n80\n79\nA) Large Coastal Sharks\n79\n78\n78\n77\n77\n9 Blacktip\n76\n76\nFigure 2.3\n75\n75\n74\n74\n14\n25\n20\n15\n10\n13\n12\n10\n5\n0\n11\n9\n8\n7\n6\n5\n4\n3\n2\n1\n0","Sandbar Sharks\nIn the analysis of the catch rate series for sandbar sharks, during the period 1993 to\n1997, four of five catch rate indices exhibit positive slopes (one of which is statistically\nsignificant) and only one index exhibited a negative slope (which was not statistically\nsignificant). The largest annual rate of increase from these indices during this period\nwas 37 percent, while the only index showing a decrease, decreased at one percent\nannually (Table 2.35).\nFor the sandbar shark baseline catch series (Table 2.36), results of the Bayesian\nmodel indicate that the stock size had continuously declined from about 3.3 million fish\nin 1974 to about 924,000 fish in 1998; maximum sustainable catch was 71,264 fish; the\nstock size in 1998 was only about 29 percent of carrying capacity or 58 percent of\nmaximum sustainable yield levels; the landings in 1997 were about 1.3 times that\nwhich would produce maximum sustainable catch; and the 1997 fishing mortality rate\nwas about 2.7 times higher than that which would produce maximum sustainable yield\n(Table 2.38). Projections indicated that the status quo policy would stabilize the stock\nlevel, but would not allow recovery (Nfin/K = 0.3 after ten years, and 0.31 after 20 and\n30 years), with a probability of 41 percent that the stock size after ten, 20, and 30 years\nwould be larger than the 1998 stock size. All the other options predicted faster stock\nrecovery, but only the zero-landings policy allowed the stock to almost reach the\nmaximum sustainable yield level after ten years. With the ten percent and 20 percent\nof 1995 landings options, maximum sustainable yield could be reached after 20 years,\nand after 30 years, maximum sustainable yield could be reached with the ten percent,\n20 percent, and 30 percent of 1995 landings options (see Chapter 3).\nFor the sandbar shark alternative catch series (Table 2.37), projections were by far\nthe most optimistic. Results indicate that the stock size had continuously declined from\nabout three million fish in 1974 to about 941,000 fish in 1998; maximum sustainable\ncatch was 109,043 fish; the stock size in 1998 was only about 35 percent of carrying\ncapacity or 70 percent of maximum sustainable yield levels; the landings in 1997 were\nabout 0.85 times lower than that which would produce maximum sustainable catch; and\nthe 1997 fishing mortality rate was about 1.6 times higher than that which would\nproduce maximum sustainable yield (Table 2.38). All landings policies allowed stock\nrecovery to the level producing maximum sustainable yield after only ten years. The\nstatus quo policy had a 50 percent probability that stock size would be larger than the\nmaximum sustainable yield level after ten years, and a 74 percent probability that the\nstock size would be larger than the 1998 stock size after ten years (see Chapter 3).\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 60","Table 2.35\nRecent (1993 - 1997 and 1990 - 1997) trends in catch rates. Slopes and standard deviations (SD) of\nthe slopes are expressed relative to the mean of the data points (n) in the slope calculation. Slopes\nthat are significantly different from zero at a 0.1 probability level are marked with an *\n(1998\nSEW\nReport)\n1993 - 1997 Data\n1990 - 1997 Data\nIndex\nslope\nSD\nslope\nSD\nn\nn\nSandbar\nVirginia LL\n4\n0.1051\n0.0696\n7\n0.1876*\n0.0518\nPelagic Logs\n4\n0.1995\n0.1584\n4\n0.1995\n0.1584\nLate Rec Surveys\n5\n0.1347\n0.0771\n5\n0.1347\n0.0771\nNMFS LL SE\n3\n-0.0101\n0.3082\n3\n-0.0101\n0.3082\nShark Observer\n4\n0.3654*\n0.0940\n4\n0.3654*\n0.0940\nEarly Rec Surveys\n3\n-0.2917\n0.2165\n--\nNMFS LL NE\n3\n0.1010\n0.2348\n--\nTable 2.36\nEstimates of the annual baseline landings of sandbar sharks based on area-gear definitions described\nin the NMFS 1996 SEW Report. (1998 SEW Report)\nCommercial\nAverage\nLanded Wt./\nRecreational\nRec+Com\nUnreported\nTotal\nYear\nLandings\nWt.\nAve. Wt.\nHarvest\n(lb)\n(lb)\n(lb)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n1986\n796,509\n35.9\n22,187\n123,661\n145,848\n6,225\n152,073\n1987\n2,285,644\n35.9\n63,667\n32,551\n96,218\n17,575\n113,793\n1988\n2,737,938\n35.9\n76,266\n64,792\n141,058\n56,650\n197,708\n1989\n4,215,657\n35.9\n117,428\n27,415\n144,843\n48,150\n192,993\n1990\n4,026,470\n35.9\n112,158\n58,811\n170,969\n26,050\n197,019\n1991\n3,292,594\n35.9\n91,716\n36,794\n128,510\n5,650\n134,160\n1992\n3,470,449\n35.9\n96,671\n36,294\n132,965\n132,965\n1993\n2,483,235\n35.9\n69,171\n26,607\n95,778\n95,778\n1994\n4,691,470\n35.4\n132,527\n14,973\n147,500\n147,500\n1995\n3,012,065\n36.4\n82,749\n24,869\n107,618\n107,618\n1996\n2,004,759\n31.3\n64,050\n35,180\n99,230\n99,230\n1997\n982,100\n30.7\n31,990\n40,929\n72,919\n72,919\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 61","Estimates of the annual alternative landings of sandbar sharks based on area-gear definitions\nTable 2.37\ndescribed in NMFS, 1996. Alternative sandbar catch series follow the same logic as the alternative\nlarge coastal catch series; differences from the baseline are in italics. (1998 SEW Report)\nYear\nCommercial\nAverage\nLanded Wt./\nRecreational\nRec+Com\nUnreported\nTotal\nLandings\nWt.\nAve. Wt.\nHarvest\n(lb)\n(lb)\n(lb)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n1986\n1,593,018\n35.9\n44,374\n123,661\n168,035\n6,225\n174,280\n1987\n4,571,288\n35.9\n127,334\n32,551\n159,885\n17,575\n177,460\n1988\n5,475,876\n35.9\n152,531\n64,792\n217,323\n56,650\n273,973\n1989\n8,431,314\n35.9\n234,855\n27,415\n262,270\n48,150\n310,420\n1990\n8,052,940\n35.9\n224,316\n58,811\n283,127\n26,050\n309,177\n1991\n6,585,188\n35.9\n183,431\n36,794\n220,225\n5,650\n225,875\n1992\n6,940,898\n35.9\n193,340\n36,294\n229,634\n229,634\n1993\n3,724,852\n35.9\n103,756\n26,607\n130,363\n130,363\n1994\n4,691,470\n35.4\n132,527\n14,973\n147,500\n147,500\n1995\n3,012,065\n36.4\n82,749\n24,869\n107,618\n107,618\n1996\n2,004,759\n31.3\n64,050\n35,180\n99,230\n99,230\n1997\n982,100\n30.7\n31,990\n40,929\n72,919\n72,919\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 62","Table 2.38\nExpected posterior values of parameters and time series for sandbar from the Bayesian\nproduction model analyses. Note: K (carrying capacity), N (abundance), MSC (maximum\nsustainable catch) and C 1975 - 1980 (landings in 1975 - 1980) are in thousands of sharks.\n(1998 SEW Report)\nSandbar Baseline Catch Series\nSandbar Alternative Catch Series\nParameter\nExpected Value\nCV\nExpected Value\nCV\nK\n3,265.00\n0.32\n2,870.00\n0.42\n0.10\n0.70\nr\n0.21\n0.79\nC1975-80\n170.00\n0.54\n126.00\n0.56\nMSC\n71.00\n0.55\n109.00\n0.41\nN(98)\n924.00\n0.45\n941.00\n0.47\nN(98)/K\n0.29\n0.39\n0.35\n0.37\nN(75)\n3,313.00\n0.33\n2,945.00\n0.45\nN(98)/N(75)\n0.29\n0.41\n0.35\n0,41\nSandbar Baseline Catch Series\nSandbar Alternative Catch Series\nYear\nN\nN/K\nN/N...\nF/F\nF\nYear\nN\nN/K\nN/N...\nF/F\nF\n1974\n3,311\n1.02\n2.05\n1.48\n0.05\n1974\n2,960\n1.03\n2.06\n0.74\n0.04\n1975\n3,143\n0.97\n1.95\n1.56\n0.05\n1975\n2,830\n0.99\n1.97\n0.77\n0.04\n1976\n2,989\n0.93\n1.85\n1.65\n0.06\n1976\n2,720\n0.95\n1.90\n0.81\n0.05\n1977\n2,847\n0.88\n1.77\n1.75\n0.06\n1977\n2,630\n0.92\n1.84\n0.84\n0.05\n1978\n2,713\n0.84\n1.69\n1.85\n0.06\n1978\n2,540\n0.89\n1.79\n0.87\n0.05\n1979\n2,586\n0.81\n1.61\n1.95\n0.07\n1979\n2,470\n0.87\n1.74\n0.90\n0.05\n1980\n2,465\n0.77\n1.54\n2.06\n0.07\n1980\n2,400\n0.85\n1.70\n0.93\n0.05\n1981\n2,348\n0.74\n1.48\n2.19\n0.08\n1981\n2,330\n0.83\n1.66\n0.96\n0.05\n1982\n2,234\n0.71\n1.41\n2.33\n0.08\n1982\n2,270\n0.81\n1.62\n0.99\n0.06\n1983\n2,123\n0.67\n1.35\n2.49\n0.09\n1983\n2,210\n0.79\n1.59\n1.02\n0.06\n1984\n2,013\n0.64\n1.28\n2.69\n0.09\n1984\n2,150\n0.78\n1.56\n1.06\n0.06\n1985\n1,904\n0.61\n1.22\n2.95\n0.10\n1985\n2,100\n0.76\n1.53\n1.09\n0.06\n1986\n1,804\n0.58\n1.16\n2.70\n0.09\n1986\n2,030\n0.74\n1.47\n1.59\n0.09\n1987\n1,724\n0.56\n1.11\n2.09\n0.07\n1987\n1,940\n0.70\n1.40\n1.81\n0.10\n1988\n1,640\n0.53\n1.05\n3.85\n0.13\n1988\n1,800\n0.65\n1.29\n3.04\n0.18\n1989\n1,509\n0.48\n0.96\n4.11\n0.14\n1989\n1,600\n0.57\n1.14\n3.94\n0.23\n1990\n1,378\n0.41\n0.88\n4.64\n0.16\n1990\n1,390\n0.49\n0.98\n4.63\n0.27\n1991\n1,276\n0.40\n0.81\n3.44\n0.12\n1991\n1,230\n0.43\n0.86\n3.92\n0.23\n1992\n1,204\n0.38\n0.76\n3.63\n0.13\n1992\n1,100\n0.38\n0.77\n4.56\n0.26\n1993\n1,150\n0.36\n0.73\n2.75\n0.09\n1993\n1,020\n0.36\n0.71\n2.82\n0.16\n1994\n1,087\n0.34\n0.69\n4.15\n0.16\n1994\n977\n0.34\n0.68\n3.31\n0.19\n1995\n1,018\n0.32\n0.64\n3.57\n0.12\n1995\n943\n0.33\n0.67\n2.48\n0.14\n1996\n971\n0.31\n0.61\n3.50\n0.12\n1996\n933\n0.34\n0.67\n2.27\n0.13\n1997\n941\n0.30\n0.59\n2.70\n0.09\n1997\n940\n0.34\n0.69\n1.62\n0.09\n1998\n923\n0.29\n0.58\n1998\n962\n0.36\n0.72\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 63","Blacktip Sharks\nIn the analysis of the catch rate series for blacktip sharks during the period 1993 to\n1997, two of five catch rate indices exhibited positive slopes (one of which was\nstatistically significant) and three of five indices exhibited a negative slope (one of\nwhich was statistically significant). The annual rate of change from these indices\nduring this period ranged from 35 percent to 19 percent (Table 2.39).\nFor the blacktip shark baseline catch series (Table 2.40), results of the Bayesian\nmodel indicate that the stock size had continuously declined from about 5.1 million fish\nin 1974 to about 1.4 million fish in 1998; maximum sustainable catch was 136,727 fish;\nthe stock size in 1998 was only about 25 percent of carrying capacity or 50 percent of\nmaximum sustainable yield levels; the landings in 1997 were about 1.8 times that\nwhich would produce maximum sustainable catch; and the 1997 fishing mortality rate\nwas about 3.5 times higher than that which would produce maximum sustainable yield\n(Table 2.42). Projections indicated that the status quo policy would not allow recovery\nof the blacktip shark stock (Nfin/K = 0.17, 0.14, and 0.13 after ten, 20, and 30 years\nrespectively), with the probability that the stock size after ten, 20, and 30 years would\nbe larger than the 1998 stock size being about 16 percent. The zero-landings policy\nindicated that the stock would reach the maximum sustainable yield level after between\nten and 20 years. The only other policy that would allow for stock recovery after\n20 years was the ten percent of 1995 quota policy (Nfin/K = 0.56). The maximum\nsustainable yield was predicted to be reached with zero landings, and the ten percent\nand 20 percent of 1995 quota policies after 30 years (see Chapter 3).\nFor the blacktip shark alternative catch series (Table 2.41), results indicate that\nthe stock size had continuously declined from about 6.1 million fish in 1974 to about\n1.4 million fish in 1998; maximum sustainable catch was 156,884 fish; the stock size in\n1998 was only about 22 percent of carrying capacity or 44 percent of maximum\nsustainable yield levels; the landings in 1997 were about 1.6 times that which would\nproduce maximum sustainable catch; and the 1997 fishing mortality rate was about\n3.7 times higher than that which would produce maximum sustainable yield (Table\n2.42). Predictions incorporating expanded catch followed the same general pattern as\nthe baseline catch series scenario. Thus, projections indicated that the status quo policy\nwould not allow recovery of the blacktip shark stock (Nfin/K = 0.16, 0.17, and 0.17\nafter ten, 20, and 30 years respectively), with the probability that the stock size after\nten, 20, and 30 years were larger than the 1998 stock size being about 21 percent,\n23 percent, 23 percent, respectively. The zero-landings policy indicated that the stock\nwould reach the maximum sustainable yield level after between ten and 20 years. As\nwith the baseline catch series scenario, the only other policy that would allow for stock\nrecovery after 20 years was the ten percent of 1995 quota policy (Nfin/K = 0.53) and\nmaximum sustainable yield was predicted to be reached with zero landings, and the ten\npercent and 20 percent of 1995 quota policies after 30 years (See Chapter 3).\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 64","Table 2.39\nRecent (1993 - 1997 and 1990 - 1997) trends in catch rates. Slopes and standard deviations (SD) of\nthe slopes are expressed relative to the mean of the data points (n) in the slope calculation. Slopes\nthat are significantly different from zero at a 0.1 probability level are marked with an\n*\n(1998 SEW Report)\n1993 - 1997 Data\n1990 - 1997 Data\nIndex\nslope\nSD\nn\nslope\nn\nSD\nBlacktip\nPelagic Logs\n5\n-0.1920*\n0.0445\n6\n-0.1385*\n0.0387\nLate Rec Surveys\n5\n-0.1277\n0.0662\n5\n-0.1277\n0.0662\nShark Observer\n4\n-0.0856\n0.3799\n4\n-0.0856\n0.3799\nNMFS LL SE\n3\n0.0518\n0.2945\n3\n0.0518\n0.2945\nGulf Reef Logs\n5\n0.3462*\n0.1252\n5\n0.3462*\n0.1252\nEarly Rec Surveys\n3\n0.2285*\n0.0272\n--\nNMFS LL NE\n3\n-0.0667\n0.1734\n--\nTable 2.40\nEstimates of the annual baseline landings of blacktip sharks based on area-gear definitions described\nin NMFS, 1996. (1998 SEW Report)\nYear\nCommercial\nAverage\nLanded Wt./\nRecreational\nRec+Com\nUnreported\nMexico\nTotal\nLandings\nWt.\nAve. Wt.\nHarvest\nsmall fish\n(lb)\n(lb)\n(lb)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n1986\n1,213,040\n20.5\n59,173\n162,403\n221,576\n18,675\n15,642\n255,893\n1987\n1,463,544\n20.5\n71,392\n129,552\n200,944\n52,725\n22,346\n276,015\n1988\n3,300,321\n20.5\n160,991\n139,809\n300,800\n56,650\n29,050\n386,500\n1989\n3,832,421\n20.5\n186,947\n111,363\n298,310\n48,150\n35,754\n382,214\n1990\n2,052,287\n20.5\n100,112\n94,135\n194,247\n26,050\n42,458\n262,755\n1991\n2,744,292\n20.5\n133,868\n150,794\n284,662\n5,650\n49,161\n339,473\n1992\n3,610,218\n20.5\n176,108\n157,659\n333,767\n55,865\n389,632\n1993\n3,086,965\n20.5\n150,584\n109,054\n259,638\n62,569\n322,207\n1994\n3,829,364\n20.0\n191,468\n66,106\n257,574\n62,569\n320,143\n1995\n2,915,797\n20.9\n139,512\n67,046\n206,558\n62,569\n269,127\n1996\n2,121,714\n22.3\n951,44\n78,010\n173,154\n62,569\n235,723\n1997\n1,709,694\n22.6\n75,650\n68,284\n143,934\n62,569\n206,503\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 65","Estimates of the annual alternative landings of blacktip sharks based on area-gear definitions\nTable 2.41\ndescribed in the 1996 NMFS SEW Report. Alternative blacktip catch series follow the same logic\nas the alternative large coastal catch series; differences from the baseline are in italics.\n(1998 SEW Report)\nYear\nCommercial\nAverage\nLanded Wt./\nRecreational\nRec+Com\nUnreported\nMexico\nTotal\nLandings\nWt.\nAve. Wt.\nHarvest\nsmall fish\n(lb)\n(lb)\n(lb)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n1986\n2,426,080\n20.5\n118,345\n162,403\n280,748\n18,675\n15,642\n315,065\n1987\n2,927,088\n20.5\n142,785\n129,552\n272,337\n52,725\n22,346\n347,408\n1988\n6,600,642\n20.5\n321,982\n139,809\n461,792\n56,650\n29,050\n547,492\n1989\n7,664,842\n20.5\n373,895\n111,363\n485,258\n48,150\n35,754\n569,162\n1990\n4,104,574\n20.5\n200,223\n94,135\n294,358\n26,050\n42,458\n362,866\n1991\n5,488,584\n20.5\n267,736\n150,794\n418,530\n5,650\n49,161\n473,341\n1992\n7,220,436\n20.5\n352,216\n157,659\n509,875\n55,865\n565,740\n1993\n4,630,448\n20.5\n225,875\n109,054\n334,929\n62,569\n397,498\n1994\n3,829,364\n20.0\n191,468\n66,106\n257,574\n62,569\n320,143\n1995\n2,915,797\n20.9\n139,512\n67,046\n206,558\n62,569\n269,127\n1996\n2,121,714\n22.3\n95,144\n78,010\n173,154\n62,569\n235,723\n1997\n1,709,694\n22.6\n75,650\n68,284\n143,934\n62,569\n206,503\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 66","Expected posterior values of parameters and time series for blacktip from the Bayesian\nTable 2.42\nproduction model analyses. Note: K (carrying capacity), N (abundance), MSC (maximum\nsustainable catch) and C 1975 - 1985 (landings in 1975 - 1980) are in thousands of sharks.\n(1998 SEW Report)\nBlacktip Baseline Catch Series\nBlacktip Alternative Catch Series\nParameter\nExpected Value\nCV\nExpected Value\nCV\nK\n5,527.00\n0.31\n6,532.00\n0.29\n0.12\n0.70\n0.11\n0.70\nr\nC1975-80\n81.00\n0.37\n235.00\n0.38\nMSC\n137.00\n0.43\n157.00\n0.45\nN(98)\n1,383.00\n0.57\n1,441.00\n0.56\nN(98)/K\n0.25\n0.43\n0.22\n0.40\nN(75)\n5,179.00\n0.31\n6,097.00\n0.28\nN(98)/N(75)\n0.27\n0.47\n0.25\n0.45\nBlacktip Baseline Catch Series\nBlacktip Alternative Catch Series\nYear\nN\nN/K\nN/N...\nF/F\nF\nYear\nN\nN/K\nN/N...\nF/F\nF\n1974\n5,192\n0.96\n1.91\n0.93\n0.05\n1974\n6,130\n0.95\n1.90\n0.94\n0.04\n1975\n4,996\n0.92\n1.84\n0.97\n0.05\n1975\n5,899\n0.91\n1.83\n0.98\n0.04\n1976\n4,820\n0.89\n1.77\n1.01\n0.05\n1976\n5,715\n0.88\n1.77\n1.02\n0.05\n1977\n4,659\n0.86\n1.71\n1.05\n0.05\n1977\n5,548\n0.86\n1.71\n1.05\n0.05\n1978\n4,510\n0.83\n1.66\n1.09\n0.05\n1978\n5,393\n0.83\n1.67\n1.09\n0.05\n1979\n4,371\n0.80\n1.60\n1.12\n0.05\n1979\n5,349\n0.81\n1.62\n1.12\n0.05\n1980\n4,240\n0.78\n1.56\n1.16\n0.06\n1980\n5,113\n0.79\n1.58\n1.16\n0.05\n1981\n4,116\n0.76\n1.51\n1.27\n0.06\n1981\n4,985\n0.77\n1.54\n1.19\n0.05\n1982\n3,997\n0.74\n1.47\n1.24\n0.06\n1982\n4,862\n0.75\n1.50\n1.23\n0.05\n1983\n3,884\n0.71\n1.43\n1.28\n0.06\n1983\n4,745\n0.73\n1.47\n1.26\n0.06\n1984\n3,774\n0.70\n1.39\n1.32\n0.06\n1984\n4,633\n0.72\n1.43\n1.30\n0.06\n1985\n3,667\n0.68\n1.35\n1.37\n0.07\n1985\n4,524\n0.70\n1.40\n1.34\n0.06\n1986\n3,545\n0.66\n1.31\n1.61\n0.08\n1986\n4,393\n0.68\n1.36\n1.59\n0.07\n1987\n3,399\n0.63\n1.26\n1.81\n0.09\n1987\n4,211\n0.65\n1.30\n2.01\n0.09\n1988\n3,191\n0.59\n1.18\n2.70\n0.13\n1988\n3,903\n0.60\n1.21\n3.43\n0.15\n1989\n2,936\n0.54\n1.08\n2.92\n0.14\n1989\n3,493\n0.54\n1.08\n4.02\n0.18\n1990\n2,747\n0.50\n1.01\n2.15\n0.11\n1990\n3,184\n0.49\n0.98\n2.83\n0.13\n1991\n2,577\n0.47\n0.95\n2.97\n0.14\n1991\n2,916\n0.45\n0.89\n4.04\n0.18\n1992\n2,342\n0.43\n0.86\n3.78\n0.18\n1992\n2,541\n0.39\n0.77\n5.64\n0.25\n1993\n2,115\n0.39\n0.77\n3.51\n0.17\n1993\n2,203\n0.33\n0.67\n4.68\n0.21\n1994\n1,916\n0.35\n0.70\n3.91\n0.19\n1994\n1,975\n0.30\n0.60\n4.28\n0.19\n1995\n1,738\n0.32\n0.63\n3.70\n0.18\n1995\n1,804\n0.27\n0.54\n4.02\n0.18\n1996\n3.89\n1,597\n0.29\n0.58\n3.61\n0.18\n1996\n1,667\n0.25\n0.50\n0.17\n1997\n1,481\n0.27\n0.54\n3.52\n0.17\n1997\n1,555\n0.23\n0.47\n3.74\n0.17\n1998\n1,373\n0.25\n0.50\n1998\n1,452\n0.22\n0.44\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 67","2.4.1.2 Small Coastal Sharks\nConcerns have been raised by members of the HMS Advisory Panel and the public\nthat the assessment in the 1993 FMP was overly optimistic in its estimation of small\ncoastal shark (SCS) intrinsic rates of increase and the subsequent levels of fishing\nmortality that this group can withstand, and that the small coastal shark quota which is\nbased on this assessment is too high and should be reduced. NMFS has not conducted\nan evaluation of small coastal shark stock status since the 1993 evaluation, primarily\ndue to the lack of sufficient catch per unit effort time series. Small coastal sharks are\ntargeted in localized fisheries in the southern United States, caught incidentally in other\ncommercial fisheries, and are commonly used for bait. Small coastal sharks are also\ncommonly encountered in recreational fisheries in the southern United States, in coastal\nwaters of the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico.\nSpecies-specific fishery independent catch rate data only exist for Atlantic\nsharpnose and bonnethead sharks. Atlantic sharpnose shark catch rate data, which\ndominates the small coastal shark catch rate information, appear to be relatively stable,\nwith a slightly increasing trend in the early 1990s and a slightly decreasing trend since\n1995 (Figure 2.4). Bonnethead shark catch rate data (one extensive time series) exhibit\nstrongly cyclical and decreasing trends from the early 1970s to the early 1980s, and a\nlow but relatively stable trend since the early 1980s.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 68","Catch per unit effort series for small coastal sharks. (SEW Report, NMFS, 1998)\nFigure 2.4\nA) Small coastal sharks\n6\n5\n4\n3\n2\n0\nI\n1\n2.0\nTILE\n0A.\n0\n72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97\nYear\nSCLL Oregon II\nB) Atlantic Sharpnose\n6\n5\n4\n3\n2\n1\n0\n72\n73\n74\n75\n76\n77\n78\n79\n80\n81\n82\n83\n84\n85\n86\n87\n88\n89\n90\n91\n92\n93\n94\n95\n96\n97\nYear\nLLNE\nOregon II\nVILL\nSCII\nC) Bonnethead\n6\n5\n4\n3\n2\n1\n1\n0\n727374 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 9\nYear\nOregon II\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 69","2.4.1.3 Pelagic Sharks\nNMFS has not evaluated the stock status of pelagic sharks since 1993, primarily due\nto the lack of long-term and large scale (in terms of geographic coverage) time series.\nIn fact, since no estimate of maximum sustainable yield could be calculated in the\noriginal Atlantic Shark FMP, the pelagic quota was based on the mean landings from\n1986 to 1991. Several species within the pelagic shark management unit are trans-\noceanic (e.g., blue, oceanic whitetip, and mako sharks) and are subject to exploitation\nby many nations. In order to conduct a comprehensive stock evaluation for pelagic\nsharks with all relevant catch, landings and catch rate time series, the cooperation of\nmany nations is needed. However, a regional evaluation of porbeagle sharks (and\npotentially shortfin mako sharks) may provide scientifically valid results as the ranges\nand primary fisheries for these species are within the jurisdiction of only a few\ncountries (e.g., Canada and the United States).\nThe available information on catch, landings, and catch rates, while informative of\ngeneral trends, is insufficient to modify current estimates of maximum sustainable yield\nor quota levels for pelagic sharks. In general, catch rate data for the pelagic species\ncombined indicate that the rapid decline seen in the late 1980s has apparently stabilized\nsince 1992 (Figure 2.5). In general, blue, mako, and thresher sharks exhibit decreasing\ncatch rates, although for both blue and thresher sharks the catch rates have increased\nslightly since 1995. However, catch rates for mako sharks from the LPS increased in\n1996 and 1997, contrary to the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries tournament\ncatch per unit effort index data which indicate an 85-percent decline since 1994 (Philip\nCoates, Director, MA DMF, pers. comm.) and anecdotal evidence that the catches of\nshortfin mako sharks were greatly reduced in those years. Catch rates for thresher and\noceanic whitetip sharks exhibit high variability. There is little evidence from the catch\nrate data that supports the need for more restrictive management measures at this time.\nHowever, members of the public have expressed the concern that the fully fished pelagic\nsharks may become overfished if the pelagic longline fishery, which encounters and lands\npelagic sharks incidentally to tuna and swordfish fishing, begins to direct effort on\npelagic sharks in response to declining tuna and swordfish quotas.\nAdditional concerns have been raised by members of the public regarding the\nsusceptibility of porbeagle sharks to overexploitation given the potential for expansion\nin directed fishing effort on pelagic sharks. The porbeagle fishery in the northwest\nAtlantic is a classic example of a boom and bust commercial fishery that ceased to be\ncommercially viable after only a few years. Currently, there is a small directed\nporbeagle fishery, predominantly in New England, as well as a moderate fishery for\nporbeagle sharks in Canada. Landings statistics are under review, but based on\ninformation reported by the Portland Fish Exchange, landings have been as high as\n83 mt dw in recent years. Based on historical catch rates, NMFS has concluded that\nporbeagle sharks should be managed separately from the combined pelagic shark unit\nand carefully monitored to ensure that fishing mortality rates are sustainable.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 70","97\n90\n80\n70\n60\n50\n40\n30\n20\n10\nWeightout\n0\n96\n97\n96\nPLL\n95\nJapanese obs.\nWeight out\n95\n94\n94\n93\nPLL\nLPS\n93\n92\n92\n91\n91\n90\n90\n&\n89\n89\n88\nYear\n88\nYear\n87\n87\nI\n86\n19\n86\n85\n85\n84\nCatch per unit effort series for Pelagic sharks. Note change in scale. (SEW Report, NMFS, 1998).\n84\n83\n83\n82\n82\n81\nC Mako Sharks\nD) Threshers\n81\n80\n80\n79\n79\n78\n78\n13\n12\n10\n9\n13\n12\n11\n8\n7\n6\n5\n4\n3\n2\n11\n10\n9\n8\n7\n6\n5\n4\n3\n2\n1\n0\n1\n0\n2\n97\n450\n400\n350\n300\n250\n200\n150\n100\n50\n96\n0\n97\n95\n96\n94\n95\n93\n94\n92\n93\n91\n92\n91\n90\n90\n89\n89\n88\nYear\n88\nYear\n87\n87\n86\n86\n85\n85\n84\nPelagic logbook\n84\nJapanese Obs.\n83\n83\nPelagic logbook\n82\n82\nLPS\nA) Pelagic sharks\n81\n81\nB) Blue sharks\n80\n80\n79\n79\nFigure 2.5\n78\n78\n13\n12\n10\n11\n9\n8\n7\n6\n5\n4\n3\n2\n1\n0\n13\n12\n11\n10\n9\n8\n7\n6\n5\n4\n3\n2\n1\n0","2.4.2\nInternational Aspects of the Atlantic Shark Fisheries\nThere is no foreign fishing for sharks allowed in U.S. waters. Pelagic sharks are caught\nin the ICCAT Convention area, often as bycatch in the tuna and swordfish fisheries, but\ntheir harvest is not currently managed by ICCAT. Member nations have not yet determined\nwhether shark management is within the purview of the Commission. However, ICCAT's\nresearch activities have included the collection of bycatch statistics in swordfish and tuna\nfisheries, including shark bycatch, since 1994. ICCAT's Standing Committee on Research\nand Statistics has since established a Sub-Committee on Bycatch and a Shark Working\nGroup to improve the quality of statistical information, collect additional species-specific\ndata, and incorporate information on sharks into ICCAT's statistical databases. The Sub-\nCommittee on Bycatch will meet in May 1999 to discuss catch rate indices for sharks.\nThe Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also collects\nlimited data on shark landings and trade, not including recreational or artisanal harvests of\nsharks. Few countries submit species-specific data and some harvesting countries submit no\ninformation at all. Bycatch of sharks and finning are widespread practices that are not well-\ndocumented. As a result, fishing mortality is seriously under-reported and it is difficult to\ndetermine the potential effects of international fishing effort on the stocks. The international\nfishery for sharks is growing rapidly, but most of the expansion in recent years has taken\nplace in the Pacific Ocean. Landings of Atlantic sharks reported to FAO have remained\nfairly constant since 1990. The 1995 landings that were reported to FAO in the Atlantic\nOcean (excluding the Mediterranean) totaled 242,413 mt (FAO, 1997). The country with\nthe highest reported landings of elasmobranchs (including sharks, rays, and skates) for the\nAtlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans combined is Indonesia, followed by India, Chinese-\nTaipei, United States, Mexico, and Japan (FAO, 1997).\nJapan is a major market for sharks, although landings have declined in recent years and\nimports are increasing to meet Japanese demand for shark products. Japan has increased\nshark imports from $600,000 worth of sharks in 1976 to $18 million in 1997 (NOAA, 1998).\nIn 1996, Japan reported landing only 1,270 mt of sharks in the Atlantic Ocean, down from a\nrecent high of 4,710 mt in 1994 (FAO, 1997). Between 1991 and 1996, an average of\n71 percent of Japanese shark landings was made by pelagic longline vessels targeting tuna,\nand the rest by other longline fisheries, trawl, gillnet and other methods (NOAA, 1998).\nMexican shark landings in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean are primarily part of\nmultispecies artisanal fisheries that fluctuate according to seasonal abundance (Castillo and\nMarquez, 1996; Castillo et al., 1998). This fishery supplies low-cost fresh and dried-salted\nmeat for the domestic market. Mexico's shark landings in the Gulf of Mexico are\ndominated by Atlantic sharpnose, bonnethead, and blacktip sharks (Bonfil, 1997). Blacktip\nsharks are known to migrate from the western U.S. Gulf into the Mexican Gulf. In 1993,\nMexico issued a moratorium on new commercial permits in the shark fishery to limit the\nnumber of participating vessels. Through the Instituto Nacional de Pesca, Mexico is\ncollecting data to determine the level of shark bycatch in other fisheries, particularly tuna\nand swordfish fisheries. The 1998 SEW attempted to incorporate Mexican landings and\nrecommended collection of more information about the species and size composition of\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 72","Mexican catches and landings as well as the rates of movement of large coastal sharks,\nparticularly blacktip and sandbar sharks, in Mexican and U.S. waters.\nCanadian landings of Atlantic sharks consist primarily of porbeagle, shortfin mako, and\nblue sharks and a Shark Management Plan for these species was established in 1995\n(Anonymous, 1995; Hurley, 1998). A seasonal directed longline fishery exists for porbeagle\nsharks with approximately three freezer longline vessels and 20 inshore vessels fishing\nbetween March and November. A directed fishery for blue sharks is developing with\napproximately 20 inshore pelagic longline and handline vessels fishing primarily on the\nScotian Shelf between July and October. Shortfin mako sharks are taken primarily as\nbycatch in the swordfish longline fishery. Landings increased to 1922 mt by 1994,\ncomprised of 1545 mt of porbeagle, 157 mt of shortfin mako, 113 mt of blue, and 107 mt of\nunspecified sharks (Hurley, 1998). In 1995, Canada established precautionary catch limits\nfor porbeagle (1500 mt), blue shark (250 mt), and shortfin mako sharks (250 mt) in the\ndirected shark fishery, established landings threshold criteria for a limited entry program,\nspecified that licenses are exploratory, prohibited finning, restricted fishing gears and areas,\nestablished seasons, and restricted the recreational fishery to hook and line release only\n(Anonymous, 1995; Hurley, 1998). The Canadian plan is designed to: 1) provide for a\nreasonable scientific basis for management, 2) control the commercial and recreational shark\nfisheries SO that they are economically viable in the long term, and 3) foster partnerships with\nthe industry on the scientific study and management of the resource (Anonymous, 1995).\n2.4.3\nDomestic Aspects of the Atlantic Shark Fisheries\nCooperation with states in developing coordinated conservation measures is important\nto successful domestic shark management. In 1996 and 1997, NMFS sent letters to all\nAtlantic and Gulf of Mexico state fishery directors strongly urging states to: 1) implement\nshark fishery regulations at least as restrictive as Federal regulations; 2) close state fisheries\nin conjunction with Federal shark fishery closures; 3) prohibit fishing for sharks in\nimportant nursery areas; 4) apply recreational retention limits to recreational fishermen\nregardless of where sharks are caught; 5) prohibit the sale of recreationally-caught sharks\nand shark products; and 6) prohibit finning and adopt other measures that govern how and\nwhen fins may be landed.\nIn July 1997, in an effort to protect juvenile sandbar and dusky sharks, the State of\nNorth Carolina prohibited possession of all sharks taken by commercial gear in state waters,\nexcluding Atlantic sharpnose sharks and pelagic sharks. In January 1998, the Mid-Atlantic\nFishery Management Council passed a motion encouraging all the states between Maine and\nTexas to close their state waters to all directed fishing for large coastal sharks in order to\nprotect pupping and nursery areas. The New England Fishery Management Council\nsupported the Mid-Atlantic Council's recommendation and requested that NMFS do\neverything possible to facilitate the closing of large coastal shark pupping and nursery areas\nin state and Federal waters to directed fishing for large coastal sharks. The National\nAudubon Society's Living Oceans Program released a publication in 1998, \"Sharks on the\nLine: A State-by-State Analysis of Sharks and Their Fisheries,\" which concludes that\ncurrent Federal regulations alone are inadequate to ensure the recovery of Atlantic and Gulf\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 73","shark populations and urges states to go beyond Federal regulations and establish or further\nrestrict current shark fishing regulations. Several Atlantic and Gulf states, notably\nDelaware, Virginia, New Jersey, Georgia, and Louisiana have recently implemented or are\nin the process of implementing shark regulations. At the February 1999 meeting of the\nHMS AP, the regulations proposed for this FMP were discussed specifically with regard to\nimpacts on the states. In response to NMFS' letter to the states requesting Coastal Zone\nManagement Act (CZMA) certification, only Georgia objected to the FMP for lack of\nconsistency with Georgia state regulations due to the continued allowance of the shark drift\ngillnet fishery off their waters.\nAt the 1998 annual meeting, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission Policy\nBoard passed two motions regarding shark management. The first motion called for \"the\nPolicy Board to consider the options of the Commission relative to enhancing the\nmanagement of sharks in state water.\" The second stated \"\nthe Policy Board recommends\nthat the member states adopt complementary regulations consistent with all federal shark\nmeasures including but not limited to minimum sizes, fishery closures once federal quotas\nare reached, and prohibition of take of exceptionally vulnerable species and life stages; and\nconsider development of an Interstate Shark FMP.\" The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries\nCommission conducted a Technical Shark Workshop in April 1999, to collect state by state\ninformation on shark fisheries, review materials from the Federal Shark FMP, and develop\noptions for possible shark management. NMFS will continue to work with Atlantic and\nGulf of Mexico states and Regional Fishery Management Councils and Commissions to\ndevelop consistent state and Federal shark regulations.\nCommercial Fishery\nIn the early years of the 20th century, a Pacific shark fishery supplied limited demands\nfor fresh shark fillets and fish meal as well as a more substantial market for dried fins of\nsoupfin sharks. In 1937, the price of soupfin shark liver skyrocketed when it was discovered\nto be the richest source of vitamin A available in commercial quantities. A shark fishery\nalong the Atlantic coast developed in response to this demand. Sixteen vessels began\ntargeting sharks off the southeastern coast of the United States, including a shark longline\nfishery in Salerno, Florida that operated nearly continuously from 1936 to 1950 (Springer,\n1952). At this time, all shark fishing was done with chain sets, except for one vessel known\nto set nearshore gillnets for nurse sharks. The weight of the chain line normally confined\nfishing to depths less than 46 meters. When currents were not strong, however, sets were\nmade at depths to 91 meters. In the last years of this fishery, the catch per unit effort\nincreased due to further expansion of the fishery and a bonus arrangement that encouraged\ncooperation among the fishermen. By 1950, landings had decreased to a pre-1937 level of\n322 mt due to a combination of overfishing, imports, and the availability of synthetic\nvitamin A (Springer, 1950; Wagner, 1966).\nA small fishery for porbeagle existed in the early 1960s off the U.S. Atlantic coast\ninvolving Norwegian fishermen. Between the World Wars, Norwegians and Danes had\npioneered fishing for porbeagles in the North Sea and in the region of the Shetland, Orkney,\nand the Faroe islands. In the late 1940s, these fishermen caught from 1,360 to 2,720 mt\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 74","yearly, with lesser amounts in the early 1950s (Rae, 1962). The subsequent scarcity of\nporbeagles in their fishing area forced the Norwegians to explore other grounds, and around\n1960, they began fishing the Newfoundland Banks and the waters east of New York.\nBetween 1961 and 1964, their catch increased from 1,800 to 9,300 mt, then declined to\n200 mt (Casey et al., 1978).\nShark fisheries developed rapidly in the late 1970s due to increased demand for their\nmeat, fins, and cartilage. At the time, sharks were perceived to be underutilized as a fishery\nresource. The high commercial value of shark fins led to the controversial practice of\nfinning, or removing the valuable fins from sharks and discarding the carcass. Growing\ndemand for shark products encouraged expansion of the commercial fishery throughout the\nlate 1970s and the 1980s. Tuna and swordfish vessels began to retain a greater proportion of\ntheir shark incidental catch, and some directed fishery effort expanded as well. As catches\naccelerated through the 1980s, shark stocks suffered a precipitous decline. Peak commercial\nlandings of large coastal and pelagic sharks were reported in 1989.\nWhile organized intensive shark fisheries have fluctuated, more localized shark\nfisheries have existed for many years. Directed fisheries for Atlantic sharks are conducted\nby vessels using bottom longline, gillnet, and rod and reel gear. Directed commercial\nlongline fishing vessels currently catch primarily sandbar, dusky, and blacktip sharks.\nSandbar and blacktip sharks make up approximately 60 to 75 percent of the commercial\ncatch and approximately 75 to 95 percent of the commercial landings (Gulf and South\nAtlantic Fisheries Development Foundation, Inc., 1996). The remainder of the catch is\ncomprised mostly of bull, bignose, tiger, sand tiger, lemon, spinner, scalloped hammerhead\nand great hammerhead sharks, with catch composition varying by region. These species are\nless marketable and are often released SO they are reflected in the overall catch but not the\nlandings.\nIn 1993, NMFS completed an FMP for Atlantic sharks that implemented the following\nmeasures: 1) a fishery management unit containing 39 frequently-caught species of Atlantic\nsharks, separated into three groups for assessment and regulatory purposes (large coastal,\nsmall coastal, and pelagic), 2) a fishing year of January 1 through December 31 to which a\ncalendar year quota is allocated (for large coastals and pelagics), and further divided into\ntwo equal six-month period sub-quotas (January to June; July to December), 3) retention\nlimits for the recreational fishery, 4) a commercial permit requirement for sale of catch\nsubject to earned income criteria, and 5) prohibition of finning of Atlantic sharks. Unlike\nother HMS, sharks are not subject to ICCAT's management authority, SO quota levels are\nestablished by NMFS.\nA number of difficulties arose in the initial year of implementation of the Atlantic\nShark FMP. Derby-style fishing, coupled with what some participants observed to be an\nunusual availability of sharks, led to an intense fishing season for large coastal sharks, with\nthe fishery closing within one month. Oversupply of shark carcasses led to reports of record\nlow prices. The short fishing season also complicated the task of monitoring the large\ncoastal shark quota and of closing the season with the required advance notice. Because the\nclosure was significantly earlier than expected and a number of commercial fishermen and\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 75","dealers indicated that they were adversely affected, NMFS established a 4,000-pound\ncommercial retention limit on large coastal sharks for commercial fishing vessels, with no\nlimits on landings from the two other species groups. These commercial retention limits\nwere intended to extend the fishing season as long as possible, in order to reduce the waste,\neconomic disruption, and safety problems associated with a derby fishery. Other problems\nin this fishery included an excessive harvesting capacity relative to the allowable catches\nand market gluts.\nThe 1993 FMP concluded that large coastal sharks were overfished, that pelagic sharks\nand small coastal sharks were fully fished, and that stock recovery to levels of the 1970s\nwould be slow due to the relatively low intrinsic rates of increase exhibited by these species.\nThe 1994 SEW concluded that the scheduled quota increase for 1995 should be delayed\nindefinitely. The 1996 SEW reiterated that the large coastal stock continued to be\noverfished. While the rapid rate of decline that characterized the stocks in the 1980s had\nslowed significantly, by 1996, reductions in fishing mortality of 50 percent or more would\nbe required to ensure a reasonable probability of stock increases over the next two years.\nIn 1997, NMFS reduced the overall commercial quota of 2,570 mt dw by 50 percent to\n1,285 mt dw for the large coastal species group, established a 1,760 mt dw quota for the\nsmall coastal species group, and maintained the commercial quota for the pelagic species\ngroup at 580 mt dw. The retention limits for the recreational fishery were reduced from four\nper vessel per trip for the large coastal and pelagic species groups combined and five per\nperson per day for the small coastal species group to two sharks per vessel per day for all\nspecies combined, except for Atlantic sharpnose sharks for which NMFS established an\nallowance two fish per person per trip. In addition, landing or sale of whale, basking, sand\ntiger, bigeye sand tiger, and white sharks was prohibited. These measures were designed to\nprevent development of directed fisheries for species particularly vulnerable to over-\nexploitation and increase the accuracy of species-specific identification.\nCommercial landings of large coastal sharks declined in 1997 as a result of the new\nmanagement measures (Table 2.43). Commercial pelagic shark landings have not reached\nthe commercial quota of 580 mt dw since the implementation of the original shark FMP,\nalthough they did increase by 20 percent to 433 mt dw in 1997, the year of the 50-percent\ncut in the large coastal shark quota, possibly indicating some substitution (Table 2.44).\nThus, only those pelagic shark species that lack commercial value are discarded; there\nshould be no regulatory discards. Mako, porbeagle, and thresher sharks comprise 98 percent\nof the landings (Table 2.45). Data submitted from the Portland Fish Exchange, Inc.\n(Portland, ME), indicate that landings of porbeagle sharks ranged from 10.3 mt dw in 1998\nto 83.4 mt dw in 1994, with an average of 36.6 mt dw (Barbara Stevenson, pers. comm.).\nEstimates of the pelagic sharks discarded dead each year in the tuna and swordfish\nlongline fisheries range from approximately 300 to 1,200 mt WW from 1987 to 1995, of\nwhich approximately 60 to 95 percent by weight are blue sharks (about 9,000 to 30,000 fish)\n(Table 2.46; Cramer, 1996). Blue sharks are frequently discarded because their unpalatable\nmeat has minimal commercial value. Estimates of pelagic sharks discarded in the pelagic\nlongline fisheries in 1996 and 1997 are 839 and 253 mt ww, respectively, of which\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 76","approximately 73 percent are blue sharks (about 19,000 and 8,000 fish) (Cramer et al.,\n1997; Cramer and Adams, 1998; Table 2.46). Estimates of pelagic sharks discarded dead in\nother fisheries in 1996 and 1997 are 110 and 56 mt ww, respectively, of which 93 and\n58 percent are blue sharks (about 3000 and 1400 fish) (see Cramer et al., 1997; Cramer and\nAdams, 1998).\nThus, in 1996, the total estimate (pelagic longline and other) of dead discards is\n82 percent of the commercial pelagic shark quota, with blue shark dead discards comprising\n62 percent of the quota. In contrast, the total estimate of dead discards in 1997 is 27 percent\nof the commercial pelagic shark quota, with blue shark dead discards comprising 19 percent\nof the quota. When blue sharks are not included, the estimate of dead discards in 1996 is\nabout 119 mt dw, or 20 percent of the pelagic shark quota, and in 1997, the estimate of dead\ndiscards is about 46 mt dw, or eight percent of the pelagic shark quota. Estimates of blue\nsharks discarded alive range by area, quarter, and year from approximately 30 to 100 percent\nduring the period 1992 01995 (Cramer, 1996). Catches of blue sharks (in numbers) in the\nGrand Banks and Northeast Coastal areas often are near or exceed the catch of the targeted\nswordfish and tuna (Cramer, 1996).\nHistorically, small coastal sharks were incidental catch in commercial fisheries, and\ncommonly used for bait. Observer data indicate that small coastal shark landings represent\n(by number) two percent, 19 percent, and 72 percent of the total observed mortality of the\nsmall coastal shark catches in the directed shark longline fishery for the North Carolina,\nwest Florida, and south Atlantic Bight regions, respectively (see Table 6, Branstetter and\nBurgess, 1997). These data indicate that approximately 98 percent, 81 percent, and\n28 percent, respectively, of the small coastal shark catch in those regions was not landed but\nwas used for bait. Note that observer data for the North Carolina and west Florida areas\nsuggest that unreported mortality of small coastal sharks is high; however, the volume of\nsmall coastal shark catches in those areas is minor. Nevertheless, small coastal shark\nlandings statistics may considerably underestimate mortality in this fishery. Commercial\nlandings of small coastal sharks have increased from nine mt dw in 1994 to 326 mt dw in\n1997 (Table 2.47), with Atlantic sharpnose, blacknose, and finetooth sharks comprising\n90 percent of the landings.\nGiven the short directed fishing season for sharks, fishermen have had to diversify in\norder to maintain their financial viability, either into other fisheries or other occupations.\nMany participants in the commercial shark fishery are engaged in the longline fishery for\nswordfish and tuna, the gillnet fisheries, the hook and line fisheries, or the snapper-grouper\nor reef fish fisheries. The NMFS permit database indicates that more than 97 percent of\npermitted shark fishermen hold other fishing permits from the Southeast Regional Permit\nOffice (1998). As part of this FMP, NMFS is implementing a limited access system for the\ncommercial fishery that is based on current and historical participation in the fishery. The\npurpose of limited access is to reduce latent effort in the shark fishery and prevent further\novercapitalization. The limited access system is fully described in Chapter 4.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 77","Recreational Fishery\nRecreational fishing for Atlantic sharks occurs in federal and state waters from\nNew England to the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea. U.S. recreational shark harvests\nhave declined somewhat from the peak recorded catches in 1983. In 1990, the International\nGame Fishing Association named the following Atlantic sharks as those typically targeted\nby recreational fishermen: blue, shortfin mako, porbeagle, and thresher sharks (in the\npelagic management unit); and the tiger and hammerhead sharks (in the large coastal\nmanagement unit) (Rose, 1996).\nFor pelagic species, some of which are considered prized gamefish (e.g., makos),\nrecreational harvests have fluctuated from a peak of approximately 93,000 fish in 1985 to a\nlow of about 6,000 fish in 1994. The apparent decline of shortfin mako sharks is of\nsubstantial concern to the recreational fishing community. Recreational landings of small\ncoastal sharks have fluctuated around 50,000 to 150,000 fish per year since the mid 1980s,\nwith Atlantic sharpnose comprising about 65 percent of the catches (Tables 2.47 and 2.48)\nThe 1993 FMP for Atlantic sharks established a recreational retention limit of five\nsmall coastal sharks per person per day. In 1997, NMFS combined the recreational retention\nlimit into an all-shark limit of two fish per vessel per trip with an allowance for two Atlantic\nsharpnose sharks per person per trip. This measure was\ndesigned to address concerns that juvenile large coastal\nsharks were being misidentified as small coastal sharks,\nwhile the additional allowance for Atlantic sharpnose\nsharks was intended to allow anglers on charter/partyboats\nthe opportunity to land a shark. In response to the\noverfished designation of large coastals, NMFS reduced the\nrecreational retention limit by 50 percent in 1997. Sharks\nthat are not retained by the angler must be released in a\nmanner to ensure the maximum possibility of survival.\nFishing for white sharks is catch and release only.\nA future NMFS employee proudly\ndisplays his first catch. Photo\ncredit: George Darcy, NMFS\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 78","Table 2.43 Large coastal sharks commercial and recreational landings. Numbers and weights are converted\nto weights and numbers using an average size. (SB-III-5; SB-III-6; Scott et al., 1998)\nYear\nCommercial\nRecreational\nTotal\nCommercial\nRecreational\nTotal\nLandings\nHarvest\nLandings\nLandings\nHarvest\nLandings\n(lb dw)\n(lb dw)\n(lb dw)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n1986\n2,533,492\n8,916,855\n11,450,347\n53,996\n426,119\n480,115\n1987\n4,817,293\n8,583,245\n13,400,538\n104,656\n314,379\n419,035\n1988\n7,747,849\n7,108,406\n14,856,255\n274,649\n300,592\n575,241\n1989\n10,141,149\n6,144,728\n16,285,877\n351,026\n221,052\n572,078\n1990\n7,691,300\n2,659,046\n10,350,346\n267,523\n213,216\n480,739\n1991\n8,139,134\n2,612,873\n10,752,007\n200,175\n293,259\n493,434\n1992\n8,609,981\n3,050,456\n11,660,437\n143,501\n304,895\n448,396\n1993\n6,775,795\n2,224,289\n9,000,084\n89,629\n248,988\n338,617\n1994\n8,438,581\n1,869,291\n10,307,872\n190,136\n160,869\n351,005\n1995\n6,870,848\n2,342,353\n9,213,201\n160,394\n183,434\n343,828\n1996\n5,262,314\n2,356,732\n7,619,046\n170,504\n184,560\n355,064\n1997*\n3,127,223\n2,068,231\n5,195,454\n103,406\n161,967\n265,373\n*1997 data are preliminary\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 79","Table 2.44 Pelagic sharks commercial and recreational landings. Numbers and weights are converted to\nweights and numbers using an average size. (Scott et al., 1996; Poffenberger, 1996;\nScott et al., 1998)\nCommercial\nRecreational\nTotal\nCommercial\nRecreational\nTotal\nYear\nLandings\nHarvest\nLandings\nLandings\nHarvest\nLandings\n(lb dw)\n(lb dw)\n(lb dw)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n1986\n269,912\n7,542,466\n7,812,378\n4,264\n42,092\n46,356\n1987\n603,516\n3,795,202\n4,398,718\n8,722\n37,259\n45,981\n1988\n1,135,734\n3,886,981\n5,022,715\n15,580\n33,418\n48,998\n1989\n2,026,772\n3,024,180\n5,050,952\n31,121\n22,609\n53,730\n1990\n1,595,497\n1,148,853\n2,744,350\n23,090\n15,359\n38,449\n1991\n705,529\n715,223\n1,420,752\n9,295\n11,553\n20,848\n1992\n1,370,698\n1,444,062\n2,814,760\n18,132\n16,418\n34,550\n1993\n1,207,666\n2,782,806\n3,990,472\n14,819\n31,271\n46,090\n1994\n986,808\n665,920\n1,652,728\n18,953\n6,151\n25,104\n1995\n834,723\n3,046,364\n3,881,087\n11,521\n32,891\n44,412\n1996\n695,531\n1,930,016\n2,625,547\n9,594*\n20,838\n191,342\n1997*\n955,313\n776,433\n1,731,746\n13,177*\n8,383\n111,789\n* 1997 data are preliminary. 1996 and 1997 commercial landings by number converted from weight using the\n1995 average size.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 80","Table 2.45 Estimated landings estimates of pelagic sharks in commercial and recreational fisheries for\n1996 and 1997. Note: commercial landings are in pounds dressed weight and recreational\nharvest are in numbers of fish. Note: landings of fins are included in the commercial estimate.\n(Scott et al., 1998)\nCommercial Landings\nRecreational Harvest\nSpecies\n1996\n1997\n1996\n1997\nBigeye thresher\n5,295\n5,308\nBlue\n10,228\n967\n10,461\n4,265\nCow\n81\n443\n54\nLongfin mako\n5,923\n2,112\nMako genus\n7\n10\nOceanic whitetip\n217,254\n3,656\nPorbeagle\n46,424\n3,690\nShortfin mako\n158,422\n261,825\n9,062\n2,618\nThresher\n237,507\n109,030\n865\n1,436\nUnclassified\n14,478\n568,644\nTOTAL\n695,531\n955,313\n20,838\n8,383\n* 1997 data are preliminary\nTable 2.46 Blue shark dead discards as a percentage of all pelagic shark dead discards by Pelagic Longline\nVessels for 1987 - 1997. 1996 and 1997 includes other gear. (Cramer, 1996; Cramer et al.,\n1997; Cramer and Adams, 1998)\nPelagic Sharks\nBlue Sharks\nPercent of\nPelagic Sharks\nYear\nNumber\nMT (ww)\nMT (dw)\nNumber\nMT (ww)\nMT (dw)\nMT (dw)\n1987\n13,092.00\n560.64\n280.32\n12,506.00\n526.20\n263.10\n93.86\n1988\n13,655.00\n468.73\n234.37\n12,934.00\n421.16\n210.58\n89.85\n1989\n13,480.00\n538.21\n269.11\n12,525.00\n480.01\n240.00\n89.19\n1990\n13,955.00\n795.97\n397.99\n13,141.00\n741.34\n370.67\n93.14\n1991\n17,232.00\n813.21\n16,562.00\n406.61\n772.32\n386.16\n94.97\n1992\n8,940.00\n298.30\n149.15\n7,043.00\n184.39\n92.20\n61.81\n1993\n30,544.00\n1,191.53\n595.77\n29,329.00\n1,136.33\n568.17\n95.37\n1994\n13,411.00\n637.70\n318.85\n11,986.00\n572.24\n286.12\n89.73\n1995\n8,738.00\n307.75\n153.88\n7,325.00\n242.39\n121.20\n78.76\n1996*\n22,153.00\n949.22\n474.61\n18,996.00\n710.69\n355.34\n74.87\n1997*\n9,284.00\n310.55\n155.02\n7,777.00\n219.28\n109.64\n70.72\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 81","Table 2.47 Small coastal sharks commercial and recreational landings. Numbers and weights are converted\nto weights and numbers using an average size. (Scott et al., 1996; Poffenberger, 1996;\nScott et al., 1998)\nCommercial\nRecreational\nTotal\nCommercial\nRecreational\nTotal\nYear\nLandings\nHarvest\nLandings\nLandings\nHarvest\nLandings\n(lb dw)\n(lb dw)\n(lb dw)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n(Number)\n1986\nNA\n256,614\n256,614\nNA\n34,923\n34,923\n1987\nNA\n462,257\n462,257\nNA\n48,751\n48,751\n1988\nNA\n804,639\n804,639\nNA\n82,375\n82,375\n1989\nNA\n596,546\n596,546\nNA\n62,335\n62,335\n1990\nNA\n603,306\n603,306\nNA\n47,281\n47,281\n1991\n1,164\n1,151,499\n1,152,663\nNA\n137,018\n137,018\n1992\nNA\n674,675\n674,675\nNA\n116,163\n116,163\n1993\n7,766\n538,329\n546,095\nNA\n78,680\n78,680\n1994\n20,510\n733,289\n753,799\n3,717\n103,193\n106,910\n1995\n40,010\n953,970\n993,980\n4,125\n135,085\n139,210\n1996\n460,667\n795,993\n1,256,660\n143,958\n112,715\n256,673\n1997*\n719,341\n685,162\n1,404,503\n224,794\n97,021\n321,815\nTable 2.48 Estimated landings estimates of small coastal sharks in commercial and recreational fisheries for\n1996 and 1997. Note: commercial landings are in pounds dressed weight and recreational\nharvest is in numbers of fish. Note: landings of fins are included in the commercial estimate.\n(Scott et al., 1998)\nCommercial Landings\nRecreational Harvest\nSpecies\n1996\n1997\n1996\n1997\nAtlantic angel\n3,814\nAtlantic sharpnose\n165,171\n256,632\n73,018\n65,530\nBlacknose\n140,790\n202,781\n11,737\n10,761\nBonnethead\n60,694\n75,787\n21,996\n15,730\nCaribbean sharpnose\n876\nFinetooth\n92,980\n184,141\n1,602\n5,000\nSmalltail\n548\nUnclassified\n4\nTOTAL\n460,515\n719,341\n112,715\n97,021\n* 1997 data are preliminary\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 82","2.4.4 Social and Economic Aspects of the Domestic Atlantic Shark Fisheries\nCommercial Fishing\nThere is significant demand for shark meat in markets throughout the United States,\nAsia, and Europe. During 1995, shark imports on the international market (from all oceans)\ntotaled 53,000 mt with a value of $169 million (NOAA, 1998). Frozen shark products\naccounted for 67 percent in volume and fresh shark products accounted for 30 percent in\nvolume, while dried shark fins accounted for three percent in volume (NOAA, 1998).\nWholesale prices for sharks vary widely, depending upon quality, product form, market\nfactors, and species.\nIn general, the most valuable species include shortfin mako, thresher, porbeagle, and\nrequiem sharks, dogfish, and smoothhounds (Weber and Fordham, 1997). The highest-\nquality meat is sold as sashimi or steaks in fresh seafood markets. Weber and Fordham\n(1997) reported regionali preferences for shark fins. In Hong Kong, processors seek the fins\nof hammerhead, tiger, oceanic whitetip, blacktip, dusky and blue sharks, while the fins of\nthresher, nurse sharks, and ray and skate wings have minimal value. In Taiwan, fin traders\nprefer the hammerhead, dusky, and blacktip reef sharks, and place a lower value on the\nthresher and blue sharks. In the United States domestic market, buyers generally prefer\nhammerhead and sandbar shark fins, followed by the dusky, tiger, blacktip, bull, and silky\nsharks (Weber and Fordham, 1997).\nIn addition to markets for shark meat and fins, there is extensive world trade in other\nshark products including leather, cartilage, liver oil, and jaws. While smaller sharks are\npreferred for human consumption, due to the greater ease of storage and lower concentra-\ntions of urea and mercury in the flesh, larger sharks are more often used for dried fins and\nleather products. It is difficult to process sharks for both meat and skins, primarily because\nskins must be processed immediately to preserve their quality (Rose, 1996). Shark cartilage\nis processed into tablets for cancer treatment. Liver oil is also used in pharmaceuticals,\nlubricants, and cosmetics.\nDuring the winter, the directed shark fishery is concentrated in the southeastern\nUnited States, particularly in Florida, since large coastal sharks tend to migrate south in\nwinter. During the summer, large coastal sharks are more widely dispersed, allowing\nvessels in the mid-Atlantic and Northeast to participate in the fishery. In the Northeast\nregion, commercial pelagic longline fisheries for swordfish and tuna encounter some sharks\nas the secondary target species. Many sharks are discarded except for species like mako,\nthresher, and porbeagle sharks whose fins and meat command higher prices. These sharks\nare a marketable component of the traditional catch of the pelagic longline fishery.\nNearly all Atlantic shark fishermen operate in the multispecies longline fishery where\ngear requirements are substantially similar. McHugh and Murray (1997) compared the\nproportion of catch per trip by value for a sample of directed shark fishing vessels in surveys\nconducted over two periods, one before and one after implementation of the Shark FMP in\nApril 1993. Survey data reveal that the share of sharks, in total trip catch value, declined\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 83","from 90.8 percent to 62.1 percent. In contrast, the share of grouper, in total value, increased\nfrom 6.9 percent to 34 percent. The 1993 finning prohibition and quota cuts, along with the\n1994 commercial retention limit, likely played a role in this changing composition, although\na more important factor may have been the increase in grouper prices while shark prices\nwere relatively stable or declining. Examination of the trips by share of shark in total\nvolume of catch indicates that there is been a notable shift in the concentration of activity\naway from shark products toward more diversified trips (McHugh and Murray, 1997).\nSince 1983, the ex-vessel price for sharks has remained relatively stable at about\n$0.50 per pound in constant dollars after almost doubling from 1979 to 1983. However,\nnominal fin prices have risen significantly since 1987 in response to demand from Asia.\nDuring the 1995 fishing season, average carcass prices were around $0.80 per pound, while\ntop quality fin prices held steady at around $18 to $26 per pound. The length of trips varies\nfrom less than four days to more than 12 days. Since the implementation of the FMP in\n1993, trip lengths for the majority of trips have declined from over 12 days to under four\ndays (an average per trip of eight days; McHugh and Murray, 1997). The shift to the\nsnapper-grouper fishery, as noted above, is further evidence of the diversity of the shark\nfishery and the ability of participants to shift their product mix as regulatory, economic, or\nother factors change.\nMcHugh and Murray (1997) estimated profits per fishing trip for shark vessels as the\nowner's share of total catch minus all expenses other than those for food, which are\nnormally taken out of the crew's share of the revenues. For the entire fishery, per-day profit\nrates were calculated, with a seven-day trip averaging $1,589 (for comparison with figures\nprovided below). When examined by vessel category, vessels in the 40 to 49 foot range\naveraged $1975 in profits per seven-day trip ($282.18 in profits per day). A regression\nanalysis shows that trip profitability is unrelated to the proportion of catch which is shark.\nProfits were also positively related to dummy variables for the 1994 and 1995 seasons,\npossibly indicating that the more efficient highliners remained in the fishery following\nimplementation of the commercial retention limit. There is anecdotal evidence (supported\nin McHugh and Murray, 1997) that the implementation of the commercial retention limit\nrule resulted in the exit of some of the larger vessels from the shark fishery.\nIn another recent social and economic study (Larkin et al., 1998), slightly over one-\nthird of the trips examined (approximately 15 percent of all trips) were conducted on vessels\nin the 30 to 49 foot category, which is likely most representative of vessels that would target\nand/or land sharks. In this size category, 30 percent of fish landed were sharks, as opposed\nto 12 percent for vessels in the 50 to 69 foot size category and two percent for vessels in the\n70 to 89 foot size category. For these vessels, the average variable expenses per trip were\n$3,683 (including light sticks, which were probably used on swordfish-directed trips), while\ngross revenues ranged from $5,954 to $7,145. Total returns for a trip (payments to owner,\ncaptain, and owner) ranged from $2,271 to $3,462. With an annual average of 14.8 trips per\nyear in this size range, these averages yield annual net revenues per vessel of $34,000 to\n$51,000, to be divided between the crew, captain (if not the same as the owner), and owner.\nThe owner's share would need to cover insurance, depreciation, vessel maintenance, and\nother fixed costs. Since crews generally receive approximately 50 percent of the net\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 84","revenues, and fixed costs are variable, it is uncertain whether the owner would be able to\ncover fixed costs and incur a net income.\nCommercial shark fishing also generates economic activity in the processing,\ndistribution and retailing sectors. Thus, shark fishery regulations can also impact non-\nfishing businesses. Although the 1993 FMP and its implementing regulations required\nshark vessel operators to offload their fins and carcasses at the same time, there appears to\nbe an important market distinction between the shark fin and shark meat market that is\nevident at the time of offloading. Shark fin buyers are specialized operators who are highly\nskilled in the identification and grading of shark fins. In contrast, shoreside processors\nhandling shark meat are most likely to handle the entire range of species harvested by the\nfleets in their area. Thus, fin buyers are likely more affected by changes in shark regulations\nthan shark meat processors and distributors. McHugh and Murray (1997) indicate that shark\nfin buyers operate more like wholesalers than ex-vessel buyers, as their price negotiations\nwith the vessel operator do not include the dealer who was the first receiver.\nDealers and shoreside processors purchasing directly from fishing vessels are required\nto obtain a NMFS dealer permit. On the dealer application form, applicants may check off\nboxes for the following species: reef fish, rock shrimp, snapper-grouper, shark, and\nswordfish. The permit costs $35 per year, regardless of the number of species indicated.\nExamination of the most recent dealer permit base reveals a total of 249 permit holders, of\nwhich 239 (96 percent) had checked off other species. Thus, similar to vessels, processors\nwho handle sharks operate in a multispecies processing sector. Of the ten dealers handling\nexclusively sharks, four are located in Florida and three in Virginia. Based on information\nin the dealer database, 104 dealers (42 percent) are based in Florida, 22 (nine percent) in\nLouisiana, and 18 (seven percent) each in North Carolina and Texas. The geographical\npattern of dealer permit holders is thus similar to that for vessel permit holders, although\nSouth Carolina and Massachusetts figure predominantly in the dealer permit base with\n17 and 14 permits, respectively.\nRecreational/Charter Fishing\nCharter vessel fishing for sharks is becoming\nincreasingly popular. In most U.S. waters, this type of\nfishing occurs from May to September. In some regions,\ncertain species are heavily targeted, e.g., sharpnose and\nblacktip in the Carolinas, and makos and large white\nsharks at Montauk, NY. Many charter vessels also\nfish for sharks out of ports in Ocean City, MD and\nWachapreague, VA. Headboats may land the smaller\nshark species, but they usually do not target sharks\nspecifically, except for a headboat fishery for sharpnose\nsharks based in Port Aransas, TX.\nTournament participants observe the\nweigh-in of the day's catch. Photo\ncredit: Dan Stawinski\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 85","Shark tournament fishing is usually conducted from vessels that vary in size from small\noutboards to sportfishing yachts of 15 meters or longer. The number of participants and\nvessels varies: a two-day Long Island, NY shark tournament has drawn 300 vessels and about\n1,500 anglers annually in recent years, but some tournaments limit the number of vessels to\nless than 150 because of limited shore facilities. More exclusive tournaments charge high\nentry fees on a first-come, first-served basis, and offer a top prize of $50,000 or more. One\nmajor shark tournament in the mid-Atlantic, which has been held since 1988, offers prizes for\nthe largest makos and blue sharks (with minimum sizes of 200 lbs and 150 lbs, respectively.)\nNearly 200 vessels participate in this two-day tournament. Some tournaments encourage\ncatch and release fishing by offering prize points for released sharks. The increase in eastern\nGulf Coast shark fishing tournaments since 1973 underscores the popularity of this activity\namong anglers. Previously, there were only about a half dozen such tournaments in the\nregion, but by the late 1980s there were about 65 each year (Casey, 1989).\nFisher and Ditton (1992) found that anglers spent an average of $197 per trip and\nwere willing to spend on average an additional $105 rather than stop fishing for sharks.\nGiven that most anglers release the fish that they catch, it is unlikely these estimates have\nchanged substantially since 1992. Analyses presented at the 1998 SEW found that\napproximately 886 trips that caught a shark were sampled annually by the MRFSS survey\nfrom 1994 through 1996. Using these figures, a minimum estimate of the annual total spent\nby anglers who caught sharks is $174,542 and the annual angler consumer surplus is\n$93,030 for a minimum estimate of gross value of $267,572 per year. The number of trips\nthat catch sharks would be higher than the number sampled, SO this represents a minimum\nestimate of the economic impact of the shark recreational fishery. Fisher and Ditton (1992)\nalso found that 32 percent of shark anglers said that no other species would be an acceptable\nsubstitute for sharks.\nNon-Consumptive Uses of Sharks\nIn addition to the production and direct consumption of shark products, net benefits in\nthe shark fishery are also derived from the existence value of sharks for non-consumptive\nuser groups. Some people value knowing that sharks exist in the sea or value seeing sharks\nin the wild. The larger the wild stock of sharks, the greater this non-consumptive use value\nassociated with the shark fishery. At present, quantitative estimates of existence value for\nsharks are unavailable. However, given the fascination by the public with sharks, it could\nbe quite high. As an example of existence value, Cabot (1996) estimated the willingness to\npay to recover the marine turtle populations at $33 per person or, if extrapolated, $8.3 billion\nfor the nation. Existence value should be incorporated in the management decision-\nmaking process.\nChapter 2 - Atlantic Sharks - 86","2.5 HMS Gear Types\nThis section describes the gears used to catch Atlantic highly migratory species. A\ndiscussion of bycatch of these gear types can be found in Section 3.5.\nFishermen made an estimated 206,806 trips targeting large pelagics (on private and charter\nvessels, both recreational and commercial) using rod and reel and handline during 1997. This\nestimate is only for trips made from Maine through Virginia. An additional 2,913 trips were\nestimated for North Carolina, but these were specifically for bluefin tuna. There are approxi-\nmately 20,000 vessels permitted to use rod and reel, either recreationally or commercially, to fish\nfor Atlantic tuna. The amount of gear used by these vessels, in terms of the number of rods and\nhooks, is unknown. Approximately 7,500 vessels are permitted to use harpoons to land Atlantic\ntuna; fewer than 100 of which are in the Harpoon category, the rest are in the General category.\nIt is unknown how many trips are taken exclusively with harpoon gear.\nFive vessels are permitted to use purse seine gear in the Atlantic tuna fishery. In 1996,\n45 trips were taken by these vessels, on which 44 sets or hauls were made. Since the annual\nquota for the Purse Seine category has not changed since 1995, the amount of trips and sets per\nyear has likely remained somewhat constant. In 1998, only four vessels landed bluefin tuna\nunder the Purse Seine category quota (the fifth vessel transferred its quota to other vessels, as is\npermitted under the regulations), but the overall number of trips and sets for the category is most\nlikely similar to those made in the years since 1996.\nApproximately 40 vessels reported using coastal driftnets (other than pelagic) through the\nNortheast Region Dealer Reporting system in 1997. Twenty-six of these vessels reported\nlanding Atlantic tuna (other than bluefin tuna), including Atlantic bonito. These vessels target\nspecies other than tuna, but catch tuna incidentally. It is unknown at this time how many trips or\nsets were made by these vessels, or how much gear was deployed.\nApproximately 12 to 15 vessels use gillnets, typically 275 to 1,800 meters long and 3.2 to\n4.1 meters deep, with stretched mesh from 12.7 to 29.9 cm, to fish for sharks in the southeast\nUnited States (off the Florida and Georgia coasts). Fishing trips are usually less than 18 hours\nlong and in nearshore areas within 30 nautical miles from port. These vessels target large coastal\nsharks and small coastal sharks (primarily blacknose, Atlantic sharpnose, blacktip, and\nhammerhead) and have incidental catches of coastal pelagic finfishes (Trent et al., 1997).\nDuring 1996, 264 pelagic longline vessels fishing for Atlantic swordfish deployed\napproximately 10.2 million hooks. Based on the eligibility criteria selected in the limited access\nsystem (see Chapter 4 for details), NMFS estimates that approximately 198 and 218 vessels are\neligible for a directed and incidental swordfish permit, respectively, and that approximately\n416 vessels are eligible for a BAYS longline permit.\nBetween 1994 and 1998, the Gulf and South Atlantic Fisheries Development Foundation's\nObserver Program observed the directed large coastal shark bottom longline fishery and\ndocumented details on the landings of about four percent of the large coastal shark quota.\nApproximately 5.5 million hook hours of effort caught more than 26,000 sharks with the average\nChapter 2 - HMS Gear Types - 87","bottom longline sets lasting between 10.1 and 14.9 hours (GSAFDF, 1998). Based on the\neligibility criteria selected in the limited access system (see Chapter 4 for details), NMFS\nestimates that approximately 211 and 578 vessels are eligible for a directed and incidental shark\npermit, respectively.\n2.5.1\nPelagic Longlines\nThe U.S. pelagic longline fishery for Atlantic HMS primarily targets swordfish,\nyellowfin tuna, or bigeye tuna in various areas and seasons. Secondary target species\ninclude dolphin fish, albacore tuna, pelagic sharks (e.g., mako, thresher, blue and porbeagle\nsharks) as well as several species of large coastal sharks. Although this gear can be\nmodified (i.e., depth of set, hook type, etc.) to target either swordfish or tuna, like other\nhook and line fisheries, it is a multi-species fishery. These fisheries are opportunistic,\nswitching gear style and making subtle changes to optimize the net returns of each\nindividual trip. Longline gear sometimes attracts and hooks non-target finfish with no\ncommercial value, as well as species that cannot be retained by commercial fishermen, such\nas billfish. Pelagic longlines may also interact with protected species such as marine\nmammals, sea turtles and sea birds, and have thus been classified as a Category I fishery\nwith respect to the Marine Mammal Protection Act.\n659026\nEYELANDER\nA pelagic longline vessel based in New Bedford, MA that is a part of\nthe distant water fishing fleet. Photo credit: Louis Jachimczyk, NMFS,\nOffice of Law Enforcement\nPelagic longline gear is composed of several parts. The primary fishing line, or\nmainline of the longline system, can vary from five to 40 miles in length, with\napproximately 20 to 30 hooks per mile. This FMP limits the length of the mainline of\na\npelagic longline to 24 nautical miles from August 1 to November 30 in the Mid-Atlantic\nBight through an interim measure. The depth of the mainline is determined by ocean\ncurrents and the length of the floatline, which connects the mainline to several buoys and\nperiodic markers with radar reflectors and radio beacons. Each individual hook is connected\nChapter 2 - HMS Gear Types - 88","by a leader to the mainline. Lightsticks, which contain chemicals that emit a glowing light,\nare often used. When attached to the hook and suspended at a certain depth, they attract bait\nfish which may, in turn, attract pelagic predators. When targeting swordfish, the lines\ngenerally are deployed at sunset and hauled in at sunrise to take advantage of the nocturnal\nnear-surface feeding habits of the large pelagic species (Berkeley et al., 1981). In general,\nlonglines targeting tuna are set in the morning, deeper in the water column, and hauled in the\nevening. Except for vessels of the distant water fleet which undertake extended trips,\nfishing vessels preferentially target swordfish during periods when the moon is full to take\nadvantage of increased densities of pelagic species near the surface. Those sets targeting\ndolphin fish are set in the daytime near the surface, with shorter longlines and shorter\nsoak time.\nSecondary hook and line gear is permitted onboard pelagic longline vessels. Longliners\nuse harpoons for safer handling of larger fish, and for the occasional harvest of free\nswimming fish that approach the vessel during haul-back. Using a technique known as\nsticking,\" fishermen may use a long pole to extend several longline leaders and\nhooks behind the vessel. Typically, this line is trolled while hauling the primary gear or\nwhile the vessel is moving on the fishing grounds. \"Jigging machines\" are a type of bandit\ngear used for trolling for HMS. Many pelagic longliners troll regular rod and reel gear while\ndrifting to determine what species are available in the area they are passing through.\nReported effort, in terms of number of vessels fishing, has fluctuated in recent years but\nhas not shown obvious trends in the distant water, southeast coastal, and northeast coastal\nareas. However, there appears to be a trend towards decreasing numbers of vessels fishing\nin the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. In all areas, the reported number of hooks per set\nhas increased. Although swordfish appear to have remained the primary target species in the\nCaribbean, distant water, and southeast coastal fishery areas, the proportion of swordfish in\nthe reported landed catch has decreased in both the distant water and southeast coastal areas.\nIn the case of the distant water fishery, an increasing proportion of the reported landings are\nBAYS tuna. Coastal shark and dolphin landings have increased in the southeast coastal\narea. The largest decreases in targeting and landing of swordfish were in the northeast\ncoastal area (Cramer and Adams, 1997). The Gulf of Mexico, which has historically been\nprimarily a yellowfin tuna fishery, has had an increase in reported targeting and landing of\nswordfish in recent years (Cramer and Scott, 1998).\nThe pelagic longline fishery sector is comprised of five relatively distinct segments\nwith different fishing practices and strategies. Each vessel type has different range\ncapabilities due to fuel capacity, hold capacity, size, and construction. In addition to\ngeographical area, segments differ by percentage of various target and non-target species,\ngear characteristics, bait, and deployment techniques. Some vessels fish in more than one\nfishery segment during the course of the year.\nThe Gulf of Mexico Yellowfin Tuna Fishery\nThese longline vessels primarily target yellowfin tuna year-round in the Gulf of Mexico,\nbut may also catch and sell dolphin fish, swordfish, and other tuna and sharks. During\nChapter 2 - HMS Gear Types - 89","yellowfin tuna fishing, few swordfish are captured incidentally. Many of these vessels\nparticipate in other Gulf of Mexico fisheries (targeting shrimp, shark, and snapper/grouper)\nduring allowed seasons, which may require a change in gear. Major home ports for this\nfishery include Panama City, FL; Destin, FL; Dulac, LA; and Venice, LA.\nThe Southern Atlantic - Florida East Coast to Cape Hatteras Swordfish Fishery\nThese pelagic longline vessels primarily target swordfish year-round. Yellowfin tuna\nand dolphin fish are other important marketable components of the catch. Smaller vessels\nfish shorter trips from the Florida Straits north to the bend in the Gulf Stream off Charleston,\nSC (Charleston Bump). Mid-sized and larger vessels migrate seasonally on longer trips\nfrom the Yucatan Peninsula throughout the West Indies and Caribbean Sea and some trips\nrange as far north as the mid-Atlantic coast of the United States to target bigeye tuna and\nswordfish during the late summer and fall. Fishing trips in this fishery average nine sets\nover 12 days. Major home ports (including seasonal ports) for this fishery include\nGeorgetown, SC; Cherry Point, SC; Charleston, SC; Fort Pierce, FL; Pompano Beach, FL;\nDania, FL; and Key West, FL. This sector of the fishery consists of small to mid-size\nvessels that typically sell fresh swordfish to local high-quality markets.\nThe Mid-Atlantic and New England Swordfish and Bigeye Tuna Fishery\nThis fishery has evolved during recent years to become an almost year-round fishery\nbased on directed tuna trips, with substantial numbers of swordfish trips as well. Some\nvessels participate in the directed bigeye/yellowfin tuna fishery during the summer and fall\nmonths and then switch to bottom longline fisheries and/or shark fishing during the winter\nwhen the shark season is open. Fishing trips in this fishery sector average 12 sets over 18\ndays. During the season, vessels primarily offload in the major ports of Fairhaven, MA;\nMontauk, NY; Barnegat Light, NJ; Ocean City, MD; and Wanchese, NC. Some of these\nvessels follow the swordfish along the mid-Atlantic coast, then fish off the coast of the\nsoutheast United States during the winter months.\nThe U.S. Atlantic Distant Water Swordfish Fishery\nThis fleet's fishing grounds span the northwest Atlantic to as far east as the Azores and\nthe mid-Atlantic Ridge. Some of the larger vessels have moved beyond this area and into\nthe south Atlantic Ocean. About ten larger vessels operate out of mid-Atlantic and New\nEngland ports during the summer and fall months, and move to Caribbean ports during the\nwinter and spring months. Many of the current distant water operations were among the\nearly participants in the U.S. directed Atlantic commercial swordfish fishery. These larger\nvessels, with greater ranges and capacities than the coastal fishing vessels, enabled the\nUnited States to become a significant player in the north Atlantic fishery. They also fish for\nswordfish in the south Atlantic. The New England longline vessels traditionally have been\nlarger than their Florida counterparts because of the distances required to travel to the\nfishing grounds. The larger sized vessels allow more time at sea. A typical New England\nlongline vessel generally ranges from 60 to 80 feet in length, and fishes off New England in\nthe summer and fall. As winter approaches, these vessels work their way southward.\nChapter 2 - HMS Gear Types - 90","Fishing trips in this fishery tend to be longer than in other fisheries, averaging 30 days and\n16 sets. Principal ports for this fishery range from San Juan, PR through Portland, ME, and\ninclude Fairhaven, MA, and Barnegat Light, NJ. There have been approximately ten to\nfifteen distant water vessels in recent years, reduced from a peak of 60 to 70 vessels in the\nlate 1980s and early 1990s.\nThe Caribbean Island Tuna and Swordfish Fishery\nThis fleet is similar to the southeast coastal fishing fleet in that both are comprised\nprimarily of smaller vessels that make short trips relatively near-shore, producing very high\nquality fresh product. Both fleets also encounter relatively high numbers of undersized\nswordfish at certain times of the year. Longline vessels targeting highly migratory species\nin the Caribbean use fewer hooks per set, on average, fishing deeper in the water column\nthan the distant water fleet off New England, the northeast coastal fleet, and the Gulf of\nMexico yellowfin tuna fleet. This fishery is typical of most pelagic fisheries, being truly a\nmulti-species fishery, with swordfish as a substantial portion of the total catch. Yellowfin\ntuna, dolphin fish, and, to a lesser extent, bigeye tuna, are other important components of the\nlanded catch. Principal ports are St. Croix, USVI and San Juan, PR. Many of these high-\nquality fresh fish are sold to local markets to support the tourist trade in the Caribbean.\n2.5.2\nBottom Longlines\nThe Atlantic bottom longline fishery targets large coastal sharks, with landings\ndominated by sandbar and blacktip sharks. Gear characteristics vary slightly by region, but\nin general, a ten-mile long monofilament bottom longline, containing about 750 hooks, is\nfished overnight. Skates, sharks, or various finfishes are used as bait (GSAFDF, 1997). The\ngear typically consists of a heavy monofilament mainline with lighter weight monofilament\ngangions. Some fishermen may occasionally use a flexible 1/16 inch wire rope as gangion\nmaterial or as a short leader above the hook.\nCommercial shark fishing effort with bottom longline gear is concentrated in the\nsoutheastern United States and Gulf of Mexico. McHugh and Murray (1997) found in a\nsurvey of shark fishery participants that the largest concentration of bottom longline\nfishing vessels is found along the central Gulf coast of Florida, with the John's Pass -\nMadeira Beach area considered the center of directed shark fishing activities. In 1996, the\ngreatest number of shark permits was issued in Florida (63 percent), followed by Louisiana\nand North Carolina (seven percent each). Focusing on the 565 permit holders who landed\nat least one large coastal shark in 1995 or 1996 (\"active\" permit holders), Florida is the\nlead state, with over 61 percent of active permit holders, followed by Louisiana and\nNorth Carolina with eight and seven percent, respectively. Of the 40 vessels that\ncumulatively caught half the reported landings, 55 percent listed Florida as their home state,\nfollowed by North Carolina at 15 percent, and Louisiana at ten percent. As with all HMS\nfisheries, some shark fishery participants move from their home ports to active fishing areas\nas the seasons change.\nChapter 2 - HMS Gear Types - 91","Between 1994 and 1997, the Gulf and South Atlantic Fisheries Development\nFoundation's Observer Program observed 5.5 million hook hours of effort that caught\nmore than 26,000 sharks (GSAFDF, 1997). Their observations indicated that average\nbottom longline sets lasted between 10.1 and 14.9 hours, with longer sets typical of the\nNorth Carolina and Florida Gulf fisheries and shorter sets typical of the South Carolina/\nGeorgia fishery. North Carolina fishermen, on average, set the longest lines (13.7 miles),\nfollowed by the Florida Gulf (10.5 miles) and the South Carolina/Georgia fishery\n(6.9 miles).\nAccording to findings of the GSAFDF's Observer Program, sandbar and blacktip\nsharks dominated catches of large coastal sharks. Depending on region and year, they\nconstituted 60 to 75 percent of the catch and 75 to 95 percent of the landings during the\nperiod 1994 to 1996. Tiger sharks were the third-most common large coastal sharks caught\nduring the three-year period. However, the tiger shark has little market value and is usually\ndiscarded; a few were landed, and some small individuals were used as bait. Other species,\nsuch as dusky, bull, and lemon sharks were found to be of local importance. Five species\n(sandbar, blacktip, dusky, bull, and lemon sharks) constituted 95 percent of the landings.\nVessels operating in the South Atlantic Bight caught and landed a greater diversity of\nspecies than other regions.\n2.5.3\nAtlantic Pelagic Driftnets\nPelagic driftnets are set anywhere from mid-water to the surface and drift with tide and\nwind conditions. The vessel stays with one end of the net to ensure that the net remains\nstretched. Several driftnets may be set end to end in a string. Pelagic driftnets are best\ndescribed as \"entanglement\" nets, rather than gillnets, since the objective is to entangle,\nrather than gill, the target fish. Driftnet fishing for large pelagics is most common at night,\nwith soak times averaging 12 hours. Fishermen prefer fishing when the moon is dark to\nprevent detection of the net by target species. Schools of fish are not specifically targeted\nwith this gear; however, nets are set near oceanographic thermal fronts where large pelagic\nfish congregate. During swordfish seasons in the past, driftnet gear was typically 20 to\n22 inch mesh size, 60 to 70 meshes deep, set 18 to 30 feet below the surface, and with a\nfloatline length of 1.5 miles. The Magnuson-Stevens Act limits the length of the net to\n2.5 km (approximately 1.6 miles).\nAlthough the swordfish driftnet quota was not reached in 1998, NMFS did not reopen\nthe fishery due to high bycatch rates of endangered sea turtles and marine mammals. In\nJanuary 1999, NMFS prohibited the use of driftnets in the Atlantic swordfish fishery,\nincluding the possession of any swordfish when a driftnet was on board a vessel (e.g., in the\ncase of a tuna driftnet trip). This FMP further prohibits the use of driftnets in the tuna\nfishery, although vessels which target other species using driftnets may apply for an\nexempted fishing permit in order to retain incidentally caught Atlantic tunas (other than\nbluefin tuna). To date, no driftnet sets have been made in sole pursuit of sharks although\nNMFS has received inquiries as to the possibility of this fishery. A New England pelagic\ndriftnet shark fishery might further exacerbate bycatch problems with this gear. However,\nNMFS does not anticipate driftnet trips taken to pursue sharks given the limited quota for\nChapter 2 - HMS Gear Types - 92","large coastal sharks and the requirement to discard all tunas and swordfish. If further action\nis needed to limit the use of driftnets, NMFS will consider further rulemaking.\n2.5.4\nAtlantic Coastal Driftnets\nAtlantic tunas other than bluefin tuna are sometimes caught in driftnet fisheries other\nthan the pelagic driftnet fishery. According to NMFS' Northeast Regional Office dealer\nreports, approximately 40 vessels reported using driftnets (other than pelagic) in 1997, down\nfrom about 50 vessels in 1996. In 1997, 26 of the vessels reported landing bonito and/or\nbigeye, albacore, yellowfin, skipjack (BAYS) tunas, with 14 reporting landing BAYS tunas.\nIn 1996, 31 of the vessels reported landing bonito and/or BAYS tunas, with 16 reporting\nBAYS tuna landings. The mesh size of the gear used by these vessels is generally smaller\nthan six inches, and the fishery takes place mainly off southern New England and the\nmid-Atlantic region from Rhode Island to North Carolina during the summer and early fall,\nwith the majority of landings occurring in New Jersey and New York. The mesh size of the\ngear used is generally smaller than six inches, and Table 2.49 presents the landings of these\nvessels for 1996 and 1997. Landings of BAYS tuna made up less than one percent of the\ntotal landings reported, while landings of dogfish and bluefish made up over 40 percent and\napproximately 20 percent, respectively, of the total landings. Other species that made\nup\na\nsignificant portion of these vessels' total landings include monkfish and weakfish.\nThe landings of BAYS tunas by non-pelagic driftnet gear make up a relatively small\nportion of the total U.S. landings of these species. The 1998 U.S. National Report to\nICCAT reports composition of total U.S. landings by non-pelagic driftnets as follows:\nskipjack - about 9.4 percent; albacore - approximately 2.5 percent; yellowfin and bigeye\n-\nless than 0.1 percent each.\nData are also available from 51 observed trips using coastal driftnets from 1996 through\n1998. In slight contrast to the dealer-reported data, the observer data indicate that bluefish\nare the main species caught using this gear type, accounting for over 65 percent of the\nretained catch. Bonito were the second most significant part of the catch, accounting for\n11.5 percent of the retained catch. BAYS tunas accounted for less than one-half of one\npercent of the retained catch for these observed trips. For bycatch of this gear type, refer to\nSection 3.5. The FMP bans this type of gear for BAYS, but NMFS will allow exempted\nfishing permits while the agency studies the fishery over the next few years.\nReported landings of Atlantic tuna for vessels using non-pelagic driftnets, in pounds, 1996 - 1997.\nTable 2.49\n(NMFS Northeast Regional Office Dealer Weighout Reports)\nBAYS\nSkipjack\nAlbacore\nYellowfin\nBigeye\nBonito\nOther\nTotal\nTunas\nCatch\nTunas\n1996\n35,289\n14,976\n19,304\n1,009\n0\n204,883\n5,690,356\n5,725,645\n1997\n50,224\n32,540\n17,105\n339\n240\n150,813\n5,590,585\n5,640,809\nChapter 2 - HMS Gear Types - 93","2.5.5\nSoutheast Shark Drift Gillnets\nGillnet fishing for sharks in the southeast United States (Florida and Georgia coasts)\nhas existed for many years. NMFS conducted an observer program in the southeast shark\ndrift gillnet fishery from 1993 to 1995 (Trent et al., 1997). The following information is\ntaken from those observer data. This fishery is comprised of 12 to 15 vessels approximately\n12.2 to 19.8 meters long that used nets typically 275 to 1,800 meters long and 3.2 to\n4.1 meters deep, with stretched mesh from 12.7 to 29.9 cm. Fishing trips are usually less\nthan 18 hours long and in nearshore areas within 30 nautical miles from port. The number\nof vessels in the fishery increased from five to 11 from 1993 to 1995, but the total number of\ntrips decreased from 185 in 1994 to 149 in 1995. From 1993 to 1995, 48 trips and 52 net\nsets were observed. Eight shark species made up over 99 percent of sharks caught\nincluding, in order of abundance by weight: blacknose, Atlantic sharpnose, blacktip,\nfinetooth, scalloped hammerhead, bonnethead, spinner, and great hammerhead. Ten species\nof finfish and rays made up over 97 percent of the non-shark catch including, in order of\nabundance: king mackerel, little tunny, cownose ray, crevalle jack, cobia, spotted eagle ray,\ngreat barracuda, tarpon, Atlantic stingray, and Spanish mackerel (Trent et al., 1997).\nFrom 1996 through the first fishing period of 1998, no observers were placed on shark\ndrift gillnet vessels due to problems with observer placement (observers were not able to\nview the haul back of the gear) that have since been resolved. Beginning in the second\nfishing period of 1998, shark drift gillnet fishermen were reminded of the requirement to\nnotify NMFS of trips and to carry observers. Seven trips were observed on five vessels in\nthe second period of 1998. Recent legislation in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida has\nprohibited the use of commercial gillnets in state waters, thereby forcing some of these\nvessels into deeper waters under Federal jurisdiction, where gillnets are less effective.\nThis FMP requires 100 percent observer coverage in the shark drift gillnet fishery at all\ntimes, and prohibits the use of gillnets to fish for sharks unless a NMFS-approved observer\nis aboard.\n2.5.6\nSink Gillnets\nA sink gillnet fishery along the north Atlantic coast lands Atlantic bonito and little\ntunny. In terms of catch composition and areas and times in which it takes place, this\nfishery is similar to that of the coastal driftnet fishery described above. In 1997, 27,751 lbs\nof Atlantic bonito, valued at $19,203, were landed using sink gillnets by 27 vessels on\n244 trips (see Table 2.50). On one of these trips little tunny was also landed.\nChapter 2 - HMS Gear Types - 94","Table 2.50 Sink gillnet bonito fishery, 1997. (NMFS Northeast Weighout Database (NMFS, 1997b))\nState\n# of Vessels\n# of Trips\nPounds\nValue\nMaryland\n1\n1\n7\n1\nMassachusetts\n3\n6\n342\n79\nNew Jersey\n4\n5\n135\n125\nNew York\n14\n192\n26,686\n18,801\nRhode Island\n4\n8\n513\n152\nVirginia\n1\n2\n68\n45\nTOTAL\n27\n214\n27,751\n19,203\n2.5.7\nPurse Seines\nU.S. vessels fishing for Atlantic tuna with purse seine gear originally operated from\nseveral ports in the northeastern United States, California, and Puerto Rico. The fishery\ntraditionally targeted small and medium tuna in nearshore waters (rarely outside 200 km)\nbetween Cape Hatteras and Cape Cod in the summer, and giant tuna in the Gulf of Maine in\nlate summer and early fall for the cannery industry. Currently, purse seiners target bluefin\ntuna within 75 miles of the New England coast and BAYS tunas in federal waters off the\nmid-Atlantic coast. A combination of quota regulations and over-investment in fishing\ncapacity has strictly limited the duration of the fishing seasons.\nIn 1982, a limited entry system with non-transferable individual vessel quotas (IVQs)\nfor purse seining was established, effectively excluding any new entrants to this category.\nEqual quotas are assigned to individual vessels by regulation; the IVQ system is possible\ngiven the small pool of ownership in this sector of the fishery. Currently, the Atlantic\nbluefin tuna purse seine fleet is limited to five vessels. In the past, larger distant-water\nseiners from the U.S. Pacific coast and Canada occasionally diverted operations from the\nyellowfin and skipjack tuna fisheries to fish for bluefin tuna, but this practice is no longer\npermitted. These larger vessels may have been less efficient in the shallow shelf waters of\nthe northwest Atlantic than the smaller purse seine vessels currently involved in the fishery.\nPrior to the establishment of the limited access system, up to 21 purse seine vessels\nparticipated in the fishery, landing upwards of 5,000 mt of bluefin on an annual basis.\nWhen the limited access system for the Purse Seine category was first established in\n1982, the five vessels which were allowed to continue participating in the fishery reflected\nthose participating at the time. Currently, while only five vessels participate in the fishery,\napproximately 60 people earn a significant portion of their annual income working on the\nPurse Seine category vessels fishing for bluefin. This does not include the spotter pilots,\ndealers, processors, freight forwarders, and others who derive part of their income from\nthe purse seine fishery. Three of the Purse Seine category vessels land their catch in\nNew Bedford, MA, a community which is very dependent on fishing. The other two Purse\nSeine category vessels land their bluefin in Gloucester and Sandwich, MA, communities\nwhich are also dependent on fishing for their economic and social livelihood. Only one of\nthe currently permitted Purse Seine category vessels participates in other commercial\nChapter 2 - HMS Gear Types - 95","fisheries. The nets and other associated gear used for purse seining are expensive and very\nspecialized, and it may not be cost effective to refit the vessels for other fisheries.\nAtlantic tuna purse seining operations typically use spotter aircraft to locate fish\nschools. The vessels may not even leave the docks until suitable concentrations of fish are\nlocated. Although the season officially opens August 15, the actual start of the seining\nfishing season coincides with availability of fish in schools large and dense enough to offset\nfishing costs. It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the other commercial categories, the\nuse of IVQs has eliminated the \"race to the fish\" in the Purse Seine category. Once\nsufficient densities of fish appear and the fat content is suitable for the market, catch rates\nare generally high and the annual quota for large medium and giant bluefin tuna is usually\nmet within weeks. While bluefin tuna is the primary target of the Purse Seine category\nfishery, opportunistic catch of skipjack and yellowfin tuna can be an important addition to\ntotal annual catch. This FMP sets the Purse Seine category quota at 18.6 percent of the total\nU.S. quota for bluefin tuna, with a cap of 250 mt (divided evenly into five IVQs of 50 mt),\nof which a minimum of 90 percent are giant bluefin tuna (greater than 81 inches) and ten\npercent may be large medium bluefin tuna (73 to 81 inches). In addition, purse seiners are\nlimited to a one percent bycatch limit on undersized bluefin tuna (lesser than 73 inches)\nwhich cannot be sold. Any bycatch of undersized bluefin tuna by these same vessels when\ntargeting yellowfin or skipjack tuna is included in this one-percent limit. Purse seine vessels\ncannot target other tunas unless they have bluefin tuna quota available, in case of bycatch.\n2.5.8\nHandgear (Rod and Reel, Handline and Harpoon)\nThe handgear fishery for HMS includes private vessels, charter vessels, and headboat\nvessels. Details of operations, frequency and duration of trips, and distance ventured\noffshore by recreational fishermen vary widely. The handgear fishery for tuna is composed\nof a diverse collection of vessels and fishermen. Most of the vessels are greater than seven\nmeters in length and are privately owned by individual fishermen. Charter/headboats have\nbeen targeting school bluefin tuna off New York and New Jersey since the early 1900s. A\nrecent survey of anglers that participated in the 1997 winter fishery off Cape Hatteras, NC\nfound that 73 percent of 1,390 vessel trips for bluefin tuna were taken on charterboats\n(Ditton et al., 1998). Small bluefin tuna are typically caught by trolling with artificial lures,\nalthough chunking has become popular in some areas, using rod and reel. Giant bluefin tuna\nare harpooned (a commercial fishery), or are caught by trolling, or by chumming and\ndrifting with several types of hook and line gear. Mackerel, whiting, mullet, ballyhoo, and\nsquid are the usual choices for bait.\nRecreational fishing for medium and giant bluefin tuna with rod and reel generally\ntakes place between December and February off North Carolina. Smaller bluefin tuna are\ntargeted off Virginia, Delaware and Maryland in early to mid-summer, with the center of\nactivity moving northward into the New York Bight as the season progresses. Giant bluefin\ntuna are caught with handgear in Cape Cod Bay, the Gulf of Maine, and other New England\nwaters during summer and early fall. Fishing usually takes place between eight and 200 km\nfrom shore. Beyond these general patterns, the availability of bluefin tuna at a specific\nChapter 2 - HMS Gear Types - 96","location and time is highly dependent on environmental variables that fluctuate from year-\nto-year. Tournaments tend to concentrate fishing effort into a small area.\nThe proportion of domestic HMS landings that is harvested with handgear varies by\nspecies. In 1997, the amount of yellowfin tuna harvested with handgear in the northwest\nAtlantic was roughly three times the amount harvested by longlines. The yellowfin tuna\nrecreational fishery is often the \"staple\" fishery for fishermen along the Atlantic coast.\nYellowfin tuna are often available for a long summer fishing season, and are sought for\nconsumption by many recreational fishermen. During 1997, handgear was used to harvest\n71 percent of total U.S. skipjack tuna landings. Only 27 percent of total U.S. bigeye tuna\nlandings in 1997 were attributed to handgear, with most activity occurring in rod and reel\nfisheries between Cape Hatteras and Massachusetts. Approximately one-third of U.S.\nlandings of albacore tuna were caught with handgear in 1997. There are minimal data\navailable on current rod and reel fishing for swordfish. In 1997, only 15 swordfish\nencountered by rod and reel fishermen were reported to the Large Pelagic Survey.\nHarpoon vessels formerly operating out of Rhode Island and Massachusetts\ntraditionally took extended trips for swordfish north and east of the Hudson Canyon and\nparticularly off Georges Bank, landing as many as 20 to 25 large swordfish over a ten-day\nperiod. Due to decreased availability of the large swordfish they target, there are no known\ncommercial harpoon fishermen (who use only harpoons) who have both a current permit and\nthe specified landings required for a directed permit. As part of the limited access program\nimplemented in this FMP, NMFS will issue a handgear permit to those fishermen who\nprovide documentation of having been issued a swordfish permit for use with harpoon gear\nor those who landed swordfish with handgear as evidenced by logbook records, verifiable\nsales slips or receipts from registered dealers, or state landings records. NMFS will also\nissue handgear permits to those applicants who meet the earned income requirement, i.e.,\nthose who had derived more than 50 percent of their earned income from commercial\nfishing through the harvest and first sale of fish or from charter/headboat fishing, or those\nwho had gross sales of fish greater than $20,000 harvested from their vessel, during one of\nthe three calendar years preceding the application. See Chapter 4 for a description of the\nhandgear permit for swordfish under the limited access system.\nIn the past, sharks were often called \"the poor man's marlin.\" Recreational shark\nfishing with rod and reel is now a popular sport at all social and economic levels, largely\nbecause of accessibility to the resource. Sharks can be caught virtually anywhere in salt\nwater, with even large specimens available in the nearshore area to surf anglers or small\nboaters. Most recreational shark fishing takes place from small to medium-size vessels.\nMakos, white sharks, and large pelagic sharks are generally accessible only to those aboard\nocean-going vessels. Recreational shark fisheries are exploited primarily by private vessels\nand charter/headboats although there are some shore-based fishermen active in the\nFlorida Keys.\nChapter 2 - HMS Gear Types - 97","2.6 Current Permitting, Reporting, Data Collection Requirements and Fisheries Monitoring\nMonitoring programs form the foundation of effective management in both commercial and\nrecreational fisheries. NMFS strives to ensure that this information: 1) is collected and\nprocessed efficiently; 2) avoids duplication or redundancy; 3) is compatible with other data\nsources; 4) is secure; 5) minimizes burdens on those reporting; 6) is complete and accurate; 7) is\nstatistically valid and internally consistent; 8) is relevant and responsive to users' needs; and 9) is\navailable on a timely basis. Data collection efforts must meet the requirements of the Atlantic\nTunas Convention Act. NMFS has published a comprehensive research and monitoring plan for\nHMS which will be updated on an annual basis.\nCommercial logbook data, including catch and effort statistics, discards, and locations of\ncatches, are used to estimate catch per unit effort and discard rates of target and bycatch species.\nData from licensed Atlantic tuna, swordfish, and shark dealers are used primarily for quota\nmonitoring, but statistics on fish lengths and weights may also be used to determine average\nweights at size, which can vary substantially from year to year. At-sea observer programs\nprovide detailed information on the locations of fishing activities, fishing effort expended per\nunit time, other factors affecting fishing success, the composition of fish catches, species, sizes\nand amounts retained, biological condition of captured fish, and discard rates of target and\nbycatch species. Land-based surveys of recreational fisheries, including dockside intercept\nsurveys and telephone surveys, provide similar information on recreational fisheries. These data\non catch and effort are used to develop standardized indices of catch per unit effort which, in\nturn, are used as indices of relative stock abundance in stock assessment models.\nWhile data collection is carried out primarily by NMFS, monitoring and research on large\npelagics is conducted by a combination of government, academic, and to a lesser extent, private\nresearch entities. Research priorities are gleaned from SCRS annual reports; recommendations\nfrom the Advisory Committee to the U.S. Section of ICCAT; recommendations from the HMS,\nBillfish, and Longline Advisory Panels; recommendations from the Shark Evaluation\nWorkshops, and from interaction among researchers, fishery managers and constituents. The\nprimary objective of the research and statistics program is to improve the knowledge base\nnecessary to design, implement, and monitor domestic and international management measures.\n2.6.1\nMonitoring and Reporting in the Commercial Fishery\nCommercial fisheries for Atlantic tunas, sharks, and swordfish are monitored through a\ncombination of vessel logbooks, dealer reports, port sampling, cooperative agreements with\nstates, and scientific observer coverage. Logbooks contain information on fishing vessel\nactivity, including dates of trips, number of sets, area fished, number of fish and other\nmarine species caught, released and retained. In some cases, social and economic data such\nas volume and cost of fishing inputs are provided. Monitoring of U.S. high seas commercial\nfisheries for large pelagics will be further enhanced by the requirement for a Vessel\nMonitoring System (VMS), which is described in Section 3.8. Observer coverage for HMS\nfisheries is also described later in this section.\nChapter 2 - Permitting/Reporting/Monitoring - 98","Vessel and Dealer Permitting and Reporting\nCurrently all commercial vessels that hold HMS permits are required to display the\nofficial number of the vessel SO as to be clearly visible from an enforcement vessel or\naircraft. Vessel permits for commercial and recreational vessels targeting Atlantic tunas\n(bluefin, yellowfin, bigeye, albacore, and skipjack) must be renewed on an annual basis.\nNMFS has issued approximately 20,000 Atlantic tuna vessel permits under an automated\npermitting system that was implemented in 1997.\nAnnual permits are also required for U.S. commercial vessels fishing for swordfish and\nfor those commercial vessels fishing for Atlantic sharks in the U.S. Exclusive Economic\nZone (EEZ). This FMP implements a two-tiered limited access permit system for directed\nand incidental longline fishing for swordfish, sharks and BAYS tunas based on current and\nhistorical participation in these fisheries. The limited access program requires pelagic\nlongline vessels targeting tuna or swordfish to have tuna, shark, and swordfish permits\n(either directed or incidental.) Longline vessels targeting sharks must have a shark permit\n(either directed or incidental.) The limited access program is intended to stabilize the fleet\nsize and provide an opportunity for NMFS to collect data, conduct studies, and work\ncooperatively with constituents to develop a flexible, and permanent, effort control program.\nSee Chapter 4 for a detailed description of the limited access program for HMS.\nDealer permits are required for the commercial receipt of Atlantic tuna, swordfish, and\nsharks. A separate dealer permit is required for each of the fisheries. Bluefin tuna dealers\nreport imports through the Bluefin Statistical Document, as described below, while\nswordfish dealers report through the dealer import form. Permits for dealers to purchase\nspecies in the swordfish or shark management unit are issued by the NMFS Southeast\nRegional Office and permits for the Atlantic tuna fishery, including bluefin tuna, are issued\nby the NMFS Northeast Regional Office through a government contractor. Dealer permits\nfor sharks and swordfish are issued for a 12-month period from the first of the month\nfollowing the month in which the business was incorporated. Atlantic tuna dealer permits\nare issued for a calendar year (January 1 through December 31). Dealer reports must be\nsubmitted to NMFS twice a month for all swordfish, sharks and tunas.\nSwordfish semi-annual commercial quotas are monitored through a combination of\nvessel logbooks, tally sheets, port sampling, dealer reports, and scientific observer coverage.\nLogbooks contain information on fishing vessel activity, including dates of trips, number of\nsets, area fished, and the number of marine species caught, released, and retained. In some\ncases, social and economic data such as volume and cost of fishing inputs are also provided.\nDaily logbooks must be completed within 48 hours of a trip and postmarked within seven\ndays of sale of the swordfish and/or tuna off-loaded from a trip. Copies of tally sheets must\nbe submitted with the logbook forms. If no fishing occurred during a month, a report SO\nstated must be submitted in accordance with instructions provided with the logbook forms\n(\"zero reporting\"). In October 1997, NMFS implemented the same management measures\nfor the south Atlantic swordfish stock that are currently in place for the north Atlantic\nswordfish stock, including vessel permitting, logbook reporting, and observer requirements.\nChapter 2 - Permitting/Reporting/Monitoring - 99","NMFS collects shark data through reports from owners/operators of permitted vessels\nunder a mandatory commercial logbook program and the shark fishery observer program.\nCommercial landings data for sharks are also collected by seafood dealers and port agents\nwho routinely record the weight and average ex-vessel price of sharks. Species-specific\ncatch and landings statistics for sharks are problematic, since there are many similar species\nand identification of dressed sharks is difficult. To increase species-specific reporting,\nNMFS intends to develop a field guide for sharks to assist fishermen in the identification of\nspecies for the required catch reports. NMFS is required by the Biological Opinion to work\ncooperatively with the Florida Department of Environmental to compare shark drift gillnet\nlandings data from various sources. This is necessary to better determine actual effort levels\nfor improved sea turtle take estimates and to assess what effort levels may be occurring in\nthe area during right whale season.\nMonitoring of the commercial bluefin tuna fishery is conducted primarily through the\ndealer reporting system. Dealers are required to record each purchase of Atlantic bluefin\ntuna on a landing card and provide the information to NMFS within 24 hours of the\npurchase or receipt of the fish. The landing cards, which are used to monitor the bluefin\ntuna quota, include the following information: dealer number, dealer name, date the fish\nwas landed, harvest gear, fork length, weight (whole or dressed), identification tag number,\narea where fish was caught, port where landed, Atlantic tuna permit number, vessel name,\nand the name and dated signature of the vessel's master. In 1998, NMFS began using\nFAX/Optical Character Recognition (OCR) technology for bluefin tuna landing cards in\norder to facilitate data entry and quota monitoring. Bluefin tuna dealers are also required to\nsubmit summary reports to NMFS on a biweekly basis, which provide additional economic\ndata including the destination of the fish, price per pound, and quality rating.\nWhile there are currently no commercial quotas for tunas other than bluefin tuna,\ncommercial catches of these species are monitored through a combination of vessel\nlogbooks, port sampling, dealer reports, and scientific observer coverage. Vessels are\nrequired to report catches of Atlantic tunas in their logbooks, and dealers are required to\nreport receipt of Atlantic tunas on their dealer report forms. Commercial landings\ninformation on Atlantic tunas is enhanced through cooperative agreements with states that\nreport fisheries information to NMFS and through a port agent network in the Northeast that\ncovers Virginia through Maine.\nTrade Monitoring\nNMFS is active in monitoring imports and exports of HMS. NOAA Form 370, the\nFisheries Certificate of Origin, is currently used to monitor imports of tuna and other fish\nproducts to certify that the fish were not harvested by methods injurious to dolphins. It is\nnot required for fresh fish shipments but is a requirement for all frozen tuna shipments\nentering his country. The NOAA Form 370 may be submitted to Customs through\nelectronic filing.\nAs described in Section 2.2.4, all bluefin tuna (Atlantic and Pacific) imported to, or\nexported from, the United States must be accompanied by a Bluefin Statistical Document\nChapter 2 - Permitting/Reporting/Monitoring - 100","(BSD) in order to meet the requirements of ICCAT's BSD Program. The purpose of the\nBSD is to track bluefin tuna trade as a means to improve the reliability of statistical\ninformation on bluefin tuna landings, since a considerable number of vessels fishing for\nbluefin tuna are registered to non-member nations and not all nations fully report their\nlandings to ICCAT. In 1996, 9,429 mt of bluefin tuna were added to the reported ICCAT\nlandings in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean based on BSD reports. In the United\nStates, the completed BSD must be sent to the NMFS Northeast Regional Office within\n24 hours of a bluefin tuna shipment (Atlantic or Pacific) entering or leaving the country.\nInformation collected through the BSD program is reported to ICCAT on a semi-annual\nbasis and is used to assess total bluefin tuna mortality as well as compliance with quotas.\nThe Certificate of Eligibility (COE) program for\nswordfish tracks the country and ocean of origin of\nswordfish, and validates that if the shipment contains\nAtlantic swordfish or swordfish parts, they are\nderived from swordfish weighing more than the U.S.\nminimum size of 33 lbs dw. These regulations are\ndesigned to facilitate the collection of information\nrelating to the trade in Atlantic swordfish which may\nhinder conservation efforts by the United States\nand ICCAT.\nA Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has\nSmall swordfish are sometimes encountered\nrecently been developed between U.S. Customs and\nby commercial fishing vessels. Photo\nNMFS to facilitate the transmission of U.S. Customs\ncredit: Dan Stawinski\ndata related to bluefin tuna and swordfish trade on a\nmonthly basis. NMFS has requested import data on fresh, chilled, or frozen bluefin tuna and\nswordfish. Swordfish products in all forms (e.g., fresh and frozen steaks, frozen fillets) are\nsubject to ICCAT import monitoring requirements. Data received under this MOU include\nport of entry, importer, consignee, weight of shipment, country of origin, and type of\nshipment. These data help NMFS identify major importers and exporters and points of entry\nfor various swordfish product forms. NMFS works with U.S. Customs to enforce trade\nrestrictions on HMS (e.g., bluefin tuna from Panama, Belize, and Honduras). The MOU\nalso helps NMFS to verify the bluefin tuna import data it receives from dealers and identify\nthose importers not in compliance with the BSD program. Aggregated data on import,\nexport, and re-export of HMS, including countries of origin, product form, and weight and\nvalue of shipments, are available to the public through the website of the NMFS Division of\nStatistics and Economics (http://kingfish.ssp.nmfs.gov).\nObserver Coverage\nThis FMP requires observer coverage of all the commercial fisheries that target HMS.\nHowever, all vessels from a particular sector may not be selected for observer coverage\nbased on sampling design or objectives of the program in a particular year. At-sea observer\nprograms allow NMFS to collect information on the conduct of the fishery and the type\n(species, size, condition) and amount of total catch, both landed and discarded, from the\nChapter 2 - Permitting/Reporting/Monitoring - 101","fishery. Given the multispecies nature of HMS fisheries and the overfished condition of\nseveral target species, collection of such information will be helpful in meeting the\nobjectives of this FMP and the requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.\nScientific observer coverage of the U.S. pelagic longline fleet was initiated by NMFS in\n1992. Government contractors and NMFS observers collect catch data on pelagic longline\nvessels fishing in the waters of the northwest Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and Caribbean\nSea. An ICCAT recommendation requires five percent observer coverage of vessels fishing\nfor yellowfin and bigeye tuna. Selection of U.S. vessels is a random, five percent target\nsampling based on the fishing vessel performance information provided through mandatory\npelagic logbooks. The NMFS' Southeast Fisheries Science Center and NMFS' Northeast\nFisheries Science Center successfully recorded effort from 652 sets during 1994, 699 sets\nduring 1995, 362 sets during 1996, and 460 sets during 1997. Observers from the NMFS'\nSoutheast Fisheries Science Center have recorded over 50,000 fish (primarily swordfish,\ntuna, and sharks), marine mammals, turtles, and seabirds during this time period. NMFS is\nrequired under the ESA to have five percent coverage of the pelagic longline fleet, and during\ncertain times and in certain areas, 100 percent coverage of the shark drift gillnet fleet. This\nFMP requires 100 percent observer coverage for the southeast shark drift gillnet fleet.\nAdditional data on sex ratio at size for Atlantic swordfish have been collected since\n1989 by the NMFS' Southeast Fisheries Science Center in cooperation with volunteer\ncaptains in the U.S. longline fleet. Scientific observers and cooperative vessel captains and\ncrews have provided biological material for analysis of swordfish reproductive behavior, age\nand growth, and stock structure identification. Morphometric (length and weight) and other\nbiological data have primarily been collected within the range of U.S. vessels operating in\nthe western Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and Caribbean Sea. Additionally, swordfish\ndata have been collected by the ICCAT-sponsored Venezuelan observer program aboard\nVenezuelan longline vessels fishing the lower Caribbean Sea since 1991.\nSince 1994, NMFS has provided funds to the Gulf and South Atlantic Fisheries\nDevelopment Foundation (GSAFDF) and the University of Florida to run an observer\nprogram for the southeast U.S. commercial shark longline fishery. Additional funding was\nprovided through a Saltonstall-Kennedy grant in 1996. The program collects information on\ncatch and effort, size/age and sex composition of the catch, landings, discards, and other\nbiological information about the catch. The program is responsible for developing what is\nbelieved to be the largest biological database in existence for western North Atlantic sharks.\nThe voluntary program documented two percent of U.S. commercial shark landings during\nthe 1994 to 1997 period, observing 5.5 million hook-hours of effort and more than 26,000\nsharks (GSAFDF, 1998).\nThe NMFS Biological Opinion requires observer coverage in some fisheries to avoid\njeopardy to animals that are protected under the Endangered Species Act. Five percent\ncoverage of the pelagic longline fishery is required and a final recommendation of the\nAtlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Team was to increase observer coverage in this\nfishery, which would provide more accurate data on levels of protected species bycatch. In\naddition, the Biological Opinion requires NMFS to provide observers with complete\nChapter 2 - Permitting/Reporting/Monitoring - 102","sampling kits and protocols to maximize data collection opportunities, especially with\nregard to analyzing the relative proportion of loggerheads taken from the northern\nsubpopulation. The Biological Opinion also requires 100 percent observer coverage of the\nshark drift gillnet fleet during right whale season.\nVessel Monitoring Systems\nIn 1997, ICCAT recommended that nations implement a vessel monitoring system\n(VMS) program to track the fishing positions of their larger commercial vessels fishing for\nHMS by 1999. This FMP goes a step further to implement a VMS program for all U.S.\npelagic longline vessels. The VMS program will support efforts to enforce time/area\nclosures. In the past, NMFS had a voluntary VMS pilot program that allowed vessels to\noffload swordfish after the directed fishery closure SO long as they ceased fishing by the time\nof the closure. The new VMS initiative will also allow NMFS to track a more accurate\ngeographic distribution of pelagic longline fishing effort. In addition to providing an\nopportunity for real time monitoring, and delayed off-loading and/or transit during directed\nfishery closures, VMS will promote safety-at-sea and communication for participating\nvessels. In the future, VMS may be used to collect near real-time catch and effort data, as\nwell as bycatch data reported by observers.\n2.6.2\nMonitoring and Reporting in the Recreational Fishery\nBy definition, recreational landings of Atlantic HMS are those that are not marketed\nthrough commercial channels, therefore it is not possible to monitor anglers' catches\nthrough ex-vessel transactions as in the commercial fishery. Instead, NMFS conducts\nstatistical sampling surveys of the recreational fisheries. These survey programs have been\nused for well over a decade. The two primary survey vehicles of the recreational sector\nconducted by NMFS are the Marine Recreational Fishing Statistics Survey (MRFSS) and\nthe Large Pelagic Survey. Estimates of U.S. recreational harvests for tuna and tuna-like\nspecies are currently under active review as described in the 1998 U.S. National Report to\nICCAT (October, 1998).\nThe MRFSS is a survey designed to provide regional and state-wide estimates of\nrecreational catch for marine fish species in the Atlantic. It was not designed to account for\nthe unique characteristics of HMS fisheries, although information on these species is\nfrequently obtained by the survey. The MRFSS is a random-dial telephone survey,\nrestricted to coastal counties from Virginia through Louisiana. The MRFSS does not cover\nthe state of Texas nor does it cover the charter/headboat fisheries. Therefore, data from the\ncharter/headboat sector of the fishery are provided by an independent survey in the State of\nTexas and by the NMFS Headboat Survey in the southeast United States. Information\ncollected by the MRFSS on recreational shark landings is used to estimate the number of\nfishing trips, the number and species of sharks caught and/or landed, the weight of these\nsharks, and the number of persons fishing. Shark species are identified to the extent\npossible.\nChapter 2 - Permitting/Reporting/Monitoring - 103","The MRFSS estimates three types of catch:\n1. Fish that are available for identification, enumeration, weighing, and measuring by\ndockside interviewers are called Type A catch or landings;\n2. Fish not brought ashore in whole form but used as bait, filleted, or discarded dead\nare called Type B1 catch (Type A and Type B1 catch together comprise harvest);\n3. Fish released alive are called Type B2 catch; and\n4. The sum of Catch Type A, Catch Type B1, and Catch Type B2 is called total catch.\nThe MRFSS estimates of recreational landings and harvest are calculated using Type A\nand B1 catches only. Estimates of Type B2 catches were not included. Thus, estimates of\n\"catch\" are actually estimates of immediate recreational fishing mortality as landings or\nharvest. A complete accounting of fishing mortality would include post-release mortality\nassociated with Type B2 fish. Quantitative estimates of post-release or delayed mortality of\nHMS in recreational fisheries are not available at this time.\nThe Large Pelagic Survey was originally designed to estimate annual recreational\ncatches of bluefin tuna from North Carolina through Massachusetts in the summer months\n(primarily for small and medium bluefin tuna) and to evaluate abundance trends of bluefin\ntuna by monitoring catch and effort associated with all sizes of bluefin tuna. Although it\nwas designed for bluefin tuna, the Large Pelagic Survey collects catch information on other\nhighly migratory species at certain times and in certain areas. There are two phases to this\nsurvey: 1) dockside interviews and observation to obtain number, species, and sizes of fish\ncaught during a trip; and 2) a telephone survey directed at those people likely to be active in\nthe HMS fishery to obtain the amount of effort during the prior reporting period and\ncorroborative information about the number of fish captured. In 1992, the Large Pelagic\nSurvey was redesigned to provide inseason monitoring of recreational catches of bluefin\ntuna relative to the quota. This was done by increasing the frequency of the reporting\nperiod, increasing both dockside and telephone sampling frequency, expanding the areas and\ntimes of monitoring, and focusing the sampling in the times and areas most important for the\nbluefin tuna catch estimation. Although the Large Pelagic Survey was designed for bluefin\ntuna, the data are also used to estimate catch information for other HMS and to monitor\ncatch per unit effort trends.\nIn 1997, NMFS instituted a mandatory Automated Catch Reporting System to\nsupplement monitoring of the recreational fishery for Atlantic bluefin tuna. Although this\ncall-in requirement (1-888-USA-TUNA) is an integral part of the Angling category\nmonitoring system, it has not replaced traditional survey methods in the recreational fishery.\nThe recreational surveys described above are conducted simultaneously in order to provide a\nmeasure of comparison for the reported catch estimates. All vessels landing bluefin tuna\nagainst the Angling category quota are required to participate in both the call-in reporting\nand survey programs. NMFS will continue to examine the results from these quota\nChapter 2 - Permitting/Reporting/Monitoring - 104","monitoring approaches together to enhance the accuracy and timeliness of quota monitoring\nin the Angling category for bluefin tuna.\nA NMFS pilot program includes a telephone survey of charterboat fishing effort in\nLouisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and the Florida Gulf Coast, which is being conducted in\ncooperation with the Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission, the Alabama Department\nof Conservation and Natural Resources, the Florida Department of Environmental\nProtection, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, and the Mississippi\nDepartment of Marine Resources. The NMFS Panama City Laboratory has also conducted a\npilot logbook panel survey of charterboat fishing effort along the Florida panhandle. These\npilot programs are being tested as alternative methods for estimating charterboat fishing\neffort already covered by the MRFSS. The pilot surveys are currently being evaluated in\ncomparison with the current MRFSS method to determine which method is best for\nestimating charterboat fishing effort. Although this FMP establishes a mandatory logbook\nreporting requirement for charter/headboat vessels, the pilot program is investigating\nalternate means of obtaining accurate catch estimates in this fishery, while minimizing\nsurvey costs and the reporting burden.\nNMFS is committed to working with the states to develop more effective partnerships\nfor monitoring the recreational fisheries. As part of a program launched in 1998, more than\n25 reporting stations have been established in North Carolina, and Angling category vessel\noperators in the winter fishery are required to fill out a catch reporting card for each bluefin\ntuna. Information on these angler catch cards is entered into a database in the Northeast\nRegional Office on a weekly basis. This program, coordinated by NMFS in cooperation\nwith the North Carolina Division of Marine Fisheries, was continued in 1999. Other mid-\nAtlantic states, including Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia have demonstrated an interest in\nestablishing a similar program. There are significant challenges associated with developing\ntagging programs for the recreational fishery, since the participants are widely dispersed and\nrecreational landings are not channeled through any central points of contact (e.g., fish\ndealers in the commercial fishery). NMFS believes that a successful tagging program\ndepends upon effective state and federal coordination that takes into account regional\ndifferences in the fishery, in addition to cooperation with the recreational industry.\nIn April 1998, NMFS implemented a mandatory registration system for tournaments\ninvolving any billfish, with mandatory reporting if selected. This FMP extends the\nrequirement to tournaments directed at any Atlantic HMS, in order to improve estimates of\nHMS catches and landings by tournament participants. Tournament registration allows\nNMFS to establish a universe in order to expedite outreach to recreational fishermen who\nparticipate in tournaments. The reporting forms also provide NMFS with catch, release, and\nfishing effort statistics that are useful in characterizing the fishery. Because the Large\nPelagic Survey does not collect recreational fishing data in the southeast United States or the\nGulf of Mexico, tournament data can provide information on which species are targeted in\nthese areas, as well as release rates for each species. Finally, this information allows NMFS\nscientists to travel to selected tournaments to collect data on age/growth and sexual maturity\nthat are used in stock assessments.\nChapter 2 - Permitting/Reporting/Monitoring - 105","2.6.3\nOther Data Collection Programs\nTagging\nTagging studies are used primarily to determine the distribution, migration paths,\ngrowth rates and rates of movement of HMS. These factors relate directly to the key\nmanagement issues of stock identification and stock productivity. When a tagged fish is\nrecaptured, the location, size, and other biological characteristics are assessed as compared\nto conditions when the fish was released. This has proven to be a cost-effective and reliable\nmeans of gathering information that can provide the basis for determining the growth and\nmovement of HMS. To date, tag returns have demonstrated the existence of trans-Atlantic\nmigrations, but most HMS are reported recaptured on the same side of the Atlantic.\nAll release and recapture data collected by the Southeast Fisheries Science Center's\nCooperative Tagging Center (CTC) are made available to ICCAT. The CTC is a continuing\njoint research effort by scientists and recreational and commercial fishermen that is designed\nto provide information on the movements and biology of HMS through the direct\nparticipation of the public. NMFS has established Internet access for communication\nbetween the CTC database and other agencies or countries. This will facilitate high-speed\ntransfer of tagging data to and from other tagging programs, with the intent to establish the\nCTC as the central depository for HMS release and recapture information. In the eastern\nAtlantic and Mediterranean Sea, an ICCAT tag recovery program was established in 1997,\nwith coordinators appointed for key geographic locations throughout the area.\nFishermen and scientists working with the CTC released more than 2,400 bluefin tuna\nwith conventional tags during 1997. As of August 1997, at least 183 of the bluefin tuna\nreleased near Hatteras had been recaptured from off the western North Atlantic and an\nadditional six were recaptured in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. The number of\nswordfish tagged and released by U.S. pelagic longline vessels has substantially increased\nsince the United States implemented minimum size regulations in 1991, now averaging\nabout 1,200 fish annually. Reported recoveries of tagged swordfish have likewise increased.\nThe National Marine Fisheries Service conducts an extensive Cooperative Shark\nTagging Program (CSTP) using volunteer assistance of recreational and commercial\nfishermen. Fishermen catch sharks primarily on rod and reel, on private vessels and\ncharterboats, at sport fishing tournaments and on longline gear aboard research vessels and\ncommercial fishing vessels. In 1997, members of the Cooperative Shark Tagging Program\ntagged 8,816 fish representing 31 species of sharks and rays and 11 species of teleosts. This\nis the second highest number tagged in a single year (second only to 1996) and brings the\ntotal to more than 147,000. U.S. fishermen, in conjunction with fishermen from England,\nCanada, Portugal, Ireland, France, and Spain were responsible for the tagging effort.\nRecreational anglers tagged 68 percent of sharks, fishing with rod and reel and tagging free\nswimming sharks, while NMFS and other biologists tagged 21 percent using longline, gill\nnets, and handlines. Commercial fishermen and observers on board commercial vessels\ntagged an additional 1,016 fish (11 percent).\nChapter 2 - Permitting/Reporting/Monitoring - 106","Shark tagging studies, in cooperation with Mote Marine Laboratory's Center for Shark\nResearch, have been underway since 1991. Primarily juvenile and small adult sharks have\nbeen tagged in a number of coastal areas of the Gulf of Mexico, including off Florida,\nTexas, and Mexico. An intensive tagging study has been underway since 1995 in Quintana\nRoo, Mexico, in cooperation with Mote Marine Laboratory and Mexico's Instituto Nacional\nde la Pesca. These various studies are designed to map shark nursery areas and migratory\npatterns, assess age and growth characteristics, assist with stock identification, and evaluate\nthe degree of exchange of shark stocks across international boundaries.\nRecently, tagging technology has progressed to create fish tags equipped with small\ncomputers that can store information on changes in location and temperature for years at a\ntime. Although these archival tags are costly, the information content of a single tag is\nmuch greater than that associated with traditional tagging methods. The ability to trace the\nmigration of an individual fish may lead to better determinations of stock units for HMS\nmanagement. In the future, these high-technology archival tags may provide definitive\ninformation on bluefin tuna spawning site fidelity in the western Atlantic and Mediterranean\nSea, indicating whether bluefin tuna that swim across the ocean actually return to spawn in\nthe area where they originated or spawn in multiple areas. Archival tags also facilitate\nbehavioral studies that investigate the physiological and environmental preferences of HMS.\nIn recent years, programs involving non-traditional tagging, including pop-up and\narchival satellite tags, have been gaining momentum. The catch and release winter fishery\nfor medium and large bluefin tuna in North Carolina provides a good setting for conducting\nresearch on archival tagging. As of March 1999, ten bluefin tuna with archival tags have\nbeen recovered, two in the Mediterranean, two in Canada and six along the Atlantic coast of\nthe United States, and information has been retrieved via satellite from 42 of the pop-up\nsatellite tags. Preliminary findings of this research have been published in the Proceedings\nof the National Academy of Science. In the early months of 1999, researchers off the coast\nof North Carolina placed 100 additional archival tags in mature bluefin tuna weighing\nbetween 350 and 600 lbs. Nine more pop-off satellite tags have been placed on the mature\nbluefin, six off the Carolinas, and three in the Gulf of Mexico off Louisiana. These tags are\nprogrammed to pop-off before September 1999. Tagging of medium and giant bluefin tuna\nwill continue to improve the documentation of year class differences in movement patterns,\ndefinition of geographical boundaries, and investigation of potential overlap of Atlantic\nbluefin tuna stocks. This research is designed to identify any patterns of movement that\nmight indicate spawning versus feeding grounds based on geolocation, temporal visitation,\nand temperature data. Possible correlations between the movement patterns of bluefin tuna\nand oceanic features such as temperature and currents will also be examined over long time\nperiods.\nAs part of the comprehensive plan for HMS monitoring and research, NMFS scientists\nwill enhance cooperative partnerships to develop new systems that optimize the release and\nrecapture of tagged HMS. Future research sponsored by the agency is likely to include tag\nperformance experiments, improved tag and attachment anchor design, and modification of\nreporting protocols to improve recapture information. In addition to their important\nimplications for stock structure, new tagging technology and field and laboratory\nChapter 2 - Permitting/Reporting/Monitoring - 107","experiments will provide NMFS with additional data to support the estimation of HMS life\nhistory parameters. These improved tagging efforts will also be useful in future investiga-\ntions of post-release survival rates for HMS in both commercial and recreational fisheries.\nCooperative Agreements with States\nIn order to facilitate the collection of fisheries data, NMFS has established cooperative\nagreements with many of the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coastal states, Puerto Rico, and\nthe U.S. Virgin Islands to collect fishery statistics. The cooperative agreements do not\nimpose a specific method of data collection for the landings statistics. The states have\nimplemented various procedures that are consistent with their management and regulatory\nneeds to collect these data. The states, however, are bound to provide the landings data as\nmonthly summaries by species by dealer with the county where the product was landed and\nthe area where it was caught. The states are obligated to provide these data within 60 days\nfrom the end of each calendar month.\nA number of states are expanding their data collection programs to include tagging of\nHMS. Cooperation with state agencies, universities and constituents, within the various\nstates, on tagging of HMS is opportunistic and varies from year to year. Shark tagging is\noften carried out through the states under contracts to investigate early life history stages and\ninshore fishing effort on the smaller sharks. The tagging effort coordinated by NMFS for\nbluefin tuna and billfish requires a special tagging kit (50 CFR Ch.II; 285.27). Several state\nagents, and U.S. Coast Guard personnel are aware of this requirement and assist in the\ndistribution of tagging kits from time to time.\nDatabases to Support Management Decisions\nThe information collected by NMFS and other entities on HMS is stored in numerous\ndatabases. The majority of the information collected, including data on catch and effort,\ndiscards, tagging programs, ex-vessel prices, exports and imports, biological sampling, and\nobserver programs, is stored in databases maintained by NMFS at Headquarters and the\nNortheast and Southeast Fisheries Science Centers and Regional Offices. The Regional\nOffices and Headquarters also maintain databases on vessels and dealers permitted to\nparticipate in HMS fisheries. Currently, an effort is underway within NMFS to document\nall existing databases, including those maintained outside the agency, that contain\ninformation on HMS.\nSection 401 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act requires the Secretary of Commerce to work\nwith key stakeholders to develop a proposal for implementing a nationwide fishing vessel\nregistration system and fisheries information collection system. This system will integrate\nall fishery-dependent data systems required under applicable federal statutes and regulations.\nOne of the primary objectives is to reduce the burden on fishermen and other industry\nparticipants who collect fisheries data. Existing programs, systems and infrastructure\ninvestments will be utilized to the extent possible.\nChapter 2 - Permitting/Reporting/Monitoring - 108","While the comprehensive fisheries information and vessel registration systems will be\ncoordinated across regions, they will also be designed to recognize the unique characteristics\nof regional fisheries. The new systems should improve NMFS' ability to aggregate harvest\ndata into national summary-level data. Multiple, independent regional information\nmanagement systems that currently lack a common or overarching framework will soon be\nlinked. The Atlantic Coastal Cooperative Statistics Program (ACCSP), a cooperative state-\nfederal program designed to improve the collection and management of marine and coastal\nfisheries data, is implementing a pilot information management system and other regions are\nengaged in similar strategic planning. The mission of the ACCSP is to cooperatively\ncollect, manage, and disseminate fishery statistical data and information for the conservation\nand management of fishery resources for the Atlantic coast and to support the development\nand operation of a national program. Information on the ACCSP program was provided to a\njoint session of the HMS Advisory Panel and Billfish Advisory Panel.\nThe recently established Core Statistics Program at NMFS has also played a significant\nrole in shaping the fisheries information proposal and will continue to be an integral\ncomponent of the comprehensive system. The fisheries information initiative will seek to\nestablish data quality standards for accuracy and timeliness that are acceptable to all data\nproviders and information managers. The NMFS Division of Fishery Statistics and\nEconomics already maintains several databases that contain information on the value and\nvolume of U.S. commercial landings, wholesale prices, and trade data. Future surveys will\nimprove the collection of information on the costs and earnings of commercial and\nrecreational fishing vessels. These data are important for making allocation decisions and\nfor understanding the consequences of management alternatives on the fishing industry.\nNMFS believes that the new system will build public confidence in the agency's ability to\ncollect fisheries information in the most efficient and effective manner possible.\nChapter 2 - Permitting/Reporting/Monitoring - 109","Table 2.51 HMS permitting and reporting requirements.\nSpecies\nVessels\nDealers/Importers/Tournaments\nBluefin\nLanding cards\nLanding cards\nAt-sea observer (if selected)\nBiweekly dealer report\nLogbooks (if selected)\nBiweekly importer report\nLPS/MRFSS (recreational: if contacted)\nICCAT BSD\nPhone-in report (1-800-USATUNA)\nTournament registration and reporting\nPermits:\nPermits for Dealers and Importers\nAngling\nGeneral\nLongline\nPurse seine\nHMS Charter/Headboat\nTrap\nOther Tuna\nAt-sea observer (if selected)\nBiweekly dealer report\nLogbooks (if selected)\nTournament registration and reporting\nLPS/MRFSS (recreational: if contacted)\nPermits for Dealers\nPermits:\nAngling\nGeneral\nLongline\nPurse seine\nHMS Charter/Headboat\nTrap\nSharks\nAt-sea observer (if selected)\nBiweekly dealer report\nLogbooks (if selected)\nTournament registration and reporting\nLPS/MRFSS (recreational: if contacted)\nPermits for Dealers\nPermits:\nDirected\nIncidental\nHMS Charter/Headboat\nSwordfish\nAt-sea observer (if selected)\nBiweekly dealer/import report\nLogbooks (if selected)\nTournament registration and reporting\nTrip summaries\nPermits for Dealers/Importers\nSet forms\nCertificate of Eligibility for imports\nTally sheets\nLPS/MRFSS (recreational: if contacted)\nPermits:\nDirected (Longline)\nDirected (Handgear)\nIncidental\nHMS Charter/Headboat\nChapter 2 - Permitting/Reporting/Monitoring - 110","2.7 Existing Time/Area Closures under MMPA and Other Laws\nIn addition to the time/area closure implemented in this FMP (see Section 3.5), there are a\nnumber of time/area closures implemented by NMFS, states, or the Councils which may affect\nthe way HMS fishermen fish. These include time/area closures to protect large whales or coral\nhabitat. Some of these time/area closures are shown in Figure 2.6 below. Each closure affects\ndifferent gear types, lasts for different lengths of time, and may have observer requirements.\nHighly migratory species fishermen who fish in these areas must follow these regulations as well\nas the regulations outlined in this FMP. For a complete understanding of the regulations shown\nin the figure below, HMS fishermen should refer to 64 FR 7529 (Large Whale Take Reduction\nPlan) and 50 CFR 622.35 (c) (Oculina Banks). The Caribbean Coral Reef Plan time/area closure\nis entering the proposed rule stage and is not final at this time. Because HMS cover the Atlantic\nand the Gulf of Mexico, HMS fishermen should be sure to contact their Regional Office or\nCouncil in order to keep apprised of any change in regulations outside of HMS which may\naffect them.\nFigure 2.6\nMap showing locations of time/area closures which may affect HMS fishermen. Summaries of the\nregulations are also shown. The Caribbean Coral Reef time/area closure is not final at this time.\nTime/Area closure to minimize interactions\nwith Large Whales.\nNo fishing with drift gillnet gearfrom Nov.- March.\nFishing with strikenet gear allowed from\nNov.- March only if observer is onboard.\n30\"\nNo fishing with bottom longline,\nbottom trawl, dregde, pot. or trap.\nNo vessel may anchor in this area.\n0.>\nTime/Area closure to minimize interactions\nwith Large Whales\nFishing with difft gillnet gear allowed from\nNo fishing allowed to\nNov.- March only if observer is onboard\nprotect coral habitat.\nChapter 2 - Permitting/Reporting/Monitoring - 111","References Cited in Chapter 2\nAnonymous. 1995. 1995 Atlantic Management Plan: Porbeagle, Shortfin Mako, and Blue Sharks. Department of\nFisheries and Oceans, Canada.\nBabcock, E.A. and E.K. Pikitch. 1998. The effect of bag limits on shark mortality in the U.S. Atlantic recreational\nfishery. Shark Evaluation Workshop document SB-IV-25. 32 pp.\nBeideman, N. 1998. Blue Water Fishermen's Association, Barnegat Light, NJ, Personal communication.\nBerkeley, S.A., E.W. Irby, Jr., and J.W. Jolley, Jr. 1981. Florida's Commercial Swordfish Fishery: Longline Gear\nand Methods. MAP-14, Marine Advisory Bulletin, Florida Sea Grant College in cooperation with University\nof Miami, Rosenstiel School of Marine and Atmospheric Science and Florida Department of Natural\nResources, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, 23 pp.\nBonfil, R. 1997. Status of Shark Resources in the Southern Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean: Implications for\nManagement. Fisheries Research 29: 101-117.\nBrown, C.A. and S.H. Gruber. 1988. Age Assessment of the Lemon Shark, Negaprion Brevirostris, Using\nTetracycline Validated Vertebral Centra. Copeia 1988: 747-753.\nCarroll, M.T. 1998. An Assessment of the Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Market: Implications for Management.\nUniversity of Rhode Island Master's Thesis. Kingston, RI. 212 pp.\nCasey, J.G., H.L. Pratt, C.E. Stillwell. 1985. Age and Growth of the Sandbar Shark, Carcharhinus Plumbeus, from\nthe Western North Atlantic. Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 42: 963-975.\nCastillo, J.L. and J.F. Marquez. 1996. Evaluacion de la Pesqueria de Tiburon del Golfo de Mexico. Instituto\nNacional de la Pesca, Secretaria de Pesca. 198 pp.\nCastillo, J.L., J.F. Marquez. M.C. Rodriguez, E. Cortes, and A. Cid. 1998. The Mexican artisanal shark fishery in\nthe Gulf of Mexico: toward a regulated fishery. 1998 SEW Document, SB-IV-8. 39 pp.\nCastro, J.I. 1983. The Sharks of North American Waters, College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press,\n180 pp.\nCITES. 1996. Discussion Paper Pursuant to CITES Resolution Conf. 9.17: An Overview of the Impacts on the\nBiological Status of Sharks, 66 pp.\nCramer, J., and H. Adams. 1998. Large Pelagic Logbook Newsletter - 1996, NOAA Techical Memo. NMFS-\nSEFSC-407, p. 61.\nCramer, J. and G.P. Scott. 1998. Summarization of catch and effort in the pelagic longline fishery and analysis of the\neffect of two degree square closures on swordfish landings and discards, Sustainable Fisheries Division\nContribution MIA-97/98-17.\nCramer, J. 1996. Species Reported Caught in the U.S. Commercial Pelagic Longline, Gillnet, and Pair Trawl\nFisheries from 1987 to 1995, Miami Lab. Contribution MIA- 95/96-38, 91 pp.\nFAO. 1997. Food and Agriculture (FAO) Yearbook, Fisheries statistics, commodities. Food and Agriculture\nOrganization of the United Nations, Rome.\nFisher, M.R. and R.B. Ditton. 1992. Characteristics of Billfish Anglers in the U.S. Atlantic Ocean, Mar. Fish.\nRev. 54, 6 pp.\nChapter 2 - References - 112","Folsom, W.B., D. M. Crory, and K. Brewster-Geisz. North America-Swordfish Fishing. Published in \"World\nSwordfish Fishing: An Analysis of Swordfish Fishing Operations. Past-Present-Future. Volume IV.\n\"Prepared by the Office of Science and Technology, National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA., US\nDepartment of Commerce, Silver Spring.\nGulf and South Atlantic Fisheries Development Foundation, Inc. 1997. Continuation of an observer program to\ncharacterize and compare the directed commercial shark fishery in the eastern Gulf of Mexico and South\nAtlantic, MARFIN Grant No. NA57FF0286, May 1997.\nGulf and South Atlantic Fisheries Development Foundation, Inc. 1996. Characterization and comparisons of the\ndirected commercial shark fishery in the eastern Gulf of Mexico and off North Carolina through an observer\nprogram. Final Report. MARFIN Grant No. NA47FF0008. 74 pp.\nHelfman, G.S., B.B. Collette, and D.E. Facey. 1997. The Diversity of Fishes. Blackwell Science, Inc. Malden, MA.\n528 pp.\nHurley, P.C.F. 1998. A review of the fishery for pelagic sharks in Atlantic Canada. Fisheries Research 39: 107-113.\nLucy, J.A., E.A. Bochenek, and N.J. Chartier. 1990. Fleet Characteristics and Boat-Owner Expenditures Associated\nwith Virginia's Recreational Marline-Tuna Fishery. In Planning the Future of Billfishes Part 2 253-262.\nNational Coalition for Marine Conservation.\nMcHugh, R.J. and T.J. Murray. 1997. An analysis of the demand for, and supply of shark. MARFIN Grant No,\nNA57FF0052, University of South Florida and Georgia State University, December 1997.\nMoyle, P.B., and J.J. Cech. 1996. Fishes: an Introduction to Ichthyology, 3rd Edition. Prentis Hall. Upper Saddle\nRiver, NJ. 590 p.\nNMFS. 1998a. Permits Division, St. Petersburg, FL, personal communication. May 3, 1998.\nNMFS. 1998b. Proposed Amendment 1 to the Atlantic Billfish Fishery Management Plan, October 1998.\nNMFS. 1998c. Consideration of the Economic Effects and Potential Alternatives to the 1997 Quotas on the Atlantic\nLarge Coastal Shark Fishery. May 14, 1998. p 52.\nNMFS. 1997a. National Report of the United States: 1997. ICCAT Working Document SCRS/97/Revised\n(11/4/97), November 1997.\nNMFS. 1997b. 1997 Shark Evaluation Annual Report. Southeast Fisheries Science Center. 11pp.\nNMFS. 1997c. Southern New England Bonito and Little Tunny Fishery Exemption Area incorporating the\nEnvironmental Assessment: Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan, NMFS, Northeast regional\noffice, May 28, 1996 and Addendum to the Environmental Assessment for the Southern New England Little\nTunny Gillnet Fishery.\nNMFS. 1997d. 1994/1995 Report of the Southeast Fisheries Science Center Billfish Program. NOAA Technical\nMemorandum NMFS-SEFSC-398, 15 p.\nNational Research Council. 1994. An Assessment of Atlantic Bluefin Tuna. National Academy Press. Washington,\nD.C., 144 pp.\nOfiara, D. and B. Brown. 1987. The 1986 Economic Survey of New Jersey's Big Game Fishery. New Jersey\nDepartment of Environmental Protection, Division of Fish, Game and Wildlife, Marine Fisheries\nAdministration, Technical Series 87-1, 21pp.\nChapter 2 - References - 113","Rose, D. A. 1996. An overview of world trade in sharks and other cartilaginous fishes. TRAFFIC International. 106 pp.\nSouth Atlantic Fishery Management Council (SAFMC). 1985. Fishery Management Plan, Regulatory Impact\nReview, Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, and Final Environmental Impact Statement for Atlantic\nSwordfish. Southpark Circle, Suite 306, Charleston, South Carolina, February, 1985.\nSAFMC. 1990. Amendment 1 to the Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Swordfish, Charleston, SC, October\n1990, 101 pp.\nSCRS. 1990. Field Manual for Statistics and Sampling Atlantic Tunas and Tuna-Like Fishes, 3rd edition, ICCAT,\nMadrid, Spain, 184 pp.\nScott, G.P., P.J. Phares, and B. Slater. 1996. Recreational Catch, Average Size and Effort Information for Sharks in\nU.S. Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico Waters. Southeast Fisheries Science Center. NMFS. Miami lab.\nContribution ML-95/96- 44. 1996 SEW Document, SBIII-5., p 56.\nSona, S.C. 1998. Shark fisheries, trade, and market of Japan. NOAA Technical Memoramdum NMFS. NOAA-TM-\nNMFS-SWR-033.\nTaylor, T., C. Adams, and J. Roderick. 1995. Economic Effects of Swordfish Management Policy on Swordfish and\nTuna Fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico. Draft Final MARFIN Project Report, MARFIN Project Number NA-\n37FF0055, Food and Resource Economics Department, Inst. of Food and Agr. Sci., U of Florida, Gainesville, FL.\nThunberg, E. and J.L. Seale. 1992. Economic Analysis of United States Demand for Swordfish and Economic\nEffects of Effort Reduction on the Gulf of Mexico Swordfish Fishery. Final Project Report, MARFIN,\nDepartment of Food and Resource Economics, P.O. Box 110240, U of Florida, Gainesville, FL.\nTrent, L., D.E. Parshley, and J.K. Carlson. 1997. Catch and Bycatch in the Shark Drift Gillnet Fishery Off Georgia\nan East Florida. Marine Fisheries Review 59(1): 19-28.\nTurner, R.E., and D.F. Boesch. 1987. Aquatic animal production and wetland relationships: Insights gleaned\nfollowing wetland loss or gain. In: D. Hooks (eds.), Ecology and Management of Wetlands: 25-39. Croon\nHelms, LTD, Beckenham, Kent, UK.\nWatson, E. 1996. An Economic Comparison of the U.S. and Canadian Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fisheries. Thesis,\nUniversity of Maine. Orono, Maine.\nWeber, M.L. and S.V. Fordham. 1997. Managing Shark Fisheries: Opportunities for International Conservation.\nTRAFFIC International ad the Center for Marine Conservation. 61 pp.\nWilson, D., B.J. McCay, D. Estler, M. Perez-Lugo, J. LaMarque, S. Seminski, A. Tomczuk. 1998. Social and\nCultural Impact Assessment of the Highly Migratory Species Fishery Management Plan and the Amendment\nto the Atlantic Billfish Fisheries Management Plan, NOAA-NMFS-HMS Contract 178 pp.\nChapter 2 - References - 114","Chapter 3\nREBUILDING AND MAINTAINING HMS FISHERIES\nManagement Under National Standard 1: The Maximum Sustainable Yield Control Rule\n3.1\n3\n3.1.1\nThe Maximum Fishing Mortality Threshold\n6\n3.1.2\nThe Minimum Stock Size Threshold\n7\n3.2\nOverfished Stocks: Managing for Recovery\n9\n3.2.1\nBiomass Target During Rebuilding\n11\n3.2.2\nRecovery Period: The Rebuilding Trajectory\n12\n3.2.3\nTarget Control Rule During Rebuilding\n12\n3.3 Healthy Stocks: Managing for Fox\n14\n3.3.1\nTarget Control Rule for Healthy Stocks\n14\n3.3.2\nBiomass Approaching Overfished Designation: the Minimum Biomass Flag\n15\n3.4\nManagement Measures for Directed Fishing\n16\n3.4.1\nQuota Alternatives\n16\n3.4.1.1 Atlantic Tunas\n16\n3.4.1.1.1\nBluefin Tuna Quota Alternatives\n16\n3.4.1.1.2\nBluefin Tuna Domestic Allocation\n26\n3.4.1.1.3\nBluefin Tuna Quota Transfer Criteria\n38\n3.4.1.1.4\nBigeye Tuna Quota Alternatives\n40\n3.4.1.2 North Atlantic Swordfish\n45\n3.4.1.2.1 North Atlantic Swordfish Quota Alternatives\n45\n3.4.1.2.2\nSwordfish Domestic Allocation\n60\n3.4.1.3\nAtlantic Sharks\n61\n3.4.1.3.1\nCommercial Quota Alternatives for Large Coastal Sharks\n70\n3.4.1.3.2\nPelagic Sharks Commercial Quota Alternatives\n90\n3.4.1.3.3\nSmall Coastal Sharks Commercial Quota Alternatives\n95\n3.4.1.3.4\nFishery Operations\n98\n3.4.1.3.5\nOverharvest/Underharvest Adjustments\n102\n3.4.1.3.6\nPublic Display and Scientific Quota\n109\n3.4.2\nEffort Controls, Retention Limits, and Other Management Measures\n112\n3.4.2.1 Atlantic Tunas\n113\n3.4.2.1.1\nBluefin Tuna Effort Controls\n113\n3.4.2.1.2\nBluefin Tuna Recreational Retention Limits\n124\n3.4.2.1.3\nBluefin Tuna Size Limits\n126\n3.4.2.1.4\nYellowfin Tuna Size Limits\n132\n3.4.2.1.5\nYellowfin Tuna Recreational Retention Limits\n134\n3.4.2.1.6\nBigeye Tuna Size Limits\n136\n3.4.2.2\nNorth Atlantic - Swordfish Rebuilding\n138\n3.4.2.2.1\nSwordfish Size Limits\n138\n3.4.2.2.2\nSwordfish Retention Limits\n143\nChapter 3 - Table of Contents - 1","149\n3.4.2.3 Atlantic Sharks\n149\nProhibited Species\n3.4.2.3.1\n160\nShark Recreational Retention and Size Limits\n3.4.2.3.2\n175\nRecreational Landing Condition for Sharks\n3.4.2.3.3\n177\nProhibition on Finning of Sharks\n3.4.2.3.4\n180\nDirected Large Coastal Shark Commercial Retention Limit\n3.4.2.3.5\n185\nAuthorized Gears\n3.4.3\n185\n3.4.3.1 Atlantic Tunas\n191\nFishing Year\n3.4.4\n193\nA Strategy for Bycatch Reduction in HMS Fisheries\n3.5\n193\nIntroduction\n3.5.1\n194\n3.5.1.1 Bycatch Reduction and The Magnuson-Stevens Act\n196\n3.5.1.2 Bycatch Reduction and the Marine Mammal Protection Act\n198\n3.5.1.3 Bycatch Reduction and the Endangered Species Act\n200\nEvaluation and Monitoring of Bycatch\n3.5.2\n202\n3.5.2.1 Bycatch of HMS in All Fisheries\n206\n3.5.2.2 Finfish Bycatch in HMS Fisheries\n218\n3.5.2.3 Marine Mammal Bycatch in HMS Fisheries\n222\n3.5.2.4 Sea Turtle Bycatch in HMS Fisheries\n223\n3.5.2.5 Sea Bird Bycatch in HMS Fisheries\n224\n3.5.2.6 Summary of Bycatch Issues\n227\nManagement Measures to Address Bycatch Problems\n3.5.3\n227\n3.5.4.1 Reducing HMS Bycatch and Bycatch Mortality\n227\n3.5.4.1.1 Bluefin Tuna\n243\n3.5.4.1.2 Swordfish Bycatch Reduction Measures\n256\n3.4.4.1.3\nSharks\n263\n3.5.4.1.4 Billfish\n264\nGeneral Bycatch Reduction Measures\n3.5.4.1.5\n273\n3.5.4.2 Reducing Protected Species Bycatch and Bycatch Mortality\n282\nA Strategy for Future Bycatch Reduction\n3.5.4\n284\n3.6 Interim Milestones (During Recovery)\n288\nUncertainty Issues\n3.7\n290\nMonitoring, Permitting and Reporting\n3.8\n290\n3.8.1 Introduction\n291\nMonitoring, Permitting and, Reporting Measures\n3.8.2\n304\n3.9 Safety of Human Life At Sea\n306\nFishery Access and Weather-Related Vessel Safety\n3.9.1\n310\n3.9.2 Procedures for Consideration of Management Adjustments\n311\nOther Safety Issues\n3.9.3\n311\n3.10 Ongoing Management\n311\n3.10.1 An Introduction to FMP amendments and Frameworks\n312\n3.10.2 Stock Assessment and Fishery Evaluation Report\n314\n3.10.3 Advisory Panel and Continuing Fishery Management\n314\n3.10.4 Procedure for Adjusting the Management Measures\n316\n3.10.5 Shark Operations Team\nChapter 3 - Table of Contents - 2","3.1 Management Under National Standard 1: The Maximum Sustainable Yield\nControl Rule\nTwo fundamental objectives of this fishery management plan are to halt or prevent\noverfishing and to rebuild overfished fish stocks to ensure the long-term sustainability of the\nstocks. In order to meet these objectives, managers must be able to determine when stocks are\noverfished and in need of rebuilding to the level that can support maximum sustainable yield\n(MSY). The MSY is the maximum long-term average yield that can be produced by a stock on a\ncontinuing basis. The MSY for any particular stock is characterized by a biomass (B) level, i.e.,\nBMSY. and a fishing mortality rate (F), i.e., FMSY. Thus, there are two important components to\nclassification as an overfished fishery: a fishing mortality rate component and a stock biomass\ncomponent. If F is higher than that required to produce MSY on a continuing basis, then\noverfishing is occurring. If B level has fallen to a level substantially below that which can\nproduce MSY, then the stock is overfished.\nAccording to the Technical Guidance for National Standard (NS) 1 (Technical Guidelines,\nRestrepo al., 1998), a \"control rule\" describes a variable (e.g. F) over which management has\nsome directed control as a function of some stock size variable. This FMP uses a control rule\nreferencing F as a function of stock size or biomass (B). These control rules identify \"good\"\nversus \"bad\" stock conditions as well as management actions that will make the stock condition\nchange from \"bad\" to \"good.\"\nIn these control rules, fishery managers must identify reference points, one for F and one for\nB, for each stock under management, that will identify when overfishing is occurring or when the\nstock is overfished. The Technical Guidelines call these two reference points \"status\ndetermination criteria.\" The status determination criteria are: 1) the maximum fishing mortality\nthreshold (MFMT); and 2) the minimum stock size threshold (MSST). If F exceeds MFMT, then\noverfishing is occurring. If B is lower than MSST, then the stock is overfished (see Figure 3.1).\nIn either of these cases, the stock must be classified as \"overfished\" in NMFS' annual report to\nCongress, and the Magnuson-Stevens Act requires that NMFS must take management action to\nhalt overfishing and rebuild the stock. The MSY control rule helps managers determine what\nlevel of fishing mortality is appropriate, given the stock's biomass level and the current fishing\nmortality rate.\nIn defining the status determination criteria in this FMP, NMFS uses the defaults described\nTechnical Guidelines. In most cases, HMS species or species groups are considered data-\nmoderate. However, some species, particularly specific shark species or skipjack tuna, may be\nconsidered data-poor. The only HMS which may potentially be considered data-rich would be\nbluefin tuna. Given the fact that most situations will be data-moderate, NMFS has decided to\nadopt the Technical Guidance defaults to the extent practicable. In some cases, however, it may\nbe necessary to fall back on the data-poor defaults. Thus, these defaults are also described in the\nfollowing sections. In all cases, NMFS will rely on the results of the SAFE report (Section 3.10)\nbefore changing these criteria from data-moderate to data-poor, consistent with the Technical\nGuidelines.\nChapter 3 - Management Under NS 1 - 3","Figure 3.1 Rebuilding Parameters and Status Determination Criteria\nRebuilding Plan\nwith Constant\nOverfishing Area\nCatch\nMFMT\n1.0\nOverfished\nFor = Final Target\nF/F\nMSY\nArea\n0.0\n1.0\nB/B\nMSY\nFigure 3.1 illustrates the major elements of a rebuilding program. Rebuilding programs or\nplans are special forms of control rules which are implemented when stock size has fallen below\nlimit biomass levels and/or fishing mortality has increased above limit fishing mortality levels.\nThe horizontal axis of Figure 3.1 represents the ratio of B to the stock's biomass at MSY (BMSY);\nthe vertical axis represents the ratio of F to the fishing mortality for the stock at MSY (FMSY).\nThe stock is \"healthy\" when B/BMSY is greater than MSST, F/F MSY is less than MFMT, and the\nstock is not in the rebuilding phase. At this point, the F that can be supported is FMSY. If B falls\nbelow MSST, then F must be reduced to a level below FMSY (MFMT) in order to rebuild the\nstock. The magnitude of the reduction in F depends on how severely the stock is overfished, its\ncapacity to rebuild, and the selection of the recovery time.\nThe status determination criteria (MSST and MFMT) are also described in Figure 3.1. The\nMFMT (as described in Section 3.1.1) is a horizontal line. When F goes above MFMT,\noverfishing is occurring and must be stopped immediately. The MSST (as described in Section\n3.1.2) is a vertical line. When B falls below MSST, the stock is considered overfished and must\nbe rebuilt. Thus, fishery management measures should be designed to keep stocks safely in the\nunshaded part of the diagram by holding fishing mortality rates low enough and stock biomass\nlevels high enough to avoid straying into the shaded areas.\nThere are several other important lines in Figure 3.1. The solid vertical line labeled\n\"BREBUILDING TARGE represents the biomass that managers are trying to achieve during a\nrebuilding program. In the case of Atlantic HMS, BREBUILDING TARGET is equal to BMSY\n(B/BMSY = 1). Also shown are: 1) the fishing mortality rate that will produce the optimum yield\n(Foy; horizontal line); 2) the equilibrium or average biomass associated with optimum yield\n(Boy; vertical); 3) the minimum biomass flag (vertical); and 4) the curve expected under a\nrebuilding plan with a constant catch scenario. When a fishery is healthy, managers will try to\nChapter 3 - Management Under NS1-4","set the fishing mortality rate SO that it produces the optimum yield (OY), resulting in a stock size\nof Boy. OY is the yield from a fishery that will provide the greatest overall benefit to the nation,\nparticularly with respect to food production and recreational opportunities and taking into\naccount the protection of marine ecosystems. FOY is the FMSY from the fishery, as reduced by any\nrelevant social, economic, or ecological factors. Since FOY cannot exceed FMSY, then Boy (the\nequilibrium or average B associated with Foy) must be equal to or greater than BMSY. Biomass\ncan be expected to fluctuate over time, due to changes in environmental conditions, recruitment\nto the stock, and other variables. However, when biomass drops to the level of the minimum\nbiomass flag (Section 3.3.2), managers should be aware of the decline and should consider\nimplementing measures to prevent the stock biomass from falling further to the MSST. Thus, the\nminimum biomass flag serves as a warning to consider remedial action before implementation of\na formal rebuilding program is required.\nAll rebuilding plans found in this FMP have a constant catch scenario. Under this type of\nscenario, managers seek to maintain a constant level of landings and dead discards in consecutive\nyears from the stock. As the stock rebuilds (B increases) fishing effort and F will decrease for\nthe same amount of catch. Thus, once the stock is rebuilt, fishermen will not catch as great a\nportion of the stock as they catch when the stock is overfished. This FMP allows managers some\nflexibility in changing management measures in extreme cases to keep rebuilding on track.\nNMFS will depend on the results of the SAFE report for determining the status of the stock and\nwill follow the framework procedure (Section 3.10) before changing any management measure.\nPlease note that NMFS can only increase the biomass of the stock over time by changing\nbehavior of the fishermen and the amount of fish they are allowed to land and discard.\nThis section presents the MFMT and MSST for Atlantic swordfish, tunas, and sharks. Each\nstock is evaluated in terms of these status determination criteria. Stocks that have been listed as\noverfished in NMFS' Report to Congress on the Status of Fisheries (i.e., north Atlantic\nswordfish, west Atlantic bluefin tuna, Atlantic bigeye tuna, and large coastal sharks) will be the\nsubject of rebuilding plans in this FMP. Although north Atlantic albacore has not yet been listed\nin the annual Report to Congress, NMFS has determined that this stock is overfished based on\nthe latest stock assessment and the status determination criteria defined in this FMP. NMFS will\namend the FMP within the year to outline a rebuilding plan for north Atlantic albacore, which\nwill establish the foundation that can be used to develop an international rebuilding program.\nYellowfin tuna is not considered overfished at this time, however, NMFS is concerned with the\nfindings of SCRS. The latest stock assessment found a range of fishing mortality rates,\ndepending on the models used, but SCRS concluded that the relative fishing mortality rate\nprobably exceeds one. NMFS will update the status of yellowfin tuna relative to the status\ndetermination criteria in the FMP as new scientific information becomes available. Quota levels\nand rebuilding schedules identified in this FMP may be modified in the future as a result of new\nstock assessment data and management recommendations from ICCAT, if the United States\naccepts these ICCAT recommendations.\nChapter 3 - Management Under NS I - 5","The Maximum Fishing Mortality Threshold\n3.1.1\nMFMT = Flimit = FMSY\nThe maximum fishing mortality threshold (MFMT) is a fishing mortality rate (F) that allows\nmanagers and fishery participants to determine if overfishing is occurring. When F exceeds the\nMFMT, overfishing is occurring and remedial management action must be taken. For Atlantic\nHMS, the MFMT is the fishing mortality rate necessary to produce MSY on a continuing basis\n(FMSY). While previous reviews of overfishing definitions (Rosenberg et al., 1994) have\nconsidered F MSY to be an appropriate target reference point for ongoing fishery management,\nNSGs and the Technical Guidelines consider FMSY to be the limit reference point, with a target\nreference point set at a more conservative value (see Section 3.2.3). This means that FMSY should\nbe considered an upper boundary, beyond which overfishing will be occurring. Note that\nAtlantic tunas and swordfish are managed internationally by ICCAT, whose objective is to treat\nFMSY as a target, not a limit.\nThe Technical Guidelines recommend using proxies for FMSY when MSY cannot be reliably\nestimated:\nIn the absence of data and analyses that can be used to justify alternative\napproaches, it is recommended that F30% be used for stocks believed to have\nrelatively high resilience, F40% for stocks believed to have low to moderate\nresilience, and F35% for stocks with\" \"average\" resilience. For stocks with very\nlow productivity (such as rockfish and most elasmobranchs), fishing mortality\nrates in the range F 50% to F 60% are recommended as proxies for FMSY. Less-\npreferred alternatives (in order of preference) are to use F., M, F max or F med\n(however, if Fmed is calculated from data collected when the stock was\nfluctuating around BMSY, then it would be a good proxy for FMSY).\nIn this FMP, NMFS uses FMSY for all species, however, in the future NMFS may need to use a\nproxy, such as F50% or F60%, for some shark stocks. Thus, in cases where FMSY cannot be reliably\nestimated or in the absence of information used to select appropriate reference points, NMFS will\nrely on the results of the SAFE report (Section 3.10) to arrive at the best proxy for FMSY,\nconsistent with the default proxies for FMSY recommended in the Technical Guidelines.\nThe F levels used to set these criteria vary by species due to differences in species biology,\nthe characteristics of the fishery, and the best scientific information available (Table 3.1).\nSeveral HMS are being fished at a rate higher than MFMT, indicating that overfishing is\noccurring for these stocks. In addition to looking at F levels, NMFS must consider the\nuncertainty estimates surrounding these levels. This FMP implements an uncertainty value of at\nleast 50 percent (Section 3.7). As described in Table 3.1, several Atlantic HMS are being fished\nat a rate higher than the MFMT, indicating that overfishing is occurring.\nChapter 3 - Management Under NS I - 6","Fishing mortality rates of Atlantic HMS relative to the maximum fishing mortality\nTable 3.1\nthreshold of FMSY.\nIs Overfishing Occurring?\nRelative Fishing Mortality Rate\nSpecies\ni.e., is F > FMSY?\n(Fyear/FMSY)\nYes\nNorth Atlantic Swordfish\nF95 = 2.05FMSY\nYes\nSouth Atlantic Swordfish\nF95 = 1.24FMSY\nYes\nWest Atlantic Bluefin Tuna\nF97/FMSY (two-line)=1.73\nF97/FMSY (Beverton-Holt) = 4.10\nYes\nYes\nBigeye Tuna\nF96/FMSY = 1.5-2.2\nF/ = 1.39 (uncertain)\nYes\nNorth Atlantic Albacore\nF/ =0.91\nTuna\nF/F.1 = 1.60\nF97/FMSY = variable, probably\nNo *\nYellowfin Tuna\nexceeds 1.0\nUnknown *\nWest Atlantic Skipjack\nUnknown\nTuna\nYes\nBlacktip Shark\nF/MMYY = 3.52 (baseline)\nF97/FMSY = 3.74 (alternative)\nF97/FMSY = 2.70 (baseline)\nYes\nSandbar Shark\nF97/FMSY = 1.62 (alternative)\nF97/FMSY = 6.34 (baseline)\nYes\nLarge Coastal Sharks\nF97/FMSY = 6.03 (alternative)\n(all species)\nNo\nSmall Coastal Sharks\nF86-91/FMSY = 0.89\nPelagic Sharks\nUnknown\nUnknown *\n* See Chapter 2 for discussions on the status of yellowfin tuna, skipjack tuna, and pelagic sharks.\nThe Minimum Stock Size Threshold\n3.1.2\nMSST = Blimit=(1-M)BMsy when = M < 0.5;\nMSST = Blimit = 0.5 BMSY when M 0.5\nThe minimum stock size threshold (MSST) is the lower limit of a stock biomass level\nthat allows fishery managers and participants to determine if a stock is overfished. When\nthe stock biomass level falls below the MSST, the stock is overfished and remedial\nmanagement action must be taken to rebuild the stocks to BMSY- The levels described above\nare those defaults recommended in the Technical Guidelines for data-moderate situations.\nMost HMS species or species groups (swordfish, most tunas, some shark species) can be\nlabeled as data-moderate. However, some species, particularly specific shark species,\nshould be labeled data-poor. In data-poor cases the Technical Guidelines recommend that:\nChapter 3 - Management Under NS 1 - 7","the default limit control rule be implemented by multiplying the average catch\nfrom a time period when there is no quantitative or qualitative evidence of\ndeclining abundance (Recent catch) by a factor depending on a qualitative\nestimate of relative stock size:\nLimit catch = 1.00*(Recent catch)\nAbove BMSY:\nLimit catch = (Recent catch)\nAbove MSST but below BMSY:\nBelow MSST (i.e., overfished):\nLimit catch = 0.33* (Recent catch).\nIn most cases, NMFS will implement the recommended defaults for data-moderate situations.\nHowever, for data-poor cases as recommended in the SAFE report, NMFS may implement\nthe recommended defaults for data-poor situations using the framework procedure (Section\n3.10). Regarding data-poor or data-moderate stock evaluations, NMFS scientists, as part of\nSCRS and the shark evaluation workshop, are enhancing data collection and analyses to\nimprove NMFS' ability to make informed decisions about setting limits and targets.\nScientists and managers must take into account the life history characteristics of the\nspecies under consideration in the selection of appropriate status determination criteria.\nSpecies that take many years to reach reproductive age or those that produce few offspring\nmay be more vulnerable to overfishing. Conversely, species that mature early and produce\nmany young may be able to withstand higher levels of fishing pressure without overfishing\noccurring. Natural mortality (M) varies from stock to stock based on biological\ncharacteristics of the species. MSST is intrinsically linked to the population and\nreproductive characteristics of the stock through M. As described in Table 3.2, the biomass\nof several Atlantic HMS stocks is considerably lower than MSST, indicating that these\nstocks are overfished.\nFor Atlantic HMS, except yellowfin tuna, the MSST is the stock biomass level equal to\none minus the quantity of the instantaneous natural mortality rate (M) multiplied by the\naverage biomass necessary to produce MSY on a continuing basis (Blimit = (1-M)BMSY). For\nyellowfin tuna, the natural mortality rate is greater than 0.5 (M = 0.6 at ages 2 and above)\nand the MSST is 0.5BMSY- Under the NSGs, the MSST is the highest of these two, therefore\nfor yellowfin tuna, the higher value is selected.\nChapter 3 - Management Under NS 1 - 8","Table 3.2\nBiomass of Atlantic HMS relative to the minimum stock size threshold. Unless otherwise noted,\nMSST = (1-M)BMSY-\nSpecies\nRelative Biomass (Byear/BMSY)\nMSST\nIs the Stock\nOverfished?\n(is Byear/BMSY\n< MSST\nNorth Atlantic Swordfish\nB96/BMSY = 0.58\n0.8BMSY\nYes\nSouth Atlantic Swordfish\nB96/BMsy=0.99\n0.8BMSY\nNo\nWest Atlantic Bluefin Tuna\nSSB, (two-line) = 0.48\n0.86SSBMSY\nYes\nSSB,,SSBMSY (Beverton-Holt) = 0.071\n0.86SSBMSY\nYes\nSSB,/SSB75=0.14-0.17\n0.86SSBMS\nYes\nBigeye Tuna¹\nB97/BMSY = 0.6-0.8\n0.6BMSY\nNo\n(age 2+)\nN. Atlantic Albacore Tuna\nB97/BMSY = 0.47 (0.34-0.63)\n0.7BMSY\nYes\nB90-94/B75-80 = 0.72\nYellowfin Tuna\nB97/BMSY = 0.92 - 1.35\n0.5BMSY\nNo\n(age 2+) 2\nWest Atlantic Skipjack Tuna\nUnknown\nUnknown\nUnknown 4\nBlacktip Shark3\nN98/NMSY = 0.50 (baseline)\n0.9BMSY\nYes\nN98/NMSY = 0.44 (alternative)\nSandbar Shark3\nN98/NMSY = 0.58 (baseline)\n0.9BMSY\nYes\nN98/NMSY = 0.70 (alternative)\nLarge Coastal Sharks3 (all\nN98/NMSY = 0.30 (baseline)\n0.9BMSY\nYes\nspecies)\nN/NMSY = 0.36 (alternative)\nSmall Coastal Sharks\nB/BMSY = 1.12\n0.9 BMSY\nNo\nPelagic Sharks\nUnknown\nUnknown\nUnknown 4\n'Natural mortality for yellowfin and bigeye tunas changes with age. For yellowfin tuna ages 0 and 1, M = 0.8 and for yellowfin\ntuna ages 2+, M= 0.6. For bigeye tuna, M=0.8 for ages 0 and 1, and 0.4 for ages 2+. The values of M for older age classes will\nbe used in setting the MSST. Bigeye tuna was identified as overfished in the 1998 Report to Congress on the Status of Fisheries.\n2 In the case of yellowfin tuna, M is greater than 0.5, necessitating use of 0.5BMSY as the MSST, rather than (1-M)BMSY.\n3\nSince most of the catch per unit effort series and catches were in number of fish rather than biomass or yield in weight, the\nproduction modeling method was used to estimate numbers of fish (N) rather than biomass (B).\n4See Chapter 2 for a discussion on the status of skipjack tuna and pelagic sharks.\n3.2 Overfished Stocks: Managing for Recovery\nOnce a stock is declared overfished, NMFS must initiate efforts to have a rebuilding plan in\nplace within one year. NMFS considered a range of alternatives in deciding how to rebuild\noverfished stocks. This section presents a generic overview of the range of alternatives\nconsidered for all overfished HMS, from cessation of all fishing to less restrictive rebuilding\noptions. The options that do not support requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act are rejected,\nChapter 3 - Managing for Recovery - 9","and several options for managing fishing mortality within the range of feasible alternatives are\nanalyzed further for each overfished species. In some cases, reductions in F may be achieved\nthrough measures other than reduced quotas (e.g., minimum sizes and time/area closures).\nWhile the Magnuson-Stevens Act requires the preparation of these rebuilding plans at this time,\nNMFS cannot take unilateral quota action for internationally managed stocks given the\nrequirements of ATCA.\nFour basic approaches cover the full range of alternatives considered for overfished stocks:\nProhibit all harvest (i.e., all sources of. fishing mortality) of the overfished stocks -\nThis alternative would lead to the fastest rebuilding of overfished stocks because it would\nachieve a fishing mortality rate of zero, leaving only reproduction and natural mortality to\ndetermine stock size. However, this alternative would impose severe restrictions on fishery\nparticipants, in both directed and incidental fisheries. At this time, this approach is\ninconsistent with the objectives of the FMP. This alternative is also impractical from a\ndomestic management viewpoint because it would require prohibition of all gear capable of\ncatching the overfished species in the wide-ranging area inhabited by the species, even in\nother fisheries, and in other countries. Given its practical shortcomings and adverse social\nand economic impacts, this approach is rejected.\nAllow harvest in accordance with a rebuilding program - This approach is the only\nfeasible alternative for overfished Atlantic HMS. In order to meet the FMP objective of\nrebuilding overfished stocks, fishing mortality rates must be adjusted in accordance with\nthe rebuilding program. It is important to account for all sources of fishing mortality. To\nguide the rebuilding process, managers must select a biomass target that will achieve\nrebuilding and a recovery period during which rebuilding will take place. Using the\nbiomass target and recovery period as goals, managers can select fishing mortality rates\nfor the recovery period that will rebuild the stocks in the selected time period and allow\nmanagement to proceed to the second phase, ongoing management of healthy stocks\n(Section 3.3). For swordfish and bigeye tuna, this FMP provides the foundation for\ndeveloping international rebuilding programs.\nStatus Quo harvest (fishing mortality) levels - This approach would adopt the status quo\nharvest levels to serve as a rebuilding plan. If overfished Atlantic HMS stocks are being\nfished at rates in excess of the level required to produce maximum sustainable yield, fishing\nmortality must be reduced immediately. In cases where status quo harvest levels do not\nreduce fishing mortality to meet the requirements to halt overfishing and rebuild overfished\nstocks, this approach is rejected.\nIncrease the harvest to maximum sustainable yield levels - The Magnuson-Stevens Act\nand this FMP establish the maximum sustainable yield level as the highest acceptable long-\nterm sustainable harvest level for any species under management. Based on this guidance,\nmanagers can allow harvest at fishing mortality rates up to the maximum sustainable yield\nlevel, given a level of uncertainty. This approach must be rejected for overfished stocks,\nhowever, because it would not meet requirements to rebuild overfished stocks. It should be\nChapter 3 - Managing for Recovery - 10","noted that all overfished HMS are currently fished at a rate above the maximum sustainable\nyield level (Table 3.1); thus, this alternative is rejected.\nAfter a biomass target and preferred recovery period have been selected, managers must\ndetermine which management tools should be used to meet the FMP objectives and\nrequirements of the law. Annual quotas, an important tool used to control fishing mortality\nrates, will be a central part of HMS recovery programs. This is particularly true for bluefin\ntuna and swordfish because ICCAT uses quota management as the primary tool to control\nfishing mortality in these overfished fisheries. However, there are many additional\nmanagement measures that can be implemented domestically and internationally to affect\nthe species and size composition of the catch (times/area closures, gear modifications) and\nthe conditions under which the fish may be possessed, retained, and/or sold. All of these\nfactors can have an effect on fishing mortality and thus on the recovery trajectory for\noverfished stocks. In this FMP, these additional measures were considered in light of the\ncontribution that they could make to rebuilding. All management alternatives were\nevaluated in the context of their expected success at meeting management objectives:\nrebuilding overfished stocks, or maintaining healthy stocks.\n3.2.1\nBiomass Target During Rebuilding\nB\nREBUILDING TARGET = BMSY\nBefore a rebuilding program can be designed or implemented, managers must identify a\ngoal, or biomass target, that will allow determination of when rebuilding is complete and the\nstock has returned to, or is maintaining, a healthy condition. This biomass target is used to\nestablish management measures to guide the rebuilding process. The biomass target is a\nlevel of stock abundance at which harvesting of the resources can be sustained on a continual\nbasis at the level necessary to support MSY. As discussed in the NSGs, rebuilding actions\nshould do more than merely assure that the stock reaches the target level; rather, the goal is to\nrestore the stock's capacity to that level on a continuing basis, consistent with its natural\nvariability. The biomass rebuilding target is applicable only during the rebuilding phase of\nthe management plan, and would signal recovery of the stock to a healthy condition.\nIn the case of Atlantic HMS, the biomass target for rebuilding overfished stocks is set at\nthe average biomass level that allows harvest of maximum sustainable yield on a continuing\nbasis (BMSY). This approach is outlined in the NSGs as an appropriate way to address NS1.\nUse of a biomass target of BMSY is consistent with ICCAT's management goal for tunas and\ntuna-like species and with management objectives for large coastal sharks that were\nestablished in the 1993 Atlantic Shark FMP. The spawning stock biomass necessary to\nproduce maximum sustainable yield on a continuing basis (SSBMSY) will be used as the\nmetric for BMSY for west Atlantic bluefin tuna.\nChapter 3 - Managing for Recovery - 11","Recovery Period: The Rebuilding Trajectory\n3.2.2\nAfter a rebuilding biomass goal has been established, a rebuilding trajectory is selected\nthat will ensure consistent and reasonably rapid progress towards recovery, enabling stocks\nto be rebuilt within the time constraints of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. The final NSGs\ndefine \"consistent progress\" to mean that remedial action should be taken immediately, and\nthat such action should include explicit milestones expressed in terms of measurable\nimprovement of the stock with respect to its overfished status determination criteria.\nSection 304(e)(4) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act requires that the time period for rebuilding\nbe as short as possible, but always less than ten years, except in cases where the biology of\nthe stock of fish (e.g. large coastal sharks), other environmental conditions, or management\nmeasures under an international agreement in which the United States participates dictate\notherwise (e.g., bluefin tuna, swordfish, bigeye tuna).\nUnder the NSGs, in cases where the stock cannot rebuild in ten years, even if the\nfishing mortality rate is reduced to zero, the rebuilding time period may be adjusted upwards\nto the extent warranted by biological considerations, the needs of fishing communities, and\nrecommendations by international organizations in which the United States participates, as\nlong as the rebuilding period does not exceed the time required to rebuild at zero fishing\nmortality rate plus one mean generation time for the species, or equivalent period based on\nthe species' life history characteristics. If the stock can rebuild in less than ten years with\nzero fishing, the NSGs state that the time period for rebuilding may be adjusted up to ten\nyears to account for the needs of fishing communities, recommendations by international\norganizations in which the United States participates, and the biology of the species.\nHowever, the rebuilding program should make consistent and reasonably rapid progress\ntoward rebuilding the overfished stock. Because of differences in the biology of the stocks,\nthe rebuilding period is different for each species. For example, it may be possible to\nrebuild swordfish within ten years, but large coastal sharks may not be rebuilt for 39 years.\nThe alternatives discussed throughout the rest of this chapter include a lower and an\nupper limit for recovery time periods. Within the range of feasible alternatives, the\nalternatives for recovery periods have been evaluated in the context of the FMP objectives\nand the requirements Magnuson-Stevens Act. Limits that were not consistent with the FMP\nobjectives were rejected.\nTarget Control Rule During Rebuilding\n3.2.3\nAfter a biomass target and preferred recovery period have been selected, the fishing\nmortality rate is the only mechanism that can be directly controlled to achieve rebuilding.\nThe Technical Guidelines indicate that the limit control rule establishes a set of pre-agreed\nplans for making management decisions about fishing mortality based on stock size. The\npre-agreed nature of the measures ensures that management actions will be implemented\nwithout delay, enabling managers to respond rapidly to changing conditions. The NSGs\nstate that, in selecting a fishing mortality rate that will result in a long-term average catch\napproximating maximum sustainable yield, NMFS should consider the characteristics of the\nChapter 3 - Managing for Recovery - 12","fishery, the objectives of the FMP, and the best scientific information available. In setting a\nfishing mortality rate during rebuilding, primary consideration should be given to the FMP\nobjectives to prevent overfishing and rebuild overfished stocks to the biomass associated\nwith maximum sustainable yield level and to minimize adverse impacts on affected fishery\nparticipants. This section describes alternatives for setting the fishing mortality rate to\nrebuild overfished stocks.\nFinal Action: Constant Catch Control Rule\nFtarget F FMSY\nNMFS prefers to rebuild overfished HMS through the use of fixed quotas. The\nTechnical Guidelines indicate that Ftarget may change depending on the value of the ratio of\nB to BMSY. In cases where B/BMSY is extremely low (less than half MSST), Ftarget may need\nto be reduced to zero, or as close to zero as possible. In cases where B/BMSY is between\n1/2 MSST and BMSY, Ftarget should be set to 75 percent of the target defined in Section 3.3.1.\nBased on the results of the SAFE report, NMFS will consider changing Ftarget as necessary.\nSCRS commonly assumes that during the rebuilding period a fixed quota will be set;\nthis management approach that is commonly recommended by ICCAT. A fixed quota, or\nconstant catch, scenario implies a variable fishing mortality rate (F) during the rebuilding\nperiod, with F actually falling as the stock rebuilds under a constant quota (Figure 3.1).\nHowever, as the stock rebuilds and F falls, fishermen will enjoy increasing catch rates. The\nmajor advantage of constant quotas is relative stability for commercial and recreational\nfishery participants. Administrative costs of managing the fishery can also be minimized.\nDisadvantages include the use of a higher F earlier in the rebuilding period when stocks are\nmore vulnerable. However, this concern can be addressed by setting catch levels low\nenough to ensure rebuilding while still allowing the fisheries to continue. Setting catch\nlevels low enough to ensure rebuilding can result in high stock sizes at the expense of\nrelatively small foregone yield.\nAs described in Section 3.1.1, there are times when FMSY may be poorly estimated. This\nincludes simulation studies or population analyses for data-poor species. In these cases,\nNMFS will rely on the results of the SAFE report to arrive at the best proxy for FMSY\nconsistent with the Technical Guidelines (see Section 3.1.1). In all cases, NMFS will ensure\nthat F is less than the proxy for FMSY during rebuilding using the uncertainty values\ndescribed in Section 3.7. It should be noted that this final action does not preclude NMFS\nfrom using the method described in the rejected option below in the future.\nRejected Option for Target Control Rule\nRejected Option: Fixed fishing mortality rate (Fiarget = 0.XFMSY)\nDuring the rebuilding period, fishing mortality rates would likely need to be set below\nthe rate that would support MSY. Managers would need to select a fishing mortality rate for\nChapter 3 - Managing for Recovery - 13","the rebuilding period that would most efficiently, and with the highest probability of\nsuccess, reach the biomass target within the selected time period. While this alternative is\nsimilar to the final action above, this option gives fishery managers less flexibility given the\nuncertainty of F, B, and the best scientific data available.\nA fixed F strategy in which a target fishing mortality rate is set is less risky than a\nconstant catch strategy for rebuilding overfished stocks (SCRS, 1998). The target fishing\nmortality rates are usually translated into corresponding quotas which require adjustment\nafter each assessment, depending on the status of the stock. This could invite additional\nroom for negotiation at ICCAT of less restrictive quotas. To prevent frequent changes in\nquotas and negotiations for less restrictive quotas, NMFS prefers setting a long-term\nconstant catch strategy that is non-negotiable in the rebuilding interim, such as was\nnegotiated at ICCAT in 1998 for bluefin tuna. In addition, variable quotas may have\nnegative social and economic impacts on fishermen and higher administrative costs. Thus,\nthis option is rejected.\n3.3 Healthy Stocks: Managing for Fox\nThe Magnuson-Stevens Act is clear in its requirement to prevent overfishing while\nachieving, on a continuing basis, optimum yield (OY). OY is the yield from a fishery that will\nprovide the greatest overall benefit to the nation, particularly with respect to food production and\nrecreational opportunities, taking into account the protection of marine ecosystems. For all\nstocks, it is critical to set precautionary thresholds to avoid overfishing. Target biomass and\nfishing mortality rates should be selected to maximize the likelihood that the maximum fishing\nmortality and minimum stock size thresholds will not be exceeded. This is consistent with the\nNSGs which indicate that target reference points, such as OY, should be set safely below limit\nreference points, which are defined by the status determination criteria. The criteria used to set\ntarget catch levels should be risk-averse, so that greater uncertainty regarding the status or\nproductive capacity of a stock or stock complex corresponds to greater caution in setting target\ncatch levels. HMS stocks that have not been determined to be overfished include skipjack tuna,\nyellowfin tuna, small coastal sharks, and pelagic sharks.\nTarget Control Rule for Healthy Stocks\n3.3.1\nFtarget=0.75 F MSY = Fox\nBlarget = Box\nFtarget is used to set fishing mortality rates for healthy (non-overfished) stocks and after\nrebuilding of overfished stocks has been accomplished to ensure that the maximum fishing\nmortality threshold (Flimit) is not exceeded. FOY is the FMSY from the fishery, as reduced by\nany relevant social, economic, or ecological factors. For the HMS stocks that are not\noverfished, FOY is set at the yield resulting from fishing at 75 percent of FMSY. Thus, NMFS\nassumes that the relevant social, economic, and ecological factors reduce FMSY by 25\npercent. This is the default level recommended in the Technical Guidelines to provide a\nsafety margin to ensure that the fishing mortality rate does not exceed the maximum fishing\nChapter 3 - Managing for Foy - 14","mortality threshold. As described in Section 3.1.1, proxies may be used for FMSY based on\nthe results of the SAFE report, consistent with the Technical Guidelines. BOY is average\nbiomass that corresponds to Foy.\nBased on modeling results (Restrepo, et al., 1998), FOY is expected to average more\nthan 90 percent of the maximum average long-term yield (i.e., maximum sustainable yield),\nfor stocks that are not overfished. The target fishing mortality rate should be set sufficiently\nbelow the limit such that it offers a reasonable margin of safety and it is also possible to\ndistinguish between the two statistically. Setting the target fishing mortality rate below the\nminimum fishing mortality threshold of FMSY also safeguards against uncertainty in stock\nassessments, imperfect implementation of management actions, and other factors that can\ncause the minimum fishing mortality threshold to be approached or surpassed. In addition,\nfishing at 75 percent of FMSY reduces the probability that a stock will decline below MSST.\n3.3.2\nBiomass Approaching Overfished Designation: the Minimum Biomass Flag\n(1-M)Boy where >BMSY\nThe biomass flag is useful to managers because it signals a decline in biomass before\nbiomass falls to a level where the stock must be classified as overfished and in need of\nrebuilding. Since this is a precautionary variable, the biomass flag should be set in excess of\nthe minimum stock size threshold (MSST) that identifies the stock as overfished (Figure\n3.1) in order to alert managers and fishery to the need for action. Arresting stock biomass\ndecline before the MSST is reached will allow managers to implement precautionary\nmeasures that may boost biomass and prevent overfishing. Consideration of the natural\nvariations of population should also be a component in determining the value of this\nprecautionary variable.\nFor Atlantic HMS, the minimum biomass flag is set at (1-M)Boy where BOY > BMSY.\nBOY is defined as the equilibrium B associated with Fox. If the fishery is being fished at\n75 percent of FMSY (Foy), the equilibrium biomass level (BOY) may be approximately 125 to\n130 percent of BMSY, based on modeling results in the Technical Guidelines.\nThis minimum biomass flag establishes a biologically-linked measure that would\ntrigger precautionary management action to ensure that a stock will not become overfished.\nTable 3.3 summarizes the biomass flags for Atlantic HMS stocks.\nI\nThe limit fishing mortality rate is the equivalent of the maximum fishing mortality threshold (MFMT). For Atlantic HMS, the MFMT is\nFMSY. Thus, Foy should be set sufficiently below FMSY to: 1) ensure that the limit is not regularly exceeded; and 2) that the two can be\nstatistically distinguished from each other.\nChapter 3 - Managing for Foy - 15","Biomass of Atlantic HMS relative to the minimum biomass threshold.\nTable 3.3\nSpecies\n(1-M)Boy\n0.8B\nNorth Atlantic Swordfish\nSouth Atlantic Swordfish\n0.8B,\nOY\n0.86SSB,\nWest Atlantic Bluefin Tuna\n0.6B OY (age 2+)\nBigeye Tuna\n0.7B\nNorth Atlantic Albacore Tuna\nOY\n0.5B (age 2+)b\nYellowfin Tuna\nUnknown d\nWest Atlantic Skipjack Tuna\nBlacktip Shark\n0.9B\nOY\n0.9B\nSandbar Shark\nLarge Coastal Sharks (all species)\n0.9B\nOY\n0.9B\nSmall Coastal Sharks\nOY\nUnknown d\nPelagic Sharks\n*Natural mortality for yellowfin and bigeye tuna changes with age. For yellowfin tuna ages 0 and 1,\nM = 0.8 and M = 0.6 for yellowfin tuna ages 2+. For bigeye tuna, M=0.8 for ages 0 and 1, and 0.4\nfor ages 2+. The values of M for older age classes will be used in setting the MSST.\nBIn the case of yellowfin tuna, M is greater than 0.5, necessitating use of 0.5B as the MSST, rather\nthan using (1-M)Boy-\nSince most of the catch per unit effort series and catches were in number of fish rather than biomass\nor yield in weight, the production modeling method was used to estimate numbers of fish rather than\nbiomass.\ndee Chapter 2 for a description of the status of skipjack tuna and pelagic sharks.\n3.4 Management Measures for Directed Fishing\n3.4.1\nQuota Alternatives\nThere are no significant safety implications of these quota alternatives. Although\nreducing quotas may increase the derby nature of HMS fisheries, NMFS is taking steps to\nmitigate those effects through effort controls, limited access, and other measures. NMFS\nwill continue to monitor the derby nature of the fisheries and consider safety implications of\nnew fishery conservation and management measures.\n3.4.1.1 Atlantic Tunas\n3.4.1.1.1 Bluefin Tuna Quota Alternatives\nIn 1998, SCRS developed a range of recovery options aimed at achieving\nspawning stock biomass levels that would support maximum sustainable yield\n(SCRS, 1998b). These options were developed using assumed relationships\nbetween spawning stock biomass and recruitment. SCRS did not select any of these\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 16","relationships as being more likely to reflect reality than any other. As a result, a\nrange of possible relationships were captured within the results of two models - the\nBeverton-Holt model and the two-line model. These models produced very different\nestimates of maximum sustainable yield (7,700 mt WW and 2,800 mt ww,\nrespectively). SCRS was unable to arrive at a consensus as to which stock-\nrecruitment model might better reflect the population dynamics of west Atlantic\nbluefin tuna.\nAccording to the Beverton-Holt model, maximum sustainable yield would likely\nbe difficult to achieve within 20 years even in the absence of any catches. A 2,000-\nmt WW catch would allow for a 1.5-fold recovery to about ten percent of the level\nthat would support maximum sustainable yield (approximately 7,700 mt WW under\nthis assumption). However, according to the two-line model, a TAC of 2,500 mt\nWW would allow the spawning stock biomass to double over the next 20 years,\nreaching 93 percent of the biomass that could support maximum sustainable yield\n(approximately 2,800 mt WW under this assumption). Thus, under the two-line\nstock recruitment relationship, in order to have about a 50-percent chance of\nreaching biomass levels that support maximum sustainable yield within 20 years,\ncurrent catches need not be reduced. SCRS also concluded that if existing levels of\ncatches are maintained, it is unlikely that there will be a measurable change in the\nstatus of the stock in the short term using either model for assessments.\nThe quota alternatives discussed below result from different rebuilding periods,\nassuming that each quota remains constant throughout the rebuilding time period.\nThis is consistent with ICCAT's general practice on quota recommendations and\nSCRS' practice on stock status projections over time. There are an infinite number\nof recovery trajectories which could be selected to rebuild a stock within a specific\ntime frame. For example, SCRS has investigated several alternative trajectories in\nwhich the west Atlantic bluefin tuna quota is adjusted as the recovery period varies.\nAt each level of constant quota there is a different time period associated with\nrecovery.\nFinal Action: Adopt the ICCAT Rebuilding Program (recovery to biomass\nrebuilding target in 20 years)\nThe Magnuson-Stevens Act and NSGs provide guidance to address the limitations\nimposed by an international body whose management recommendations may not\nreadily conform to the rebuilding time frame required by the Act. The primary\nobjective of management of the bluefin tuna fishery is now to rebuild the stock to\nlevels that will support the optimum yield, rather than maintaining a scientific\nmonitoring quota. Based on the 1998 stock assessment, parties at the 1998 meeting\nof ICCAT established a Rebuilding Program for west Atlantic bluefin tuna with the\ngoal of reaching maximum sustainable yield in 20 years. This binding\nrecommendation sets the annual TAC at 2,500 mt WW. The landings quota allocated\nto the United States was increased by 43 mt from 1,344 mt to 1,387 mt ww, to apply\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 17","annually, until such time as the TAC is changed based on advice from SCRS. The\nU.S. allowance for dead discards is an additional 68 mt WW. If there are dead\ndiscards in excess of this allowance, they must be counted against the following\nyear's quota. If there are fewer dead discards, then half of the underharvest may be\nadded to the following year's quota while the other half is conserved. The new\nrecommendation also allows four years to balance the eight percent tolerance for\nbluefin tuna under 115 cm (young school and school bluefin tuna).\nThe ICCAT Rebuilding Program provides flexibility to alter the TAC, the\nmaximum sustainable yield target, and/or the rebuilding period based on subsequent\nscientific advice. However, the annual TAC of 2,500 mt WW will not be altered\nunless there is evidence that a catch level greater than 2,700 mt WW or less than\n2,300 mt WW would have at least a 50-percent probability of rebuilding the stock to\nmaximum sustainable yield within the 20-year time frame. (See Appendix 2 for a\ndescription of the recommendation adopted by ICCAT). This Rebuilding Program\nincludes targets for recovery, limits, and explicit interim milestones expressed in\nterms of measurable improvement of the stock. The rebuilding time frame provides\na specified recovery period, biomass targets, fishing mortality rate limits, and\nexplicit interim milestones that support the objectives of the FMP and the intent of\nthe Magnuson-Stevens Act.\nEcological Impacts\nThe 1998 bluefin tuna stock assessment concluded that, based on the two-line\nstock recruitment model, west Atlantic bluefin tuna spawning stock biomass has a\n90-percent probability of recovering to levels that would support a maximum\nsustainable yield of 2,800 mt WW in approximately 20 years (by 2019), under a\nTAC of 2,500 mt WW. Under a different stock recruitment model (Beverton-Holt),\nhowever, the 1998 stock assessment found that a 2,500-mt WW west Atlantic TAC\ncould not be sustained, and that catches would need to be reduced to zero to allow a\nrecovery which would support a maximum sustainable yield of 7,700 mt WW in\napproximately 20 years. The ICCAT Rebuilding Program provides flexibility to\nalter the TAC, the maximum sustainable yield target, and/or the rebuilding period\nbased on subsequent scientific advice that a catch level greater than 2,700 mt WW or\nless than 2,300 mt WW would have at least a 50-percent probability of rebuilding the\nstock to maximum sustainable yield within the 20-year time frame. After\nsubtracting the 79 mt WW allowance for dead discards and the quotas for Bermuda\nand St. Pierre et Miquelon, this plan establishes an overall landings quota of\n2,413 mt ww, a 2.5-percent increase from the 1997 to 1998 level of 2,354 mt WW.\nThis results in a U.S. landings quota of 1,387 mt ww, a 3.2-percent increase from\nthe 1997 1998 U.S. landings quota of 1,344 mt WW.\nAssuming that the U.S. quota remains at 1,344 mt ww, that the domestic\nallocation scenario remains at 1997 percentage shares, and that the average weights\nof school, large school/small bluefin tuna, and large medium/giant bluefin tuna\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 18","landed are 40 pounds, 135 pounds, and 415 pounds, respectively (based upon recent\naverage sizes from the NMFS Large Pelagic Survey and the NMFS Northeast\nRegion Bluefin Dealer Database), this scenario would result in an estimated\n14,808 bluefin tuna being landed by the United States (5,857 73 inches curved\nfork length (CFL) and 8,951 < 73 inches CFL) each year until stock rebuilding is\ncomplete, an increase of 3.1 percent from the status quo. This also assumes that the\nReserve quota is divided equally between large medium/giant and large school/\nsmall medium bluefin tuna (and not to the school bluefin subquota, for which there\nis now a separate reserve - see Section 3.4.2.1.1). Impacts of alternative allocations\nand other management measures that could affect the size selectivity of catch (thus\nthe number of fish caught to make up the 2,500 mt WW and 1,387 mt ww) under the\nICCAT Rebuilding Program are discussed later in this document.\nAs the TAC for west Atlantic bluefin tuna remains at status quo levels, and the\nU.S. domestic landings quota will increase by only a small amount, impacts to other\nfinfish stocks and protected species will most likely be minimal.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nAs mentioned above, the domestic U.S. landings quota will increase by\napproximately three percent compared to the status quo. As a result, the present\nvalue of gross and net revenues, as well as angler consumer surplus, are\napproximately three percent higher than those that would be associated with status\nquo landings levels. Using the selected alternative for domestic allocation, the\ndollar amounts for these measures are $227 million, $92 million and $234 million,\nrespectively. Dollar amounts of the present values of Angler Consumer Surplus and\nnet and gross revenues for all alternatives are listed in Chapter 7.\nThe increase in the quota for the United States could result in increased fishing\nopportunities and revenues to the commercial and recreational industries. Since this\nmeasure is very similar to the status quo, however, social impacts will most likely\nbe minimal. Also, as the level of catch during rebuilding is not much different than\nafter rebuilding is complete, the effects of the transition to quota levels after the\nstock is rebuilt would be minimal as well, particularly when discounted under\npresent value analyses.\nThe west Atlantic bluefin tuna stock supports important recreational and\ncommercial fisheries. Many fishing communities along the Atlantic coast depend\non these fisheries at various times of the year. The community profiles in Chapter 9\ndescribe the social environment of the fishery and the potential community impacts\nof the various alternatives.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 19","Conclusion\nThe ICCAT Rebuilding Program adopted in 1998 meets the standards of the\nMagnuson-Stevens Act in that it includes an appropriate rebuilding time period,\ntargets, limits, and explicit interim milestones for recovery expressed in terms of\nmeasurable improvement of the stock. While the quotas may have to be adjusted\nbased on additional scientific evidence as specified in the terms of the\nrecommendation, the ICCAT Rebuilding Program requires that ICCAT keep\nrebuilding on schedule. The final action is also consistent with ATCA, as it\nimplements a quota equal to that allocated to the United States by ICCAT, and\nmaintains traditional fishing patterns of fishing vessels of the United States.\nRejected Options for Bluefin Tuna Quota Alternatives\nRejected Option: Status quo - scientific monitoring quota for bluefin tuna\nUnder this alternative, the landings quota for west Atlantic bluefin tuna,\n2,354 mt ww, with 1,344 mt WW allocated to the United States, would remain the\nsame as in 1997 to 1998. The 1998 SCRS stock assessment projects that these\ncatch levels would result in an increase of the spawning stock biomass to levels\nwhich would support a maximum sustainable yield of 2,800 mt WW in about\n20 years (by 2019). Other ICCAT management recommendations that were in\nplace prior to the 1998 rebuilding plan for west Atlantic bluefin tuna include\nminimum sizes, quotas (including an eight percent tolerance on school bluefin\ntuna), a statistical document program, time/area closures, and compliance measures.\nHowever, in the past, these conservation and management measures have not been\nimplemented as a coordinated rebuilding plan with specific targets, recovery\ntrajectories, and milestones.\nEcological Impacts\nUnder this alternative, the overall west Atlantic landings quota and U.S. national\nquota would stay at 1997 to 1998 levels (2,354 and 1,344 mt ww/year, respectively),\nwith the overall west Atlantic TAC remaining at 2,500 mt WW. Assuming status\nquo catch levels and the same size selectivity of catch, the 1998 SCRS assessment\nprojects that, under the two-line stock-recruitment model, there is a 50-percent\nchance that the spawning stock biomass will increase to levels which would support\na maximum sustainable yield of 2,800 mt WW in approximately 20 years (by 2019).\nUnder the Beverton-Holt model, however, there is a greater than 50-percent chance\nthat a TAC of 2,500 mt WW cannot be sustained, and that catches would need to be\nreduced to zero to allow a recovery of the stock to levels that would support a\nmaximum sustainable yield of 7,700 mt WW in approximately 20 years.\nAssuming that the U.S. quota remains at 1,344 mt ww, the domestic allocation\nscenario remains at 1997 percentage shares, and that the average weights of school,\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 20","large school/small bluefin tuna, and large medium/giant bluefin tuna landed are\n40 pounds, 135 pounds, and 415 pounds, respectively, this scenario would result in\nan estimated 14,363 bluefin tuna being landed by the United States (5,676 73\ninches CFL and 8,687 < 73 inches CFL) each year.\nThis alternative would not establish a coordinated rebuilding program with\nspecific targets, recovery trajectories, and milestones. In place of a long-term\nrebuilding plan, the TAC would be open to renegotiation following the next stock\nassessment. In contrast to the final action, this alternative would not establish a\nmechanism to ensure that there is at least a 50-percent probability of rebuilding the\nstock within 20 years. This alternative would not allow the \"automatic\" adjustment\nof the quota should future assumptions show that 2,500 mt WW does not carry with\nit a 50-percent probability of doubling the spawning stock biomass in 20 years.\nThis alternative would also maintain the west Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery as a\nscientific monitoring quota. The primary objective of a scientific monitoring quota\nis not to manage the fishery at optimum yield, but rather to use the fishery to\nmonitor changes in stock size. As this alternative is the status quo, impacts on\nother fish stocks, protected species, and essential fish habitat are described in the\nChapter 2 and other sections of the FMP.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThe expected commercial ex-vessel revenues for this alternative, for the 1999\nfishing year, by commercial fishing category (assuming status quo/preferred\nallocations and using 1997 average prices), are shown in Table 3.4. The present\nvalue of gross and net revenues for the 1999 to 2038 period under this alternative\nare estimated to be $224 million and $90 million, respectively (see Chapter 7). The\npresent value of Angler Consumer Surplus for this alternative for the same period\nis\nestimated to be $228 million (see Chapter 7). These results are used as the baseline\nfor comparing the economic consequences of other alternatives.\nConclusion\nMany bluefin tuna fishermen who commented on quotas have indicated that the\nquota should be maintained or increased. This alternative, however, lacks a\nrebuilding program with a specific recovery period, target biomass and fishing\nmortality rate, and milestones to adjust the rebuilding trajectory, and thus does not\nmeet requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act or guidance contained in the NSGs\nto rebuild overfished fisheries. This alternative would also violate ATCA, as well\nas the Magnuson-Stevens Act, as it would implement a quota less than that\nallocated to the United States by ICCAT. It could also have a negative impact on\ntraditional fishing patterns of fishing vessels of the United States.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 21","Projected 1999 ex-vessel gross revenues in the U.S. Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery by\nTable 3.4\ncommercial fishing category under status quo rebuilding and quota allocation\nalternatives (based on 1997 prices).\nGross Revenues\nCategory\n$10,280,094\nGeneral\n$960,721\nHarpoon\n$1,330,299\nLongline\n$11,773\nTrap\n$4,558,011\nPurse Seine\n$17,140,898\nTOTAL\nRejected Option: Ten-year rebuilding program (2,000 mt WW west Atlantic quota)\nThis alternative would require that overfished stocks of west Atlantic bluefin\ntuna be rebuilt to the spawning stock biomass necessary to produce maximum\nsustainable yield on a continuing basis in ten years, which, using the two-line stock\nrecruitment model, could be achieved with a 2,000-mt WW TAC. This alternative\nwas chosen for analysis because section 304(e)(4) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act\nrequires that the time period for rebuilding overfished fisheries be as short as\npossible, but always ten years or less, except in cases where the biology of the stock\nof fish, other environmental conditions, or management measures under an\ninternational agreement in which the United States participates dictate otherwise.\nWhile the international agreement clause does apply bluefin tuna, investigating a\nten-year recovery program is a viable option due to the emphasis on the ten-year\nrebuilding time-period in the Magnuson-Stevens Act.\nEcological Impacts\nThe 1998 stock assessment concluded that, using the two-line stock recruitment\nmodel, the west Atlantic bluefin tuna spawning stock biomass would recover to\nlevels which would support a maximum sustainable yield of 2,800 mt WW in ten\nyears under a TAC of 2,000 mt WW. However, under a different stock recruitment\nmodel (Beverton-Holt), the 1998 stock assessment found that a 2,000-mt WW west\nAtlantic quota would not result in the spawning stock biomass necessary to produce\nmaximum sustainable yield on a continuing basis, but would result in a 20-percent\nincrease in the spawning stock biomass over approximately 20 years. After\nsubtracting an allowance for dead discards and the quotas for Bermuda and St.\nPierre et Miquelon, this alternative would require a reduction of the overall landings\nquota to approximately 1,913 mt ww, a 19-percent reduction from the current level\nof 2,354 mt WW. Under the two-line stock-recruitment model, this catch level\nwould provide a 50-percent chance of recovery to the spawning stock biomass\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 22","necessary to produce maximum sustainable yield on a continuing basis in ten years,\nand would result in a U.S. landing quota of approximately 1,100 mt ww, an\n18- percent reduction from the current U.S. quota of 1,344 mt WW (see Table 3.5).\nAssuming status quo domestic allocations and size selectivity of catch, this\nalternative would result in an 18-percent reduction in numbers of fish landed by the\nUnited States and a similar reduction in west Atlantic landings, compared to status\nquo catch levels. Using the average sizes for school, large school/small medium,\nand large medium/giant bluefin tuna, this alternative would result in an estimated\n11,747 bluefin tuna being landed by the United States (4,643 73 inches CFL and\n7,104 < 73 inches CFL) each year until stock rebuilding is complete (assuming\nstatus quo domestic allocations). Impacts of alternative allocations and other\nmanagement measures that could impact the size selectivity of catch (thus the\nnumber of fish caught to make up the 2,000 mt WW and 1,100 mt ww) under a\nten-year rebuilding plan are discussed later in this document.\nThis reduction in quota could increase incidental catches and discards of bluefin\ntuna due to the mixed species nature of many fisheries for HMS. In addition, as the\nstock recovers and abundance increases, incidental catches and discards could\nincrease further. Alternatives addressing incidental catch and discard reduction are\ndiscussed later in this chapter. A lower bluefin tuna quota could also cause a shift\nin both commercial and recreational fishing effort, and perhaps mortality, towards\nother HMS as well as other fish stocks. However, most of the HMS species to\nwhich commercial and recreational fishing effort could shift are also overfished and\nwould be undergoing similar rebuilding efforts. Stocks that are fully fished or\noverfished, such as yellowfin tuna, bigeye tuna, north Atlantic albacore tuna, and\nsharks, would likely be most vulnerable to problems caused by additional fishing\nmortality resulting from displaced effort.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nNet economic benefits are reduced under this alternative as compared with the\nstatus quo and final action. With a rebuilding period of ten years, the U.S. landings\nquota is approximately 18 percent lower than the status quo landings quota and\n21 percent lower than the landings quota under the final action. Although the\npost-rebuilding quotas are higher than those under status quo, the revenues they\ngenerate are heavily discounted in the present value analysis because they occur\nmany years from now. As a result, the present value of gross and net revenues, as\nwell as Angler Consumer Surplus, are nine percent lower for this alternative than\nunder the status quo. The dollar amounts for these measures under this alternative\nare $204 million, $82 million and $208 million, respectively. The above figures all\nassume status quo/preferred domestic allocations among sectors of the fishery. In\naddition to changes in net economic benefit, there would be economic impacts in\nthe form of reductions in commercial and recreational fishing expenditures such as\nbait, fuel, and ice.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 23","The west Atlantic bluefin tuna stock supports important recreational and\ncommercial fisheries. Many fishing communities along the Atlantic coast depend\non these fisheries at various time of the year. This alternative would have a\nnegative impact on all categories due to the quota reduction, which would affect\ngross revenues and fishing opportunities. Some displacement from the fishery is\nlikely as commercial fishermen, charter/headboat captains, and dealers cease\noperations and recreational vessel owners elect to leave the fishery to pursue other\nspecies or to participate in other recreational activities. Recent surveys of the\nrecreational fishing community (Ditton, 1998; Wilson et al., 1998) found that tunas\nwere the first choice target species of many anglers, and it is expected that a bluefin\ntuna quota reduction could cause some of these people to leave the fishery or to\ntarget other species.\nConclusion\nThis alternative would allow NMFS to meet requirements of the Magnuson-\nStevens Act to implement a rebuilding program for bluefin tuna. It is consistent\nwith the NSGs and the Technical Guidelines because it provides a framework for a\nrebuilding program with a specific recovery period, targets, and limits. This\nalternative is rejected, however, as it would negatively impact commercial and\nrecreational fisheries and is more restrictive than that allowed under the require-\nments of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. In addition, this alternative was not the\nrebuilding program agreed to at ICCAT, and the United States must work with other\nfishing nations in the Atlantic to ensure rebuilding. Furthermore, § 304(e) of the\nMagnuson-Stevens Act specifies that rebuilding programs for highly migratory\nspecies must reflect traditional participation in the fishery, relative to other nations,\nby fishermen of the United States. In addition, NS 8 requires that conservation\nand management measures provide for the sustained participation of fishing\ncommunities and that management measures minimize, to the extent practicable,\nadverse impacts on those communities, while remaining consistent with\nconservation requirements. The rebuilding requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens\nAct and the NSGs can be met with less significant social and economic disruption\nto the fishery by adopting the ICCAT Rebuilding Program, which this FMP\nimplements as a final action.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 24","Table 3.5\nU.S. Quota (in metric tons) into the Future under Rebuilding Alternatives*\nICCAT Rebuilding Program (20 Years)\nYear\nStatus Quo\n10-Year Recovery\nFINAL ACTION\n1999\n1,344\n1,100\n1,387\n2000\n1,344\n1,100\n1,387\n2001\n1,344\n1,100\n1,387\n2002\n1,344\n1,100\n1,387\n2003\n1,344\n1,100\n1,387\n2004\n1,344\n1,100\n1,387\n2005\n1,344\n1,100\n1,387\n2006\n1,344\n1,100\n1,387\n2007\n1,344\n1,100\n1,387\n2008\n1,344\n1,100\n1,387\n2009\n1,344\n1,100\n1,387\n2010\n1,344\n1,415\n1,387\n2011\n1,344\n1,415\n1,387\n2012\n1,344\n1,415\n1,387\n2013\n1,344\n1,415\n1,387\n2014\n1,344\n1,415\n1,387\n2015\n1,344\n1,415\n1,387\n2016\n1,344\n1,415\n1,387\n2017\n1,344\n1,415\n1,387\n2018\n1,344\n1,415\n1,387\n2019\n1,344\n1,415\n1,387\n2020\n1,415\n1,415\n1,415\n2021\n1,415\n1,415\n1,415\n2022\n1,415\n1,415\n1,415\n2023\n1,415\n1,415\n1,415\n2024\n1,415\n1,415\n1,415\n2025\n1,415\n1,415\n1,415\n2026\n1,415\n1,415\n1,415\n2027\n1,415\n1,415\n1,415\n2028\n1,415\n1,415\n1,415\n2029\n1,415\n1,415\n1,415\n2030\n1,415\n1,415\n1,415\n2031\n1,415\n1,415\n1,415\n2032\n1,415\n1,415\n1,415\n2033\n1,415\n1,415\n1,415\n2034\n1,415\n1,415\n1,415\n2035\n1,415\n1,415\n1,415\n2036\n1,415\n1,415\n1,415\n*Assumes U.S. share of quota to be 57.48% when west Atlantic quota is less than 2,413 mt ww, and 52.14% when west Atlantic quota is greater than\n2,660 mt ww, after subtracting the allowance for dead discards and the quotas for Bermuda and St. Pierre et Miquelon. Also assumes maximum\nsustainable yield = 2,800 mt ww.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 25","3.4.1.1.2 Bluefin Tuna Domestic Allocation\nThe United States allocates its annual bluefin tuna quota among five sectors of\nthe fishery in order to collect the broadest possible array of scientific information\nand to optimize social and economic benefits. The 1998 ICCAT Recommendation\nchanged the basis upon which the harvest of west Atlantic bluefin tuna was\nauthorized. The focus on allocating quota for scientific monitoring purposes was\nreplaced with a focus on rebuilding the stock and managing the fishery for\ncontinuing optimum yield. However, ICCAT continues to require all contracting\nparties, non-contracting parties, entities, and fishing entities to provide the best\navailable data for the assessment of the stock by SCRS, including information on\nthe catches of the broadest range of age classes possible. NMFS maintains that the\ncollection of the best available scientific data, which is ensured by keeping the\nfishery categories that collect catch per unit effort information (i.e., the Angling and\nGeneral categories) open over as long a time period and as large a geographic area\nas possible, is an important factor to consider in the domestic management of the\nbluefin tuna fishery.\nIn 1992, NMFS established \"base\" quotas for each category in the bluefin tuna\nfishery based upon the historical share of landings in each of these categories during\nthe period 1983 through 1991. These quotas were used in 1992, 1993, and 1994,\nthen modified in 1995 when the Purse Seine category quota was reduced by 51 mt\nWW to 250 mt WW. The main reason for the reduction in the Purse Seine category\nquota was that the primary purpose of the scientific monitoring quota was to\nprovide data for stock assessments. The Purse Seine category does not provide a\ncatch per unit effort time series used to estimate trends in stock size. Other reasons\nfor reducing the Purse Seine quota in 1995 were issues raised by constituents of\n\"fairness and equity\", and the greater employment generated in the non-Purse Seine\ncategories. Also in 1995, four mt WW were transferred from the Incidental category\nto the Angling category to account for landings of large medium and giant bluefin\ntuna in the consolidation of recreational permits. In 1997, quota allocations were\nslightly modified from the 1995 base levels to more accurately reflect recent trends\nin fleet size, effort, and landings by category, and also to reflect the scientific\nmonitoring nature of the west Atlantic quota. In 1998, allocations remained the\nsame as in 1997, but were modified slightly after accounting for under- and over-\nharvests in certain categories.\nThe 1998 ICCAT Recommendation on west Atlantic bluefin tuna increased the\nlandings quota allocated to the United States by 43 mt WW from 1,344 mt WW to\n1,387 mt ww, to apply annually, until such time as the TAC is changed based on\nadvice from SCRS. The recommendation established a 79 mt WW allowance for\ndead discards for the west Atlantic, of which the United States was allocated 68 mt\nWW. Consistent with the Recommendation, for any of the following alternatives, if\nNMFS determines that the U.S. annual dead discard allowance has been exceeded,\nNMFS would subtract the amount in excess of the allowance from the total amount\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 26","of bluefin tuna that can be landed. If NMFS determines that the annual dead\ndiscard allowance has not been reached, NMFS may add half of the remainder to\nthe total amount of bluefin tuna that can be landed. Under ATCA, no regulation\nmay have the effect of increasing or decreasing the (CCAT-recommended quota.\nThe 1998 ICCAT Rebuilding Program also allows four years to balance the\neight-percent tolerance for bluefin tuna under 115 cm (young school and school\nbluefin tuna). The United States currently allows the eight percent to be landed\nunder the Angling category quota on an annual basis. The FMP implements this\nprovision of the ICCAT recommendation through the establishment of the school\nbluefin tuna reserve (described in Section 3.4.2.1.1), and through annual\nadjustments to the school bluefin tuna landings and reserve categories as necessary\nto meet the ICCAT requirement. Given the four-year accounting period,\nadjustments for estimated overharvest or underharvest of school bluefin tuna will\nnot be restricted to automatic carryover between fishing years. Instead, flexible\nadjustments may be made to enhance fishing opportunities and the collection of\ninformation on a broad range of size classes. NMFS will strive, however, to\nmanage the Angling category fishery so that landings of school bluefin tuna are kept\nat eight percent of the United States' total bluefin tuna quota on an annual basis.\nRegardless of the estimated landings in any year, NMFS may adjust the annual\nschool bluefin tuna quota to ensure that the average landings of these fish over each\nfour-consecutive-year period does not exceed eight percent by weight of the total\nbluefin tuna quota allocated to the United States.\nFor all other bluefin tuna quota categories, NMFS must adjust quotas on an\nannual basis to reflect overharvest or underharvest in each category during the\nprevious year. If a quota category or subcategory exceeds its quota or adjusted\nquota in a particular year, its quota must be reduced by that amount for the\nfollowing year. In the following year NMFS also may allocate any remaining quota\nfrom the Reserve to cover this overharvest, consistent with the criteria described in\nSection 3.4.1.1.3. The total of the adjusted quotas and the Reserve will be\nconsistent with the ICCAT Rebuilding Program.\nAccuracy in quota monitoring in the bluefin tuna fishery is difficult and\noverharvests are likely. Thus, accounting for overharvests is not intended to\n\"punish\" the category that exceeded its quota or adjusted quota or to \"reward\" other\ncategories that did not exceed their quota or adjusted quota, i.e., other categories\nwill not be allocated extra quota in the event that one category or subcategory's\nlandings quota is reduced to account for an overharvest. The change in the fishing\nyear to June 1 through May 31 should make it easier for NMFS to determine each\ncategory's final landings for the previous year, and thus determine each category's\ninitial quota for the following year, as few bluefin landings occur during April and\nMay (in the categories with high catch rates).\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 27","The following alternatives describe various allocation scenarios that set the\nrelative percentage of the U.S. quota for the six sectors of the domestic bluefin tuna\nfishery. Altering the relative allocation between these fishery sectors has the\npotential to alter the rebuilding trajectory because the different sectors target\ndifferent size and age classes of bluefin tuna. In addition, changes in allocation\nwould have economic impacts. Each domestic allocation alternative is analyzed\nbased on the ICCAT Rebuilding Program (the final bluefin tuna quota action). The\nfollowing analysis also presents the relative differences in present values of the\ndomestic allocation alternatives. Table 3.6 presents the range of U.S. bluefin tuna\nquotas under a range of rebuilding and allocation alternatives.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 28","Allowance\nDiscard\n68\n68\n68\n68\n68\n68\n68\n68\n68\n68\n68\nReserve\n35\n43\n35\n28\n28\n28\n28\n33\n33\n33\n33\nCategory\nTrap\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\nLongline\nCategory\n113\n113\n109\n109\n136\n109\n141\n111\n89\n89\n89\n11\nCategory\nPurse\nSeine\n258\n250\n323\n129\n204\n204\n256\n102\n250\n250\n313\n125\nHarpoon\nCategory\n54\n54\n69\n54\n43\n43\n55\n43\n53\n53\n68\n53\nTable 3.6 Bluefin quotas (in metric tons) under rebuilding and allocation alternatives.\nCategory\nAngling\n273\n273\n312\n217\n217\n247\n265\n265\n302\n0\n0\n0\nCategory\nGeneral\n653\n653\n818\n743\n518\n518\n649\n590\n633\n633\n793\n721\nTotal\n1,387\n1,387\n1,387\n1,387\n1,100\n1,100\n1,100\n1,100\n1,344\n1,344\n1,344\n1,344\nU.S.\nAtlantic (Landing\nTotal West\nQuota)\n2,413\n2,413\n2,413\n2,413\n1,913\n1,913\n1,913\n1,913\n2,354\n2,354\n2,354\n2,354\nSeine Cap (FINAL\n3. No Small Fish\n3. No Small Fish\n3. No Small Fish\n4. Reduce Purse\n4. Reduce Purse\n4. Reduce Purse\nAlternative\nAllocation\n2. SQ w/ Purse\n2. SQ w/ Purse\n2. SQ w/ Purse\nDomestic\n1. Status Quo\n1. Status Quo\n1. Status Quo\nSeine 50%\nACTION)\nRebuilding\nAlternative\n(20 Years) -\nRebuilding\nRebuilding\nStatus Quo\nProgram\n10-Year\nACTION\nProgram\nICCAT\nFINAL","Final Action: Status quo domestic quota allocations, with Purse Seine\ncategory capped at 250 mt WW\nU.S. domestic quota allocations will be based on the same percentages as the\n1997 allocations, but the Purse Seine category will be capped at its 1997/1998 quota\nof 250 mt WW (see Table 3.7). Anything over 250 mt WW that the Purse Seine\ncategory would receive under the percentage allocations will instead be added to the\nReserve. Based on these percentages, and overharvest or underharvest in the\nAngling, General, and Purse Seine categories in 1998, the adjusted quotas for the\n1999 fishing year are as follows: 261 mt WW for the Angling category, including\n99 mt WW for the school bluefin tuna subquota; 654 mt WW for the General\ncategory; 54 mt WW for the Harpoon category; 113 mt WW for the Longline\ncategory; one mt WW for the Trap category; 252 mt WW for the Purse Seine\ncategory; and 43 mt WW for the Reserve (see Table 3.8).\nVessels using purse seine nets have participated in the U.S. fishery for bluefin\ntuna continuously since the 1950s, although a number of purse seine vessels did\ntarget and land bluefin tuna off of Gloucester, MA as early as the 1930s. The\nlimited entry system with non-transferable individual vessel quotas (IVQs) for purse\nseining was established in 1982, effectively excluding any new entrants to this\ncategory. NMFS considered the relevant factors outlined in section 303(b)(6) of the\nMagnuson-Stevens Act, which include: (A) present participation in the fishery;\n(B) historical fishing practices in, and dependence on, the fishery; (C) the\neconomics of the fishery; (D) the capability of fishing vessels used in the fishery to\nengage in other fisheries; (E) the cultural and social framework relevant to the\nfishery and any affected fishing communities; and (F) any other relevant\nconsiderations. See the description of the Purse Seine category fishery in Chapter 2\nfor more information on the history of this fishery and for discussion of the\npreceding factors. Equal quotas are assigned to individual vessels by regulation; the\nIVQ system is possible in this category given the small pool of ownership in this\nsector of the fishery. Currently, only five vessels comprise the bluefin tuna Purse\nSeine fleet, and the quotas were made transferable among the five vessels in 1996.\nThe combined result of the limited access IVQ system and quota allocation to\nPurse Seine category vessels is that each owner is essentially assured an annual\nallocation of 50 mt. Vessel owners in other categories receive no such \"guaranteed\nallocation.\" Indeed, the most likely outcome in the open access portions of the\nbluefin fishery is that most vessels will land less fish as the number of participants\nincreases.\nA limited access system for the Longline category fishery for Atlantic tunas is\nalso established in this FMP (see Chapter 4).\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 30","Ecological Impacts\nBased on the average size for large medium/giant bluefin tuna, the final action\nwill result in an estimated 14,853 bluefin tuna being landed (5,836 73 inches CFL\nand 9,017 < 73 inches CFL) each year by the United States throughout the 20-year\nrebuilding period. This is an estimated increase of 3.4 percent in the number of fish\nthat would be landed under the status quo rebuilding and allocation alternatives, and\na very slight increase compared to the number that would be landed with the same\nrebuilding alternative under the status quo allocation alternative.\nThe composition of the landings (in numbers of fish) is slightly different from\nthe status quo allocation alternative. Given the 20-year ICCAT Rebuilding\nProgram, the Purse Seine category would be due to receive 258 mt WW using the\nstatus quo allocation percentages. As the final action is very similar to the status\nquo, and the overall U.S. quota in the Rebuilding Program is very similar to the\nstatus quo, the impacts on other fish stocks, protected species, and essential fish\nhabitat would be similar to those described in Chapter 2.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nCombined with the 20-year Rebuilding Plan, the final action results in estimated\npresent values of gross and net revenues for the 1999 to 2038 period which are\nslightly lower than with the status quo allocation alternative, and are estimated to be\n$227 million and $92 million, respectively (see Chapter 7). The present value of\nAngler Consumer Surplus for the final action is the same as under the status quo,\nand is estimated to be $228 million (see Chapter 7). If the additional quota which is\nput into the Reserve under the final action goes to commercial or recreational\ncategories, gross and net revenues, and/or Angler Consumer Surplus would increase\naccordingly.\nThe social impacts from this final action will be similar to those of the status quo\nallocation alternative. The extra tonnage allocated to the Reserve will most likely\nbe allocated to those categories that have high participation and/or have closed\nquickly in recent years (e.g., the Harpoon category) or those which collect\ninformation important for stock assessments (e.g., the General and Angling\ncategories), which could relieve conflict in these categories. As with the other\nallocation alternatives, however, conflict between user groups will most likely\ncontinue.\nConclusion\nAt the HMS AP meeting in August 1998, while no clear consensus emerged,\nthere was little discussion of, or support for, changing the Purse Seine category\nquota. The HMS AP met in January 1998 to discuss bluefin tuna quota allocations\nand General category effort controls, and there was strong support for the status\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 31","quo, although some AP members did support a reduction in the Purse Seine\ncategory quota. Both AP discussions occurred in light of a potential reduction of\nthe overall U.S. allocation and therefore to domestic quota category allocations; no\nincreases were anticipated at the time. Public comment on allocation issues was\nmixed, with some comments on the purse seine allocation issue stating that the\ncategory's allocation should be increased, some stating that it should be decreased,\nas well as some in favor of the cap.\nNMFS maintains that limiting the Purse Seine category to its quota level of\nrecent years would not unduly impact that category, with its limited entry IVQ\nsystem and limited participants, especially when compared to the intense\ncompetition and increased participation in the handgear fisheries. The IVQ system\nin place, which assigns a set quota to the category and to each vessel, essentially\ninsulates the Purse Seine category from increased competition and participation, and\nNMFS maintains that limiting the Purse Seine category to 250 mt WW is consistent\nwith the National Standards. However, the AP has not had an opportunity to\naddress this issue in light of the 1999 quota increase, and NMFS would appreciate\nany insight the AP may provide. Therefore, NMFS is not making a final decision\nregarding the allocation of the 8 mt potential Purse Seine category quota increase\nfor 1999 at this time; instead, NMFS will hold the 8 mt in the Reserve until after the\nAP has discussed the issue. If NMFS retains the 250 mt cap as proposed, no further\nmodifications to this FMP will be made. If, however, NMFS does not retain the\nPurse Seine category quota cap, the FMP will be modified through the framework\nprovisions contained herein.\nTable 3.7 Domestic Quota Allocation Percentage Alternatives\nStatus Quo with\nEliminate Small\nReduce Purse\nCategory\nStatus Quo\nPurse Seine Cap*\nFish\nSeine 50%\nAllocation\n53.6\nGeneral\n47.1\n47.1\n59.0\n0.0\n22.5\nAngling\n19.7\n19.7\n18.6*\n23.3\n9.3\nPurse Seine\n18.6\n3.9\n5.0\n3.9\nHarpoon\n3.9\n8.1\n10.1\n8.1\nLongline\n8.1\n0.1\nTrap\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n2.5\n2.5\nReserve\n2.5\n2.5*\n*Purse Seine category receives 250 mt WW or 18.6% of quota, whichever is less. Any part of 18.6% above 250 mt ww is\nallocated to the Reserve.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 32","Table 3.8 1998 Bluefin Quotas, Landings, and Under/Overharvest; 1999 and Future Quotas (mt ww).\nA\nB\nC\nD\nE\nF\nG\nH\n1998\n1998\n1998\n1998 Under\n1999\n1999-2018\nAdjusted\nCategories\nInitial\nAdjusted\nLandings\n(+)/\nBridge\nFishing\n1999\nquota\nOverharves\nquota\nQuota\nYear\nFishing\nt (-)\n(Jan-May)\nQuota*\nYear Quota\n(January-\n(June-May)\n(June-May)\nDecember)\nSchool (N)\n57\n66\n44\n-12\n0\n48\n43\nA\nSchool (S)2\n51\n26\n60\n42\n38\nN\nLg School/\n81\n61\n45\n16\n16\n83\n83\nG\nSm Med (N)\nL\nI\nLg School/\n72\n90\n31ª\n59\n59\n73\n73\nN\nSm Med (S)\nG\nTrophy (N)\n3\n3\n<1\n2\n0\n2\n2\nTrophy (S)\n5\n5\n3\n2\n4\n4\n4\nGeneral\n657\n707\n706\n1\n0\n653\n654\nC\nLongline (N)³\no\n24\n24\n23\n1\n1\n24\n24\nM\nLongline (S)4\n89\n49\n24\n25\n25\nM\n89\n89\nE\nTrap\n1\n1\n1\n0\n0\n1\n1\nR\nC\nPurse Seine\n250\n250\n248\n2\n0\n250\n252\nI\nA\nHarpoon\n53\n60\n60\n0\n0\n54\n54\nL\nReserve\n52\n16\n1b\n15\n15\n43\n43\nSchool Reserve\n0\n21\n18\n---\n---\n---\n---\nTOTAL\n1,395\n1,358\n1,247\n112\n120\n1,387\n1,378\na As of November 6, 1998 (includes school bluefin tuna used for research and landings reported through North Carolina pilot program)\nb Includes non-school bluefin tuna used for research and bluefin tuna seized by Enforcement\n* Does not include 68 mt ww discard allowance\n1 Angling category northern area is defined as waters north of 38° 47'\n2 Angling category southern area is defined as waters south of 38° 47'\n3 3Longline category northern area is defined as waters north of 34° 00'\n4 Longline category southern area is defined as waters south of 34° 00'\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 33","Rejected Options for Bluefin Tuna Domestic Allocation Alternatives\nRejected Option: Status quo domestic quota allocation of bluefin tuna\nEcological Impacts\nThe number of fish projected to be landed under the status quo allocation\nalternative with the various rebuilding alternatives are described in the ecological\nimpact analyses of the quota alternatives in Section 3.4.1.1.1. Based on the 20-year\nRebuilding Program and the average sizes for school, large school/small medium,\nand large medium/giant bluefin tuna, this alternative would result in an estimated\n14,808 bluefin tuna being landed by the United States (5,857 73 inches CFL and\n8,951 < 73 inches CFL) each year until stock rebuilding is complete. This is\nequivalent to a 3.1-percent increase in numbers of fish landed in the west Atlantic\nby the United States, compared to landings levels under the status quo rebuilding\nalternative.\nAs this allocation alternative is the status quo, and the overall U.S. quota during\nthe rebuilding period is very similar to the status quo, impacts on other fish stocks,\nprotected species, and essential fish habitat are described in Chapters 5 and 6.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nBluefin prices and harvesting costs vary by sector. As a result, altering the\nallocation among these sectors would have effects on gross and net bluefin tuna\nrevenues. However, gross and net bluefin tuna revenues are even more strongly\ninfluenced by the choice of rebuilding alternative. The analysis of the economic\nimpacts of this allocation alternative is based on the provisions of the 20-year\nRebuilding Plan.\nThe estimated present value of gross and net revenues for the 1999 to 2038\nperiod are estimated to be $229 million and $92 million, respectively (see\nChapter 7). The present value of Angler Consumer Surplus for this alternative is\nestimated to be $228 million (see Chapter 7)\nThe status quo social environment of the bluefin tuna fishery in the United States\nis described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 9. In past rulemaking, constituents have\nrequested changes to the allocation system, including reallocation of Purse Seine\nquota to the handgear categories, reallocation of General category quota to the\nAngling category, and elimination of the small bluefin tuna fishery. Public comment\nis often emphatic from both the commercial and recreational sectors, and these\ndebates would likely continue under other quota allocation alternatives as well.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 34","Conclusion\nThere is currently conflict between various user groups, and this allocation\nalternative would likely result in continued conflict as it is the status quo and is\nconsistent with past allocations.\nRejected Option: Elimination of the small fish quota for bluefin\nThis quota allocation alternative would eliminate the Angling category quota for\nbluefin tuna and redistribute it to the other quota categories based on their current\npercentage allocation. See Tables 3.6 and 3.7 for the percentage quota distributions\nand metric tonnage for each category under this alternative. Analyses conducted\nusing the 1996 stock assessment suggest that this alternative could result in\nrebuilding in slightly less time than under the status quo allocation.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would eliminate the landing of school and large school/small\nmedium bluefin tuna. Based on the average size for large medium/giant bluefin\ntuna, and the 20-year Rebuilding Program, this allocation alternative would result in\nan estimated 7,368 bluefin tuna being landed each year by the United States until\nstock recovery to the spawning stock biomass necessary to produce maximum\nsustainable yield on a continuing basis, a reduction of 49 percent in the number of\nfish which would be landed under the status quo rebuilding alternative. This\nalternative would result in 50 percent fewer fish landed by number (although the\nsame amount of fish landed by weight), compared to what would be landed under\nthe status quo allocation alternative.\nThis allocation alternative would be expected to provide the fastest rebuilding\nover the long term, and could ultimately provide for a higher overall quota. While\nanalyses have not been conducted using data from the 1998 stock assessment, past\nanalyses indicate that rebuilding would occur slightly faster (two to five years faster\nthan under status quo allocation) with elimination of mortality in the small fish\nfishery, all else remaining equal. However, the elimination of the small fish fishery\nfor bluefin tuna could have a negative impact on other fish stocks, particularly other\nHMS such as yellowfin tuna, north Atlantic albacore tuna, and sharks, as the\ndisplaced recreational effort shifts.\nThe rod and reel fishery for small bluefin tuna (Angling category) is the only\nfishery which targets juvenile bluefin tuna. Eliminating this fishery would\neliminate the only source of catch per unit effort data for these age classes of bluefin\ntuna. Catch per unit effort data and indices are important factors used in the stock\nassessments conducted by SCRS.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 35","Social and Economic Impacts\nSince the traditional mid-Atlantic recreational bluefin tuna fishery has not been a\ncatch and release fishery, a no-retention provision would substantially reduce angler\nconsumer surplus from the small fish fishery. As indicated above, the present value\nof Angler Consumer Surplus is estimated to be $228 million under the status quo\nallocation alternative and the 20-year rebuilding program. However, the present\nvalue of commercial gross and net bluefin tuna revenues for the 20-year rebuilding\nperiod would increase if the small fish fishery were eliminated. The present values\nwould be $288 million and $116 million, respectively, representing increases of\n$58 and $24 million over commercial gross and net bluefin tuna revenues under the\nstatus quo domestic allocation. The net effect on present values would still be\nnegative under this alternative since the reduction in angler consumer surplus is\nonly partially offset by the increase in present value from the commercial fishery.\nThere would be significant negative social impacts on the recreational fishing\ncommunity as this alternative would eliminate the fishery for school, large school,\nand small medium bluefin tuna. The impact could be just as severe for the\ncharterboat industry if recreational fishing opportunities are reduced and clients\nchoose not to make fishing plans, thus reducing charter/headboat revenues and\nincome. Commercial fishermen and their communities would benefit from this\nalternative because their allocation percentages would increase. There would most\nlikely be increased conflict between the various user groups over quota allocation\nissues, as the recreational fishing community would seek to regain a share of\nthe quota.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it would not provide for harvesting optimum\nyield. It is also inconsistent with NS 8 because it would not provide for the\nsustained participation of fishing communities, to the extent practicable. The\nlimited retention of pre-spawning bluefin tuna by recreational and commercial\nfishermen has been an integral part of this fishery throughout its history and is a\npart of the fishery's future. If managed appropriately, these fish can continue to\nafford sustained fishing opportunities without adversely affecting the stock. The\nadverse social and economic impacts on the recreational and charter/headboat\nsectors from this alternative result in its rejection. Further, this alternative would\nhinder NMFS' ability to collect the best available data on the catches of the\nbroadest range of age classes possible for assessment of the west Atlantic stock, as\nrequired by the 1998 ICCAT Recommendation.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 36","Rejected Option: 50-percent reduction in Purse Seine category allocation, with\nmaintenance of limited access in purse seine fishery\nThis quota allocation alternative would reduce the Purse Seine allocation by\n50 percent and redistribute that quota to the General and Angling categories based\non their current percentage allocation. This alternative, while it would reduce the\nquota allocated to the Purse Seine category and the individual vessels in it, would\nmaintain the IVQ limited access management system that is currently in place. See\nTables 3.6 and 3.7 for the percentage quota distributions and metric tons for each\ncategory under this alternative.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative redistributes some of the quota which would have been landed as\nmature fish by Purse Seine category vessels to the recreational fishery for immature\nfish, and would result in a greater number of fish landed than with the other\nallocation alternatives. Rebuilding could be slower than under the status quo\nallocation alternative. The size composition of the landings, under each rebuilding\nalternative, would not be significantly different from that under the status quo\nallocation, however, and the pace of rebuilding under this allocation alternative\nwould most likely be very similar to those under status quo allocations.\nBased on the average size for the large medium/giant bluefin tuna, combined\nwith the 20-year ICCAT Rebuilding Plan, this allocation alternative would result in\nan estimated 15,227 bluefin tuna being landed (5,565 73 inches CFL and\n9,572 < 73 inches CFL) each year by the United States until stock rebuilding is\ncomplete, an increase of six percent in the number of fish which would be landed\nunder the status quo rebuilding and allocation alternatives, and a slight increase\ncompared to the number that would be landed with a similar rebuilding time period\nunder the status quo allocation alternative.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis allocation alternative would result in an overall decrease in the present\nvalue of gross and net bluefin tuna revenues to $217 million and $85 million,\nrespectively, as compared to the status quo allocation. The decrease results in part\nfrom the fact that both gross and net revenues per ton are lower for the General\ncategory, which would be reallocated some of the purse seine quota, than for the\nPurse Seine category. In addition, a portion of the purse seine quota would be\nallocated to the Angling category. As a result, the present value of Angler\nConsumer Surplus would increase from the status quo allocation to $261 million.\nThis alternative would impact the purse seine fishery severely under any of the\nrebuilding alternatives. There are a limited number of people who benefit from the\npurse seine quota, and, while the fishery has continued despite past reductions in\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 37","quota, it is unclear if those people would leave the fishery if their quota allocation\npercentage were to be reduced (see Section 2.5.4). The General and Angling\ncategories would benefit from this allocation alternative under any of the rebuilding\nalternatives. For instance, more General and Angling category fishermen could\nretain their permits and continue participating in the bluefin tuna fishery than\nmight otherwise under the ten- or 20-year rebuilding alternatives. There would\nmost likely be continued conflict between the various user groups over quota\nallocation issues.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because of the adverse social and economic impacts it\nwould have on the Purse Seine sector of the bluefin tuna fishery, and because it\nwould not maintain traditional fishing patterns as required by the Magnuson-\nStevens Act.\n3.4.1.1.3\nBluefin Tuna Quota Transfer Criteria\nNMFS has the authority to allocate any portion of the Reserve to any category or\ncategories of the fishery after considering the following four factors: 1) the\nusefulness of information obtained from catches of the particular category of the\nfishery for biological sampling and monitoring the status of the stock; 2) the catches\nof the particular gear segment to date and the likelihood of closure of that segment\nof the fishery if no allocation is made; 3) the projected ability of the particular gear\nsegment to harvest (land) the additional amount of bluefin tuna before the\nanticipated end of the fishing season; and 4) the estimated amounts by which quotas\nestablished for other gear segments of the fishery might be exceeded.\nNMFS is also authorized to make adjustments to quotas involving transfers\nbetween categories if, during a single year quota period, it is determined, based on\nlanding statistics, present year catch rates, effort, and other available information,\nthat any category is not likely to take its entire quota as previously allocated for that\nyear. Given that determination, NMFS may transfer inseason any portion of the\nquota of any fishing category to any other fishing category after considering the\nfour factors listed above.\nFinal Action:\nAdd \"Effects on Rebuilding and Overfishing\" as a factor to\nconsider when allocating Reserve or transferring bluefin tuna\nquota between categories\nThis action adds a fifth factor for NMFS to consider before allocating any\nportion of the Reserve to any category or categories of the bluefin tuna fishery, or\nbefore NMFS transfers any portion of the quota of any fishing category to any other\nfishing category. The fifth factor that NMFS will need to consider is: the\nanticipated consequences of the quota transfer on rebuilding and overfishing.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 38","Ecological Impacts\nConsideration of rebuilding and overfishing implications when making inseason\ntransfer decisions could result in faster rebuilding for west Atlantic bluefin tuna,\nconsistent with the precautionary approach to fisheries management. This factor\nwill most likely need to be considered in the context of transfers to the Angling\ncategory fishery for juvenile bluefin tuna. While consistent with the current ICCAT\nrecommendations, increasing the catch of juvenile bluefin tuna in the west Atlantic\ncould slow rebuilding; however, the Angling category fishery for juvenile bluefin\ntuna is the only source of scientific monitoring information (catch per unit effort\nand biological samples) on these age classes of bluefin tuna. Catch per unit effort\ndata and indices are important factors used in the stock assessments conducted by\nSCRS, and biological samples are used for research on stock structure and life\nhistory of the species. Fishery managers must strive for a balance between\nscientific monitoring and rebuilding objectives in making quota transfers, and\ninseason transfers to and from the Angling category may still be made.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nReducing the catch of juvenile bluefin tuna in the west Atlantic would help speed\nrebuilding. This final action could prevent excessive transfers to the Angling\ncategory fishery for juvenile bluefin tuna, which could result in reduced fishing\nopportunities, revenues, and angler consumer surplus for the private recreational\nand charter/headboat fleet fishing for bluefin tuna.\nConclusion\nWest Atlantic bluefin tuna is overfished, and one of the driving forces behind this\nFMP is to end overfishing and rebuild overfished stocks. Adding the additional\ncriteria that NMFS must consider, among other factors, the consequences of a\nbluefin tuna quota transfer on rebuilding and overfishing before allocating quota\nfrom the Reserve or transferring bluefin tuna quota between categories is consistent\nwith the objectives of this FMP, the requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act and\nthe NSGs, and the precautionary approach to fisheries management.\nRejected Options for Bluefin Tuna Quota Transfer Criteria\nRejected Option: Status quo for bluefin quota transfer criteria\nWhen the regulations regarding allocation from the Reserve and transfer between\nquota categories were first implemented, NMFS did not include consideration for a\nrebuilding program because there was no rebuilding program in place, nor was there\na statutory requirement for a rebuilding program. These circumstances have\nchanged, and the requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act as well as the\nobjectives of this FMP emphasize the need to rebuild overfished stocks. Thus, the\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 39","current regulations are no longer preferred. Given the need to take into account\npotential effects on rebuilding when transferring quota, this alternative is rejected.\nRejected Option: Limit bluefin quota transfers to any category to 20 percent of\nthat category's original quota\nThis alternative would limit the amount to bluefin tuna that could be transferred\nfrom the Reserve and/or another quota category to any quota category (other than\nthe Purse Seine category, which is capped at 250 mt) to 20 percent of that\ncategory's original quota. For example, if the Harpoon category's quota were 54 mt\nww, the maximum that could be transferred to that category through inseason\nactions for a particular year would be 10.8 mt WW (20 percent of 53 mt ww). Any\nadditional landings, beyond this 20 percent transfer limit, would have to be\nsubtracted from that category's quota in the following year.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative could have positive impacts on the west Atlantic bluefin tuna\nstock as it would prevent excessive quota transfers to categories where increased\ncatch could slow rebuilding, as discussed under the final action. This could result in\nfaster rebuilding and stricter adherence to the precautionary approach.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would prevent excessive transfers to all bluefin tuna quota\ncategories. This could result in a quota category not receiving a quota transfer to\ncover overharvest, which could result in that category having quota deducted the\nfollowing year. This could result in reduced fishing opportunities, income, and/or\nAngler Consumer Surplus for the commercial and/or recreational fleet fishing for\nbluefin tuna. This alternative also may limit NMFS' ability to transfer quota as\nnecessary to ensure full use of the domestic bluefin tuna quota.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected at this time, although NMFS encourages further\ndiscussion of this issue from the HMS AP and the public. West Atlantic bluefin\ntuna is overfished, and one of the driving forces behind this FMP is to end\noverfishing and rebuild overfished stocks. Adding additional limitations on bluefin\ntuna quota transfers could have positive effects on rebuilding the west Atlantic\nbluefin tuna stock.\n3.4.1.1.4 Bigeye Tuna Quota Alternatives\nICCAT has not yet adopted quotas for bigeye tuna, and the international\nmanagement measures for bigeye tuna are not currently implemented as a\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 40","coordinated rebuilding program as defined by the Magnuson-Stevens Act.\nHowever, ICCAT has recognized the danger that could be presented by the recent\nincrease in bigeye tuna catches, especially increased landings of fish less than the\nminimum size by non-U.S. vessels in the equatorial fishery. SCRS has determined\nthat under the current exploitation patterns, and assuming recruitment at recent\naverage levels, yields of bigeye tuna are expected to decline in the near future to\nlevels below the maximum sustainable yield. At the November 1998 meeting of\nICCAT, the United States introduced a resolution that requests SCRS to develop\nrebuilding scenarios for bigeye tuna, based on the available data. A bigeye tuna\nstock assessment is not scheduled for 1999, but will likely be held in 2000 or 2001.\nDue to the very limited U.S. share of the international fishery for bigeye tuna, a\nunilateral rebuilding plan would not be expected to have a measurable effect on the\nstock. Additionally, any unilateral action on behalf of the United States that would\ndeprive U.S. fishermen of access to the bigeye tuna resource might not reflect\ntraditional participation by U.S. fishermen relative to foreign competitors, and thus\ncould be contrary to § 304(e) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. The United States is\nresponsible for only one percent of Atlantic-wide bigeye landings; thus, the\nrebuilding plan for bigeye tuna will rely heavily on international cooperation and\ncompliance with management measures.\nFinal Action: Establish the foundation for developing an international\nten-year rebuilding program for Atlantic bigeye tuna\nThis final action establishes the foundation that can be used in negotiations with\nICCAT to develop a ten-year rebuilding program for overfished Atlantic bigeye\ntuna, including targets for recovery, fishing mortality rate limits, and explicit\ninterim milestones expressed in terms of measurable improvements of the stock. If\nsuccessful, an Atlantic-wide TAC for bigeye tuna, along with other conservation\nand management measures, will be adopted by ICCAT to rebuild the stock. The\nUnited States would then implement the ICCAT Rebuilding Program for bigeye\ntuna through quotas and/or increased minimum sizes and retention limits in the\ndomestic fishery.\nSCRS has determined that a reduction in Atlantic-wide catch of bigeye tuna,\nalong with a reduction in the proportion of catches less than the minimum size,\ncould result in recovery to maximum sustainable yield within ten years (Figure 9,\nSCRS, 1998). If possible, given international considerations and the rebuilding\nscenarios that will be developed by SCRS based on the best available scientific\ninformation on the status of the stock, NMFS seeks a ten-year rebuilding program\nfor bigeye tuna.\nThe Magnuson-Stevens Act and NSGs provide guidance for managers to\naccommodate the limitations imposed by being a member of an international body\nwhose management recommendations may not readily conform to a ten-year\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 41","rebuilding time frame. Under this action, the United States will adopt a rebuilding\nprogram for bigeye tuna as recommended by ICCAT. However, implementation of\nthis alternative will depend on a thorough analysis of the ICCAT Rebuilding\nProgram to ensure that it includes a specified recovery period, biomass targets,\nfishing mortality rate limits, and explicit interim milestones expressed in terms of\nmeasurable improvement of the stock. Each of these components is necessary to\nsupport the objectives of this FMP and the intent of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.\nEcological Impacts\nSCRS has strongly recommended a reduction in the total catch of Atlantic bigeye\ntuna to the 1992 level, which was approximately 85,000 mt WW (SCRS, 1998). If\nthis scientific recommendation were to be adopted by ICCAT, it would require at\nleast a six percent reduction from the 1997 Atlantic-wide level of bigeye catch. In\nthe United States, reported landings of bigeye in 1997 (1,095 mt ww) would need to\nbe reduced to 1,029 mt WW in order to achieve a six percent reduction in catch. It\nshould be noted that U.S. commercial and recreational landings figures for BAYS\ntunas, including bigeye tuna, are under active review, which may result in changes\nto landings estimates.\nAnother critical part of a recovery plan for bigeye tuna is a reduction in the\ncatch of fish less than the minimum size. As noted in Chapter 2, approximately\n70 percent of the Atlantic-wide bigeye catch is composed of fish smaller than 3.2 kg\n(seven pounds), even though ICCAT allows only a 15-percent tolerance for fish\nsmaller than this size. The United States has already addressed this problem in the\ndomestic fishery by implementing a minimum size of 27 inches CFL (approxi-\nmately 6.4 kg) with zero tolerance. The rebuilding plan for bigeye tuna should\naddress this problem at the international level. This could be accomplished through\nlimitations on the use of fish aggregating devices in the surface fisheries near the\nequator, as recommended by SCRS.\nBecause a mixed species pelagic longline fishery is the main commercial fishery\nin the United States for bigeye tuna, the implementation of a new quota system\ncould increase discards of bigeye tuna. In addition, as the stock recovers and\nabundance increases, increased discards of bigeye could occur. Alternatives\naddressing incidental catch and discard reduction are discussed later in this chapter.\nA reduction in landings of bigeye tuna could also cause a shift in both commercial\nand recreational fishing effort, and perhaps mortality, towards other species.\nOverall, however, this action will result in positive ecological impacts on the stock\nbecause current catch rates exceed the levels needed to produce the maximum\nsustainable yield.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 42","Social and Economic Impacts\nAs ICCAT has not yet adopted a rebuilding program for bigeye tuna, a complete\nanalysis of the social and economic impacts of this alternative cannot be conducted\nat this time. If the ICCAT Rebuilding Program involves a substantial reduction in\nallowable catch, there would likely be a short-term reduction in economic benefits\nfrom the fishery until the stock recovers. For instance, if ICCAT established an\nAtlantic-wide TAC at 1992 levels, a six percent reduction in commercial landings\nwould result in a similar reduction in revenues. U.S. commercial landings of bigeye\ntuna in 1997 were 803 mt ww, with an average price of $3.53 per pound dw, for a\ntotal ex-vessel value of approximately five million dollars. A six percent reduction\nin revenues could result in an ex-vessel value of approximately $4.7 million.\nEstimated recreational landings of bigeye were 293 mt ww, SO a six-percent\nreduction in landings would limit the recreational fishery to 275 mt WW. Since\nbigeye tuna are not often targeted by recreational fishermen, except in certain times\nof the year and in certain areas, it is difficult to estimate the effect that a reduction\nin allowable landings of bigeye would have on angler consumer surplus. It would\nmost likely be reduced, but to an unknown extent, since many recreational trips\ntargeting bigeye tuna may also target yellowfin tuna.\nAs described in Chapters 4, 7, and 9, the pelagic longline fleet is under\nconsiderable strain due to increasingly stringent regulations, market difficulties and\nproblems in securing and retaining trained crew members. Bigeye tuna can be a\nprofitable catch, since prices of export-quality fish can be nearly as high as prices\nfor bluefin tuna. Numerous vessels in the pelagic longline fishery are operating on\nnarrow profit margins. Management measures that further restrict this fishery\nthrough large quota reductions or closures could affect fishing communities,\nparticularly those in the pelagic longline fishery in the mid-Atlantic region. There\nare not expected to be any significant safety implications associated with this\naction. Although a landings quota could increase the derby nature of the pelagic\nlongline fishery, NMFS is implementing a limited access program that would\nmitigate those impacts.\nConclusion\nThis is the final action. An international rebuilding plan for bigeye tuna is the\nmost effective alternative for meeting the conservation objectives of NS 1, while\ntaking into account impacts on fishing communities. Implementation of this final\naction will depend on an analysis of any rebuilding program that is adopted by\nICCAT. NMFS will work with ICCAT member nations to develop and adopt an\nappropriate international rebuilding plan for bigeye tuna. In order to be consistent\nwith the requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the rebuilding program must\ninclude a specified recovery period, biomass targets, fishing mortality rate limits,\nand explicit interim milestones.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 43","Rejected Options for Bigeye Tuna Quota Alternatives\nRejected Option: Status quo: No rebuilding plan for bigeye tuna\nUnder this alternative, the management scheme currently in place for Atlantic\nbigeye tuna, including that for the United States, would remain the same. The\nbasic\nconservation recommendation of ICCAT in place for bigeye tuna is a minimum size\nof 3.2 kg (7 pounds). Seventy percent of current catches Atlantic-wide, however,\nconsist of bigeye tuna smaller than this minimum size. Spanish and French purse\nseine fleets have agreed to limit fishing on schools of bigeye tuna associated with\nfloating objects, which should reduce the catch of juveniles. A resolution limits\ncatches of Atlantic bigeye tuna by Chinese-Taipei to 16,500 mt WW. ICCAT also\napproved a binding recommendation that requires all member countries to report\ntheir vessels greater than 80 GRT that are fishing for bigeye tuna in the Atlantic\nOcean. ICCAT has not recommended Atlantic-wide or national quotas for bigeye\ntuna, nor has it investigated recovery scenarios, although at the November 1998\nmeeting, ICCAT adopted a resolution requesting SCRS to develop rebuilding\nscenarios for bigeye tuna.\nEcological Impacts\nThe 1998 SCRS report states that under current exploitation pattern and\nrecruitment levels, yields of bigeye tuna would be expected to decline in the near\nfuture to levels below maximum sustainable yield. Current catch levels cannot be\nsustained, and without additional management measures, may result in substantial\ndeclines in stock size.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nIf current catches cannot be sustained and result in substantial stock declines,\nthere could be significant negative social and economic impact to vessels and\ncommunities involved in the U.S. bigeye tuna fishery. Commercial catches and\nrevenues, along with recreational catches and fishing opportunities, would decline,\nresulting in lower revenues and perhaps in lower angler consumer surplus.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected. The Magnuson-Stevens Act requires the development\nof rebuilding plans for all species that are listed by NMFS as overfished. Bigeye\ntuna was added to the list of overfished fisheries in October 1998. NMFS is\ncommitted to multilateral efforts to develop an international rebuilding plan for\nbigeye tuna.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 44","3.4.1.2 North Atlantic Swordfish\nNorth Atlantic swordfish are considered overfished. Current biomass is\nestimated to be less than that needed for maximum sustainable yield and the fishing\nmortality rate exceeds that which would produce maximum sustainable yield\n(Chapter 2). ICCAT recommendations for north Atlantic swordfish include\nminimum sizes, quotas, and compliance measures, although these measures are not\ncurrently implemented as a coordinated rebuilding plan as defined by the\nMagnuson-Stevens Act. In this FMP, the United States establishes the foundation\nfor negotiating an ICCAT Rebuilding Program for north Atlantic swordfish in\n1999. The rebuilding plan may include quota reductions, measures to account for\nall sources of mortality, and other conservation and management measures, as\nappropriate.\n3.4.1.2.1 North Atlantic Swordfish Quota Alternatives\nReducing Quotas to Rebuild the North Atlantic Swordfish Stock\nIn this FMP, analyses of the rebuilding alternatives for the north Atlantic\nswordfish stock are based on the results of the 1996 SCRS stock assessment. In\n1996, SCRS reported that total swordfish biomass corresponding to the level that\nwould produce maximum sustainable yield in the north Atlantic may not be\nachieved in five or ten years without substantial reductions in catch from 1996\nlevels. In response to the 1996 stock assessment, ICCAT implemented a substantial\nreduction in quotas for 1997 through 1999. SCRS has maintained that the level of\nharvest needs to be further reduced below the level of replacement yield in order to\nrebuild the stock. In 1998, the swordfish recruitment index showed substantially\nimproved recruitment in 1997. However, the replacement yield for 1997 is likely to\nbe about 8,000 to 12,000 mt and catch levels remain above projected replacement\nyield levels (SCRS, 1998a).\nThe 1996 assessment included projections of SSB/SSB MSY under a variety of\nscenarios for the 1997 to 2010 period. These scenarios assume constant catch,\nhowever, which is not valid given the decreasing swordfish catches in recent years.\nAs shown in Table 3.9, reported swordfish catch declined from 1995 to 1997. If\nthere is compliance with ICCAT quota reductions, catch should continue to decline\nin 1998 and 1999. Thus, it is impossible to obtain projections directly from the\n1996 SCRS report because it assumes constant catch levels over this period.\nReported Atlantic-wide catch (landings and discards) of North Atlantic Swordfish\nTable 3.9\n1990 to 1997, in mt whole weight (Source: SCRS, 1998a)\n1990\n1991\n1992\n1993\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\nNorth Atlantic\n15,672\n14,716\n15,005\n16,350\n14,501\n16,026\n14,208\n12,510\nSwordfish Catch\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 45","The low-ends of the 80 percent confidence interval estimates were used (Table\n17, SCRS, 1996a) to adjust the SCRS ADAPT projections. The results of the\nADAPT projections were adjusted based on reported and estimated catches for the\n1996 to 1998 period, information that was unavailable at the time of the 1996 SCRS\nreport. This precautionary approach resulted in conservative estimates of the\nimpact of the quotas considered. In essence, these adjustments shifted the curves\nshown in Figure 3.2 down from where they are in the SCRS report. Again, these\nadjustments were deemed necessary because the constant catch assumptions in the\n1996 SCRS projections are no longer valid. For example, the 8,000 mt WW TAC\nprojections contained in the SCRS report assume this catch level for 1996 to 1998,\nyet the actual TAC, and thus the reported and estimated catches for this period, are\nsignificantly higher than this level. To more accurately reflect real 1996 to 1998\ncatches, the 8,000 mt WW TAC projections were adjusted downward, resulting in\nthe rebuilding trajectory shown in Figure 3.2. Similar adjustments were made to the\n6,000 mt WW and zero mt WW rebuilding trajectories.\nProjected SSB/SSB MSY for north Atlantic swordfish for 1999 to 2008 under constant-catch\nFigure 3.2\nscenarios (based on SCRS projections and adjusted by NMFS)\nSSB/SSBmsy\n10\n1\n8000 mt\n6000 mt\n0mt\n0.1\n0.01\nUsing the adjusted stock assessment projections, three constant-catch scenarios\nwere analyzed for the 1999 to 2008 period: zero mt/year; 6,000 mt ww/year, and\n8,000 mt ww/year. Figure 3.2 plots the projected SSB/SSB MSY for 1999 to 2008\nunder constant-catch scenarios. \"Quotas\" in this analysis are considered as total\nallowable catch, i.e., removal of swordfish from the stock either by landing or\ndiscarding dead swordfish.\nIn 1999, SCRS will reassess the status of north Atlantic swordfish, using data\nthrough 1998, and will provide ICCAT with a range of recovery scenarios.\nUpdated relative abundance analyses completed in 1998 indicated substantially\nimproved recruitment of swordfish in 1997 (SCRS, 1998a). This improvement,\nshould it prove to be real over time (and not an artifact of one year's worth of data),\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 46","could allow for increases in spawning biomass in the future. However, SCRS\nexpressed concern about the high catches (landings and discards) of small swordfish\nin 1997, which could prevent a strong year-class from reaching maturity. The 1999\nassessment may provide a more optimistic outlook than that indicated in the 1996\nassessment, if this year class is not heavily harvested until it reaches maturity\n(SCRS, 1998a). The United States will consider the rebuilding scenarios developed\nby SCRS in 1999, as well as the comments that were received on the alternatives\npresented here (in terms of time frames and rationale, not absolute numbers) when\ndeveloping the swordfish rebuilding plan.\nFinal Action: Establish the foundation for developing an international\nten-year rebuilding program for north Atlantic swordfish\nThis final action establishes the foundation that can be used in negotiations with\nICCAT to develop a ten-year rebuilding program for overfished north Atlantic\nswordfish, including targets for recovery, fishing mortality rate limits, and explicit\ninterim milestones expressed in terms of measurable improvements of the stock. If\nsuccessful, the TAC for north Atlantic swordfish would be reduced, and other\nconservation and management measures may be adopted, in order to rebuild the\nstock. The United States would then implement the ICCAT Rebuilding Program\nfor north Atlantic swordfish through adjusted quotas and/or additional conservation\nand management measures in the domestic fishery.\nHistorically, the United States has been a leader in conservation of Atlantic\nswordfish, and has demonstrated the willingness to take the critical steps necessary\nto conserve these stocks. This fact has been a primary negotiation tool at ICCAT,\nand it is questionable whether the recent ICCAT actions would have been possible\nwithout the support by the United States. The United States sponsored a resolution\nat the 1998 ICCAT meeting that requests SCRS to develop recovery scenarios for\noverexploited stocks following the 1999 swordfish stock assessment. Instead of\nfocusing on quota levels, NMFS prefers a plan that emphasizes the rebuilding\nperiod. NMFS seeks to rebuild the north Atlantic swordfish stock in ten years,\nconsistent with the Magnuson-Stevens Act (swordfish could rebuild in less than ten\nyears at zero fishing mortality). Following the 1999 stock assessment, NMFS will\ntake into account international considerations and the best scientific information\navailable on the status of the stock in developing an appropriate rebuilding plan for\nconsideration at ICCAT in November 1999.\nThe Magnuson-Stevens Act and National Standards provide guidance for\nmanagers to accommodate the limitations imposed by being a member of an\ninternational body whose management recommendations may not readily conform\nto a ten-year rebuilding time frame. Under this action, the United States will adopt\na rebuilding program for north Atlantic swordfish as recommended by ICCAT.\nHowever, implementation of this alternative will depend on an examination of the\nICCAT Rebuilding Program, including a specified recovery period, biomass targets,\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 47","fishing mortality rate limits, and explicit interim milestones expressed in terms of\nmeasurable improvement of the stock. Each of these components is necessary to\nsupport the objectives of the FMP and the intent of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.\nEcological Impacts\nUnder this final action, NMFS establishes the foundation for an ICCAT\nRebuilding Program that would result in a ten-year recovery period for north\nAtlantic swordfish. Based on the 1996 stock assessment, the north Atlantic TAC\nfor swordfish would need to be reduced to 8,000 mt WW per year for ten years\nbeginning in 2000 in order to rebuild the stock within ten years. The current\nU.S. share is 29 percent of the TAC, which would amount to 2,320 mt WW during\nthe ten-year rebuilding period, although relative shares for each country are subject\nto negotiation at ICCAT. This annual TAC of 2320 mt WW each year for ten years\ndoes not include any reductions for dead discards. Based on currently available\ndata, this alternative would represent a 27-percent decrease in catch for the north\nAtlantic and for the United States.\nThe final action may likely result in an increase in swordfish discards if pelagic\nlongline fishermen continue to fish for tunas during a directed swordfish closure,\nalthough bycatch limits during a directed fishery closure should mitigate such\neffects. In addition, reductions in swordfish quotas may cause shifts in effort to\nother pelagic species such as dolphinfish, tunas, and wahoo; and some decrease in\nunmarketable species typically discarded in the directed pelagic longline fishery for\nswordfish. If this action results in reduced fishing effort by the pelagic longline\nfleet, interactions with turtles and marine mammals and other bycatch species may\ndecrease. However, if fishermen target other species with their pelagic longlines,\nsea turtle and billfish catch may increase as fishing is likely to take place during the\nday or late evening, when bycatch rates of these some species may be higher.\nOverall, this action will have a positive ecological impact on the north Atlantic\nswordfish stock because current catch rates exceed levels needed to produce the\nmaximum sustainable yield.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nAs ICCAT has not yet adopted a recovery program, an analysis of the impacts of\nthe program can not be performed at this time. An ICCAT Rebuilding Program that\nreduces the allowable catch could cause a short-term reduction in economic benefits\nfrom the fishery. Should ICCAT develop and adopt a swordfish rebuilding program\nwith specific time periods, milestones, targets, and limits, NMFS will perform full\nanalyses of its expected ecological, economic, and social impacts.\nCurrent estimates of the negative gross and net revenue impacts for the\nrebuilding years are large, reflecting a quota cut of approximately 27 percent from\n1998 levels. Annual gross ex-vessel revenues are estimated to be approximately\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 48","$11.4 million for a ten-year rebuilding period. Net revenues are estimated to be\n$1.5 million for the same period. Present values of swordfish gross and net\nrevenues for the domestic fishery are estimated to be slightly lower under this action\nthan under a six-year rebuilding program and slightly higher than under a three-year\nrebuilding program (Chapter 7).\nAs a result, it is likely that some vessels that rely heavily on swordfish revenues\nwould be forced to seek revenues in other fisheries or exit fishing altogether.\nHowever, this alternative allows for rebuilding in the longest time period allowed\nby the Magnuson-Stevens Act and the National Standard Guidelines, and the\ndislocation of fishing effort would be far smaller than under more restrictive\nrebuilding alternatives. Fisheries to which displaced swordfish effort could viably\nbe redirected would vary by region and type of gear owned by the boat, but might\ninclude: increased targeting of BAYS tunas by pelagic longline vessels,\nparticipation in the snapper-grouper fishery, and participation in the mackerel, squid\nand butterfish fisheries, although many of these fisheries also have limited access\nprovisions in place.\nAs described in Chapters 4, 7, and 9, the pelagic longline fleet is under\nconsiderable strain due to increasingly stringent regulations, market difficulties, and\nproblems in securing and retaining trained crew members. Numerous vessels are\noperating on very narrow profit margins. Measures that further restrict this fishery,\nthrough large quota reductions or closures, will affect more than just the marginal\nvessels. This measure could affect fishing communities, particularly those in the\nmid-Atlantic, southeast United States, and the Gulf of Mexico.\nThere are no significant safety implications associated with this action. Reduced\nquotas could increase derby conditions in the fishery, although pelagic longline\nfishermen could choose to modify their fishing behavior in order to \"target\" other\nspecies during daytime sets.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is selected. Many comments were received that supported this\nfinal action. An ICCAT Rebuilding Program is the most effective alternative for\nmeeting the conservation objectives of NS 1, while taking into account impacts on\nfishing communities. Implementation of this final action will depend on an analysis\nof any rebuilding program that is adopted by ICCAT. NMFS will work with\nICCAT member nations to develop and adopt an appropriate rebuilding plan for\nnorth Atlantic swordfish. In order to be consistent with the requirements of the\nMagnuson-Stevens Act, the rebuilding plan must include a specified recovery\nperiod, biomass targets, fishing mortality rate limits, and explicit interim milestones\nexpressed in terms of measurable improvement of the stock.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 49","Final Action: Establish the foundation to count dead discards against the\nswordfish quota\nCurrently, dead discards of swordfish are not counted against the swordfish\nquota, and the quota corresponds directly to landings. Dead discards by U.S.\ncommercial fishing vessels are tabulated and reported to ICCAT, and are considered\nin SCRS stock assessments. Other nations have implemented a higher minimum\nsize than the United States, and, under the ICCAT recommendation, may retain up\nto 15 percent of their catch in swordfish smaller than that minimum size. Despite\nthe fact that no nations other than the United States and Canada report dead discards\nof swordfish, it is likely that dead discards do occur when vessels of other\ncontracting parties reach their 15-percent tolerance of undersized fish (although\nsome nations exceed this allowance).\nThe United States introduced a resolution to ICCAT in 1998 that directs SCRS to\ntake dead discards into account when developing rebuilding scenarios for north\nAtlantic swordfish. The United States cannot adjust the amount of swordfish\nlanded by subtracting dead discards unilaterally because it would have the effect of\nreducing the quota, which is inconsistent with ATCA. This final action establishes\nthe foundation for developing measures to count dead discards of swordfish against\nthe quota.\nEcological Impacts\nUnder this action, swordfish discarded dead by commercial or recreational\nfishermen would be counted against the swordfish quota, and thus, would be\naccounted for in the TAC for the entire stock. Under the expected reduced quotas\nof a swordfish rebuilding plan, pelagic longline fishermen may reduce the number\nof sets as a fleet and stop longline fishing when the swordfish season closes.\nAlternatively, pelagic longline fishermen may continue to fish with longlines,\ntargeting swordfish until that season closes, and then targeting dolphin or tunas with\nlonglines. To a certain extent, NMFS can control incidental catch rates of swordfish\nby directed fishery gears by adjusting bycatch limits during a closure of the directed\nfishery. Therefore, NMFS assumes that under a rebuilding plan, future dead\ndiscards and landings of swordfish would be proportional to 1997 dead discards/\ntotal catch. Dead discard rates are therefore expected to remain at the 1997 rate\n(445.7 mt WW of dead discards in comparison to total catch 3421.9 mt WW or\n13 percent). If fishermen do not change their fishing patterns (i.e., continue fishing\nat night), except to discard swordfish after the directed fishery closure, discards may\nincrease. If fishermen exit the fishery to pursue other activities, including other\nfishing activities, discards may decrease because there will be a shorter directed\nfishing season. This final action will account for all sources of mortality of the\nstock, except post-release mortality of fish released alive by both recreational and\ncommercial fishermen, for which NMFS currently has no estimates.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 50","This final action will decrease mortality over time if landings and bycatch are\nstrictly monitored and counted against the quota. This measure may also result in\nproportional reductions in associated bycatch (since the season will be closed\nearlier) including sea turtles, marine mammals, and other unmarketable species. It\nis possible that, when earlier closures occur, effort will be directed to other pelagic\nlongline activities (e.g., the daytime tuna longline fishery), where bycatch levels of\nunmarketable species may be higher. This measure may encourage fishermen to\navoid areas where incidental catch is high but may also encourage inaccurate\nlogbook reporting. This is a difficult impact to address due to relatively low levels\nof observer coverage. Quotas are monitored in the swordfish fishery based on\nvessel logbook and dealer reports. NMFS scientists have developed a technique to\naccount for commercial bycatch using logbook and observer data (Cramer and\nAdams, 1998a). However, this final action may provide an incentive for both\nrecreational and commercial fishermen to underestimate their dead discards of\nswordfish because they would be penalized with reduced allowable landings for\nthose dead discards.\nBoth recreational and commercial fishermen have an incentive to handle\nswordfish in such a manner as to promote their post-release survival, if possible.\nThis is the most conservative alternative for accounting for all sources of mortality\non the north Atlantic swordfish stock. NMFS will work with the Advisory Panels,\nFishery Management Councils, and the constituency in the future to address all\nsources of fishing mortality on the north Atlantic swordfish stock, including\nswordfish taken incidental to other fishing operations.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nAs noted above, NMFS estimates that this final action will result in a 20-percent\nreduction in the commercial quota as compared with the status quo (assuming1997\ndiscard levels and 1999 quota). The economic analyses presented both in this\nchapter and in Chapter 7 are based on this assumption; as a result, the present values\nof gross and net swordfish revenues are 20 percent lower than they would be under\nthe status quo. In addition to reducing overall landings, this final action could also\naffect the timing of closures of the swordfish fishery. Closure projections would be\nmade based upon available discard information on a monthly basis. During\nclosures of the commercial swordfish fishery, if participants try to avoid swordfish,\nthey may pursue other species such as yellowfin and bigeye tunas, and thus mitigate\neconomic losses resulting from this action. This final action might adversely affect\ncommercial fishermen because the Incidental landings quota category will be closed\nwhen the Incidental landings quota is reached.\nConclusion\nIf successful, this action will result in an ICCAT recommendation to count dead\ndiscards against the total U.S. quota. The United States would then be able to\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 51","implement this action consistent with ATCA. This final action supports the\nfoundation for the development of an international rebuilding program for north\nAtlantic swordfish at the November 1999 ICCAT meeting. Rebuilding a stock\nrequires accounting for all sources of mortality on that stock. While this action may\nnot be a solution to reducing bycatch mortality, it will support rebuilding by\naccounting for discard mortality of swordfish. In addition, dead discards of\nswordfish in the recreational fishery are expected to be minimal, particularly if\nrecreational fishermen are educated about proper handling and release procedures as\nthe stock recovers (see Section 3.5).\nFinal Action: Subtract recreational landings and discards of north Atlantic\nswordfish from Incidental Catch Quota\nThis action will require that all recreational swordfish landings and discards be\nsubtracted from the U.S. Incidental Quota (directed commercial landings and\ndiscards are subtracted from the Directed Fishery Quota). In the future, NMFS will\nundertake allocation discussions with the HMS Advisory Panel and fishery\nconstituents and may consider re-allocation of the U.S. north Atlantic swordfish\nTAC among all fishery users. As a result of this action, the United States will be\nrequired to report recreational swordfish landings and dead discards to ICCAT\nannually. The Large Pelagic Survey and other data collection methods\n(charter/headboat logbooks, observer programs, tournament reports) will be used to\ngenerate an annual landings and dead discard estimate. This estimate of recreational\nlandings will be subtracted annually from the Incidental swordfish quota.\nBecause recreational landings are not tabulated until the end of the season, there is\na possibility that the current year's Incidental Quota would be filled. Therefore, one\nyear's landings will be subtracted from the following year's quota if the current\nyear's quota is full. The estimate of recreational dead discards will be accounted for;\nthe process of that accounting will be dependent on the recommendation adopted at\nICCAT in 1999 (see above discussion of dead discard accounting possibilities). At\nsuch time in the future when swordfish rebuild and recreational fishermen begin to\ndirect fishing effort on this species, NMFS intends to make a decision as to how to\nallocate swordfish TAC to accommodate the directed fishery effort.\nEcological Impacts\nBy accounting for all sources of mortality on the overfished north Atlantic\nswordfish stock, SCRS will be able to make more accurate projections of stock size\nand therefore estimate fishing mortality rates that will support a rebuilding program.\nNMFS has heard of occasional interactions between recreational fishermen and sea\nturtles, however, those interaction rates are low and NMFS does not think this\nalternative would likely have any impact on sea turtles.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 52","Social and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative might adversely affect commercial fishermen because the\nIncidental Catch quota category would be closed when the quota is reached. This\nneeds to be considered with respect to the new limited access program which may\naffect how swordfish are accounted for. For example, in the recent past, NMFS has\nnot closed the Incidental Catch quota. However, if some longline fishermen are\ngiven limited access swordfish permits, that quota may be reached. The\nrecreational fishery is not expected to catch many swordfish or to discard many\ndead swordfish and therefore, the reduction in Incidental Catch quota available to\nthe commercial fishermen would likely not have a significant impact. However, as\nrecreational effort increases as swordfish stocks rebuild, the fraction of swordfish\ntaken by recreational fishermen could increase, therefore reducing the amount of\nswordfish available to other fisheries that incidentally catch swordfish. NMFS will\naddress the future expected directed fishing effort by recreational fishermen with a\nnew TAC allocation system when the need arises. The framework includes a\nmechanism to allocate swordfish quota among swordfish fishermen.\nConclusion\nAccounting for recreational landings and discards of swordfish is consistent with\nthe need to account for all sources of fishing mortality. As effort increases in the\nswordfish recreational fishery, consistent with stock rebuilding, accounting for\nincreasing fishing effort in the stock assessment will become increasingly\nimportant.\nRejected Options for Swordfish Rebuilding\nRejected Option: Do not count dead discards of swordfish against the U.S.\nswordfish quota allocation (status quo)\nEcological Impacts\nThe long-term ecological impact of failing to count dead discards against the\nquota is the perpetuation of fishing in excess of the recommended swordfish\nremoval levels. Following a stock assessment, SCRS provides ICCAT with a\nmaximum total allowable catch. ICCAT allocates landings quotas based on this\nlevel of allowable removal, however, landings quotas do not include consideration\nof dead discards. Fishing operations discard undersized and damaged fish, and\nfailure to count this source of mortality against the quota masks the true condition\nof the stock.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 53","Social and Economic Impacts\nThere are no expected short-term social and economic impacts of the status quo\nalternative. Long-term social and economic impacts could include continued stock\ndeclines leading to reduced gross revenues for fishery participants and increased\nsocial and economic instability for the fleet.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected. The Magnuson-Stevens Act requires the\ndevelopment of rebuilding plans for all species that are considered overfished. All\nsources of fishing mortality must be accounted for and reductions in landings are to\nbe distributed among all fishermen. North Atlantic swordfish was added to the list\nof overfished fisheries in 1997.\nRejected Option: Status quo for monitoring recreational mortality\nThis alternative exempts recreational swordfish mortalities from being counted\ntowards U.S. swordfish quotas. Currently the limited recreational fishery is not\nspecifically monitored for directed or incidental swordfish catch, although the Large\nPelagic Survey and MRFSS data indicate occasional swordfish landings by\nrecreational fishermen.\nEcological Impacts\nCurrently, the status quo is not considered to have significant ecological impacts\non the North Atlantic swordfish stock. Swordfish are reportedly caught incidental\nto other trolling recreational fisheries and catch rates are low due to low directed\nfishing effort attributed to the overfished status of the stock. The United States does\nnot report this limited recreational mortality to ICCAT. However, as swordfish\nstocks rebuild, the long-term ecological impacts of not reporting will increase.\nRecreational fishermen can be expected to begin directed fishing effort on\nswordfish as the stock rebuilds. The expected increase in directed fishing effort on\nswordfish by recreational fishermen should be monitored and reported to ICCAT to\nensure that all sources of mortality of North Atlantic swordfish are accounted for in\nthe stock assessment. Therefore, this alternative is rejected in this FMP.\nThis alternative would not likely have an impact on protected species because\nthey are reported as being encountered very rarely by rod and reel fishermen in the\nAtlantic Ocean. This alternative would not likely have a significant impact on non-\ntarget species as any unwanted finfish is likely to be discarded alive by recreational\nfishermen. NMFS has heard of occasional interactions between recreational\nfishermen and sea turtles, however, those interaction rates are low and NMFS does\nnot think this alternative would likely have any impact on sea turtles. NMFS,\nhowever, cannot estimate post-release mortality for sea turtles or finfish at this time.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 54","Social and Economic Impacts\nThe status quo does not have any short-term social and economic impacts on\nrecreational fishermen due to low catch rates of swordfish and the fact that there is\ncurrently a limited amount of directed fishing (including tournaments) for this\nspecies. Therefore, not accounting for swordfish recreational catches would not\naffect fishermen in the short term. However, in the future, as directed fishing effort\nincreases in response to increased incidental encounters (as a result of rebuilding),\nfishermen could experience negative social and economic impacts from increased\nfishing mortality that is not accounted for in the stock assessment, causing the stock\nto decline. Therefore, rebuilding could be hindered by this future increase in fishing\nmortality by the recreational fishing sector.\nConclusion\nAll sources of fishing mortality on the overfished north Atlantic swordfish stock,\nboth directed and incidental, should be accounted for in the stock assessment. In\naddition, U.S. fishing mortality should reflect the TAC allocated to the United\nStates by ICCAT. As recreational fishing effort increases, consistent with\nswordfish rebuilding, it will become increasingly important to account for it in the\nstock assessment.\nRejected Option: Establish a recreational quota for north Atlantic swordfish\nThis alternative would establish a Recreational Catch Quota (landings plus\ndiscards). Unused quota would be transferred to the Incidental Catch Quota by an\ninseason transfer. Catch estimates (landings plus discards) would be made using\nthe Large Pelagic Survey, the Recreational Billfish Survey, the MRFSS data, and\ntournament reporting until other monitoring programs could be developed. In the\nfuture, NMFS will conduct allocation discussions with fishery constituents based on\nhistorical swordfish landings and will consider re-allocating the U.S. north Atlantic\nswordfish quota among all fishery users.\nMany members of the HMS AP supported the proposal to establish a recreational\nquota based on historical landings. They recommended that this quota could be\nmonitored by a tagging program for every swordfish landed by a recreational\nfisherman. The framework provisions of the final FMP allow for the development\nof such a program as a regulatory amendment.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would not be likely to have any ecological impacts provided the\nquota is not exceeded. NMFS would make ongoing estimates of current\nrecreational landings and discards based on entries in the Large Pelagic Survey\ndatabase. NMFS would explore the historical proportion of the catch that\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 55","recreational swordfish fishermen landed and reallocate a limited quota to the\nrecreational fishery based on that and the current catch rates. This alternative could\nhave positive impacts on the swordfish stock because the directed commercial\nquotas would be decreased accordingly. There could be a positive impact on the\nstock because recreational fishing mortality would be accounted for in the stock\nassessment. It is unknown what proportion of swordfish that are caught\nrecreationally are undersized. Therefore, NMFS cannot evaluate what the impacts\nwould be on small swordfish. It is likely, however, that mortality of undersized\nswordfish that are caught by rod and reel gear is lower than those small swordfish\ncaught on pelagic longline gear.\nIn addition, interactions between rod and reel gear and protected species is\nminimal and therefore, reallocating quota away from the pelagic longline fishery\nmight decrease the impacts to marine mammals and sea turtles in the future.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nRegarding the re-allocation of the swordfish quota to include a share for\nrecreational fishermen, commercial fishermen may experience a short-term negative\nimpact (subtraction of quota from existing directed or incidental quota) followed by\na long-term positive impact relative to other recreational quota alternatives. Setting\na recreational quota would set a cap on recreational landings. NMFS has not\ncompleted analyses of the historical landings of recreational swordfishermen and so\nit is impossible to quantify the possible reduction in commercial quota at this time.\nThese impacts will be discussed in any future framework rulemaking to establish a\nrecreational swordfish quota.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected. The administrative burden of this alternative is very\nhigh for the long term given the significant interest many swordfishermen would\nhave in setting recreational quotas and the need to monitor those quotas in real-time,\nas compared to the final action which requires only that landings are calculated at\nthe end of the season. In addition, NMFS recognizes that current recreational\ncatches are very low and much of the quota allocated based on historical catches\nwould end up being reallocated to the commercial fishery, consistent with ATCA\nrequirements until swordfish stocks rebound.\nRejected Option: Status quo north Atlantic swordfish quotas beyond 1999\nThis option would continue to maintain landings at the levels adopted by\nICCAT through 1999. This alternative is rejected because status quo quotas in the\nfuture are not currently estimated to support rebuilding. NMFS seeks to have\nquotas set as part of a rebuilding program based upon the stock projections of the\nupcoming 1999 swordfish assessment.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 56","Ecological Impacts\nAccording to the 1996 assessment, the status quo ICCAT quotas beyond 1999\nwould result in further stock declines. Preliminary SCRS analyses indicated that\nstatus quo harvest levels are not sustainable and exceed replacement yield. NMFS\nemphasizes that this alternative would not rebuild overfished north Atlantic\nswordfish stocks. Even if future catches stayed at the maximum sustainable yield\nlevel, the stock would be expected to decline, given that current stock level is\nbelow that needed to sustain the maximum sustainable yield. Status quo quotas\nthrough 1999 for the north Atlantic swordfish stock are above the replacement yield\nestimated in the 1996 assessment (could be as low as 9,400 mt, SCRS, 1996a) and\nin 1997, reported landings exceeded the TAC by 11 percent (SCRS, 1998a). Under\nstatus quo, a large increase in swordfish recruitment is not likely if the spawning\nstock biomass continues to decline. SCRS emphasized the need for effective\nconservation and management measures throughout the Atlantic Ocean, not only to\nconserve the stock but to account for the uncertainty associated with the north/south\nstock structure assumptions. Quantitative ecological impacts of the status quo\ndepend on the accuracy of the 1996 assessment in light of declining north Atlantic\nswordfish catches over the period 1996 to 1998. However, it is clear that total\nswordfish biomass at maximum sustainable yield levels may not be achieved in five\nor ten years without substantial reductions in catch from status quo levels.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThe long-term social and economic impacts of maintaining status quo catch\nlevels and failing to rebuild the north Atlantic swordfish stock would be substantial\nto all sectors of the fishing industry, including the trade sector, although short-term\nimpacts would be minimal. As noted in the community profiles (Chapter 9), the\npelagic longline fleet is under considerable strain due to increasingly stringent\nregulations, market difficulties, and problems in securing trained and stable crew\nmembers. Numerous vessels are operating on very thin margins. There are no\nsignificant safety implications of this alternative.\nConclusion\nNMFS rejects status quo quotas in the future except if the 1999 stock assessment\nindicates they would support rebuilding of the stock with at least a 50-percent\nprobability of recovery.\nRejected Option: Three-year recovery period\nUnder this alternative, the Atlantic-wide quota for north Atlantic swordfish\nwould be reduced to zero for three years (assuming all countries would stop\ncatching swordfish).\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 57","Ecological Impact\nThis alternative would provide the fastest possible rebuilding for the north\nAtlantic swordfish stock. The adjusted projection indicates that three years of zero\ncatch would allow the north Atlantic swordfish stock to rebuild to the level capable\nof supporting the maximum sustainable yield within three years. Even with no\ndirected fishing, however, swordfish would continue to be captured and killed\nincidentally in other fisheries, likely lengthening the rebuilding period beyond three\nyears.\nAnother important ecological effect of this alternative would be the expected shift\nin fishing effort to other species. Other target species in the pelagic longline fishery\nare yellowfin and bigeye tuna, large coastal sharks (directed permit needed),\ndolphinfish, and wahoo. Some vessels that participate in the north Atlantic\nswordfish fishery also participate in the south Atlantic swordfish fishery at different\ntimes of the year. It is likely that this alternative would prompt an increase in fishing\npressure on these other target species or on south Atlantic swordfish. Bigeye tuna,\nlarge coastal sharks, and south Atlantic swordfish are fully fished or overfished, and\nthe stocks have little or no ability to withstand additional fishing pressure at this\ntime. Positive ecological impacts of this alternative include expected reductions in\nbycatch of billfish, sea turtles, and bluefin tuna associated with reductions in\nlongline fishing activity, which would only be realized if some fishermen exit the\nfishery instead of continuing to fish with longlines while discarding swordfish. This\nalternative, as well as other rebuilding alternatives, assume that fishing pressure will\nbe limited by other nations as well as the United States.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative presents the option of rebuilding as quickly as possible by\nreducing the fishing mortality rate to zero until the stock rebounds. According to\nstock projections, rebuilding could be accomplished in three years at a fishing\nmortality rate of zero. However, the gross and net revenue implications for these\nyears are obvious and drastic: a quota of zero would result in zero gross and net\nrevenues related to swordfish for the rebuilding period. Vessels that rely heavily on\nswordfish revenues would be forced to seek revenues from other species caught on\na pelagic longline, in other fisheries, or exit fishing altogether. Fishermen would\nlikely continue pelagic longline fishing, thus prompting the agency to consider the\neffects of bycatch of swordfish. Fisheries to which displaced swordfish effort could\nviably be redirected would vary by region and type of gear owned by the boat, but\nmight include: the snapper-grouper fishery and the mackerel, squid and butterfish\nfishery. From a U.S. national perspective, the present values of swordfish gross and\nnet revenues under this alternative are estimated to be slightly lower than under the\nsix-year rebuilding alternative and higher than the 10-year rebuilding alternative.\n(Chapter 7).\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 58","As noted in the social impact analysis, the pelagic longline fleet is under\nconsiderable strain due to increasingly stringent regulations, market difficulties, and\nproblems in securing and retaining trained crew members. Numerous vessels are\noperating on very thin margins. Measures that further restrict this fishery, through\nlarge quota reductions or closures, will affect more than just the marginal vessels.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected. While this alternative provides for the fastest\nrebuilding to the biomass level capable of supporting maximum sustainable yield, it\nhas substantial adverse economic and social effects and may increase bycatch of\nswordfish because all swordfish would have to be released. NS 8 of the Magnuson-\nStevens Act guides managers to meet conservation objectives while also\nminimizing adverse impacts on fishing communities and allowing sustained access\nby those communities to the fishery, to the extent practicable. Other alternatives for\nrebuilding the north Atlantic swordfish stock meet the conservation objectives of\nthe Magnuson-Stevens Act and of this FMP with fewer adverse social and\neconomic effects on fishery participants and fishing communities. Finally, the U.S.\nis more likely to garner support at ICCAT for a less restrictive rebuilding program.\nRejected Option: Six-year recovery period\nUnder this alternative, the north Atlantic-wide TAC for swordfish would be\nreduced to 6,000 mt WW per year for six years.\nEcological Impact\nThe adjusted projection indicates that the stock would rebuild to the maximum\nsustainable yield level in six years at this catch rate. This alternative represents a\ndecrease from the current Atlantic-wide quota level of 11,000 mt WW per year.\nAllocation to the United States would be approximately 1,740 mt WW per year, a\nreduction of 45 percent from the current quota level of 3,190 mt WW per year. As\nwith the three-year program above, this alternative would result in increased fishing\npressure on other species in the pelagic longline fishery complex as well as an\nincrease in swordfish bycatch.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative is an intermediate alternative between rebuilding as quickly as\npossible (three years) and rebuilding as slowly as the National Standards allow (ten\nyears). According to 1996 stock projections and adjustments, rebuilding could be\naccomplished in six years with a total north Atlantic swordfish quota of 6,000 mt\nWW. The United States is assumed to be allotted 29 percent of this amount\n(1,740 mt ww) during the rebuilding period. The gross and net revenue impacts for\nthe rebuilding years are large, reflecting a quota cut of approximately 45 percent\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 59","from 1998 levels. As a result, it is likely that some vessels that rely heavily on\nswordfish revenues would be forced to seek revenues in other fisheries or to exit\nfishing altogether. Fisheries to which displaced swordfish effort could viably be\nredirected would vary by region and type of gear owned by the boat, but might\ninclude: increased targeting of BAYS tunas by pelagic longline vessels;\nparticipation in the snapper-grouper fishery; and participation in the mackerel, squid\nand butterfish fisheries. Vessels that had shifted effort away from swordfish could\ndirect it back at that time. From a U.S. national perspective, the present values of\nswordfish gross and net revenues under this alternative are estimated to be slightly\nhigher than under both the three- and ten-year rebuilding alternatives (Chapter 7).\nAs noted in the social impact analysis, the pelagic longline fleet is under\nconsiderable strain due to increasingly stringent regulations, market difficulties, and\nproblems in securing and retaining trained crew members. Measures that further\nrestrict this fishery, through large quota reductions or closures, however, are likely\nto affect more than just the marginal vessels. There are no significant safety\nimplications of this alternative.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected at this time because it does not most effectively meet\nobjectives both to rebuild overfished fisheries and to minimize adverse impacts of\nconservation and management measures on fishing communities, to the extent\npracticable. Chapter 7 presents a summary of the present value analysis conducted\nfor the final swordfish rebuilding actions. All of the results presented here\nincorporate the estimated impacts of a possible negotiated discard reporting\nalternative (i.e., that dead discards would be counted against the U.S. swordfish\nquota). As noted above (and in the table), the preferred discard reporting alternative\nhas the effect of reducing swordfish landings by an estimated 20 percent.\n3.4.1.2.2 Swordfish Domestic Allocation\nThe U.S. north Atlantic swordfish quota is divided between a Directed Catch\nQuota (currently 87 percent) and an Incidental Catch Quota (currently 13 percent).\nThe directed quota is divided into two, equal semi-annual seasons. Under limited\naccess, authorized fishing gears will depend on the permit category. Directed\nswordfish permit holders may use longline, harpoon, rod and reel, bandit gear, and\nhandline2. Swordfish landed by these gears when the directed fishery is open will\nbe subtracted from the directed fishery quota. Incidental swordfish permit holders\nmay land swordfish taken with squid trawl, rod and reel, handline, or longline gear.\nSwordfish landed by Incidental swordfish permit holders and by directed permit\nholders during a directed fishery closure (except harpoon) will be subtracted from\nthe Incidental Catch quota. Handgear permit holders may fish for swordfish with\n2\nDriftnets are no longer authorized in the swordfish fishery and swordfish may not be possessed on board a vessel that has a driftnet on\nboard.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 60","handline, rod and reel, bandit gear, and harpoon. Swordfish landed by these permit\nholders will be subtracted from the directed fishery when that fishery is open and\nfrom the Incidental fishery when the directed fishery is closed. An exception to this\nis harpoon-landed fish which may not be landed during a directed fishery closure by\na permit holder of any type.\nRecreational fishermen are not required to obtain a permit, and may not sell\nswordfish. NMFS received public comments that supported establishing a separate\nrecreational catch quota that would accommodate the relatively high historical\nrecreational landings. Recreational swordfish landings will be subtracted from the\nIncidental Catch quota. In the future, NMFS may assemble historical recreational\nlandings data and conduct an allocation discussion among fishery users.\n3.4.1.3 Atlantic Sharks\nIn 1997, NMFS reduced the large coastal shark (LCS) commercial quota and\nrecreational retention limit as an interim measure to increase the probability that no\nfurther stock declines would occur until a long-term rebuilding program could be\ndeveloped. The probability associated with recovery to maximum sustainable yield\nunder that quota and retention limit reduction was 50 percent. This level of certainty\nwas acceptable for an interim measure, especially given the impacts of such a quota\nreduction on fishermen and their communities. However, 50-percent probability is\nminimally acceptable for ensuring that overfished fisheries are rebuilt to maximum\nsustainable yield levels. In developing the rebuilding program for large coastal sharks,\nNMFS has used a higher threshold of probability as a guide in order to ensure that the\nintended results of a management action are actually realized. Specifically, 70 percent\nprobability frequently appears in the model projections and NMFS has used this higher\nprobability as a guide in assessing the relative merits of one rebuilding time frame over\nanother. Many factors are relevant when assessing rebuilding programs, including\nvariability of fish biology, environment, and fishery characteristics. NMFS also used a\nlow probability of a negative outcome as an additional guide in evaluating potential\nmanagement measures (e.g., less than a 20-percent probability that stock sizes would\ndecrease under a given management measure).\nThe 1998 SEW Final Report indicates that large coastal sharks remain overfished\nand would not rebuild at current harvest levels. As an aggregate, a zero landings policy\nfor 30 years (the longest projection considered) does not even meet the minimal\nprobability standard of 50 percent of rebuilding (Table 3.10). After 30 years at zero\nlandings, the LCS baseline catch series projection indicates a 46-percent probability of\nreaching maximum sustainable yield levels whereas the alternative catch series\nprojection indicates a 39-percent probability of almost reaching maximum sustainable\nyield (Table 3.11). Given these results, commercial and recreational directed fisheries\nwould be need to be eliminated for at least 30 years as bycatch mortality alone may\njeopardize rebuilding if LCS continue to be managed as an aggregate. Additionally,\nbycatch mortality in incidental fisheries would need to be reduced to the maximum\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 61","extent possible in order to increase the probability of recovery of the LCS complex\nwithin 30 to 40 years.\nRegarding the 1997 quotas relative to the 1995 quota levels, LCS as an aggregate\nwere reduced by 37 percent (in numbers of fish) when considering commercial and\nrecreational landings combined (Table 3.12). When considering commercial landings\nalone, the landings of LCS were reduced by 56 percent in numbers of fish (six percent\nmore than the target reduction) or by 56 percent by weight (six percent more than the\ntarget reduction, Table 3.12; see Table 2, Scott et al., 1996). Recreational harvest of\nlarge coastal sharks was reduced by 12 percent (in numbers of fish), or 38 percent less\nthan the target reduction (Table 3.12). Relative to the levels of landings necessary to\nrebuild under the selected rebuilding program, landings of large coastal sharks as an\naggregate would need to be reduced to zero for at least 30 years.\nDue to the severity of the reductions that would be required in LCS landings in\norder to rebuild LCS as an aggregate consistent with the Magnuson-Stevens Act and the\nNSGs, NMFS developed separate rebuilding schedules for species complexes based on\nsandbar sharks (ridgeback LCS) and blacktip sharks (non-ridgeback LCS) utilizing new\ninformation contained in the 1998 SEW Final Report.\nThe projections from the 1998 SEW for large coastal sharks with a 10-, 20-, and 30-year time\nTable 3.10\nhorizon under several alternative quota policies relative to the 1995 quota. Fifty percent of 1995\nlevels is status quo. Nfin/K is the ratio of stock size at the end of the projection to carrying capacity\n(K). Also shown is the probability that stock size will be less than 20% of K (Nfin<0.2K), more\nthan 50% of K (Nfin>0.5K), and higher than the 1998 stock size (Nfin>N98). (NMFS, 1998a)\nA) Large Coastal Shark Baseline Catch Series\nP(Nfin>N98)\nP(Nfin<0.2K)\nP(Nfin>0.5K)\nHorizon\nf=%C95\nNfin/K\n0.00\n1.00\n10-year\n0\n0.23\n0.42\n0.66\n0.68\n0.00\n10\n0.18\n0.88\n0.00\n0.21\n20\n0.12\n0.03\n0.97\n0.00\n30\n0.07\n0.00\n0.00\n40\n0.03\n1.00\n0.00\n1.00\n0.00\n50\n0.01\n0.20\n1.00\n20-year\n0\n0.36\n0.14\n0.74\n0.46\n0.07\n10\n0.25\n0.82\n0.02\n0.24\n20\n0.11\n0.04\n0.97\n0.00\n30\n0.03\n0.00\n0.00\n40\n0.01\n1.00\n0.00\n1.00\n0.00\n50\n0.01\n0.04\n0.46\n1.00\n30-year\n0\n0.50\n0.76\n0.37\n0.23\n10\n0.33\n0.78\n0.07\n0.24\n20\n0.12\n0.04\n0.96\n0.01\n30\n0.03\n1.00\n0.00\n0.00\n40\n0.01\n0.00\n1.00\n0.00\n50\n0.01\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 62","Table 3.10 (continued)\nB) Large Coastal Shark Alternative Catch Series\nHorizon\nf=%C95\nNfin/K\nP(Nfin<0.2K)\nP(Nfin>0.5K)\nP(Nfin>N98)\n10-year\n0\n0.25\n0.26\n0.01\n1.00\n10\n0.22\n0.49\n0.00\n0.76\n20\n0.17\n0.71\n0.00\n0.30\n30\n0.13\n0.86\n0.00\n0.10\n40\n0.09\n0.95\n0.00\n0.04\n50\n0.07\n0.98\n0.00\n0.03\n20-year\n0\n0.36\n0.07\n0.15\n1.00\n10\n0.27\n0.33\n0.08\n0.82\n20\n0.18\n0.67\n0.02\n0.35\n30\n0.10\n0.86\n0.01\n0.15\n40\n0.09\n0.90\n0.00\n0.13\n50\n0.09\n0.89\n0.01\n0.12\n30-year\n0\n0.47\n0.03\n0.39\n1.00\n10\n0.34\n0.25\n0.19\n0.84\n20\n0.18\n0.65\n0.08\n0.36\n30\n0.11\n0.80\n0.03\n0.21\n40\n0.15\n0.72\n0.03\n0.33\n50\n0.29\n0.31\n0.06\n0.75\nTable 3.11 Large coastal shark rebuilding decision analysis.\nQuota Level\nHorizon\nProbability of\nAble to Rebuild\nRebuilding\nAnalysis\n(% 1995 Quota)\n(years)\nRebuilding\nWithin 10 years?\nSchedule\nBaseline\n0\n30\n0.46\nNo\nnot developed\n(see below)\nAlternative\n0\n30\n0.39\nNo\nTable 3.12 Large coastal shark landings analysis.\nPercent Reduction of\nLandings under\n1995 Landings\n1997 Landings\n1997 landings from\nRebuilding\n(#s of fish)\n(#s of fish)\n1995 landings. Target\n(#s of fish)\nwas 50% reduction.\nRecreational\n183,400\n161,900\n12%\nBycatch only\n(see below)\nCommercial\n222,400\n98,400\n56%\nAdjusted Commercial\n7,211,688\n3,127,223\n56%\n(weight)\n(pounds)\n(pounds)\nTotal\n405,800\n260,300\n37%\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 63","Sandbar sharks\nThe production modeling results and projections for sandbar sharks are\nconsiderably more optimistic than those for LCS; however, the probability that sandbar\nsharks could rebuild within ten years is low. Considering the baseline catch series, the\nprobability that sandbar sharks could rebuild within ten years under zero landings is\n41 percent, which is less than the acceptable minimum probability (Table 3.13).\nConsidering the alternative catch series, the probability that sandbar sharks could\nrebuild within ten years increases to 70 percent under a zero landing policy and is\napproximately 50 percent under the status quo (Table 3.13). This is greater than the\nacceptable minimum probability. However, the 1998 SEW Final Report states\n\"[r]ecovery to maximum sustainable yield is likely to be a lengthy process under the\nbest of circumstances, and it is unlikely that full recovery of the resource to maximum\nsustainable yield stock level could occur within a decade under any catch scenario\"\n(p. 30).\nIn developing a rebuilding program and time frame for sandbar sharks, it is\nimportant to note that several other species (e.g., dusky sharks, bignose sharks) are\neasily misidentified as sandbar sharks and any management measure based on sandbar\nsharks would necessarily include some mortality on those other species. Additionally,\nthe dusky shark, which ranks as the second-most important sandbar-like species in\ncommercial and recreational landings data, is considerably less productive than the\nsandbar shark. For example, dusky sharks are slower to mature (235 cm FL for dusky\nsharks VS. 150 cm FL for sandbar sharks), has a longer gestation period (16 months vs.\nabout 12 months), and may have a three year reproductive cycle rather than a two year\nreproductive cycle. Estimates of mean generation lengths for dusky sharks average\n27.5 years whereas the sandbar shark estimates average 19 years (see Cortes and Scott,\n1998). Thus, considering the life histories of species like dusky sharks becomes\nparticularly relevant in assessing realistic rebuilding programs based primarily on\nsandbar sharks. The implication for a sandbar-based rebuilding program is that the\nother species in the complex may limit the ability of the complex to rebuild within a\ntime frame that a sandbar-only fishery could rebuild.\nNMFS believes that a sandbar-based complex, which would include mortality on\nother species like the less productive dusky shark, would not realistically be able to\nreach maximum sustainable yield levels within ten years even under a zero landings\npolicy. Accordingly, NMFS believes that \"zero plus one mean generation time frame\"\nis the appropriate rebuilding time frame for a sandbar-based complex. Based on the\nprojections for the baseline sandbar shark catch series from the 1998 SEW, sandbar\nsharks would have a 71-percent probability of reaching maximum sustainable yield\nlevels under a zero landings policy for about 20 years. Thus, when considering the\nsandbar mean generation time of 19 years, an appropriate and realistic time frame for\nrebuilding a sandbar-based complex would be about 39 years (Table 3.14). Note that\nthe rebuilding time frame would be approximately 47.5 years if the dusky shark mean\ngeneration time had been selected, and that using the sandbar shark mean generation\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 64","time results in a more conservative (i.e., shorter) time frame within which management\nmeasures must be developed and implemented.\nThus, within a 39-year rebuilding time frame, the baseline projections indicate that\nsandbar sharks would have a 51-percent probability of reaching maximum sustainable\nyield levels within 30 years under a 30 percent of 1995 quota policy (Table 3.13).\nWhile this probability is only the minimal acceptable, NMFS believes that the weight\nof evidence from the catch rate indices (four of five indices exhibit positive slopes; the\nonly negative slope was not statistically significant, see Chapter 2) and the alternative\ncatch analyses (sandbar sharks could rebuild under status quo quota levels) supports a\nless restrictive approach. Additionally, given the fact that the rebuilding time frame\nexceeds the longest projection available, NMFS believes that a lower probability for a\nshorter time frame adequately approximates the level of certainty required for a longer\ntime frame. Additionally, there is a low probability that the stock size would continue\nto decrease (20 percent and seven percent under the baseline and alternative catch series\nscenarios, respectively) and a high probability that the stock size in 30 years will\nincrease (73 percent and 91 percent under the baseline and alternative catch series\nscenarios, respectively; Table 3.13).\nTable 3.13\nThe projections from the 1998 SEW for sandbar sharks with a 10-, 20-, and 30-year time horizon\nunder several alternative quota policies relative to the 1995 quota. Fifty percent of 1995 levels is\nstatus quo. Nfin/K is the ratio of stock size at the end of the projection to carrying capacity (K).\nAlso shown is the probability that stock size will be less than 20% of K (Nfin<0.2K), more than\n50% of K (Nfin>0.5K), and higher than the 1998 stock size (Nfin>N98). (NMFS, 1998a)\nC) Sandbar Baseline Catch Series\nHorizon\nf=%C95\nNfin/K\nP(Nfin<0.2K)\nP(Nfin>0.5K)\nP(Nfin>N98)\n10-year\n0\n0.48\n0.05\n0.41\n1\n10\n0.45\n0.09\n0.36\n0.98\n20\n0.41\n0.14\n0.31\n0.88\n30\n0.38\n0.19\n0.26\n0.70\n40\n0.34\n0.27\n0.22\n0.54\n50\n0.30\n0.36\n0.17\n0.41\n20-year\n0\n0.64\n0.02\n0.71\n1\n10\n0.59\n0.05\n0.61\n0.98\n20\n0.52\n0.11\n0.52\n0.89\n30\n0.45\n0.20\n0.42\n0.72\n40\n0.38\n0.32\n0.33\n0.55\n50\n0.31\n0.45\n0.26\n0.41\n30-year\n0\n0.75\n0.00\n0.85\n1\n10\n0.68\n0.03\n0.75\n0.99\n20\n0.60\n0.09\n0.64\n0.90\n30\n0.50\n0.20\n0.51\n0.73\n40\n0.40\n0.35\n0.40\n0.55\n50\n0.31\n0.49\n0.31\n0.41\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 65","Table 3.13 (continued)\nD) Sandbar Alternative Catch Series\nHorizon\nf=%C95\nNfin/K\nP(Nfin<0.2K)\nP(Nfin>0.5K)\nP(Nfin>N98)\n0.70\n1\n10-year\n0.66\n0.02\n0\n0.67\n1\n10\n0.64\n0.03\n0.97\n0.05\n0.64\n20\n0.61\n0.9\n0.08\n0.59\n30\n0.58\n0.53\n0.82\n40\n0.55\n0.12\n0.50\n0.74\n50\n0.52\n0.16\n1\n20-year\n0\n0.80\n0.01\n0.86\n0.82\n1.00\n10\n0.77\n0.01\n0.76\n0.97\n20\n0.72\n0.04\n0.91\n0.07\n0.72\n30\n0.68\n0.83\n0.13\n0.68\n40\n0.63\n0.18\n0.61\n0.74\n50\n0.58\n0.00\n0.94\n1\n30-year\n0\n0.87\n1.00\n10\n0.83\n0.01\n0.89\n0.84\n0.98\n20\n0.78\n0.03\n0.07\n0.79\n0.91\n30\n0.73\n0.83\n0.14\n0.72\n40\n0.67\n0.74\n0.21\n0.67\n50\n0.60\nTable 3.14 Sandbar-based complex rebuilding decision analysis.\nProbability of\nAble to Rebuild\nRebuilding\nQuota Level\nHorizon\nAnalysis\nWithin 10 years?\nSchedule\n(% 1995 Quota)\n(years)\nRebuilding\n30% of 1995\n0.41\nNo, therefore\nBaseline\n0\n10\nquota for 39 years\nselect\n\"Zero Fishing Plus\n(20 + 19 years)\n0.71\n0\n20\nOne Mean\nGeneration Time\"\n0.7\nYes, at zero\nsee above,\nAlternative\n0\n10\nbaseline catch\nlandings\nseries analysis\nYes, with minimal\n50 (status quo)\n20\n0.5\nprobability\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 66","Table 3.15 Sandbar shark landings analysis.\nPercent Reduction of\nLandings\nAdditional\n1995\n1997\n1997 landings from\nunder\nReduction\nLandings\nLandings\n1995 landings. Target\nRebuilding\nNeeded to\n(#s of fish)\n(#s of fish)\nwas 50% reduction.\n(#s of fish)\nRebuild\nRecreational\n24,869\n40,929\n-64%\n7,461\n82%\nCommercial\n82,749\n31,990\n61%\n24,824\n22%\nAdjusted\n3,012,065\n982,100\n67%\n903,616\n8%\nCommercial\n(pounds)\n(pounds)\n(pounds)\n(weight)\nTotal\n107,618\n72,919\n32%\n32,286\n56%\nRegarding the 1997 landing reductions relative to the 1995 quota levels, sandbar\nsharks were reduced by 32 percent (in numbers of fish) when considering commercial and\nrecreational landings combined (Table 3.15). When considering commercial landings\nalone, the landings of sandbar sharks was reduced by 61 percent in numbers of fish\n(11 percent more than the target reduction) or by 67 percent by weight (17 percent more\nthan the target reduction using the sandbar-specific catch series). Recreational harvest of\nsandbar sharks increased by 64 percent (in numbers of fish). Relative to the levels of\nlandings necessary to rebuild under the 30 percent of 1995 quota policy, landings of\nsandbar sharks need to be further reduced by 56 percent for commercial and recreational\nlandings combined, by 22 percent for commercial landings in numbers of fish or by eight\npercent by weight, and by 82 percent for recreational harvest (Table 3.15).\nBlacktip sharks\nThe modeling results and projections for blacktips more closely follow those for the\nLCS aggregate than those for sandbar sharks alone. As with the aggregated LCS,\nblacktip sharks have less than a minimally acceptable probability of rebuilding to\nmaximum sustainable yield levels within ten years even under a zero landings policy.\nBlacktip sharks would have only a 36-percent and 27-percent probability of rebuilding\nwithin ten years at zero landings under the baseline and alternative catch series\nanalyses, respectively (Table 3.16). Accordingly, NMFS believes that \"zero plus one\nmean generation time frame\" is the appropriate rebuilding time frame for a blacktip-\nbased complex. Based on the projections for the baseline blacktip shark catch series\nfrom the 1998 SEW, blacktip sharks would have a 69-percent probability of reaching\nmaximum sustainable yield levels under a zero landings policy for about 20 years\n(Table 3.16). Thus, when considering the blacktip mean generation time of 9.4 years\n(see Cortes and Scott, 1998), an appropriate and realistic time frame for rebuilding a\nblacktip-based complex would be 29.4 years, or approximately 30 years (Table 3.17).\nAs with sandbar sharks, it is important to note that management measures would\nessentially target a blacktip-based complex and that other species within that complex\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 67","need to be considered in developing a blacktip-based rebuilding program. However,\nunlike the sandbar-based complex in which the secondary species of importance in\nharvest data is considerably less productive than primary species, the blacktip-based\ncomplex is more homogenous in terms of relative productivity. Therefore, a blacktip-\nbased rebuilding program is more likely to characterize the species in a blacktip-based\ncomplex.\nThus, within a 30-year rebuilding time frame, the baseline projections indicate that\nblacktip sharks would have a 54-percent probability of reaching maximum sustainable\nyield levels within 30 years under a 20 percent of 1995 quota policy. The baseline\nprojections indicate that blacktip sharks would have a 71-percent probability of\nreaching maximum sustainable yield levels within 30 years under a ten-percent of 1995\nquota policy (Table 3.16). While the probability of reaching maximum sustainable\nyield under a 20-percent of 1995 quota policy does not meet the goal of 70-percent\nprobability, NMFS believes that several factors preclude a high level of certainty. In\nparticular, the level of uncertainty regarding catch rates, and species and size\ncomposition of sharks landings in the western Gulf of Mexico and the statement in\n1998 SEW Report that \"[f]or blacktips, large reductions in catches may be needed, but\nit is unclear whether reductions in the United States alone would achieve the intended\ngoals\" indicate that some latitude may be necessary until such issues are addressed.\nAccordingly, NMFS believes that a 20-percent of 1995 quota policy for 30 years is a\nreasonable rebuilding time frame for a blacktip-based complex (Table 3.17).\nFurthermore, there is a low probability that the stock size would continue to decrease\n(21 percent and 20 percent under the baseline and alternative catch series scenarios,\nrespectively) and a high probability that the stock size in 30 years will increase\n(75 percent and 77 percent under the baseline and alternative catch series scenarios,\nrespectively), under these quota levels (Table 3.16).\nRegarding the 1997 landing reductions relative to the 1995 landing levels, blacktip\nsharks were reduced by 30 percent (in numbers of fish) when considering commercial\nand recreational landings combined (Table 3.18). When considering commercial\nlandings alone, the landings of blacktip sharks were reduced by 46 percent in numbers\nof fish (four percent less than the target reduction) or by 41 percent by weight (nine\npercent less than the target reduction using the blacktip-specific catch series).\nRecreational harvest of blacktip sharks increased by two percent (in numbers of fish).\nRelative to the levels of landings necessary to rebuild under the 20 percent of 1995\nquota policy, landings of blacktip sharks need to be further reduced by 71 percent for\ncommercial and recreational landings combined, by 63 percent for commercial landings\nin numbers of fish or by 66 percent by weight, and by 81 percent for recreational\nharvest (Table 3.18).\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 68","The projections from the 1998 SEW for blacktip sharks with a 10-, 20-, and 30-year time horizon\nTable 3.16\nunder several alternative quota policies relative to the 1995 quota. Fifty percent of 1995 levels is\nstatus quo. Nfin/K is the ratio of stock size at the end of the projection to carrying capacity (K).\nAlso shown is the probability that stock size will be less than 20% of K (Nfin<0.2K), more than\n50% of K (Nfin>0.5K), and higher than the 1998 stock size (Nfin>N98). (NMFS, 1998a)\nE) Blacktip Baseline Catch Series\nP(Nfin>N98)\nHorizon\nf=%C95\nNfin/K\nP(Nfin<0.2K)\nP(Nfin>0.5K)\n1\n10-year\n0\n0.45\n0.08\n0.36\n0.15\n0.29\n0.94\n10\n0.41\n0.26\n0.21\n0.71\n20\n0.35\n30\n0.28\n0.39\n0.12\n0.48\n0.29\n40\n0.22\n0.53\n0.09\n0.65\n0.06\n0.16\n50\n0.17\n20-year\n0\n0.64\n0.02\n0.69\n1\n0.96\n10\n0.56\n0.09\n0.56\n20\n0.45\n0.22\n0.42\n0.75\n0.40\n0.30\n0.51\n30\n0.34\n0.59\n0.17\n0.31\n40\n0.22\n0.10\n0.16\n50\n0.14\n0.74\n0.01\n0.86\n1\n30-year\n0\n0.77\n10\n0.66\n0.06\n0.71\n0.96\n0.21\n0.54\n0.75\n20\n0.52\n30\n0.37\n0.42\n0.38\n0.52\n0.22\n0.31\n40\n0.23\n0.62\n50\n0.13\n0.79\n0.13\n0.17\nF) Blacktip Alternative Catch Series\nP(Nfin>N98)\nHorizon\nf=%C95\nNfin/K\nP(Nfin<0.2K)\nP(Nfin>0.5K)\n10-year\n0.10\n0.27\n1\n0\n0.41\n0.24\n0.95\n10\n0.38\n0.18\n0.17\n0.73\n20\n0.33\n0.29\n0.13\n0.52\n30\n0.27\n0.41\n0.33\n40\n0.22\n0.53\n0.06\n0.04\n0.21\n50\n0.16\n0.63\n0.62\n1\n20-year\n0\n0.61\n0.02\n0.51\n0.97\n10\n0.53\n0.09\n0.38\n0.76\n20\n0.44\n0.23\n0.54\n30\n0.34\n0.39\n0.28\n0.19\n0.34\n40\n0.24\n0.56\n0.23\n50\n0.17\n0.70\n0.14\n30-year\n0\n0.73\n0.00\n0.79\n1\n0.67\n0.97\n10\n0.64\n0.06\n0.77\n20\n0.52\n0.20\n0.52\n0.37\n0.55\n30\n0.38\n0.39\n0.35\n40\n0.26\n0.62\n0.26\n0.75\n0.17\n0.23\n50\n0.17\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 69","Table 3.17 Blacktip-based complex rebuilding decision analysis.\nQuota Level\nHorizon\nProbability of\nAble to Rebuild\nRebuilding\nAnalysis\n(% 1995 Quota)\n(years)\nRebuilding\nWithin 10 years?\nSchedule\nBaseline\nNo, therefore select\n20% of 1995\n0\n10\n0\n\"Zero Fishing Plus\nquota for 30 years\nOne Mean\n(20 + 9 years)\n0\n20\n1\nGeneration Time\"\nAlternative\n0\n10\n0\nNo\nsee above,\nbaseline catch\n0\n20-30\n1\nYes, at zero\nseries analysis\nlandings\nTable 3.18 Blacktip shark landings analysis.\nPercent Reduction of\nLandings\nAdditional\n1995\n1997\n1997 landings from 1995\nunder\nReduction\nLandings\nLandings\nlandings. Target was\nRebuilding\nNeeded to\n(#s of fish)\n(#s of fish)\n50% reduction.\n(#s of fish)\nRebuild\nRecreational\n67,046\n68,284\n-2%\n13,409\n81%\n27,903\n63%\nCommercial\n139,512\n75,650\n46%\n583,160\n66%\nAdjusted\n2,915,797\n1,709,694\n41%\n(pounds)\nCommercial\n(pounds)\n(pounds)\n(weight)\n30%\n41,312\n71%\nTotal\n206,558\n143,934\n3.4.1.3.1 Commercial Quota Alternatives for Large Coastal Sharks\nThe ramifications of further quota reductions for the directed commercial LCS\nfishery are substantial. Evidence available to NMFS indicates that some directed\nLCS fishermen have already left the fishery as it is no longer economically viable\nfor them to continue fishing under the reduced LCS quota. It is reasonable to\nassume, given the magnitude of the additional reductions in the commercial quota\nthat are necessary to reduce fishing mortality to rebuild LCS and to account for all\nsources of fishing mortality (dead discards and state landings after Federal\nclosures), that the directed fishery may essentially be eliminated. Landings of LCS\nin incidental commercial fisheries may continue to occur unless regulations limiting\neffort in those other fisheries are implemented. A reduced commercial quota could\nresult in increased discards of LCS due to prolonged directed fishery closures, if\nthey continue to operate unchanged, contrary to the desired reduction in effective\nfishing mortality. This increase in discards may substantially offset the expected\nreductions in effective fishing mortality under the selected rebuilding program.\nNOTE: The final action to implement a public display and scientific research\nquota of 60 mt ww, or 43 mt dw, is not explicitly discussed below but are reflected\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 70","in the final quota levels for LCS. The final action for the public display and\nscientific research quota is discussed in Section 3.4.1.3.6.\nFinal Action: Separate LCS management group into ridgeback and non-\nridgeback LCS with each subgroup having separate quotas;\nEstablish a minimum size and maintain quota level of 620 mt\ndw on ridgeback LCS; Reduce the quota on non-ridgeback\nLCS to 196 mt dw\nThis action subdivides the LCS management group into a ridgeback LCS\nsubgroup and a non-ridgeback LCS subgroup. A number of shark species in the\nLCS management group are characterized by a mid-dorsal ridge that is easily\nidentified even after the fish has been headed, gutted, and finned. Thus, the mid-\ndorsal ridge is useful as a diagnostic characteristic for management and enforcement\npurposes. This action also splits the LCS aggregate quota into separate ridgeback\nLCS and non-ridgeback LCS quotas, based on historical landings, and establishes\na\nminimum size restriction for ridgeback LCS. Because the minimum size is\nexpected to reduce effective fishing mortality by the amount necessary to rebuild\nthis subgroup, this action does not reduce the quota for ridgeback LCS, except for\nhalf of the public display quota (maintain quota at 642 mt dw per year minus 30 mt\nWW (22 mt dw) public display quota). The quota for non-ridgeback LCS will be\nreduced to 196 mt dw per year (218 mt dw minus 30 mt WW (22 mt dw) public\ndisplay quota). All ridgeback LCS below the minimum size must be released in a\nmanner that will ensure the maximum probability of survival.\nThe \"ridgeback\" sharks within the LCS unit authorized for retention include\nsandbar, silky, and tiger sharks (dusky, night, bignose, Caribbean reef, and\nGalapagos sharks also have a \"ridge\"; however, these species are classified as\nprohibited species under the final action in Section 3.4.2.3.1). Additionally,\nsandbar and dusky sharks, the two primary species within this subgroup that are\ntargeted by commercial and recreational fisheries, have similar life history traits,\ngeographic ranges, and appearances so they are often confused. The term \"sandbar-\ndusky complex\" is often used to describe the dominant species in these fisheries.\nThe \"non-ridgeback\" sharks within the LCS unit authorized for retention include\nthe blacktip, spinner, bull, nurse, lemon, great hammerhead, scalloped hammerhead,\nand smooth hammerhead sharks (narrowtooth sharks also lack a \"ridge\"; however,\nthis species is classified as prohibited under the final action in Section 3.4.2.3.1).\nThe primary species within this subgroup are the blacktip shark, followed by the\naggregate hammerheads and bull sharks. The species that would comprise the non-\nridgeback subgroup also have similar life history traits and geographic ranges, and\nthe term \"blacktip-spinner complex\" is often used to describe the dominant species\nin these fisheries.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 71","The safety at sea concerns resulting from a ridgeback LCS minimum size that\nwould push fishing effort offshore are considerable for the North Carolina winter\nfishery. However, the area off Cape Hatteras is considered an important over-\nwintering area for juvenile and subadult sandbar and dusky sharks. One potential\nalternative to a minimum size for ridgeback LCS that would address safety at sea\nconcerns and meet rebuilding objectives would be a time/area closure for directed\nridgeback LCS fishing off Cape Hatteras in winter months (see Section 3.5.2.3 for a\ndiscussion of this issue).\nEcological Impacts\nThis action is a step towards species-specific management and responds to the\n1998 SEW recommendation that \"[e]very effort should be made to manage species\nseparately\" and to NMFS's goal of minimizing economic impacts on fishermen and\ncommunities, to the extent practicable. While this action would not manage on an\nactual species level, the identification and enforcement problems with species-\nspecific management measures are insurmountable at this time. This action allows\nfor management measures to be more tailored to those species complexes within\nthe larger LCS unit with which different fisheries interact. For example, the\nsandbar-dusky fishery operates primarily in the southeast Atlantic region from\nNorth Carolina south to Florida. On the other hand, the blacktip-spinner fishery is a\nmore southern fishery from Florida through the Gulf of Mexico.\nThis action, by establishing separate quota levels for the ridgeback (sandbar\nbased) and non-ridgeback (blacktip based) LCS, will allow for greater quota levels\non those species complexes that can withstand higher fishing mortality while still\nrestricting fishing mortality on those species complexes that cannot. In this way,\nridgeback and non-ridgeback LCS rebuilding programs can minimize adverse\neconomic impacts while achieving conservation objectives.\nAverage percentage of landings of ridgeback species versus non-ridgeback LCS\nTable 3.19\nspecies. Does not include the weight of prohibited species and fins. (Poffenberger,\n1996, Scott et al., 1998)\nRidgeback LCS\nNon-Ridgeback LCS\ncommercial\ncommercial\nlandings (pounds dw)\nlandings (pounds dw)\n1,341,692\n891,258\n1994\n2,106,501\n891,537\n1995\n2,107,478\n2,049,405\n1996\n961,793\n1,642,056\n1997\n6,427,464\n5,474,256\nTotal\n1,606,866\n1,368,564\nAverage landings per year\n46%\n54%\nPercent of total landings\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 72","Adjusted commercial landings data during the period 1994 through 1997 (based\non the species-specific catch histories in the 1998 SEW Final Report; Table 3.19)\nshow that commercial landings of those species in the ridgeback and non-ridgeback\nLCS subgroups are roughly equivalent. Therefore, under this action, separate\nquotas of 620 mt dw (based on half of the 1997 LCS commercial quota (642 mt dw)\nminus half of the public display quota (22 mt dw)) would be established as the\nreference point for the ridgeback and non-ridgeback subgroups. To determine the\nlevel of landings by subgroup that is consistent with the selected rebuilding program\n(see above), the sandbar-based ridgeback LCS commercial quota would need to\nbe reduced by 22 percent by number and by eight percent by weight, and the\nblacktip-based non-ridgeback LCS commercial quota would need to be reduced by\n63 percent by number and 66 percent by weight, relative to 1997 landings levels\n(Tables 3.15 and 3.18).\nThe rationale for establishing a minimum size for ridgeback LCS is that several\ndemographic analyses for sandbar sharks indicate that juvenile and subadult stages\nor sizes are the most sensitive to fishing mortality (Sminkey and Musick, 1995,\nBrewster-Geisz and Miller, 1998, Cortes and Scott, 1998) and that protection of\nthese sensitive stages can greatly enhance recovery to maximum sustainable yield\nlevels. Furthermore, the sensitivity that these subadult stages/sizes exhibit declines\nconsiderably right before the sharks reach full maturity. These results support a\nminimum size at first maturity (the first recorded size at maturity) that would\neffectively protect the most sensitive stages/sizes.\nWhile these results are perhaps more relevant for the non-ridgeback LCS (due to\nthe greater reductions in fishing mortality needed), a minimum size restriction is\nimplemented only for ridgeback LCS because of the distinct size-depth segregations\nexhibited by sandbar and dusky sharks, as evidenced by observer data (see below).\nThis size-depth segregation results in smaller juvenile and subadult sandbar and\ndusky sharks predominating in nearshore waters (less than ten fathoms) and larger\nadults predominating in offshore waters (greater than ten fathoms; Branstetter and\nBurgess, 1998 a,b). Therefore, it is possible to target fishing effort on the less\nsensitive adult sandbar and dusky sharks by concentrating fishing effort in offshore\nareas. The 1998 SEW Final Report states \"[t]he size-depth segregation of sandbar\nsharks is likely to result in less bycatch of smaller, immature individuals, thereby\nreducing effective fishing mortality\" (p.34).\nAdditionally, observer data indicate that a moderate to high percentage of\nsandbar sharks are brought to the vessel alive in the directed commercial bottom\nlongline fishery (Branstetter and Burgess, 1998a). For example, approximately\n43 to 86 percent of sandbar sharks are brought to the vessel alive, depending on the\nregion and time of year; conversely, 14 to 57 percent of sandbar sharks are brought\nto the vessel dead (see Table 9, Branstetter and Burgess, 1998a). Observer data for\ndusky sharks indicate that this species suffers higher fishing-related mortality than\nsandbar sharks (approximately 21 to 50 percent of dusky sharks are brought to the\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 73","vessel alive; conversely, about 50 to 79 percent of dusky sharks come to the vessel\ndead). However, a minimum size for ridgeback LCS, by pushing fishing effort\noffshore out of areas where small sandbar and dusky sharks predominate, will still\nreduce fishing mortality on the sensitive smaller fish and enhance dusky shark\nrebuilding.\nThis action does not implement a minimum size on non-ridgeback LCS due to\nconcerns that such a measure might actually increase fishing mortality on blacktip\nsharks (the primary non-ridgeback LCS). Observer data indicate that the juvenile,\nsubadult, and adult blacktip sharks occur in mixed schools in nearshore areas.\nTherefore, it is not possible to target the larger blacktip adults without frequently\nencountering the juveniles and subadults. The 1998 SEW Final Report states \"[a]s\nit may be difficult to target a stage/size class of blacktip sharks and thereby\nredistribute fishing mortality onto older, less sensitive stages/sizes, a commercial\nminimum size on blacktip sharks may actually increase effective fishing mortality\nas more small fish are caught and discarded in order to harvest the same quantity of\nlarger fish\" (p. 34). The argument against a minimum size for blacktip sharks, and\ntherefore non-ridgeback LCS, is further supported by the low survival of blacktip\nsharks in the directed commercial bottom longline fishery. Observer data indicate\nthat approximately six to 34 percent of blacktip/spinner sharks are brought to the\nvessel alive, depending on the region and time of year; conversely, 66 to 94 percent\nof blacktip/spinner sharks are brought to the vessel dead (Branstetter and\nBurgess, 1998a).\nRelative to the rebuilding program, a minimum size on ridgeback LCS (unlike\nthe non-ridgeback LCS) will allow a higher level of effective fishing mortality\nwhile still achieving positive growth to maximum sustainable yield levels, although\nwhat that level of fishing mortality would be is unknown at this time. As discussed\nabove, a minimum size that approximates the size at first maturity will effectively\nprotect the most sensitive stages/sizes. For sandbar sharks, the primary ridgeback\nLCS, this size equates to approximately 137 to 140 cm FL, or 4.5 feet FL. A\nminimum size that would approximate dusky shark age at first maturity would be\napproximately 235 cm FL, or about 7.5 feet FL. Regardless of whether a\nminimum size was based on sandbar or dusky sharks, the ancillary protection for\nthe other species by concentrating fishing effort offshore should be substantial (see\nFigure 3.3).\nEstablishing a sandbar-based minimum size of 137-cm FL for ridgeback LCS in\nthe commercial fishery will have differential ecological impacts by region and time\nof year. Based on observer data, reductions in sandbar and dusky shark landings\nmay range from four to 70 percent and nine to 65 percent, respectively, depending\non region and fishing season. For example, sandbar sharks below a 137-cm FL\nminimum size in the winter season approximate 22, five, and 76 percent in the\nFlorida east coast, Florida gulf coast, and North Carolina regions, respectively,\nwhereas in the summer season, sandbar sharks below a 137-cm FL minimum size\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 74","comprise eight, seven, and 35 percent in Florida east coast, Florida gulf coast, and\nNorth Carolina regions, respectively (Table 3.20). Overall reductions would\napproximate 19, five, and 70 percent for both seasons combined in the Florida east\ncoast, Florida gulf coast, and North Carolina regions, respectively, and\napproximately 51 percent for both seasons and all regions combined. The\necological benefits of a sandbar-based minimum size for ridgeback LCS will be\nsubstantial in the North Carolina region, and particularly in the winter season, as\nthis fishery has increasingly targeted juvenile and subadult sandbar and dusky\nsharks over the past few years. Thus, a minimum size of 137-cm FL will greatly\nreduce effective fishing mortality on juveniles and subadults in this important\nwintering area.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 75","Chapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 76","Chapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 77","80.6% (1028)\n29.6% (1782)\n49.2% (4442)\n>= 137 cm fl\n42.3% (401)\n44.8% (475)\n25.9% (164)\n95% (1587)\n60.2% (41)\n17.9% (50)\n10.2% (21)\n59.3% (57)\n15% (287)\n100% (17)\n5.3% (40)\n88% (45)\nSize distribution of some commercially important sharks by season and region. Note: this table includes only those fish that were measured.\n13.2% (1188)\n30.5% (588)\n12.7% (162)\n15.6% (940)\n31.9% (202)\n24.6% (183)\n>= 120 and\n20.8% (15)\n33.7% (94)\n46.1% (94)\n<137 cm fl\n2.5% (27)\n2.7% (26)\n7.8% (4)\n5% (82)\n1% (1)\nTotal\n-\n54.5% (1051)\n54.8% (3300)\n37.5% (3387)\n42.1% (266)\n48.4% (135)\n54.9% (520)\n52.6% (558)\n< 120 cm fl\n56.9% (41)\n43.6% (89)\n39.6% (38)\n< 0.1% (3)\n70% (520)\n6.6% (84)\n--\n-\n77.5% (1276)\n91.1% (154)\n>= 137 cm fl\n91.6% (230)\n17.7% (42)\n17.6% (12)\n18.6% (20)\n91% (142)\n93% (441)\n65% (579)\n12% (82)\n83.3% (5)\n100% (7)\n93% (26)\n3% (8)\n-\n12.8% (211)\n20.7% (142)\n17.5% (157)\n>= 120 and\n20.6% (49)\n15.8% (43)\n32.7% (35)\n<137 cm fl\n7.5% (19)\nSummer\n22% (15)\n1.7% (3)\n7% (33)\n2% (3)\n7% (2)\n-\n-\n-\n81.2% (220)\n67.2% (459)\n17.5% (157)\n61.6% (146)\n< 120 cm fl\n9.6% (159)\n60.2% (41)\n48.5% (52)\n16.6% (1)\n7.1% (12)\n0.7% (2)\n7% (11)\n--\n--\n-\n-\n23.4% (1203)\n16.5% (205)\n>= 137 cm fl\n32.7% (259)\n96% (1146)\n43% (3166)\n30.8% (122)\n17.9% (50)\n100% (10)\n36% (321)\n78% (798)\n6.8% (32)\n58% (52)\n90% (19)\n1% (1)\n-\n(Branstetter and Burgess, observer data, 1997)\n35.8% (446)\n15.2% (783)\n13.3% (977)\n38.7% (153)\n29.6% (140)\n>= 120 and\n33.7% (94)\n60.8% (59)\n<137 cm fl\n2.7% (24)\n14% (143)\n4.1% (49)\n9.5% (2)\n3% (23)\nWinter\n1% (1)\n-\n-\n43.7% (3227)\n47.6% (592)\n30.3% (120)\n63.6% (300)\n48.4% (135)\n64.3% (509)\n61.2% (546)\n< 120 cm fl\n61% (3143)\n38.1% (37)\n41% (37)\n0.1% (2)\n8% (82)\n--\n-\n-\nGeorgia/South Carolina\nGeorgia/South Carolina\nFlorida Gulf Coast\nFlorida Gulf Coast\nFlorida Gulf Coast\nFlorida east coast\nFlorida east coast\nFlorida east coast\nRegion\nNorth Carolina\nNorth Carolina\nNorth Carolina\nLouisiana\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal\nTable 3.20\nSpecies\nBlacktip\nSandbar\nDusky",">= 137 cm fl\n48.6% (71)\n34.4% (22)\n85.7% (30)\n72.2% (13)\n19.7% (13)\n44.1% (15)\n20.7% (6)\n15% (30)\n2% (2)\n>= 120 and\n14.4% (21)\n<137 cm fl\n14.1% (9)\n24.1% (7)\n11.1% (2)\n11.7% (4)\n8.6% (3)\n5% (10)\n6% (6)\nTotal\n-\n79.5% (159)\n< 120 cm fl\n51.5% (33)\n55.2% (16)\n80.3% (53)\n44.1% (15)\n16.7% (3)\n37% (54)\n91% (91)\n5.7% (2)\n>= 137 cm fl\n40.5% (15)\n37.3% (3)\n66.6% (2)\n45.5% (5)\n40% (10)\n30% (27)\n6.1% (2)\n-\n--\n>= 120 and\n<137 cm fl\n12.1% (4)\n10.8% (4)\nSummer\n8.8% (8)\n(0)\n-\n-\n-\n-\n--\n< 120 cm fl\n61.1% (55)\n81.8% (27)\n40.5% (15)\n62.5% (5)\n33.3% (1)\n54.5% (6)\n52% (13)\n-\n-\n>= 137 cm fl\n33.9% (19)\n85.7% (30)\n73.3% (11)\n48.8% (66)\n20.7% (6)\n3.6% (4)\n1.5% (1)\n7% (3)\n-\n>= 120 and\n<137 cm fl\n15.5% (21)\n16.1% (9)\n24.1% (7)\n13.3% (2)\n8.6% (3)\n1.8% (2)\nWinter\n3% (2)\n-\n-\n94.5% (104)\n< 120 cm fl\n55.2% (16)\n35.5% (48)\n95.5% (64)\n13.3% (2)\n50% (28)\n5.7% (2)\n93% (40)\n-\nFlorida Gulf Coast\nFlorida Gulf Coast\nFlorida east coast\nFlorida east coast\nRegion\nNorth Carolina\nNorth Carolina\nLouisiana\nTotal\nTotal\nSpecies\nSpinner\nSilky","As this overall percentage reduction substantially exceeds the necessary\nreduction of 22 percent in number of fish, no overall ridgeback LCS quota reduction\n(from 642 mt dw) is warranted at this time. However, due to concerns regarding the\nless productive dusky shark and bycatch of ridgeback LCS less than 137 cm FL, no\nquota increase is warranted at this time either. A ridgeback LCS commercial quota\nof 642 mt dw in combination with a 137-cm FL minimum size will meet the\nselected rebuilding program objectives and meet NS 1 and 9 requirements to rebuild\noverfished fisheries and minimize bycatch and bycatch mortality.\nNo minimum size for non-ridgeback LCS is established due to the inability to\ntarget adult stages/sizes of blacktip sharks. The non-ridgeback LCS quota will need\nto be reduced from the roughly 50 percent of the current LCS quota of 1,285 mt dw\nby approximately 66 percent by weight to 218 mt dw in order to be consistent with\nthe selected rebuilding program (Tables 3.18 and 3.21).\nRidgeback LCS and Non-Ridgeback LCS commercial quotas (mt dw) for 1999+ under\nTable 3.21\nfinal action.\nTotal LCS\nReduction from\nRidgeback LCS\nNon-Ridgeback LCS\nYear\n1997 Quota\nQuota\nQuota\nQuota\n33%\n196\n860\n1999+\n620\n(218- 21 mt dw*)\n(642- 22 mt dw*)\n*includes accounting for 60 mt WW (43 mt dw) public display and scientific research quota.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThe social impacts of this action will be substantial due to the potential changes\nin fishery operation from a minimum size on ridgeback LCS and due to magnitude\nof the non-ridgeback LCS quota reduction necessary to achieve rebuilding to\nmaximum sustainable yield levels. While a minimum size with a status quo quota\nfor ridgeback LCS should enable fishermen to continue to target and land the same\nquantity of ridgeback LCS, this action may substantially change how the fishery\noperates. For example, pushing fishermen further offshore to target adult fish will\nlikely increase the number of days per trip but, depending on derby fishing\nconditions, may or may not reduce the number of trips per season and may or may\nnot reduce the length of the season. Thus, there may be substantial changes to how\nthis fishery operates that may result in many directed commercial shark fishermen\nleaving the fishery. Evidence available to NMFS indicates that some fishermen\nhave already left the shark fishery as a result of the 1997 LCS quota reduction.\nGiven the additional costs associated with fishing offshore and the additional\nreductions in quota for non-ridgeback LCS, those fishermen who were operating at\nthe margin under 1997 quota levels may cease being viable operations under this\nrebuilding program. A permanent loss of fishermen and community infrastructure\nmay also result from this action.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 80","This action is economically severe in the short term. It has larger estimated\npresent values than the alternative to establish ridgeback and non-ridgeback LCS\nwithout a ridgeback LCS minimum size. The present value of gross revenues is\nestimated to be $31.8 million while the present value of net revenues would be\nbetween $5.6 and $6.6 million for a increase from the status quo baseline of\n49.2 percent (see Chapter 7). In the short term, this action may increase the cost of\nfishing as the minimum size on ridgeback LCS may push fishermen farther offshore.\nThis may increase the amount of fuel needed per trip or decrease the amount of time\nspent fishing. However, larger fish tend to be more valuable than smaller fish, both\nin terms of meat and fin value. Thus, the extra cost of fuel and time spent steaming\nmay be offset by the additional value of the larger fish. Also, the season might\nlengthen due to the minimum size on ridgeback LCS, which may help to alleviate\ncurrent market glut conditions and improve ex-vessel prices. In the long term, this\naction will allow species to rebuild at different rates, thus shortening, compared to\nstatus quo, the rebuilding time to a economically viable fishery without market gluts\nand short seasons (see Chapter 7 for more details).\nThe economic impacts of a sandbar-based minimum size for ridgeback LCS may\nbe pronounced in the North Carolina region, and particularly in the winter season,\nas this fishery has increasingly targeted juvenile and subadult sandbar and dusky\nsharks over the past few years.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it is expected to meet NS 1 to prevent overfishing\nand rebuild overfished fisheries, NS 9 to minimize bycatch and bycatch mortality,\nand NS 8 to ensure continued participation by traditional fishing communities, to\nthe extent practicable.\nRejected Options for Commercial Quotas for Large Coastal Sharks\nRejected Option: Status quo (maintain LCS management group as a single group;\ncommercial quota of 1,285 mt dw per year)\nThis alternative would maintain the current LCS management group of those\nspecies authorized for retention as a single group. This alternative would also\nmaintain the current commercial quota of 1,285 mt dw per year.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would result in a continuing decline in LCS to one percent and\nseven percent of carrying capacity within ten years under the baseline and\nalternative catch series scenarios, respectively. There is a 98- to 100-percent\nprobability that LCS stocks would decline to below 20 percent of carrying capacity,\nand a zero- to three-percent probability that LCS stocks would increase from the\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 81","1998 population levels within ten years under the baseline and alternative catch\nseries scenarios, respectively (see Table 3.10). This alternative would not meet\nNS 1 to prevent overfishing and rebuild overfished fisheries.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nAs LCS would continue to decline, this alternative has safety at sea concerns and\nwould result in worsening derby fishing conditions and increasingly unpredictable\nfishing seasons and prices. These conditions would continue to worsen as the\nfishery becomes less viable, with an increasing number of fishermen leaving the\nfishery. Eventually, the LCS fishery would cease being commercially viable and\nthe directed fishery, with its fishermen and communities, would essentially be\neliminated. This alternative would not meet NS 8 to ensure continued participation\nby traditional fishing communities, to the extent practicable.\nIn the short term, the same economic problems in the fishery that exist now\n(market gluts, derby fishery, short seasons) would continue. However, over the\nlong term, the severity of the current economic problems would increase as stock\nlevels continued to decline.\nTwo different present value analyses of gross revenues were examined for this\nalternative, each corresponding to a different scenario regarding attainable quota\nlevels. Under the first scenario, the current quota, and therefore the harvest,\nremained at 1,285 mt dw for 30 years. The present value of gross revenues is\nestimated to be $41.3 million. The present value of net revenues is estimated to be\nbetween $7.4 and $8.8 million (see Chapter 7). Under the second scenario, the\nquota is assumed to be unattainable due to decreasing stock levels. For this\nalternative, the current quota was reduced by ten percent each year to reflect\ndeclining catches (the quota would not be met). Ten percent is the reduction in\nabundance estimated per year by looking at the Bayesian model projections from\nthe 1998 SEW Final Report. A ten percent reduction each year for 30 years reduces\nthe quota a total of 96 percent. This is similar to the 94-percent reduction estimated\nfrom the status quo level (217 thousand fish) to the expected landings per year in\n30 years (13.8 thousand fish) projected in the 1998 SEW Final Report. With the ten\npercent annual reduction, the present value of gross revenues is estimated to be\n$19.3 million while the present value of net revenues is estimated to be between\n$3.4 and $4.1 million (see Chapter 7). This second scenario will be used as the\nbaseline status quo for the present value analysis because the quota is not expected\nto be met under the status quo during each year of the rebuilding period due to\nongoing decline of the stock. Thus, while some of the following alternatives\ndiscuss quota reductions, they may indicate increases from the status quo estimates\nof the present value of gross and net revenues because they assume that the entire\nquota under consideration can be landed during each year of rebuilding.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 82","Other options would include reducing the current quota by different amounts.\nThese options may increase the severity of short-term economic impacts. However,\nnot all of these options would minimize the long-term impact. The present values\nof some of these options are shown in Chapter 7.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it would not meet NS 1 to prevent overfishing\nand rebuild overfished fisheries or NS 8 to ensure continued participation by\ntraditional fishing communities, to the extent practicable, because the LCS stocks\nwould continue to decline.\nRejected Option: Maintain LCS management group as a single group and reduce\nthe quota by an additional 50 percent to 642 mt dw per year\nThis alternative would maintain the LCS management group of those species\nauthorized for retention as a single group but would reduce the commercial quota of\n1,285 mt dw per year by 50 percent to 642 mt dw per year.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would result in a continuing decline in LCS to between seven\nand 12 percent of carrying capacity within ten years under the baseline catch series\nscenario, and between 13 and 17 percent of carrying capacity within ten years under\nthe alternative catch series scenario. There is a 71- to 97-percent probability that\nLCS stocks would decline to below 20 percent of carrying capacity, and a zero\npercent probability that LCS stocks would increase from the 1998 population levels\nwithin ten years under the baseline and alternative catch series scenarios under this\nalternative (see Table 3.10). This alternative would not meet NS 1 to prevent\noverfishing and rebuild overfished fisheries.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nBecause LCS would continue to decline, this alternative would result in rapidly\nworsening derby fishing conditions and increasingly unpredictable fishing seasons\nand prices, with the fishery becoming progressively less viable and an increasing\nnumber of fishermen being forced out of the fishery. Eventually, the LCS fishery\nwould cease being commercially viable and the directed fishery, with its fishermen\nand communities, would essentially be eliminated as the LCS stocks decline to\ndecline. This alternative has safety at sea concerns due to the worsening derby\nfishing conditions.\nThis alternative may have severe economic impacts. In the short term, many\nshark fishermen may cease operations. In the long term, under this alternative,\nLCS will rebuild more quickly than under the status quo and will return to an\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 83","economically viable fishery. The expected gross revenues from this alternative are\n$20.6 million with expected net revenues between $3.7 and $4.4 million (see\nChapter 7). This alternative increases the net revenues from the status quo baseline\nby seven percent. The status quo assumes that the status quo quota (1,285 mt) is not\nsustainable for each year of the rebuilding period. Thus, in the analysis of the status\nquo alternative, the estimates of annual landings and the present value of gross and\nnet revenues is adjusted to account for continued decline of the stock. While this\nalternative would lead to continued decline of the stock, it is feasible that the\nentire quota amount could be caught each year. Thus, this alternative represents\nan economic increase from the status quo because landing of the full quota is\nincluded for each year of rebuilding in the estimates of the present value of gross\nand net revenues.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it would not meet NS 1 to prevent overfishing\nand rebuild overfished fisheries.\nRejected Option: Maintain LCS management group as a single group and close\nthe directed commercial fishery\nThis alternative would maintain the LCS management group of those species\nauthorized for retention as a single group but would reduce the commercial quota of\n1,285 mt dw per year to zero. All LCS encountered incidental to other fishing\noperations would have to be released in a manner that ensured the maximum\nprobability of survival.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would provide for the fastest rebuilding possible with 46-percent\nand 39-percent probabilities of LCS reaching maximum sustainable yield levels in\n30 years under the baseline and alternative catch series scenarios, respectively (see\nTable 3.10). This alternative provides near 100-percent probabilities that LCS\nstocks will increase from the 1998 levels and provides 42-, 14-, and 4-percent\nprobabilities that LCS stocks would decline to 20 percent of carrying capacity over\nthe next ten, 20, and 30 years, respectively, under the baseline catch series scenario.\nThis alternative would increase bycatch of LCS in incidental fisheries as LCS\nstocks rebuild, and thereby potentially slow the recovery to maximum sustainable\nyield levels, unless measures were taken in those incidental fisheries to reduce\nLCS bycatch. This alternative would meet NS 1 to prevent overfishing and rebuild\noverfished fisheries; however, as discussed below, it may have unnecessarily large\nadverse impact on directed shark fishery participants.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 84","Social and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would have the most immediate and severe impacts on fishermen\nand directed commercial LCS fishing communities, although this alternative would\nresult in the quickest return to an economically viable LCS fishery. Given that LCS\nas an aggregate will likely require decades to reach maximum sustainable yield\nlevels, those fishermen that are dependent on LCS fishing are unlikely to be able to\nparticipate in a future fishery. In the interim, those communities in which directed\nLCS fishing is important are likely to have replaced the revenue-generating shark\nfishing component with another revenue-generating source and the infrastructure\n(dealers, processors, marine supply stores) that supported shark fishing may be\npermanently lost. This alternative does not meet NS 8 because practicable\nalternatives exist that meet conservation and rebuilding objectives while reducing\nadverse impacts on fishermen and fishing communities.\nThis alternative has the most severe economic impacts. In the short term, many\nshark fishermen would have to cease operations. In the long term, this alternative\nwould lead to the fastest return to an economically viable LCS fishery. A closure\nfor 30 years will have a gross revenue and net revenue present value of zero. The\nprojection of 30 years for the LCS aggregate from the 1998 SEW Final Report\nsuggests this may not be long enough to rebuild the stock. However, the sandbar\nbaseline and blacktip baseline analyses from the 1998 SEW Final Report suggest\nthe two stocks may be rebuilt in 20 years under zero fishing with 62-percent\nprobability (see Tables 3.13 and 3.16). Under this alternative, if the fishery is\nclosed for 20 years and then re-opened, the present value of gross revenues is\n$6.4 million, while the present value of net revenues is between $1.1 and $1.4\nmillion (see Chapter 7). This alternative assumes the fishery would re-open in\n20 years under 1997 quota levels. This alternative reduces the net revenues from\nthe status quo baseline by 67 percent.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected due to the fact that it does not meet NS 8 requirements\nbecause practicable alternatives exist that meet conservation and rebuilding\nobjectives while reducing adverse impacts on fishermen and fishing communities.\nRejected Option: Separate the LCS management group into ridgeback and non-\nridgeback LCS with each subgroup having separate and reduced\nquotas of 591 and 218 mt dw, respectively\nThis alternative would subdivide the LCS management group into a ridgeback\nLCS subgroup and a non-ridgeback LCS subgroup. This alternative would also\nsplit the LCS aggregate quota into separate ridgeback LCS and non-ridgeback\nLCS quotas, based on historical landings, and reduce them to 591 and 218 mt dw,\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 85","respectively. This alternative is similar to the final action but would not establish a\nminimum size and would reduce the quota for ridgeback LCS.\nEcological Impacts\nThe rationale for this alternative follows that developed for the final action and\nwould be a next step towards species-specific management and responds to the\n1998 SEW recommendation that \"[e]very effort should be made to manage species\nseparately\" and to NMFS's goal of minimizing economic impacts on fishermen and\ncommunities, to the extent practicable. To determine the level of landings by\nsubgroup that is consistent with the selected rebuilding program (see above), the\nsandbar-based ridgeback LCS commercial quota would need to be reduced by\n22 percent by number and by eight percent by weight, and the blacktip-based non-\nridgeback LCS commercial quota would need to be reduced by 63 percent by\nnumber and 66 percent by weight, relative to 1997 landings levels (Tables 3.15 and\n3.18). Thus, the ridgeback LCS commercial quota would be 591 mt dw and the\nnon-ridgeback LCS quota would be 218 mt dw. This rebuilding program would\nmaintain these constant quotas for approximately 30 years (based on the selected\nrebuilding time frames based on \"zero plus one generation time\"), or until otherwise\nadjusted (Table 3.22). Because this alternative would not establish a minimum size\nfor ridgeback LCS, which would push fishing effort offshore out of areas where\nsmall sandbar and dusky sharks predominate, the reductions in fishing mortality on\nsensitive smaller fish and depleted dusky sharks would not be as great as that under\nthe final action. This alternative would likely increase bycatch and bycatch\nmortality as the fishing seasons for ridgeback and non-ridgeback LCS would be\nclosed for extended periods, rendering these sharks bycatch during fishery closures.\nDepending on the magnitude of such bycatch and bycatch mortality, management\nmeasures to reduce fishing mortality in incidental fisheries may be warranted.\nRidgeback LCS and non-ridgeback LCS commercial quotas (mt dw) for 1999+ under\nTable 3.22\nalternative with quotas only.\nReduction from\nNon-Ridgeback\nTotal\nRidgeback LCS\nYear\nLCS Quota\n1997 Quota\nLCS Quota\nQuota\n809\n37%\n218\n1999+\n591\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThe social impacts of this alternative would probably be severe due to the\nmagnitude of quota reductions necessary to achieve rebuilding to maximum\nsustainable yield levels. Many directed commercial shark fishermen would likely\nleave the shark fishery under such reduced quotas. Evidence available to NMFS\nindicates that some fishermen have already left the shark fishery as a result of the\n1997 LCS quota reduction. Given additional reductions, those fishermen who were\noperating at the margin under 1997 quota levels would likely cease being viable\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 86","operations under this rebuilding program. As with the alternative to close the\ndirected fishery, a permanent loss of fishermen and community infrastructure may\nresult from this alternative.\nThis alternative would allow for some continued fishing but in the short term\nwould not alleviate market gluts, short fishing seasons, other current economic\nproblems, or safety at sea concerns. However, in the long term, this alternative\nwould allow for a viable fishery for some species. The present value of gross\nrevenues of this alternative is estimated to be $25.7 million, while the present value\nof net revenues is estimated to be between $4.5 and $5.4 million (see Chapter 7).\nThis is a reduction in net revenues from the status quo of 31.4 percent, assuming the\nstatus quo baseline quota could be attained over 30 years.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because of the greater ecological benefits and lesser\nsocial and economic impacts expected from establishing a minimum size on\nridgeback LCS in addition to separate quotas for ridgeback and non-ridgeback LCS.\nRejected Option: Separate LCS management group into ridgeback and non-\nridgeback LCS; establish a minimum size and maintain the\nquota on ridgeback LCS at 642 mt dw per year; establish a\nseparate, phased-in quota reduction on non-ridgeback LCS of\n218 mt dw per year\nAs in the final action, this alternative would subdivide the LCS management\ngroup into a ridgeback LCS subgroup and a non-ridgeback LCS subgroup. This\nalternative would also split the LCS aggregate quota into separate ridgeback LCS\nand non-ridgeback LCS quotas, based on historical landings, and establish a\nminimum size restriction and no reduction in quota for ridgeback LCS (maintain\nquota at 642 mt dw per). However, unlike the final action, this alternative would\nreduce the non-ridgeback quota to 218 mt dw per year by increments over a period\nof five years.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative follows the same rationale as that developed for the final action,\nwith the addition of phased-in quota reduction for non-ridgeback LCS. The\nrationale for this phased-in reduction of approximately 13 percent (from 642 mt dw)\nper year through 2003 (five years) is to minimize the adverse economic impacts\n(Table 3.23). This reduction would extend the time needed to reach maximum\nsustainable yield levels.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 87","Table 3.23\nRidgeback LCS and non-ridgeback LCS commercial quotas (mt dw) 1999 - 2003+\nincorporating 3-percent reduction (approximately 85 mt dw) in quota for non-ridgeback\nLCS per year.\nRidgeback LCS\nYear\nNon-ridgeback\nTotal\nReduction from\nQuota\nLCS Quota\nLCS Quota\n1997 Quota\n1999\n642\n557\n1,199\n6%\n2000\n642\n472\n1,114\n13%\n2001\n642\n387\n1,029\n20%\n2002\n642\n302\n944\n26%\n2003+\n642\n218\n860\n33%\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThe social impacts of this alternative would probably be substantial due to the\npotential changes in fishery operation from a minimum size on ridgeback LCS and\ndue to magnitude of the non-ridgeback LCS quota reduction necessary to achieve\nrebuilding to maximum sustainable yield levels. However, the severity of the\nimpacts of the quota reduction on non-ridgeback LCS fisheries would likely be\nmoderated due to the incremental phase-in of that quota reduction, allowing time for\nfishermen and their communities to adapt to more restrictive regulations.\nThis alternative has slightly larger estimated present values than the final action.\nThe present value of gross revenues is estimated to be $32.9 million while the\npresent value of net revenues would be between $5.8 and $6.9 million for a increase\nfrom the status quo baseline of 39.7 percent (see Chapter 7).\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected due to NMFS' concerns that phased-in quota\nreductions may not be appropriate for species or species complexes that require\nsuch long rebuilding periods. Additionally, NMFS reduced the LCS commercial\nlandings in 1993 when the original Shark FMP was established and maintained that\nlandings level until 1997 when NMFS reduced the LCS commercial quota again as\nan interim measure pending the establishment of a long-term rebuilding program.\nNMFS believes that the 1993 quota and 1997 interim reduction have already\nessentially phased in the reductions necessary for rebuilding LCS and that no\nfurther phase-in is warranted.\nRejected Option: Separate LCS management group into ridgeback and non-\nridgeback LCS; establish a minimum size and maintain the\nquota on ridgeback LCS at 642 mt dw per year; reduce the quota\nfor non-ridgeback LCS to zero\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 88","As in the final action and rejected options above, this alternative would subdivide\nthe LCS management group into a ridgeback LCS subgroup and a non-ridgeback\nLCS subgroup; split the LCS aggregate quota into separate ridgeback LCS and non-\nridgeback LCS quotas, based on historical landings; and establish a minimum size\nrestriction and no quota reduction for ridgeback LCS (maintain quota at 642 mt dw\nper year). However, this alternative would reduce the non-ridgeback LCS quota to\nzero. All non-ridgeback LCS would have to be released in a manner that would\nensure the maximum probability of survival.\nEcological Impacts\nThe rationale for this alternative follows from that developed from the final\naction and rejected options above, with the primary difference that the quota for\nnon-ridgeback LCS would be reduced to zero for 20 years until non-ridgeback LCS\nare rebuilt to maximum sustainable yield levels. This alternative would result in\nthe fastest rebuilding for the non-ridgeback LCS as the only source of mortality\nwould be bycatch. However, as with the rejected option to close the fishery,\nbycatch and the associated bycatch mortality would increase as the non-ridgeback\nLCS stock increases, and thereby potentially slowing the recovery to maximum\nsustainable yield levels, unless measures were taken in those incidental fisheries to\nreduce that bycatch.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would likely have impacts similar to those discussed under the\nfinal action and the rejected option to close the entire LCS fishery. Those fishermen\nand communities that target primarily ridgeback LCS would likely experience\nimpacts similar to those under the final action (ridgeback LCS minimum size and\nno quota reduction), whereas those fishermen and communities that target primarily\nnon-ridgeback LCS would likely experience impacts similar to those under the\nrejected option to close the fishery. As discussed under those alternatives, the social\nimpacts from this alternative would likely be substantial.\nThe economic impacts of this alternative would be severe in the short term.\nCurrent economic problems would be exacerbated especially in terms of extreme\nmarket gluts and shortened seasons. However, in the long term, this alternative\nwould allow for a shorter time to recovery than status quo for both species\nsubgroups. This alternative assumes that the non-ridgeback LCS fishery reopens in\n20 years with approximately half of the 1997 quotas (642 mt dw). The present\nvalue of gross revenues for this alternative is estimated to be $23.9 million while\nthe present value of net revenues is estimated to be between $4.2 and $5.0 million\n(see Chapter 7). This alternative leads to an increase of 22 percent from the\nbaseline net revenues of the status quo.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 89","Conclusion\nThis alternative is rejected due to the existence of practicable alternatives that\nmeet conservation and rebuilding objectives while reducing adverse impacts on\nfishermen and fishing communities.\n3.4.1.3.2 Pelagic Sharks Commercial Quota Alternatives\nFinal Action: Establish a species-specific quota for porbeagle sharks of 92 mt\ndw; Reduce pelagic shark quota by 92 mt dw to 488 mt dw.\nThis action establishes a separate quota of 92 mt dw for porbeagle sharks, based\non data submitted by the Portland Fish Exchange, Inc., and would reduce the\npelagic shark quota accordingly. The porbeagle quota of 92 mt dw is approximately\nten percent higher than the highest annual porbeagle landings (about 83 mt dw)\nfrom 1990 to 1998. The final action will allow limited opportunities for fishery\nexpansion but will establish separate controls on this segment of the pelagic shark\ncommercial fishery.\nIn the draft HMS FMP, NMFS presented data and figures on porbeagle shark\nlandings that are currently under revision due to the submission of additional data\nand comments from the New England Fishery Management Council and the State\nof Massachusetts. NMFS is implementing a porbeagle shark quota of 92 mt dw,\nwhich is based on the highest landings data currently available, as a balance\nbetween establishing separate controls on this species and minimizing social and\neconomic impacts, pending additional assessment.\nEcological Impacts\nPending additional scientific analyses, it cannot be determined whether current\nlevels of fishing mortality on porbeagle sharks are sustainable. If porbeagle shark\nstocks are at optimum yield levels, this action would be consistent with NS 1 to\npreventing overfishing but may increase bycatch if the separate quota resulted in\nfishery closures and regulatory discards. If porbeagle shark stocks are below\noptimum yield levels, this action would not contribute to rebuilding and may result\nin harvest restrictions in the future.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action may have social impacts depending on the magnitude of incidental\ncatches and landings in other fisheries. If a separate quota resulted in directed\nfishery closures due to high incidental catches, derby fishing conditions may\ndevelop with associated market gluts, unstable markets, and safety concerns.\nHowever, porbeagle sharks are not the targeted species for most pelagic fisheries\nand, while fishermen may have a fundamental disagreement with regulatory\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 90","discards, the loss of income from incidental porbeagle shark catches is unlikely to\nhave a substantial impact. To the extent that porbeagle shark stocks are declining\nunder current harvest levels, this action will not mitigate any adverse social impacts\nin the future.\nThis action will likely have little economic impact as fishermen and fishing\ncommunities are currently operating below these quota levels. This action will limit\nthe potential for expansion of directed fishing for porbeagle sharks, and depending\non the incidental catches and landings of porbeagle sharks in other fisheries, may\nresult in decreases in directed porbeagle fishing opportunities.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because porbeagle sharks are known to be highly\nsusceptible to overfishing and because shifts in fishing effort may result in\nincreased fishing mortality on species not previously targeted. Due to the limited\npotential for porbeagle sharks to sustain large-scale directed fishing mortality, this\naction will maintain the traditional directed fishery while preventing increases in\nlandings from current levels. NMFS may revisit the porbeagle shark quota levels\npending further information and/or stock assessments.\nFinal Action: Establish a separate quota for blue sharks of 273 mt dw;\nReduce pelagic shark quota by overharvests in blue shark\nquota\nThis action addresses concerns regarding the high numbers of blue sharks caught\nand discarded in the pelagic longline fisheries by creating an incentive to reduce\nblue shark dead discards. This action will also mitigate the potential development\nof a \"vicious cycle\" in which all pelagic sharks become regulatory discards as a\nresult of counting dead discards against the quota (as the available quota is reduced\nbecause of dead discards, the fishery may experience extended closures in which all\npelagic sharks are discarded, thereby increasing the estimates of dead discards\nwhich must be counted against an ever smaller quota).\nThis action establishes a separate allowance for blue sharks (NOTE: this action\ndoes not implement the prohibition on possession of blue sharks, as was proposed\nin the draft HMS FMP). The 273 mt dw quota for blue sharks is equivalent to the\naverage weight of blue sharks discarded dead by longline fisheries targeting tunas\nand swordfish for the period 1987 to 1997 (see Chapter 2). Commercial landings of\nblue sharks have ranged from less than 1 mt dw to 4.6 mt dw, and averaged 1.1 mt\ndw, from 1987 to 1997. If landings and dead discards of blue sharks exceed the\n273 mt dw quota, then that overharvest will be deducted from the pelagic shark\nquota the following year.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 91","This action may substantially reduce the available commercial quota because\ncurrent estimates of blue shark dead discards can constitute a large proportion of the\npelagic shark quota (62 percent in 1996 VS. 19 percent in 1997, see discussion in\nChapter 2). However, this action should mitigate the reductions in the pelagic shark\nquota as a result of blue shark dead discards by establishing a separate quota for that\nspecies against which landings and dead discards will be counted, thereby the\nlessening the reduction required. Nevertheless, this action may still reduce the\navailable pelagic shark quota because the magnitude of blue shark landings and\ndead discards catches can still be higher than the selected quota.\nCatches of blue sharks are unlikely to decrease because they are not the target\nspecies but are caught incidentally to fishing operations targeting tunas and\nswordfish. Without changes in fishing patterns (areas fished, gear, bait) in those\nother fisheries, blue sharks will continue to be caught and some discarded dead. To\nthe extent that effort restrictions in those fisheries (quota reductions, time/area\nclosures) reduce the incidental catches of blue sharks, dead discards may decrease.\nAdditionally, the majority of blue sharks can be released alive (Cramer, 1996) such\nthat this action will increase the incentive to maximize the survival of all\nincidentally caught blue sharks.\nEcological Impacts\nThis action may have ecological impacts if large reductions in the pelagic shark\nquota result from exceeding the blue shark quota. The fact that high proportions of\nthe discarded blue sharks are discarded alive indicates that increases in dead\ndiscards of blue sharks may not occur. To the extent that this action creates an\nincentive to reduce blue shark dead discards so as not to reduce the pelagic shark\nquota, this action will have positive ecological impacts.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action may have social impacts if the available pelagic shark quota is reduced\nto the point that fishery closures result in derby fishing conditions. However, blue\nsharks and pelagic sharks are not the targeted species for these fisheries and, while\nfishermen may have a fundamental disagreement with regulatory discards, any loss of\nincome from pelagic shark landings is not expected to have a substantial impact. If\ndead discards of blue sharks substantially exceed the blue shark quota and the pelagic\nshark quota is reduced significantly, this action will shorten the fishing season and\nmay put some fishermen out of business, cause market gluts, lower ex-vessel prices,\nand decrease safety at sea. It may also increase variable costs and decrease gross\nrevenues by pushing fishermen out of areas where blue sharks are abundant and into\nareas where the target species may be less abundant. In the long term, however, this\naction should increase the number of pelagic sharks available and contribute to a\nviable fishery.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 92","Conclusion\nThis action is selected because it balances the need to monitor and account for all\nsources of mortality and NS 9 to reduce bycatch and minimize the mortality of\nunavoidable bycatch. Establishing a blue shark quota and reducing the pelagic\nshark quota by any overharvest of the blue shark quota should create an incentive to\nmaximize the survival of blue sharks encountered. Furthermore, this action will\nreduce the likelihood that incidental catches of blue sharks would preclude a pelagic\nshark fishery as a result of the \"vicious cycle\" discussed above.\nRejected Options for Commercial Quotas for Pelagic Sharks\nRejected Option: Status quo (580 mt dw or 37 percent of the pelagic TAC).\nThis alternative would maintain the current management structure and\nallocations based on the pelagic shark management group as a single group.\nEcological Impacts\nPending additional scientific analyses, it cannot be determined whether current\nlevels of fishing mortality are sustainable. Aggregate pelagic shark catch rates\nsuggest that the rapid declines seen in the mid 1980s to early 1990s have slowed.\nHowever, for transoceanic species like the blue shark, catch rate indices from U.S.\nfisheries alone may not track relative population abundance trends with accuracy.\nTherefore, to the extent that current fishing mortality levels are sustainable, this\nalternative would not result in negative ecological impacts. If current fishing\nmortality rates are too high, this alternative may contribute to stock declines.\nHowever, other final actions in this FMP, including a recreational minimum size\nlimit for all sharks and counting dead discards against the commercial quota, may\nreduce the overall mortality of pelagic sharks.\nIt is important to note that expansion of the harvesting capacity of the fishing\nfleet (vessel length, horsepower, gross tonnage) and the number of participants in\nthe fishery would be limited under the limited access system for the Atlantic\nswordfish, tuna longline, and shark commercial fisheries. While the limited access\nwill not limit fishing effort (number of trips, length of trips, amount of gear fished),\nreductions in directed fishery quotas may reduce fishing mortality rates.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would not have any marginal social or economic impacts in the\nshort term. In the long term, this alternative may have significant social or\neconomic impacts if the stock declines.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 93","Conclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because of concerns regarding the sustainability of\ncurrent fishing mortality rates and the potential for increased fishing effort on\nthose species known to have limited capacity to withstand fishing pressure (e.g.,\nporbeagle sharks). Additionally, this alternative, in concert with the final action to\ncount dead discards against the commercial quota, would likely result in the pelagic\nshark commercial fishery being eliminated as blue shark dead discards would\neventually exceed a reduced commercial quota such that all pelagic sharks would\nbecome regulatory discards, contrary to the intent of NS 9.\nRejected Option: Interim reduced commercial quota pending assessment\nThis alternative would reduce the commercial allowable catches as a\nprecautionary measure to ensure that fishing mortality rates are sustainable,\npending further stock assessments.\nEcological Impacts\nThe ecological impacts of this alternative would depend on the magnitude of\nreductions in the commercial quota. If pelagic shark stocks are at optimum yield\nlevels, this alternative would exceed the NS 1 requirement to preventing overfishing\nbut would likely increase bycatch if the reduced quota resulted in fishery closures\nand regulatory discards. If pelagic shark stocks are below optimum yield levels,\nthis alternative would facilitate rebuilding and potentially minimize any harvest\nrestrictions in the future.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative may have social impacts depending on the magnitude of\nreductions in the commercial quota. If such reductions resulted in fishery closures,\nderby fishing conditions may develop with associated market gluts, unstable\nmarkets, and safety concerns. However, pelagic sharks are not the targeted species\nfor these fisheries and, while fishermen may have a fundamental disagreement with\nregulatory discards, the loss of income from pelagic shark landings is unlikely to\nhave a substantial impact. To the extent that pelagic shark stocks are declining\nunder current harvest levels, this alternative would mitigate any adverse social\nimpacts in the future by potentially minimizing the need for future harvest\nrestrictions.\nThis alternative may have short-term economic impacts depending on the quota\nreduction and the length of time until an assessment.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 94","Conclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because of the expectation of greater ecological\nbenefits under the final action which establishes a separate porbeagle commercial\nquota, a reduction in the recreational retention limit with a minimum size, and\naccounting for all sources of mortality, consistent with the precautionary approach.\n3.4.1.3.3 Small Coastal Sharks Commercial Quota Alternatives\nFinal Action: Cap commercial SCS quota at ten percent higher than 1997\nlevels (359 mt dw) as an interim measure pending future\nassessment\nThis action reduces the SCS quota by 80 percent to 359 mt dw, which is ten\npercent higher than 1997 landings of 326 mt dw, as an interim measure pending\nfuture assessment. This action follows a similar approach to that used in developing\na separate quota for porbeagle sharks of ten percent higher than recent landings.\nEcological Impacts\nThis action will have minor ecological impacts as the landings in the SCS fishery\nwill not be reduced. As the selected quota is still higher than 1997 landings, there is\nstill opportunity for expansion of the current fishery. To the extent that the SCS\nquota is too high, this action may mitigate any reductions needed in the future. This\naction will likely not affect total mortality of SCS because it affects SCS landings\nonly and does not restrict the ability of fishermen to use SCS as bait. Additional\nmeasures such as increasing observer coverage to obtain better estimates of cryptic\nmortality or requiring fishermen to report the catch and disposition of all SCS in\naddition to SCS landings may be warranted to address this issue.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action may have negative social impacts because those fishermen who\nappear to have begun targeting SCS in recent years will have fewer opportunities\nfor expanding their current operations. Additionally, restrictions in both the LCS\nand SCS fisheries may result in the need for fishermen to diversify their operations\nand this action will further restrict one of the fisheries previously thought to have\nexpansion opportunities. However, the limited access system will limit the number\nof fishermen in all shark fisheries and moderate any expansion in participants into\nthe SCS fishery. Because the selected quota is higher than current landings, derby\nfishing conditions with associated safety concerns are not expected to develop.\nThis action may have negative economic impacts even though the selected quota\nis higher than current landings because of the loss of substantial fishery expansion\nthat fishermen may desire due to restrictions in both the LCS and SCS fisheries.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 95","Conclusion\nThis action is selected because the SCS commercial fishery landings may be\nsubstantially underestimated due to cryptic mortality and the current SCS quota\nmay not be sustainable. This action still allows for a limited degree of fishery\nexpansion but eliminates the potential for excessive growth. This action will\nfacilitate maintenance of SCS at optimum levels until future stock assessments can\nbe conducted.\nRejected Options for Commercial Quotas for Small Coastal Sharks\nRejected Option: Status quo (1,760 mt dw or 68 percent of the SCS TAC)\nThis alternative would maintain the current management structure and\nallocations as established in 1997 based on the assessment that supported the\noriginal FMP in 1993.\nEcological Impacts\nTo the extent that the SCS assessment in the original FMP is overly optimistic,\nthis alternative would allow potential overfishing to continue. However, to the\nextent that the assessment is correct, this alternative would maintain the quota at\nmaximum sustainable yield levels and would not result in negative ecological\nimpacts.\nIt is important to note that expansions of the harvesting capacity of the fishing\nfleet (vessel length, horsepower, gross tonnage) and the number of participants in\nthe fishery would be limited under the limited access system for the Atlantic\nswordfish, tuna longline, and shark commercial fisheries. While the limited access\nwill not limit fishing effort (number of trips, length of trips, amount of gear fished),\nreductions in directed fishery quotas may reduce fishing mortality rates.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would likely have few social or economic impacts as fishermen\nand communities are already operating under these restrictions. However, as the\ncommercial quota has not been reached to date, this alternative would allow for\nexpansion into this fishery for fishermen that may be displaced from other fisheries,\nincluding other shark fisheries. The increase in landings since 1995 supports that\nsuch an expansion is occurring. To the extent that the SCS quota is too high, this\nalternative would allow for expansion of fishing effort that may not be sustainable\nin the long term.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 96","Conclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because of concerns regarding the sustainability of\ncurrent fishing mortality rates and the potential for increased fishing effort from\nfishermen displaced from other fisheries.\nRejected Option: Interim reduced commercial quota pending assessment\nThis alternative would reduce the SCS quota as a precautionary measure to\nensure that fishing mortality rates are sustainable, pending further stock\nassessments.\nEcological Impacts\nThe ecological impacts of this alternative would depend on the magnitude of\nreductions in the commercial quota. If SCS stocks are at optimum yield levels, this\nalternative would exceed the NS 1 requirement to preventing overfishing but would\nlikely increase bycatch if the reduced quota resulted in fishery closures and\nregulatory discards. If SCS stocks are below optimum yield levels and the SCS\nquota is too high, this alternative would facilitate rebuilding and potentially\nminimize any harvest restrictions in the future. This alternative may not affect total\nmortality of SCS because this alternative would affect SCS landings only and\nwould not restrict the ability of fishermen to use SCS as bait. Additional measures\nsuch as increasing observer coverage to obtain better estimates of cryptic mortality\nor requiring fishermen to report the catch and disposition of all SCS in addition to\nSCS landings may be warranted to address this issue.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative may have social impacts depending on the magnitude of\nreductions in the commercial quota. If such reductions resulted in fishery closures,\nderby fishing conditions may develop with associated market gluts, unstable\nmarkets, and safety concerns. To the extent that SCS stocks are declining under\ncurrent harvest levels, this alternative would mitigate any adverse social impacts in\nthe future by potentially minimizing the need for future harvest restrictions.\nThis alternative may have small short-term economic impacts depending on the\nquota reduction and the length of time until an assessment.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because of the expectation of greater ecological\nbenefits under the final action, which caps any increases in SCS landings and\nshould mitigate any reductions needed in the future.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 97","3.4.1.3.4 Fishery Operations\nThe commercial shark fisheries are divided into two equal semiannual periods\n(January 1 through June 30, July 1 through December 31) with the annual available\nquota equally allocated to each period. Previous regulations stipulated that any\noverharvests or underharvests in the first period were adjusted in the second period;\nhowever, due to lack of authority to adjust quotas across years, no adjustments in\navailable quota for overharvests or underharvests in the second period were made\n(although these events were incorporated into stock assessments). Previous\nregulations also stipulated a minimum of a five-day advance notice period from the\ndate of filing such notice at the Office of the Federal Register and the effective date\nof the closure, which may not allow adequate advanced planning for fishing trips.\nBefore the 1997 LCS quota reduction, the LCS quota for the first period was\nreached in May, but was reached in early April in 1997 and at the end of March in\n1998 and 1999. The LCS quota for the second period has been reduced due to\noverharvests in the first period in all years except 1994. The second period quota\nwas reached in August or September before the 1997 LCS quota reduction, and was\nreached in three weeks in 1997 and four weeks in 1998. Depressed prices, market\ngluts, loss of stable markets, and safety concerns have resulted from these derby\nfishing conditions.\nFinal Action: Schedule fishery openings for specified periods; Season-specific\nadjustments for quota overharvests and underharvests the\nfollowing year (no reopening within that season)\nThis action establishes opening and closing dates of the LCS fishery prior to the\nfishery opening, based on historical catch rates (e.g., announce that the LCS would\nbe open from January 1 through February 15 before the fishery opened). Thus,\nfishermen will know in advance exactly how long the fishery will remain open. The\nquota will still be monitored as it is now but any quota overharvest and under-\nharvests will be adjusted in that season the following year (NMFS retains the\nauthority to close the fishery if landings data significantly exceed predicted catch\nrates). The fishery will not reopen within that season if there is a quota\nunderharvest.\nEcological Impacts\nThis action will not have direct ecological impacts. However, indirect impacts of\nincreasing the predictability of the fishery may include greater attention to reducing\nbycatch rates of immature fish or other regulatory or market-driven discards as well\nas increasing post-release survival of bycatch. This action should reduce the\nincentive for fishermen to concentrate fishing efforts inshore in order to reach the\nretention limit and offload before the closure is effective. Fishing in inshore areas\nwhere immature sharks predominate can have several negative ecological\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 98","ramifications including higher catches of immature fish and associated higher\neffective fishing mortality rates, increased bycatch rates of undersized fish, and\nhigher fishing effort (with increases in bycatch of immature fish) because more\nsmall fish than large fish must be caught to reach the same weight-based quota.\nIt is likely that fishing effort will be shifted further offshore where larger fish\npredominate due to the implementation of a minimum size for ridgeback LCS;\nhowever, as derby fishing conditions persist, the incentive to minimize transit time\nand fish inshore will continue as well. To the extent that this action reduces the\n\"race for fish,\" bycatch catch rates and post-release survival concerns may be given\nhigher priority in determining fishing practices and areas than catching the most fish\non a given trip. This action may also increase or alter bycatch rates and mortality\nbecause, although the fishery would not reopen later that season, if large\nadjustments are needed the following year then bycatch rates may increase (due to\nincreased derby conditions from a reduced quota) or may be altered (due to the\nfishery being open longer and later in the year if the quota is increased).\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action will increase the predictability of the LCS fishery by allowing\nmore advance planning of fishing trips. Since fishermen will know in advance how\nlong the fishery will be open, the uncertainty of sudden and unexpected fishery\nclosures will be eliminated. This action will be unlikely to have adverse social\nimpacts. This action also allows longer term planning of marketing and advertising\nfor shark dealers and retailers. This action may also reduce derby fishing conditions\nand associate safety concerns and decrease the potential for market gluts, thereby\nincreasing revenues. There are positive economic benefits associated with this\naction as compared to the status quo.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is selected because of the expected increase in stability and\npredictability in the LCS fishery, reduced safety concerns, reduced enforcement\ncosts of a single fishery opening and closure, and possible reduction in\nadministrative costs from less extensive inseason monitoring of the quota.\nRejected Options for Fishery Operations\nRejected Option: Status quo (five-day advance notice period)\nThis alternative would maintain the current requirement that NMFS provide a\nminimum of five days advanced notice of fishery closures from the date of filing\nsuch notice at the Office of the Federal Register and the effective date of the closure.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 99","Ecological Impacts\nThis alternative would not have direct ecological impacts; however, in\ncombination with reduced quotas, this alternative would contribute to continued\nderby fishing conditions. This alternative would continue to disrupt long-term\nplanning of fishing trips and, if notice is given during a fishing trip, would create\nincentive for fishermen to concentrate fishing efforts inshore in order to reach the\nretention limit and offload before the closure is effective. It is likely that fishing\neffort will be shifted further offshore where larger fish predominate due to the\nimplementation of a minimum size for ridgeback LCS; however, as derby fishing\nconditions persist, the incentive to minimize transit time and fish inshore will\ncontinue as well. To the extent that this alternative would contribute to the\ncontinued \"race for fish,\" bycatch catch rates and post-release survival concerns\nwould continue to be a lower priority in determining fishing practices and areas than\ncatching the most fish on a given trip.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would continue to contribute to the instability and unpredict-\nability of the LCS fishery with associated safety at sea concerns. This alternative\nwould not be expected to have additional social and economic impacts because\nfishermen are already operating under this restriction.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because of the relatively greater benefits of scheduling\nfishery openings for specified periods with seasons-specific adjustments for quota\noverharvests and underharvests the following year and increasing safety at sea (see\nfinal action).\nRejected Option: Extend the advance notice period to ten days\nThis alternative would increase the current advanced notice requirement by five\ndays such that NMFS would provide a minimum of ten days advanced notice of\nfishery closures from the date of filing such notice at the Office of the Federal\nRegister and the effective date of the closure.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would not have direct ecological impacts. However, indirect\nimpacts of increasing the predictability of the fishery may potentially include\ngreater attention to reducing bycatch rates of immature fish or other regulatory or\nmarket-driven discards as well as increasing post-release survival of bycatch. An\nincrease in the notice from five to ten days would result in less reliable projections\nof seasonal landings, which may result in increases in quota overages or maybe\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 100","even underharvests. However, because season-specific quota adjustments are\nimplemented, any increased quota overages would not result in deviations from the\nrebuilding schedule.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would likely increase the predictability of the LCS fishery by\nallowing more advanced planning of fishing trips and increase safety at sea.\nAdditionally, for fishermen whose fishing trips are longer than five days, this\nalternative would decrease the possibility of learning of the closure mid-trip and\nhaving to come inshore to offload any LCS before the closure. Because season-\nspecific quota adjustments are implemented, this alternative would be unlikely to\nhave adverse social impacts. However, this alternative may also increase the\npotential of overshooting the annual quota and thus, decrease any potential revenues\nfor the following year.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because of the relatively greater benefits of scheduling\nfishery openings for specified periods with season-specific adjustments for quota\noverages and underharvests the following year (see final action).\nRejected Option: Schedule fishery openings for specified periods; season-specific\nadjustments for quota overharvests and underharvests the\nfollowing year unless sufficient underharvests to allow\nreopening within that season\nThis alternative would establish opening and closing dates of the LCS fishery\nprior to the fishery opening, based on historical catch rates (e.g., announce that the\nLCS would be open from January 1 through February 15 before the fishery opens).\nThus, fishermen would know in advance exactly how long the fishery would remain\nopen. Under this alternative, the quota would monitored as it is now and any quota\noverharvests or underharvests would adjusted in that season the following year.\nUnlike the final action, this alternative would allow the fishery to reopen within a\nseason if sufficient quota remained.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would likely have similar ecological impacts as those discussed\nunder the alternative to increase the advanced notice period to ten days in that\nincreasing the predictability of the fishery may reduce bycatch rates of immature\nfish or other regulatory or market-driven discards as well as increase post-release\nsurvival of bycatch. Additionally, to the extent that this alternative may extend\nand/or shift the traditional LCS fishing season to other times of the year, bycatch\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 101","rates and mortality may also be altered (increased or decreased, same or different\nspecies encountered).\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative may increase the predictability of the LCS fishery by allowing\nmore advanced planning of fishing trips and increase safety at sea. However, this\nalternative may also result in increased switching to and from shark fishing and\nother fishing operations if the shark fishery opens and closes multiple times. In\naddition to the economic costs, this alternative may also disrupt traditional fishing\npatterns and increase the social impacts of multiple closures.\nThis alternative may increase the conversion costs between gears. Currently,\nsome fishermen switch gear during a LCS closure. Under this alternative,\nfishermen may be switching gears every time the fishery opens within a season.\nThis alternative would likely increase enforcement costs and administrative burden\nto open and close the fishery multiple times.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because of the enforcement and administrative costs\nto open and close the fishery multiple times.\n3.4.1.3.5 Overharvest/Underharvest Adjustments\nPrevious regulations stipulated that commercial quota overharvests or under-\nharvests in the first semiannual period were adjusted in the second semiannual\nperiod (e.g., if the first half goes over by 25 percent of its available quota, the\nsecond half is reduced by 25 percent). However, commercial quota overharvests or\nunderharvests in the second semiannual period were not adjusted in the first\nsemiannual period the following year. Estimates of dead discards of sharks were\nincluded in stock assessments but overall quotas were not directly reduced by such\nestimates. In this way, the historically southeastern LCS fishery (the primary\ndirected shark fishery) was apportioned the majority of the available commercial\nquota (because LCS tend to migrate south in winter, the fishermen in southern areas\nwere able to catch more LCS in winter than fishermen in northern areas; by the\nsummer, LCS are more widely dispersed SO that fishermen in both areas were able\nto participate in the fishery). It is important to note that all shark landings\n(including dead discards) were incorporated into stock assessments, so while\noverharvests or underharvests in the second half were not adjusted into the\nfollowing year's quota, the mortality was known and assessed. Under this system,\npelagic and small coastal shark quota levels have not been exceeded to date and\nthus have not been adjusted inseason or annually. Recreational landings are\nevaluated and adjusted annually (there is no inseason monitoring or retention limit\nadjustment in the recreational shark fishery).\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 102","Final Action: Season-specific quotas and adjustments for the commercial\nfisheries; Annual retention limits and adjustments for\nrecreational fisheries\nThis action adjusts any commercial quota overharvests or underharvests in a\ngiven period in the same period the following year, and establishes and adjusts\nrecreational overharvests or underharvests on an annual basis.\nEcological Impacts\nThis action will likely allow for increased commercial fishing effort in northern\nareas, which may affect species and size composition of catches and landings. This\naction will eliminate unchecked deviations from the selected rebuilding schedule,\nwill minimize the need for additional reductions in the future, and will provide for\nthe benefits of an underharvest or windfall. This action eliminates commercial\noverharvest due to the current inability to take year-end overharvests off the next\nyear's quota but also ensures that fishermen will be provided the opportunity to land\nany underharvests if the quota is not filled in a given season. This flexibility is\nimportant because NMFS will be announcing fishery seasons ahead of times and the\npotential for under and overharvests is increased. No additional ecological impacts\nare expected under this action for recreational fisheries because these fisheries are\nalready operating under these procedures.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action may increase the incentive for commercial fishermen to submit\nlandings reports in a manner that facilitates accurate quota monitoring. Because\noverharvests will be adjusted in the same period the following year, there will be\nmore direct accountability of penalties and windfalls within a region, and will\nensure that fishermen will be provided the opportunity to land any underharvests if\nthe quota is not filled in a given season. This action should reduce or eliminate the\nsense of unfairness between regions in the allocation of the available quota. No\nadditional social impacts are anticipated under this action for recreational fisheries.\nThis action does not have significant safety concerns.\nThis action may have a small negative economic impact for commercial\nfishermen who fish in the first season and a small positive economic impact for those\nfishermen who fish primarily in the second season. Under previous regulations, the\nfirst season was always allowed to fish the full sub-quota. If the first season went\nover the allowed sub-quota, the fishery in the second half of the season was curtailed\nby the amount over in the first half of the season. Under this action, vessels fishing\nin each season will be allowed to fish for the entire sub-quota for that 6 month\nseason. If either season goes over, its revenues will be reduced the following year as\nits sub-quota is reduced. Also, if either season goes under its sub-quota, its revenues\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 103","the following year will be increased as its sub-quota is increased. No additional\neconomic impacts are anticipated under this action for recreational fisheries.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it will eliminate unchecked deviations from the\nselected rebuilding schedule for commercial fisheries, increase direct accountability\nof penalties and windfalls within a region, increase the incentive for fishermen to\nsubmit landings reports in a manner that facilitates accurate quota monitoring, and\nreduce or eliminate the sense of unfairness between regions in the allocation of the\navailable quota. This action is also selected for recreational fisheries because it will\nkeep the recreational harvest levels on track under the selected rebuilding schedule.\nFinal Action: Account for all sources of fishing mortality in establishing\nquota levels, including counting dead discards and landings in\nstate waters after Federal closures against Federal quotas\nThis action will account for all sources of mortality in assessing an annual harvest\nlevel and will reduce that available quota by the amount of shark discarded dead and\nthe amount harvested in state waters after Federal fishery closures, consistent with the\napproach described in the introduction of Section 3.1.1. For LCS, observer data\nindicate that approximately ten percent of LCS caught in the directed shark fishery\nare discarded dead, which accounts for about 3.5 to 5.5 percent of total LCS\nmortality. The pelagic longline fishery, which encounters LCS incidental to other\nfishing operations, is estimated to account for about 1.5 to four percent of total LCS\nmortality. Estimates of the pelagic sharks discarded dead in the tuna and swordfish\nlongline fisheries range from approximately 300 to 1,200 mt WW between 1987 and\n1997 (about 9,000 to 30,000 fish; see discussion in Chapter 2), of which approxi-\nmately 62 to 95 percent is blue sharks. Thus, estimates of dead discards of pelagic\nsharks have ranged from 27 to 103 percent of the commercial pelagic shark quota (for\nyears when a quota was established), with blue shark dead discards comprising from\n19 to 98 percent of the quota. When blue sharks are not included, the estimate of\ndead discards of pelagic sharks has ranged from eight to 20 percent of the pelagic\nshark quota. For SCS, observer data indicate that about 99 percent of SCS caught are\neither landed or used for bait, such that dead discards would be negligible. However,\nadditional measures such as increasing observer coverage to obtain better estimates of\ncryptic mortality or requiring fishermen to report the catch and disposition of all SCS\n(not just SCS landings) may be warranted to address this issue.\nRegarding state landings after Federal closures, in the first and second seasons of\n1998, an additional 243 and 188 mt dw of LCS (38 and 31 percent of the available\nquotas), respectively, were landed in state waters after the Federal closure. In the\nfirst and second seasons of 1997, approximately 206 and 170 mt dw (32 and\n52 percent of the available quotas), respectively, of LCS and unclassified sharks\nwere landed in state waters after the Federal closures. State landings of pelagic\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 104","sharks after a Federal closure would be expected to be minimal (should the Federal\npelagic shark quota be reached) because fisheries for these species primarily occur\nin Federal waters. On the other hand, state landings of SCS after a Federal closure\ncould be substantial (should the Federal SCS shark quota be reached) because SCS\nare frequently encountered in state fishing activities. A number of Atlantic coastal\nstates have recently revised (North Carolina, Delaware, Virginia) or are in the\nprocess of revising (New Jersey, Georgia, Louisiana) their state shark regulations to\nbe consistent or more restrictive than current Federal shark regulations.\nEcological Impacts\nThis action could reduce the available commercial quota significantly, which\nwould enhance rebuilding to maximum sustainable yield levels. However, this\naction may result in increases in regulatory discards if quota levels are reduced and\nfishery closures result or if the duration of fishery closures are lengthened. For\nLCS, the quota reductions could range from 30 to 60 percent, which would\ncontribute to LCS rebuilding but may essentially result in fishery closure.\nFor pelagic sharks, this action may substantially reduce the available commercial\nquota because recent estimates of dead discards have constituted a large portion of\nthe quota. This action will likely result in increased regulatory discards, and\ntherefore less available quota, because pelagic sharks will continue to be\nencountered while fishing for other species. While many of those incidental catches\nare released alive, the magnitude of those catches that do result in dead discards can\nbe significant. Thus, counting dead discards against the available pelagic quota\ncould quickly result in a \"vicious cycle\" in which the entire pelagic quota could\nbecome regulatory discards. It is unlikely that catches of pelagic sharks would\ndecrease because they are not the target species but are caught incidentally to\nfishing operations targeting tunas and swordfish. Without changes in fishing\npatterns (areas fished, gear, bait) in those other fisheries, pelagic sharks will\ncontinue to be caught and some portion discarded dead. To the extent that effort\nrestrictions in those fisheries (quota reductions, time/area closures, limited access)\nreduce the incidental catches of pelagic sharks, dead discards may decrease.\nAdditionally, the final action to establish a separate blue shark quota would lessen\nany reductions in the pelagic shark quota necessary, thereby likely allowing the\nfishery to continue.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action will likely have substantial social impacts where dead discards\ncomprise a large portion of the currently available quota. Decreases in available\nquotas are likely to worsen derby fishing conditions, with associated safety\nconcerns, and extend fishery closures. This action may then increase the instability\nin shark markets and prices. However, pelagic sharks are not the targeted species\nfor these fisheries and, while fishermen may have a fundamental disagreement with\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 105","regulatory discards, the loss of income from pelagic shark landings is unlikely to\nimpact them substantially. To the extent that this action enhances rebuilding to\nmaximum sustainable yield levels, it will result in a faster return to economically\nviable and stable shark fisheries.\nRegarding state landings after Federal closures, this action will likely have\nsubstantial social impacts if shark landings in state waters after Federal closures\ncomprise a large portion of the currently available quota. Decreases in available\nquotas are likely to worsen derby fishing conditions, with associated safety\nconcerns, and extend fishery closures, thus increasing the instability in shark\nmarkets and prices. However, to the extent that this action enhances rebuilding to\nmaximum sustainable yield levels, it will result in a faster return to economically\nviable and stable shark fisheries. On the other hand, this action may create further\nincentive for fishermen to cancel their Federal commercial shark permits in order to\nfish in less restrictive or unregulated state waters. This action may also penalize\nthose fishermen who retain their Federal permits by reducing the commercial quota\navailable to them due to fishing operations outside of NMFS' jurisdiction. These\nconcerns may be mitigated or exacerbated by the implementation of limited access,\ndepending on the degree to which fishermen cancel or retain their Federal permits.\nThe impacts of this final action would also be mitigated as states implement\nregulations to close state waters when the Federal seasons close.\nThis action may have significant economic impacts, especially if dead discard\nrates are high. For LCS, approximately five to ten percent of LCS caught are\ndiscarded dead by the directed shark and pelagic tuna/swordfish fisheries. Thus,\nthis action could result in reduced revenues for those vessels. For pelagic sharks,\nthis action may have severe economic impacts as dead discards, particularly of blue\nsharks, regularly comprise large proportions of the quota. The final action to\nestablish a blue shark quota should minimize any reductions in the pelagic shark\nquota. However, should dead discards of blue sharks exceed the quota and result in\na large reduction in the pelagic shark quota, this action may put some fishermen out\nof business, shorten the fishing season, cause market gluts, lower ex-vessel prices,\nand decrease safety at sea. It may also increase variable costs and decrease gross\nrevenues by pushing fishermen out of waters where sharks are abundant and into\nwaters where target species may also be less abundant. In the long term, however,\nthis may increase the number of LCS and pelagic sharks available and more quickly\nrebuild a viable fishery. For SCS, this action will likely have negligible economic\nimpacts because approximately 99 percent of SCS are retained.\nCounting landings from state waters after Federal closures may have a severe\nimpact on Federally permitted shark fishermen. Currently, many states continue to\nallow their fishermen to land LCS after a Federal closure. When these landings are\ncounted against the next year's Federal quota, the already short Federal shark\nseasons is likely to become even shorter. Landings of LCS and unclassified sharks\nin state waters after Federal closures are high enough that, in combination with\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 106","counting dead discards against the quota, Federal waters may not even open under\nthis action. This will force Federal shark fishermen out of business or force them to\ndrop their Federal permit and fish only in state waters.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it will account for all sources of mortality in\ndetermining annual quota levels, greatly enhance rebuilding to maximum\nsustainable yield levels, and reduce any deviations from the selected rebuilding\nschedules that may result from overestimated harvest levels as a result of\nunderestimating all sources of mortality.\nRejected Options for Overharvest/Underharvest Adjustments\nRejected Option: Status quo (inseason quota monitoring; commercial quota\noverharvests and underharvests in first semiannual period\nadjusted in second semiannual period quota; no adjustment of\nsecond semiannual period; no corresponding reductions of\ncommercial quotas from dead discards; recreational over-\nharvests and underharvests assessed and adjusted annually)\nThis alternative would continue to allow harvest levels to be exceeded in the\nsecond period without a corresponding reduction in available quota. This system\nhas contributed to the need for frequent adjustments to quota levels.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would sustain the need for periodic reductions in quota levels\nin excess of the selected reductions in order to bring any overharvests in line with\nthe scheduled quotas under the selected rebuilding program, and may delay\nrebuilding of LCS to maximum sustainable yield levels. Additionally, the lack of\ndirect accounting of dead discards against the quotas contributes to the need for\nperiodic reductions in quota levels and may also delay rebuilding of LCS to\nmaximum sustainable yield levels. To the extent that fishery closures result in\nunderharvests in the second period, this alternative would also not allow for a\ncorresponding increase or windfall in the following period. Finally, this alternative\ncould slow rebuilding of LCS by failing to account for quota overharvests, and thus,\nmortality in excess of that prescribed by the rebuilding schedule, that could occur\nduring the second annual quota period.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would perpetuate beliefs that the northern fishermen and\ncommunities are unfairly penalized for commercial quota overharvests in southern\nareas. This alternative, in combination with severe derby conditions and associated\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 107","safety concerns, has also created incentives to submit landings reports late in order\nto delay fishery closures and \"get a fair share\" of the quota, especially because there\nis no adjustment for underharvests in the second period. No additional economic\nimpacts are expected in short term. In the long term there may be significant\nnegative economic impacts if the stock does not rebuild.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it fails to account for all sources of mortality\nin establishing quota levels. This alternative would likely result in deviations from\nthe rebuilding schedule and delays in rebuilding LCS stocks to maximum\nsustainable yield levels.\nRejected Option: Establish regional and/or state quotas\nThis alternative would establish separate regional or state harvest levels based on\nhistorical landings in shark fisheries.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative, in combination with reduced quotas, may exacerbate derby\nfishing conditions by further dividing an already small quota into smaller portions,\nthereby increasing the incentive to fish inshore where immature sharks predominate.\nAdditionally, to the extent that this alternative may extend and/or shift traditional\nshark fishing seasons to other times of the year and other areas, bycatch rates and\nmortality may also be increased or altered. However, the establishment of\nridgeback LCS and non-ridgeback LCS subgroups with separate management\nmeasures may essentially establish regional management because ridgeback LCS\nare predominant in the Atlantic through Florida and non-ridgeback LCS are\npredominant from Florida through the Gulf of Mexico.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative may decrease the predictability and stability of the shark\nfisheries because of multiple shark fishery openings and closures and greater\nincentive for fishermen to switch to and from shark fishing and fishing for other\nspecies. In addition to the economic costs, this alternative may also disrupt\ntraditional fishing patterns and increase the social impacts of multiple closures,\nincluding income and employment stability and predictability. However, depending\non how quota overharvests and underharvests were allocated, this alternative would\nlikely satisfy fishermen in those areas or states primarily affected by quota\nadjustments in the second fishing period.\nThis alternative could have variable economic impacts depending on the region\nand/or state quota(s) selected. It may stabilize the market, lengthen the season, and\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 108","reduce the derby fishery in some areas. In others, it may shorten the season and\nincrease the derby fishery if sufficient quota(s) are not allocated to that region. This\nalternative would greatly increase enforcement and administrative costs to open,\nmonitor, close, and adjust multiple fisheries.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected due to increased enforcement and administrative costs\nand the possibility that derby fishing conditions and associated safety concerns\ncould worsen.\n3.4.1.3.6 Public Display and Scientific Quota\nIn 1997, NMFS prohibited possession of five species of sharks: sand tiger,\nbigeye sand tiger, whale, basking, and white sharks. These species were identified\nas highly susceptible to overexploitation and the prohibition on possession was a\nprecautionary measure to ensure that directed fisheries did not develop. Due to\ntheir status as a prohibited species, sand tiger sharks (a popular aquarium species)\ncan now only be legally retained by obtaining an exemption from the possession\nprohibition through the process described under 50 CFR Part 600.745 (Scientific\nresearch activity, exempted fishing, and education activity). Such exemptions are\ncalled exempted fishing permits, or EFPs. Several LCS are also popular aquarium\nspecies, and collectors or aquariums wishing to obtain an LCS during a commercial\nfishery closure can either obtain an EFP or are limited to the possession limits under\nthe recreational retention limits.\nThe rationale for issuing an EFP is described in detail under 50 CFR Part\n600.745(b) and states: \"A NMFS Regional Director or Director may authorize, for\nlimited testing, public display, data collection, exploratory, health and safety,\nenvironmental cleanup, and/or hazard removal purposes, the target or incidental\nharvest of species managed under an FMP or fishery regulations that would\notherwise be prohibited.\" The rationale relevant to this discussion is public display.\nThe process for obtaining an EFP is also described under that section and requires\ndetailed information on the target or incidental species to be harvested, the gear to\nbe used, the locations and times of collection, as well as public notice and comment\nin the Federal Register and notification and consultation with affected Councils and\nstates. Thus, the process for issuance of an EFP under previous regulations was\ntime-consuming and burdensome.\nIn 1998, NMFS received a total of 14 applications for EFPs to collect Atlantic\nsharks outside of the current regulations prohibiting possession of sand tiger sharks\nand possession of LCS during a closure. Twelve EFPs were issued with no\nmodifications (two EFP applications were issued for the 1999 season) which\nauthorized collection of 331 Atlantic sharks. Of those twelve, five EFP applications\nrequested a total of 130 LCS or sand tiger sharks rather than listing the number of\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 109","sharks per species. The other seven EFP applications listed the number of sharks\nper species and requested 72 sand tiger, 28 sandbar, eight blacktip, 22 lemon, ten\nbull, 19 nurse, 14 tiger, 24 scalloped hammerhead, and four great hammerhead\nsharks, for a total of 201 sharks. The two EFP applications issued for 1999\nrequested an additional 26 sand tiger, 18 sandbar, 18 dusky, 18 lemon, and\n18 bonnethead sharks. By the end of March 1999, NMFS had received 11 EFP\napplications.\nFinal Action: Establish separate public display and scientific research quota\nof 60 mt ww; Establish separate public display permitting and\nreporting system\nThis action establishes a separate quota, permitting, and reporting system for\naquariums, researchers, and collectors of sharks for the purposes of public display\nand scientific research. Under this system, aquariums and collectors will still apply\nfor a permit and provide essentially the same information as under the previous\nregulations. NMFS will then evaluate: 1) the status of the stock(s) for the species\nrequested; 2) consistency with conservation, enforcement, and other management\nobjectives; 3) the merits of the application (including the adequacy of the facilities\nwhere the animals will be maintained); 4) the aquariums, researchers, or collectors\nEFP history, if any (number of animals collected previously, gear proposed,\nwhether required reports were submitted in a timely manner, etc); and 5) the amount\nof public display and scientific quota remaining. NMFS will require applications to\nspecify the number of sharks per species to be collected and will stipulate specific\ncollection limits per species if the EFP is issued.\nIf deemed appropriate, NMFS will issue a permit with tags (with mail-in\ninformation cards) for the collection of a specified number of animals, authorized\ngears, authorized areas and times for collection activities, and other relevant\nrestrictions. Each permit will be valid only for the number of animals and tags\nspecified, and each animal must be tagged immediately to be considered an\nauthorized collection. Each tag will have an associated information card (species\nauthorized, date, time, and location of collection, sex and size of animal, tag number,\netc) that must be filled out and mailed within five days of collection (five days should\nallow sufficient time to determine an animal's health and suitability for public\ndisplay). The tag must be maintained in the animal during this acclimation period.\nShould an animal be deemed unsuitable for public display during the acclimation\nperiod, the animal must be released with the tag intact in a manner that ensures the\nmaximum probability of survival, and the information card should be returned with\nthe word \"released\" at the top. NMFS may issue a replacement tag and information\ncard for such released animals. This system will preclude the need to public notice\nand comment in the Federal Register and consultation with affected Councils and\nStates in the issuance of each EFP application. Once the public display and\nscientific quota is reached, no additional EFPs will be issued.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 110","For example, if a collector requested to collect two sand tiger sharks, NMFS\nwould evaluate the request and if appropriate, NMFS would issue an EFP and two\ntags with information cards for the collection of two sand tiger sharks. In order for\nthe collection activity to be in compliance with the EFP, the applicant must tag the\nanimals immediately and return the information cards within five days of capture.\nAny shark retained without a tag would be considered a violation of the EFP. If one\nshark is found to be unsuitable for public display during the first five days of\ncaptivity, the animal must be released with the tag intact and the card should be\nmarked \"released\" at the top. NMFS may then issue a replacement tag and\ninformation card under the same guidelines outlined above.\nNote: NMFS will consider accreditation in the American Zoo and Aquarium\nAssociation, or equivalent standards, as meeting the requirement of providing\nadequate facilities for animal husbandry (under the merits of the EFP application).\nEcological Impacts\nThe ecological impacts of this action will be minimal as the public display and\nscientific quota will be less than five percent of the overall quota established for\nLCS. To the extent that the permitting and reporting system will better ensure\ncompliance with authorized activities and quota levels, this action will enhance\nrebuilding.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action will cause a minor reduction in total quota levels and potential\ncommercial revenues as the separate public display and scientific quota will be\ndeducted from the LCS quota. However, it is unlikely this will impact fishermen\nsignificantly. This action should reduce the time delays currently associated with\ncollecting sharks for public display and will facilitate advanced planning of fishing\nactivities. This action does not have significant safety at sea concerns.\nThis action will greatly enhance monitoring and enforcement of authorized\nactivities and quota levels. Currently, dockside enforcement mechanisms are\ngreatly reduced due to lack of a verifiable permitting, monitoring, and reporting\nsystem. This action will maintain moderate administrative costs relative to the\nnumber of participants and the quantity of shark collections involved. This action\nhas received Paperwork Reduction Act approval.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected due to the increased monitoring and enforcement\nassociated with a separate permitting and reporting system, which will enhance\nLCS rebuilding by increased tracking of all sources of mortality and reduced\nopportunities for unauthorized collections.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 111","Rejected Options for Public Display and Scientific Quota\nRejected Option: Status quo (exempted fishing permit process under 600.745\nregulations)\nThis alternative would maintain the rationale and process under 600.745\nregulations for exemptions from the prohibitions on possession of sand tiger sharks\nas well as an exemption from the prohibition on possession of other sharks over the\nrecreational retention limit during a commercial fishery closure.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would have no new ecological impacts. However, indirect\nimpacts of the current rationale and process for EFPs, which can result in reduced\nenforcement and compliance, could negatively impact LCS rebuilding.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative results in extended delays of EFP issuance to aquariums and\ncollectors of sharks for public display and hinders advanced planning of fishing\nactivities. This alternative is not expected to have social impacts or safety at sea\nimplications. This alternative imposes a moderate administrative costs (preparing\nnumerous notices of receipt of EFP applications in the Federal Register, establishing\ncomment periods, consulting with States and Councils, and issuing EFPs) relative to\nthe number of participants and the quantity of shark collections involved.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because of the extended delays and administrative\ncosts in EFP issuance.\nEffort Controls, Retention Limits, and Other Management Measures\n3.4.2\nGiven the fully-fished and overfished status of many HMS stocks, management of\nrecreational fishing effort is an important component in building and maintaining\nsustainable HMS fisheries. Fishing effort can be limited in several ways, for instance\nthrough seasonal closures, catch and release requirements, or retention limits. Retention\nlimits place a limit on the number of fish that an angler or vessel may retain on the basis of\nfishing trip, day, season, or some other measure of effort. NMFS implements these\nmeasures as necessary and retention limits are included on the framework (refer to Section\n3.10.) Some effort controls and retention limits may have positive impacts on safety at sea\ndue their effects on reducing the length of a trip (except in the case of recreational fishing, in\nwhich fishermen can continue to catch and release). Other retention limits may negatively\neffect safety at sea if they cause fishermen to take multiple \"trips\" in a day in order to\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 112","maximize their catch. The following sections address the use of retention limits and other\nmanagement measures in HMS fisheries.\n3.4.2.1 Atlantic Tunas\n3.4.2.1.1 Bluefin Tuna Effort Controls\nGeneral Category\nEffort controls are used in the bluefin tuna fishery to affect where, when, and\nhow (gear type) bluefin tuna are harvested for a variety of objectives. General and\nAngling category catch per unit effort information is used in stock assessments, and\nlengthening the season is important for the collection of these data used to monitor\nthe status of the stock. See Section 3.4.1.1.2 for a more detailed explanation of\ncatch per unit effort and the importance of scientific data collection in the west\nAtlantic bluefin tuna fishery. Objectives also include reducing bycatch, achieving\noptimum yield (e.g., lengthening the season for market reasons), and addressing\nallocation issues (e.g., through set-asides and split seasons). For example, the\ntemporal and spatial effort control alternatives for the General category seek to\nlengthen the fishing season in a category with high participation and catch rates.\nPrior to this FMP, which includes a limited access system for Atlantic tunas\nLongline category participants, all but one of the commercial and recreational\nAtlantic tuna permit categories were open access. The Purse Seine category was the\nsingle \"closed\" U.S. bluefin tuna fishery, operating under a limited access,\ntransferable individual vessel quota (IVQ) system. While the other categories\n(General, Harpoon, and Angling, and Trap) are open access, NMFS has published a\n\"control date\" (September 1, 1994) in the Federal Register. The purpose of this\ncontrol date is to advise current and future commercial participants that access to\nthe U.S. bluefin tuna fishery may be limited at some point in the future, and that\nfuture access for entrants after the control date is not assured. NMFS has also\npublished a concept paper on limited access for Atlantic HMS, and has held public\nworkshops on limited access in the Atlantic tunas fisheries. The 1995 bluefin tuna\nFinal EIS also discusses several \"strawman\" proposals for limited access and IVQs.\nNMFS plans to consider some form of limited access in the bluefin tuna fishery, as\nother fisheries undergo limited access, restrictions on fishing effort to support\nrebuilding, and a narrowing of other alternatives available to new fishery\nparticipants. The effort controls discussed below should be considered in light of\nboth open and limited access.\nCurrently, NMFS establishes annual General category effort control\nspecifications, including time period subquotas and restricted-fishing days (RFDs)\non which fishing for bluefin tuna by vessels in the General category is prohibited.\nEffort controls are implemented to extend the fishing season temporally and\nspatially, in order to collect better scientific data for stock assessment purposes, and\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 113","to increase ex-vessel prices as fish quality improves in the fall, thereby helping to\nachieve optimum yield). NMFS intends to continue with this method of annual\nspecifications to establish time period subquotas and RFDs. Input from the public,\nindustry, NMFS' consultative parties, and the HMS AP is incorporated into the\nannual effort control specifications for the General category.\nAlong with the Addendum to the draft HMS FMP, NMFS published proposed\nannual General category effort control specifications for the 1999 fishing year. The\nGeneral category effort control alternatives are discussed in Appendix 3; final\nspecifications will be published along with the 1999 Atlantic bluefin tuna quota\nspecifications separately from the final rule to implement the HMS FMP and\nAmendment 1 to the Billfish FMP.\nSpotter Aircraft\nSpotter aircraft are used in the commercial fisheries for bluefin tuna. Aircraft are\nutilized by vessels fishing in the General, Harpoon, and Purse Seine categories to\nlocate schools of fish and assist the vessels in the capture of the fish, by providing\ninformation on where to set nets, throw harpoons, and put out or troll lines. NMFS\nhas received numerous comments that the use of aircraft to locate bluefin tuna is,\namong other things, undermining the General category effort controls previously\nestablished for the General category and is accelerating the closure of both the\nGeneral and Harpoon categories. The resulting increase in efficiency of the few\nvessels that use spotter planes has the effect of undermining NMFS' efforts to meet\noptimum yield, as fishing opportunities are further restricted by the accelerated use\nof quota. Furthermore, the specific data collection programs for catch per unit\neffort would be jeopardized, in part by the added influence of spotter planes.\nNMFS has, on two occasions prior to the draft FMP and Addendum, requested\nspecific comments on ways to mitigate the impact of aircraft use on catch rates\n(54 FR 29916, July 17, 1989 and 61 FR 18366, April 25, 1996). Prior to 1997,\nNMFS elected not to regulate aircraft use in the Atlantic tuna fisheries, in part\nbecause of concerns about the enforceability of spotter aircraft regulations.\nAdditionally, in 1996, the majority of active tuna spotters signed a voluntary\nagreement that would limit activity to harpoon vessels. NMFS recognized that the\nvoluntary agreement warranted a trial period, but also indicated that the agency\nwould continue to monitor the situation and would take appropriate action if\nnecessary.\nOn March 4, 1997 (62 FR 9726), NMFS proposed to prohibit use of aircraft and\nagain requested comments. On July 18, 1997 (62 FR 38487), NMFS published a\nfinal rule prohibiting the use of aircraft to assist vessels in all but the Purse Seine\nand Harpoon categories. In response to a lawsuit filed by the Atlantic Fish Spotters\nAssociation, the United States District Court for Massachusetts, on June 10, 1998,\nordered that the prohibition on the use of spotter aircraft in assisting bluefin tuna\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 114","vessels in other than the Harpoon and Purse Seine categories, as codified in 50 CFR\n285.31(a)(40) be overturned, and is now void.\nHowever, fishery management concerns regarding optimum yield and data\ncollection continue to be expressed. Public comments continue to vociferously urge\nthat NMFS ban planes in the bluefin tuna fishery (except for use in the Purse Seine\nfishery) for a multitude of reasons. Finally, at the August 1998 meeting of the HMS\nAP, apart from three abstentions, all members of the AP requested and advised that\nNMFS prohibit the use of spotter planes in the bluefin tuna fishery. Therefore,\nNMFS is again considering action to respond to these issues. The following section\ndescribes several alternatives that NMFS is considering in order to better understand\nand manage the effects of spotter aircraft in the bluefin tuna fishery.\nFinal Actions on Effort Controls\nFinal Action: No action at this time on spotter planes (statusquo)\nThis action maintains the status quo, which is that there are no restrictions on\nspotter aircraft assisting fishing vessel operators to locate and catch bluefin tuna.\nAs mentioned above, the HMS AP considered this issue at a public meeting in\nAugust 1998. While the vast majority of the public comments opposed the use of\naircraft in the General and Harpoon categories (see following alternative), some did\nspeak in favor of their use. The reasons they gave for allowing the use of spotter\naircraft in all categories included: spotter planes do not significantly accelerate the\ncatch rate - it is the sheer number of participants in the fishery that accelerate the\ncatch rate; spotter aircraft and pilots have contributed to science through the aerial\nsurvey; and spotter pilots allow vessels to select for larger fish via sighting of\nrelative size between schools of fish, resulting in fewer discards. Those defending\nthe use of spotter aircraft also expressed concern that this issue was being decided\nby a popularity contest and that just because the majority wants aircraft banned does\nnot mean it is a legally defensible action.\nThe AP itself discussed the issue extensively, and while the AP did not express a\nunanimous view, a strong consensus emerged in favor of prohibiting the use of\nairplanes by all vessels participating the Atlantic tunas fisheries, with the exception\nof Purse Seine category vessels. Several AP members reserved comment, but none\nspoke in favor of plane use. The points that the AP members made in favor of\nbanning the use of aircraft are described in the alternatives to prohibit the use of\nspotter aircraft.\nEcological Impacts\nAs mentioned above and described here and in the following alternatives,\nmaintaining the current regulations could result in continued difficulties with\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 115","premature fishery closures and market gluts, and could counteract the General\ncategory effort controls. The ecological impacts of spotter planes in the bluefin\ntuna fishery are likely minimal, although some commenters indicated that the use of\nspotter planes results in discards in that harpooners not relying on aircraft may be\nmore selective. Several comments also indicated that planes make it easier to land\nmultiple fish in a day, and may result in some vessels illegally high-grading in the\nGeneral category (in which vessels are only allowed one fish per day, and are\nrequired to stop fishing and return to port as soon as the one fish is caught).\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nAllowing the use of spotter aircraft permits spotter pilots to continue to generate\nincome from the bluefin tuna fishery, although this income comes directly from the\nsale of the fish, which would otherwise remain with the vessel. There is no change\nin total gross revenues from the General category quota (unless accelerated catch\nrates result in lower prices), just a reallocation of some revenues to pilots rather\nthan vessels.\nSafety-at-sea concerns have also been identified by the public, and would not be\naddressed by continuing to allow the use of spotter planes. Many harpoon\nfishermen argue that the use of spotter planes is contradictory to the reasoning used\nin establishing the Harpoon category (i.e., that a harpoon fishery can only be\npursued under optimal weather and sea conditions, which is why it was given a\nmultiple daily catch allowance). Additional impacts of the use of spotter aircraft in\nthe bluefin tuna fishery are described in the other alternatives below.\nConclusion\nAs evidenced by the AP's consensus, NMFS maintains that the use of spotter\nplanes in the General and Harpoon categories is a problem in the bluefin tuna\nfishery and that the use of spotter planes impedes the collection of important\nscientific information about this fishery. NMFS maintains that this remains true,\neven though the west Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery is no longer a \"scientific\nmonitoring\" quota under the 1998 ICCAT Recommendation on west Atlantic\nbluefin tuna rebuilding. While no longer a \"scientific monitoring quota,\" the\nRecommendation does require that the United States provide the best available data\nfor the assessment of the stock by SCRS. In addition, NMFS now needs to ensure\nthat the use of spotter planes is consistent with NMFS' efforts to implement\nmeasures to achieve optimum yield in the bluefin tuna fishery, consistent with the\nMagnuson-Stevens Act. For these reasons, NMFS is currently developing a\nproposed rule to address the issue of spotter planes in the bluefin tuna fishery, and\nintends that a final rule would be completed prior to the commencement of the\nGeneral and Harpoon category fishing seasons, June 1, 1999. NMFS will consider\ninformation gathered during the development of this FMP, including comments\nfrom AP members and the public during the scoping and other public comment\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 116","processes. These comments were very helpful and NMFS has determined that it\nwill address this issue in a separate rulemaking.\nFinal Action: Establish a \"school reserve\" category\nThis action establishes a \"school reserve\" category which could be used in the\ninstance of overharvest in the school category. This action would be implemented\nwith any rebuilding and allocation alternative, SO long as the allocation alternative\nprovides for a school bluefin tuna fishery.\nFor school bluefin tuna, ICCAT limits west Atlantic bluefin tuna fishing nations\nto eight percent of their national quota (see discussion below and in the rebuilding\nsections of the FMP). For the preferred rebuilding and allocation alternatives, this\nwould be 111 mt WW for the United States. Because of high, as well as highly\nvariable, catch rates, the Angling category can easily harvest and exceed this quota.\nThe United States is held accountable for such an overharvest, and those school fish\nwould be deducted from the U.S. quota in the following year.\nThe 1998 ICCAT Recommendation on west Atlantic bluefin tuna rebuilding\nrequires that the catch of school bluefin tuna be limited to no more than eight\npercent by weight of the total U.S. quota over each four-consecutive-year period.\nNMFS proposes to implement this provision through the establishment of the\nschool bluefin tuna reserve specified below and through annual adjustments to the\nschool bluefin tuna landings and reserve categories as necessary to meet the ICCAT\nrequirement. Given the four-year accounting period, NMFS adjustments for\nestimated overharvest or underharvest of school bluefin tuna will not be restricted to\nautomatic carryover between fishing years. Instead, flexible adjustments would be\nmade to enhance fishing opportunities and the collection of information on a broad\nrange of bluefin tuna size classes, provided that the eight percent landings limit is\nmet over the applicable four-year period.\nA school reserve of approximately 20 mt WW [actual tonnage would be\ncalculated from a percentage (18.5 percent of school allowance, which would be\n21 mt ww), as with other allocations] will reduce the chances of the United States\nexceeding the eight percent tolerance, as the school reserve will not be allocated at\nthe start of the season, but would be held in reserve as a buffer against an\noverharvest. If an overharvest did not occur, the school reserve could be allocated\nto the recreational fishery later in the year or carried over and allocated the\nfollowing year, consistent with the relevant ICCAT recommendations\nEcological Impacts\nThis action could have positive ecological impact as it could help prevent the\nUnited States from exceeding its quota of school bluefin tuna.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 117","Social and Economic Impacts\nAs this action will not increase or decrease the overall quota or the Angling\ncategory quota, it would not have any social or economic impacts as compared to\nthe status quo. The Angling category will still be allowed to harvest its full quota.\nConclusion\nThis is the final action. Along with the 1998 ICCAT recommendation which\nallows four years to balance the eight percent tolerance, establishing a reserve of\nschool bluefin tuna will provide more flexibility in managing the Angling category\nfishery. This could help prevent the United States from exceeding its quota of\nschool bluefin tuna, which would prevent excessive fishing on the stock as well as\nreductions in future years' school bluefin tuna quota. This alternative would not\nhave negative social or economic impacts. NMFS has not identified any safety-at-\nsea implications for this action.\nRejected Options for Effort Controls\nRejected Option: For all vessels other than purse seine category vessels, prohibit\nthe use of aircraft to assist fishing vessel operators in the\nlocation and capture of west Atlantic bluefin tuna\nAs mentioned above, NMFS has received numerous comments that the use of\naircraft to locate bluefin tuna for General category vessels is contrary to effort\ncontrols previously established, accelerates the closure of the Harpoon category, and\nposes safety concerns. This alternative would prohibit the use of aircraft for bluefin\ntuna fishing except for assisting Purse Seine category vessels.\nThe Harpoon boat category was established in 1980 based on information\nsupplied by a small number of harpoon fishermen. They presented evidence that\nthey constituted a small traditional fishery that should be segregated from the\nGeneral category. The harpoon fishery could only be pursued under optimal\nweather and sea conditions, which allow fishermen to sight fish from the tower and\npulpit. Since these conditions occur infrequently in New England, the one fish per\nday per vessel General category catch limit was too restrictive and hence, a separate\nquota and a multiple daily catch allowance was established for the Harpoon boat\ncategory. However, the use of harpoons in the General category is also authorized,\nand the proportion of fish landed in the General category with harpoon gear has\nincreased steadily since 1994.\nNMFS has received comments that the use of spotter aircraft undermines the\nbasis for the multiple daily catch allowance which was once considered necessary\nfor the preservation of the traditional harpoon fishery. Commenters note that, with\nthe advent of spotter planes, harpooning can be done under far less than optimal\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 118","weather and sea conditions, and Harpoon category participants are able to fill\ncategory quota more quickly. Some Harpoon vessel owners apparently switch to\nGeneral category vessels when the Harpoon category quota is attained and continue\nto use their spotter planes, thus accelerating the rate at which the General category\nquota (or time period subquota) is met, and counteracting the effort controls\ndesigned to extend fishing opportunities for the General category.\nCommenters have noted that maintaining the current regulations could result in\ncontinued difficulties with premature fishery closures and market gluts and could\ncounteract the General category effort controls. They note that the use of planes,\namong other factors, undermines the General category effort controls. Similarly,\nbanning spotter aircraft for all but the Purse Seine category fishery is consistent\nwith other measures used by NMFS in recent years to ensure a wider geographical\nand temporal distribution of fishing activities, which contributes to the collection of\nthe best scientific data for stock assessment purposes, and provides or increases\nfishing opportunities for all fishery participants (consistent with NMFS' efforts to\nachieve optimum yield in this fishery). In recent years, the General category quota\nhas been met in less time than previously, despite other efforts to slow the fishery\n(via time period subquotas and restricted-fishing days). NMFS notes that use of\naircraft to harvest more fish in a shorter period of time is inconsistent with measures\nto slow the fishery and improve market conditions, particularly for a fresh fish\nfishery. In 1996, ICCAT adopted a recommendation prohibiting the use of spotter\naircraft by purse seine vessels in the Mediterranean due to their effect of\naccelerating catch rates. However, in the United States, the Purse Seine category\nfishery is managed under a transferable individual vessel quota program. Therefore,\nthe rate of catch in the U.S. Purse Seine category fishery is not of concern. Spotter\nplanes can assist Purse category vessel operators in the location of schools of large\nfish, thus reducing discards.\nEnforcement is a central issue in the regulation of the use of aircraft for the\nbluefin tuna fishery. Certain industry members have indicated that they are willing\nto work with NMFS Enforcement by providing information regarding potential\nviolations of spotter plane regulations. Special agents with investigative training\ncould be deployed to follow up on potential violations. In comments on the 1997\nspotter plane prohibition rulemaking, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)\nindicated that the ban would not interfere with the FAA's jurisdiction, because the\nrule would not prevent or hinder pilots from flying since the action only would\nprohibit vessels from using any aircraft to aid in the harvest of bluefin tuna.\nAs mentioned above, the HMS AP considered this issue at a meeting in\nWarwick, RI in August 1998. The meeting was open to the public and during the\npublic comment period the AP heard extensive testimony from fishery participants\nboth in favor of and against this alternative. The majority of the public comments\nwere against the use of aircraft in the General and Harpoon categories. Commenters\nexpressed the following reasons for banning the use of spotter aircraft: spotter\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 119","planes accelerate the catch rate in both the General and Harpoon categories, both\ndirectly and indirectly; accelerated catch rates result in shorter seasons, thereby\naffecting both catch per unit effort data collection and revenues; planes make it\neasier to catch multiple fish and thus make it easier to violate catch limit regulations\nand highgrade; vessels operating with the assistance of planes often cause conflict\non the fishing grounds; airplanes are not a traditional or historical part of the\nHarpoon or General categories - they only got involved extensively after there was\nless work spotting for swordfish in the mid-1980s; and planes can cause safety\nconcerns, for both vessels and the planes themselves, by concentrating vessels and\nplanes in a small area. The AP itself discussed the issue extensively, and while the\nAP did not express a unanimous view, a strong consensus emerged in favor of\nbanning the use of airplanes by all vessels participating the Atlantic tunas fisheries,\nwith the exception of Purse Seine category vessels. Several AP members reserved\ncomment, but none spoke out in favor of plane use. The points that the AP\nmembers made in favor of banning the use of aircraft in all but the Purse Seine\ncategory were as follows (these comments are noted as stated):\nThe use of spotter aircraft accelerates the catch rate in both the General and\nHarpoon categories, both directly and indirectly. They are a highly efficient,\nunregulated, unpermitted, gear type. Vessels that hire planes directly are\nobviously assisted, but many vessels are assisted indirectly just by seeing the\nplanes and using them as a guide to where the fish are. This indirect or\n\"peripheral\" catch may be hard to quantify, but it exists and is significant; it also\nundermines NMFS' efforts to achieve optimum yield in this fishery. In addition,\nmost fish in the Harpoon category are caught with the assistance of planes. With\nno planes, the Harpoon category would last much longer, and the Harpoon\ncategory fishermen would not switch over to a General category boat (to further\naccelerate the catch in the General category) as soon.\nBecause the use of spotter aircraft accelerates the catch rate, their use\ncompromises the collection of good catch per unit effort data, which are then\nused in the stock assessments. Aircraft cause the catch to be spatially and\ntemporally concentrated, less random in nature, and more affected by short term\nand localized factors which can result in unreliable or unusable catch per unit\neffort data for stock assessments.\nPlanes cause an increase in effort. When fish are hard to find or are far offshore\nduring parts of the season, planes can find them very easily. Vessels that\nnormally would not even try in such conditions are then directed to these fish by\nthe planes.\nThe use of spotter planes adds to a vessel's potential to violate regulations and\nland multiple fish per day in the General category, to highgrade and discard low\nquality fish.\nPilots do not have a vested interest in the fishery. They are essentially an\nunpermitted gear type, and their activity is not monitored or controlled.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 120","The use of spotter aircraft is a safety concern. The \"rules of the road\" for\nnavigation and safety do not seem to apply when vessels are racing after a plane.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative probably would have minimal impact on stock rebuilding as\nwhatever quota is in place would most likely be harvested with or without the use\nof spotter aircraft. However, spreading the General category fishery out, both\ntemporally and geographically, would result in better data being collected and used\nin stock assessments, which would have positive ecological affects as there would\nbe a better understanding of the status of the stock and more informed management\ndecisions could be made. As for discards, it is unclear what effect prohibiting the\nuse of aircraft would have on the catch of bluefin tuna too small to retain. Some\ncomments indicate that discards would be reduced because harpooners not relying\non aircraft may be more selective. However, some commenters argue that the\ndiscards may be increased because harpooners are not as accurate in finding\nretainable fish as are spotter pilots. There is little reliable information currently\navailable to determine which outcome is more likely to occur.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nSpotter aircraft have largely been employed in the Purse Seine and Harpoon\ncategories, and to a much lesser extent in the General and Angling categories.\nAnecdotal evidence to date suggests that each spotter pilot assists in the harvest of\n15 Harpoon Category fish per season and that spotter pilots receive 25 percent of a\nvessel's revenues from sale of bluefin tuna. Using 1997 figures (average weight of\nHarpoon category landings and average price per pound), prohibiting the use of\nspotter aircraft in the Harpoon category would thus reduce average gross revenues\nfor pilots by approximately $12,000. However, in the General category, daily\nlandings are limited to one bluefin tuna per vessel. Therefore, prohibiting the use of\nspotter pilots in the General category would be expected to reduce average gross\nrevenues for pilots by considerably less than $12,000.\nBecause the full bluefin tuna quota would likely be taken even without the aid of\nspotter aircraft, gross revenue lost to pilots would accrue to vessel operators. No\ninformation available to NMFS suggests that the pilots depend solely on bluefin\ntuna spotting for their livelihoods. This alternative may not have a significant\neconomic impact, if one views the fishery in the context of several thousand small\nbusiness entities, including vessel operators and shoreside support services. The\n1995 Final Environmental Impact Statement for bluefin tuna provides information\non direct and indirect full-time equivalent (FTE) employment in certain portions of\nthe bluefin tuna fishery. An estimated total of over 1,200 direct and indirect FTE\njobs are attributed to the bluefin tuna fishery. On a full-time equivalent basis, less\nthan two percent of small business entities would be affected by this alternative\n(Final Environmental Impact Statement, July 20, 1995, p. 129, Table 3.16).\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 121","Anecdotal information suggests the existence of some unsafe practices by\nspotter planes, such as near misses with more than one aircraft flying at low\naltitude or aircraft attracting too many vessels to the same area. For example, on\nApril 9, 1997, two single-engine planes carrying spotters of spawning herring\ncollided over Prince William Sound, AK, killing two individuals in one of\nthe planes.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected at this time. NMFS believes more information on the\nuse and effects of spotter aircraft in the bluefin tuna fisheries should be reviewed\nbefore taking further action. NMFS will continue to seek the input of the HMS AP\nin further evaluation of management alternatives regarding spotter aircraft. See\nconclusion for the final action.\nRejected Option: For all vessels other than harpoon and purse seine category\nvessels, prohibit the use of aircraft to assist fishing vessel\noperators in the location and capture of west Atlantic bluefin tuna\nNMFS implemented this measure though a final rule effective July 1997.\nHowever, as mentioned previously, the United States District Court for\nMassachusetts ordered that the prohibition be overturned effective June 10, 1998.\nDespite the Court's ruling, NMFS continues to believe that extending the season\nfor the rod-and-reel fisheries helps ensure the collection of the best available data\nfor the assessment of the stock as well as providing opportunities for all fishery\nparticipants. To this end, NMFS has taken regulatory actions in previous years to\nextend the bluefin tuna season for the General and Angling categories. However,\ndata from the Harpoon and Purse Seine category fisheries have not been\nincorporated into any of the currently usable catch per unit effort indices; therefore\nthe effect of spotter aircraft accelerating catch rates in these fisheries is less\nsignificant.\nWhile exempting Harpoon as well as Purse Seine category vessels would\nmitigate adverse impacts on spotter pilots, there would be difficulties in enforcing\nthe ban when the Harpoon and General category fisheries are operating\nconcurrently. Harpoon gear is also authorized for the General category, but the\nexemption would only apply to vessels permitted in the Harpoon category.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would have effects that are primarily economic and/or\nadministrative in nature. However, as spotter pilots are able to determine the\napproximate size class of a school of bluefin tuna, prohibiting the use of spotter\naircraft in the General category may increase the potential for catching undersized\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 122","fish in the handgear categories and could lead to increased discards. It is unclear\nwhat effect prohibiting the use of aircraft would have on the catch of bluefin tuna\ntoo small to retain. Some comments indicate that discards would be reduced\nbecause harpooners not relying on aircraft may be more selective and because they\nwill be less apt to strike at fish they cannot see well (as they may with spotter pilot\nassistance). However, some commenters argue that the discards may be increased\nbecause harpooners are not as accurate in finding retainable fish as are spotter\npilots. There is little reliable information currently available to determine which\noutcome is more likely to occur. In recent years, less than ten percent of the\nGeneral category quota has been taken with harpoon gear, thus the potential for\nincreased (or decreased) discards is limited.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThe analysis in the final action and in the previous rejected alternative includes a\ndescription of the potential social and economic impacts of this alternative. As\nmentioned above, exempting harpoon as well as purse seine vessels from a spotter\naircraft prohibition would mitigate adverse impacts on spotter pilots.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected at this time. NMFS believes more information on the\nuse and effects of spotter aircraft in the bluefin tuna fisheries should be reviewed\nbefore taking further action. NMFS will continue to seek the input of the HMS AP\nin further evaluation of management alternatives regarding spotter aircraft. See\nconclusion for the final action.\nRejected Option: Reintegrate the Harpoon and General categories\nReintegration of the Harpoon category with the General category would simplify\nregulations and establish parity between the two categories insofar as the catch limit\nwould be one bluefin tuna greater than 73 inches CFL (or 81 inches CFL, if\nimplemented) per vessel per day for all handgear types. It has been alleged that\nfishing activities associated with spotter aircraft require that multiple landings be\nattempted, potentially through the practice of at-sea transfers. The reduction in the\ndaily catch limit for the harpoon sector would diminish the cost-effectiveness of\nspotter aircraft assistance and thus could potentially reduce their use in the fishery.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would have effects that are primarily economic and/or\nadministrative in nature.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 123","Social and Economic Impacts\nThe social and economic impacts from this alternative would mostly be felt by\nthe participants in the Harpoon category who would be limited to the one fish per\ntrip retention limit in the General category. Some vessels in the Harpoon category\nland over 25 fish per year. The more successful vessels in the General category\nland similar numbers of fish, SO the impact may not be great, although because of\nthe General category daily catch limit of one fish per vessel, more trips are\nnecessary. Many vessel owners in the Harpoon category also own another vessel in\nthe General category, and when the Harpoon category closes, they fish in the\nGeneral category on their second vessel. This alternative would eliminate the need\nfor a second vessel, and could impact the revenues of those owners/operators who\nhave multiple vessels. This is hard to assess, however, as these vessel\nowner/operators could participate full-time in the General category and potentially\nmake up for the income lost from the Harpoon category vessel.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected at this time. For those who use exclusively harpoon\ngear, the weather dependency of using harpoon gear still warrants the multiple catch\nlimit in the Harpoon category. NMFS will continue to seek the input of the HMS\nAP in further evaluation of management alternatives regarding spotter aircraft. See\nconclusion for the final action.\n3.4.2.1.2 Bluefin Tuna Recreational Retention Limits\nFinal Action: Status quo retention limits\nThis is the status quo alternative for the bluefin tuna Angling category.\nInseason adjustments are based on catch levels and considerations of effort over\ntime and area. While this FMP implements a base Angling category daily\nretention limit of one bluefin (measuring 27 to less than 73 inches CFL) per\nvessel, this management measure relies on inseason adjustments to regulate the\ndaily retention limits for the Angling category. Anglers are advised to check the\nupdates (e.g., catch limit adjustment and closure information) that NMFS\nprovides via the Atlantic Tunas Information Line (888-872-8862) or\nwww.usatuna.com before making a fishing trip. Recreational anglers are also\nallowed one \"trophy\" fish per vessel per year of 73 inches CFL or greater which\ncannot be sold. NMFS intends to maintain this system because the limited\nrecreational quota, and highly variable catch rates and locations, make it difficult\nto set fixed retention limits. NMFS continues to work with recreational\nfishermen and the HMS AP to develop an improved system to manage inseason\nretention limits for the bluefin tuna Angling category fishery, particularly in light\nof the ICCAT-recommended four-year balancing period for the eight percent\ntolerance of school bluefin tuna landings.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 124","Rejected Options for Bluefin Tuna Recreational Retention Limits\nRejected Option: Adopt a sliding scale daily retention limit for bluefin for\nU.S. Coast Guard inspected vessels\nThis alternative would add to the status quo a sliding scale daily retention\nlimit for Coast Guard inspected vessels with Charter/Headboat category permits.\nNMFS has received a proposal from several recreational fishing groups to set a\nhigher retention limit for Coast Guard inspected vessels. These vessels carry a\nlarger number of passengers for-hire than do non-inspected vessels. The\nproposal requested a daily retention limit of one fish per angler, with the\nfollowing graduated scale for the maximum number of fish per vessel:\nsix fish for vessels that carry eight to 20 passengers\neight fish for vessels that carry 20 to 25 passengers\nten fish for vessels that carry 35 to 48 passengers\n12 fish for vessels that carry 40 to 60 passengers\n14 fish for vessels that carry 60 to 80 passengers\n18 fish for vessels that carry 80 to 100 passengers\n20 fish for vessels that carry 100 to 149 passengers\nThese increased daily retention limits would only apply when the Angling\ncategory fishery is \"open\" (daily retention limit is higher than one fish from the\nschool through small medium size classes - e.g., one school bluefin tuna per person,\nwith up to three school bluefin tuna per vessel).\nEcological Impacts\nThere would be little ecological impact with this alternative as compared to the\nstatus quo. The number of fish caught in the Angling category is controlled through\na quota, which would not be affected by a sliding scale daily retention for inspected\nvessels. However, the retained catch would likely be more concentrated in certain\ntimes and areas and the quality of the catch per unit data would be affected.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nSeveral HMS AP members who represent the recreational fishing community,\nespecially those representing charter and headboat fishermen and associations, have\nexpressed concerns that recent restrictions on Angling category daily retention\nlimits have unfairly excluded larger charter and headboats from the bluefin tuna\nfishery. This sliding scale daily retention limit could allow those vessels to\nparticipate in the bluefin tuna fishery. Several other AP members thought that a\ndifferent retention limit for inspected vessels would be unfair to the smaller\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 125","\"six-pack\" charterboats and private recreational vessels. It would likely result in a\nshorter season for all bluefin tuna recreational fishery participants, especially those\nin areas where bluefin do not appear until later in the season.\nConclusion\nWhile this alternative may be viable, it is rejected at this time. Retention limits\nin the Angling category have varied widely over the course of the last few years. It\nis difficult to predict catch rates and landings, and a sliding scale retention limit for\ninspected vessels would be difficult and confusing to implement for the highly\ndynamic Angling category. As mentioned above, however, NMFS is committed to\nworking with recreational fishermen and the HMS AP to develop an improved\nsystem to manage inseason retention limits for the bluefin tuna Angling category\nfishery.\n3.4.2.1.3 Bluefin Tuna Size Limits\nMinimum size limits can influence the size composition of the harvest, and will\ninfluence the amount and character of total fishing mortality in a fishery and the\ntherefore pace of rebuilding. Under minimum size regulations, fishermen may not\nretain and/or land fish below the minimum size. Minimum size regulations are\nintended to conserve juvenile fish in three ways. First, prohibition on landing\nand/or sale prevents development of a commercial market for small fish, thereby\ndiscouraging fishermen from targeting them. Secondly, some of the small fish that\nare discarded will survive and mature to reproduce and contribute to the stock\nbiomass. Third, a minimum size results in fewer fish being retained per mt than\nwould be otherwise. However, to the extent that fishermen cannot control the size\ncomposition of the fish they catch, minimum sizes can result in significant discards\nof undersized fish. The objective to minimize bycatch and bycatch mortality, and\nthe requirement to rebuild overfished fisheries should be considered when\nevaluating these alternatives.\nMany of these alternatives, while listed separately here, could be implemented\nsimultaneously. For example, an increase in the minimum size for recreational\nbluefin tuna could be implemented at the same time as an increase in the minimum\nsize for sale. Each minimum size alternative is analyzed individually, but more\nthan one combination of alternatives is possible, and the alternatives should be\nconsidered in the context of other management measures under consideration in\nrebuilding overfished stocks, such as quota reductions, and retention limits. Also,\nin many cases, quantitative data are not available to assess the impact of these\nalternatives on the shape and slope of the rebuilding trajectory. In those cases, the\neffects on rebuilding are evaluated in a qualitative manner. There are no significant\nsafety implications of these bluefin tuna retention limit alternatives.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 126","Final Action: Status quo minimum size for bluefin tuna\nThe current minimum size for bluefin tuna is 27 inches curved fork length (CFL)\nrecreational and 73 inches CFL commercial. ICCAT recommends that there be no\neconomic gain from the take of bluefin tuna measuring less than 45 inches and there\nis an eight-percent tolerance for these fish. NMFS has taken an even more\nrestrictive approach in implementing the no economic gain provision by prohibiting\nthe sale of bluefin tuna measuring less than 73 inches CFL. U.S. regulations allow\nzero tolerance of landings of bluefin tuna measuring less than 27 inches. Purse\nSeine category vessels are restricted to giant bluefin tuna (z 81 inches CFL), but are\nallowed a tolerance for large medium bluefin tuna (73 to 81 inches CFL) of 15\npercent by weight of the total amount of bluefin tuna per trip, and ten percent by\nweight of the total amount of bluefin tuna per season per vessel. For the Harpoon\nboat category, although landings of giant bluefin tuna are not restricted, there is a\ndaily limit of one large medium bluefin tuna per vessel.\nEcological Impacts\nAs this is the status quo, the effects of this action will be determined by the\noverall quota levels and allocation actions described above. For a complete\ndescription of the impacts of the status quo, see the description of fisheries section\n(Chapter 2), as well as the final rebuilding and allocation actions in this chapter.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nFor a complete description of the impacts of the status quo, see the description of\nfisheries section (Chapter 2), as well as the final rebuilding and allocation actions in\nthis chapter.\nConclusion\nThis is the final action. NMFS maintains that the current size limits and\ntolerances for the bluefin tuna fishery are consistent with ICCAT recommendations,\nthe objectives of this FMP, and achieving optimum yield in the fishery. The current\nsize limits and tolerances for bluefin tuna limit fishing mortality on pre-spawning\nfish, minimize bycatch and discards, maximize fishing opportunities, and will allow\nthe stock to rebuild.\nRejected Options for Bluefin Tuna Size Limits\nRejected Option: Increase minimum recreational size for bluefin tuna to 47 inches\n(119 cm) CFL (large school size class)\nThis alternative would eliminate the fishery for school bluefin tuna which targets\nfish 27 inches to less than 47 inches CFL. The 1996 ICCAT recommendation on\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 127","bluefin tuna prohibited the landing of school bluefin tuna, with a discretionary\ntolerance of eight percent, by weight, of a country's national quota. The 1998\nrecommendation allows four years to balance the eight-percent tolerance for school\nbluefin tuna. The new recommendation would allow the United States to not allow\nthe catch of school bluefin tuna for two or three years, \"storing up\" its school\nbluefin tuna allowance which could then be allocated in one year. The United States\ncurrently allows the eight-percent to be landed under the Angling category quota on\nan annual basis. This alternative would eliminate that eight-percent tolerance, and\nwould allocate the quota to the large school/small medium size classes for the\nrecreational Angling category.\nEcological Impacts\nUnder this alternative, no school bluefin tuna would be landed. Using average\nweights and the preferred rebuilding and allocation alternatives, the number of\nbluefin tuna landed in the United States would be 11,103 (5,836 73 inches CFL\nand 5,267 < 73 inches CFL) per year, a reduction of 30 percent from what would be\nlanded under the status quo.\nSCRS and the Southeast Fisheries Science Center did not analyze or project the\neffects of eliminating the school fishery using the 1998 stock assessment, but the\nSoutheast Fisheries Science Center has projected bluefin tuna stock status into the\nfuture under a scenario eliminating the school fishery using data from the 1996\nassessment. The projections indicated that eliminating mortality in the school fish\nfishery would result in slightly faster rebuilding under all rebuilding (quota)\nscenarios. Because regulations have limited the share of school bluefin tuna catch\nin recent years (since 1994) to a relatively small share of the overall west Atlantic\ncatch, current catch levels have little effect on west Atlantic stock rebuilding\nprojections. Under a 20-year rebuilding program (500 mt ww/year west Atlantic\nquota using the 1996 assessment), the stock would rebuild in only slightly less time\n(perhaps one year) than under the status quo allocation alternative. In addition, if\nrebuilding were to be set to a time period (as it is in the rebuilding alternatives in\nthis FMP Addendum), eliminating the school fish fishery would allow a slightly\ngreater quota to be landed during rebuilding, while at the same time keeping the\nstock on the selected recovery trajectory. However, increasing the minimum size to\n47 inches would virtually eliminate collection of any scientific data, especially\ncatch per unit effort data, on school bluefin tuna.\nThe elimination of the school fish fishery for bluefin tuna could have a negative\nimpact on other fish stocks, particularly for other fully- or over-fished HMS such as\nyellowfin tuna and sharks, should the displaced recreational effort shift to target\nthose stocks. This alternative could also increase discards of school bluefin tuna, as\nrecreational fishermen may not be able to control the size composition of the bluefin\ntuna they catch.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 128","Social and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would not reduce the quota for any category in the bluefin tuna\nfishery, but would eliminate the fishery for school bluefin tuna. In certain areas,\nsuch as off Ocean City, MD; Wachapreague, VA; and Cape May, NJ, the primary\nrecreational and charter fishery for bluefin tuna targets school bluefin. These fleets\nand communities may be adversely affected by this alternative as they may not be\nable to shift effort towards large school/small medium bluefin tuna, or other species.\nAngler consumer surplus would most likely be reduced from status quo levels (see\nrebuilding alternatives and economic description of fisheries section). Current catch\nlimits for school bluefin tuna are already considered very restrictive by recreational\nconstituents.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because projections indicate that eliminating the\nschool fish fishery would result in only slightly faster rebuilding under all\nrebuilding (quota) scenarios, and eliminating the school fishery would have too\ngreat a negative impact on the recreational fishery and its communities. NS 8\nrequires NMFS to minimize adverse economic impacts on fishing communities, to\nthe extent practicable. There are other practicable measures that can be taken that\nwould result in less severe economic impact to recreational bluefin tuna fishing\ncommunities and businesses without unduly compromising rebuilding requirements\n(e.g., the eight-percent tolerance on the landing of school bluefin). In addition, this\nalternative would restrict NMFS' ability to collect scientific information (both catch\nand effort data and biological samples) from the school bluefin tuna fishery, which\nwould be contrary to the 1998 ICCAT recommendation to collect the best available\ndata for the assessment of the stock by SCRS, including information on the catches\nof the broadest range of age classes possible. The U.S. rod and reel small fish catch\nper unit effort (CPUE) index is especially important for stock assessment purposes,\nas it provides insight on the future condition of the spawning stock and is the only\nsmall fish rod and reel index available for the west Atlantic bluefin stock.\nRejected Option: Increase minimum commercial size for bluefin tuna to 81 inches\n(206 cm) CFL (giant size class), or size at first maturity\nThis alternative would raise the minimum size for bluefin tuna from 73 to 81\ninches CFL in the General and Longline categories, and would eliminate tolerances\nin the Harpoon and Purse Seine categories for large medium bluefin tuna (73 to\nless than 81 inches CFL). A bluefin tuna measuring 81 inches CFL weighs\napproximately 300 pounds and is eight years old, which is the age at first maturity.\nTable 3.24 indicates the 1997 size composition of the commercial bluefin tuna\ncatch.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 129","Ecological Impacts\nThis alternative would have the effect of increasing the average weight and\ndecreasing the total number of commercial fish landed, compared to the status quo.\nThis alternative would limit bluefin tuna harvest to those fish that are nearing\nspawning age. These fish have many fewer natural predators than smaller bluefin\ntuna. Providing these fish added protection and an opportunity to spawn could\nspeed rebuilding, although it is unclear to what degree. This alternative could\nincrease discards, as many large medium bluefin tuna are landed in the commercial\ncategories (averaging approximately 26 percent for all commercial categories).\nBecause fishermen may be able to direct their efforts towards larger fish, the\nincrease in discards may not be as high as the recent numbers of large medium\nbluefin tuna landed and sold. The number of large medium VS. giant bluefin tuna\nlanded by commercial category in 1997 is shown in Table 3.24.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThe social and economic impacts of this alternative would be minimal, because\nthe tonnage allowed to be landed would be the same as under the status quo. It\nwould have the effect of decreasing the numbers of commercial sized fish allowed\nto be landed, and this may result in the quota being caught by fewer vessels.\nHowever, because it may take vessels more trips to land a fish, vessels may incur\ngreater costs. In 1997, average prices for giant bluefin tuna were four percent\nhigher than those for large medium bluefin tuna ($7.47/pound VS. $7.18/pound,\nwhole weight), therefore, gross revenues may increase under this alternative.\nConclusion\nAlthough this alternative could protect and relieve pressure on pre-spawning\nsized fish, it would increase discards. This alternative is rejected.\nPercent breakdown by size class of commercial bluefin tuna for 1997 (NMFS NERO\nTable 3.24\nbluefin tuna dealer database).\nGiant (%)\nTotal # of fish\nLarge Medium (%)\nCategory\n67.8\n3,669\n32.2\nGeneral\n72.2\n288\n27.8\nHarpoon\n1,271\n95.7\nPurse Seine\n4.3\n241\n66.0\n34.0\nIncidental\n5,469\n74.4\n25.6\nTOTAL\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 130","Rejected Option: Lower minimum size for sale for bluefin tuna to 47 inches\n(119 cm) CFL (large school size class)\nThis alternative would lower the minimum size for bluefin tuna to 47 inches for\nthe Longline and Trap categories (previously grouped as Incidental category) and\nGeneral categories, allow Harpoon category vessels to land and sell one fish from\nthe large school through large medium bluefin tuna per trip (as opposed to just large\nmedium), and would change the large medium bluefin tuna allowance for Purse\nSeine category vessels to include the large school and small medium size classes.\nGeneral category vessels were allowed to sell school and medium sized bluefin tuna\nbefore July 1992.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would lower the average size, and thus raise the total number, of\nfish landed commercially, even under the status quo quota. This alternative could\nslow rebuilding, although it is unclear to what degree. This alternative would likely\nreduce discards because commercial fishermen would not need to discard smaller\nfish. Although there are discards with any minimum size, smaller bluefin tuna may\nbe easier to handle and release unharmed than larger fish. In addition, an increase in\nthe number of fish tagged and released may lead to better monitoring of the stock.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThe social and economic impacts of this alternative would be minimal because\nthe tonnage allowed to be landed would be the same as under the status quo. It\nwould have the effect of increasing the numbers of commercial sized fish allowed to\nbe landed which could result in the quota being caught by a greater number of\nvessels. Because the range of large school and small medium bluefin tuna extends\nbeyond the traditionally commercial bluefin tuna fishing grounds of New England,\nthis alternative could result in some commercial revenues and activity shifting from\nNew England to the mid-Atlantic area. This alternative may also reduce overall\nex-vessel revenues to the General category. As mentioned above, 1997 average\nprices for large medium bluefin were slightly lower than those for giant bluefin, and\naverage prices would likely be even lower for large school and small medium\nbluefin tuna.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it would increase the number of bluefin tuna\nlanded and could slow rebuilding. Under this alternative, discards in the New\nEngland area may be reduced as there are few bluefin tuna below 47 inches in that\narea, and commercial fishermen would most likely have to discard fewer fish than\nthey do now under the 73 inch CFL minimum size. Commercial effort, landings,\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 131","and discards could increase in the mid-Atlantic area, however, where smaller\nbluefin tuna (both larger and smaller than 47 inches) are more prevalent.\n3.4.2.1.4 Yellowfin Tuna Size Limits\nFinal Action: Status quo minimum size\nThe current minimum size for yellowfin tuna is 27 inches CFL for both the\ncommercial and recreational fisheries. This is a higher minimum size than the\n3.2 kg minimum established by ICCAT, but was implemented in 1996 to\ncorrespond to the bluefin tuna minimum size for identification and enforcement\npurposes. Although ICCAT allows a discretionary tolerance of 15 percent less\nthan 3.2 kg, the United States permits no tolerance for undersized fish.\nEcological Impacts\nYellowfin tuna are considered fully-fished. Minimum size regulations are\nintended to conserve juvenile fish in three ways. First, prohibition on landing\nprevents development of a commercial market for small fish, thereby discouraging\nfishermen from targeting them. Second, some of the small fish that are discarded\nwill survive and mature to reproduce and contribute to the stock biomass. Third, a\nminimum size results in fewer fish being retained per mt than would be otherwise.\nHowever, to the extent that fishermen cannot control the size composition of the\nfish they catch, minimum sizes can result in significant discards of undersized fish.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nMinimum size limits can influence the size composition of the harvest, and will\ninfluence the amount of total fishing mortality in a fishery and the nature of the\nfishery. Under minimum size regulations, fishermen may not retain and/or land fish\nbelow the minimum size, thus more yellowfin would be released. There could be\nsome loss of revenue to the commercial fishery associated with the regulatory\ndiscards. There could also be some effect on angler consumer surplus, but the\nextent of potential impacts on the recreational fishery is uncertain. Since this action\ndoes not alter the status quo, no social impacts are expected.\nConclusion\nThe United States has already implemented a higher minimum size than that\nrequired by ICCAT. The United States has also prohibited all retention of yellowfin\ntuna less than the minimum size, rather than allowing a 15-percent tolerance.\nRaising the minimum size would not be consistent with the objective to minimize\nbycatch and bycatch mortality. Thus, at this time, NMFS has decided to maintain\nthe current minimum size of 27 inches.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 132","Rejected Option for Yellowfin Tuna Size Limits\nRejected Option: Increase minimum size (both commercial and recreational) for\nyellowfin tuna to 47 inches (119 cm) CFL\nThis alternative would increase the minimum size for yellowfin tuna from\n27 inches CFL to a size which is above their size at first maturity. Yellowfin reach\nsexual maturity at a size of about 45 inches (115 cm) CFL. A minimum size of\n47 inches was chosen for this alternative because it corresponds to the large school\nsize class for bluefin tuna.\nEcological Impacts\nOverall impacts on the yellowfin tuna stock would be minimal due to the very\nsmall percentage of yellowfin tuna that the United States is currently estimated to\nland in the Atlantic compared to other nations (the United States landed six percent\nof yellowfin tuna in the Atlantic in 1997). The average size of yellowfin tuna\nlanded would increase, but overall landings could decrease. Large Pelagic Survey\ndata from 1996 and 1997, indicate that 91 percent of yellowfin tuna landed by\nrecreational anglers were below 47 inches CFL. The yellowfin tuna numbers may\nbe skewed by the fact that the Large Pelagic Survey does not cover the Gulf of\nMexico, where yellowfin tuna tend to be larger, but the amount of yellowfin tuna\ncaught recreationally in the Gulf of Mexico is much less than that caught in the\nnorthwest Atlantic.\nA review of commercial data from dealer weighout slips for 1997 indicates that,\nin terms of numbers of fish, 92.5 percent, 66.7 percent, and 4.8 percent of the\nyellowfin tuna caught with rod and reel in the Atlantic, longline in the Atlantic, and\nlongline in the Gulf of Mexico, respectively, were below 47 inches CFL. By\nweight, and for the same areas, 84.9 percent, 50.8 percent, and 0.8 percent of\nyellowfin tuna landed were below 47 inches CFL. The majority of commercial\nlandings (by weight) of yellowfin tuna of all sizes are made using longline gear in\nthe Gulf of Mexico (NMFS, 1998).\nGiven the size composition data for both commercial and recreational landings,\ndiscards of undersized yellowfin tuna could increase substantially under this\nalternative. This alternative could also cause recreational and commercial effort\ntargeting yellowfin tuna to shift to other HMS, as well as other fisheries.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nDue to the large number of yellowfin tuna currently caught that are below\n47 inches CFL, this alternative could cause significant economic losses to the\ncommercial sector. Using weights from the longline fishery in the Atlantic, about\n50 percent of the revenues from yellowfin tuna, and 40 percent of the revenues\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 133","could be lost as a result of this alternative. This alternative could cause shifts in\nfishing activity to areas where there are larger fish, which would result in lower\neconomic losses, but the loss of revenue would most likely still be substantial.\nFor the recreational fishery, this alternative would mean that most of the\nrecreationally caught yellowfin tuna could not be retained, which could seriously\nimpact angler consumer surplus, as well as charterboat revenues and the\ncommunities that support the recreational and for-hire fisheries. The degree of\nimpact on the recreational fishery, while most likely significant, is unknown.\nConclusion\nWhile this alternative is viable, it is rejected at this time due to the increase in\ndiscards that could occur, particularly in view of the low percentage of yellowfin\nand bigeye tuna that the United States lands in the Atlantic compared to other\nnations (and thus the overall impact on F stock-wide). This alternative would also\nhave large adverse economic impacts on both recreational and commercial\nfishermen and communities in the United States. There are no significant safety\nimplications of this alternative.\n3.4.2.1.5 Yellowfin Tuna Recreational Retention Limits\nFinal Action: Establish a recreational retention limit of three yellowfin tuna\nper person per day\nThis retention limit for yellowfin tuna is designed to prevent excessive landings\nin the recreational fishery and maximize fishing opportunities. Yellowfin tuna are\nconsidered fully-exploited, and the latest SCRS report indicates that the current\nfishing mortality rate may be higher than that which would support maximum\nsustainable yield on a continuing basis. NMFS is also required to implement the\nICCAT recommendation to limit effective fishing effort for yellowfin tuna to\n1992 levels. Limits in the commercial fishery include prohibitions on pair trawl and\ndriftnet gear for yellowfin tuna, as well as limited access in the purse seine and\nlongline fisheries. Since NMFS maintains that limiting access to the recreational\nfishery is not a feasible option at this time, the retention limit is an alternate\nmanagement measures that is consistent with the ICCAT recommendation.\nRetention limits might also help to encourage catch and release fishing of this\nspecies which has been designated fully fished. Many comments noted that\nvoluntary retention limits currently exist in Delaware and North Carolina, as well as\nother areas, where charterboats and private anglers do not exceed three yellowfin\ntuna per person per day. There are no significant safety implications of these\nyellowfin tuna retention limit alternatives.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 134","Ecological Impacts\nThis retention limit limits the harvest of yellowfin tuna while still allowing for\nconsumptive use of the species. Data from the 1996 and 1997 Large Pelagic Survey\nindicate that 79 percent of trips targeting large pelagic species, including yellowfin\ntuna, have 3 or more anglers on board. Large Pelagic Survey data also indicate that\nunder present conditions with no retention limit, 94.9 percent of trips that land at\nleast one yellowfin tuna, land nine yellowfin tuna or less. These data indicate that\nthis measure will have a small positive ecological impact, but it will not restrict\nyellowfin tuna landings on most recreational fishing trips. This action could\nincrease discards as anglers may need to release fish if they have already reached\nthe retention limit. Since most fishing trips will not be restricted by this retention\nlimit, however, any increase in discards due to this action will be minimal.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action may discourage fishermen from paying for charter/headboat trips if\nthey see the retention limit as limiting their fishing activity. As indicated above,\nhowever, this retention limit would limit very few anglers or trips on which\nyellowfin tuna are landed. Based on the 1997 average yellowfin tuna weight of\napproximately 33 pounds, a catch limit of three fish per person would amount to\napproximately 99 pounds of yellowfin tuna for each angler per trip.\nChartered vessels typically have four or six anglers on board. Large Pelagic\nSurvey data indicate that under present conditions with no retention limit, 98.4\npercent of trips that land at least one yellowfin tuna, land 12 yellowfin tuna or fewer,\nand 99.9 percent of trips which land at least one yellowfin tuna, land 18 yellowfin\ntuna or fewer. Therefore, this alternative would likely have little impact on charter\noperations or revenues. As also mentioned above, this retention limit would\nencourage catch and release fishing which is increasingly popular for yellowfin tuna\nand other pelagic species caught in the recreational fishery.\nConclusion\nFollowing the 1998 stock assessment, SCRS concluded that the current fishing\nmortality rate for yellowfin is probably greater than that which would support MSY\n(SCRS, 1998). Therefore, it is critical to ensure that effective fishing effort does not\nincrease further. NMFS is concerned about the status of yellowfin tuna and the\nneed to ensure consistency with the ICCAT recommendation to limit the effective\nlevel of fishing effort.\nIn order to reduce and/or prevent excessive recreational catches and maintain\nfishing opportunities, a recreational daily retention limit of three fish per person for\nyellowfin tuna is warranted. This measure is also consistent with the ICCAT\nrecommendation on limiting effective fishing effort for yellowfin tuna. Measures\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 135","taken to implement this recommendation in the commercial fishery for yellowfin\ntuna include the prohibitions on pair trawl and driftnet gear for all Atlantic tunas,\nand limited access in the purse seine and pelagic longline fisheries.\nRejected Option for Yellowfin Tuna Recreational Retention Limit\nRejected Option: No recreational retention limit for yellowfin tuna\nEven though yellowfin tuna are fully-fished, and may be overfished, current data\nsuggest that catch rates per angler are low and it may not be necessary at this time to\nimpose a retention limit. Conversely, catch rates are known to be quite high for\nthose fishermen who are consistently successful at catching yellowfin tuna.\nRecreational (rod and reel) harvest of yellowfin tuna was reported as 46 percent of\nthe total U.S. landings for this species in 1997 (NMFS, 1998b).\nEcological, Social, and Economic Impacts\nFor a description of the fishery for yellowfin tuna, including the economics of the\nfishery under the status quo, see the description of fisheries in Chapter 2 of the FMP.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected. While yellowfin tuna are not yet listed as overfished,\nNMFS maintains that in order to prevent excessive landings of yellowfin tuna in the\nrecreational fishery and maximize fishing opportunities, a recreational retention\nlimit is warranted. This measure is also consistent with the ICCAT\nrecommendation on limiting effective fishing effort for yellowfin tuna.\n3.4.2.1.6 Bigeye Tuna Size Limits\nFinal Action: Status quo minimum size\nThe current minimum size for bigeye tuna is 27 inches CFL for both the\ncommercial and recreational fisheries. This is a higher minimum size than the\n3.2 kg minimum established by ICCAT, but was implemented in 1996 to\ncorrespond to the bluefin tuna minimum size for identification and enforcement\npurposes. Although ICCAT allows a discretionary tolerance of 15 percent, the\nUnited States permits no tolerance for undersized fish. There are no significant\nsafety implications of this alternative.\nEcological Impacts\nMinimum size regulations, in general, are intended to conserve juvenile fish in\nthree ways. First, prohibition on landing prevents development of a commercial\nmarket for small fish, thereby discouraging fishermen from targeting them.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 136","Secondly, some of the small fish that are discarded will survive and mature to\nreproduce and contribute to the stock biomass. Third, a minimum size results in\nfewer fish being retained per mt than would be otherwise. The magnitude of\nnumbers of bigeye tuna discarded is unclear, as is the extent to which regulatory\ndiscards result from the current minimum size.\nEconomic and Social Impacts\nMinimum size limits can influence the size composition of the landings, and will\ninfluence the amount of total fishing mortality in a fishery and the nature of the\nfishery. Under minimum size regulations, fishermen may not retain and/or land fish\nbelow the minimum size, thus more bigeye tuna would be released. There could be\nsome loss of revenue to the commercial fishery associated with the regulatory\ndiscards. There could also be some effect on angler consumer surplus, but the\nextent of potential impacts on the recreational fishery is uncertain.\nConclusion\nThe United States has already implemented a higher minimum size than that\nrequired by ICCAT. The United States has also prohibited all retention of fish less\nthan the minimum size, rather than allowing a 15-percent tolerance. Raising the\nminimum size would not be consistent with the objective to minimize bycatch and\nbycatch mortality. Thus, at this time, NMFS has decided to maintain the current\nminimum size of 27 inches (69 cm) CFL. There are no significant safety\nimplications of this alternative.\nRejected Options for Bigeye Tuna Minimum Size\nRejected Option: Increase minimum size (commercial and recreational) for bigeye\ntuna to 47 inches (119 cm) CFL\nThis alternative would increase the minimum size for bigeye tuna from 27 inches\nCFL to a size which is above their size at first maturity. Bigeye reach sexual\nmaturity at approximately 41 inches (105 cm) CFL. A CFL of 47 inches was\nchosen for this alternative because it corresponds to the large school size class for\nbluefin tuna. There are no significant safety implications of this alternative.\nEcological Impacts\nOverall impacts on the bigeye tuna stocks would be minimal because the United\nStates landed only one percent of bigeye tuna in the Atlantic in 1997. The average\nsize of bigeye tuna landed would increase, but overall landings could decrease.\nLarge Pelagic Survey data from 1996 and 1997, indicate that 27 percent of bigeye\ntuna caught by recreational anglers were below 47 inches CFL.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 137","A review of commercial data from dealer weighout slips for 1997 indicates that,\nin terms of numbers of fish, 61.6 percent, 40.5 percent, and 16.4 percent of the\nbigeye tuna caught with longline in the Atlantic, longline in the Caribbean, and\nlongline in the Gulf of Mexico, respectively, were below 47 inches CFL. By\nweight, the numbers are 40.5 percent, 23.4 percent, and 7.9 percent for bigeye tuna.\nMost landings are made using longline gear in the Atlantic.\nDue to the above numbers for both commercial and recreational landings,\ndiscards of undersized bigeye tuna could increase substantially under this\nalternative. This alternative could also cause recreational and commercial effort\ntargeting bigeye tuna to shift to other HMS, as well as other fisheries.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nDue to the large number of bigeye tuna currently caught that are below 47 inches\nCFL, this alternative could cause significant economic losses to the commercial\nsector. Using weights from the longline fishery in the Atlantic, about 40 percent of\nthe revenues from bigeye tuna could be lost as a result of this alternative. This\nalternative could cause shifts in fishing activity to areas where there are larger fish,\nwhich would result in lower economic losses, but the loss of revenue would most\nlikely still be substantial.\nFor the recreational fishery, this alternative would mean that much of the bigeye\ntuna could not be retained, which could seriously impact angler consumer surplus,\nas well as charter/headboat revenues and the communities that support the\nrecreational and for-hire fisheries. The degree of impact on the recreational fishery,\nwhile most likely significant, is unknown.\nConclusion\nWhile this alternative is viable, it is rejected at this time due to the increase in\ndiscards that could occur, particularly in view of the low percentage of bigeye tuna\nthat U.S. fishermen land in the Atlantic Ocean compared to other nations (and thus\nthe overall impact on F stock-wide). This alternative would also have large adverse\neconomic impacts on both recreational and commercial fishermen and communities\nin the United States.\n3.4.2.2 North Atlantic - Swordfish Rebuilding\n3.4.2.2.1 Swordfish Size Limits\nIn 1996 and again in a 1998 SCRS report, ICCAT scientists concluded that\nsubstantial gains in North Atlantic swordfish yield could accrue if fishing mortality\non small swordfish could be reduced (SCRS, 1996a, 1998a). In 1998, SCRS\nscientists expressed concern about the high catches of small swordfish and the lack\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 138","of and possible inaccuracies of size data from many countries. The only\ninternational conservation measure in place to protect small Atlantic swordfish is a\nminimum size. In 1995, ICCAT recommended an alternative minimum size limit\nof 44 pounds WW (33 pounds dw or 119 cm lower jaw fork length) with no\ntolerance and records of discards Other ICCAT countries (except Canada) have\nimplemented a minimum size of 41 pounds dw, but this minimum size limit\nincludes a 15-percent tolerance per trip of undersized swordfish. NMFS does not\nsupport any minimum size with a tolerance due to the difficulty in enforcing such a\nregulation. This was adopted by the United States and Canada in 1996.\nTo facilitate enforcement of the U.S. minimum size, and to implement the\nalternate minimum size recommendation, NMFS has prohibited the import of\nundersized Atlantic swordfish or swordfish pieces weighing less than 33 pounds dw\nunless documented as being derived from a fish weighing more than 33 pounds dw.\nTo monitor swordfish imports by harvesting country, NMFS requires all U.S.\nswordfish importers to obtain a dealer permit and report all swordfish import\nactivities on a bi-weekly basis. NMFS has also implemented a Certificate of\nEligibility program to validate that all Atlantic swordfish entering the United States\nweigh more than 33 pounds dw, or if the swordfish is processed into pieces, that\nthose pieces were derived from swordfish weighing more than 33 pounds. These\nrequirements aid in enforcing the U.S. minimum size and also facilitate the tracking\nof swordfish imports.\nBecause dead discards of swordfish are not reported by all other fishing nations,\nNMFS cannot evaluate the \"success\" of the minimum size limit in reducing bycatch\nmortality on the entire north Atlantic stock. However, NMFS evaluated the current\nminimum size limit in response to comments from the ICCAT Advisory Committee\nSwordfish Working Group and other members of the public. The evaluation found\nthat despite voluntary efforts by U.S. pelagic longline fishermen and the switch to\nthe lower minimum size, the U.S. fishery has not substantially reduced mortality of\nundersized swordfish (Cramer and Adams, 1998). The minimum size, therefore\nhas the potential to increase \"regulatory\" discards of swordfish weighing less than\n33 pounds dw, although longline dead discards decreased from 1996 to 1997. For\nthose swordfish released alive as well as billfish, pelagic longline fishermen have\nchampioned tagging efforts.\nMortality of undersized swordfish by other U.S. fishermen (e.g., squid trawls) is\ncontrolled only to the extent that an incidental catch limit eliminates the incentive\nfor \"targeting\" swordfish in a non-directed fishery. Currently, swordfish caught in\nsquid trawls are reported to NMFS through the dealer reporting system (landings)\nand through the observer system (landings plus discards). NMFS will continue to\nevaluate catch rates of swordfish of all sizes in all non-directed fisheries in order to\ncontrol fishing mortality of small swordfish. Mortality of small swordfish in the\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 139","international fishery is monitored by landings because many harvesting countries\nland the 15-percent tolerance or more (For more information, consult SCRS, 1998a).\nStatus quo size limit (33 pounds dw, 119 cm LJFL,\nFinal Action:\n29 inches CK)\nFigure 3.4 indicates the measurement of swordfish for compliance with the\n29 inches cleithrum to keel minimum size.\nFigure 3.4 Measurement of swordfish: 29 inches cleithrum to keel.\nCK\nEcological Impacts\nThis action maintains the status quo size limit adopted by the United States in\n1996. This minimum size may encourage fishermen to avoid concentrations of small\nswordfish. In some cases, however, fishermen continue to fish for swordfish in\nknown concentration areas of undersized fish and discard the undersized fish due to\nthe proximity of the fishing grounds to port. This minimum size of 33 pounds dw\n(73 inches CK) is less than the presumed size at maturity for Atlantic swordfish.\nAdditionally, pelagic longline fishing gear is not selective of size classes; 25 percent\n(by number) of swordfish caught were discarded in 1996 (presumed undersized;\nCramer and Adams, 1998). In some areas, 45 percent of swordfish (by number)\nwere discarded, such as in the Florida East Coast area in 1996. Increasing the\nminimum size limit may not decrease catches of small swordfish, but rather could\ndecrease the landings only. Thus, increasing the minimum size limit may not result\nin reduced mortality on immature swordfish. An increase in minimum size could be\neffective, if accompanied by time/area closures or other restrictions that reduce\nmortality on small size classes of swordfish or increase post-release survival.\nPossible useful time/area closures could include known nursery areas. Refer to\nSection 3.5 for a discussion on time/area closures as a means to minimize bycatch.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 140","Social and Economic Impacts\nBecause this fishery operates on a quota management system, and the price per\npound small swordfish is lower than that for larger swordfish, this alternative\nincreased the total ex-vessel value of the swordfish quota relative to years in which\nthere was. This FMP will also count dead discards against the quota, further\nproviding an incentive for fishermen to avoid discarding swordfish and to seek\nareas of larger fish. In 1997, approximately 467.1 mt of swordfish were discarded\ndead (NMFS, 1998b), which translates to a decrease of $3.05 million in ex-vessel\nrevenues foregone. Increasing the minimum size limit may not decrease catches of\nsmall swordfish, but rather could decrease the landings and thus the revenues only.\nTo the extent that swordfish fishermen could successfully avoid swordfish nursery\nareas, economic impacts would be minimal. Because nursery areas appear to be\nrather large, it appears that social impacts could be large if fishermen must re-locate\nin order to avoid concentrations of small swordfish. This alternative has no safety\nat sea implications.\nConclusion\nThe status quo size limit is the final action at this time. If time/area closures are\neffective at removing fishing effort from nursery areas, dead discard rates could be\nlowered substantially, allowing for all swordfish caught in other areas to be\nlanded. In that case, NMFS may reconsider negotiating a change in minimum size\nlimits at ICCAT, to minimize discards of small swordfish in nursery areas but allow\nfor fishermen to retain all swordfish in other areas. NMFS may seek international\ncooperation in reducing mortality on small swordfish via the ICCAT process\nin 1999.\nRejected Size Limit Options\nRejected Option: Increase the minimum size for Atlantic swordfish to size at\nmaturity\nNMFS considered increasing the minimum size for swordfish to the size at\nmaturity based on the sex of the fish caught. Thus, for males the minimum size\nwould be 37 pounds dw and females the minimum size would be 122.6 pounds dw.\nOne reason NMFS rejects this alternative is because swordfish are not easily sexed\nexternally, making it impossible, in most cases, for fishermen to discard undersized\nfish by sex. Occasionally, a fishermen will haul a swordfish on board that releases\nmilt, or sperm, indicating a male swordfish. Likewise, female swordfish are\nsometimes brought on board releasing eggs. However, fish that are not releasing\neggs or sperm cannot be easily sexed alive.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 141","Ecological Impacts\nIncreasing the size limit of swordfish would, in theory, protect small swordfish\nand would result in increased yield from the North Atlantic stock. However, the\npredominant harvesting gear of North Atlantic swordfish is the pelagic longline\nwhich cannot select for fish over a certain size, other than avoiding areas with\nconcentrations of small fish. This regulation would therefore increase bycatch by\nincreasing the discard of small swordfish. NMFS does not expect that a higher\nminimum size for swordfish will increase the yield of this stock catches of small\nswordfish. In conjunction with time/area closures, however, an increased size limit\nmay be an effective conservation measure to discourage fishermen from fishing in\nconcentrated areas of small swordfish. Because it is NMFS' intention that discards\nof swordfish would be counted against the quota by ICCAT, this alternative would\nnot be expected to increase the length of the fishing season in an effort to land the\nswordfish quota, comprised of swordfish above a higher minimum size.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nU.S. pelagic longline fishermen do not appear to be able to select particular size\nclasses of swordfish in current fishing areas. Because discards will be counted\nagainst the quota, this alternative would decrease the total ex-vessel worth of the\nAtlantic swordfish quota and may result in negative social and economic impacts on\nthe fishery. Increasing the minimum size might cause fishermen to travel farther\noffshore to avoid concentrations of small swordfish, thus increasing their trip costs\nand possibly increasing safety risks.\nConclusion\nThis option is rejected because it may increase bycatch mortality. In addition,\nthis option may have negative social and economic impacts. Thus, this alternative\nis inconsistent with NS 8 and NS 9.\nRejected Option: Eliminate the minimum size for Atlantic swordfish\nThis option would eliminate the minimum size for swordfish and would force\nfishermen to retain all swordfish that are hooked. This is currently inconsistent with\nthe ICCAT recommendation. The ICCAT Advisory Committee and other members\nof the public have indicated support for the elimination of a minimum size for\nswordfish due to the relative non-selectivity of pelagic longline gear. Fishermen\nwho make longline sets in nursery areas cannot avoid catching small swordfish, and\nit has been argued that eliminating the minimum size will reduce dead discards.\nMore importantly, this option might force fishermen out of nursery areas since\nsmall swordfish are worth less (gross ex-vessel price) than larger swordfish.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 142","Ecological Impacts\nThere is currently an incentive to avoid undersized fish, however many\nundersized swordfish are still being discarded dead. Eliminating the minimum size\nlimit for swordfish would result in the landing of all swordfish caught by all fishing\ngears. This would reduce bycatch of undersized swordfish because those fish would\nbe marketed. However, market prices for small swordfish are typically very low,\nand fishermen might therefore be influenced to avoid small swordfish. In contrast,\nthis measure might create an incentive for people living and fishing close to nursery\nareas to target swordfish in those areas due to their proximity to shore and thus,\nreduced fishing trip costs. The size composition of the catch may change, and\ninclude smaller swordfish. Increasing the proportion of small swordfish in the\nU.S. catch is detrimental to rebuilding.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative is likely to increase the value of each longline set because more\nswordfish per set would be landed (fewer discarded); the increase would be\nparticularly felt by longline fishermen who typically discard a high proportion of\ntheir catch due to regulations. However, since small swordfish are often worth less\nthan larger swordfish, this alternative may not increase the ex-vessel revenues of\nfishermen. This alternative would allow fishermen who currently fish further\noffshore due to the minimum size restriction to fish inshore or in nursery areas.\nThus, fishing trip costs and transit times would be reduced. This alternative may\nhave positive safety implications because fishermen, in some areas, would likely\nmake fewer sets in a trip because they would be able to retain small fish.\nDecreasing the length of a fishing trip may combat fatigue and maintenance\nproblems which may accumulate during a longer trip.\nConclusion\nRejected. Although this alternative may be consistent with NS 9 by reducing\nbycatch and bycatch mortality, without any complementary measures such as\ntime/area closures, fishermen would have only a market incentive to avoid smaller\nfish. This measure is inconsistent with the ICCAT recommendation.\n3.4.2.2.2 Swordfish Retention Limits\nAs international and domestic management measures for north Atlantic swordfish\nfocus on decreasing the annual TAC to rebuild the stock, fishery managers may be\nable to work with fishery participants to determine optimal parameters within which\nto conduct these \"limited\" fishery operations. In the past, seasonal closures affected\nthe gross ex-vessel prices of swordfish. Closure dates cause market gluts and lower\nprices (as well as storage and handling problems), as fishermen take advantage of the\nlast few fishing days. In response to comments from industry, NMFS established\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 143","effort control measures to lengthen the season and reduce derby fishing conditions,\nand provided for delayed offloading in order to decrease safety risks to fishermen,\nwith the intention of increasing the net economic benefit of the catch. Since then,\nseveral large swordfish vessels have exited the Atlantic swordfish fishery, which has\nreduced the current need for commercial retention limits. In addition, VMS will\nallow for delayed offloading after a directed fishery closure. Therefore, the need for\nfederally managed effort controls in the swordfish fishery may be significantly\nreduced. With the advice of the HMS AP, NMFS can decide whether effort controls\nin this fishery are needed in the future (after the implementation of limited access\npermits). If NMFS identifies effort controls as a management priority for the\nAtlantic swordfish fishery, the framework measures would allow for retention limits,\ndays between landings, and days at sea. However, the administrative costs increase\nwith implementation of every effort control regulation. Thus, NMFS encourages\nfishery participants to work together to voluntarily regulate fishing effort and\nestablish parameters for optimal fishing conditions. This may be easier with the\nimplementation of a limited access program.\nFinal Action: Status quo - no swordfish retention limits in the directed\ncommercial fishery\nEffort control measures which may be considered as retention limits in the\ndirected Atlantic swordfish fishery include retention limits and/or days between\nlandings. In the September 1995 final rule (60 FR 46776), NMFS implemented\nretention limits for the 1996 calendar year. There had been considerable discussion\nregarding options for establishing variable retention limits, including a retention\nlimit based on the individual vessel's catch history, retention limits for distant-water\nVS. coastal-water trips, and retention limits by vessel size. There was also\ndiscussion of allowing vessels to have a minimum amount of time in port between\nlandings. All of these options were deemed to be difficult to quantify, implement\nand/or enforce. In the 1995 final rule, NMFS noted in the response to comments on\neffort controls:\n\"The difficulty in classifying distant-water vs. coastal-water vessels and of\nenforcing different trip limits for them requires the establishment of one trip limit\nthis time The trip limit is based on 90 percent of trips taken in the Grand\nat\nBanks (distant-water) fishery in 1992 and 1993.\"\nOnce the limited access system is in place, there may be expanded options for\nextending the fishing season for Atlantic swordfish. With a smaller, more definable\nuniverse, NMFS may be able to design and implement systems that are efficient for\nboth vessels and for administrative and enforcement purposes. In addition, this\nFMP requires that pelagic longline vessels complete their logbooks within 48 hours\nof haulback, which may facilitate enforcement of minimum time in port (logbooks\nare currently required seven days after offloading). Given that other measures\nadopted in the FMP may present new options for addressing derby fishing\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 144","conditions, NMFS will consider retention limits and other effort controls in future\nrulemaking under the framework provisions of the FMP.\nEcological Impacts\nThe formation of an intense derby fishery might increase incidental catch rates as\nfishermen \"race for the fish\" without heed for increased bycatch rates of immature\nfish or other regulatory or market-driven discards. However, limited access may\nreduce the potential for increased derby situations in the future. NMFS will re-\nevaluate the ecological impacts of the status quo in the future if there appear to be\nthreats to any species as a result of changing fishing patterns.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThe status quo will not have significant social and economic impacts on\ncommercial swordfish fishermen unless a derby fishery forms. However, the derby\nnature of the swordfish fishery has been reduced with the departure of several large\ncapacity vessels from the Atlantic swordfish fishery; limited access should reduce\nthe possibility of a derby fishery even more. In addition, VMS will allow for\ndelayed offloading after a directed fishery closure. This may result in increased ex-\nvessel revenues.\nAt this time, this alternative has not had significant impact on safety at sea\nbecause derby conditions are considered manageable (e.g., no accidents as a result\nof overloading, or a race for the fish). NMFS will continue to monitor the fishery\nand may implement retention limits at such time that the fishery may benefit from\ndecreased catch rates or if safety issues arise (e.g., overloaded vessels).\nConclusion\nNMFS has received comments in the past requesting effort controls in the\nAtlantic swordfish fishery. Since that time, the nature of the fishery has changed\nand the final actions contained in this FMP and implemented by final rule will\nfurther benefit Atlantic swordfish fishermen, with regard to effort control measures.\nNMFS will re-assess the need for effort controls in the future and may implement\nretention limits in the commercial fishery by the framework process.\nFinal Action: Swordfish bycatch limits\nThe intention of bycatch limits is to allow fishermen to land the swordfish they\nencounter in non-directed fishing operations, thereby reducing discards of swordfish\ncaught \"accidentally\" (e.g., by squid trawls or pelagic longline \"tuna\" fishermen).\nThese bycatch limits may also remove any incentive for non-directed fishermen to\nstart targeting swordfish. In the past, these bycatch limits have likely been effective\nas an incentive to keep fishermen using non-directed gears from targeting swordfish\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 145","(e.g., squid trawl fishermen). NMFS establishes retention limits to reduce bycatch\n(and therefore discards) of swordfish by fishermen using gears that are not\nauthorized in the directed swordfish fishery (five swordfish per trip for squid trawl\nvessels), or by directed fishermen during directed fishery closures (15 swordfish per\ntrip for pelagic longline vessels). Refer to Table 3.25 for a summary of these\nbycatch limits. NMFS has also established bycatch limits for fishermen with\nIncidental limited access permits in the swordfish fishery (two swordfish per trip).\nNMFS will evaluate the effectiveness of bycatch limits in minimizing discards of\nswordfish in non-directed fisheries and may alter bycatch limits to effectively\nremove the incentive for fishermen to target swordfish during a closure of the\ndirected fishery. NMFS may adjust these retention limits during the season\ndepending on catch rates and the amount of remaining Directed or Incidental Catch\nquota. For more information on these limits as they apply to limited access permits,\nplease see Chapter 4.\nTable 3.25\nSwordfish bycatch limits.\nSwordfish Bycatch Limit\nGear\nSquid trawl\n5 swordfish per trip\nPelagic Longline: Incidental permit (at all times\n2 swordfish per trip\nuntil incidental catch quota is filled)\nPelagic Longline: Directed Permit during\n15 swordfish per trip\ndirected fishery closure (until incidental catch\nquota is filled)\n2 swordfish per trip\nAll other gears\nEcological Impacts\nThese limits do not have any apparent ecological impact on the Atlantic\nswordfish stock because swordfish are managed under a quota system. Therefore,\nany swordfish landed, regardless of gear type, is counted against the swordfish\nquota and reported to ICCAT. Limiting retention of swordfish by implementing\nbycatch limits allows fishermen to utilize those swordfish they encounter but\ndiscourages a directed fishing effort for swordfish and therefore is not likely to have\nany negative effect on the stock. If these limits do not accommodate the magnitude\nof incidental catch of swordfish and result in increased discards, the impact will be\nmitigated by counting dead discards against the quota (once adopted by ICCAT.)\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThese retention limits allow fishermen who encounter swordfish while fishing\nother species to land those fish. Therefore, this action will increase ex-vessel\nrevenues for vessels using fishing gear that is not authorized for use in the directed\nAtlantic swordfish fishery. This alternative has no effect on safety at sea issues.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 146","Conclusion\nBycatch limits may serve as an incentive for directed fishery participants to avoid\nswordfish to the extent they can while fishing for other species. This is consistent\nwith NS 9.\nFinal Action: Status quo - no swordfish retention limits in the recreational\nfishery except for the existing minimum size\nNMFS implements only a minimum size (29 inches CK) to restrict catches of\nswordfish by the limited recreational fishery. NMFS does not implement retention\nlimits or bycatch limits in this fishery. Should recreational fishing effort increase in\nthe future, NMFS may consider other retention limits to manage this sector of the\nswordfish fishery. Recreational swordfish fishermen are required to report their\ncatches (retained and discarded swordfish) to any NMFS-sponsored dockside or\ntelephone survey soliciting such information.\nEcological Impacts\nNot establishing retention limits on recreational swordfish fishermen will not\nhave an ecological effect on swordfish because recreational and commercial catch is\ncapped overall by a quota. The minimum size, however, will have positive impacts\non the stock as recreational catch rates increase because most swordfish caught in\nthe recreational fishery are released alive.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action will not have any social or economic impacts. Recreational catch\nrates are currently very low and retention limits are not necessary at this time.\nRecreational fishermen are subject to a minimum size of 33 pounds dw or 29 inches\nCK. This alternative has no safety at sea implications.\nConclusion\nRecreational retention limits (other than the minimum size limit) are not needed\nat this time. Should recreational catch rates increase and participation as well,\nretention limits may be useful in the future to slow catch rates and will be included\nas a framework measure.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 147","Rejected Options for Swordfish Retention Limits\nRejected Option: Retention limit in the commercial fishery\nRetention limits have been implemented in the past to control effort in the\nswordfish fishery. Since that time, the character of the swordfish fishery has\nchanged: larger vessels have exited the Atlantic fishery, prices have declined,\nfishery effort has slowed, etc. At this time, retention limits do not appear to be\nneeded and would not contribute to furthering the objectives of this FMP relative\nto swordfish.\nEcological Impacts\nImplementing a retention limit does not directly affect the swordfish stock\nbecause total landings are limited by an ICCAT quota. However, retention limits\nmay reduce the derby nature of the fishery, allowing fishermen to fish more\nselectively. This may result in decreased bycatch and increased survival of\ndiscarded species. Conversely, retention limits could result in increased dead\ndiscards if the last set in a trip places a vessel above the retention limit.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nIn a derby fishery in which large capacity vessels can have an economic\nadvantage over smaller vessels, a retention limit may \"level the playing field\". The\nAtlantic pelagic longline fishery for north Atlantic swordfish, despite decreasing\nquotas, did not reach its landings quota in the Fall of 1998. Lower swordfish prices\nhave reportedly reduced overall directed effort and diminished the likelihood of\nlengthy directed fishery closures. Further, larger vessels that once participated in\nthe fishery have moved to the Hawaii pelagic longline fishery. NMFS, supported\nby members of the HMS AP, does not intend to implement a retention limit in this\nfishery at this time.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected. Effort controls such as days-at-sea, retention limits,\nand days-between-landings may be necessary to extend the season. NMFS may\nconsider these measures under the framework in the future. NMFS has received\ncomments that numbers of fish should be used for a retention limit rather than\npoundage. This might encourage fishermen to target larger fish and might provide\nan equitable system for slowing catch rates in all areas of the pelagic longline\nfishery. NMFS intends to wait for the evaluation of other implemented measure sin\nthis FMP, including limited access, before assessing wether effort controls need to\nbe re-considered in the commercial swordfish fishery.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 148","Rejected Option: Recreational retention limits for swordfish\nEcological Impacts\nAt this time, this retention limit would not likely affect the swordfish stock due\nto current reported low swordfish recreational fishing effort\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis retention limit would not have social or economic impacts on recreational\nfishermen due to current reported low swordfish recreational fishing effort.\nConclusion\nNMFS rejects this alternative as unnecessary at this time. Retention limits are\nincluded in the framework of this FMP (refer to Section 3.10).\n3.4.2.3 Atlantic Sharks\n3.4.2.3.1 Prohibited Species\nIn 1997, NMFS prohibited possession of five species of sharks: sand tiger,\nbigeye sand tiger, whale, basking, and white sharks. These species were identified\nas highly susceptible to overexploitation and the prohibition on possession was a\nprecautionary measure to ensure that directed fisheries did not develop.\nNMFS has received requests to consider separate management measures,\nincluding prohibitions on possession, for dusky and night sharks due to the stock\nstatus of these species. Dusky, night, and sand tiger sharks were petitioned and\nadded to Candidate Species List under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in the fall\nof 1997. However, NMFS had already prohibited possession of sand tigers sharks\nin the commercial and recreational fisheries, and thereby had already afforded those\nspecies the maximum protection possible within its fisheries management\njurisdiction. The alternatives regarding possession of dusky and night sharks are\ndiscussed below.\nNMFS has also received requests to consider a prohibition on possession of\nsawfish, a species of ray, due to its stock status, restricted geographical range, and\nvulnerability to capture in fishing nets. However, under the Magnuson-Stevens Act,\nSecretarial authority is limited to those Atlantic highly migratory species defined as\ntuna species, marlins, oceanic sharks, sailfishes, and swordfish, and to those species\nfor which the appropriate fishery management council fails to act, if the fishery\nrequires conservation and management. As sawfish is not a species of shark, this\nspecies does not fall under Secretarial jurisdiction. NMFS may consider future\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 149","management measures in coordination with those States, Councils, and/or\nCommissions that have the authority to develop such measures.\nFinal Action: Prohibit possession of all sharks except those that are expected\nto be able to sustain fishing mortality; Allow retention\n(consistent with established quotas and retention limits) of\ncertain commonly landed LCS (sandbar, silky, tiger, blacktip,\nspinner, lemon, bull, nurse, smooth hammerhead, scalloped\nhammerhead, great hammerhead), pelagic sharks (blue, shortfin\nmako, common thresher, porbeagle, oceanic whitetip) and SCS\n(Atlantic sharpnose, blacknose, finetooth, bonnethead) within\nFederal waters. Redefine management categories accordingly.\nThis action prohibits the retention of all sharks unless their stock sizes can\nsupport and sustain fishing mortality sufficiently to meet this FMPs objectives.\nRetention is restricted to 11 species of LCS, five species of pelagic sharks, and four\nspecies of SCS within Federal waters, consistent with established commercial\nquotas and recreational retention limits. Possession of all other shark species,\nincluding dusky and night sharks, is prohibited. All sharks not authorized for\nretention must be released in a manner that ensures the maximum probability of\nsurvival. This action does not apply to spiny dogfish (Squalus acanthias) because\nthis species will be managed under the Spiny Dogfish FMP under the jurisdiction of\nthe New England and Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Councils.\nThis action requires recategorizing sharks. The revised shark groupings are\npresented in Table 3.26. NOTE: Consistent with the final action under Section\n3.4.2.3.4, a new group of deepwater/other shark species is established for species\nformerly unregulated (NMFS formerly only collected data on these species). Thus,\nNMFS prohibits finning of sharks, regardless of species. These deepwater/other\nspecies are not subject to the permit and reporting requirements, retention and size\nlimits, or quotas established in this FMP. NMFS may consider additional\nmanagement measures for this group in the future.\nThis action establishes a change from a management policy that prohibits\npossession of certain species known to be vulnerable to overfishing to a manage-\nment policy that only allows possession of certain species known or expected to be\nable to withstand specified levels of fishing mortality. The status of shark stocks\nwill be evaluated annually as part of the SAFE Report. Based on these results,\nNMFS will work in conjunction with the HMS AP to evaluate whether any changes\nto the management categories are warranted. Any changes would be made\nfollowing the framework procedures described under Section 3.10. As the number\nof species that would be authorized for retention is reduced by about 50 percent, this\naction should reduce enforcement burden and costs considerably, especially because\nmany of the species that are removed from the list of species that could previously\nbe retained are difficult to identify.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 150","Table 3.26Sharks in the Management Unit by Species Groups as Established in the FMP.\nLarge Coastal Sharks\nRidgeback Species\nSandbar\nCarcharhinus plumbeus\nSilky\nCarcharhinus falciformis\nTiger\nGaleocerdo cuvieri\nNon-Ridgeback Species\nBlacktip\nCarcharhinus limbatus\nBull\nCarcharhinus leucas\nLemon\nNegaprion brevirostris\nNurse\nGinglymostoma cirratum\nSpinner\nCarcharhinus brevipinna\nGreat hammerhead\nSphyrna mokarran\nScalloped hammerhead\nSphyrna lewini\nSmooth hammerhead\nSphyrna zygaena\nSmall Coastal Sharks\nAtlantic sharpnose\nRhizoprionodon terraenovae\nBlacknose\nCarcharhinus isodon\nBonnethead\nSphyrna tiburo\nFinetooth\nCarcharhinus acronotus\nPelagic Sharks\nBlue\nPrionace glauca\nOceanic whitetip\nCarcharhinus longimanus\nPorbeagle\nLamna nasus\nShortfin mako\nIsurus oxyrinchus\nThresher\nAlopias vulpinus\nProhibited Species\nAtlantic angel\nSquatina dumerili\nBasking\nCetorhinus maximus\nBigeye thresher\nAlopias superciliousus\nBignose\nCarcharhinus altimus\nCaribbean reef\nCarcharhinus perezi\nCaribbean sharpnose\nRhizoprionodon porosus\nDusky\nCarcharhinus obscurus\nGalapagos\nCarcharhinus galapagensis\nLongfin mako\nIsurus paucus\nNarrowtooth\nCarcharhinus brachyurus\nNight\nCarcharhinus signatus\nSand tiger\nOdontaspis taurus\nBigeye sand tiger\nOdontaspis noronhai\nSevengill\nHeptranchias perlo\nSixgill\nHexanchus griseus\nBigeye sixgill\nHexanchus vitulus\nSmalltail\nCarcharhinus porosus\nWhale\nRhincodon typus\nWhite\nCarcharodon carcharias\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 151","Table 3.26 (continued)\nDeepwater and Other Sharks\nIceland cat shark\nApristurus laurussoni\nSmallfin cat shark\nApristurus parvipinnis\nApristurus profundorum\nDeepwater cat shark\nBroadgill cat shark\nApristurus riveri\nMarbled cat shark\nGaleus arae\nScyliorhinus meadi\nBlotched cat shark\nChain dogfish\nScyliorhinus retifer\nDwarf catshark\nScyliorhinus torrei\nJapanese gulper shark\nCentrophorus acuus\nGulper shark\nCentrophorus granulosus\nLittle gulper shark\nCentrophorus uyato\nKitefin shark\nDalatias licha\nFlatnose gulper shark\nDeania profundorum\nPortuguese shark\nCetroscymnus coelolepis\nGreenland shark\nSomniosus microcephalus\nEtmopterus bullisi\nLined lanternshark\nBroadband dogfish\nEtmopterus gracilispinnis\nEtmopterus hillianus\nCaribbean lanternshark\nGreat lanternshark\nEtmopterus princeps\nSmooth lanternshark\nEtmopterus pusillus\nFringefin lanternshark\nEtmopterus schultzi\nGreen lanternshark\nEtmopterus virens\nCookiecutter shark\nIsistius brasiliensis\nBigtooth cookiecutter\nIsistius plutodus\nSmallmouth velvet dogfish\nScymnodon obscurus\nPygmy shark\nSqualiolus laticaudus\nRoughskin spiny dogfish\nSqualus asper\nBlainville's dogfish\nSqualus blainvillei\nCuban dogfish\nSqualus cubensis\nEchinorhinus brucus\nBramble shark\nPristiophorus schroederi\nAmerican sawshark\nFlorida smoothhound\nMustelus norrisi\nSmooth dogfish\nMustelus canis\nEcological Impacts\nThis action will likely have a combination of the ecological impacts discussed\nunder the status quo and the prohibitions on dusky and night sharks under current\nmanagement policy, and will allow for faster rebuilding or stock maintenance for\nuncommon and seriously depleted species if bycatch mortality is not too large.\nDusky shark catch rate data indicate large population declines since the early 1970s\nand observer data indicate that dusky sharks have a low post-release survival rate in\ncommercial bottom longline shark fisheries (only about 27 percent come to the\nvessel alive, see Table 9, Branstetter and Burgess, 1998a). In recreational fisheries,\nsharks are generally considered to have high post-release survival rates, indicating\nthat prohibition of dusky sharks in recreational fisheries may contribute\nsubstantially to rebuilding. Limited evidence indicates that catches of night sharks\nhave declined considerably in recent years and that this species has an extremely\nlow ability to withstand even bycatch mortality (see Castro and Woodley, 1997).\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 152","To the extent that this action reduces the potential for fisheries or markets to\ndevelop on less-frequently landed species, this action will have positive ecological\nimpacts. This action restricts possession in all commercial and recreational\nfisheries within Federal waters to those species known or expected to be able to\nwithstand specified levels of fishing mortality.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nProhibiting possession of dusky sharks will likely have adverse social impacts in\nboth commercial and recreational fisheries because dusky sharks are preferentially\nretained relative to capture in the commercial directed shark fisheries and are\ntargeted as a large game fish in recreational fisheries. The prohibition on\npossession of night sharks will likely have minimal social impacts because night\nsharks represent only a minor portion of the commercial and recreational catch. For\nthe other LCS, pelagic sharks, and SCS, this action will likely have negligible social\nimpacts because uncommon species are prohibited.\nAs with the ecological impacts, this action will likely have a combination of the\neconomic impacts discussed under status quo and the prohibitions on dusky and\nnight sharks. This action may reduce revenues of commercial fishermen because\nthe dusky shark comprised approximately five and two percent of LCS commercial\nlandings by weight in 1996 and 1997, respectively. This action will likely have\nminimal economic impacts because night sharks represent less than one percent of\ntotal LCS landings for both the commercial and recreational fisheries (see Chapter\n2). For the other LCS, pelagic sharks and SCS, this action will likely have\nnegligible economic impacts because only the uncommon species, which constitute\na minor portion of the landings, are prohibited.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it helps prevent development of directed fisheries\nor markets for uncommon or seriously depleted species. This action is selected for\ndusky and night sharks due to catch rate data that indicate large population declines\nsince the early 1970s, and will allow for faster rebuilding for this species, thereby\nenhancing LCS rebuilding, if bycatch mortality is not too large.\nRejected Options for Prohibited Species\nRejected Option: Status quo (prohibition on possession of whale, basking, sand\ntiger, bigeye sand tiger, and white sharks within Federal waters;\ncatch-and-release only fishing for white sharks)\nThis alternative would maintain the current prohibition on possession of whale,\nbasking, sand tiger, bigeye sand tiger, and white sharks within Federal waters. This\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 153","alternative would also maintain the current allowance for catch-and-release only\nfishing for white sharks.\nEcological Impacts\nThe 1998 SEW did not conduct species-specific stock assessments on these\nspecies due to lack of sufficient data, therefore it cannot be determined whether\ncurrent fishing mortality rates (as a result of bycatch mortality) are sustainable.\nHowever, this alternative would maintain the maximum protection for whale,\nbasking, sand tiger, bigeye sand tiger, and white sharks within Federal waters, short\nof implementing regulations to reduce bycatch and bycatch mortality rates in other\nfisheries that encounter these species.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would not be expected to have additional social or economic\nimpacts because fishermen are already operating under these restrictions.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it could allow directed fisheries or markets to\ndevelop for other uncommon or seriously depleted species. Limiting prohibitions\non possession to these species may result in unsustainable increases in fishing\nmortality on other vulnerable species or those not yet exploited. Also, there are\necological benefits to prohibiting retention of dusky and night sharks, namely\nenhancing LCS rebuilding, which are addressed in the final action.\nRejected Option: Maintain management policy to prohibiting possession of\nselected species of sharks; add dusky and night sharks only to\nthe prohibited species group\nThis alternative would maintain the current management policy that prohibits\npossession of certain species known to be vulnerable to overfishing and would add\ndusky and night sharks only to the prohibited species group. This alternative\nwould also maintain the current allowance for catch-and-release only fishing for\nwhite sharks.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would allow retention of several species not commonly landed\nand would prohibit possession of dusky and night sharks only. Catch rate data\nindicate large population declines of dusky and night sharks since the early 1970s\nand this alternative would allow for faster rebuilding for these species if bycatch\nmortality is not too large (NMFS 1996, Castro and Woodley 1997, NMFS 1998a).\nObserver data indicate that dusky sharks have a low post-release survival rate in\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 154","commercial bottom longline shark fisheries (only about 27 percent come to the\nvessel alive, see Table 9, Branstetter and Burgess, 1998a). In recreational\nfisheries, sharks are generally considered to have high post-release survival rates,\nindicating that prohibition of dusky and night sharks in recreational fisheries may\ncontribute substantially to rebuilding. In 1996 and 1997, approximately 14,000\ndusky sharks per year were landed in recreational fisheries (see Chapter 2).\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nProhibiting possession of dusky sharks would likely have adverse social\nimpacts in both commercial and recreational fisheries because dusky sharks are\npreferentially retained relative to their capture rate in the commercial directed shark\nfisheries and are targeted as a large game fish in recreational fisheries. Prohibiting\npossession of night sharks would likely have minimal social impacts because this\nspecies represents only a minor portion of commercial and recreational landings.\nThis alternative may result in changes in fishing practices in fisheries other than\nshark fisheries in order to reduce dusky shark bycatch. In the long term, this\nalternative would likely enhance rebuilding of LCS, and contribute to a quicker\nreturn to an economically-viable shark fishery.\nThis alternative may reduce revenues of commercial fishermen because the\ndusky shark is a relatively important species in the commercial fishery and is often\nconfused with the sandbar shark. Dusky sharks comprised approximately five and\ntwo percent of LCS commercial landings in 1996 and 1997, respectively.\nProhibiting possession of night sharks would likely have minimal economic impacts\nbecause night sharks represent only minor portions of commercial or recreational\ncatches. Approximately 6,500 pounds dw and 57 pounds dw of night sharks were\nlanded in the commercial fishery in 1996 and 1997, respectively; in the recreational\nfishery, about 380 and 90 night sharks were harvested in 1996 and 1997,\nrespectively (see Chapter 2). These landings constitute less than one percent of\ntotal LCS landings for both the commercial and recreational fisheries. Accordingly,\nthis alternative is unlikely to result in changes in fishing practices in order to reduce\nnight shark bycatch. This alternative may also increase costs for commercial\nfishermen by pushing them out of waters where dusky and/or night sharks are\nabundant and by increasing the time required to sort through the sharks during gear\nhaulbacks. This alternative would increase enforcement costs by prohibiting\nretention of a species that is relatively common in commercial and recreational\nHMS fisheries.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because of the greater ecological benefits expected\nunder the final action for other uncommon or seriously depleted species, including\ndusky and night sharks.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 155","Rejected Option: Prohibit possession of all Atlantic sharks (including all LCS,\npelagic, and SCS) within Federal waters\nThis alternative would prohibit possession of all Atlantic sharks subject to\nFederal management (inclusive of all 72 species of LCS, pelagic sharks, SCS,\nprohibited species, and deepwater/other species; see Table 1.1) in all commercial\nand recreational fisheries in Federal waters. Therefore, all Atlantic sharks subject to\nFederal management would have to be released in a manner that ensures the\nmaximum probability of survival.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would be equivalent to the rejected options to close the\nLCS commercial fishery (see Section 3.4.1.3.1) and establish catch and release\nonly recreational fishing for all sharks (see Section 3.4.2.3.2), with the additional\neffect of closing the pelagic and SCS commercial fisheries as well. This alternative\nwould result in the fastest rebuilding to maximum sustainable yield levels for LCS\nand would contribute to the maximum extent to the maintenance of pelagic and\nSCS stocks.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would have immediate and severe social and economic impacts\nin all shark fisheries as the LCS directed bottom longline and SCS drift gillnet\nfisheries would likely be eliminated. While the pelagic longline fisheries, the\nsnapper-grouper fisheries, and the reef fish fisheries would likely continue to\noperate, the reduction in gross revenues may be substantial. It would also severely\nrestrict the directed fishing activities of some pelagic longline vessels during times\nor in areas of high shark bycatch. To the extent that pelagic longline fishermen\nwould be able to continue to fish but would have to discard all incidentally caught\nsharks, this alternative may be perceived as \"unfair\" by pelagic and SCS fishermen\nthat may believe that overfishing in the LCS fisheries is precluding their fisheries\nfrom continuing.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because some species of sharks are not overfished and\nbecause some that are can support some level of fishing mortality during rebuilding.\nThe social and economic benefits provided by landed sharks can thus be realized\nwithout further reducing shark stocks.\nRejected Option: Prohibit possession of all LCS; allow retention of commonly\nlanded pelagic sharks (blue, shortfin mako, common thresher,\nporbeagle, oceanic whitetip) and SCS (Atlantic sharpnose,\nblacknose, finetooth, bonnethead) within Federal waters\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 156","This alternative would prohibit possession of all LCS subject to Federal\nmanagement (inclusive of all ridgeback and non-ridgeback LCS, see Table 1.1) in\nall commercial and recreational fisheries within Federal waters, but would allow\npossession of five species of pelagic sharks and four species of SCS. Therefore, all\nLCS subject to Federal management would have to be released in a manner that\nensures the maximum probability of survival.\nThis alternative would change the management policy from a prohibition on\npossession of certain species known to be vulnerable to overfishing to a\nmanagement policy that only allows possession of certain species known or\nexpected to be able to withstand specified levels of fishing mortality. As the\nnumber of species that can be retained would be reduced by an additional 25 species\nsuch that nine easily identified species would be authorized for retention, this\nalternative should reduce enforcement burden and costs considerably.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would be equivalent to closing the LCS commercial fishery (see\nSection 3.4.1.3.1) and establishing catch and release only recreational fishing for all\nsharks (see Section 3.4.2.3.2), with the additional effect of removing uncommon or\nseriously depleted species from the pelagic and SCS commercial and recreational\nfisheries. This alternative would result in the fastest rebuilding to maximum\nsustainable yield levels for LCS. This alternative would contribute to a limited\nextent to the maintenance of pelagic and SCS stocks at optimum yield levels;\nhowever, as data are limited regarding the ability of these species to sustain fishing\nmortality, the removal of uncommon species may still result in stock declines.\nFurther stock assessments would be necessary to evaluate current fishing mortality\nrates relative to maximum sustainable yield and optimum yield levels.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would have immediate and severe social and economic impacts\nin LCS shark fisheries because the directed bottom longline fishery would be\neliminated. This alternative would likely have negligible social and economic\nimpacts for the pelagic shark and SCS fisheries because only the uncommon\nspecies, which constitute a minor portion of the landings, would be eliminated.\nHowever, the loss of income from LCS shark revenues could substantially reduce\nrevenues in the pelagic longline fisheries, the snapper-grouper fisheries, and the reef\nfish fisheries that encounter and land LCS incidental to other fishing operations.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because the final action to prohibit certain species of\nLCS (as well as the final actions to establish ridgeback and non-ridgeback LCS with\na minimum size on ridgeback LCS, reduce the non-ridgeback LCS quota, and count\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 157","dead discards and state landings after Federal closures against Federal quotas)\nindicate that some species of LCS can support limited levels of fishing mortality\nduring rebuilding. The social and economic benefits provided by landed LCS can\nthus be realized without further reducing LCS stocks or impeding rebuilding.\nRejected Option: Prohibit commercial fishing for, and possession of, all Atlantic\nsharks within Federal waters\nThis alternative would prohibit directed fishing for, and possession of, all\nAtlantic sharks subject to Federal management (inclusive of all 72 species of LCS,\npelagic sharks, SCS, prohibited species, and deepwater/other species; see Table 1.1)\nin all commercial fisheries within Federal waters. Therefore, all Atlantic sharks\nsubject to Federal management caught in commercial fishing operations would have\nto be released in a manner that ensures the maximum probability of survival. This\nalternative would be equivalent to the alternative to close the LCS commercial\nfishery (see Section 3.4.1.3.1), with the additional effect of closing the pelagic and\nSCS commercial fisheries as well. This alternative would not impact recreational\nshark fisheries.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would greatly enhance rebuilding to maximum sustainable yield\nlevels for LCS because the commercial LCS fishery constitutes 60 to 75 percent of\ntotal LCS landings by weight and 40 to 50 percent of total LCS landings by number\nin recent years. While bycatch and bycatch mortality would still occur (and may\nincrease if fishing effort in other commercial fisheries increases as a result of\nclosing the commercial LCS fishery), this alternative would still eliminate a large\nportion of current LCS mortality and would enhance rebuilding to maximum\nsustainable yield levels. For pelagic sharks and SCS, this alternative would\ncontribute substantially to the maintenance of these stocks at optimum yield levels.\nThis alternative would result in all Atlantic sharks caught in commercial fishing\noperations becoming regulatory discards.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would have immediate and severe social and economic impacts\nin all commercial shark fisheries as the LCS directed bottom longline and SCS drift\ngillnet fisheries would be eliminated. The reduction in gross revenues may be\nsubstantial for fisheries that target other species in addition to sharks. To the extent\nthat pelagic longline fishermen would be able to continue to fish but would have to\ndiscard incidentally caught sharks, this alternative may be perceived as \"unfair\" by\npelagic and SCS fishermen who may believe that overfishing in the LCS fisheries\nis precluding their fisheries from continuing. This alternative may be also\nperceived as \"unfair\" by commercial fishing interests if the recreational fishery is\nallowed to continue.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 158","Conclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because some species of sharks are not overfished and\nbecause some that are can support some level of commercial fishing mortality\nduring rebuilding. The social and economic benefits provided by commercially\nlanded sharks can thus be realized without further reducing shark stocks.\nRejected Option: Prohibit recreational fishing for, and possession of, all Atlantic\nsharks within Federal waters\nThis alternative would prohibit possession of all Atlantic sharks subject to\nFederal management (inclusive of all 72 species of LCS, pelagic sharks, SCS,\nprohibited species, and deepwater/other species; see Table 1.1) in all recreational\nfisheries within Federal waters. Therefore, all Atlantic sharks subject to Federal\nmanagement caught in recreational fishing operations would have to be released in\na manner that ensures the maximum probability of survival. This alternative would\nbe equivalent to the alternative to establish catch and release only fishing for all\nsharks (see Section 3.4.2.3.2). This alternative would not impact commercial\nshark fisheries.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would greatly enhance rebuilding to maximum sustainable yield\nlevels for LCS because the recreational LCS fishery constitutes 25 to 40 percent of\ntotal LCS landings by weight and 50 to 60 percent of total LCS landings by number\nin recent years. While bycatch and bycatch mortality would still occur, sharks are\nbelieved to have relatively high post-release survival rates in recreational fisheries\nsuch that this alternative would eliminate a large portion of current LCS mortality\nand greatly enhance rebuilding to maximum sustainable yield levels. For pelagic\nsharks and SCS, this alternative would also enhance stock status and maintenance at\noptimum yield levels.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would have social impacts by eliminating recreational landings\nof all sharks. This alternative would eliminate the opportunities for trophy and\ntournament anglers to bring in their catches and may reduce an angler consumer\nsurplus if no sharks can be retained. This alternative is perceived as \"unfair\" to\nrecreational fishing interests if commercial fisheries are allowed to continue. It is\nimportant to note that this alternative would not prevent anglers from fishing and\ngaining the benefits of the fishing experience but it would prevent anglers from\nretaining any of their shark catch. The adverse social impacts of this alternative\nmay be reduced to the extent that there is a growing public opinion that catch-and-\nrelease fishing is the preferable recreational fishery for sharks.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 159","The impact of this alternative depends on the willingness for shark anglers to\nsubstitute other fish for released sharks. Therefore, this alternative will have\ngreater, but slightly higher, impacts as those discussed under recreational minimum\nsize impacts (see Section 3.4.2.3.2). This is especially true as tournaments would\nbe unable to land any trophy fish. Fisher and Ditton (1992) found that 27 percent of\nthe anglers surveyed fish in order to obtain fish for eating and 18 percent fish in\norder to obtain a trophy. Given the evidence that shark anglers do not necessarily\nfish in order to obtain a trophy or for consumption, reductions in angler consumer\nsurplus or the willingness to pay significantly may be mitigated for private vessels.\nHowever, it is possible that the angler consumer surplus may be reduced at the\ntournament level.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because some species of sharks are not overfished and\nbecause some that are can support some level of recreational fishing mortality\nduring rebuilding. The social and economic benefits provided by recreationally\nharvested sharks can thus be realized without further reducing shark stocks.\n3.4.2.3.2 Shark Recreational Retention and Size Limits\nIn 1997, the retention limits for Atlantic sharks in recreational fisheries were\nreduced by 50 percent as a proxy to reducing effective fishing mortality equally\nacross user groups. However, data from 1997 indicate that recreational harvests of\nLCS were reduced by only 12 percent (in numbers of fish), and for sandbar sharks\nand blacktip sharks, recreational harvests actually increased by 64 and two percent,\nrespectively (Tables 3.15 and 3.18). Analyses presented at the 1998 SEW indicate\nthat the retention limit reduction was not effective at reducing fishing mortality by\nthe intended 50 percent primarily because most fishing trips were already harvesting\nonly one to two sharks per trip (Babcock and Pikitch, 1998). The recreational\nfisheries, which often target other species and encounter sharks incidentally, are\nlikely to be able to reduce fishing effort on sharks by not retaining those sharks\ncaught incidentally. Post-release mortality of sharks caught on rod and reel is\ngenerally believed to be low such that restricting recreational fisheries to lower\nretention limits or to catch and release only fishing would afford those fishermen\nwith the opportunity to fish while still achieving a reduction in effective fishing\nmortality.\nIn analyzing rebuilding alternatives for LCS for the commercial fishery, NMFS\nmore fully developed the original alternatives based on establishing ridgeback and\nnon-ridgeback LCS subgroups in light of the magnitude of harvest reductions that\nwould be required if LCS continued to be managed as a single group. As described\nin Chapter 2, analyses of sandbar and blacktip sharks alone indicate that the\nmagnitude of landings reductions needed to rebuild sandbar-based and blacktip-\nbased complexes are not as severe. These analyses indicate that recreational\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 160","harvests of sandbar and blacktip sharks would need to be reduced by 82 and 81\npercent in number of fish, respectively, relative to 1997 harvest levels (Tables 3.15\nand 3.18).\nFinal Action: One shark per vessel per trip with a 4.5 foot minimum size and\none Atlantic sharpnose shark per person per trip (no\nminimum size)\nThis action reduces the recreational retention limit to one shark per vessel per trip,\nestablishes a minimum size of 4.5 feet FL (equivalent to 137 cm FL) for all sharks,\nand establishes an allowance for one Atlantic sharpnose shark per person per trip\nwith no minimum size restriction. It will essentially create catch and release only\nfishing for all sharks less than 4.5 feet FL, other than Atlantic sharpnose sharks.\nEcological Impacts\nThis action will reduce the harvest of sandbar and blacktip sharks (and, therefore,\nLCS) by the necessary 82 and 81 percent in numbers of fish, respectively, relative to\n1997 harvest levels (Tables 3.15 and 3.18). Analyses of the recreational fishery\npresented at the 1998 SEW (Babcock and Pikitch, 1998) indicate that a reduction in\nthe recreational retention limit alone would have only a minor reduction in LCS\nharvest levels relative to 1997 harvest levels because most recreational LCS fishing\ntrips currently harvest less than one LCS per trip. However, a reduction in the\nrecreational retention limit in combination with the selected minimum size will\nreduce the harvest of sandbar and blacktip sharks by the necessary levels, and thus\nwill meet NS 1 to rebuild overfished fisheries for LCS. This action may exceed the\nNS 1 requirement to prevent overfishing for the fully fished pelagic sharks and SCS.\nThis action establishes the same minimum size for the recreational fishery that is\nimplemented in the commercial ridgeback LCS fishery, with the exception that the\nminimum size for the recreational fishery applies to all sharks and not a subgroup\n(with an exception for Atlantic sharpnose sharks). The rationale for this action is\nthat post-release mortality of sharks caught in recreational fisheries is believed to be\nrelatively low. As no quantitative estimates for post-release mortality of sharks\ncaught in recreational fisheries (in general or for individual species) are currently\navailable, only qualitative impacts can be discussed at this time. This is in contrast\nwith the relatively high mortality rate of many sharks in commercial fisheries,\nparticularly the non-ridgeback LCS as evidenced by observer data (see discussion\nunder commercial quota alternatives). In commercial fisheries, implementing a\nminimum size for species that come to the vessel dead will only increase regulatory\ndiscards and may actually increase effective fishing mortality. However, for\nrecreational shark fisheries that are believed to have low post-release mortality, a\nminimum size of 4.5 feet for all sharks will greatly reduce the effective fishing\nmortality on the most sensitive stages/sizes by essentially implementing catch-and-\nrelease fishing on juvenile and subadult sharks. This alternative will shift\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 161","recreational fishing mortality primarily onto larger, less sensitive adults (some post-\nrelease mortality undersized fish would still occur), while still allowing for the\nrecreational fishing experience and limited harvest of some sharks.\nAccording to MRFSS data, approximately 95 percent of LCS harvested in 1997\nwere below the selected minimum size (Figure 3.5). Therefore, this action should\nreduce the number of LCS harvested by more than the 82 and 81 percent necessary\nunder the selected LCS rebuilding program. This action will also limit the quantity\nof sharks that can be harvested on a given trip to one and SO will meet the reductions\nneeded for rebuilding where a minimum size alone would not. Because significant\nrecreational fisheries for sharks exist in nearshore waters and coastal bays and\nestuaries (many of which have been identified as pupping and nursery EFH for\njuvenile and subadult stages/sizes), one potential drawback with a minimum size in\nnearshore waters may result if increased fishing effort is directed towards pregnant\nfemales as they enter the pupping grounds in coastal bays and estuaries. NMFS will\nmonitor the impacts of this action and may consider additional management\nmeasures, such as male only harvest, as warranted to address such circumstances.\nThis action, though primarily intended as a LCS rebuilding measure, will also\naffect pelagic and SCS fisheries. In fact, some SCS like Atlantic sharpnose and\nbonnethead sharks do not reach 4.5 feet (137 cm FL) at full maturity (both Atlantic\nsharpnose and bonnethead sharks reach maximums of about 110 cm TL. Blacknose\nsharks reach a maximum of 164 cm TL, which approximates 137 cm FL, such that\nonly the largest blacknose sharks may reach this minimum size. Thus, recreational\nfishing for SCS would be essentially catch-and-release fishing only under this\naction except for Atlantic sharpnose sharks. However, SCS are often caught\nincidentally to other recreational fishing operations such that this action is unlikely\nto affect the primary targets of those operations.\nOn the other hand, substantial recreational fisheries target pelagic sharks,\nespecially shortfin mako, thresher, and blue sharks, and reducing the recreational\nretention limit may contribute to the stock status of these species. Implementing a\n4.5 feet FL minimum size will have relatively minor ecological impacts on pelagic\nsharks because most of the pelagic sharks currently retained exceed 4.5 feet FL.\nThis minimum size is smaller than the length equivalent of the 100-pound minimum\nsize (approximately 162 cm FL) for mako sharks that was considered in the 1993\nAtlantic shark FMP and was suggested in scoping meetings for the development of\nthis FMP. However, to the extent that this alternative supports voluntary\nrestrictions on harvest of juvenile and subadult sharks, faster rebuilding may result.\nReducing the allowance of Atlantic sharpnose sharks per person from two to one\nwill likely have moderate ecological impacts as most anglers currently harvest less\nthan two Atlantic sharpnose sharks per trip. This action for Atlantic sharpnose\nsharks is a preventative measure to increase the probability that any shifts in\nrecreational fishing effort and harvest away from the overfished LCS to Atlantic\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 162","sharpnose sharks are sustainable. However, pending additional scientific\nevaluation, it cannot be determined if current or reduced fishing mortality rates on\nAtlantic sharpnose sharks are sustainable. On the other hand, catch rates of Atlantic\nsharpnose sharks do not appear to be showing any signs of decline.\nThis action could result in continued misidentification of juvenile LCS and other\nshark species as Atlantic sharpnose sharks. In 1997, NMFS established an\nallowance for two Atlantic sharpnose sharks per person in addition to a per vessel\nretention limit in part because Atlantic sharpnose sharks were thought to be readily\nidentifiable from other species due to the presence of white spots on the back.\nHowever, members of the public have raised concerns that species-specific\nidentification continues to be a significant problem and that juvenile LCS are\nfrequently misidentified, sometimes as Atlantic sharpnose sharks. NMFS believes\nthat, with additional education and outreach, problems with misidentification of\nAtlantic sharpnose sharks can be adequately addressed.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action may have substantial social impacts for nearshore anglers by\nessentially establishing a catch-and-release only fishery for sharks in nearshore\nwaters. While this action would apply to fishing within and fish from Federal waters,\nit may differentially impact anglers who are unable to expand their fishing into deeper\nwaters where larger fish predominate. To the extent that anglers want to retain their\ncatch, those anglers who cannot expand to offshore fishing would experience large\nreductions in their harvest levels. This action will likely have minor social impacts\nfor offshore anglers because most of these anglers are already operating within these\nrestrictions. However, reducing the recreational retention limit to one shark per\nvessel per trip will likely have substantial adverse impacts on directed pelagic\nfisheries as angler's willingness to pay may decline due to the reduced retention limit.\nAs those anglers who are unwilling to accept a substitute for shark fishing will still be\nable to land one shark, any reduction in those angler consumer surplus may also be\nmitigated. Additionally, the increasing conservation ethic among anglers towards\ncatch-and-release fishing may mitigate any adverse social impacts of this action. This\naction may have safety concerns for recreational fishermen who will have to\ndetermine the length of sharks relative to the minimum size.\nThis action may have variable economic impacts depending on the willingness of\nanglers to release sharks caught and substitute other fish for sharks. This action will\nrequire anglers to release most of the sharks currently caught. Fisher and Ditton\n(1992) note that most anglers release the fish they catch (over 70 percent of the\nanglers surveyed said they would be just as happy releasing the fish they caught)\nand that anglers spent an average of $197 per trip and were willing to spend on\naverage an additional $105 rather than stop fishing for sharks. Fisher and Ditton\n(1992) also found that 32 percent of shark anglers said that no other species would\nbe an acceptable substitute for sharks. Analyses presented to the 1998 SEW\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 163","(Babcock and Pikitch, 1998) indicate that most sharks caught are released and that\n63 percent of all shark recreational trips would be unaffected by a reduction in the\nretention limit to one shark per trip. Based on MRFSS data for 886 trips surveyed\nfrom 1994 through 1996 that caught a shark, Babcock and Pikitch (1998) estimated\na minimum of $174,542 as the annual total spent by anglers who caught sharks\n(there may have been additional trips which targeted sharks but did not catch one),\n$93,030 as the annual angler consumer surplus, with a minimum of $267,572 per\nyear as the total gross value.\nWhile it is possible that some anglers may not pay to only catch and release or\ntag and release sharks, it is also possible that anglers may pay additional money for\nthe challenge of catching a large, adult shark as opposed to the small, juvenile\nsharks currently caught. This is especially true in the long term as the stock\nrebuilds and large sharks become more abundant. Over 60 percent of those\nsurveyed said they would rather catch one or two big fish than ten smaller fish.\nAlso, 76 percent of those surveyed said that they fish in the saltwater for the\nchallenge (Fisher and Ditton, 1992). Fisher and Ditton (1992) state that \"shark\nanglers are intimately involved in fishing for big fish, and for many it is probably a\ncentral life interest.\" Given this evidence, NMFS does not believe a minimum size\nor a reduction in the retention limit would affect angler consumer surplus\nsignificantly in LCS or SCS recreational fisheries. However, since there are pelagic\nshark tournaments and directed pelagic shark charterboat operations, this action\nmay reduce angler consumer surplus in those fisheries, especially for tournaments\nthat tally the number of fish caught. In the short term, this action will allow for the\ncontinuation of current revenues to charterboat owners and captains and others who\nrely on the recreational shark fishery. In the long term, as shark stocks rebuild,\ncurrent revenue would increase as less time would be required to catch sharks and\nthe abundance of larger sharks increases.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it will meet NS 1 to prevent overfishing and\nrebuild overfished fisheries for LCS and prevent overfishing for the fully fished\npelagic and SCS. Additionally, this action is selected because it implements the\nsame minimum size for recreational and commercial shark fisheries and allows\nlimited recreational harvest of sharks, consistent with the selected rebuilding\nprogram and NS 1, 4, and 8. Since anglers would still have the possibility of\nretention of a large fish, this action may mitigate social impacts relative to the\nrejected option to establish catch and release only fishing for all sharks.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 164","Chapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 165","","Rejected Options for Shark Recreational Retention and Size Limits\nRejected Option: Status quo (two sharks per vessel per trip plus an allowance for\ntwo Atlantic sharpnose sharks per person per trip)\nThis alternative would maintain the current recreational retention limits of two\nsharks per vessel per trip, inclusive of LCS, pelagic sharks, and SCS. It would also\nmaintain the allowance for two Atlantic sharpnose sharks per person per trip to\naccommodate charter and headboat operations.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would result in continued LCS stock declines due to excessive\nharvest levels relative to the rebuilding program selected (see Table 3.11). This\nalternative would result in a continuing decline in LCS to one percent and seven\npercent of carrying capacity within ten years under the baseline and alternative\ncatch series scenarios, respectively. There is a 98 to 100 percent probability that\nLCS stocks would decline to below 20 percent of carrying capacity, and a zero- to\nthree-percent probability that LCS stocks would increase from the 1998 population\nlevels within ten years under the baseline and alternative catch series scenarios,\nrespectively. This alternative would not meet NS 1 to prevent overfishing and\nrebuild overfished fisheries.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would have relatively little social impact in the short term as\nmost anglers are already operating below these restrictions. However, in the long\nterm, as LCS stocks continue to decline, more fishing effort will be required to find\ntarget LCS, which would likely result in reduced revenues and increased costs for\ncharterboat and headboat operations. Angler consumer surplus may also decline for\nthose LCS-targeted trips. The combination of a per vessel and a per person\nretention limit has been identified as confusing for anglers and problematic for\nenforcement.\nFisher and Ditton (1992) found that anglers spent an average of $197 per trip and\nwere willing to spend on average an additional $105 rather than stop fishing for\nsharks. Given the fact that most anglers release the fish they catch and that the\ncatch and release fishing ethic is growing, it is unlikely that these estimates have\nchanged substantially since 1992. Fisher and Ditton (1992) also found that\n32 percent of shark anglers said that no other species would be an acceptable\nsubstitute for sharks. In the short term, this alternative would allow for the\ncontinuation of current revenues to charterboat owners and captains and others who\nrely on the recreational shark fishery. In the long term, as shark stocks continue to\ndecline, current revenue would decrease as additional time would be required to\ncatch sharks. Eventually, revenue from shark fishing would cease.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 167","Conclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it would not meet NS1 to prevent overfishing\nand rebuild overfished fisheries.\nRejected Option: Reduce retention limit to one shark per vessel per trip\nThis alternative would reduce the per vessel limit by 50 percent. This alternative\nwould reduce harvest levels of LCS to a maximum of one shark per vessel per trip,\ninclusive of ridgeback and non-ridgeback LCS, as well as all pelagic sharks and SCS.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would not reduce the harvest of sandbar and blacktip sharks (and\ntherefore LCS) by the necessary 82 and 81 percent in numbers of fish, respectively,\nrelative to 1997 harvest levels (Tables 3.15 and 3.18). Analyses of the recreational\nfishery presented at the 1998 SEW (Babcock and Pikitch, 1998) indicate that, since\nmost recreational LCS fishing trips currently land less than one LCS per trip, this\nalternative would have only a minor reduction in LCS harvest levels relative to\n1997 harvest levels. Thus, this alternative would not meet NS 1 to rebuild\noverfished fisheries for LCS but would likely exceed the NS 1 requirement to\nprevent overfishing for the fully fished pelagic sharks and SCS.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would likely only have minor social impacts because most\nrecreational anglers are already operating within these restrictions. However,\nreducing the recreational retention limit to one shark per vessel per trip would likely\nhave substantial adverse impacts on directed pelagic fisheries as angler consumer\nsurplus may decline due to the reduced retention limit. The increasing conservation\nethic among anglers towards catch-and-release fishing may mitigate any adverse\nsocial impacts of this alternative. As those anglers who are unwilling to accept a\nsubstitute for shark fishing would still be able to harvest one shark, any reduction in\nthose anglers' willingness to pay may also be mitigated.\nFisher and Ditton (1992) note that most anglers release the fish they catch.\nAnalyses presented to the 1998 SEW (Babcock and Pikitch, 1998) indicate that\nmost sharks caught are released and that 63 percent of all shark recreational trips\nwould be unaffected by a reduction in the retention limit to one shark per trip.\nGiven this evidence, it is unlikely that a reduction in the retention limit would affect\nangler consumer surplus significantly in LCS or SCS recreational fisheries.\nHowever, since there are pelagic shark tournaments and directed pelagic shark\ncharterboat operations, this alternative may reduce angler consumer surplus in those\nfisheries.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 168","Conclusion\nThis alternative is rejected as a stand-alone alternative because it would not meet\nNS 1 to prevent overfishing and rebuild overfished fisheries.\nRejected Option: Establish an allowance for one Atlantic sharpnose shark per\nperson per trip\nThis alternative would limit recreational harvest to one Atlantic sharpnose shark\nper person per trip. No other sharks would be authorized for retention.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would implement catch-and-release fishing only for all sharks\nexcept Atlantic sharpnose sharks and would require all other sharks to be released in\na manner that maximizes the probability of survival. This alternative would result\nin the fastest rebuilding to maximum sustainable yield levels for LCS by reducing\neffective fishing mortality to post-release mortality only. Assuming a low post-\nrelease mortality, this alternative would be expected to provide high probability that\nLCS stocks will increase from the 1998 levels (Tables 3.11, 3.14, and 3.17). This\nalternative would be expected to meet NS 1 to prevent overfishing and rebuild\noverfished fisheries for LCS, and would also enhance stock status for the fully\nfished pelagic and small coastal sharks.\nReducing the allowance of Atlantic sharpnose sharks per person from two to one\nwould likely have moderate ecological impacts as most anglers currently harvest\nless than two Atlantic sharpnose sharks per trip. This alternative for Atlantic\nsharpnose sharks would be a precautionary measure to increase the probability that\nany shifts in recreational fishing effort and harvest away from the overfished LCS to\nAtlantic sharpnose sharks are sustainable. However, pending additional scientific\nevaluation, it cannot be determined whether current or reduced fishing mortality\nrates on Atlantic sharpnose sharks are sustainable. On the other hand, catch rates of\nAtlantic sharpnose sharks do not appear to be showing any signs of decline.\nThis alternative could also result in misidentification of juvenile LCS and other\nshark species as Atlantic sharpnose sharks. In 1997, NMFS established an\nallowance for two Atlantic sharpnose sharks per person in addition to a per vessel\nretention limit in part because Atlantic sharpnose sharks were thought to be readily\nidentifiable from other species due to the presence of white spots on the back.\nHowever, members of the public have raised concerns that species-specific\nidentification continues to be a significant problem and that juvenile LCS are\nfrequently misidentified, sometimes as Atlantic sharpnose sharks. NMFS intends to\ndevelop an identification guide to address this concern and to increase public\neducation and awareness.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 169","Social and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative may have substantial social impacts by eliminating landings of\nall sharks except Atlantic sharpnose sharks. This alternative would eliminate the\nopportunities for trophy and tournament anglers to bring in their catches and may\nsignificantly reduce an angler consumer surplus if only Atlantic sharpnose sharks\ncan be retained. Additionally, directed pelagic shark fisheries would become\nessentially catch and release only fisheries. The adverse social impacts of this\nalternative may be reduced to the extent that there is a growing public opinion that\ncatch-and-release fishing is the preferable recreational fishery for sharks.\nThis alternative would likely have similar economic impacts to those described\nunder establish catch and release only fishing in that the impacts would depend on\nthe willingness for shark anglers to substitute other fish and release sharks caught,\nespecially for tournament participants who would be unable to harvest any trophy\nfish and for directed pelagic shark fishery participants. Given that shark anglers do\nnot necessarily fish in order to obtain a trophy or for consumption, this alternative\nmay only result in minor reductions in angler consumer surplus. However, angler\nconsumer surplus may be reduced at the tournament level, in directed pelagic shark\nfisheries, and in fisheries whose participants are unwilling to substitute Atlantic\nsharpnose shark fishing as their only shark fishing activity.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected as a stand-alone alternative because the final action is\nexpected to moderate the social and economic impacts while still meeting\nconservation objectives.\nRejected Option: Establish a minimum size of 4.5 feet FL (137 cm FL) for all\nsharks\nThis alternative would restrict recreational landings of all sharks to those greater\nthan 4.5 feet FL (equivalent to 137 cm FL). It would essentially create catch and\nrelease only fishing for all sharks less than 4.5 feet FL.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would establish the same minimum size for the recreational\nfishery that is implemented in the commercial ridgeback LCS fishery, with the\nexception that the minimum size for the recreational fishery would apply to all\nsharks and not a subgroup. The rationale for this alternative follows that for the\nfinal action in that post-release mortality of sharks caught in recreational fisheries is\nbelieved to be relatively low. A minimum size of 4.5 feet for all sharks would\ngreatly reduce the effective fishing mortality on the most sensitive stages/sizes by\nessentially implementing catch-and-release fishing on juvenile and subadult sharks.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 170","According to MRFSS data, approximately 95 percent of LCS harvested in 1997\nwere below the selected minimum size (Figure 3.5). Therefore, this alternative\ncould reduce the number of LCS harvested by more than the 82 percent necessary\nunder the selected LCS rebuilding program.\nHowever, this alternative would not limit the quantity of sharks that could be\nharvested on a given trip and so, as a stand-alone alternative, a minimum size may\nactually allow for expansion of harvest levels, contrary to the reductions needed for\nrebuilding. Additionally, significant recreational fisheries for sharks exist in\nnearshore waters and coastal bays and estuaries which are important pupping and\nnursery areas for juvenile and subadult stages/sizes. Many of these areas have been\nidentified as essential fish habitat. One potential drawback with a minimum size in\nnearshore waters may result if increased fishing effort is directed towards pregnant\nfemales as they enter the pupping grounds in coastal bays and estuaries. Additional\nmanagement measures, such as male only harvest, may be warranted in such\ncircumstances.\nThis alternative, though primarily intended as a LCS rebuilding measure, would\nalso affect pelagic and SCS fisheries. Recreational fishing for SCS would be\nessentially catch-and-release fishing only under this alternative because some SCS\nlike Atlantic sharpnose and bonnethead sharks do not reach 4.5 feet (137 cm FL) at\nfull maturity. However, SCS are often caught incidentally to other recreational\nfishing operations such that this alternative is unlikely to affect the primary targets\nof those operations. On the other hand, substantial recreational fisheries target\npelagic sharks, especially shortfin mako, thresher, and blue sharks. However,\nimplementing a 4.5 feet FL minimum size would have relatively minor ecological\nimpacts because most of the pelagic sharks currently retained exceed 4.5 feet FL.\nTo the extent that this alternative supports voluntary restrictions on harvest of\njuvenile and subadult sharks, faster rebuilding may result.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative may have substantial social impacts by essentially establishing a\ncatch-and-release fishery for sharks in nearshore waters. While this alternative\nwould apply to fishing within and fish from Federal waters, it may differentially\nimpact anglers who are unable to expand their fishing into deeper waters where\nlarger fish predominate. To the extent that anglers want to retain their catch, those\nanglers who cannot expand to offshore fishing would experience large reductions in\ntheir harvest levels. However, the increasing conservation ethic among anglers\ntowards catch-and-release fishing may mitigate any adverse social impacts of this\nalternative. This action may have safety concerns for recreational fishermen who\nwould have to determine the length of sharks relative to the minimum size.\nThis alternative may have variable economic impacts depending on how willing\nanglers are to release sharks caught and substitute other fish. Under this alternative,\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 171","anglers would be forced to catch and release most of the sharks currently caught.\nHowever, there is evidence that anglers already do this voluntarily (Fisher and\nDitton, 1992; Babcock and Pikitch, 1998). Fisher and Ditton (1992) found that over\n70 percent of the anglers surveyed said they would be just as happy releasing the\nfish they caught (rated as \"agree\" and \"strongly agree\"). However, it is possible\nthat some anglers may not pay to only catch and release or tag and release sharks.\nFisher and Ditton (1992) found that 51 percent of the anglers surveyed said that the\nmore fish they catch (but not necessarily land), the happier they are. It is also\npossible that anglers may pay additional money for the challenge of catching a\nlarge, adult shark as opposed to the small, juvenile sharks currently caught. This is\nespecially true in the long term as the stock rebuilds and large sharks become more\nabundant. Over 60 percent of those surveyed said they would rather catch one or\ntwo big fish than ten smaller fish (Fisher and Ditton, 1992). Also, 76 percent of\nthose surveyed said that they fish in the saltwater for the challenge (Fisher and\nDitton, 1992). Fisher and Ditton (1992) state that \"shark anglers are intimately\ninvolved in fishing for big fish, and for many it is probably a central life interest.\"\nGiven this evidence, NMFS does not believe a minimum size would decrease angler\nconsumer surplus. In fact, it may even increase it over the long term.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected as a stand-alone alternative because the final action\nis expected to mitigate the social and economic impacts while still meeting\nconservation objectives.\nRejected Option: Catch-and-release only recreational fishing for sharks\nThis alternative would implement catch-and-release fishing only for all\nrecreational shark fisheries, inclusive of all LCS, pelagic sharks, and SCS. This\nalternative would require all sharks to be released in a manner that maximizes the\nprobability of survival.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would result in the fastest rebuilding to maximum sustainable\nyield levels by reducing recreational fishing mortality to post-release mortality only.\nAs no quantitative estimates for post-release mortality of sharks caught in\nrecreational fisheries (in general or for individual species) are currently available,\nonly qualitative impacts can be discussed at this time. However, assuming a low\npost-release mortality, this alternative would be expected to provide for the fastest\nrebuilding possible with high probabilities that LCS stocks will increase from the\n1998 levels. This alternative would be expected to meet NS 1 to prevent\noverfishing and rebuild overfished fisheries for LCS, and would also enhance stock\nstatus for the fully fished pelagic and small coastal sharks.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 172","Social and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would have substantial social impacts by eliminating recreational\nharvests of all sharks. This alternative would eliminate the opportunities for trophy\nand tournament anglers to bring in their catches and may significantly reduce an\nangler's willingness to pay if no sharks can be retained. This alternative may be\nperceived as \"unfair\" to recreational fishing interests if the commercial fishery is\nallowed to continue. It is important to note that this alternative would not prevent\nanglers from fishing and gaining the benefits of the fishing experience but it would\nprevent anglers from retaining any of their catch. The adverse social impacts of this\nalternative may be reduced to the extent that there is a growing public opinion that\ncatch-and-release fishing is the preferable recreational fishery for sharks.\nThis alternative also depends on the willingness for shark anglers to substitute\nother fish and release sharks caught. Therefore, this alternative will have similar,\nbut slightly higher, impacts as those discussed under minimum sizes. This is\nespecially true as tournaments would be unable to harvest any trophy fish. Fisher\nand Ditton (1992) found that 27 percent of the anglers surveyed fish in order to\nobtain fish for eating and 18 percent fish in order to obtain a trophy. Given the\nevidence that shark anglers do not necessarily fish in order to obtain a trophy or for\nconsumption, it is unlikely this alternative would reduce angler consumer surplus or\nthe willingness to pay significantly for private vessels. However, angler consumer\nsurplus may be reduced at the tournament level, in directed pelagic shark fisheries,\nand in those fisheries whose participants are unwilling to substitute fishing for\nspecies other than sharks.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected as a stand-alone alternative because the final action is\nexpected to mitigate the social and economic impacts while still meeting\nconservation objectives.\nRejected Option: Establish catch and release only recreational fishing for LCS\nand SCS and establish a retention limit of one pelagic shark per\nvessel per trip\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would establish catch and release only recreational fishing for all\nLCS and SCS, and would reduce the recreational retention limit for pelagic sharks\nto one fish per vessel per trip. The rationale for this alternative follows from those\nfor the preceding alternatives in that it constitutes a combination of catch and\nrelease only fishing for all LCS and SCS and a reduced retention limit for pelagic\nsharks. This alternative would reduce the recreational retention limit on pelagic\nsharks by 50 percent and would reduce recreational fishing mortality on LCS and\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 173","SCS to post-release mortality only. Because post-release mortality of sharks is\nbelieved to be low but is currently unknown, this alternative would meet the\nreduction needed under the selected rebuilding program while accounting for post-\nrelease mortality. This alternative would be expected to result in the fastest\nrebuilding to maximum sustainable yield levels for LCS with high probability that\nLCS stocks would increase from the 1998 levels. This alternative would be\nexpected to meet NS 1 to rebuild overfished fisheries for LCS, and may prevent\noverfishing for the fully fished pelagic and small coastal sharks.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nAs with the ecological impacts, the social impacts of this alternative are likely to\nbe a combination of those discussed under the preceding alternatives. This\nalternative would be likely to have substantial social impacts because the pelagic\nshark retention limit would be reduced such that the pelagic shark tournaments\nwould be restricted to one pelagic shark per vessel per trip and would be unable to\nharvest any LCS or SCS. It is important to note that this alternative would not\nprevent anglers from fishing and gaining the benefits of the fishing experience. The\nadverse social impacts of this alternative may be reduced to the extent that there is\ngrowing public opinion that catch-and-release fishing is the preferable recreational\nfishery for sharks.\nThe economic impacts of this alternative would depend on the willingness for\nshark anglers to substitute other fish and release sharks caught, especially for\ntournament participants who would be unable to harvest any trophy LCS and would\nbe restricted to one pelagic shark per vessel per trip. Given that shark anglers do\nnot necessarily fish in order to obtain a trophy or for consumption, this alternative\nmay only result in minor reductions in angler consumer surplus. However, since\nmany tournaments target pelagic sharks for which the retention limit would be\nreduced, angler consumer surplus at the tournament level may be reduced\nsubstantially. This alternative would establish a catch-and-release fishery for all\nLCS and SCS and would likely differentially impact anglers and the recreational\ncommunities if shark anglers are unable, or unwilling, to expand their fishing into\noffshore waters where pelagic sharks predominate. To the extent that anglers want\nto retain their catch, those anglers who cannot expand to offshore fishing or\nsubstitute other species would experience large reductions in their harvest levels.\nThe combination of a per vessel and a per person retention limit has been\nidentified as confusing for anglers and problematic for enforcement. This\nalternative would establish catch and release only fishing for all LCS and SCS in\npart due to the difficulties in enforcement of the current regulations and due to\ncontinued, widespread misidentification of juvenile LCS and SCS.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 174","Conclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because of substantial social and economic impacts,\nand because the final action is expected to meet rebuilding goals while reducing\nsocial and economic impacts.\n3.4.2.3.3 Recreational Landing Condition for Sharks\nPrevious Atlantic shark regulations did not stipulate any landing condition\nrequirements for recreational fishermen. The Atlantic shark regulations do stipulate\nthat commercial permit holders cannot fillet a shark at sea, which means that sharks\ncan be headed, gutted, and finned but the carcass must be landed with the flesh\nattached. This stipulation for the commercial fishery was implemented to improve\ndockside identification of sharks to the species level.\nNMFS received comments that requiring recreational anglers to keep sharks\nintact while allowing commercial fishermen to head and fin sharks is unfair. These\ncomments warrant further consideration. However, NMFS adopts the requirement\nfor recreational fishermen to keep sharks intact while not imposing a new\nrequirement for commercial fishermen at this time. When the Shark FMP was\nimplemented in 1993, commercial fishermen were allowed to remove and discard\nheads, tails, and fins and to fillet the sharks at sea to allow more of the available\nvessel hold capacity to be used for storing the shark carcasses that eventually would\nbe sold. A commercial landing prohibition on filleting sharks at sea was\nimplemented in 1997 in order to increase species-specific of carcasses at the dock.\nThe basis for this provision may have changed, but additional public discussion is\nneeded before the regulations are modified. While NMFS strives for consistent\nregulations for all user groups, concerns about quality and safety of seafood sold for\npublic consumption resulting from inadequate freezing of shark carcasses preclude a\nsimilar regulation for commercial shark fisheries at this time. Because individual\nrecreational shark fishermen harvest smaller quantities of sharks per trip and take\nshorter fishing trips relative to commercial operations, recreational fishermen\nshould be able to adequately ice shark carcasses so as not to compromise seafood\nsafety. Requiring recreational fishermen to keep sharks intact will address\ncontinued widespread problems with species-specific identification of sharks in\nrecreational fisheries.\nFinal Action: Require that all sharks harvested by recreational fishermen\nhave heads, tails, and fins attached\nThis action requires all sharks that are harvested by recreational fishermen have\nthe heads, tails, and fins attached to the carcass. Anglers may still gut and bleed the\ncarcass by making an incision at the base of the caudal peduncle as long as the\ncaudal tail is not removed. Filleting sharks at sea is prohibited.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 175","Ecological Impacts\nThis action has minimal ecological impacts in that no changes in fishing effort or\ndistribution would be expected as result of this requirement. This action will\ngreatly facilitate dockside species-specific identification of shark harvest for\nmonitoring, management, and enforcement purposes. To the extent that this\nrequirement facilitates stock assessments, this action will enhance rebuilding and\nspecies-specific management.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action should have minimal social impacts because it will not preclude\nanglers from bleeding those sharks retained for personal consumption (necessary to\nprevent spoilage of the meat), and those anglers who desire to have their catch\nmounted will not be impacted. This action will establish different regulations\nbetween the commercial and recreational fishing communities and may contribute\nto a sense of \"unfairness\" in terms of regulatory burden. To the extent that this\nrequirement facilitates species-specific identification of retained sharks, this action\nwill have positive social impacts by enhancing stock assessments and species-\nspecific management.\nThis action should have little economic impact. Anglers could still bleed and\neviscerate sharks for consumption. To the extent that it supports stock assessments,\nthis measure will allow more species-specific and less restrictive management in\nthe future.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected due to the enhancement of dockside identification of\nsharks at the species level and decreased enforcement costs, which will facilitate\nspecies-specific stock assessments and management. NMFS may consider carcass\nlandings restrictions in commercial fisheries to address problems with species-\nspecific identification of sharks in those fisheries in the future.\nRejected Option for Recreational Landing Condition for Sharks\nRejected Option: Status quo (no landing condition requirements; recreationally\nlanded sharks can be headed, gutted, finned, and filleted at sea)\nThis alternative would not establish a landing condition requirement for\nrecreationally harvested sharks. Sharks harvested by recreational anglers could\ncontinue to be headed, gutted, finned, and filleted at sea.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 176","Ecological Impacts\nThis alternative would have no direct ecological impacts. However, to the extent\nthat problems with species-specific identification continue to confound stock\nassessments and management, this alternative would have negative ecological\nimpacts.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nTo the extent that problems with species-specific catch and effort data from\nrecreational fisheries confound stock assessments and management, this alternative\nwould contribute to the need for broad-brush management, which may result in\nmore restrictive management measures than might otherwise be possible.\nAdditionally, disparate regulations between the commercial and recreational fishing\ncommunities may contribute to a sense of \"unfairness\" in terms of regulatory\nburden. This alternative would be expected to have no additional economic impacts\nbecause anglers are already operating under this provision.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because of the need to improve species-specific\nidentification of sharks in recreational fisheries.\n3.4.2.3.4 Prohibition on Finning of Sharks\nNMFS prohibited the practice of finning (removing the fins of a shark and\ndiscarding the carcass) as part of the original Atlantic Shark FMP in 1993. As\nstated in the 1993 FMP \"the U.S. public has decried this practice, perceiving it as\nwasteful and cruel\" (p.74). Prior to the original 1993 FMP, the practice of finning\nwas common due to the extremely high commercial value of the fins and the\ncomparatively low value of the meat (currently, average prices for fins are\n$11.67 per pound whereas the average price for meat is $0.58, $0.55, and $1.21 per\npound for LCS, SCS, and pelagic sharks, respectively).\nPreviously, the Atlantic shark regulations prohibited the finning of sharks in the\nmanagement unit only (the 39 species to which Federal regulations applied). There\nwas no prohibition on finning of sharks outside of the Federal management unit\n(approximately 34 species), creating a significant enforcement burden to verify\nspecies-specific identification of shark fins through DNA testing.\nFinal Action: Create new management group of deepwater/other sharks\n(formerly data collection only) and establish a prohibition on\nfinning for this management group\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 177","This action creates a new management group of deepwater and other shark\nspecies found in the U.S. Atlantic E.E.Z. (species formerly included in the 1993\nShark FMP for data collection only) and establishes a prohibition on finning as the\nonly regulation for the deepwater/other shark management group at this time.\nThese deepwater/other species are not subject to the permit and reporting\nrequirements, retention and size limits, or quotas established in the FMP. NMFS\nmay consider additional management measures for this group in the future.\nEcological Impacts\nTo the extent that Federal shark permit holders are finning shark species outside\nof the Federal management unit (LCS, pelagic sharks, and SCS only), this action\nwill eliminate that waste and contribute to rebuilding or maintenance of those\nspecies. This action will also enhance enforcement capabilities by removing a\ncostly and time-consuming administrative burden of verifying species-specific\nidentification of shark fins through DNA testing, and therefore ensure compliance\nwith the prohibition on finning on all sharks.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action may decrease net revenues for those fishermen who rely on revenue\nfrom the fins (not the meat) of sharks outside the Federal management unit. This\naction may also increase fixed costs if fishermen need to provide additional freezer\nspace for species normally finned and discarded; however, estimates of any such\ncost increases are unavailable at this time.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it will greatly enhance enforcement capabilities\nand contributes to the rebuilding or maintenance of shark species formerly\nunregulated by reducing any waste from finning. This action is also selected due to\nthe additional benefits of including these species into the Federal management unit\nand thereby establishing regulatory authority should additional management\nmeasures be necessary in the future. NMFS intends to evaluate the biological\ncondition of the stocks in the deepwater/other group and may consider additional\nmanagement measures in conjunction with the HMS AP following the framework\nprocedure described in Section 3.10.\nRejected Option for Prohibition on Finning of Sharks\nRejected Option: Status quo - shark finning prohibited in the Federal management\nunit of the Atlantic ocean\nThis alternative would not establish a deepwater/other management group, would\nmaintain the current prohibition on finning of the 39 LCS, pelagic sharks, and\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 178","SCS only, and would not extend that prohibition to all shark species found in the\nU.S. EEZ.\nEcological Impacts\nTo the extent that Federal shark permit holders are finning shark species outside\nof those in the Federal management unit, this alternative would allow that waste to\ncontinue.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would not be expected to have additional social and economic\nimpacts because fishermen are already operating under this restriction.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because of significant enforcement costs and the\ngreater benefits of establishing a deepwater/other species group into the Federal\nmanagement unit and thereby establishing regulatory authority should additional\nmanagement measures be necessary in the future.\nRejected Option: Extend prohibition on finning to all sharks as condition of\nFederal permit\nThis alternative was the preferred alternative in the draft HMS FMP and would\nlink the prohibition on finning to the Federal commercial shark permit. As a\ncondition of receiving the permit, Federal shark permit holders would agree that\nthey would not fin any sharks, regardless whether such sharks are defined as part of\nthe Federal management unit or are subject to any Federal regulations. This\nalternative is similar to the final action but limits the prohibition on finning to\nFederal commercial shark permit holders only. Non-Federally permitted\ncommercial fishermen and recreational fishermen would not be affected by this\nalternative.\nEcological Impacts\nTo the extent that Federal shark permit holders are finning shark species outside\nof those in the Federal management unit, this alternative would eliminate that waste\nand contribute to rebuilding or maintenance of those species. This alternative\nwould enhance enforcement capabilities by removing a costly and time-consuming\nadministrative burden of verifying species-specific identification of shark fins\nthrough DNA testing.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 179","Social and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative may decrease net revenues for those fishermen who rely on\nrevenue from the fins (not the meat) of sharks outside the management unit. This\nalternative may also increase fixed costs if fishermen need to provide additional\nfreezer space for species normally finned and discarded, however, estimates of any\nsuch cost increases are unavailable at this time.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because there are greater benefits from including all\nsharks in the management unit.\n3.4.2.3.5 Directed Large Coastal Shark Commercial Retention Limit\nSince the original FMP was implemented in 1993, the LCS directed commercial\nfishery has experienced severe derby fishing conditions. Such conditions often\nresult in fishermen fishing further inshore than they normally do in order to\nminimize transit time from fishing grounds to offloading sites. Fishing in inshore\nareas where immature sharks predominate can have several negative ecological\nramifications including higher catches of immature fish and associated higher\neffective fishing mortality rates, increased bycatch rates of undersized fish if a\nminimum size is implemented, and higher fishing effort (with increases in bycatch\nof immature fish) because more small fish than large fish must be caught to reach\nthe same weight-based quota. Due to the implementation of minimum size, it is\nlikely that fishing effort will be shifted further offshore where larger fish\npredominate; however, as derby fishing conditions persist, the incentive to\nminimize transit time and fish inshore will continue as well.\nIn 1994, in an attempt to prolong the fishing seasons and reduce derby\nconditions, NMFS implemented a 4,000-pound retention limit in the LCS fishery.\nAs a result of the reduced profitability of trips under this retention limit, many of\nthe large fishing vessels left the LCS fishery. On a given trip, fishermen that reach\nthe 4,000-pound LCS retention limit in mid-haulback must cut off the remaining\ngear and return to shore. Once unloaded, the fisherman may return to collect the\nremaining gear. This practice can result in delays of a few days in collecting all the\ngear as well as lost gear and higher mortality of species, including juvenile sharks,\nsea turtles, and other finfish, than if the gear had been collected all at once.\nFinal Action: Status quo (4,000 pounds dw per trip retention limit for\ndirected LCS fisheries)\nThis action maintains the directed LCS commercial retention limit of 4,000 pounds\ndw. No retention limits exist for the directed commercial pelagic shark or SCS\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 180","fisheries although retention limits for all species are established for incidental shark\npermit holders under the limited access system (see Chapter 4 for more details).\nEcological Impacts\nThis action, in combination with limited access, will help ensure that derby\nfishing conditions do not worsen. To the extent that reduced quotas will increase\nderby fishing conditions, the commercial retention limit will help extend the season\nand mitigate a worsening of the derby. Because this action will not eliminate the\n\"race for fish,\" bycatch catch rates and post-release survival concerns may continue\nto be a lower priority in determining fishing practices and areas than catching the\nmost fish on a given trip.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action may not have additional economic impacts because directed LCS\nfishermen are already operating under this restriction. It will continue to extend the\nLCS fishery by reducing the amount of fish that can be landed on a given trip but\nwill help ensure that the instability and unpredictability of the LCS fishery does not\nincrease.\nConclusion\nThis measure is selected because of concerns that derby fishing conditions and\nassociated safety problems would worsen and bycatch and bycatch mortality rates\nwould increase if the directed LCS retention limit were increased or eliminated.\nAdditionally, the economic advantages of extending the LCS fishing season are\nexpected to outweigh the possible increased profitability of individual LCS trips.\nRejected Options for Directed Large Coastal Shark Commercial Retention\nLimits\nRejected Option: Decrease directed LCS commercial retention limit to\n2,000 pounds dw\nThis alternative would decrease the directed LCS commercial retention limit of\n4,000 pounds dw by 50 percent to 2,000 pounds dw.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative may lengthen the LCS fishing seasons and may mitigate derby\nfishing conditions. To the extent that this alternative reduces derby fishing\nconditions, bycatch and bycatch mortality rates of immature or undersize sharks and\nother regulatory or market-driven discards may decrease if these concerns were\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 181","given higher priority in determining fishing practices and areas than catching the\nmost fish on a given trip.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative may have some positive social and economic impacts by\nextending the fishing seasons, decreasing the severity of market gluts, and\nmitigating derby fishing conditions relative to the 4,000 pound retention limit.\nHowever, this alternative may decrease the profitability of individual shark trips to\noffset the costs of fishing by increasing fuel and labor costs as well as the chances\nfor lost gear from an increased number of trips. Decreased profitability of trips may\nresult in fishermen who were operating at the margin under the 4,000-pound\nretention limit leaving the fishery or worsened derby fishing conditions from\nfishermen trying to make up for increased costs. However, annual gross revenues\nfor smaller vessels that may be operating at the margin may increase because a\nlower retention limit may result in larger vessels exiting the fishery.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected at this time because of the uncertainty of the impacts\nof decreasing the retention limit on derby fishing conditions, safety at sea, and\nbycatch and bycatch mortality rates. While this FMP implements limited access for\nthe Atlantic shark fishery and is expected to alleviate some derby fishing\nconditions, the actual level of that reduction is not known at this time. NMFS\nintends to reevaluate possible changes in the directed LCS retention limit once the\nimpacts of limited access are better known.\nRejected Option: Increase directed LCS commercial retention limit to\n6,000 pounds dw\nThis alternative would increase the directed LCS commercial retention limit of\n4,000 pounds dw by 50 percent to 6,000 pounds dw.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would likely shorten the LCS fishing seasons and thereby\nworsen derby fishing conditions. This alternative would likely increase bycatch and\nbycatch mortality rates of immature or undersize sharks and other regulatory or\nmarket-driven discards as these concerns would be a lower priority in determining\nfishing practices and areas than catching the most fish on a given trip.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would likely increase the instability and unpredictability of the\nLCS fishery by shortening the fishing seasons and worsening derby fishing\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 182","conditions relative to the 4,000-pound retention limit. This alternative may also\nattract larger fishing vessels due to possible increased profitability on a given trip,\nthereby further exacerbating derby fishing conditions and safety concerns.\nImplementation of a limited access or individual quota system that would\nsignificantly alleviate derby fishing conditions may warrant further consideration of\nincreasing or eliminating the commercial LCS retention limit.\nThis alternative may improve the profitability of individual shark trips. By\nincreasing the retention limit, directed LCS fishermen would be allowed to bring in\nadditional sharks and thus offset the cost of fishing. This alternative may also\ndecrease the cost of shark fishing by decreasing the chances for lost gear; however,\nthis alternative also has negative impacts. By increasing the retention limit, the\nlength of the LCS season would likely be decreased, increasing the severity of\nmarket gluts and derby fishing conditions. Also, annual gross revenues for smaller\nvessels that may be operating at the margin would likely decline because the\nretention limit would allow relatively more of the quota to be harvested by larger\nvessels. Any increase in gross revenues for these larger vessels could be offset by\ndecreasing ex-vessel prices due to market gluts. An increased retention limit could\nalso attract larger vessels back into the fishery, provided they are willing to obtain a\nlimited access permit, which could remove profits from directed LCS fishermen.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected at this time because of concerns that derby fishing\nconditions would worsen, safety at sea would decrease, bycatch and bycatch\nmortality rates would increase, and because the economic advantages of extending\nthe LCS fishing season are expected to outweigh the possible increased profitability\nof individual LCS trips. Additionally, while this FMP implements limited access\nfor the Atlantic shark fishery and is expected to alleviate some derby fishing\nconditions, the actual level of that reduction is not known at this time. NMFS\nintends to reevaluate possible changes in the directed LCS retention limit once the\nimpacts of limited access are better known.\nRejected Option: Eliminate the directed LCS commercial retention limit\nUnder this alternative, directed LCS fishermen would be unrestricted in the\namount of LCS landed on any given trip during the open season for LCS.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would significantly shorten the LCS fishing seasons and thereby\nworsen derby fishing conditions. As discussed above, this alternative would likely\ngreatly increase bycatch and bycatch mortality rates of immature or undersized fish\nand other regulatory or market-driven discards as these concerns continue to be a\nlower priority in determining fishing practices and areas than catching the most fish\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 183","on a given trip. To the extent that the LCS fishing season would be closed for a\nmuch longer time, bycatch and bycatch mortality rates may actually decline if\nbycatch rates during the open season were not too high.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would likely greatly increase the instability and unpredictability\nof the LCS fishery by dramatically shortening the fishing seasons and worsening\nderby fishing conditions. This alternative could also attract larger fishing vessels\ndue to increased profitability on a given trip, thereby further exacerbating derby\nfishing conditions and safety concerns. Implementation of a limited access or\nindividual quota system that would significantly alleviate derby fishing conditions\nmay warrant further consideration of increasing or eliminating the directed\ncommercial LCS retention limit.\nThis alternative would likely improve the profitability of a portion of individual\nshark trips. By eliminating the directed LCS retention limit, fishermen would be\nallowed to bring in unlimited quantities of shark per trip and thus offset the cost of\nfishing, especially since the costs of lost gear would be greatly reduced. This\nalternative would also have significant negative impacts, however. By eliminating\nthe directed LCS retention limit, the length of the LCS season would likely be\nsubstantially decreased, increasing the severity of market gluts and derby fishing\nconditions. Also, annual gross revenues for smaller vessels that are operating at the\nmargin would likely decline because derby-style fishery would allow relatively\nmore of the quota to be harvested by larger vessels. Any increase in gross revenues\nfor these larger vessels could be offset by decreasing ex-vessel prices due to market\ngluts. Additionally, eliminating the directed LCS retention limit could attract larger\nvessels back into the fishery, provided they are willing to obtain a limited access\npermit, which may remove profits from current shark fishermen.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected due to increased bycatch and bycatch mortality rates,\nworsened derby fishing conditions and safety at sea, increased instability in the LCS\nfishery, and expectations that the majority of directed LCS fishermen would\nexperience substantially reduced annual gross revenues. Limited access is expected\nto alleviate some derby fishing conditions and NMFS intends to reevaluate possible\nchanges in the directed LCS retention limit once the impacts of limited access are\nbetter known.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 184","3.4.3\nAuthorized Gears\n3.4.3.1 Atlantic Tunas\nFinal Action: Prohibit driftnet gear in the Atlantic tunas fisheries, maintain status\nquo for other Atlantic tunas gear types\nThis action removes driftnets as an authorized gear type in the Atlantic tunas\nfisheries. North Atlantic swordfish were the primary Atlantic highly migratory species\ntargeted using driftnets, although the use of driftnets in the Atlantic swordfish fishery\nwas banned by NMFS in January 1999. There is little information available about\npelagic driftnetting for Atlantic tunas since there have been few directed sets on tunas.\nNo directed tuna driftnet fishery was known to exist until two \"swordfish driftnet\"\nvessels used driftnet gear in 1997 to target tuna species, resulting in a high rate of\ndeaths of marine mammals. In 1998, one vessel made two trips targeting tuna species\nusing driftnet gear. The driftnet used was of a smaller mesh size (six-inch stretch) than\nthat commonly used for swordfish (18 to 22 inch). Preliminary information on the two\ntrips indicates that, while few tuna were caught on the first 1998 trip (only one set\nmade), a substantial amount was landed on the second trip (three sets made). There\nwere no mammal or turtle takes on the first trip, and one common dolphin was taken on\nthe second trip. These protected species takes are lower than rates commonly seen in\nthe swordfish driftnet fishery; however, the driftnet trips targeting tuna in 1997 did have\nhigh takes and this gear is known for its high takes of protected species.\nSpecies of tuna caught incidentally by driftnet vessels targeting swordfish include\nskipjack, albacore, yellowfin, and bigeye tuna. These tunas range in size, and dealers\nindicate that driftnet-caught tunas tend to be lower quality than longline-caught tunas\nbecause of damage from the fishing net. When sets are specifically targeted at tuna\nwith swordfish driftnet gear, it appears that turtle and marine mammal takes are similar\nto those in which swordfish are targeted, provided the same gear is used in the same\ngeneral areas and seasons. According to the 1997 Biological Opinion issued by the\nNMFS Office of Protected Resources, a directed tuna driftnet fishery would be required\nto have 100 percent observer coverage and a time/area closure in order to avoid\njeopardy of taking a northern right whale.\nThere is also a coastal driftnet fishery which lands Atlantic tunas (mostly west\nAtlantic skipjack and north Atlantic albacore tuna, as well as Atlantic bonito and little\ntunny). This fishery primarily targets bluefish and weakfish in the summer and fall, off\nthe coasts of southern New England and the mid-Atlantic. From the data available,\napproximately 20 vessels using this type of gear landed Atlantic tunas in 1996 and\n1997 (see Chapter 2).\nThis final action prohibits the use of all driftnet gear in the Atlantic tunas fisheries.\nHowever, vessels using driftnet gear when targeting species other than Atlantic tunas\nmay apply for an Experimental Fishing Permit (EFP) to land incidentally caught\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 185","Atlantic tunas (other than bluefin). A condition of the EFP will be that the vessels must\nsubmit information about their catch and effort to NMFS.\nOther than prohibiting the use of driftnets, this alternative maintains the status quo\nfor other geartypes in the Atlantic tunas fishery. However, as part of the regulatory\nconsolidation for HMS, begun by NMFS in 1996 and completed with this FMP, certain\nminor administrative and technical changes were made to the regulations. These\nchanges include redefinition of the incidental catch permit category for Atlantic tunas.\nThe Incidental category is now split into \"Longline\" and \"Trap\" categories, and fixed\ngear other than traps and purse seines for non-tuna fisheries are no longer allowed to\nland bluefin tuna.\nEcological Impacts\nThe Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) requires NMFS to calculate the\npotential biological removal level for each marine mammal stock that may be seriously\ninjured or killed by commercial fishing activities. A primary goal of the MMPA is to\nensure that the level of marine mammals killed or seriously injured by commercial\nfishing activities is reduced to the potential biological removal level to ensure these\nstocks remain healthy. In 1998, the driftnet fishery for Atlantic swordfish opened\nAugust 1 and closed August 14. Driftnet vessels landed approximately two-thirds of\ntheir swordfish quota of 91,711 pounds, and also took 34 endangered or threatened sea\nturtles, including two green turtles, five leatherback turtles, and 27 loggerhead turtles\nalong with 293 whales, dolphins and other marine mammals. In the 1998 Atlantic\nswordfish driftnet fishery, the potential biological removal level was exceeded for\nbeaked whales and common dolphins. When driftnet sets are specifically targeted at\ntuna, it appears that takes are similar to those in which swordfish are targeted, provided\nsimilar gear is used in the same general areas and seasons. Any future trips taken by\ndriftnet vessels targeting tunas pose a threat to endangered and threatened turtles, and\nstrategic stocks of marine mammals.\nSeveral Atlantic tunas are overfished (bigeye tuna, north Atlantic albacore tuna,\nand west Atlantic bluefin tuna) and the potential for an increased driftnet tuna fishery\nrisks additional mortality on these stocks. There are many New England and mid-\nAtlantic gillnet vessels whose fishing is limited by effort controls such as days-at-sea\nrestrictions, seasonal closures, and retention limits. These vessels use driftnets (for\ngroundfish, dogfish, monkfish, etc.) with mesh sizes similar to those used by the vessel\ntargeting tunas in 1998, and may easily convert to fish for tunas during times when they\nare restricted from fishing for their usual targeted species. NMFS is concerned about\nthe potential effort which could be directed at tunas which could result in increased\nmortality on fully fished and overfished species.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 186","Social and Economic Impacts\nWhile there is no established driftnet fishery for Atlantic tunas, prohibiting the use\nof this gear type would prevent any future directed effort on the over- or fully-fished\nBAYS tunas. In 1992 to 1995, an average of 5.74 tunas (other than bluefin tuna) were\ncaught per set by driftnets targeting swordfish, and most of these tunas were retained\nand sold. However, since NMFS has banned the use of driftnets in the Atlantic\nswordfish fishery, the income generated by these sales of incidental catches of tuna has\nalready been eliminated. Vessels using coastal driftnets may continue to land and sell\nAtlantic tunas caught incidentally while targeting other species, if they apply for and\nare issued an Experimental Fishery Permit.\nConclusion\nThis is the final action. Pelagic driftnets have been shown to have high bycatch of\nfinfish and protected species (Cramer, 1996). Allowing development of a new directed\nfishery for fully fished Atlantic tuna stocks, particularly when other stocks in the target\ncomplex are overfished, is not consistent with the precautionary approach to fisheries\nmanagement, nor with the objectives of this FMP to build sustainable HMS fisheries.\nFurthermore, allowing development of a new fishery with a gear that has been\ndemonstrated to have high bycatch rates would not support achievement of NS 9, nor\nwould it support objectives of this FMP to minimize bycatch and bycatch mortality.\nNMFS has not identified any significant safety implications associated with this action.\nFinal Action: Status quo authorized gear for swordfish\nIn January 1999, NMFS prohibited the use of driftnets in the Atlantic swordfish\nfishery. There are no other expected changes to authorized gears in this fishery.\nDirected gears remain: pelagic longline, rod and reel, handline, and harpoon. In\naddition to these gears that are also authorized in the Incidental fishery (with the\nexception of Harpoon), squid trawls may land swordfish as incidental catch subject to\nretention limits (see Section 3.4.2.2.2). There are not expected to be any ecological\nimpacts of this status quo, other than those described in Section 3.5, outlining bycatch\nwith each of these gear types. There are no social or economic impacts or safety issues\nassociated with this alternative.\nFinal Action: Status quo authorized gear for sharks: (A) for the hook and line\nfishery: rod and reel, handline, and bandit gear; (B) for the longline\nfishery: longline gear; (C) for the drift gillnet fishery: gillnet gear\nOn June 4, 1998 (63 FR 30455), NMFS published a proposed rule to establish a list\nof fisheries and allowable fishing gear and, specific to Atlantic shark fisheries, the\nproposed list of authorized fisheries and gears included: 1) rod and reel, handline, and\nbandit gear (for the hook and line fishery); 2) longline gear (for the longline fishery);\n3) gillnet gear (for the drift gillnet fishery); and 4) harpoon gear (for the harpoon\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 187","fishery). On January 27, 1999 (64 FR 4030) NMFS finalized the list of authorized\ngears and, specific to the shark fishery, removed the harpoon gear from the final list of\nauthorized gears due to the lack of historical landings as well as the fact that the only\ntwo species readily available to harpoon gear are the whale and basking sharks, both of\nwhich are prohibited species. This action maintains all the fisheries and gear types as\nfinalized on January 27, 1999. This action maintains the only current gear restriction of\na maximum length restriction of 2.5 kilometers for drift gillnets.\nEcological Impacts\nIn the absence of other new management measures, this action allows the bycatch\nrates and mortality in all authorized fisheries and gears, including the southeast drift\ngillnet shark fishery, to continue. However, the final action that requires 100 percent\nobserver coverage in the southeast drift gillnet shark fishery will ensure that any\nbycatch and bycatch mortality is fully monitored and documented (see Section 3.5). To\nthe extent that such bycatch rates and mortality keep overfished species from rebuilding\nor contribute to excessive fishing mortality on other species, this alternative would have\nnegative ecological impacts.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action is the status quo and is not expected to have additional social or\neconomic impacts because fishermen are already operating under these restrictions.\nSeveral states are making efforts to reduce drift gillnet bycatch and bycatch mortalities\nof juvenile sharks, sea turtles, and other valuable finfish. This action will maintain\nenforcement costs and the administrative costs of observer coverage and fishery\nmonitoring.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because, in combination with the final actions to adopt the\nAtlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan regulations and to require 100 percent\nobserver coverage in the southeast drift gillnet shark fishery, concerns regarding high\nbycatch and bycatch mortality rates of marine mammals, sea turtles, and finfish in that\nfishery will be addressed.\nNOTE: There are inconsistencies between the final rule governing the List of\nFisheries and Gear under the Magnuson-Stevens Act (64 FR 4030), the Atlantic\nLarge Whale Take Reduction Plan regulations under the Marine Mammal\nProtection Act (64 FR 7529), and the proposed rule to implement the HMS FMP\n(64 FR 3154) regarding use of strike nets in the shark drift gillnet fishery. NMFS\nwill address these inconsistencies through future regulatory and other actions.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 188","Rejected Options for Authorized Gears\nRejected Option: Status quo authorized gear for tuna\nBefore the implementation of this FMP, the authorized gears in the Atlantic tuna\nfisheries were: rod and reel, handline, harpoon, bandit gear, and purse seine nets.\nDriftnets were also allowed for tunas other than bluefin. Incidental catches of bluefin\ntuna were allowed for vessels fishing with longlines, purse seine nets targeting herring\nand menhaden, fixed gear, and traps. This alternative would maintain this status quo\nfor authorized gear types in the Atlantic tuna fishery.\nEcological Impacts\nThe ecological impacts of the status quo can be found in the Description of\nFisheries section of the FMP (Chapter 2), as well as the Social Impact Assessment\n(Chapter 9). The impacts of allowing the use driftnets for Atlantic tunas (other than\nbluefin) are also described in the Final Action above.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would not be expected to have any additional social or economic\nimpacts because fishermen are already operating under these measures. There are no\nsignificant safety implications associated with this alternative.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected in favor of the Final Action above.\nRejected Option: Allow spearguns as an authorized gear in the Atlantic tunas fishery\nThis alternative would add spearguns to the list of authorized gears in the Atlantic\ntunas fishery. At the 1993 public hearings on the proposed list of authorized gears in\nthe Atlantic tuna fishery, no comments were received from spear fishermen and the\nregulations were made final without listing spear guns as an authorized gear. Since\nimplementation of the final rule on authorized gear types in the bluefin tuna fisheries,\nNMFS has received several written requests and presentations at AP meetings to\nauthorize spear fishing gear for the Atlantic tunas fisheries. Several spearfishermen\nexpressed an interest in participating in the winter bluefin fishery in North Carolina.\nUnder this alternative, speargun fishermen would be permitted in either the Angling\ncategory or the Charter/headboat category.\nEcological Impacts\nGiven the quota system in place for bluefin tuna, this alternative would not result in\nadditional bluefin tuna landings. The potential increase in landings for other Atlantic\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 189","tunas would be minimal compared with the landings by current participants. This is\nunderscored by public comment and written comments submitted to NMFS from\nspearfishermen that suggest that fewer than twenty fishermen would be expected to use\nthis gear type. Furthermore, many speargun fishermen have reported to NMFS at\npublic meetings that they expect encounter rates with the target species to be very low,\nand that an individual fisherman could expect to fish for months or years without\ncatching a tuna. However, west Atlantic bluefin tuna and most other Atlantic tunas are\nalready overfished or fully-fished, and allowing new gear types and fisheries for these\nspecies would not be consistent with NMFS' objective to rebuild overfished stocks and\nprevent overfishing of healthy stocks, and other measures in this FMP to control fishing\neffort and limit gear types. There are also concerns that allowing spearguns to be used\nin the Atlantic tunas fishery would increase discards. These concerns stem from the\nfact that some fish which are speared may free themselves of the dart, but would most\nlikely be mortally wounded.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThe economic impacts of allowing spearguns as an authorized gear type would\nlikely be minimal. Allowing bluefin tuna to be caught with spearguns under the\nAngling category quota would reduce the amount of quota available for rod and reel\nanglers, which could result in reduced angler consumer surplus for the recreational\nsector. This could be offset by added angler consumer surplus for spearfishermen.\nAtlantic bluefin tuna and most other Atlantic tunas are subject to intense\ncompetition between user groups. Allocating bluefin tuna quota for an additional gear\ntype could result in increased competition for a fishery which already has excess\ncapacity relative to its quota. When the issue of spearguns was discussed by the HMS\nAP, panel members and members of the public expressed safety concerns about rod and\nreel vessels and divers fishing in the same area. Due to certain \"Rules of the Road\" for\nnavigation, divers must be given a wide berth at sea, and this raises safety issues due to\npotential gear conflicts between the recreational/commercial fleets and the\nspearfishermen, particularly during the North Carolina winter fishery for bluefin tuna.\nHowever, spearfishermen contest that because they must be able to surface quickly\nwhile freediving, and because of the danger of gear entanglement, divers would not fish\nin the same areas as rod and reel or longline vessels.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected. As mentioned above, allowing new gear types and\nfisheries for these species would not be consistent with objectives to rebuild overfished\nstocks and to prevent overfishing. NMFS has recently denied petitions or requests for\nadditional allowable gear types and fisheries for Atlantic tunas on these grounds (i.e.,\npair trawls and commercial handgear in the North Carolina winter fishery for bluefin\ntuna). The addition of spearguns as an authorized gear type in the Atlantic tuna fishery\ncould also increase user group conflict and safety concerns. The HMS AP heard\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 190","comments from the public at multiple meetings, and discussed the issue without\nreaching consensus.\n3.4.4\nFishing Year\nThe following alternatives consider implications of changing the fishing year in HMS\nfisheries. Alternatives relating to the scheduling of the fishing year are not likely to have\nsignificant safety implications, however, ecological, social, and economic impacts are\ndiscussed below.\nFinal Action:\nFishing year begins June 1 and Ends May 31 for tuna and swordfish;\nfishing year begins January 1 and ends December 31 for sharks\nEach November, the United States participates in negotiations at ICCAT to manage the\ntuna, swordfish, and billfish fisheries. In the following months, NMFS issues regulations or\ntakes other action to implement ICCAT recommendations. As part of the rulemaking\nprocess, it may be necessary to conduct analyses, draft regulations and accompanying\ndocuments, and hold a series of public hearings, before an ICCAT recommendation can be\nimplemented. A SAFE report will be prepared annually in January/February and AP\nmeetings may also be necessary. It is difficult to complete these tasks thoroughly in\nsufficient time for fishery participants to be aware of how the regulations may change for the\nupcoming fishing year, particularly if the fishing year commences almost immediately after\nthe ICCAT meeting (January 1). This action shifts the start of the fishing year for tunas to\nJune 1, giving both NMFS and fishery participants adequate time to develop and consider\nconservation and management measures that will implement ICCAT recommendations\neffectively. Since sharks are not currently subject to ICCAT management authority, the\ncalendar year is maintained.\nEcological Impacts\nThis action is not expected to have any ecological impacts. It should not necessarily\nchange the time of the year or the areas in which HMS are caught. For bluefin tuna, the\nGeneral and Harpoon category seasons will still open June 1 of each year, and the Purse\nSeine category will open August 15 and run through December 31 or until the quota is\nlanded. For tunas other than bluefin, Purse Seine vessels may fish from June 1 through\nDecember 31, as long as they have bluefin quota remaining.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action is expected to have positive social and economic impacts on participants in\nthe Atlantic tunas fisheries. It will allow fishery participants more time to plan their fishing\nactivities, and thus should lend more predictability to fishing-dependent business and income.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 191","Conclusion\nNMFS will implement this final action, based on the management considerations\noutlined above. This action has no significant safety implications. Although NMFS will\ncontinue to report calendar year data to ICCAT for the purposes of stock assessment, fishing\nyear data will be used to determine the United States' compliance with ICCAT quotas.\nRejected Options for the Fishing Year\nRejected Option: Status quo fishing year\nUnder this alternative, the fishing year for sharks and Atlantic tunas would remain\nJanuary 1 through December 31. The swordfish fishing year would remain June 1 through\nMay 31. For Atlantic tunas, the General and Harpoon categories do not open until June 1,\nand the Purse Seine category does not open until August 15, but the \"fishing year\" ends\nDecember 31 for these categories as well.\nEcological Impacts\nThe shark fishing year is split into two semi-annual seasons, January 1 through June 30\nand July 1 through December 31. The quota is split evenly between the semi-annual\nseasons, and this FMP authorizes NMFS to deduct quota overharvests and add quota\nunderharvests from one semi-annual season from the quota for the same semi-annual season\nthe following year. Prior to this FMP, overharvests or underhavests could not be carried\nacross fishing years.\nThe north Atlantic swordfish fishing year is currently split into two semi-annual\nseasons, June 1 through November 31 and December 1 through May 31. The longline/\nharpoon quota is split evenly between the seasons with an annual Incidental catch quota.\nNMFS may deduct quota overharvests and add quota underharvests to the following\nfishing year or semi-annual season, whichever is reasonable (i.e., deduct first semi-annual\noverharvest from second semi-annual season, deduct second semi-annual season overharvest\nfrom following fishing year). SCRS assessments are completed and new TAC and other\nmeasures are recommended by ICCAT in November, allowing time to implement\nmanagement measures prior to the start of the following fishing year on June 1.\nThe fishing year for Atlantic tunas begins January 1, although the General and Harpoon\nfisheries for bluefin tuna open June 1, and the Purse Seine fishery for bluefin tuna opens\nAugust 15. The Angling, Longline, and Trap categories do open on January 1, and the\nICCAT schedule makes it difficult to implement ICCAT recommendations by the start of\nthe fishing year.\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 192","Social and Economic Impacts\nWithout sufficient time to implement ICCAT recommendations before the start of the\nfishing year for some fisheries, it can be difficult for fishermen to plan, and participate in the\nprocess of implementation of ICCAT recommendations.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected. The fishing years for HMS start at different times of the\nyear, causing confusion when referring to fishing years, especially those fisheries subject to\nICCAT management authority. In addition, it is difficult for NMFS to implement ICCAT\nrecommendations for tunas in time for the January 1 fishing year since the ICCAT meeting\nis in November. There are no significant safety implications associated with this alternative.\n3.5 A Strategy for Bycatch Reduction in HMS Fisheries\n3.5.1 Introduction\nBycatch has become a central concern of fishing industries, resource managers,\nscientists, and the public, both nationally and globally. A 1994 report of the Food and\nAgriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations estimated that the nearly one-quarter\n(27 million metric tons) of the total world catch by commercial fishing operations was\ndiscarded (Alverson et al., 1994). Bycatch from recreational fisheries was not quantified in\nthe FAO report, but anglers also discard (dead and alive) millions of fish each year. Bycatch\ncan result in death or injury to the discarded fish, and it is essential that this component of\ntotal fishing-related mortality be incorporated into fish stock assessments and evaluation of\nmanagement measures.\nBycatch precludes other more productive uses of fishery resources; it is particularly\nimportant to minimize the waste associated with bycatch when so many of the world's\nfisheries are either fully exploited or overexploited. Although not all discarded fish die,\nwhen bycatch becomes a source of fishing mortality it can slow the rebuilding of overfished\nstocks. Bycatch imposes direct and indirect costs on fishing operations by increasing\nsorting time and decreasing the amount of gear available to catch target species. Bycatch\nconcerns also apply to populations of marine mammals, sea turtles, seabirds and other\ncomponents of ecosystems for which there are no commercial or recreational uses.\nIn 1998, NMFS developed a national bycatch plan, Managing the Nation's Bycatch\n(NMFS 1998c), which includes programs, activities, and recommendations for federally\nmanaged fisheries. That plan establishes a definition of bycatch as fishery discards, retained\nincidental catch, and unobserved mortalities resulting from a direct encounter with fishing\ngear. The Magnuson-Stevens Act defines bycatch as fish which are harvested in a fishery,\nbut which are not sold or kept for personal use, and includes economic and regulatory\ndiscards. NMFS bases all bycatch discussions in this FMP on the Magnuson-Stevens Act\ndefinition of bycatch. In this FMP, NMFS responds to recommendations made by the\nChapter 3 - Measures for Directed Fishing - 193","NMFS bycatch plan by seeking to improve data on the character and magnitude of bycatch\nin HMS fisheries, funding research on gear deployment methods, working cooperatively\nwith the fishing industry, and reducing bycatch of tunas and undersized swordfish. This\nsection of the FMP, provides a bycatch reduction strategy for Atlantic HMS fisheries (tunas,\nsharks, and swordfish). Bycatch in the billfish fishery is addressed in Amendment One to\nthe Atlantic Billfish FMP (NMFS, 1999a), although measures to reduce billfish bycatch will\nlikely be implemented in HMS regulations/amendments\n3.5.1.1 Bycatch Reduction and The Magnuson-Stevens Act\nNational Standard 9 requires that fishery conservation and management measures\nshall, to the extent practicable, minimize bycatch and minimize the mortality of bycatch\nthat cannot be avoided. In many fisheries, it is not practicable to eliminate all bycatch\nand bycatch mortality. The Magnuson-Stevens Act defines bycatch as:\nfish that are harvested in a fishery, but are not sold or kept for personal\nuse, and includes economic discards and regulatory discards. [Bycatch]\ndoes not include fish released alive under a recreational catch and\nrelease fishery management program.\nSome relevant examples of fish that are included in the Magnuson-Stevens Act's\ndefinition of bycatch are Atlantic billfish caught and discarded by commercial fishing\ngear (unless they are tagged and released alive); undersized swordfish and BAYS tunas\ncaught and discarded by recreational or commercial fishermen; species for which there\nis little or no market and are therefore discarded, such as blue sharks; and most sharks\nthat are not landed (including fish hooked and lost, or fish released at the boat - whether\nor not the fish was tagged). A recreational catch and release fishery management\nprogram is one in which the retention of a particular species caught with recreational\nfishing gear is prohibited (National Standard Guidelines, 63 FR 24235; May 1, 1998).\nSome relevant examples of fish that would not be considered bycatch are white\nsharks caught in recreational fisheries because that fishery is, by regulation, a catch and\nrelease fishery only, and billfish and tunas that are caught, tagged, and released by\ncommercial fishing vessels. This provision applies to billfish and bluefin tuna that are\ncaught by longline vessels and released alive under the Southeast Fisheries Science\nCenter's Cooperative Tagging Center.\nNMFS recognizes that recreational anglers have voluntarily reduced landings of\nAtlantic billfish since the 1988 Atlantic Billfish FMP, by relying heavily on catch and\nrelease. Including Atlantic billfish that are recreationally caught and voluntarily\nreleased by recreational fishermen in the definition of bycatch is counterproductive\nbecause release of a live fish is a beneficial event. Each released fish provides multiple\nrecreational opportunities and social and economic benefits without adversely\nimpacting the stocks, if and only if the probability of surviving catch and release is\nhigh. Based on fishing and handling techniques currently used by recreational anglers,\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 194","the survival rate of billfish is probably in excess of 90 percent. Scientific studies\nsummarized in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.5.2.2 of the Amendment One to the Atlantic\nBillfish FMP corroborate this estimate of release survival.\nTherefore, NMFS is encouraging further catch and release of Atlantic billfish by\nestablishing a recreational catch-and-release fishery management program. The\nfollowing factors support establishment of a catch-and-release program in the\nrecreational Atlantic billfish fishery: 1) the exclusively recreational nature of the\ndirected Atlantic billfish fishery; 2) the already-existing high rate of release of live fish\nin this recreational fishery; 3) the high rate (likely in excess of 90 percent) of survival\nof recreationally caught-and-released fish; and 4) the high economic benefit of each fish\ncaught. Further, NMFS believes that establishing a catch-and-release fishery in this\nsituation will further foster the already existing catch-and-release ethic of the\nrecreational billfish fishermen, thereby increasing release of billfish caught in this\nfishery. Through this program, recreational billfish catch and release is not bycatch.\nNMFS will work with the Advisory Panels to consider such an approach for other\nhighly migratory species.\nNMFS has evaluated all final actions in this FMP in terms of their effect on the\namount and type of bycatch according to the following criteria: impacts on affected\nstocks; incomes accruing to participants in the directed fisheries in both the short and\nlong term; incomes accruing to participants in fisheries that target the bycatch species;\nenvironmental consequences; non-market values of bycatch species, which include non-\nconsumptive use and existence values; and impacts on other marine organisms. NMFS\nhas also analyzed the extent to which further reductions in bycatch are practicable,\ntaking into account the following factors: effects on the populations of bycatch species;\npotential effects on other species in the ecosystem, including marine mammals, sea\nturtles, and birds; changes in fishing and marketing costs; changes in fishing practices;\neffects on research, administration, and enforcement costs; impacts on management\neffectiveness; effects on safety at sea; changes in the economic, social, or cultural value\nof fishing activities and non-consumptive uses of fishery resources; changes in the\ndistribution of benefits and costs; and social impacts.\nThere are many benefits associated with the reduction of bycatch, including the\nreduction of uncertainty concerning total fishing-related mortality, which improves\nNMFS' ability to assess the status of stocks, to determine the appropriate optimum\nyield, and to ensure that overfishing levels are not exceeded. NMFS recognizes that it\nis also important to consider bycatch of HMS as a source of mortality, especially\nsharks, from fisheries that target species other than HMS (e.g., shrimp trawl and\nmenhaden purse seine fisheries). To support rebuilding overfished stocks and maintain\nsustainable fisheries, NMFS is committed to working with fishery constituents on an\neffective, flexible bycatch strategy. This strategy includes a combination of\nmanagement measures in the domestic fishery, and if appropriate, will consider multi-\nlateral measures at ICCAT and other international fora (e.g., FAO Shark Global Plan of\nAction). The bycatch in each fishery will be summarized annually in the SAFE report\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 195","for HMS fisheries. NMFS will evaluate the effectiveness of the bycatch reduction\nmeasures based on this summary. Any regulatory changes will be made using the\nframework in Section 3.10.\nA limited number of tools are currently available for bycatch reduction in HMS\nfisheries, all of which are being used. There are probably no fisheries in which there is\nno bycatch because none of the currently legal fishing gears are perfectly selective for\nthe target of each fishing operation (with the possible exception of the swordfish\nharpoon fishery). Therefore, to eliminate bycatch of every species in HMS fisheries\nwould require eliminating fishing. That is unrealistic, unnecessary, and inconsistent\nwith the intent of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. So, the challenge becomes one of\nmanaging the kinds of gear, their configuration, and how, when, and where they are\noperated; and the disposition of each species caught in such a way that the unintended\ncatch is reduced, the survival of the catch is maximized, and the sustainable use of\nbycatch is achieved where appropriate. HMS fisheries are currently limited to the\nfollowing gear types: rod and reel and other handgear, longline, purse seine, and\nharpoon for tunas; handgear, longline, squid trawl, and harpoon for swordfish; and\nhandgear, longline, drift gillnet, and rod and reel for sharks. Recent attempts to\nintroduce new fishing gears that also have bycatch have not succeeded (e.g., pair\ntrawls). Some gear has recently been prohibited (swordfish driftnets), and this FMP\nprohibits driftnets used for tunas and focuses additional data collection on shark drift\ngillnets. Possible gear modifications that may reduce bycatch and bycatch mortality are\nbeing researched and considered (e.g., circle hooks).\nManaging when and where fisheries operate is an effective tool for reducing\nbycatch. Recent attempts to close critical habitats to protect fish from directed and\nincidental fishing gear have been successful. Closures have been implemented in\nOculina Banks, in the Flower Garden Sanctuary, and in reef fish stressed areas.\nAdditional time/area closures are being implemented in this FMP and even more will\nbe considered in 1999 through frameworking.\nThe sustainable use of bycatch species may encourage fishermen to retain such\nspecies. Often, catch is discarded in a fishery because of undesirable species, size, sex,\nor quality, or for other reasons, including economic discards (e.g., blue sharks). If\ncertain species could be marketed, then they would be retained, not discarded, and\ntherefore would not be considered bycatch.\n3.5.1.2 Bycatch Reduction and the Marine Mammal Protection Act\nThe Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 is the principal Federal legislation that\nguides marine mammal species protection and conservation policy. Under\nrequirements of the MMPA, NMFS produces an annual List of Fisheries that classifies\ndomestic commercial fisheries, by gear type, relative to their rates of incidental\nmortality or serious injury of marine mammals. The List of Fisheries includes three\nclassifications:\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 196","Category I fisheries are those with frequent serious injury or mortality to marine\nmammals (pelagic longline);\nCategory II fisheries are those with occasional serious injury or mortality (shark\ndrift gillnet); and\nCategory III fisheries are those with remote likelihood of serious injury or mortality\nto marine mammals (shark bottom longline, charterboat rod and reel, purse seine,\nharpoon).\nFishermen participating in Category I or II fisheries are required to be registered\nunder the MMPA and if selected, to accommodate an observer aboard their vessels\n(Table 3.27). Vessel owners or operators, or fishermen, in the case of nonvessel, in\nCategory I, II, or III fisheries must report all incidental mortalities and injuries of\nmarine mammals during the course of commercial fishing operations to NMFS\nHeadquarters. There are currently no regulations requiring recreational fishermen to\nreport takes, nor are they authorized to have incidental takes (i.e., they are illegal).\nNMFS does require reporting and authorizes takes by charter/headboat fishermen\n(considered \"commercial\" by the MMPA), however, no reports have been submitted to\nNMFS to date.\nIn 1995, the reauthorization of the MMPA established the Take Reduction Team\nprocess which allows development of Take Reduction Plans for Category I and II\nfisheries. Take reduction teams are made up of individuals who represent the span of\ninterests affected by the strategies to reduce takes, including commercial and\nrecreational fishing industries, fishery management councils, interstate commissions,\nacademic and scientific organizations, state officials, environmental groups, Native\nAlaskans or other Native American interests, if appropriate, and NMFS representatives.\nThe immediate goal of a take reduction plan is to reduce, within six months of its\nimplementation, the incidental take of affected marine mammal stocks to below their\npotential biological removal levels. The long-term goal of a take reduction plan is to\nreduce, within five years, the incidental take of marine mammals to insignificant levels\napproaching zero mortality and serious injury rates. Take Reduction Plans are adopted\nby consensus and forwarded to the Secretary of Commerce with recommendations for\nimplementation. Take reduction teams relevant to HMS fisheries include the Atlantic\nOffshore Cetacean Take Reduction Team (developed to address takes by pelagic\nlongline, pelagic driftnet, and pair trawls) and the Atlantic Large Whale Take\nReduction Team (developed to address takes by shark drift gillnets, among other gears.)\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 197","Table 3.27 Reporting Requirements of the MMPA\nCategory I Fisheries\nCategory II Fisheries\nCategory III Fisheries\n(frequent serious injury or\n(occasional serious injury or\n(remote likelihood of incidental\nmortality to marine mammals)\nmortality to marine mammals)\nmortality or serious injury to\nmarine mammals)\nPelagic Driftnet and Pelagic\nShark Drift Gillnet Fishery\nShark Bottom Longline,\nLongline Fisheries\nPurse Seine, Commercial Rod\nand Reel, Harpoon Fisheries\nmust report all incidental\nmust report all incidental\nmust report all incidental\nmortalities and injuries of\nmortalities and injuries of\nmortalities and injuries of\nmarine mammals during the\nmarine mammals during the\nmarine mammals during the\ncourse of commercial\ncourse of commercial\ncourse of commercial\nfishing operations to NMFS\nfishing operations to NMFS\nfishing operations to NMFS\nHeadquarters\nHeadquarters\nHeadquarters\nmust be registered under the\nmust be registered under the\nMMPA\nMMPA\nmust, upon request,\nmust, upon request,\naccommodate an observer\naccommodate an observer\naboard their vessels\naboard their vessels\nmust comply with any\nmust comply with any\nimplementing regulations of\nimplementing regulations of\napplicable take reduction\napplicable take reduction\nplans\nplans\n3.5.1.3 Bycatch Reduction and the Endangered Species Act\nThe Endangered Species Act (ESA) is the primary federal legislation governing\ninteractions between fisheries and species whose continued existence is threatened or\nendangered. Through a consultative process, the ESA allows federal agencies to\nevaluate proposed actions in light of the impacts they could have on these ESA-listed\nspecies. In the case of marine fisheries, NMFS Office of Sustainable Fisheries consults\nwith the Office of Protected Resources to determine what impacts major fishery\nmanagement actions will have on endangered populations of marine species and what\nactions can be taken to reduce or eliminate negative impacts. Under the consultative\nprocess, NMFS issues a Biological Opinion which outlines expected impacts of the\nproposed action and specifies terms and conditions which must be met to mitigate\nimpacts on ESA-listed species.\nIn the recent past, NMFS has been operating under conditions of a Biological\nOpinion/Incidental Take Statement that include reasonable and prudent measures for\navoiding the likelihood of placing an endangered species in jeopardy.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 198","Some requirements of the Biological Opinion that may have regulatory implications\ninclude :\nfive percent observer coverage for pelagic longline vessels under stratified random\nsampling scheme;\n100 percent observer coverage for shark drift gillnets during right whale season;\nEducational workshops for vessel operators;\nA workgroup to evaluate potential management actions to reduce sea turtle takes;\nDistribute turtle release techniques;\nEvaluate observer coverage for adequacy of protected resources;\nImplement limited access; and\nAssess the potential use of VMS in the shark drift gillnet fishery.\nUnder the terms of the Incidental Take Statement, a fishery is limited to the\nfollowing sea turtle takes. A \"take\" does not imply a dead turtle, rather an interaction\nof any sort with a sea turtle. The incidental take levels will be based on an annual\nestimated number:\nPelagic Longline Fishery\n690 leatherback turtles entangled or hooked, of which no more than 11 are observed\nhooked by ingestion or moribund when released.\n1541 loggerhead turtles entangled or hooked, of which no more than 23 are\nobserved moribund when released.\n46 green turtles entangled or hooked, of which no more than two are observed\nhooked by ingestion or moribund when released.\n23 Kemp's ridley turtles entangled or hooked, of which no more than one is\nobserved hooked by ingestion or moribund when released.\nShark Drift Gillnet Fishery (annual estimated number)\n20 loggerhead turtles\n2 leatherback turtles\n2 Kemp's ridley turtles\n2 green turtles\n2 hawksbill turtles\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 199","3.5.2\nEvaluation and Monitoring of Bycatch\nThe identification and quantification of bycatch in HMS fisheries is the first step in\nreducing bycatch and bycatch mortality. The Magnuson-Stevens Act requires the amount\nand type of bycatch to be summarized in the annual SAFE reports.\nPelagic longline dead discards for swordfish, billfish, large coastal sharks and pelagic\nsharks are estimated using data from NMFS observer reports and pelagic logbook reports.\n(For more information, see Cramer and Adams, 1998a). Coastal driftnet and shark drift\ngillnet discards will be estimated using logbook data for the annual SAFE report.\nThere is concern about the accuracy of discard estimates in the rod and reel HMS\nrecreational fishery due to the low number of observations by the Large Pelagic Survey.\nThese bycatch estimates (expanded based on observations and total fishing effort) are not\ncurrently available, except for bluefin tuna in 1997. For some species, encounters are\nconsidered rare events which might result in bycatch estimates with considerable uncertainty.\nBycatch estimates of rod and reel data can also be estimated using tournament reports.\nNMFS has not estimated swordfish harpoon bycatch estimates. NMFS has limited\nobserver data on harpooned swordfish from driftnet trips in which harpoons were sometimes\nused. However, swordfish harpoon fishermen are required to submit pelagic logbooks and\nNMFS will examine those data for use in estimating bycatch. NMFS has not estimated\nbluefin tuna harpoon bycatch estimates because these tuna fishermen have not been selected\nto submit logbooks. NMFS has not estimated bycatch in the General category commercial\nrod and reel bluefin tuna fishery although anecdotal evidence indicates that undersized\nbluefin tuna may be captured. Studies of release mortality are ongoing.\nThe following table summarizes currently available information regarding bycatch in\nHMS fisheries. Data regarding the catch of HMS in other fisheries are sparse and will be\naddressed on a limited basis in this document. NMFS continues to assemble existing data\non the incidental catch of HMS (particularly for sharks) in other fisheries, and to initiate new\nmeasures that require monitoring of their effects on bycatch mortality stock-wide (e.g.,\nmeasures such as prohibiting species and implementing minimum sizes for sharks).\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 200","Bycatch and Bycatch Mortality Data\nRequire logbook reporting for Charter\nauthorized to select charter vessels for\nCollection Changes in this FMP\nlogbook reporting and all recreational\ntournament reporting form (NMFS is\nRequire Charter/headboat reporting,\ntuna vessels for observer reporting)\nI The quality of discard information was evaluated for each fishery using a 4-point scale where 0=no information available; 1= unverified harvester or incidental observer reports; 2 = isolated\n4Harpooned swordfish that are sold are indicated on the pelagic logbook. However, these fish have been frequently harpooned on driftnet or pelagic longline vessels and logbook discard\nsnapshots from observer programs; 3= estimation of discards possible with limitations on precision and accuracy; and 4=estimates available with adequate precision and accuracy.\nvessels²\nNone*\nNone2\nNone2\nNone\nNone\nNone\nMagnitude of Bycatch\nAbility to Assess\n0 ->2 23\n1-2\n3\n3\n2\n2\n2\n2\nMarine mammals\nMarine mammals\nMarine mammals\nMarine Mammals\nundersized BFT\n(predominantly\nDiscards\nAvailable Data Regarding Bycatch in HMS Fisheries (based on NMFS, 1998c)\nSea Turtles\nSea turtles\nSea turtles\nAnecdotal:\nSea birds\nUnknown\nSea birds\nFinfish\nFinfish\nFinfish\nFinfish\nFinfish\nFinfish\ntunas)\nunit effort data\n(per set or by #\nBycatch per\navailable ?\nof hooks)\nThe arrow indicates that the current ability increased as a result of final actions in this FMP\n(per set)\n(per trip)\ninformation does not attribute discards to a specific gear type if multiple gears are on board.\n(per set)\n(per set)\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\nNo\nNo\nBycatch data\navailable ?\n(finfish only)\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\n2 NMFS is authorized to select these vessels for observer coverage\nNo\nNo\nMRFSS (April-Oct, ME-TX)\nSnapper-Grouper Logbook\nLPS (June-Nov., VA-ME);\nObserver database (1996\nMultispecies Logbook\nTournament database\nDatabase\nObserver database\nObserver database\n(beginning 7/1/98)\nObserver database\nObserver database\nPelagic Logbook\nPelagic Logbook\nTagging program\nTrent et al study\n(1993-1995)\nonly)\nNone\nNone\ntuna and swordfish)4\nShark Drift Gillnet\nCommercial BAYS\nRecreational HMS\nHarpoon (bluefin\nGear Type\nPelagic Longline\nBottom Longline\nCoastal Driftnet\nPurse Seine\nTable 3.28\n(sharks)\nTunas","3.5.2.1 Bycatch of HMS in All Fisheries\nAs west Atlantic bluefin tuna, bigeye tuna, north Atlantic albacore, north Atlantic\nswordfish, and large coastal sharks are overfished, NMFS particularly seeks to limit\nbycatch mortality on these stocks. Bycatch can occur in any HMS fishery, commercial\nor recreational. The magnitude and the composition of such bycatch is dependent on\nthe gear type, and fishing technique and season.\nBycatch of Bluefin Tuna\nIn 1996, ICCAT recommended that the United States adopt measures designed to\nreduce discards of west Atlantic bluefin tuna in 1997 and 1998. At its 1998 meeting,\nICCAT modified that language to recommend that all Contracting Parties, including the\nUnited States, minimize dead discards of bluefin tuna to the extent practicable. NMFS\nhas considered numerous options to respond to the 1996 and 1998 ICCAT\nrecommendations to minimize discards. The focus of the analyses and policy\nconsiderations has been on pelagic longlines since this gear type is responsible for the\nmajority of dead discards reported by the United States to ICCAT. NMFS is also\ninterested in quantifying bycatch of bluefin tuna in the purse seine, harpoon, and rod\nand reel fisheries and is currently authorized to place observers on these vessels in order\nto collect necessary catch and effort information.\nNMFS provides annual estimates of landings and dead discards of bluefin tuna in\nthe National Report to ICCAT. The dead discard estimates are almost exclusively for\npelagic longline gear. Total longline dead discards, for both the NW Atlantic and the\nGulf of Mexico have decreased from 142 mt in 1995, to 73 mt in 1996, to 37 mt in\n1997. Estimates of bluefin tuna discards from the pelagic longline fishery were\nbased on dockside interviews expanded to landings for time-area strata for which data\nwere available (primarily the southeastern United States). From 1987 through 1991,\nbluefin tuna discard estimates for U.S. pelagic longline gear were made by multiplying\n1) logbook information on the ratio of bluefin tuna total catch (landings plus discards)\nto the logbook reported landings of large pelagic species by 2) the dockside information\nof landings of those same species. Subsequently, it was observed that the former\nestimation procedure resulted in estimates that were virtually identical to tallies of\ndiscards in the logbook reports, so NMFS is now using a simple tabulation of reported\ndiscards (for number of fish discarded), using average weights from observer data.\nIn 1996 and 1997, both logbook and observer data were used in this fashion to\ntabulate longline bluefin tuna discards. Bluefin tuna dead discards by pelagic longline\nvessels declined 48 percent in 1996 from 1995, and an additional 50 percent in 1997.\nThese reductions are due, in part, to reductions in quotas for the fisheries in which these\ndead discards occur (i.e., the shark quota was reduced by 50 percent in 1997, and the\nswordfish quota has been reduced by 30 percent from 1992 to 1998). Despite the recent\ndecline of bluefin tuna discards from the U.S. longline fleet, discards of bluefin tuna\ncontinue to occur. Tagging studies of HMS released from pelagic longline gear have\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 202","not provided data on survival rates due to many factors involved in preventing reporting\nof recaptured fish, for instance, long migration distances may imply international\nrecaptures.\nRecently, NMFS has begun to collect and analyze discard data from other gear\ntypes. Dead discard data reported to ICCAT in 1996 included 4 mt of driftnet bluefin\ntuna dead discards, and 1997 data included estimates of rod and reel dead discards\n(14.6 mt). Observers on purse seine vessels in 1996 did report several bluefin tuna\ndiscards, but it generally could not be determined whether the fish were alive or dead\n(there were no observers on purse seine vessels in 1997 or 1998). Discard data are\ngenerally unavailable for several other fisheries, including the harpoon fishery.\nLogbooks from the reef fish and grouper-snapper fisheries were also reviewed in 1996\nand 1997, but no bluefin tuna discards were reported. NMFS is exploring options for\nimproving monitoring and reporting of bluefin tuna dead discards from all gear types.\nIt is important to recognize that when comparing past estimates of dead discards\nreported to ICCAT to future estimates for detecting trends, the past estimates have, for\nthe most part, only included dead discards from pelagic longlines. For example, it\nwould be inappropriate to conclude that dead discards have not changed if the total\nestimate of dead discards were to remain at the same level, when the new estimate may\ninclude additional gear types. Refer to Table 3.48 for a summary of reported dead\ndiscards, quotas and landings of bluefin tuna for 1992 through 1997, as reported to\nICCAT in the 1997 and 1998 National Reports of the United States to ICCAT.\nMany constituents believe that large numbers of bluefin tuna discards are a result of\nthe regulations governing this fishery and that NMFS and the United States can\nalleviate these discards by changing the regulations. Longline dead discards, although\ndocumented and reported to ICCAT, do not currently count against the overall landing\nquota allocated to the Longline category or to the United States, although they are\nincorporated into stock assessments and are taken off the overall Total Allowable Catch\nbefore landings quotas are allocated at ICCAT. The 1998 ICCAT recommendation for\nwest Atlantic bluefin tuna establishes a dead discard allowance of 79 mt for the west\nAtlantic, 68 mt of which was allocated to the United States. The 1998 ICCAT\nrecommendation also provides that if a nation exceeds its discard allowance in one\nyear, that nation must deduct the excess from its following year's landing quota. If the\nactual amount of dead discards is less than the allowance, one-half of the difference\nmay be added to the allocation of catch that can be retained.\nU.S. regulations prohibit directed fishing on bluefin tuna with longline gear.\nHowever limited landings by longline vessels are allowed, incidental to other target\nfisheries and subject to target catch requirements. An owner or operator of a vessel that\nhas a Longline category Atlantic Tunas Permit may retain, possess, land, or sell large\nmedium and giant bluefin tuna taken incidentally in fishing for other species. Limits on\nsuch retention/possession/landing/sale are as follows:\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 203","1. For landings south of 34°00' N, one large medium or giant bluefin tuna per vessel\nper trip may be landed, provided that for the months of January through April at\nleast 1,500 pounds (680 kg), and for the months of May through December at least\n3,500 pounds (1,588 kg), either dressed weight or whole weight, of species other\nthan bluefin tuna are legally caught, retained, and offloaded from the same trip and\nare recorded on the dealer weighout slip as sold.\n2. For landings north of 34°00' N, landings per vessel per trip of large medium and\ngiant bluefin tuna may not exceed two percent by weight, either dressed weight or\nwhole weight, of all other fish legally caught, retained, and offloaded from the same\ntrip and which are recorded on the dealer weighout slip as sold.\nBycatch of BAYS\nThere are few data regarding bycatch of Atlantic tunas other than bluefin. BAYS\ntunas are caught incidentally in HMS fisheries, as well as in fishing operations for other\nfisheries (e.g., coastal driftnet and sink gillnet fisheries for bluefish), and the tunas are\nsold along with the targeted species. The pelagic longline fishery discards relatively\nfew yellowfin tuna throughout its range (Table 3.33.). There are some data available on\nrod and reel bycatch of Atlantic tunas, other than bluefin, collected through the Large\nPelagic Survey and the Marine Recreational Fisheries Statistics Survey, but magnitude\nof these figures is extremely low when compared to actual landings figures. This could\nindicate that few undersized fish were discarded, or that the survey does not effectively\ncollect discard information. Tournament reporting requirements will facilitate analysis\nof dead discards of BAYS tunas as these species are sometimes targeted during\ntournament fishing.\nBycatch of Swordfish\nNorth Atlantic swordfish are overfished and therefore NMFS seeks to limit bycatch\nmortality on this stock by the directed swordfish fishery and incidental fisheries (e.g.,\nsquid trawl). The majority of discards, however, are small swordfish in the pelagic\nlongline fishery. ICCAT scientists concluded that if catches of undersized swordfish\nare reduced stock-wide, substantial gains in yield could accrue. To support rebuilding\nof North Atlantic swordfish, NMFS seeks to reduce bycatch of undersized swordfish.\nIncidental catch of undersized swordfish by U.S. pelagic longline fishermen is\nconcentrated in a few areas, considered \"nursery\" areas.\nEssential fish habitat for juvenile and sub-adult swordfish is identified as a much\nlarger area for the purposes of consistency with the Magnuson-Stevens Act\nrequirements. These areas include, but are probably not limited to, the Venezuelan\nBasin, areas in the Gulf of Mexico, and areas off the east coast of Florida and South\nCarolina. Vessels from Spain, Portugal, and other nations reported significant catches\nof undersized swordfish in 1997 (less than 30 percent of total swordfish catch). NMFS\nis completing analyses to identify an effective time/area closure in order to reduce\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 204","bycatch of small swordfish by pelagic longline fishermen and will present these\nalternatives to the HMS Advisory Panel in June 1999.\nUnder the Magnuson-Stevens Act definition, swordfish kept and sold in the squid\ntrawl fishery are not bycatch. However, they are incidental catch and NMFS seeks to\nminimize swordfish interactions with squid trawl gear. Swordfish discarded in the\nsquid fishery, for whatever reason, are considered bycatch. Once the retention limits\nare met, all swordfish are discarded. Swordfish incidental catch data are submitted by\ntrawl vessel operators in pelagic logbooks (landings and discards, Table 3.29), by\nswordfish dealers (landings only, Table 3.30, Figure 3.6), and by observers (landings\nand discards and size distribution of catch). Based on a preliminary analysis of the\nNMFS swordfish quota monitoring database (dealer reports and logbooks) and pelagic\nlogbook database for 1997 catches of swordfish, squid trawl fishermen reported landing\nsix mt dw (eight mt ww). All swordfish were landed in the mid-Atlantic area. The\nfollowing table indicates monthly trends in pounds of dressed swordfish.\nTable 3.29 Number of Swordfish Caught by Squid Trawl Vessels Reported in the Pelagic Logbook,\n1996 and 1997.\nYear\nNumber of\nNumber of\nNumber of Swordfish\nNumber of Swordfish\nTrips Reported\nSwordfish Kept\nReleased Dead\nReleased Alive\n1996\n17\n39\n2\n5\n1997\n17\n33\n22\n4\nTotal\n34\n72\n24\n11\nTable 3.30 Landings of Swordfish in Squid Trawl Fishery in 1997 in pounds dressed weight (based on\ndealer reports).\nJune\nJuly\nAugust\nSeptember\nOctober\nNovember\nDecember\nLandings\n1955\n1824\n2639\n2638\n3105\n1071\n70\nSquid fishermen frequently do not submit catch and effort data through the Pelagic\nLogbook system (except when swordfish are landed) and NMFS continues to assemble\nswordfish bycatch data from the multispecies logbook database. Also, the Pelagic\nLogbook provides very limited data for swordfish interactions with the trawl fishery\n(catch and discards) because the report form is not designed for collecting effort\ninformation for this gear. In 1997, 34 trips, taking place in June to December, were\nidentified as squid trawl trips on pelagic logbook forms. During those trips, a reported\n104 swordfish were caught, 23 percent of those fish (24 swordfish) were discarded\ndead, another nine percent (nine swordfish) were discarded alive. The remainder of the\nswordfish were kept. Thirty percent of the discarded swordfish were caught on trips in\nwhich five swordfish were landed. It is possible these fish were discarded because the\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 205","swordfish bycatch limit for the squid trawl fishery had been reached, or because they\nwere undersized, or for discretionary, economic, or personal reasons. The squid fishery\nis subject to limited observer coverage. NMFS will continue to assemble data and\nmonitor bycatch of swordfish in this fishery to account for all sources of mortality.\nFigure 3.6 Landings of Swordfish by Month in Trawl Fishery (1996 to 1997) based on dealer reports.\n10000\n8000\n6000\n4000\n2000\n1996 Mid-Atlantic\n0\n1997 Northeast Coastal\nJune\nJuly\nAugust\nSept\nOct\n1997 Mid-Atlantic\nNov\nBycatch of Sharks\nBecause large coastal sharks are overfished and small coastal and pelagic sharks are\nfully fished, the bycatch of sharks by HMS fishermen and fishermen participating in\nother fisheries is a concern. Due to the seriously depleted status of some species of\nAtlantic sharks, particularly the dusky, night, and sand tiger sharks, these incidental\ncatches and associated mortality may slow or prevent rebuilding of individual species\nor entire complexes of species to maximum sustainable yield levels. The\nimplementation of a minimum size for ridgeback large coastal sharks in commercial\nfisheries and for all sharks in recreational fisheries will result in regulatory discards of\nundersized sharks being considered bycatch. NMFS identifies the bycatch of sharks in\nnon-HMS fisheries and bycatch of undersized sharks in all fisheries as a priority and\nintends to assemble data from state and federal databases to address this issue. Gears of\nconcern to declining shark populations include trawl, pelagic longline, drift gillnet, and\npurse seine. Bottom longline gear is not currently a concern because most sharks\ncaught in directed bottom longline fisheries are retained; however, the addition of\nseveral species to the prohibited species management unit as well as the ridgeback large\ncoastal sharks minimum size may result in increased bycatch in these fisheries.\nIncreased observer coverage in directed shark bottom longline fisheries and the\nactivities of the Atlantic Coastal Cooperative Statistics Program will be instrumental in\nidentifying and quantifying the bycatch concern for Atlantic sharks.\n3.5.2.2 Finfish Bycatch in HMS Fisheries\nAddressing Bycatch\nThis section outlines finfish bycatch in HMS fisheries; followed by management measures\nto minimize this bycatch.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 206","Pelagic Driftnet Fishery\nThe pelagic driftnet fishery encountered many types of pelagic finfish. Most fish\nwere retrieved dead from the net. Non-target finfish caught in this fishery in 1987 to\n1995 included the following species: bluefin tuna, BAYS tunas, billfish, large coastal\nsharks, and pelagic sharks. Tables 3.31 and 3.32 show discarded finfish in the August\n1998 pelagic driftnet fishery. Bycatch of these species pose a concern due to the\noverfished status of the large coastal sharks, bluefin tuna, and marlin. This gear is now\nprohibited.\nTable 3.31 Discarded Highly Migratory Species Caught\nTable 3.32 Discards of Non-HMS in the Pelagic Driftnet\nin the Pelagic Driftnet Fishery for Swordfish\nFishery in August 1998 (based on 100 percent\nin August 1998.\nobserver coverage)\nSpecies\nWeight of\nSpecies\nWeight (pounds ww)\nDiscarded Fish\n(pounds ww)\nSkipjack Tuna\n42,942\nManta Ray\n45018 +1210\nFalse Albacore\n257\nJellyfish\n220\nBluefin Tuna\n4,805\nFrigate mackerel\n123\nBigeye Tuna\n289\nUnclassified mackerel\n54\nYellowfin Tuna\n256\nStingray\n16\nUnclassified tuna\n45\nDevil ray\n1875\nAlbacore\n89\nCownose ray\n200\nUnclassified Shark\n66,325\nRibbonfish\n3\nBlue shark\n32,961 +2575 fins\nOcean sunfish (mola mola)\n4,940\nScalloped hammerhead\n26,850\nSlender ocean sunfish\n350\nDusky shark\n6,730\nSharptail mola\n200\nBasking shark\n4,760\nUnclassified mola\n100\nUnclassified hammerhead\n2,245\nBluefish\n46\nBigeye thresher\n935\nBull shark\n800\nSmooth hammerhead\n640\nTiger shark\n600\nGreat hammerhead\n300\nShortfin mako\n390\nLongfin mako\n250\nSandbar shark\n725\nBlacktip shark\n60\nUnclassified mako\n25\nWhite marlin\n490\nBlue marlin\n3,390\nSwordfish\n1,723\nUnclassified marlin\n950\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 207","Pelagic Longline Fishery\nAlthough the NMFS Bycatch Plan (NMFS, 1998c) considers all non-target species\nas bycatch, regardless of whether they are kept and sold or discarded, this section will\naddress the bycatch (using Magnuson-Stevens Act) of discarded non-HMS species and\ndiscarded HMS. NMFS views the pelagic longline fishery as a truly multi-species\nfishery and the composition of the catch depends on the fishing area and the season.\nAlthough some species are marketable, they may be discarded for discretionary,\neconomic, or personal reasons. Therefore, commonly caught species such as\ndolphinfish and wahoo are considered as bycatch when they are discarded. The pelagic\nlongline fishery has expanded in many areas to include dolphin and wahoo as \"target\"\nspecies possibly as a result of decreasing swordfish quotas. The following information\n(Tables 3.33, 3.34) is based on pelagic logbook data that fishermen report. NMFS\nreports dead discards only to ICCAT (e.g., U.S. National Report) therefore, NMFS has\ndeveloped methods for accurately estimating dead discards based on observer and\nlogbook data (e.g., Cramer and Adams, 1998a, Table 3.35). NMFS also examines the\ndisposition of all released fish, the total bycatch (dead plus alive), in references such as\nthe Large Pelagic Logbook Newsletter (Cramer and Adams, 1998b).\nTable 3.33 Catch of Yellowfin Tuna in the 1996 pelagic longline fishery reported in pelagic logbooks.\nArea\nNumber Caught\nPercent Kept\nPercent Discarded\nPercent Discarded\nAlive\n(Kept and Discarded)\nDead\nCAR\n780\n85\n0\n13\nGOM\n31,568\n97\n0\n1\nFEC\n762\n96\n1\n1\nSAB\n6,102\n95\n1\n3\nMAB\n10,199\n96\n1\n2\nNEC\n5,860\n97\n0\n1\nNED\n363\n96\n0\n2\nSAR\n79\n97\n0\n2\nNCA\n888\n98\n0\n0\nTUN\n4,558\n96\n0\n2\nTUS\n742\n90\n0\n8\nTOTAL\n61,901\n96\n1\n2\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 208","Table 3.34 Catch of Swordfish in the 1996 pelagic longline fishery reported in pelagic logbooks.\nArea\nNumber Caught\nPercent Kept\nPercent Discarded\nPercent Discarded\n(Kept and Discarded)\nAlive\nDead\nCAR\n12,696\n79\n10\n9\nGOM\n18,710\n68\n18\n13\nFEC\n13,394\n55\n31\n12\nSAB\n15,887\n68\n18\n12\nMAB\n1,924\n78\n9\n11\nNEC\n1,661\n81\n8\n10\nNED\n14,494\n87\n7\n5\nSAR\n722\n90\n4\n5\nNCA\n6,552\n93\n2\n3\nTUN\n4,508\n87\n5\n6\nTUS\n4,088\n95\n2\n2\nTOTAL\n94,636\n75\n14\n9\nTable 3.35\nEstimated Swordfish discarded dead by number of fish and weight in 1997 by pelagic longline\ngear. (Cramer and Adams, 1998a)\nArea\nNumber\nMetric Tons\nGulf of Mexico\n8,642\n100.39\nNorthwest Atlantic\n15,450\n249.89\nCaribbean\n957\n15.97\nGrand Banks\n3,689\n49.33\nSouth Atlantic\n1,359\n21.09\nUnknown\n437\n6.78\n'Estimates based on pelagic logbook and observer data.\nBillfish: NMFS is concerned about the number of billfish caught in the pelagic\nlongline fishery. Because these species are not permitted to be landed, all marlin,\nsailfish, and spearfish must be discarded. However, the relative magnitude and\nfrequency of encounters of billfish with pelagic longline gear (responsible for most of\nthe commercial bycatch of billfish) affect the approach necessary to reduce this\nbycatch. In 1995 (based on observer data), billfish represented a total of 1.26 percent\n(by number) of the pelagic longline catch ( blue marlin - 0.49 percent; white marlin -\n0.49 percent; sailfish - 0.2 percent; and spearfish - 0.07 percent). A total of 69.2\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 209","percent of these billfish were released alive (blue marlin - 74.4 percent; white marlin -\n68.8 percent; sailfish - 58 percent; and spearfish - 64.7 percent).\nTable 3.36\nEstimated Billfish Discarded Dead by Number of Fish and Weight in 1997 by Pelagic\nLongline Gear (Cramer and Adams, 1998a).\nArea\nBlue Marlin\nWhite Marlin\nSailfish\nNumber\nmt ww\nNumber\nMT\nNumber\nmt WW\nGulf of Mexico\n693\n42.39\n638\n12.62\n586\n12.56\nNorthwest Atlantic\n289\n18.23\n561\n11.10\n426\n9.13\nCaribbean\n335\n23.96\n341\n6.5\n145\n3.12\nGrand Banks\n37\n2.26\n23\n0.46\n0\n0\nSouth Atlantic\n668\n40.86\n1877\n37.14\n1488\n31.89\nUnknown\n36\n2.2\n69\n1.37\n49\n1.05\nEstimates based on pelagic logbook and observer data.\nNMFS examined data to identify areas where billfish bycatch may have been\nconcentrated (\"hot spots\") but because billfish are SO widely distributed, these analyses\ndo not produce any \"hot spots.\" Closing certain areas would be relatively ineffective if\nfishermen fish on the \"fringes\" of the closed area. Displaced effort would likely harvest\nas much billfish and target catch would be likely unaffected. Additional investigation\nand discussions are needed to pursue the development of time/area closures that will\nreduce billfish bycatch consistent with all the National Standards. NMFS, aided by the\nHMS and Billfish Advisory Panels, is developing alternatives for a more effective\ntime/area closure to protect small swordfish that may significantly reduce fishing effort\nduring certain times of the year. This closure may benefit billfish by reducing bycatch\nmortality.\nKing mackerel (Scomboromorus cavalla): King mackerel are caught in low numbers\nby pelagic longline fishermen and are typically sold, although they are sometimes\ndiscarded. The impact of this bycatch on king mackerel stocks is sufficiently minimal\nto be acceptable at this time. It is included in mackerel stock assessments conducted\npursuant to the Gulf and south Atlantic mackerel FMP.\nOilfish (Ruvettus pretiosus): Large numbers of oilfish, or escolar, are caught in the\nSoutheast Coastal area, the Caribbean, and the Gulf of Mexico; some are retained,\nothers have been reported as discarded (dead or alive). Based on 1997 pelagic logbook\ndata, 7,192 oilfish were reported caught in the pelagic longline fishery. Of these, 77\npercent were kept. Of the oilfish that were discarded, 56 percent were reported\ndiscarded alive. Bycatch of oilfish may need to be addressed if the mortality increases.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 210","This species has been receiving negative attention in the press due to its purgative\neffects, which may prompt fishermen to discard more oilfish than they had previously.\nLarge coastal and pelagic sharks: Several species of large coastal (dusky, silky,\nhammerhead, and night) and pelagic sharks (mako, thresher, porbeagle and blue) are\nfrequently caught in pelagic longline fisheries; some are retained due to high fin and\nmeat market value, others are reported as discarded (dead or alive). Based on pelagic\nlogbook data, in 1996, approximately 360 mt dw of large coastal sharks (primarily\nsandbar and blacktip sharks) and 200 mt dw of pelagic sharks (primarily mako) were\nlanded, whereas approximately 64 mt WW of large coastal sharks (primarily dusky,\nsilky, and unidentified sharks) and 840 mt WW of pelagic sharks (primarily blue sharks)\nwere discarded dead in pelagic longline fisheries (Cramer et al., 1997). Because large\ncoastal sharks are overfished and pelagic sharks are fully fished, NMFS seeks to\nminimize interactions between these species and pelagic longline gear.\nTable 3.37 Estimated Sharks Discarded Dead by Number of Fish and Weight in 1997 by Pelagic Longline\nGear (Cramer and Adams, 1998a). 1\nArea\nNumber\nMetric Tons\nGulf of Mexico\n1,578\n44.75\nNorthwest Atlantic\n7,121\n257.22\nCaribbean\n738\n24.35\nGrand Banks\n3,459\n86.73\nSouth Atlantic\n453\n15.67\nUnknown Area\n166\n5.58\n'Estimates based on pelagic logbook and observer data.\nBottom Longline Fishery\nFrom 1994 through 1996, observer data indicate that approximately 3.2 percent of\nthe catch (546 fish) in directed bottom longline sets targeting sharks consisted of\nfinfish. Eight species comprised 90 percent of finfish species bycatch including, in\norder of occurrence, snappers/groupers, red drum, cobia/dolphin, catfish, eel, barracuda,\ntuna/swordfish, and jacks (Branstetter and Burgess, 1998a.). Marketable species such\nas snapper/ grouper and dolphin are usually retained. Bycatch in this fishery does not\ncurrently have a significant impact on any of the bycatch species, however, it may need\nto be addressed if bycatch mortality increases.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 211","Rod and Reel Fishery\nBycatch in the rod and reel fisheries (commercial and recreational) is varied.\nInformation is collected by the Large Pelagic Survey (dockside and telephone surveys)\nand by the Marine Recreational Fisheries Statistical Survey. These \"raw\" data can be\nsummarized by area, however, actual number of fish discarded for many species, is SO\nlow, that presenting these data by area may be misleading, particularly if expansion\nestimates are made in the future. Therefore, NMFS presents the \"raw\" data for bycatch\nspecies in the rod and reel fishery in summary format (for all areas) in Table 3.38. In\nthe commercial bluefin rod and reel fishery, other tunas species or undersized bluefin\ntuna may be caught as bycatch, however these vessels have not been selected in the\nrecent past for observer coverage. In the recreational rod and reel fishery, it is difficult\nto discuss \"bycatch\" because many fishermen value the experience of fishing and may\nnot be targeting a particular pelagic species. Recreational \"marlin\" or \"tuna\" trips may\nyield dolphin, tunas, wahoo, and other species, both undersized and legally sized\nindividuals. Bluefin trips may yield undersized bluefin or a seasonal closure may\nprevent landing of bluefin tuna above the minimum size.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 212","Table\n3.38 Reported Discards of HMS in the Rod and Reel Fishery. (Based on 1997 Large Pelagic Survey,\nfrom 3538 total dockside intercepts)\nSpecies\nNumber of Fish\nNumber of Fish\nNumber of Fish\nKept\nDiscarded Alive\nDiscarded Dead\nWhite Marlin\n7\n203\n0\nBlue Marlin\n2\n30\n0\nSailfish²\n0\n2\n0\nSwordfish\n5\n6\n0\nBluefin tuna\n749\n1,181\n123\nBigeye tuna\n17\n6\n6\nYellowfin tuna\n1,632\n224\n8\nSkipjack tuna\n285\n468\n60\nAlbacore tuna\n189\n43\n2\nThresher shark\n3\n2\n0\nMako shark\n51\n86\n3\nSandbar shark\n5\n30\n1\nDusky shark\n16\n50\n0\nTiger shark\n0\n5\n0\nBlue shark\n68\n1,897\n5\nHammerhead shark\n1\n4\n0\nWahoo\n6\n1\n0\nDolphinfish\n920\n61\n0\nKing mackerel\n174\n1\n6\nAtlantic bonito\n336\n203\n1\nLittle tunny\n587\n1,015\n17\nAmberjack\n3\n18\n0\nI NMFS typically expands these \"raw\" data to report discards of bluefin tuna by the rod and reel fishery to ICCAT. If sample\nsizes are large enough to make reasonable discard estimates for other species, NMFS may estimate discard estimates of other\nbycatch species in future SAFE reports.\n2 Amendment One to the Atlantic Billfish FMP established billfish released in the recreational fishery and a \"catch and\nrelease\" program, thereby exempting these fish from bycatch considerations.\n3NMFS reported 14.6 mt of dead discards of bluefin tuna in the rod and reel fisher to ICCAT for 1997 (NMFS, 1998b).\nShark Drift Gillnet Fishery\nFrom 1993 to 1995, 48 trips and 52 net sets were observed in the shark drift gillnet\nfishery. Eight shark species made up over 99 percent of sharks caught including, in\norder of abundance by weight, blacknose, Atlantic sharpnose, blacktip, finetooth,\nscalloped hammerhead, bonnethead, spinner, and great hammerhead. Ten bycatch\nspecies of finfish and rays made up over 97 percent of the non-shark catch including, in\norder of abundance, king mackerel, little tunny, cownose ray, crevalle jack, cobia,\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 213","spotted eagle ray, great barracuda, tarpon, Atlantic stingray, and Spanish mackerel\n(Trent et al., 1997). Although most of the catch is landed, the shark drift gillnet fishery\nmay discard the following species: king mackerel, little tunny, crevalle jack, cobia,\ngreat barracuda. Some species are always discarded for regulatory or personal reasons\n(e.g., cownose ray, spotted eagle ray, tarpon, and Atlantic stingray).\nPurse Seine Fishery\nThere are no recorded instances of non-tuna finfish, other than minimal numbers of\nblue sharks, caught in tuna purse seines. Anecdotal evidence indicates that if fish are\ndiscarded, they are easily released out of the net with minimal bycatch mortality.\n3.39 1996 Purse Seine Atlantic Tunas Discards (based on NMFS observer data - 95.6% coverage for\nTable\na total of 44 hauls observed).\nReason\nPounds of Discarded Tunas (mt ww)\nFell out/off of gear\n2,310\n(1.1)\nNo market, too small\n59,100\n(26.8)\nUndersized\n34,745\n(15.8)\nRegulations prohibit retention, quota filled\n5,500\n(2.5)\nOther\n18,179\n(8.2)\n9002\n(0.4)\n'escaped alive as net opened\n2too few fish to \"bother\" with, released alive\nHarpoon Fishery\nThe deliberate fishing nature of harpoon gear is such that bycatch is expected to be\nlow. Harpoon vessels targeting bluefin tuna have not been selected for observer\ncoverage in the recent past. Therefore, there are no recorded instances of non-target\nfinfish caught with harpoons and NMFS cannot quantify the bycatch of undersized\nbluefin tuna in this fishery. Bycatch in the swordfish harpoon fishery is expected to be\nzero given the small minimum size for that species relative to the size of the fish that\nare potentially harpooned.\nConclusion\nNMFS will continue to work with the Advisory Panels, Fishery Management\nCouncils, and constituents to evaluate the need for reducing the bycatch of non-HMS\nspecies in HMS fisheries. Note that due to the historical monitoring programs focusing\non certain fisheries, NMFS has the most bycatch data for the pelagic longlines and now\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 214","prohibited pelagic driftnets. NMFS also collects bycatch data in the Large Pelagic\nSurvey but due to the low number of intercepts in which fish are released dead, the\ndead discard estimates have not yet been calculated for all species. In this FMP,\nNMFS implements other measures that will increase reporting in other fisheries and can\ntherefore, more accurately quantify bycatch in other fisheries.\nAddressing Bycatch Mortality\nThe reduction of bycatch mortality is an important component of NS 9. Physical\ninjuries may not be apparent to the fisherman who is quickly releasing a fish, turtle, or\nmammal, and there are inherent injuries associated with the stress of being hooked or\ncaught in a net. NMFS will continue to collect information on bycatch mortality of\nthese animals and will, in the future, account for bycatch mortality in stock\nassessments.\nPelagic Driftnet Fishery\nIt is difficult to consider reducing bycatch mortality in the pelagic driftnet fishery\ndue to the nature of the gear. Most finfish are dead when the net is hauled. For this\nreason and the non-selectivity of the driftnet gear, this gear is prohibited for taking all\nHMS, except sharks.\nPelagic Longline Fishery\nNMFS collects information regarding the bycatch mortality of dead finfish in the\npelagic longline fishery. Also, Berkeley and Edwards (1997) indicate that many billfish\nremained alive in their study for long periods on the longline, with 60 percent alive\nafter 6 hours and some billfish living for 12 hours or more before being released alive.\nPreliminary data from this study suggest that hook damage and entanglement with the\ngangion may be important factors causing mortality in longline caught bycatch. That\nstudy indicated that it may be possible to modify hook type and gangion material to\nreduce billfish mortality in longline fisheries. To follow up on this study, NMFS is\nsupporting a study to consider the use of circle hooks in the pelagic longline fishery and\nNMFS has considered reducing the soak time in this fishery. Very often, gear\nmodifications are not easily enforced and therefore, NMFS encourages pelagic longline\nfishermen to take voluntary steps to increase survival of released finfish.\nThe survival rate of billfish on pelagic longline gear is validated by results from a\nstudy by Berkeley and Edwards (1997), stating that 20 to 75 percent of billfish were\nalive 12 hours after being hooked (Figure 3.7). After accounting for live releases, the\neffective billfish fishing mortality (i.e., discarded dead) was 0.4 percent of the total\npelagic longline catch (blue marlin - 0.12 percent; white marlin - 0.15 percent; sailfish -\n0.08 percent; and spearfish - 0.03 percent). A total bycatch mortality impact of pelagic\nlongline gear can not be determined since the release mortality is unknown for the\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 215","hooked billfish fish that are released alive. Billfish, however, tend to have higher\nsurvival rates on a pelagic longline (Berkeley and Edwards, 1997) compared to other\nHMS species such as swordfish and tunas.\nProportion of HMS Alive After Hook-up on a Pelagic Longline. (Berkeley and\nFigure 3.7\nEdwards, unpublished data)\n25\n20\n15\n10\n5\n0\n25\n30\n10\n15\n20\nMean Soak Time (Hr)\nRod and Reel\nThe Large Pelagic Survey has collected data on live and dead discards from the rod\nand reel fishery for several years. In 1997, an estimated 15 mt of bluefin were\ndiscarded dead by rod and reel fishermen. Quantitative estimates of post-release\nmortality rates of sharks in rod and reel fisheries are not currently available, although\nthis mortality is generally believed to be low. There are some data available on rod and\nreel bycatch mortality of Atlantic tunas, other than bluefin, collected through the Large\nPelagic Survey and the Marine Recreational Fisheries Statistics Survey, but magnitude\nof these figures is extremely low when compared to actual landings figures. NMFS has\nnot estimated bycatch mortality of swordfish in the recreational fishery because the\nrecreational fishery encounters swordfish infrequently.\nResults from a recent study indicate that immediate fishing mortalities in recreational\nhook and line-caught juvenile bluefin tuna can be substantial (29.2 percent) due to\ninjuries or predation (Belle, 1997). This is likely to be a conservative estimate because\nscientific personnel in the study were professionally trained and had extensive\nexperience in fish handling techniques designed to reduce mortality. Mortality often\noccurs ten minutes or longer after the fish is released under normal circumstances.\nInjuries may not be readily apparent to the angler and seemingly minor capture injuries\nmay be related to substantial internal injuries. Forty percent of sampled tuna that died\nduring that study did not have injuries that would be apparent to the angler in the boat.\nSkomal and Chase (1996) provide evidence that the extreme stress of rod and reel\nangling did not cause immediate post-release mortality in larger bluefin tuna (50 to\n150 kg). However, they do document metabolic and pH disturbances in bluefin tuna\nsampled off of Hatteras, NC. The physiological consequences of angling stress are\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 216","poorly understood for several species of large pelagic fishes (Skomal and Chase, 1996).\nNMFS continues to support studies on recreational post-release mortality and intends to\naccount for this source of mortality when additional information becomes available.\nTable 3.40 Existing information on HMS bycatch mortality.\nStudy\nMethods\nConclusions\nBelle, 1997\nCatch of juvenile BFT and\n29% immediate post-release\nrelease into net pen\nmortality\nSkomal and Chase, 1996\nCatch of large BFT (50-150 kg)\n0% immediate post-release\nand sonic tracking in the wild\nmortality\nBerkeley and Edwards, 1997\nGOM Longline catch, hook\nSurvival depends on species\ntimers\nand length of time fish is\nhooked before being released\nSkomal and Chase, in progress\nCatch of juvenile BFT and\nsharks and sonic tracking in the\nwild\nNMFS' code of angling ethics is a code of conduct for recreational fishing which\nwas developed as part of implementing Executive Order 12962 - Recreational Fisheries.\nNMFS implements a national plan to support, develop, and implement programs that are\ndesigned to enhance public awareness and understanding of marine conservation issues\nrelevant to the well-being of marine recreational fishing. This code is consistent with\nNational Standard 9, minimize bycatch and bycatch mortality, and is therefore\nreproduced below. These guidelines are discretionary, not mandatory, and are intended\nto inform the angling public of NMFS's views regarding what constitutes ethical angling\nbehavior.\nCode of Angling Ethics\nPromotes, through education and practice, ethical behavior in the use of aquatic\nresources.\nValues and respects the aquatic environment and all living things in it.\nAvoids spilling, and never dumps any pollutants, such as gasoline and oil, into the\naquatic environment.\nDisposes of all trash, including worn-out lines, leaders, and hooks, in appropriate\ncontainers, and helps to keep fishing sites litter-free.\nTakes all precautionary measures necessary to prevent the spread of exotic plants\nand animals, including live baitfish, into non-native habitats.\nLearns and obeys angling and boating regulations, and treats other anglers, boaters,\nand property owners with courtesy and respect.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 217","Respects property rights, and never trespasses on private lands or waters.\nKeeps no more fish than needed for consumption, and never wastefully discards fish\nthat are retained.\nPractices conservation by carefully handling and releasing alive all fish that are\nunwanted or prohibited by regulation, as well as other animals that may become\nhooked or entangled accidentally.\nUses tackle and techniques which minimize harm to fish when engaging in \"catch\nand release\" angling.\n3.5.2.3 Marine Mammal Bycatch in HMS Fisheries\nMarine mammal bycatch is identified and quantified in HMS fisheries through a\nprocess that culminates in the publication of an annual \"List of Fisheries\" for\ncommercial fisheries only. The most recent List of Fisheries is for 1999 and the analysis\nutilizes data collected from the 1992 to 1995 pelagic longline fishery, the 1992 to 1996\ncoastal gillnet fishery, 1992 to 1996 shark drift gillnet fishery, and the 1996 tuna purse\nseine fishery (NMFS, 1999b). Commercial rod and reel, harpoon, purse seine,\ncharterboat HMS, and shark bottom longline fisheries have been designated Category III\nwith respect to marine mammal takes. Therefore, discussions of marine mammal takes\nin the past in this fishery are no longer relevant to HMS fishery management.\nRecreational fisheries are not considered under the MMPA.\nThe Atlantic Offshore Cetacean Take Reduction Team was formed in 1996 under a\nrequirement of the MMPA to address protected species bycatch by vessels using pelagic\nlongline, pair trawl, and pelagic driftnet gear to catch Atlantic tunas and swordfish. That\nteam produced a draft plan to reduce marine mammal takes with those gears which was\nsubmitted to NMFS in November 1996 (AOCTRT, 1996). In the time since the plan\nwas submitted, fishermen have not been authorized to use pair trawls to fish for HMS\nand driftnets have been prohibited in the Atlantic swordfish fishery (except August\n1998). The draft plan, however, also recommended a suite of gear modification and\neducational measures to reduce bycatch of marine mammals in the pelagic longline\nfishery. The inability to enforce many of these measures, due to the nature of the\nmeasures, is seen by NMFS management and enforcement staff, HMS and Billfish AP\nmembers, and USCG personnel as an obstacle to reducing bycatch in HMS fisheries.\nThe plan recommended non-regulatory measures which included increased research on\nacoustic deterrents, more comprehensive educational programs for fishery participants,\nand research on cetacean behavior.\nNMFS convened this take reduction team in 1996, and the team initially considered\ndata on marine mammal takes from 1992 to 1995. In some cases, the team considered\nanecdotal data only. Additional logbook and observer data have since been collected,\nand 1996 and 1997 data have been analyzed with respect to some of the recommended\nmeasures on that AOCTRP. In fact, several notable changes have occurred since the\nteam last met in 1996. NMFS prohibited the use of pair trawls and driftnets in the\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 218","Atlantic pelagic fishery. Pelagic longline takes of marine mammals were reduced in\n1998. NMFS reviewed the 1999 draft Stock Assessment Report for pilot whales and\nother marine mammal species caught by pelagic longlines and has reviewed total take\nrates for these animals. NMFS concluded that all the measures recommended by the\nteam for pelagic longlines may not be necessary to achieve the goals of the MMPA.\nNMFS is concerned, however, about serious injuries of marine mammals caught in\nthe pelagic longline fishery. NMFS will release serious injury guidelines, re-evaluate\ninteractions in the pelagic longline fishery, and may reconvene a take reduction team to\naddress pilot whale takes in this fishery. The following analyses of alternatives will not\nconsider recent data in an effort to present the recommendations of the Team's\nconsensus.\nPelagic Driftnet Fishery\nThe Atlantic pelagic driftnet fishery has been listed under the MMPA List of\nFisheries as a Category I fishery since 1991 due to takes of marine mammals which\nexceed 50 percent of the potential biological removal (PBR) level.\nThe AOCTRP was submitted to NMFS in 1996 with recommended measures to\nreduce interactions of marine mammals with driftnet gear. In 1998, the swordfish\ndriftnet fishery opened with no take reduction measures in place. NMFS placed\nobservers aboard ten different domestic swordfish driftnet vessels targeting swordfish in\n1998; fully 100 percent of the sets were observed. Typically, animals (finfish and\nprotected species) entangled in a pelagic driftnet are retrieved dead. In August 1998\nduring a two-week season in which 106 driftnet sets were made, 295 marine mammals\nand 34 sea turtles were entangled in driftnet gear. All of the marine mammals were\nkilled. Marine mammals included common dolphins, striped dolphins, Risso's\ndolphins, pilot whales, beaked whales, bottlenose dolphins, and white sided dolphins.\nNo threatened or endangered marine mammals were taken. A right whale was entangled\nby a driftnet although the right whale was already entangled in pot gear. The take was\nsubsequently attributed to the lobster fishery.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 219","Table 3.41. Takes of marine mammals in the 1998 pelagic driftnet fishery for swordfish. (Based on NMFS\nobserver data: 100 percent coverage).\nSpecies\nNumber Entangled\nNK Beaked Whale\n8\nSowerby's beaked whale\n2\nTrue's beaked whale\n1\nBottlenose dolphin\n3\nNK dolphin\n1\nSaddleback dolphin\n253\nStriped dolphin\n4\nGrampus\n9\nPilot whale\n6\nLong-finned pilot whale\n6\nTotal marine mammals\n293\nNMFS does not anticipate that fishermen will take driftnet trips to pursue large\ncoastal sharks given the limited quota for large coastal sharks and the requirement to\ndiscard all tunas and swordfish. If the bycatch of pelagic driftnets needs further\nreduction, appropriate action will be taken at that time.\nPelagic Longline Fishery\nThe pelagic longline fishery is listed as a Category I fishery, which results in\nincreased bycatch data collection, including observer and logbook data. The most\nrecent annual estimate indicates that the U.S. Atlantic pelagic longline fleet caught\n39 marine mammals in 1997; all were released alive. Most of the marine mammals were\nencountered in the U.S. EEZ between South Carolina and Cape Cod. NMFS continues\nto be concerned, however, about post-release mortality of injured short-finned pilot\nwhales in the pelagic longline fishery. NMFS will continue to evaluate observer data\nregarding the extent of injuries to marine mammals that interact with pelagic longline\nfishing gear and will work towards minimizing bycatch mortality through educational\nworkshops with fishermen.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 220","Table 3.42. Summary of marine mammal species incidentally injured or killed in the pelagic longline fishery.\n(Taken from NMFS, 1999b).\nSpecies\nStock\nHumpback whale\nWest North Atlantic\nMinke Whale\nCanadian East Coast\nRisso's Dolphin\nWest North Atlantic, North Gulf of Mexico\nLong-finned pilot whale\nWest North Atlantic\nShort-finned pilot whale\nWest North Atlantic\nCommon dolphin\nWest North Atlantic\nAtlantic spotted dolphin\nWest North Atlantic, North Gulf of Mexico\nPantropical spotted dolphin\nWest North Atlantic, North Gulf of Mexico\nStriped dolphin\nWest North Atlantic\nBottlenose dolphin\nWest North Atlantic offshore, Gulf of Mexico outer\nContinental Shelf, Gulf of Mexico Continental Shelf Edge\nand Slope\nHarbor porpoise\nGulf of Maine/Bay of Fundy\nShark Drift Gillnet Fishery\nThe southeast shark drift gillnet fishery is classified as a Category II fishery that is\nbelieved to be responsible for bycatch of at least one right whale. This fishery is subject\nto the regulations implementing the Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan, which\nrequires that shark drift gillnet gear be marked; establishes a closed period and restricted\narea from November 1 through March 31 each year, for the area near Savannah, GA,\nsouth to near Sebastian Inlet, FL; requires 100 percent observer coverage outside the\nclosed area; establishes special provisions for strikenets; and establishes a provision to\nclose the restricted area to this gear type if an entanglement with this gear occurs\n(February 16, 1999, 64 FR 7529). From 1996 through the first fishing period of 1998,\nno shark drift gillnet vessels were observed due to administrative problems with\nobserver placement. However, beginning in the second fishing period of 1998, shark\ndrift gillnet fishermen were informed of the requirement to notify NMFS of trips and to\ncarry observers. In 1998, nine sets were observed outside the right whale season, and\nfour fishermen have been taking observers since January 1999. This FMP establishes\n100 percent observer coverage in this fishery at all times and thus prohibits the use of\nshark drift gillnet gear if a NMFS-approved observer is not on board the vessel. These\nmeasures are intended to obtain better information for addressing protected species\nbycatch and bycatch mortality in this fishery.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 221","3.43 Summary of marine mammal species incidentally injured or killed in the shark drift gillnet fishery\nTable\n(Taken from NMFS, 1999b).\nSpecies\nStock\nBottlenose dolphin\nWest North Atlantic coastal\nNorth Atlantic right whale\nWest North Atlantic\nCurrent takes of marine mammals in the harpoon and rod and reel HMS fisheries\nappear to be virtually non-existent.\nTable 3.44 1996 purse seine marine mammal discards. (Based on NMFS observer data - 95.6% coverage for\na total of 44 hauls observed)\nSpecies Captured\nNumber and Status of Released Animal\nHumpback Whale\n1 released alive\nMinke Whale\n1 released alive\nPilot Whales\n6 released alive\n3.5.2.4 Sea Turtle Bycatch in HMS Fisheries\nRetention of endangered (Kemp's Ridley, Green, Leatherback, and Hawksbill\nturtles) and threatened (loggerhead turtles) sea turtles is prohibited under the authority of\nthe Endangered Species Act. Bycatch is minimized through regulatory and non-\nregulatory implementation of the terms and conditions of the Incidental Take Statement.\nPelagic Driftnet Fishery\nSea turtles have been encountered in the pelagic driftnet fishery for swordfish and\ntunas in the past. The majority were released dead. The following table is a one-year\nsnapshot of the turtle takes in this fishery. NMFS prohibited this fishing gear to reduce\nbycatch in the swordfish and tunas fisheries.\nTable 3.45 Takes of sea turtles in the 1998 pelagic driftnet fishery for swordfish. (Based on NMFS observer\ndata: 100% coverage)\nSpecies\nNumber Entangled\nGreen turtle\n2\nLeatherback turtle\n5\nLoggerhead turtle\n27\nTotal sea turtles\n34\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 222","Pelagic Longline Fishery\nThe pelagic longline fleet caught an estimated 544 turtles in 1997; all were released\nalive. Most turtles (57 percent) were caught outside the U.S. Atlantic EEZ,\npredominantly the Northeast Distant area. For 1992 through 1997, the estimated catch\nfor turtles ranged from a low of 544 (95 percent CI 265 to 1205) in 1997 to a high of\n3,716 (95 percent CI 2,797 to 4,933) in 1995. The number of dead turtles ranged from\nzero to 63 (95 percent CI 13 to 322). These are preliminary estimates based on observer\ndata and fishing effort reported by the fleet. The number of turtles caught per longline\nset ranged from one to nine with 77 percent of the sets catching only one turtle. The\nmost common species were loggerhead turtles (53 percent of observed turtles), followed\nby leatherback turtles (42 percent of observed turtles). Green, Hawksbill, and Kemp's\nRidley turtles were also observed in this fishery. The relative frequency of observed\nbycatch of turtles was lower in 1996 to 1997 than 1992 to 1995.\nShark Drift Gillnet Fishery\nDuring the period 1993 to 1995, 48 trips and 52 net sets were observed in which two\nloggerhead turtles were captured and released alive (Trent et al., 1997). Subsequent\nobservers have documented no sea turtle takes in nine drift gillnet sets. This FMP\nestablishes 100 percent observer coverage in this fishery at all times and prohibits use of\nshark drift gillnet gear if a NMFS-approved observer is not on board the vessel. These\nmeasures are intended to obtain better information for addressing protected species\nbycatch and bycatch mortality in this fishery. Although observed takes of turtles in the\nshark drift gillnet fishery are low, turtle distribution overlaps with fishery operation and\nturtles are very susceptible to this type of fishing gear.\nOther HMS Fisheries\nSea turtles have been reported as caught in rod and reel fishing gear, although few\nincidents have been reported. No sea turtles have been reported caught in the purse\nseine or harpoon HMS fisheries.\n3.5.2.5 Sea Bird Bycatch in HMS Fisheries\nNMFS analyzes observer data to collect sea bird bycatch information. In 1996, no\nsea birds were reported in Atlantic pelagic longline or purse seine observer data. In\n1997, 18 were recorded as dead (11 in South Atlantic Bight, six in Northeast Coastal,\nand one in Mid-Atlantic Bight) and 15 were recorded as released alive (Northeast\nCoastal) in the pelagic longline database. Sea birds have not been recorded interacting\nwith other Atlantic HMS fishing gears.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 223","3.5.2.6 Summary of Bycatch Issues\nThis FMP continues to implement measures designed to minimize bycatch and\nbycatch mortality in all HMS fisheries, to the extent practicable. NMFS also intends to\nminimize bycatch and bycatch mortality of HMS caught incidental to other fishing\noperations. NMFS identifies the following issues as current particular bycatch concerns\n(in no particular order):\nBycatch of bluefin tuna in the pelagic longline fishery\nBycatch of undersized swordfish in the pelagic longline fishery\nBycatch of billfish in the pelagic longline fishery\nPost-release bycatch mortality of all HMS in all hook and line fisheries; recreational\nand commercial.\nBycatch of sharks in all fisheries, particularly prohibited species and juvenile sharks\nBycatch of marine mammals in the pelagic longline fishery and southeast shark drift\ngillnet fishery\nBycatch of sea turtles in the pelagic longline fishery and southeast shark drift gillnet\nfishery\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 224","Observed takes of sea turtles in the 1993 - 1997 pelagic longline fishery by year, calendar quarter, and fishing area. Blank areas indicate no effort\nTotal\nfor that year, quarter, and area (based on NMFS observer data: less than 5 percent coverage in most years). Areas indicate statistical sampling\n26\n36\n11\n20\n11\n57\n60\n10\n70\n90\n21\n13\n12\n7\n6\n5\n8\n4\n1\n2\nTUS\n2\n0\nTUN\n0\n1\n1\n2\nSAR\n1\n1\n1\n2\nSAB\n0\n2\n2\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n5\n0\n1\n5\n0\n1\n2\n1\n0\n0\n3\nNED\n19\n46\n53\n57\n84\n4\n8\n21\n0\n0\n6\nNEC\n293\n10\n7\n0\n2\n4\n1\n5\n2\n2\n3\n2\nNCA\nareas for pelagic logbook data analyses (refer to Figure 3.13)\n46\n1\n6\n1\n3\n3\n2\nMAB\n16\n0\n8\n4\n5\n0\n4\n1\n5\n1\n7\n7\n3\n3\n0\n0\n0\n1\nGOM\n66\n8\n5\n8\n4\n0\n1\n1\n1\n1\n4\n0\n0\n1\n0\n3\n2\n1\n0\n0\n0\nFEC\n40\n0\n1\n0\n3\n0\n0\n2\n0\n3\n2\n0\n1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n1\n0\n1\nCAR\n14\n0\n1\n3\n2\n0\n0\n0\n0\n1\n3\nQtr\n13\n2\n2\n1\n3\n4\n4\n1\n3\n1\n2\n3\n4\n2\n1\n3\n4\n1\n2\n3\n4\nTable 3.46\nTotal\nYear\n1993\n1993\n1993\n1993\n1994\n1994\n1994\n1994\n1995\n1995\n1995\n1995\n1996\n1996\n1996\n1996\n1997\n1997\n1997\n1997","Significance of Bycatch\ncatch and release encounter, they will be available for another encounter. Therefore, in the Billfish FMP Amendment, NMFS establishes recreationally-caught billfish as a catch and release program. Nevertheless, some post-\nrelease mortality is associated with recreational billfish catch, whether they were released due to small size or a voluntary release. NMFS continues to support studies that examine the post-release survival of rod and reel\n4 Released billfish are no longer considered as bycatch in the recreational fishery. The intention of the Magnuson-Stevens Act is to increase opportunities for recreational experience, and provided billfish survive a\nmoderate\nmoderate\nmoderate\nmoderate\nmoderate\n3 The significance of bycatch is based, partially, on \"Managing the Nation's Bycatch\", the NMFS bycatch plan. The explanation for these determinations begins on page 105 of that document (NMFS, 1998c).\nhigh\nhigh\nhigh\nhigh\nhigh\nhigh\nlow\nhigh\nlow\nlow\nlow\nlow\nlow\nlow\nlow\nlow\nlow\nn/a\nReason for Discards\nREG/DIS\nREG/DIS\nREG/DIS\nREG\nREG\nREG\nREG\nREG\nREG\nREG\nREG\nREG\nREG\nREG\nREG\nREG\nREG\nPS\nPS\nPS\nn/a\nPS\nPS\nundersized target species\nother coastal species\nother coastal species\nundersized target\nundersized target\nprotected species\nundersized target\nBycatch Species\nundersized target\nundersized target\n2 The reasons that fish are discarded in that fishery [regulatory (REG); discretionary/economic/personal considerations (DIS); or prohibited species (PS)].\nBAYS tunas\nbluefin tuna\nwhite marlin\nblue marlin\nwhite marlin\nblue marlin\nsea turtles\nmammals\nbillfishes\nsailfish\nsharks\nturtles\nsharks\nbirds\nnone\ntunas\nsmall coastal sharks\nlarge coastal sharks\nsmall coastal sharks\nlarge coastal sharks\nlarge coastal sharks\nRetained Species\npelagic sharks\nyellowfin tuna\nBAYS tunas\nbluefin tuna\nBAYS tunas\nwhite marlin\nBAYS tunas\nblue marlin\nswordfish\nswordfish\nsailfish\nsharks\nBFT\nBFT\nBFT\nBFT\n218 incidental (refers to swordfish\nlimited access permit holders)\n(refers to shark limited access\n# vessels in the fishery\nA summary of bycatch in HMS fisheries.\n59 (as of 11.1.98)\npermit holders)\n578 incidental\napprox 12,000\n198 directed\n211 directed\n3 (in 1998)\n12 to 15\n7000\nI Fishery category under the Marine Mammal Protection Act\n5\nMMPA Category1\nn/a\nIII\nIII\nIII\nIII\nIII\nII\nI\nRecreational rod and reel\nCommercial rod and reel\nHarpoon/Swordfish\nShark drift gillnet\nBottom longline\nHarpoon/BFT\nTable 3.47\nPelagic LL\nPurse seine\ncaught HMS.\nGear","3.5.3\nManagement Measures to Address Bycatch Problems\n3.5.4.1 Reducing HMS Bycatch and Bycatch Mortality\n3.5.4.1.1 Bluefin Tuna\nIt is the intent of this FMP to reduce the incidental catch of bluefin tuna on gears\nthat are not authorized to take bluefin. However, it is also the intent to reduce waste\nof unavoidably caught bycatch. See Section 3.5.2.1 for a description of bluefin tuna\nbycatch. Recently, NMFS has begun to collect and analyze discard data from other\ngear types. However, it is important to recognize that when comparing past\nestimates of dead discards reported to ICCAT to future estimates for detecting\ntrends, the past estimates have, for the most part, only included dead discards from\npelagic longlines. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to conclude that dead\ndiscards have not changed if the total estimate of dead discards were to remain at\nthe same level, when the new estimate may include additional gear types. Refer to\nTable 3.48 for a summary of reported dead discards, quotas and landings of bluefin\ntuna for 1992 through 1997, as reported to ICCAT in the 1997 and 1998 National\nReports of the United States to ICCAT.\nDuring the 1980 winter/spring longline fishery for bluefin tuna in the Gulf of\nMexico, a number of U.S. longline vessels fishing for swordfish began to land\nincreasing quantities of giant bluefin tuna. NMFS was concerned that without\nimmediate action there could be substantial investment in fishing gear and\nprocessing facilities by the U.S. industry in developing a directed longline fishery\nfor bluefin tuna in the Gulf of Mexico, a known spawning area for bluefin tuna.\nThere was also concern that under the regulations at the time, longline catches could\nseverely and negatively impact the other fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico and mid-\nAtlantic areas. As a result of these concerns, NMFS published a final rule dated\nJanuary 26, 1981 (46 FR 8012), which prohibited the use of longlines in a directed\nbluefin tuna fishery, prohibited a targeted bluefin tuna fishery in the Gulf of\nMexico, implemented an incidental catch limit of bluefin tuna, and established two\nmanagement areas north and south of 36° N where different catch limits would\napply. South of 36° N, longline fishermen were restricted to two fish per vessel per\ntrip, whereas north of 36° N, they were restricted to two percent by weight of all\nother fish on board at the end of the fishing trip.\nIn 1982, ICCAT recommended a ban on directed fishing for bluefin tuna in the\nGulf of Mexico to protect the spawning stock. This action primarily impacted\nJapanese longline fishermen in the area, as U.S. longline gear had already been\nprohibited from targeting bluefin tuna in the Gulf of Mexico. However, concern\nremained over the adequacy of the incidental catch limits, particularly regarding the\nefficiency of the restriction at reducing bycatch and discards of bluefin tuna.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 227","NMFS' examination of available longline fishery data regarding discarded bluefin\ntuna in the Gulf of Mexico revealed that more than 80 percent of those bluefin tuna\nreleased were dead.\nOn January 6, 1992 (57 FR 365), NMFS determined that the incidental catch\nlimit in the south was not effective at reducing bluefin tuna bycatch and changed the\nrestriction for this area. Until that time, the bycatch restriction of up to two bluefin\ntuna per trip, without any requirement that the bluefin tuna be landed in conjunction\nwith other species, and the short distance from shore to the fishing grounds, made it\nfeasible for vessels to direct their fishing on bluefin tuna, despite the retention limit.\nAs this activity ran counter to the intent to prohibit directed fishing of bluefin tuna\nby longline gear the final regulations required longline vessels operating in the\nsouthern area (south of 36° N) to land, offload and sell at least 2,500 pounds of\nother species as a condition for landing a maximum of one bluefin tuna. After this\naction, NMFS received several comments indicating that the new bycatch restriction\nin the southern area caused an increase in bluefin tuna discards and waste. NMFS\nconducted scoping meetings on this issue and examined several options that\nincluded: 1) requiring special gear; 2) requiring a minimum number of days\nbetween a vessel's landings; and 3) review the minimum target catch requirements.\nRecommendations also included prohibiting bluefin tuna catches in the Gulf of\nMexico or, conversely, working through ICCAT to rescind the prohibition and\nallow limited directed fishing.\nOn January 19, 1994 (59 FR 2814) NMFS proposed to amend the minimum\nlanding requirements that changed by time of year. At that time NMFS maintained\nthat it was possible to conduct directed fishing on species other than bluefin tuna,\nwith only a limited amount of bluefin tuna catch. However, NMFS also stated in\nthis Federal Register notice that \"if evidence indicates this is not true, NMFS may\nconsider more stringent measures, such as area or season closures or gear\nrestrictions, in future rulemaking.\" On April 14, 1994 (59 FR 17723) NMFS\npublished a final rule that changed the directed fishery minimum weight\nrequirement on landing one bluefin tuna, for the southern area only, from at least\n2,500 pounds to 1,500 pounds during the months from January to April, and to\n3,500 pounds from May through December. Catch restrictions remained the same\nfor the northern area.\nAt the same time as NMFS modified the landings requirements, NMFS also\nmodified the geographic separation between the northern and southern\nmanagement areas by adjusting the dividing boundary south to 34° N (59 FR\n17723, April 14, 1994). This was primarily because the previous location at 36° N\nwas located in a particularly dynamic oceanographic area where vessels fishing on\none side of the line may find themselves transported by currents to the other side.\nThis division line adjustment prompted comments regarding division of quota and\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 228","specification of landings requirements affecting the northern and southern\nsubcategories of the incidental longline category.\nIn addition, NMFS received numerous written comments that the landings\nrequirements applicable in the northern area cannot be met by vessels in the shark\nlongline fisheries operating off of North Carolina in the winter months, due to the\nretention limits in effect under the shark fishery management plan. Participants in\nthis winter shark fishery have noted that the bluefin tuna and shark regulations,\ntaken together, force discarding of bluefin tuna, e.g., the 4,000-mt dw LCS retention\nlimit allows retention of only 80 1b WW of bluefin tuna. These fishermen requested\nan allowance to land and market fish that would otherwise be discarded dead, thus\nincreasing boat revenues without contributing to additional bluefin tuna mortality.\nAlso, despite these ongoing efforts to reduce discards by changing target catch\nrequirements and geographic areas, U.S. bluefin tuna dead discards increased in\n1995 to a total of approximately 142 mt (U.S. National Report to ICCAT, 1997).\nIn response to these comments, and the relatively high number of discards\nreported to ICCAT, NMFS undertook a review of the bluefin tuna incidental catch\nregulations, including division of the quotas, position of the dividing line between\nthe northern and southern subcategories, and landing criteria applicable to each\nmanagement area. Observer data from longline trips taken from 1991 to 1994\nindicated that two or fewer bluefin tuna were hooked on 91 percent of all observed\ntrips. NMFS also analyzed landings information to determine trends in landings by\ntime and area. NMFS published the results of its review in an Advanced Notice of\nProposed Rulemaking (ANPR), published on September 17, 1996, (61 FR 48876).\nThe ANPR requested public comments on possible changes to the regulations to\nreduce incidental mortality of bluefin tuna while allowing for commercial use of\nunavoidable bycatch. Various proposals were presented and several public\ncomments were received during the comment period on the ANPR. Many of the\nproposals called for various changes to the catch limits and/or moving the dividing\nline between management areas while other comments raised concern over\nproviding an incentive for a directed fishery and advocated use of time/area closures\nto address the problem of discards.\nIn response to the 1996 ICCAT recommendation that called for the United States\nto adopt measures designed to reduce discards of bluefin tuna during 1997 and\n1998, and since publication of the ANPR and receipt of comments, NMFS\nexamined different options for reducing dead discards. NMFS considered a variety\nof options, including changing the current target weight requirement, limiting the\nnumber of days per trip, and implementing time/area closures. Logbook and dealer\nweighout slips from 1991 through 1995 were collected, and initial results indicated\nsignificant differences between the number of bluefin tuna caught and discarded per\ntrip by season and region.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 229","Analyses of bluefin tuna discard data continued through 1998, the preliminary\nresults of which were presented to the HMS and Billfish APs in March and July\n1998. The 1998 ICCAT Recommendation on west Atlantic bluefin tuna requires\nthat all Contracting Parties, including the United States, minimize dead discards of\nbluefin tuna to the extent practicable. The Recommendation also established a 79-\nmt allowance for dead discards for the west Atlantic, of which the United States was\nallocated 68 mt. If a country has dead discards in excess of their allowance, they\nmust be counted against that country's landing quota for the following year. If there\nare fewer dead discards, then half of the underharvest may be added to the\nfollowing year's quota while the other half is conserved. For any of the following\nalternatives, if NMFS determines that the United States' annual dead discard\nallowance has been exceeded, NMFS would subtract the amount in excess of the\nallowance from the total amount of bluefin tuna that can be landed. If NMFS\ndetermines that the annual dead discard allowance has not been reached, NMFS\nmay add one half of the remainder to the total amount of bluefin tuna that can be\nlanded.\nOther measures adopted by NMFS in the FMP (e.g., prohibiting driftnets for\nAtlantic tunas other than bluefin, limited access for sharks and swordfish, and\nreduced quotas for sharks and swordfish) may contribute to reducing dead discards\nof bluefin tuna. In addition, the recent final rule issued by NMFS prohibiting the\nuse of driftnets for swordfish may contribute to the reduction of bluefin tuna\ndiscards.\nFinal Action: Closure of area to pelagic longline fishing in June\nThis action implements a prohibition of the use of pelagic longlines in the\nNorthwestern Atlantic from 39 to 40° N and 68 to 74° W during June (See Figure\n3.5.1). NMFS chose this alternative after the completion of analyses on nine\ndifferent time area closure options on logbook data ranging from 1992 through\n1997 (see Appendix 6). This is different from the preferred alterative published in\nthe bluefin tuna Addendum, which called for the closed area to be from 37 to 41° N\nand 70 to 74° W. Comments from the longline industry stated that there was little\ninteraction with bluefin tuna in the southern half of the proposed area. After re-\nexamination of the logbook data, a discrepancy was found with the original\nanalysis, and new analyses show that an equivalent reduction in discards can be\nachieved by closing a smaller area that is consistent with requests from the longline\nindustry.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 230","Figure 3.8\nTime/Area closure to reduce discards of bluefin tuna in the pelagic longline fishery.\nFinal Time/Area\nClosure to reduce\nBFT dead discards.\nArea closed in the\nmonth of June to\nall pelagic longline\nfishing.\n30*N\nThe challenge of time/area closures is to determine times and areas that will\neffectively meet the goal of minimizing bluefin tuna dead discards while having the\nleast impact on the directed fisheries over a long period of time. It may be\nnecessary, based on physical oceanographic data, to change the timing and location\nof the closure from year to year or from month to month. However, it would be\ndifficult to accurately identify areas and times and implement closures that change\nfrom year to year. Therefore, a wide range of options was considered. Temporal\nclosure alternatives extended from a monthly closure to a year-round closure.\nSpatial alternatives extended from two by two degree squares to an eight by four\ndegree rectangle. Analyses of logbook data indicate that: 1) at certain times of the\nyear, high levels of discards (dead and alive) can be expected in particular areas;\n2) only a few sets catch large numbers of bluefin tuna; and, 3) the location and\ntiming of these discards vary over time and space. This fluctuation in time and\nspace may be due to the variability of the natural environment, particularly the\nlocation of the northern edge of the Gulf Stream. A more detailed description of\nthe analyses performed, the results, and a discussion of the rationale for adopting\nthis alternative can be found in Appendix 6.\nEcological Impacts\nThe action will have direct positive ecological impacts on bluefin tuna by\nprohibiting longline activity in a one by six degree area during the month of June\nwhere a high number of bluefin tuna discards have been reported. This time/area\nclosure is predicted to reduce total U.S. discards of bluefin tuna by longline vessels\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 231","by approximately 55 percent within the entire area and thus reduce fishing mortality\nof bluefin tuna (Appendix 6)3 This may have a positive impact on bluefin tuna and\nassist with other ongoing efforts to rebuild this fishery. The analysis of this\ntime/area combination includes an accounting of the indirect effects of displaced\neffort to areas outside the closed area in June. Results show that the increased effort\nin adjacent areas is predicted to cause a slight increase in the rate of bluefin tuna\ndiscards in these new areas, although overall it is predicted that discards will\nsignificantly decrease. The impact on target fisheries such as swordfish, tunas other\nthan bluefin, and sharks is difficult to ascertain. Appendix 6 provides an analysis of\nestimated catch rates of other species if vessels displace to areas adjacent to the\nstudy area. These analyses predict that landings of tuna (other than bluefin) might\ndecrease on the order of two percent, whereas landings of other target species might\nactually increase. Since the swordfish and shark fisheries are managed under a\nquota, it can be assumed that the fishery would continue until the quota is reached,\nalbeit in different areas. Thus it is possible that there would be no net change in the\noverall impact to swordfish or shark stocks. It is possible, however, that movement\nof the vessels away from the time/area closures may mean that different size classes\nof swordfish or sharks are caught. Swordfish is classified as overfished, and a\nminimum size of 29 inches CK (or 33 pounds dressed weight) is in place to protect\nsmall fish. Large coastal sharks are also classified as overfished. This FMP\nimplements a minimum size of 4.5 feet fork length on ridgeback sharks. There are\nno commercial minimum sizes established for other shark species. There are no\nquotas on the other tunas, although there is a minimum size on yellowfin and bigeye\ntuna of 27 inches CFL.\nThe closure of certain areas and times to reduce discards of bluefin tuna may\nhave an impact on species such as marine mammals, turtles, and seabirds that are\ndistributed throughout the study area. Observer and logbook data indicate pelagic\nlongline interactions with these protected species, particularly sea turtles. Closure\nof the proposed areas to the longline fleet could have a positive impact on these\nspecies by removing the potential for interaction with longline gear. However, as it\nis possible that longline fishing activities will be displaced to other areas, any\nbenefits accrued in the closed area may be offset by increased interactions in the\nnew areas fished. The displacement model predicts that if vessels are displaced\nfrom the one by six degree area in June, then landings of turtles could either\nincrease by eight percent or decrease by six percent relative to the status quo\ndepending on the year in question (Appendix These results are variable because\nof the low interaction rate of this gear with turtles. Given the low level of\ninteractions between this gear type and these protected species, the final action is\nnot expected to have any significant impact on sea turtle stocks. The interaction\nbetween pelagic longline gear and marine mammals is significantly less than that\nIn 1997, the pelagic longline fleet discarded a total of 37.1 mt ww dead bluefin tuna in the Atlantic and Gulf\n3\nof Mexico, 30.7 mt WW of which were discarded dead in the northwest Atlantic. If the anticipated 55 percent\nreduction in bluefin tuna discards in the northwest Atlantic is applied to the 1997 figures, NMFS estimates that the\ntotal amount bluefin tuna dead discards for the pelagic longline fleet in 1997 would have been 20 mt ww.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 232","for sea turtles (Johnson et al., 1999). Thus, this final action is not expected to have\nany significant impact on marine mammal stocks.\nOnce implemented, NMFS will evaluate the efficacy of this closure in reducing\nbluefin tuna dead discards, given the distribution of bluefin tuna and the expected\nredistribution of fishing effort. NMFS will monitor impacts to the users of pelagic\nlongline gear to determine what, if any, future action or modifications to the\nproposed time/area closure may be necessary. Such actions could be accomplished\nby regulatory amendment under the framework procedures of the HMS FMP.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nAlthough this time/area closure is expected to reduce the number of bluefin tuna\ndiscards in the longline fishery, it is not expected to have a significant impact on\nlandings of target species such as sharks, swordfish, and other tunas. The predicted\nnegative impact for this action is greater, however, than that predicted for the\npreviously preferred four by four degree time/area closure. This is due to the fact\nthat the selected closed area is one in which more concentrated longline fishing\neffort takes place. If fishermen decide to displace effort to other areas, fishing costs\nfor fuel, bait, and ice may increase. In addition, travel time may increase.\nHowever, NMFS does not expect this possible increase in fishing costs for the short\nperiod of time of the closure to have a significant impact on small entities,\nespecially since commenters asked for this smaller area. This time/area closure may\nalso have an impact on entities such as seafood processors and tackle shops in that\narea. However, fishing effort will be displaced to other locations, NMFS does not\nbelieve that this action, given its short time-span, will adversely impact these\ncommunities.\nThere are potential concerns regarding the safety of human life at sea associated\nwith a time/area closure in the north Atlantic during June. NMFS received\ncomments that the initially proposed four by four degree closed area would force\nvessels to fish in, and travel through, a dangerous area of the Gulf Stream. This\nwas a particular concern for some of the smaller vessels which would have to travel\na larger area even though the fuel capacity of their vessels would not increase. The\nmodification of the closed area to the selected one by six degree area should\nmitigate some of these concerns especially since the selected one by six degree area\ndoes not include the dangerous area referred to in these comments.\nTime/area closures can also be costly, difficult to administer, and difficult to\nenforce. Use of a vessel monitoring system (VMS) can reduce the substantial\nenforcement costs of a time/area closure. With the use of a well-designed VMS\nprogram, enforcement can be made more efficient without sacrificing effectiveness.\nUse of VMS can increase compliance with the closure and increase net revenues to\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 233","fishermen by enabling the agency to monitor the real-time locations and, in some\ncases, fishing patterns of many vessels at any time, thereby allowing otherwise\nprohibited activities. This FMP requires VMS on all pelagic longline vessels.\nThe design of the closed area has been chosen, in part, to assist with\nenforcement. Enforcement resources, in terms of overflights and at-sea patrols,\nwould be necessary to ensure that longline fishing is not taking place in the closed\narea and time. Deployment of these assets could be combined with current\noperations and thus not incur any additional costs. This FMP requires VMS for all\npelagic longline vessels, which should reduce any additional burden and mitigate\nenforcement operational costs. This would also allow longline vessels to transit the\nclosed area. Other than the enforcement costs of monitoring the closed areas, there\nare not expected to be additional administrative costs from this option.\nConclusion\nThis final action will allow NMFS to minimize bluefin tuna dead discards while\nalso minimizing the economic and social impacts on fishermen.\nRejected Options for Reducing Bluefin Tuna Bycatch Mortality\nRejected Option: No action (status quo)\nU.S. reports to ICCAT show an increase in dead discards in the longline fishery\nbetween the years of 1995 and 1997. These dead discards were decreased from\n141.6 mt in 1995 to 37.1 mt in 1997. Quota reductions for the fisheries in which\nbluefin tuna are bycatch (i.e., the swordfish quota was reduced by 30 percent from\n1992-1998, and the large coastal shark quota by 50 percent in 1997), have affected\noverall longline discards of bluefin tuna particularly during closures of these\nfisheries. Thus, the status quo resulted in the incidental category landing fewer\nbluefin tuna than have been allowed in recent years. Subsequently, the remaining\nquota has been transferred from the Incidental category to other categories.\nEcological Impacts\nUnder this alternative, NMFS would not take any further action, beyond that\nproposed in the draft HMS FMP, to implement the ICCAT recommendation to\nminimize dead discards of bluefin tuna to the extent practicable. Thus, no\nadditional ecological impacts would be expected from this alternative. Although\nrecent NMFS actions impacting the longline fishery have had the additional effect\nof reducing bluefin tuna discards, no additional actions would be taken to reduce\nbluefin tuna discards. The reduction in quotas for other species targeted by pelagic\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 234","longline vessels adopted in this FMP (swordfish and sharks), along with the limited\naccess system implemented for swordfish and sharks, however, may have the added\neffect of reducing dead discards of bluefin tuna.\nUnder status quo, fishing patterns would not be expected to change beyond what\nit would under the other preferred alternatives in the draft HMS FMP which affect\nthe pelagic longline fishery, and thus interactions with marine mammals and\nprotected species would not be expected to change as a direct result of this\nalternative. Currently, the longline fishery is classified as a Category I fishery\nunder the MMPA. Longline gear incidentally catches turtles as well as some\nseabirds and interacts with certain marine mammal species.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nCurrently the USCG conducts routine overflights of the study area as part of\nenforcement and safety patrols. NMFS Enforcement officers conduct enforcement\noperations throughout the study area. NMFS Port Agents monitor dealer reports in\nthe Northeast region and vessel trip reports are sent directly to NMFS in the\nSoutheast Region for sharks and swordfish. Fishing activity is not expected to\nchange beyond what it would under the other final actions in the FMP that affect the\npelagic longline fishery. As such, no additional economic impacts would be\nexpected as a direct result of this alternative.\nConclusion\nUnder this alternative, no additional action would be taken by NMFS to\nminimize bluefin tuna bycatch, beyond the other preferred alternatives in the draft\nHMS FMP which affect the pelagic longline fishery. This alternative may not\ndirectly result in further bycatch reductions beyond those already achieved, but dead\ndiscards of bluefin tuna may decline due to other measures in the FMP or due to\nvoluntary measures taken by the pelagic longline fleet.\nRejected Option: Change catch limits\nUnder this alternative, target catch requirements to land a bluefin tuna would be\nmodified in an effort to reduce discards in the longline fishery. The catch limit\ncould be made more restrictive to further reduce any incentive to target bluefin tuna\nand avoid areas and times of high bluefin tuna concentration.\nAnalyses of databases show no relationship between target catch and the number\nof bluefin tuna discarded. This is expected if the fishery is truly incidental. Figures\n3.7 and 3.8 indicate this lack of relationship between target catch and the number of\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 235","bluefin tuna caught. These figures are included at the request of many commenters.\nWithout any firm relationship between target catch and discard rate there is no basis\nfor modifying target catch regulations. However, since data have been processed on\na trip basis since 1996 only, future database analyses may provide guidance for a\nchange in the target catch regulations. NMFS will continue to work with the HMS\nAP to consider such analyses in the future.\nFigure 3.9\nFigure showing the relationship between the number of bluefin tuna caught versus the\nnumber of target fish caught per trip in 1996. Each triangle or square indicates a trip in\n1996 on which bluefin tuna were caught.\n1996 Trips who caught BFT\n(Fullsize)\n120\nTrips in the Atlantic\n100\nA\nTrips in the Gulf of\n80\nMexico\n60\n40\n20\n0\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\n3500\nTarget fish caught\nFigure 3.10 This is an enlarged view of the lower left hand corner of Figure 3.9. Each triangle or\nsquare indicates a trip in 1996 on which a bluefin was caught.\nA Trips in the Atlantic\n1996 Trips who caught BFT\n(Close-up view)\nTrips in the Gulf of\n20\nMexico\nA\n18\n16\n14\n12\n10\n8\n6\n4\n2\nA\nm\nassam A\nas\n0\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\nTarget Fish Caught\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 236","Figure 3.11\nFigure showing the relationship between the number of bluefin tuna caught versus the\nnumber of target fish caught per trip in 1997. Each triangle or square indicates a trip in\n1997on which a bluefin tuna was caught.\n1997 Trips which caught BFT\n(Fullsize)\n120\nTrips in the Atlantic\n100\nTrips in the Gulf of Mexico\n80\nA\n60\n40\n20\nA\n0\n0\n500\n1000\n1500\n2000\n2500\n3000\n3500\nTarget fish caught\nFigure 3.12 This is an enlarged view of the lower left hand corner of Figure 3.11. Each triangle or\nsquare indicates a trip in 1997 on which a bluefin tuna was caught.\n1997 trips which caught BFT\n(Close-Up view)\nTrips in the Atlantic\n20\nTrips in the Gulf of Mexico\n18\n16\n14\n12\n10\n8\n6\n4\n2\n0\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\nTarget fish caught\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 237","Ecological Impacts\nThe current regulations could be changed to increase the amount of target catch\nrequired before a bluefin tuna could be retained. This may provide further incentive\nto avoid bluefin tuna, but could potentially increase discards due to the greater catch\nrequirements of target species. Conversely, the regulations could decrease the\namount of target catch required, which would make it easier to retain bluefin tuna\ncaught. This could reduce discards but could also provide an incentive to fish in\nareas where bluefin tuna were more likely to be caught. Neither increasing the\ncatch requirements nor decreasing the catch requirements would address the\nproblem of the few sets that occasionally catch large numbers of bluefin tuna.\nAnalyses show that there is little to no relationship between the target catch\namounts and the numbers of discards (Figures 3.7 to 3.10), lending support to the\ncharacterization that the bluefin tuna caught are only incidental to target fishing\noperations. Thus, changing the target catch requirements alone in this incidental\nfishery would not directly address the problem of bluefin tuna discards.\nIf incidental catch limits were increased, then fishermen would need to increase\nthe catch of other target fish stocks to land any bluefin tuna they may catch. This\ncould potentially negatively impact target stocks. If catch limits were decreased,\nthe converse would be true and target stocks maybe positively impacted. If\nhowever, a target fishery is quota limited, then target fisheries would continue until\nthe quota is attained, regardless of the incidental catch limit. Finally, in a truly\nincidental fishery there should be no motivation to target bluefin tuna, so regardless\nof the catch limits there should be no effect on target effort or catch.\nChanging the catch limits would probably have no impact on protected species\ninteractions except to the extent that changes in target catch limit requirements\naffect vessel behavior. If target catch requirements are set at appropriate levels,\nfishing effort on target species would continue at a comparable level to the status\nquo. Only the amount of bluefin tuna that vessels may retain would change.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nIncreasing or decreasing the target catch limits could have a range of social and\neconomic impacts. If the catch limits were increased, fishermen could land an\nadditional amount of target fish along with bluefin tuna. This would have\nimmediate benefits for each trip. However, if the target fishery is limited by a\nquota, this additional amount landed per trip could reduce the season. In the long\nterm, this could have a greater negative impact on the fishermen as income over the\nentire year would not be constant.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 238","If the catch limits were decreased, fishermen would not need to catch as many\ntarget fish to land a bluefin tuna. This would also have immediate benefits for each\ntrip. The fishermen could have fewer days at sea, buy less bait, ice, and fuel, and\nhave more trips each year. However, if reducing the catch limits creates a target\nfishery on bluefin tuna, this option could be devastating in the long term if\nfishermen begin to rely on an overfished species.\nThe regulations governing catch limits are already divided by geographic area\nand further subdivided by season. Additional changes to the regulations may\nprovide an extra level of complexity to the catch limit regulations that could burden\nenforcement and require additional education to fishermen. Monitoring of the\nincidental catches may also be more burdensome due to the need for finer scale\nquota monitoring.\nConclusion\nAnalyses do not indicate any correlation between catch limits and bluefin tuna\ndiscards. Thus, this alternative does not meet the goals of the FMP and is rejected.\nRejected Option: Canadian time/area closure regime\nAt the HMS AP meeting held in March 1998, NMFS was advised to consider\nthe regime used by Canada for the time/area closure in the Canadian swordfish\nlongline fishery to eliminate bluefin tuna bycatch. Below is a brief description of\nthe regulatory background and procedure implemented by Canada as outlined in the\nCanadian Swordfish Management Plan and via personal communication with Chris\nAllen, Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), March 1998.\nIn July 1994, at-sea boardings of swordfish longline vessels indicated high levels\nof bluefin tuna bycatch, particularly along Brown's and Georges Banks. Since high\nmortalities of bluefin tuna discards were observed by Officers of Canada's DFO,\nthe DFO closed the swordfish longline fishery west of a line drawn due south of\n65°30' W from Baccaro Point (southwest of Nova Scotia) to the eastern edge of the\nNorthwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization Convention Area. DFO conducted a\nseries of observer-monitored test fisheries throughout the summer fishery until early\nfall. Once the bluefin tuna bycatch ceased to be a problem, the area was reopened\nto swordfish longline fishing.\nBased on this experience, the industry proposed a Conservation Harvesting Plan,\nwhich included an annual closure for swordfish longline fishermen west of\n65°30' W until August 1, with a provision to conduct test fisheries with observers\naboard during the closure period. Because of the selective nature of the swordfish\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 239","harpoon fishery, this closure did not apply to these vessels. In addition, industry\nand DFO jointly created a \"Contingency Protocol\" with the objective of\nestablishing conservation criteria, action options and test fishery elements. This\nprotocol has been incorporated into the Canadian Swordfish Management Plan\nsince 1995. In 1997, two vessels conducted test fisheries under the Protocol and, as\na result of their catches, the area remained closed until August 10. After August 10,\nthe area west of 65°30' W was reopened, but all vessels had to carry an observer, at\ntheir own expense, in order to closely monitor all haul-backs.\nIn 1995 and 1996 the opening of the Canadian swordfish fishery was delayed\nuntil August 1 west of 65°30' W to avoid the problem of bluefin tuna bycatch. The\nCanadian Atlantic Fishery Regulations stipulate a zero tolerance of bluefin tuna\nbycatch. Closure will occur should this be exceeded based on observations from\neither at-sea inspections by Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) or by at-sea\nobservers. DFO consults with large pelagic participants to determine whether the\nfishery should continue at a reduced level of activity with a high level of observer\ncoverage, or whether to close the fishery area for a specific time period and\nimplement a comprehensive test fishery, or close the fishery for a specific time\nperiod and conduct no test fishery. The participants in the fishery determine which\nvessels may participate in the test fishery and vessel operators are responsible for all\nobserver costs for the duration of the test fishery.\nEcological Impacts\nThe Canadian model for time/area closures may also help reduce discards of\nbluefin tuna and have a positive impact on the stocks. The intent would be similar\nto the final action described above. A time/area closure would be implemented\nwhen large numbers of bluefin tuna are believed to be on the fishing grounds. In\ncontrast to the final action, determination of the appropriate time/area closure would\nbe done by vessels testing the closed area to ascertain when the bluefin tuna have\nleft the area SO that traditional target longline fishing can resume.\nThe Canadian time/area closure model could also be used to monitor the\nabundance and distribution of marine mammals or other protected species in a\ncertain test area SO that fishing effort would only be allowed when the area is clear\nof these species. This alternative could potentially reduce interaction rates with\nprotected species although it is not used in this fashion.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nCanada requires observer coverage at the expense of the longline fishermen\ninvolved. If implemented for the United States, this alternative would present an\nadditional economic burden to the fishery as well as an additional administrative\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 240","burden for the government because of openings/closings based on test results. The\nCanadian model also assumes that once the test boats have determined that bluefin\ntuna have migrated out of the test area, the fish will remain out of the area long\nenough for normal fishing operations to take place. Whereas this may be a good\nassumption for bluefin tuna migrations in the northern Canadian waters, it may not\nbe applicable in the waters of the U.S. continental shelf where migration patterns\nare less predictable. Finally the Canadian system may be more appropriate for a\nfishery in which industry routinely pays for observer vessels, and for fleets of\nrelatively modest size. For the U.S. pelagic longline fleet, guaranteed ten percent\nobserver coverage would cost up to $2.5 million per year.\nIn addition, this alternative would not allow fishermen to plan their fishing\nseason. Under this alternative, fishermen would not know when the fishery may\nopen or close. As such, plans for buying bait, fuel, ice, and other equipment would\nimpact not only fishermen, but also the communities which rely on these sales.\nAlso, unlike the final action, this alternative would not allow fishermen to displace\neffort as easily.\nIn addition to the costs of monitoring the area to determine when is an\nappropriate time for opening, enforcement would be necessary to oversee the\nfishery while in progress. On-going monitoring of catches and quota would\ncontinue as normal.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is unduly harsh to fishermen and the communities which rely on\nfishing. In addition, this alternative would create a large administrative burden. As\nsuch, even though this alternative may decrease bluefin tuna discards and bycatch, it\nis rejected.\nRejected Option: Closure of all longline fisheries once any HMS quota is reached\nUnder this alternative, NMFS would prohibit pelagic and bottom longlines for all\nspecies, for the remainder of the season, regardless of where and when fishing\noccurs, once any single quota for any HMS species is attained (quotas are in place\nfor directed longline fishing of sharks and swordfish, and an incidental (now called\nlongline) quota for bluefin tuna). For example, the quota of incidentally caught\nbluefin tuna would remain as established each year for longlines with no catch\nlimits or seasonal restrictions. Once the bluefin tuna quota for longlines was\nattained, pelagic longlines would be prohibited in all areas. The same would be\ntrue if the shark or swordfish quota was met first: longlines would be prohibited for\nthat quota season.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 241","This measure could be difficult to implement and enforce due to different\nseasonal openings and closures of the various affected fisheries. Also, because\nlongline discards are estimated as reported (using reported numbers multiplied by\nobserved weights), this alternative might increase the incentive to under-report\ndiscards, thus necessitating increased observer coverage. If all bluefin tuna caught\nwere landed, bluefin tuna discards would be reduced to zero as all bluefin tuna\ncould be retained until the quota was met. This regime could potentially have a\nbenefit of reducing incidental mortality of billfish, undersized swordfish, and sharks\ndue to early closure of the entire longline fishery for all species. However, if the\nbluefin tuna quota, or any other quota, were met rapidly at the beginning of the\ndirected fishery for any species (including swordfish, sharks or tuna other than\nbluefin tuna), there could be significant economic disruption for all of the fisheries.\nAlso, this alternative would not utilize the entire quota of those fisheries that were\nnot met first, which would be counter to the intent of ATCA and the Magnuson-\nStevens Act to provide U.S. fishermen an opportunity to harvest the full quota.\nEcological Impacts\nClosing the entire longline fishery once a quota has been reached in any HMS\nlongline fishery may have a positive impact on bluefin tuna. All bluefin tuna\ncaught could be landed until the quota was reached, unless a quota for another\nfishery was reached first. Thus, potentially there would be no dead discards of\nbluefin tuna and potentially the allocated quota may not even be caught if the quota\nof another fishery (i.e., sharks or swordfish) was caught first. However, if bluefin\ntuna that would normally have been released alive are now retained, some of the\npositive impacts would be diminished.\nClosing all longline fisheries once any individual fishery quota is reached could\nhave an impact on target stocks depending on which fishery closed first. Once the\nlongline fishery is closed after reaching a certain quota then all other target species\nwould be relieved from any additional fishing pressure - until the opening of the\nnext quota period. Target stocks may be positively impacted if fishing mortality\nwas reduced as a result of a closed longline fishery. However, this alternative could\ncause a large race-for-the fish in which fishermen try to land as many fish as\npossible of all species before the fishery closes. This could increase bycatch and\ndiscards of many species. Closing all longline activities once any quota is reached\ncould reduce interactions with protected species, but the magnitude of that potential\neffect is uncertain.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would have a significant negative impact on fishermen. While\nthe fishery for some species currently remains open for most of the season (i.e.,\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 242","swordfish) other fisheries close after only a few weeks (i.e., large coastal sharks).\nThus, this alternative would close all fisheries, preventing fishermen from switching\nfisheries once a quota is reached. The possible decrease in income, and the\nunsteady nature of the fishery not only may force fishermen out of business, but\nalso may affect the communities which rely on those fisheries.\nThis option could require additional enforcement and monitoring costs to ensure\nthat discards are properly reported and deducted from the quota. Currently, discards\nare self-reported on vessel trip reports. If some limited government-funded (versus\nfishery-funded) observer coverage were to be implemented to independently verify\ndiscard amounts, then administrative costs would increase. Other administrative\nissues include whether the discards are deducted from the longline or total quotas.\nThere may be some additional burden on administrators to quickly and accurately\ncompile discard numbers from the previous year to ensure the correct amount is\ndeducted in time. In addition, if this alternative increases the race-for-the-fish,\nsafety at sea could decrease as fishermen may be more intent on bringing in large\namounts of fish quickly than in paying attention to the safety of the vessel and crew.\nConclusion\nThis alternative could have large negative ecological and economical impacts. In\naddition, it may decrease safety-at-sea. Thus, this alternative is rejected.\nTable\n3.48\nTotal U.S. quotas and landings; longline category landings, quotas, and dead discards of bluefin\ntuna, in metric tons whole weight, 1992 - 1997.\n1992\n1993\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\nA\nTotal U.S. Quota\n1,272.0\n1,331.0\n1,235.0\n1,335.0\n1,306.0\n1,344.0\nB\nTotal U.S. Landings\n1,084.5\n1,238.1\n1,162.9\n1,309.7\n1,284.1\n1,333.6\nC\nLongline Quota\n132.0\n83.0\n109.0\n123.0\n109.0\n109.0\nD\nLongline Landings\n135.6\n88.5\n101.6\n72.6\n67.9\n49.8\nE\nLongline Dead Discards2\n43.9\n30.0\n75.3\n141.6\n73.5\n37.1\n'From Federal Register notices setting quota allocations, 1992 through 1997. Longline Quotas are initial quotas; in some\nyears the longline quota was reduced or increased due to transfers from or to other categories.\nFrom 1997 and 1998 U.S. National Reports to ICCAT.\n3.5.4.1.2\nSwordfish Bycatch Reduction Measures\nNMFS establishes measures in this FMP that are likely to reduce bycatch of\nswordfish in HMS fisheries. In some cases, bycatch reduction measures may be\ndeveloped in the future through the FMP framework. Those near-term and long-\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 243","term measures that may directly or indirectly minimize bycatch include: bycatch\nlimits, limited entry, gear modifications, minimum size, retention limits, time/area\nclosures, and a process for accounting for dead discards of swordfish. In this\nsection, NMFS considers time/area closures as a complement to the current\nswordfish minimum size requirement as a way to reduce bycatch of undersized\nswordfish and to foster rebuilding of this overfished stock. NMFS has also\nconsidered gear modifications and educational workshops and materials.\nSpecifically, NMFS seeks to minimize bycatch of undersized swordfish in the\npelagic longline fishery. Having the current size limit in place may decrease\nlandings of small swordfish, but may not decrease catches and reduce mortality\nwithout complementary management measures. Time/area closures would reduce\nfishing effort in nursery areas, thereby decreasing catch rates of, and the mortality\nrate for, undersized swordfish. However, NMFS must consider the effect of\ntime/area closures on optimum yield.\nNMFS developed alternatives to reduce bycatch of undersized swordfish with\ntwo goals: 1) to effectively reduce mortality on small swordfish and 2) to minimize\nimpacts to fishermen. There is currently no incentive to target undersized\nswordfish, given the minimum size limit and the lower market price for smaller\nswordfish. Although swordfish discards have decreased in 1997 from prior levels\n(Table 3.49), pelagic longline fishermen have been unable to reduce discards\nsufficiently with voluntary measures such as gear modifications and voluntary\navoidance of concentrations of small swordfish.\nTable 3.49\nTotal U.S. quotas and landings/discards of north Atlantic swordfish, in metric tons,\n1995 - 1997 (SCRS, 1998a).\n1995\n1996\n1997\nTotal U.S. Landings\n4025\n3562\n2976\nTotal U.S. Discards\n1644\n588\n446\nLongline Landings\n3926\n3457\n2569\nLongline Discards\n526\n562\n434\nOne consideration in developing a time/area closure program is whether to select\nsmall areas for long periods of time, or large areas for shorter periods of time.\nClosing small geographic regions to fishing may reduce mortality of small\nswordfish and billfish. However, if vessels were allowed to traverse these areas and\nfish in adjacent waters, it would be expected that mortality reductions caused by the\ntime/area closure could be offset by increased mortality on the same stock in\nadjacent waters.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 244","An analysis by Cramer and Scott (1998) of pelagic logbook data (1992 to 1996)\nsubmitted by pelagic longline fishermen, considered quarterly swordfish discard\nratios (swordfish discarded/swordfish discarded plus swordfish landed) in two\ndegree squares in the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and Caribbean Sea. The\nFlorida Straits ranked as the area of highest discards in the second and third quarters\n(April to September) and the area of the second highest discards in the first and\nfourth quarters (Cramer and Scott, 1998) and is therefore a priority area for\nprotecting small swordfish. The swordfish discard ratio ranged from 29 percent to\n60 percent in the Florida Straits during the third quarter for each year between\n1992 and 1996. The Charleston Hump area south to the Florida keys represents a\nlarger area that may act as a continuous nursery area for swordfish. Discards per\nunit effort vary widely within regions and seasons.\nFigure 3.13 illustrates statistical areas used in analyzing data collected from\npelagic longline logbooks. In 1997, 2,458 swordfish (approximately 82,720 pounds\nor 37 metric tons) were discarded dead during the third quarter from pelagic\nlongline vessels operating in the area east of the Florida East Coast (Cramer and\nAdams, 1998a). Post-release survival is not estimated for the live releases,\nhowever, it can be assumed that some fraction of all swordfish released from a hook\ndie. Although effort was lower in the Florida East Coast area (fewer hooks) than in\nthe mid-Atlantic Bight and Northeast Coastal areas, more swordfish were discarded\ndead in 1997 than in these other areas. The South Atlantic Bight has similarly high\nrates of discard in the third quarter and is also of concern in the fourth quarter, given\nreduced fishing effort but high dead discards. NMFS therefore, proposed closing\nonly the Florida Straits to pelagic longline fishing in order to protect small\nswordfish. NMFS received comments form fishermen, scientists,\nenvironmentalists, and recreational fishermen indicating that such a small closure\nwould not be effective given probable re-distribution of fishing effort.\nGiven the substantial social and economic effects of a time/area closure on\nfishermen and their communities and uncertainty regarding inter-annual re-\ndistribution of fish and fishing effort, NMFS is pursuing additional analyses of\nlarger areas. Following implementation of any time/area closure, NMFS will\nevaluate the reduction in discards and the significance of displaced effort, and\nproceed, if necessary, to implement other flexible time/area closures. The\nframework of this FMP allows for the development of additional time/area closures,\nas appropriate (see section 3.10).\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 245","Figure 3.13 Geographic areas used in summaries of pelagic logbook data from 1992 - 1997.\n(Cramer and Adams, 1998b)\n55\n50\nCaribbean (CAR)\nGulf of Mexico (GOM)\nFlorida East Coast (FEC)\nSouth Atlentic Bight (SABI\n45\nMid Atlantic Bight (MAB)\nNortheast Coastal (NEC)\nNortheast Distant (NED)\nSargasso (SAR)\nNED\n40\nNorth Centre Atlantic (NCA)\nTuna North TUN\nNEC\nTuna South (TUS)\nMAB\n35\n35\nSAB\n30\nSAR\nFEC\n25\nGOM\n22.\nNCA\n20\n15\nCAR\n13\n10\nTUN\n5\n5\nTUS\n-50\n-20\nFinal Action:\nEstablish a foundation to count dead discards of swordfish\nagainst the swordfish quota\nThis action and its impacts are explained in Section 3.4.1.2. Accounting for all\nsources of mortality is expected to create an incentive for fishermen to avoid areas\nwhere rates of interaction with small swordfish are high. While this is not a\nsolution to bycatch as an individual measure, this measure may afford the United\nStates a more effective negotiating strategy at ICCAT (in the future) to support\nbycatch reduction stock-wide. The United States has set the stage with the 1998\nU.S.-sponsored resolution for rebuilding, including the counting of dead discards.\nFinal Action: Minimum size for swordfish (status quo, 33 pounds, 73 cm\n(29 inches) CK)\nThis action and its impacts are discussed in Section 3.4.2.2. A minimum size for\nswordfish may encourage fishermen to avoid areas of concentration of small\nswordfish because these fish cannot be sold.\nFinal Action: Prohibit imports of Atlantic swordfish weighing less than the\nU.S. minimum size\nNMFS implemented a new swordfish import monitoring program which requires\nall swordfish importers to possess swordfish permits and report on a bi-weekly basis\non their swordfish imports. This action also prohibits the import of Atlantic\nswordfish weighing less than 33 pounds (the current domestic minimum size).\nPieces of Atlantic swordfish weighing less than 33 pounds must be accompanied by\nvalidation that they were derived from a swordfish that weighed more than our\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 246","minimum size limit. This program may create an incentive for countries to avoid\nsmall swordfish since they will be refused by the United States, which is a major\nmarket for Atlantic swordfish.\nFinal Action: Swordfish bycatch limits in incidental fisheries (status quo)\nThis action and its impacts are discussed in Section 3.4.2. These retention limits\nmay encourage fishermen who do not participate in the directed swordfish fishery to\navoid areas of concentration of swordfish. These bycatch limits reduce bycatch by\nproviding an allowance for landing of swordfish that cannot be avoided.\nFinal Action: Prepare a proposed rule that would implement a more effective\nclosure area to protect small swordfish\nNMFS received considerable comment regarding the proposed time/area closure\nto protect small swordfish in the Florida Straits. Most comments indicated that this\narea was too small to be effective given the likely re-distribution of effort on the\n\"fringes\" of the closed area. NMFS has therefore, chosen to reconsider a more\neffective time/area closure to protect small swordfish and has begun the necessary\nbiological, social, and economic analyses necessary for proposing a larger area or\nareas. In response to comments, and based on earlier analyses, the larger areas\ninclude the Charleston Bump and the Florida Keys. Analyses may also continue to\nexamine areas in the Gulf of Mexico. NMFS has scheduled a combined HMS and\nBillfish AP meeting for June 10 to 11, 1999 to discuss the results of new analyses\nthat NMFS is undertaking. After that discussion, NMFS will select a preferred\nalternative and publish a proposed rule under the framework of this FMP.\nEcological Impacts\nNMFS has conducted analyses for a private industry buyout that shows the\nbenefits of removing effort from large, key nursery areas. While NMFS is not\nproposing removal of effort, these analyses clearly show that larger areas can be\nmore effective, subject to impacts from re-distribution of effort. Closing a larger\narea to pelagic longline fishing may provide increased benefits to the swordfish\nstock if the area chosen is one of consistently high small swordfish concentrations\n(refer to Chapters 5 and 6 to identify essential fish habitat for juvenile swordfish).\nMany pelagic longline vessels are themselves \"highly migratory\" and may be able\nto redirect their fishing effort in open areas. If they redirect into areas where small\nswordfish are not prevalent, this alternative would still have positive ecological\nimpacts on the stock. If these fishermen redirect to areas with similar rates of\nswordfish discards, this alternative would have negligible effects on stock\nrebuilding. NMFS cannot accurately project fishing effort re-distribution at this\ntime, however, a large closure is likely to encourage those longline fishermen that\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 247","currently fish in the \"closed area\" to pursue other fishing activities during the\nclosure period.\nOne of the options NMFS may consider is a closure in the South Atlantic Bight\nduring second and third quarter months. The effects on bycatch of sea turtles could\nbe detrimental IF fishermen redirect their effort in the fourth quarter in the\nNortheast Coastal and Northeast Distant areas. In past years, the pelagic longline\nfishery has sometimes been limited due to a closure of the swordfish fishery in the\nfall. However, if a large closure is implemented in the summer or fall months,\nvessels may have an opportunity to fish throughout the fourth quarter, thereby\npotentially increasing their turtle catch rates. NMFS will, of course, consider the\nbycatch rates of turtles and marine mammals, as well as billfish and swordfish,\nwhen assessing alternatives for time/area closures. NMFS will also consider\npossible re-distribution of effort to accommodate for the \"lost\" fishing effort and the\nresultant \"extra\" quota in the Fall months relative to previous years.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThe cumulative economic impacts of reducing quota, counting discards against the\nquota, and closing a larger area to pelagic longline fishermen would be significant.\nNMFS will assess these impacts in more detail when it proposes the appropriate\ntime/area closure. At this time, NMFS does not wish to implement a smaller closure\narea which may have significant economic impacts but minor ecological benefits.\nThis alternative might have safety at sea implications if fishermen are encouraged to\nfish farther offshore than they would in the absence of such a closure. Regarding\nadministrative costs of this alternative, NMFS is committed to using time/area\nclosures to protect small swordfish. Therefore, the increased administrative costs that\nthis measure entails are not considered to be excessive for the expected positive long-\nterm benefits to the swordfish stock and the nation.\nConclusion\nNMFS prefers this alternative at this time. Comments on the HMS FMP and the\nAmendment One to the Billfish FMP (NMFS, 1999a), and further analyses indicate\nthat a larger area is necessary to achieve bycatch goals. NMFS has begun analyses\nto analyze the effectiveness of a larger closure and will present them to the public at\nthe June 1999 Advisory Panel meeting. Effectiveness of this measure would be\nassessed annually by discard analyses from the remainder of the fleet. Cramer and\nScott (1998) identified other areas of high discard rates of small swordfish,\nhowever, this alternative discusses only the Florida Straits area because NMFS\ndetermined at the time that closure would be most effective in achieving\nmanagement objectives of minimizing bycatch and helping to rebuild overfished\nfisheries while also minimizing the adverse economic impacts on affected fishery\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 248","participants. Closure of other times or areas could be considered under the\nframework provisions, pending results of the first time/area closure.\nTo reduce mortality on undersized swordfish, NMFS has implemented minimum\nsize limits, retention limits for incidental fishing gears, and a time/area closure.\nTogether, these measures are expected to encourage fishermen to avoid areas of\nconcentrations of small swordfish, reduce the incentive for targeting swordfish by\nunauthorized gears, and reduce interactions between undersized swordfish and\npelagic longline gear.\nRejected Options for Swordfish Bycatch Reduction\nRejected Option: Prohibit pelagic longline fishing in the Florida Straits from July\nthrough September\nThis rejected action would close the Florida Straits (26° to 28° latitude, 78° to\n81° longitude) to pelagic longline fishing activity during the months of July,\nAugust, and September (third quarter). Refer to Figure 3.14.\nFigure 3.14\nFlorida Straits time/area closure to reduce discards of undersized swordfish in the\npelagic longline fishery.\n30'N\nEcological Impacts\nThis action is expected to result in decreased mortality on undersized swordfish\nby eliminating fishing effort in a known nursery area for swordfish. The number of\ndiscards reported in vessel logbooks underestimates the actual benefits of area\nclosures, since logbook - reported discards tend to underestimate actual discards.\nFurther, some small swordfish that may be torn off the hook before they are boated\n(due to drag) are not reported in logbooks. Considering this, the positive impacts of\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 249","this action are underestimated by Cramer and Scott (1998). However, there is the\npotential under any time/area closure program that fishing effort will shift, resulting\nin unpredictable but potentially negative consequences for target finfish, marine\nmammals, turtles, and non-target finfish. It is difficult to estimate the percentage of\nreductions in target catch and reductions in discards for this measure.\nAlthough Cramer and Scott (1998) provide different scenarios for estimating\nfleet behavior (no redistribution of effort and re-distribution of effort), it is unknown\nwhat the fleet would do if this proposed time/area closure were implemented. If\nthe closed area is large enough, fishermen may be discouraged from fishing\n\"around\" it. However, industry representatives have indicated to NMFS that\nfishermen should be expected to re-distribute fishing effort. NMFS cannot,\nhowever, estimate what increase in costs will accrue to those fishermen. Accurate\nprediction of fishing effort re-distribution in response to regulatory actions is\ndifficult (Cramer and Scott, 1998). In a small area closure, effort could also shift to\nregions where catch rates are only marginally different, resulting in smaller than\nexpected reductions in discards. For these reasons, NMFS proposes to close a\nlarger geographic area under this alternative.\nThis action is likely to increase spawning stock biomass in the long term and\nincrease biological productivity of the north Atlantic swordfish stock. This also\nappears to be an area of concentration for blue marlin and sailfish and may result in\ndecreased discards of these species (Mace, 1997b). Based on Cramer and Adams\n(1998), 1997 dead discards of other species in the Florida East Coast area are\nsummarized in the table below. Although the area described in Table 3.50 is larger\nthan the area closed in this FMP, it gives the reader an estimate of the relative levels\nof discards of various target and non-target finfish. If the closure is implemented\nand fish distribution remains constant, it can be expected that the proposed\ntime/area closure will also reduce pelagic longline-induced mortality of the species\nlisted in the table.\nIn a recent analysis of the proposed Florida Straits time/area closure by\nGoodyear (1998a), that included impacts of effort redistribution, the average total\nblue marlin catch rises slightly, with mortality increased about one percent. The\nresults for white marlin were similar, with catch increasing from 0.9 to 1.8 percent\nand mortality increasing from 1.2 to about two percent. The analysis assumes that\nthe same amount of effort previously deployed in the closed area is deployed\nelsewhere during the months of the closure at the average catch per unit effort\noutside of the closed area. Goodyear's analyses indicated that the proposed\nswordfish closure would not likely reduce marlin bycatch. In fact, the results\nindicated that the proposed closure might slightly increase the bycatch of marlin,\nperhaps on the order of one to two percent. NMFS acknowledges that the\nmentioned closure would most likely result in a redistribution of longline effort, but\nthere is not sufficient data to support how effort will be redistributed.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 250","Table 3.50 Estimated dead discards of some highly migratory species in the pelagic longline fishery in 1997\nin the area east of the Florida East Coast during the third quarter4. (Cramer and Adams, 1998a)\nSpecies\nNumber Discarded Dead\nWeight of Fish Discarded Dead (lb ww)\nSailfish\n209\n9,856\nBlue marlin\n26\n3,498\nWhite marlin\n0\n0\nPelagic sharks\n0\n0\nBlue sharks\n0\n0\nThresher sharks\n26\n6,334\nCoastal sharks\n52\n8,549\nDusky sharks\n26\n2,290\nSilky sharks\n131\n4,919\nHammerhead sharks\n183\n33,213\nNight sharks\n183\n7,115\nThis closure is not expected to result in increased marine mammal or turtle takes\nin the pelagic longline fishery. However, as discussed above, it is impossible to\nestimate where the fishing effort will be re-distributed. The number of turtles\ncaught per swordfish (caught, not landed) varies by area, however, according to\nobserver data, the South Atlantic Bight is a likely re-distribution area for fishing\neffort and has similar takes of sea turtles (Hoey, 1998) as the time/area closure. The\nFlorida East Coast area ranks seventh of ten areas (Hoey, 1998), indicating that this\ntime/area closure is not likely to significantly reduce turtle bycatch in the pelagic\nlongline fishery. Further, even if fishing effort is re-distributed by the Florida\nStraits fleet, it is not likely to be re-distributed to areas of third quarter high turtle\nbycatch (Northeast Distant). Refer to Hoey (1998), for more information about\nturtle takes in the pelagic longline fishery by season and area.\nTakes of sea birds are low in the Atlantic pelagic longline fishery. In seven years\n(July 1990 to June 1997), five birds were observed killed (in February only) in the\npelagic longline fishery in the South Atlantic Bight. Takes in the Mid-Atlantic\nBight were slightly higher, although this closure is not likely to affect sea bird takes.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action will have a significant impact on 18 of the 20 vessels that fished in\nthis area during the third quarter of 1997. In the short term, the vessels that have\n4\nThis area is larger than the area analyzed for the time/area closure alternative, and therefore represents higher\nnumbers of discards. It is inserted in this text merely to give the reader an idea of the magnitude of small swordfish\ndiscards in the general geographic area.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 251","fished in that area during that time of year may cease fishing for the third quarter or\nrely on other forms of income, including other commercial fishing operations or\nshoreside industries. Some fishermen should be expected to re-distribute fishing\neffort as a result of a time/area closure. However, a quantitative estimate of the\namount and type of this redistribution cannot be made (Cramer and Scott, 1998).\nThis particular time/area closure is likely to reduce fishing mortality on small\nswordfish if swordfish abundance and catchability remain stable into the future at\nthe five-year average levels and if effort is not re-distributed due to the large size of\nthe closed area. While this may have a greater economic impact on smaller vessels\n(20 vessels ranging 32 to 58 feet in length overall), it would more effectively\ndecrease bycatch. Therefore, population effects for swordfish are difficult to\nquantify, but are expected to contribute to rebuilding. Closing the larger areas for\nshorter periods of time (three months VS. throughout the year) will mitigate the\nimpacts to small vessel owners who possess permits and land fish in other Southeast\nfederal fisheries (e.g., reef fish and snapper/grouper) that they could pursue during\nthe swordfish time/area closure. Vessel may also fish farther north along the coast\n(e.g., Charleston Bump area).\nThis closure could result in changes in fishing, processing, and marketing\npractices and costs if effort is re-distributed and fishermen sell their catch to\npreviously unknown dealers. Some fishermen may continue to sell to their original\nbuyer, however, transport costs for the catch may increase. In the long term, this\nmeasure should hasten rebuilding of this overfished stock, and fishermen will have\naccess to more swordfish at other times of the year, thus recouping their losses\nduring the third quarter. However, there are an increasing number of restrictive\nmeasures being placed on state and federal fisheries, including access limitation,\nand fishermen may not be able to rely on transferring effort to other fisheries.\nDealers that buy fresh high-quality swordfish in this area are frequently located in\nsmall coastal towns in Florida such as Fort Pierce and Dania. These small\nbusinesses may specialize in swordfish or deal exclusively in swordfish and may be\nsignificantly affected during the time of the closure. Any closure that may result in\nfishermen fishing farther from home than they would normally, may have\nsignificant social impacts to families. It is unlikely these impacts would be\ntransferred to a fishing community, particularly in Florida, where communities tend\nto harbor fishermen that participate in multiple species. The negative effects some\nFlorida East Coast communities may feel may be minimized because the closure is\nfor three months only. Many of these fishing vessels fish outside this area at certain\ntimes of the year anyway, possibly ranging north to the mid-Atlantic and south to\nthe Florida Keys. Another alternative that would have a lesser impact on fishing\ncommunities would likely also have a lesser benefit to stock rebuilding, because the\nclosure would have to be smaller in geographic area or time frame.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 252","This action would not represent a bias toward one area or another. NMFS\nproposed the area with the highest reported swordfish discard rates year-round.\nThat way, if the fish are moving into this area seasonally and they migration is\noffset by a few weeks, the time/area closure may still be effective. The fishing\ncommunities that may be affected by this closure may also be supported by the\ntourism trade. The area will remain open, however, to Charter fishing trips for\nhighly migratory species.\nThis closure would increase research, administration, and enforcement costs, due\nlargely to evaluating and monitoring the closure and implementing a VMS program\nfor the entire pelagic longline fleet. The evaluation and monitoring program would\nrequire increased efforts to provide spatial analysis of the pelagic longline catch and\ndiscard database. Implementing a fleet-wide VMS program has substantial\nadministration and enforcement costs up front, however once the program is\nestablished, enforcement costs would decrease, provided there are not a significant\nnumber of violations of the time/area closure.\nConclusion\nDespite the possible benefits of this closure, NMFS rejects this alternative.\nInstead, NMFS will analyze other, more effective areas. This action is rejected\nbecause fishing distribution patterns are unknown and reductions in mortality of\nsmall swordfish may not be sufficient to justify the social and economic impacts. A\ntime/area closure, implemented in conjunction with the current minimum size limit,\nmay protect a vital part of the swordfish stock. The pelagic longline industry\nappears committed to reducing catch of undersized swordfish. However, voluntary\nactions by pelagic longline fishermen to date have been insufficient to slow the\ndecline of the stock and the proposed time/area closure will help increase growth to\nmaturity of swordfish that might otherwise be caught and discarded dead. The\npossible use of a buyout program for vessels that will no longer be able to fish for\nHMS due to the loss of revenues from implementation of this alternative is\ndiscussed in Chapter 4 (Limited Access) and Chapter 7 as a mechanism to mitigate\nnegative economic impacts.\nAlthough the time/area closure described above would create a significant impact\non 20 vessel owners in Florida, is likely to achieve some reduction in bycatch of\nundersized swordfish, with possible reductions (depending on effort re-distribution)\nin bycatch of blue marlin, sailfish, dusky sharks and night sharks, all species of\ndepleted populations.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 253","Rejected Option: Status quo (No time/area closures)\nNMFS rejects the status quo for implementing time/area closures to reduce\nbycatch of undersized swordfish in the pelagic longline fishery. Although NMFS\ndoes not currently have complete analyses to support the efficacy of an appropriate\nclosure area or the social and economic impacts, NMFS is completing those\nnecessary analyses and will present the options to the HMS and Billfish Advisory\nPanel at the June 1999 meeting.\nEcological Impacts\nCurrent bycatch mortality rates of undersized swordfish in the pelagic longline\nfishery may be hindering rebuilding efforts and the minimum size results in\nincreased discards. SCRS (1998a) indicated that if mortality on small swordfish\nwould decrease, substantial gains in yield could accrue. Time/area closures may be\nan effective way to reduce fishing effort in swordfish nursery areas.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nAlthough this alternative would have the least amount of social and economic\nimpact on the pelagic longline fishermen and their respective communities and the\nleast administrative costs to implement, in the long term, these communities and the\nnation would benefit from increased yield from the stock. Therefore, NMFS rejects\nthis option in favor of an alternative that may have greater social and economic\nimpacts in the short term, but greater positive ecological impacts.\nConclusion\nNMFS rejects the status quo in terms of implementing a time/area closure.\nNMFS will pursue implementation of a large area that may reduce the amount of\nfishing effort re-distribution and therefore be more effective in protecting the stock.\nRejected Option: Time/area closures for other fishing gears\n1A: Time/Area Closures for Rod and Reel Fishermen\nEcological Impacts\nNMFS does not have data at this time that indicate a need to reduce interactions\nbetween small swordfish and rod and reel fishing gear. Tagging data indicate that\nswordfish are encountered by rod and reel gear and that most swordfish caught on\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 254","rod and reel and tagged as part of the Game Fish Tagging program are undersized\nfish. However, NMFS does not know the extent of swordfish catches in rod and\nreel gear because the tagging database is limited.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nIn addition to a pelagic longline closure, a closure for rod and reel fishermen\nwill affect commercial and recreational fishermen alike because pelagic longline\nfishermen are likely to try their luck at rod and reel fishing for swordfish if there are\nsufficient encounters with swordfish. If the closure will not directly benefit the\nstock, NMFS does not see the need for affecting commercial and recreational\nfishermen, tournaments, charter trips, or private fishing trips. Further, NMFS does\nnot support restricting a gear type if unnecessary. Time/area closures for other gear\ntypes would increase administrative costs unnecessarily, especially in the\nenforcement arena.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected. Bycatch of undersized swordfish by rod and reel\nfishing gear is currently not a concern because bycatch rates are thought to be\nminimal. Time/area closures will be included in the framework and can be\nimplemented for any gear type in the future if NMFS deems bycatch is too high.\n1B: Closures for Squid Trawl Fishermen\nSquid trawls encounter a range of sizes of swordfish as bycatch. Most swordfish\nare caught in the summer months in the mid-Atlantic area. In this FMP, NMFS\nmaintains the existing bycatch limit for squid trawls of five swordfish per trip.\nThis limit was established in conjunction with fishery participants based on\nobserved bycatch in the early 1990's.\nEcological Impacts\nNMFS will work with the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council to prevent\nswordfish bycatch rates from increasing in this fishery. Time/area closures in the\nsquid fishery are not necessary at this time as NMFS considers their interaction\nrates with swordfish to be at a low level.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 255","Social and Economic Impacts\nSquid trawls are not able to \"target\" or \"avoid\" swordfish but because catch rates\nare low, NMFS allows those swordfish to be landed. Time/area closures in this\nfishery would have to be approved by the fishery management council and further,\nwould unnecessarily interfere with the prosecution of that fishery (\"low bang for the\nbuck\"). It is not apparent that redistributing trawl effort to another area would\ndecrease swordfish bycatch in this fishery. Time/area closures for squid trawl\nvessels would increase administrative costs unnecessarily, especially in the\nenforcement arena.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected. NMFS does not consider the bycatch of swordfish in\nthe squid trawl fishery to be significant and therefore will not implement time/area\nclosures for this fishery. Adjusting bycatch limits will be a framework measure\nbecause NMFS expects further analysis of swordfish bycatch in the squid trawl\nfishery as additional data are assembled.\n3.4.4.1.3 Sharks\nIn this FMP, NMFS establishes measures that are both likely to reduce and to\nincrease bycatch of sharks. Those measures expected to reduce bycatch are final\nactions to count dead discards against quotas and to establish a quota for blue\nsharks, against which landings and dead discards will be counted. Measures that\nmay increase bycatch of sharks include prohibiting possession of dusky sharks,\nestablishing a minimum size for ridgeback LCS in commercial fisheries and for all\nsharks in recreational fisheries, and substantially reducing the non-ridgeback LCS\ncommercial quota. Despite the expected increase in bycatch, however, NMFS\nimplements these measures because of the severely depleted status of these species\nand because NMFS' believes that these measures are necessary to reduce overall\nfishing mortality. As stated in the relevant sections describing the final actions,\nNMFS may consider additional management measures to reduce bycatch and\nbycatch mortality as necessary in the future. In this section, NMFS considers\ntime/area closures as a complement to the selected rebuilding program for LCS but\ndoes not implement any time/area closures due to NMFS' limited jurisdiction over\nareas identified as juvenile and subadult shark EFH.\nFinal Action: Prohibit possession of all sharks except those that are expected\nto be able to sustain fishing mortality; Allow retention of\ncertain commonly landed LCS, pelagic sharks, and SCS within\nFederal waters\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 256","The aspect of this action relevant to bycatch and bycatch reduction is the\nprohibition on possession of dusky sharks; this action and its impacts are fully\ndiscussed in Section 3.4.2.3.1. Prohibiting the possession of dusky sharks may\nencourage fishermen to avoid areas of high concentrations of dusky sharks.\nHowever, dusky sharks often co-occur with sandbar sharks, a primary commercial\nspecies that is authorized for retention, such that catches of dusky sharks may not\ndecrease. Thus, prohibiting possession of dusky sharks may increase bycatch in\nthose areas where they cannot be avoided and will likely result in increases in dead\ndiscards because the majority of dusky sharks come to the vessel dead\n(approximately 80 percent according to observer data). NMFS implements this\naction due to the severely depleted status of dusky sharks and believes that the\nbenefits of maximizing all dusky shark survival by requiring the release of the\n20 percent of dusky sharks that come to the vessel alive outweigh the drawbacks of\nincreasing bycatch and negative social and economic impacts.\nFinal Action:\nSeparate LCS management group into ridgeback and non-\nridgeback LCS with each subgroup having separate quotas;\nEstablish a minimum size and maintain quota level on\nridgeback LCS; Reduce quota on non-ridgeback LCS in\ncommercial fisheries\nThis action and its impacts are discussed in Section 3.4.1.3.1. Establishing a\nminimum size of 4.5 feet for ridgeback LCS in commercial fisheries is expected to\npush fishing effort offshore out of areas where undersized sharks predominate and\ninto areas where sharks larger than the minimum size predominate, thus mitigating\npotential increases in bycatch. If fishing effort continues in nearshore areas, then\nbycatch of undersized sharks will increase. However, NMFS implements this\naction based in large part on the size-depth segregation that sandbar sharks, the\nprimary ridgeback LCS, exhibit. Thus, increases in bycatch of undersized sharks\nare expected to be mitigated. NMFS is not implementing a minimum size for non-\nridgeback LCS because these species do not segregate by size and depth such that a\nminimum size would increase fishing mortality as well as bycatch and bycatch\nmortality.\nThe final action to reduce the non-ridgeback LCS by 66 percent to 218 mt dw\nwill result in substantially reduced fishery openings. In addition, this action will\nincrease bycatch of non-ridgeback sharks in other fisheries during directed non-\nridgeback fishery closures. Because the majority of non-ridgeback sharks come to\nthe vessel dead, reduction in the non-ridgeback LCS quota will also increase\nbycatch mortality. NMFS implements this action due to reduce effective fishing\nmortality in order to rebuild these species consistent with Magnuson-Stevens Act\nrequirements. Increases in bycatch and bycatch mortality may slow rebuilding of\nthese species and NMFS may consider additional management measures to reduce\nbycatch and bycatch mortality as necessary in the future.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 257","Final Action: Establish recreational retention limit of one shark per vessel\nper trip with a 4.5-foot minimum size and one Atlantic\nsharpnose shark per person per trip\nThis action and its impacts are discussed in Section 3.4.2.3.2. Establishing a\nminimum size of 4.5 feet for all sharks (except Atlantic sharpnose sharks) in\nrecreational fisheries will result in most nearshore recreationally-caught sharks\nbeing released. However, post-release mortality of sharks in recreational fisheries is\nbelieved to be low.\nFinal Action: Account for all sources of fishing mortality in establishing\nquota levels, including counting dead discards and landings in\nstate waters after Federal closures against Federal quotas\nThis action and its impacts are discussed in Section 3.4.1.3.5 for all species and\nin Section 3.4.1.3.2 for blue sharks. Counting dead discards of all sharks and\nestablishing a quota for blue sharks, against which landings and dead discards will\nbe counted, may encourage fishermen to avoid areas of concentration of blue\nsharks, prohibited species, and undersized sharks.\nFinal Action: No time/area closures for shark nursery and pupping areas\n(status quo)\nCurrently, there are no time or area closures (other than directed LCS closures\nrelated to quotas) that restrict commercial or recreational harvest of Atlantic sharks.\nThis action maintains the current management structure and does not close any\nparticular areas or times to directed or incidental shark fisheries. This action allows\ndirected and incidental fisheries to continue to retain Atlantic sharks within the\nbounds of implemented regulations (species management groups, commercial\nquotas and retention limits, recreational retention limits, prohibited species,\nfishing seasons).\nAlthough several coastal bays and estuaries have been identified as important\npupping and nursery areas for sandbar and dusky sharks (notably Delaware,\nChesapeake, and Bull's Bays), these areas are within state waters and outside of\nNMFS' jurisdiction. However, NMFS is continuing to work with Atlantic and Gulf\nof Mexico states and Regional Fishery Management Councils and Commissions in\ndeveloping consistent state and Federal shark regulations.\nOne area that is within NMFS' jurisdiction is what is considered to be an\nimportant overwintering area for juvenile and subadult sandbar and dusky sharks off\nCape Hatteras and management options for that area are discussed below.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 258","Note that additional analyses and alternatives on possible time and areas closures\nthat may impact shark fisheries are discussed above under Atlantic swordfish\nrebuilding and reducing bycatch of undersized swordfish alternatives.\nEcological Impacts\nThe selected minimum size for all sharks for the recreational fisheries (except\nAtlantic sharpnose sharks) and for ridgeback LCS for commercial fisheries is\nexpected to provide protection for the most sensitive stages/sizes of sharks within\nFederal waters, regardless of time or area. A minimum size for sharks may be\nconsidered a sort of \"moving\" time/area closure as fishermen go farther offshore to\ntarget and catch larger sharks. A more complete discussion of these actions and its\neffect on juvenile sharks can be found under Sections 3.4.1.3.1 and 3.4.2.3.2.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action is not expected to have any short term social or economic impacts\nbecause fishermen are already operating under this restriction. Potential long-term\nimpacts may result if the stocks cannot rebuild and additional harvest restrictions\nare necessary.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because other measures implemented in this FMP,\nincluding separating LCS into ridgeback and non-ridgeback LCS, establishing a\nminimum size and separate quota for ridgeback LCS, establishing and substantially\nreducing the non-ridgeback LCS quota, counting dead discards and state landings\nafter Federal closures against Federal quotas, and prohibiting possession of dusky\nsharks are expected to rebuild overfished LCS consistent with the Magnuson-\nStevens Act and the National Standards. Additionally, given the limited degree of\nnursery and pupping areas in Federal waters, this action is not likely to result in the\nlevel of fishing mortality reduction necessary to rebuild LCS. Further, as many\nAtlantic and Gulf of Mexico states have recently implemented or are considering\nimplementing more restrictive shark harvest regulations, including fishery closures,\nthe need for Federal time and/or area closures is reduced.\nRejected Options to Minimize Bycatch of Sharks\nRejected Options: Close juvenile and subadult Essential Fish Habitat (EFH) year-\nround to directed shark fishing and retention of all shark\nbycatch\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 259","Ecological Impacts\nThis alternative would prohibit directed fishing for, and possession of, sharks in\nareas identified as juvenile and subadult EFH (see Chapter 6) at all times. It would\nprovide maximum protection to juvenile and subadult sharks as well as pregnant\nfemales in those areas identified as EFH, thereby enhancing rebuilding. However,\nbecause EFH has not been identified as all areas in which these stages/sizes are\nfound, this alternative would allow for fishing mortality on these stages/sizes\noutside of designated areas. This alternative would result regulatory discarding of\nall sharks caught in closed areas.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would likely have substantial social impacts on nearshore\nfishermen who cannot expand their fishing effort offshore. This alternativ\nresult in changes in fishing practices in fisheries other than shark fisheries order\nto\nreduce shark bycatch. In the long term, this alternative would likely result in faster\nrebuilding of LCS, and thereby in a quicker return to an economically-viable\nshark fishery.\nThis alternative could have significant economic impacts. Juvenile EFH primarily\noccurs in state waters; however, some areas are located in Federal waters. This\nalternative may force fishermen and processors in or near the closed areas out of\nbusiness by forcing them to increase costs and fish offshore or in unfavorable waters.\nConclusion\nMost of the areas identified as EFH for juvenile and subadult sharks are in\nnearshore waters and coastal bays and estuaries, and accordingly, are outside of\nNMFS' jurisdiction. However, NMFS intends to continue working with Atlantic\nand Gulf of Mexico states, the Regional Fishery Management Councils, and the\nAtlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission to implement sharks harvest\nregulations that will meet conservation objectives. Therefore, this alternative is\nrejected. However, as many Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico states have recently\nimplemented or are considering implementing more restrictive shark harvest\nregulations, including fishery closures, the need for Federal time and/or area\nclosures is reduced.\nRejected Option: Close juvenile and subadult EFH during spring pupping season\nto directed shark fishing and retention of all shark bycatch\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 260","Ecological Impacts\nThis alternative would prohibit directed fishing for, and possession of, sharks in\nareas identified as juvenile and subadult EFH (see Chapter 6) during the spring\npupping season (primarily June through September). It would provide less\nprotection for juvenile and subadult sharks as well as pregnant females than a year-\nround closure in those areas identified as EFH but would still enhance rebuilding.\nBecause EFH is not identified in all areas where these stages/sizes are found, this\nalternative would allow for fishing mortality to continue on these stages/sizes\noutside of designated areas. This alternative would result in fewer sharks becoming\nregulatory discards than under a year-round closure because the closures would be\nless extensive.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would have similar, but less severe, social and economic impacts\nas those discussed for a year-round closure above. It would likely have fewer social\nimpacts on nearshore fishermen because the closure would only affect spring\nfishing operations. For those nearshore fishermen who cannot expand their fishing\neffort offshore or delay until later in the year, this alternative may have substantial\nimpacts. This alternative may result in changes in fishing practices in other\ndirected fisheries to reduce shark bycatch. In the long term, this alternative would\nlikely result in faster rebuilding of LCS, and thereby in a quicker return to an\neconomically-viable shark fishery.\nConclusion\nMost of the areas identified as EFH for juvenile and subadult sharks are in\nnearshore waters and coastal bays and estuaries, and accordingly, are outside of\nNMFS' jurisdiction. Therefore, this alternative is rejected. However, as many\nAtlantic and Gulf of Mexico states have recently implemented or are considering\nimplementing more restrictive shark harvest regulations, including fishery closures,\nthe need for Federal time and/or area closures is reduced.\nRejected Option: Close sandbar and dusky shark juvenile and subadult wintering\nEFH off Cape Hatteras, NC, to directed shark fishing and\nretention of all shark bycatch\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would prohibit directed fishing for, and possession of, sharks in\nthe area off Cape Hatteras, NC, for the traditional winter fishing season in order to\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 261","provide maximum protection for juvenile and subadult sandbar and dusky sharks\nthat overwinter in that area. These areas have been identified as sandbar and dusky\nshark juvenile and subadult wintering EFH off Cape Hatteras, NC (see Chapter 6).\nThis alternative would complement the selected ridgeback LCS minimum size by\nproviding protection for those stages/sizes in areas of high concentration that are\nmore vulnerable to fishing. This alternative would enhance rebuilding of the\nridgeback LCS and reduce bycatch of sharks under the minimum size.\nOn July 25, 1997, the State of North Carolina issued a proclamation that\nprohibited commercial retention of all sharks except Atlantic sharpnose shark and\nspecies in the pelagic species group. This proclamation is intended to reduce the\nmortalities of immature sandbar and dusky sharks, based on observer data\nindicating that about 90 percent of sharks taken in North Carolina state waters\n(inside of ten fathoms) are immature. The State of North Carolina believes that this\nproclamation effectively eliminates the juvenile sandbar and dusky shark winter\nfishery, and negates the need for the time/area closure (J. Francesconi, NC Division\nof Marine Fisheries, Morehead City, NC, personal communication).\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would likely cause substantial adverse social impacts because the\ntraditional winter season comprises substantial fishing opportunities for the directed\nshark fishery in that area. Generally, winter is a time of fewer alternative\nemployment opportunities in coastal communities and the loss of revenue from\ndirected shark fishing in the winter season may be acutely felt by fishermen and\ncommunities in that area. Additionally, this alternative would also likely impact\nfishermen in other fisheries, which may depend on the ability to land their\nincidental catches of sharks for a source of revenue. This alternative would address\nsafety at sea concerns that would result from the proposed minimum size (which\nwould push fishing effort offshore in winter months) for ridgeback LCS.\nThis alternative may have a significant economic impact on fishermen and\nprocessors who rely on fishing off North Carolina. Many of them may be forced\nout of business for similar reasons as noted above. This alternative would have\nlittle economic impacts on fishermen and processors outside of North Carolina.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because the North Carolina proclamation prohibiting\ncommercial retention of all sharks is expected to eliminate the juvenile sandbar and\ndusky shark winter fishery, thereby addressing effectively the need to protect those\nsensitive sizes/stages. Additionally, several other measures selected in this FMP,\nincluding separating LCS into ridgeback and non-ridgeback LCS, establishing a\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 262","minimum size and separate quota for ridgeback LCS, establishing and substantially\nreducing the non-ridgeback LCS quota, counting dead discards and state landings\nafter Federal closures against Federal quotas, and prohibiting possession of dusky\nsharks, are expected to rebuild overfished LCS consistent with the Magnuson-\nStevens Act and the National Standards.\n3.5.4.1.4 Billfish\nFinal Action: Status quo\nNMFS received considerable comment from billfish fishermen regarding the\nproposed measures to reduce bycatch; particularly the time/area closure to protect\nsmall swordfish in the Florida Straits. Most comments indicated that this area was\ntoo small to be effective given the likely re-distribution of effort on the \"fringes\" of\nthe closed area. There was also serious concern about the impacts on billfish of\nsuch a closure given expected re-distribution of fishing effort. NMFS has,\ntherefore, chosen to reconsider the proposed time/area closure to protect small\nswordfish and has begun the necessary ecological, social, and economic analyses\nnecessary for proposing a larger area or areas. NMFS will consider the effects of a\nlarger closure on billfish mortality in all new analyses. Several measures were\nproposed in the draft HMS FMP that are contained herein that will also reduce\nbillfish bycatch mortality and may decrease billfish bycatch in the pelagic longline\nfishery. However, NMFS expects that the single measure that is likely to reduce\nbillfish bycatch may be a larger time/area closure. NMFS has scheduled a\ncombined HMS and Billfish AP meeting to discuss the new analyses for a more\neffective closure to protect small swordfish.\nNMFS also received considerable comment about selecting time/area closures to\nspecifically reduce billfish bycatch. NMFS has conducted its own analyses (Mace,\n1997) and has studied analyses submitted by external scientists (Goodyear, 1998b)\nwhich do NOT indicate that there are \"hot spots\" that could be closed to pelagic\nlongline fishing to protect billfish without significant decreases in landings of target\nspecies. If an area larger than that which was proposed is closed, fishermen may\nselect not to longline during the closed time at all, and therefore impacts from re-\ndistribution of effort are likely to be lower than under a small closure plan.\nNMFS will continue to search for ways to minimize billfish bycatch but NMFS\nalso anticipates results from a gear modification study that is ongoing that may\nindicate that bycatch mortality can be minimized through gear modifications such\nas the use of circle hooks.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 263","3.5.4.1.5 General Bycatch Reduction Measures\nNMFS considered alternatives to address discards of all HMS for all gear types.\nThe FMP includes a limited access program for swordfish, shark, and pelagic\nlongline fisheries for tunas other than bluefin, which should contribute to the U.S.\neffort to decrease discards. Other general measures that are designed to reduce\nbycatch and bycatch mortality of all non-target finfish include gear modifications\nand VMS. Taken together with final actions on permitting and reporting\nrequirements, the measures in this section are intended to help NMFS meet the\nrequirements of NS9. These actions provide for collection of information from\nsectors of HMS fisheries for which there is currently limited information available.\nInformation collected under these management measures will be used, in part, to\nhelp NMFS identify and prioritize bycatch management needs in HMS fisheries\n(refer to Section 3.8).\nFinal Action: Require the use of a vessel monitoring system (VMS) on all\npelagic longline fishing vessels\nRefer to Section 3.8.2 for a complete description of this measure which is\ndesigned to enforce any time/area closure.\nFinal Action: Require that longline gear, harpoon floats, hand line floats,\npurse seine floats, and drift gillnet floats be marked with the\nvessel ID number or vessel name\nOne of the difficulties in enforcing time/area closures for reducing bycatch is\nidentification of fishing gear. Another problem arises when marine mammals are\nentangled in fishing gear. This measure requires that longline gear be marked with\nthe vessel ID number on the terminal ends of the gear as well as on hi-flyers. It also\nrequires that purse seine, harpoon, handline, and drift gillnet vessels mark all floats\nwith the vessel ID number. This is important for enforcement of the time/area\nclosures (pelagic longline), transfer at sea provisions (harpoon and handline floats),\nand to identify any lost gear, ghost gear, or gear causing entanglements with other\nfishing gears or protected species. This action will also help to identify fishing gear\nfor gear compensation cases. The Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan\nregulations (62 FR 39157, July 22, 1997) currently require certain fishing gears to\nbe marked in the event a whale is entangled in the gear. This strategy is useful in\ntracking the location of the entanglement (assuming the fishermen knows where his\ngear is located). Public comments indicated that many longline vessel owners\ncurrently mark all floats of the longline with the vessel name and that a vessel ID\nnumber would be redundant. NMFS agrees and will allow marking of gear with a\nvessel name.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 264","Ecological Impacts\nUnder some circumstances, it is difficult for enforcement agents to determine\nownership of a section of commercial fishing gear when it is in the water. Gear in\nthe U.S. pelagic longline fishery is deployed for 15 to 40 miles, and may not have a\nreadily identifiable link to a particular vessel. Gear marking would greatly increase\nthe enforceability and effectiveness of a time/area closure by allowing enforcement\nagents to determine ownership of gear found fishing in closed areas. Fishermen\noften report lost gear in the Atlantic Ocean, and this is a concern for lost nets\nbecause they may continue to interact with, and possibly harm, marine resources.\nThe tuna and swordfish regulations currently prohibit transfer at sea and if harpoon\nand handline floats are marked, enforcement personnel can determine which bluefin\ntuna belong to each vessel, or whether swordfish are being transferred for whatever\nreason. This action has the important ecological benefit of helping to reduce fishing\nmortality on the species and life stages that the closed area is intended to protect.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nSocial and economic impacts of this measure are expected to be minimal due to\nthe fact that vessels would merely need to mark the terminal ends of the gear and\nany high-flyer along the length of the mainline (longline), and floats of driftnets,\nharpoons, handlines, and purse seines. Costs would be primarily a one-time\nexpenditure, except to maintain clarity of the markings. Costs are not expected to\naffect vessel productivity. A proposed rule to consolidate HMS regulations was\npublished in the Federal Register (61 FR 57361; November 6, 1996) and included a\nproposal to require marking of longline and harpoon gear in HMS fisheries. Five\npublic hearings were held to receive comments on that proposed rule; no comments\nwere received on the gear marking issue. The advisory panel discussed allowing\nvessel name to mark the gear instead of vessel ID number and NMFS changed the\npreferred alternative to include the vessel name. This is currently a common\npractice in this fishery.\nConclusion\nThis is a final action. Gear modifications are an effective way to decrease\nunwanted bycatch in HMS fisheries, reduce bycatch mortality, aid in rebuilding,\nand increase enforcement of other HMS conservation and management measures.\nIn addition, gear modifications may be an effective way to meet requirements to\nenforce measures to protect marine mammals, sea birds, and sea turtles with\nminimal impact on fishermen and administrative costs.\nFinal\nAction: Mandatory observer coverage in the Atlantic tunas fisheries\nand commercial shark and swordfish fisheries, if selected\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 265","Refer to Section 3.8.2 for a complete description of this measure which is\ndesigned to incorporate an existing regulation which was implemented under the\nauthority of ATCA to collect catch, bycatch, and effort information from these\nfisheries.\nFinal Action: Voluntary observer coverage of HMS charter/headboat vessels\nRefer to Section 3.8.2 for a complete description of this measure which is\ndesigned to collect bycatch information from these fisheries.\nFinal Action: Provide voluntary education workshops for all HMS fishermen\nNMFS will offer voluntary workshops for recreational and commercial HMS\nfishermen in order to increase knowledge of measures that minimize bycatch and\nbycatch mortality.\nEcological Impacts\nThis action is expected to: 1) reduce bycatch mortality by demonstrating to\noperators handling and release techniques for finfish, turtles, and marine mammals;\nand 2) improve the accuracy of recreational bycatch reporting to dockside and\ntelephone surveyors. This measure is likely to benefit overfished stocks of HMS by\nincreasing post-release survival of fish captured and discarded. Current levels of\nbycatch and bycatch mortality in some HMS fisheries are not known.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nNMFS will conduct educational workshops. Therefore, the only cost incurred by\nthe fishermen will be that related to travel and time to attend the workshops. To\nminimize this cost to fishermen, workshops would be offered at several locations\nnear recreational and commercial HMS fishing ports. Workshops may also be held\nduring the non-fishing season (in appropriate fisheries) to minimize lost fishing\ntime. NMFS will rotate the locations of workshops in an attempt to attract\nfishermen to these workshops. The administrative costs for these workshops are\nhigh, but are exceeded by the benefits associated with the possible decrease in\nbycatch and bycatch mortality that might result from education.\nPossible Topics for Voluntary HMS Fishery Workshops include:\nEducate participants about the Magnuson-Stevens Act, MMPA, and the ESA and\nbycatch minimization requirements;\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 266","Promote open communication at sea between vessel operators concerning\ninteractions with bycatch species (e.g., protected species, undersized finfish);\nEncourage feedback from those who have experienced interactions first hand;\nProvide information on safe handling techniques for released fish and protected\nspecies;\nProvide marine mammal, sea turtle, and finfish identification keys;\nPromote the use of gear modifications that reduce bycatch and bycatch mortality;\nObtain input from fishermen regarding possible mandatory reporting of\neconomic cost information;\nDiscuss and evaluate the effectiveness of de-hooking and cutting devices to\nrelease finfish, turtles and other bycatch species;\nDevelop a dialogue with fishery participants about current regulations, research\npriorities, and safety issues.\nConclusion\nNMFS rejected the original alternative that would require all recreational and\ncommercial HMS vessel operators to attend an educational workshop once every\ntwo years and to possess a certificate from that workshop on board at all times.\nBecause there is not currently a permitting system for all recreational HMS vessels,\nthe universe of affected vessels is unknown. As a result, there would no reliable\nway to either communicate the requirement to the affected universe or enforce\nparticipation in mandatory workshops.\nHowever, since there may be positive ecological benefits for overfished HMS,\nNMFS will conduct workshops on a voluntary basis for all HMS fishermen, possibly\nin conjunction with public hearings, to achieve further reductions in bycatch in HMS\nfisheries. This measure is consistent with the Magnuson-Stevens Act.\nRejected Options for General Bycatch Reduction Measures\nRejected Option: Status Quo (No Gear Modifications)\nEcological Impacts\nThere are currently no gear restrictions other than types of fishing gear that are\nauthorized in HMS fisheries. Many gear modifications to reduce bycatch are\nalready employed by HMS fishery participants; other gear modifications are being\ninvestigated through NMFS-sponsored research programs.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 267","Social and Economic Impacts\nThere would be no short-term impacts of this alternative. Long-term impacts of\nthe status quo could include decreased revenues due to continued overfishing and\nincreased costs to society based on the existence value of protected species.\nAlthough this alternative has the lowest administrative costs in the short term, the\nlong-term results of not controlling bycatch and bycatch mortality may increase\nadministrative costs in the future.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected in favor of the final action that requires gear marking.\nFurthermore, NMFS plans to pursue gear modifications to reduce bycatch through a\nsuite of non-regulatory measures, as recommended by the HMS AP.\nRejected Option: Prohibit the possession and use of any hook but a circle hook in\nHMS recreational fisheries.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative is designed to reduce bycatch mortality in recreational catch-and-\nrelease fisheries. Post-release survivability is an important component in a\nrebuilding program as recreational retention limits are, or may be, reduced to aid\nrebuilding. Currently, fish that are hooked and released not regularly reported to\nNMFS, however, they are considered bycatch under the definition in the Magnuson-\nStevens Act. Fish that are hooked but are not brought to the boat because they\nbreak off are not reported to NMFS, however, they also are considered bycatch.\nThe one exception is for billfish. For more details, refer to Amendment One to the\nAtlantic Billfish FMP (NMFS, 1999a).\nThere is evidence from ongoing studies that circle hooks may increase post-\nrelease survival by minimizing hook damage to the fish, particularly in \"chunking\"\nsituations. Circle hooks are more likely than conventional \"J\" style hooks to hook a\nfish in the jaw rather than the throat, stomach, or palate. Preliminary results of a\nstudy on a limited number of school size bluefin tuna found that 100 percent of the\nsamples were hooked in the jaw with circle hooks while 43 percent were hooked in\nthe jaw with standard straight hooks (G. Skomal, MA Division of Marine Fisheries,\nVineyard Haven, MA, pers. comm., 1998). Lines using circle hooks also seemed\nless prone to 'break-aways' before the fish was brought to the boat. Data from a\nstudy similar to that described above indicate that circle hooks resulted in 100\npercent jaw hookings for Atlantic bonito, spiny dogfish, and bluefin tuna, while\nstraight hooks resulted in throat, palate, and \"deep\" hooking sites (G. Skomal, pers.\ncomm., 1998). While this information is preliminary, it is supported by anecdotal\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 268","information from billfish and tuna fishermen that indicates that when circle hooks\nare used, post-release survival is likely to be higher than when straight hooks are\nused, and by research conducted in other fisheries. Fly-fishing gear may extend the\nfight time and increase post-release mortality rates of billfish.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThe cost of circle hooks is comparable to the cost for other types of commonly\nused hooks in the HMS recreational fishery. However, fishery participants may not\nsupport this alternative because it would require discarding all other types of hooks,\nincluding fly-fishing gear which has become increasingly popular. Nevertheless,\nthis alternative represents a capital expenditure that is minor considering other\nexpenditures in this fishery. Impacts of this measure are difficult to assess. For\nexample, if a vessel is going fishing for king mackerel and tunas in the same trip,\nonly circle hooks would be allowed on board. This impact on a charterboat or\nprivate recreational fishermen may be large or small depending on the number of\n\"split\" trips are made.\nBecause hook manufacturing and marketing strategies are in place for the current\nhook design, hook manufacturers might not be able to produce or market circle\nhooks effectively enough to recoup any losses prompted by this alternative.\nHowever, tackle shops and hook manufacturers are exploring the possibility of mass\nproducing circle hooks that would have properties acceptable to HMS recreational\nfishery participants. This alternative would have high administrative costs due to\nenforcement efforts that would be necessary as well as management efforts to define\nthe circle hook.\nConclusion\nThe HMS and Billfish APs discussed this alternative at a meeting in July 1998.\nWhile no clear consensus was reached, the APs expressed general support for the\nuse of circle hooks to reduce post-release mortality, with the reservation that this\nalternative would be better implemented in a non-regulatory way, such as through\neducational programs and outreach to the recreational fishing community.\nRepresentatives of the recreational fishing community have expressed their support\nfor the use of circle hooks, though they question the necessity of creating a\nmandatory requirement when educational programs could serve the same objective.\nNMFS agrees. It is difficult to assess the ecological and social and economic\nimpacts from this alternative due to the continued need for hooking/survival studies\non HMS and the multi-species nature of some of the HMS fleet. Therefore, NMFS\nhas decided that the use of circle hooks, particularly in \"chunking\" situations,\nshould remain voluntary until more information is available on the effects and\nimpacts of this measure.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 269","Rejected Option: Prohibit the possession and use of any hook but a circle hook in\nHMS commercial fisheries.\nEcological Impacts\nThere is a similar lack of knowledge about the effects of circle hooks in HMS\ncommercial fisheries as recreational fisheries. It is unknown what effect the use of\ncircle hooks would have on target and non-target finfish because mortality is related\nto soak time as well as hook type. For swordfish, for example, the use of circle\nhooks is not likely to reduce mortality significantly because this species dies early\non in a pelagic longline soak (Berkeley and Edwards, 1997). For species such as\nmarlins that live longer on a pelagic longline, hook type may play a more prominent\nrole in survival.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would require the use of circle hooks in all longline fisheries for\nHMS. This may have a significant impact on longline fishermen due to the cost of\nhooks and changes in the species composition of the catch. These impacts are\ndifficult to assess because of the changing hook composition of pelagic longlines in\nthe fishery. Vessels in the Gulf of Mexico, at one time, used predominantly circle\nhooks to target tunas, however, catches of swordfish have increased in that fishing\nsector and hook types may have been changed. If circle hooks provide for increased\nsurvival on a hook, there is an advantage to using hooks to benefit fishermen as\nwell. Tunas harvested live are fresher and therefore of a better quality and should\ncommand a higher price. This alternative would have high administrative costs due\nto enforcement efforts that would be necessary as well as management efforts to\ndefine the circle hook.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected. This FMP will establish voluntary educational\nworkshops that can be used as a mechanism to spread information among the fleet\nabout techniques that may reduce bycatch or bycatch mortality and have a minimal\neconomic impact.\nRejected Option: Require all vessels fishing for or possessing HMS to have a\nhook removal device on board.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 270","Ecological Impacts\nThis alternative may result in increased post-release survival of HMS released\nfrom pelagic longline or rod and reel gear. However, impacts are not quantified at\nthis time.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nHook removal devices are commercially available from several vendors and are\nused to minimize injury to the fish during removal of the hook. The HMS AP\ndiscussed the use of hook removal devices at its March 1998 meeting. Members of\nthe AP representing all sectors of HMS fisheries were extremely supportive of the\nvoluntary use of these devices. Fishery participants have largely supported the use\nof hook removal devices in some applications in HMS fisheries, though education\nabout voluntary use is thought to be a more effective tool than regulation for this\nmeasure. Enforcement of this alternative would be extremely challenging.\nAlthough dockside inspections would identify the presence or absence of the tool,\nbut would not address whether or not the devices were actually used. Dehooking\ndevices cost about $45 to 90 per tool and NMFS understands that use of the devices\nis already widespread in HMS fisheries. This alternative would have high\nadministrative costs due to the enforcement efforts that would be necessary.\nConclusion\nAs with circle hooks, the best approach to hook removal is to continue to build\non the progress that recreational and commercial fishermen are making voluntarily.\nRejected Option: Prohibit the use of pelagic longline gear in HMS fisheries\nNMFS has received written and verbal public comment at several public\nmeetings as well as from some HMS AP members, expressing concern about\nbycatch rates in the pelagic longline fishery. Many of those commenting advocated\nprohibition of pelagic longline gear in HMS fisheries as an enhancement to\nrebuilding overfished stocks and reducing bycatch mortality.\nEcological Impacts\nProhibiting the use of pelagic longlines is likely to have positive benefits on\nhighly migratory species. However, the benefits would be quickly lost if ICCAT\nwere to reallocate the U.S. portion to other countries for harvest. In addition, the\nUnited States remains a strong market for swordfish. Imports are likely to increase\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 271","with the demise of the domestic fishery thus supporting the fisheries of countries, as\nmentioned above, that do not implement restrictive conservation measures.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis measure would have a significant impact on communities and on\nindividuals and small business. It is inconsistent with the Magnuson-Stevens Act\ndue to National Standard 9 which indicates that bycatch is to be minimized, \"to the\nextent practicable.\" NMFS does not agree with some commenters that eliminating\nthe entire pelagic longline fleet is practicable because there would be excessive\neconomic impacts, and the effect of shifting quota to other countries. The\nadministrative costs of implementing this measure and then continuing to manage\nthe fishery would decrease substantially. This decrease in costs is not considered\nnecessary at this time.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected for several reasons. The pelagic longline fishery is\nallocated 98 percent of the north Atlantic and 100 percent of the south Atlantic U.S.\nswordfish quota. Under ATCA, the United States cannot implement measures which\nhave the effect of raising or lowering quotas, although NMFS has the ability to\nchange the allocation of that quota among different gear groups. The swordfish\nfishery is confined, by regulation, to three gear types: harpoon, longline, hand gear.\nSince it is unlikely that the hand gear sector would be able to catch the quota given\nthe size distribution of the stock, prohibiting longline gear would essentially have the\neffect of hindering the ability of U.S. fishermen to harvest the full quota. It would\nalso have the effect of reducing traditional participation in the swordfish fishery by\nU.S. vessels relative to their foreign competitors because the United States would\nharvest a vastly reduced proportion of the overall quota. Such action is prohibited by\nsection 304(e) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. Finally, it is likely that ICCAT would\nallocate the U.S. north Atlantic swordfish quota share away from the United States\nin response to implementation of this alternative, essentially resulting in no positive\neffects on swordfish stocks; indeed, there may be more detrimental effects if quota\nis\nharvested by other countries with fewer or no restrictions on pelagic longline\nfishermen. This measure would also have a severe adverse impacts on the pelagic\nlongline fishermen, related industries, and the communities of which they are a part.\nMost comments that NMFS received on the draft FMP indicated support for banning\nlongline fishing in order to reduce bycatch. NMFS is addressing bycatch in this\nfishery in this FMP and may further establish time/area closures and gear\nmodifications under the framework to address bycatch concerns to the extent\npracticable.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 272","3.5.4.2 Reducing Protected Species Bycatch and Bycatch Mortality\nFinal Action: Require all vessels fishing for HMS to move one nautical mile after\nan entanglement with protected species\nEcological Impacts\nData show that marine mammals are often encountered in clusters (AOCTRT,\n1996). The Atlantic Offshore Cetacean Take Reduction Team recommended that\nlongline fishermen be required to move after one entanglement and alert other vessels\nin the immediate area. Industry representatives to the AOCTRT estimated that this\nstrategy would result in a 40 percent reduction in serious injury and incidental mortality\nof strategic stocks of marine mammals. They also asserted that communication among\nmembers of the fleet fishing near each other is very important to reducing takes of\nmarine mammals. Hoey (1998) indicates that sea turtles are encountered in clusters\nwhen interacting with pelagic longline gear. This action may reduce takes of sea turtles\nas well as marine mammals in pelagic longline gear by prompting vessels to move from\nthe area of protected species interactions. VMS may afford increased enforcement\ncapability for this measure. Since this practice is already used, this alternative may not\nhave a significant impact on marine mammal bycatch.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative may reduce landings of target finfish, especially in areas where\nHMS and marine mammals have substantial geographic overlap. However, commercial\nlongline fishermen report that they already often move out of marine mammal areas to\navoid injuring the mammals or to avoid predation by pilot whales on hooked tunas.\nSince this practice is already used, this alternative may not have a significant impact on\nvessel operation.\nUnder this alternative, fuel costs may increase, depending on the size of the area in\nwhich marine mammals or turtles are encountered and the amount of time it takes to\nfind an area that is free of protected species. Safety of human life at sea should be\nconsidered when evaluating this alternative. These impacts are not expected to be\nsubstantial. This alternative will have moderate administrative costs as NMFS and\nobservers work together to evaluate the efficacy of this measure. In addition, this\nmeasure may be difficult to enforce.\nConclusion\nThis measure is a result of team consensus. It is likely that most pelagic longline\nfishermen already comply with this measure.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 273","Final Interim Action: Limit the length of the mainline of a pelagic longline to\n24 nautical miles from August 1 to November 30 in the\nMid-Atlantic Bight\nThis measure imposes a cap on the length of mainlines in the pelagic longline\nfishery in the Mid-Atlantic Bight (MAB, refer to Figure 3.13) area between August 1\nand November 30. This is an interim measure that will expire one year after the date of\neffectiveness. At that time, NMFS will evaluate the effectiveness of this measure\nwith respect to reducing bycatch of marine mammals in this area and will determine\nwhether or not to continue to limit the length of the mainline. The main reason for\nimplementing this measure is to reduce takes of marine mammals although there may\nbe other ecological benefits. Limiting the length of the mainline has the advantage of\nreducing the soak time and thus allowing fish to be retrieved sooner than they would be\nif the line were many miles longer, increasing post-release survival of discarded fish.\nAlso, hooked fish are vulnerable to predation. In the case of the pelagic longline\nfishery, pilot whales are attracted to tunas hooked on longlines. This alternative could\nallow fishermen to haul the line and retrieve the tuna before the tunas are scavenged by\npilot whales who could, in turn, become hooked on or caught in the line.\nMainlines in the pelagic longline fishery can range between approximately 15 and\n40 miles. Observer data indicate that in 1996 and 1997, the average length of mainline\nfished by pelagic longline fishermen was 20.3 miles and 21.7 miles, respectively. The\ntake reduction team met in 1996 however, and developed this measure based on\nanecdotal information that the average length of the mainline was 30 to 35 miles in this\narea at that time (AOCTRT, 1996). Based on 1996 and 1997 practices, longline\nfishermen, on average, will not have to shorten the length of their lines when fishing in\nthe MAB. Bycatch of both marine mammals and finfish is likely to be reduced in the\nsets of 38 vessels that have fished longer lines in the past. Forty-one vessels made\n74 trips in the MAB August 1 to November 30, 1997.\nEcological Impacts\nBy reducing fishing effort per set, this action has the potential to reduce takes of\nmarine mammals by reducing the number of hooks per set. However, some fishermen\nhave indicated that they may re-rig their gear to maintain the same number of hooks per\nset. The pelagic longline industry representative to the Atlantic Offshore Cetacean\nTake Reduction Team estimated that restricting the length of longline gear would result\nin a 20- to 30-percent reduction in serious injury and incidental mortality of strategic\nstocks of marine mammals in this area during this time (based on 20- to 30-percent line\nlength reduction). This measure is also likely to reduce catches of finfish species, some\nof which are overfished (LCS, swordfish, blue and white marlins, bluefin tuna). This\nanalysis, however, may be overly optimistic if fishermen react by making more sets, or\nif longlines are already shorter than this length. A shorter line implies fewer hooks, a\nshorter soak time and haul time, thus reducing the overall time the gear is in the water.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 274","This shorter soak time may increase survival of some finfish species, particularly\nbillfish (Berkeley and Edwards, 1997).\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action may decrease the efficiency of fishing operations. Increased costs may\nnot be passed on to consumers in an effort by domestic fishermen to remain competitive\nwith imported swordfish. This alternative would result in an average reduction in\nmainline of three miles (range: one- to eight-mile reduction necessary) to 41 vessels\nthat fished in this area in 1997 using a mainline longer than 24 miles. This reduction\nwould proportionally reduce revenues by 11 percent to those 41 vessels (assuming\ncatch decrease proportional to line length reduction). This assumption , however, may\nbe overly conservative if fishermen react by making more sets. This alternative exceeds\nRFA guidelines for a significant impact on a substantial number of small businesses.\nFor August to November, gross revenues would be reduced by greater than five percent\nfor greater than 20 percent of the vessels fishing in that area at that time. This\nalternative will have moderate administrative costs as NMFS and observers work\ntogether to evaluate the efficacy of this measure. In addition, this measure may be\ndifficult to enforce.\nConclusion\nThis measure is a result of team consensus. It is likely that most pelagic longline\nfishermen in this area already comply with this measure. NMFS implements this\nmeasure on an interim basis and will evaluate the efficacy (i.e., whether fishermen are\nmaking more sets) in the future. NMFS expects that the take reduction team will meet\nin the future to address the many changes to the fishery since the plan was submitted to\nNMFS in 1996.\nFinal\nAction: Voluntary vessel operator education workshops for HMS pelagic\nlongline vessels\nConsistent with the take reduction team's recommendation, HMS will offer\nvoluntary pelagic longline education workshops in an effort to disseminate information\nabout bycatch and bycatch mortality reduction. Permit holders will be notified annually\nof workshops held in their area. It is expected that once limited access is implemented\nin this fishery, fishermen will have a vested interest in this fishery and are more likely\nto implement voluntary bycatch reduction measures. For more information, see the\nworkshop final action above.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 275","Final Action:\nAdopt the Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan regulations\nunder the authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Act\nNMFS will establish consistent regulations for the southeast shark drift gillnet\nfishery under the authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Act as well as under the Marine\nMammal Protection Act (incorporation by reference). These regulations include gear\nmarking requirements, observer coverage requirements, closed areas and times, and\nspecial provisions for strikenetting (see final rule and Atlantic Large Whale Take\nReduction Plan, February 16, 1999, 64 FR 7529).\nNOTE: There are inconsistencies between the final rule governing the List of\nFisheries and Gear under the Magnuson-Stevens Act (64 FR 4030), the Large Whale\nTake Reduction Plan regulations under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (64 FR\n7529), and the proposed rule to implement the HMS FMP (64 FR 3154) regarding the\nuse of strike nets in the shark drift gillnet fishery. NMFS will address these\ninconsistencies through future regulatory and other actions.\nEcological\nThis action maintains current levels of protection for marine mammals under the\nMarine Mammal Protection Act. It will likely have similar ecological impacts as those\ndiscussed under the status quo because fishermen are already operating under these\nrestrictions. This action does not support states' efforts to reduce shark drift gillnet\nbycatch and bycatch mortalities of juvenile sharks, sea turtles, and other valuable finfish.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative would not be expected to have additional social or economic\nimpacts because fishermen are already operating under these restrictions. It would\nmaintain enforcement costs and administrative burdens of observer coverage and\nfishery monitoring.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected due to the benefits of ensuring regulatory consistency under\nboth the Marine Mammal Protection Act and Magnuson-Stevens Act.\nFinal Action. Require 100 percent observer coverage in the shark drift gillnet\nfishery at all times; Prohibit the use of drift gillnet gear in Atlantic\nshark fisheries unless a NMFS-approved observer is on board\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 276","The southeast shark drift gillnet fishery, a Category II fishery that is believed to be\nresponsible for bycatch of at least one right whale, has been suspected of interactions\nwith endangered sea turtles as well as valuable finfish along the Georgia coast for a\nnumber of years. Specifically, strandings of loggerhead sea turtles, tarpon, adult red\ndrum, and possibly cobia have coincided with observations of shark drift gillnet vessels\noperating in Federal waters off the Georgia coast. Since 1992, the State of Georgia has\nrequested that NMFS require 100 percent observer coverage in this fishery in order to\ndocument any bycatch. In 1993, the State of Georgia requested that NMFS prohibit the\nuse of this gear in this fishery to reduce bycatch of sea turtles, important recreational\nfinfish species, as well as to reduce the catches of juvenile sharks and potentially\nAtlantic sturgeon. In 1996, the Southeast Regional Office recommended public\nconsideration of elimination of this component of the fishery for Atlantic sharks due to\n\"large, but unavoidable incidental catch of many different species,\" including sea\nturtles, king and Spanish mackerel, and cobia.\nIn part due to requests from the State of Georgia, NMFS placed observers on board\nshark drift gillnet vessels in 1993. During the period 1993 to 1995, 48 trips and 52 net\nsets were observed in which no marine mammals and two loggerhead turtles were\ncaptured (Trent et al. 1997). Atlantic sharpnose, blacknose, and blacktip sharks were\nthe dominant shark species caught, and King mackerel, little tunny, and cownose ray\nwere the dominant bycatch species. From 1996 through the first fishing period of\n1998, no shark drift gillnet vessels were observed due to administrative problems with\nobserver placement. However, beginning in the second fishing period of 1998, shark\ndrift gillnet fishermen were informed of the requirement to notify NMFS of trips and to\ncarry observers. In 1998, nine sets were observed outside the right whale season, and\nfour fishermen have been taking observers since January 1999.\nBecause the limited data currently available indicate that this fishery does not have\nunavoidably large bycatch of protected species and because this bycatch is already\nregulated under the Endangered Species Act and Marine Mammal Protection Act, this\naction does not prohibit use of the drift gillnets in Atlantic shark fisheries at this time.\nThis action does establish a 100-percent observer coverage requirement for the southeast\ndrift gillnet shark fishery at all times to improve estimates of bycatch and bycatch\nmortality of protected species, juvenile sharks, and other finfish. The Biological\nOpinion issued under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act requires 100-percent\nobserver coverage during the right whale season (November 1 to March 31) as well as\nobserver coverage for the rest of the year for turtles. This action prohibits use of drift\ngillnet gear in the Atlantic shark fisheries unless a NMFS-approved observer is on board\nthe vessel.\nEcological Impacts\nThis action will have no direct ecological impacts. This action will greatly improve\nthe understanding of the population structure, status, life history, and release condition\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 277","of sea turtles taken incidentally, and will increase data on catch and effort levels in the\nshark drift gillnet fishery. This action will only support states' efforts to reduce shark\ndrift gillnet bycatch and bycatch mortalities of sea turtles and valuable finfish to a\nlimited extent.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action will have minor social and economic impacts because shark drift gillnet\nfishermen are already operating under the requirement to carry a NMFS observer, if\nselected. This action will result in 100 percent selection for observer coverage for all\nshark drift gillnet vessels at all times. This action will also result in shark drift gillnet\nvessels being in violation of the regulations if fishing with drift gillnets without an\nobserver on board.\nThis action will maintain existing enforcement costs and may greatly increase the\nadministrative costs of managing the fishery. Observer coverage costs approximately\n$600 per day. Effort estimates are not available for this sector of the directed shark\nfishery, precluding estimation of the total cost of this action. In any case, this\nexpenditure supports collection of data to determine catch and effort levels and to\nminimize bycatch and bycatch mortality to the extent practicable, and would not\nnecessarily be a permanent expense.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because of the considerable need to determine catch, effort,\nand bycatch rates and mortality in this fishery through the use of observer data.\nBecause interactions with protected species may be relatively rare events (based on\nTrent et al., 1998) and because the endangered right whale and threatened sea turtles are\npresent in the areas in which this fishery operates, 100-percent observer coverage will\ngreatly facilitate monitoring and documenting any interactions with protected species.\nThis action is also selected due to considerable public comment and NMFS' desire to\nrespond to the extent practicable to states's efforts to reduce bycatch and bycatch\nmortality of juvenile sharks, sea turtles, and other finfish. If bycatch and bycatch\nmortality of protected species, juvenile sharks, and other finfish is found to be\nnegatively impacting these species, NMFS may consider additional management\nmeasures to reduce such bycatch and bycatch mortality.\nRejected Options for Protected Species Bycatch Reduction Measures\nRejected Option: Close critical right whale habitat\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 278","NMFS proposed in the draft FMP to close critical right whale habitat to pelagic\nlongline and driftnet fishing as recommended by the Atlantic Offshore Cetacean Take\nReduction Team. Considering that no longline trips have been conducted in these areas\nand driftnets are prohibited in the Atlantic tunas and swordfish fisheries, NMFS will not\nclose these areas. NMFS does not have the authority under the Magnuson-Stevens Act\nto close state waters and does not seek to pre-empt state regulations in critical right\nwhale habitat. NMFS will evaluate longline fishing activity in the future and will\nimplement measures to reduce interactions between right whales and longline gear.\nDesignated critical right whale habitat includes the following areas:\nGreat South Channel, MA: December 1 to March 31: The area bounded by 41°40'\nN/69°45' W; 41°00' N/69°05' W; 41 °38' N/68 13' W; and 42° 10' N/68°31' W\nCape Cod Bay, MA: February 1 to April 30: The area bounded by 42°04.8' N/70°\n10' W; 42°12' N/70°15' W; 42°12' N/70°3 W; 41°46.8\" N/70°30' W and on the\nsouth and east by the interior shore line of Cape Cod, MA\nSoutheastern United States: December 1 to March 31: The coastal waters between\n31° 15' N and 30° 15' N from the coast out 15 nautical miles; and the coastal waters\nbetween 30° N and 28°00' N from the coast out five nautical miles.\nEcological Impacts\nThis measure would reduce interactions between pelagic longline gear or driftnet\ngear and the endangered northern right whale. Currently, pelagic longline and driftnet\nfishermen do not fish in Areas 1 and 2, described above. Due to problems in converting\nregulatory areas into logbook queries, it is not currently known if pelagic longline\nfishermen fish in Area 3, although it appears as though this area is too close to shore for\nlongline fishing. (Longline fishing is prohibited in state waters.) There has been no\ndriftnet fishing in Area 3. Therefore, the ecological impact of this measure is minimal\ngiven that pelagic longline and driftnet fishermen are not likely to fish in these areas\nanyway. This would, however, prevent the possible expansion of these fisheries into\nareas where the number of interactions with northern right whales might be higher.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThere would be no social and economic impacts of this alternative because longline\nfishing effort is not occurring in these areas and the driftnet fishery is already prohibited\nfor tunas and swordfish.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 279","Conclusion\nThis alternative is rejected. There is currently no interaction between longline\nfishing effort and right whales in these areas.\nRejected Option: Require vessels to haul pelagic longline gear in the order it was set\nin the Mid-Atlantic Bight between August 1 and November 31\nThis alternative was recommended by the Atlantic Offshore Cetacean Take\nReduction Team to reduce the soak time of a pelagic longline, thereby increasing post-\nrelease survival of marine mammals.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative could reduce the maximum soak time of pelagic longline gear by\nrequiring that gear be hauled in the order in which it was set. It is unknown whether\nthis measure could reduce bycatch of marine mammals although that seems a likely\nresult of reducing soak time. This alternative may result in the retrieval of live tuna,\nwhich may reduce predation and resulting entanglement by pilot whales. Fishermen\nmay also be able to release entangled marine mammals sooner, thereby improving post-\nrelease survival. Bluewater Fisherman's Association estimates that this strategy will\nresult in a ten- to 15-percent reduction in serious injury and incidental mortality of\nstrategic stocks of marine mammals.\nBased on NMFS data, it is unclear what reduction in finfish bycatch would result\nfrom this alternative. Observers do not currently report the setting/hauling\ncharacteristics of pelagic longline sets and therefore it is unknown how many vessels\noperators haul in the order they set and under what conditions this may be possible.\nThis strategy would reduce the amount of time that pelagic longline gear can be\ndeployed in the water and thus would reduce fishing effort (hours/hook) for each set.\nDespite possible benefits of this option, enforcement of this strategy would be difficult.\nVMS would simplify enforcement, providing set and haul time information in position\nreports. Since restricting soak time leads to inefficient fishing, it may result in\nincreased fishing effort in the long term. For these reasons, it is not likely to achieve\nthe objectives of the Magnuson-Stevens Act or the MMPA.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative is likely to increase costs (fuel) to the 36 vessels that fished in this\narea during this time of year in the mid-Atlantic Bight, assuming vessels could hold\nadditional fuel. However, AOCTRT members included this measure in the draft\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 280","AOCTRP that was submitted to NMFS. A reduction on soak time could reduce catches\nof target finfish, thereby resulting in a negative economic impact. However, it is more\nlikely that vessels would catch nearly the same amount of target fish over a larger\nnumber of total sets.\nPublic comments received to date on this measure from AP members and fishery\nparticipants indicate that this alternative may have serious safety implications due to:\n1) hauling additional fuel to compensate for the additional travel time (because of the\n\"run-around\" to the top of the line) during a trip; 2) concern about of traveling to the\nother end of the line in poor weather conditions (i.e., many miles against prevailing\nwinds, currents, etc.); 3) depriving crew of rest; and 4) training crew to return to the\nbeginning of the line. Carrying extra fuel can significantly reduce the stability of a\nfishing vessel, making it prone to capsizing in rough weather. In addition, it is the\ndecision of the vessel master to decide how to most safely haul longline gear. A\nregulation which makes that decision for the vessel master may be unsafe.\nConclusion\nNMFS rejects this alternative although it was part of the consensus AOCTRP. The\nAOCTRT did not consider national standards when developing this plan and this\nalternative does not consider safety of human life at sea including increased fatigue of\ncrew members and decreased stability of the vessel due to the need to carry additional\nfuel. This alternative could reduce bycatch of marine mammals, however, it is unlikely\nthat the benefits of this measure will outweigh the implications of decreased safety and\nstability of pelagic longline vessels. Through outreach, NMFS can evaluate whether\nthis is a safe alternative for some pelagic fishermen. If it is safe, NMFS could\nencourage fishermen to undertake this type of activity.\nRejected Option: Limit the number of pelagic longline vessels\nThe AOCTRT recommended limiting access to the pelagic longline fishery. Some\nmembers of the Pelagic Longline AP also favored limited access to the gear type as part\nof a comprehensive management strategy for the fishery. This alternative is similar to\nthe limited access program that NMFS is implementing, as discussed in Chapter 4.\nHowever, the final actions in this FMP limit access to the permit group by species\nrather than by gear type.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative attempts to close a possible loophole in the shark/swordfish limited\naccess programs that were proposed in 1996 and 1997, respectively (61 FR 68202; 62\nFR 8672). The final version of these limited access programs is presented in Chapter 4\nof this FMP.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 281","The pelagic longline fishery is truly a multispecies fishery. Forty-nine percent of\ntotal U.S. yellowfin tuna landings and 73 percent of total bigeye tuna landings for 1997\ncan be attributed to longline vessels. For both species, longline vessels dominate the\ncommercial portion of the fishery; there is also a substantial recreational fishery for\nyellowfin tuna. Industry representatives to the Longline Advisory Panel emphasized\nthe need to \"close the tuna loophole\" by including a provision in the proposed limited\naccess program to limit access to other species in the multi-species fishery, notably\nBAYS tunas. This step will prevent increased discards of shark and swordfish by\nvessels that are fishing for BAYS tunas, but do not possess a shark/swordfish limited\naccess permit. A limited access program for sharks and swordfish that includes a\nmechanism for limiting access to BAYS tunas was discussed extensively by the\nLongline AP. In a report that reflects the Longline AP's deliberations, NMFS\nevaluates that alternative as feasible for the fishery, considering the following criteria:\n1) consistency with objectives for Atlantic pelagic longline fisheries; 2) integration with\nother HMS Management; 3) enforceability; 4) administrative and regulatory burden;\nand 5) degree of constituency support.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nSocial and economic impacts of this alternative are discussed in Chapter 4.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected. NMFS appreciates the careful consideration of this\nalternative by the Longline Advisory Panel and the AOCTRT, particularly with regard\nto providing insight on closing the tuna loophole. However, dolphin fish and wahoo\nare other important components of the longline catch in some sectors of the fishery\n(Cramer, 1996), and these species are managed by the South Atlantic and Gulf of\nMexico Fishery Management Councils, separate from Secretarial management of\nAtlantic tunas, swordfish, and sharks. The limited access program discussed in\nChapter 4 addresses the concerns of the Longline Advisory Panel and AOCTRT, while\nalso supporting other objectives of this FMP. Additional action to limit access to\nspecies that are not under direct Secretarial management (e.g., dolphin fish and wahoo)\nwould require cooperative action by NMFS and the Councils, and could be considered\nin future actions.\n3.5.4\nA Strategy for Future Bycatch Reduction\nThis FMP includes actions to reduce bycatch in HMS fisheries. A combination of\ntime/area closures for pelagic longlines, gear modifications, limited access, voluntary\nmodifications in behavior, gear research, and counting dead discards against all quotas, are\nused for the near term. In addition, further time/area closures are contemplated. These tools\nwill continue to provide the mechanism by which bycatch will be further reduced.\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 282","NMFS data collection programs include long-term collection of catch and effort data by\ngear type and species through observer coverage and self-reporting(logbooks). NMFS is not\nprepared to set a target or uncertainty threshold for bycatch reduction at this time. Instead,\nNMFS has identified the bycatch issues of highest priority and has implemented\nmanagement measures to address those concerns in this FMP. In the future, NMFS may\nwork with the Advisory Panels to assess bycatch reduction targets and thresholds, and\nidentify acceptable levels of uncertainty for bycatch estimates. The annual SAFE Report on\nHMS stocks will summarize the bycatch statistics in HMS fisheries. NMFS and the AP will\nevaluate the effectiveness of this bycatch reduction strategy based on this summary.\nAdvanced technology will facilitate future reporting and NMFS will continue to work with\nfishery participants to improve the quality of data related to bycatch and bycatch mortality.\nNMFS will also continue to support research on bycatch reduction management\nmeasures, including additional gear modifications. Modifications to increase the selectivity\nof fishing gear often provide an effective tool for reducing bycatch in all fisheries. HMS\nsupports research projects that will help to determine the efficacy of certain gear\nmodifications with respect to bycatch and bycatch mortality. For example, NMFS is\ncurrently supporting research to determine if different levels of hooking mortality result\nfrom different hook types in the pelagic longline fishery. Other important areas for future\nresearch include gear deployment issues and post-release survival in recreational and\ncommercial HMS fisheries as well as models of currently unknown mortality on HMS\nstocks due to bycatch in other fisheries. In July 1998, the HMS AP discussed the use of\ndifferent gear types and gear deployment methods to reduce catch and mortality of non-\ntarget species in HMS fisheries. Panel members were very interested in gear modifications\nand encouraged NMFS to continue to support gear modification research and information\ndissemination to commercial and recreational fishery participants. Most AP members felt\nstrongly that non-regulatory mechanisms would be more effective and more acceptable to\nthe fleets than would be regulations mandating the use of a particular gear type or\ndeployment method. The final actions in this bycatch reduction strategy reflect that\napproach, in part. The FMP framework contains provisions to implement gear modification\nmeasures as new information becomes available supporting such regulatory measures.\nSeveral AP members have noted the importance of educating fishery participants and giving\nthem a stake in fishery conservation actions without creating new regulatory, enforcement,\nand administrative burdens. This FMP includes an outreach program that focuses on\nbycatch issues in HMS fisheries.\nStudies have indicated that discarded catch is often not reported as accurately as landed\ncatch (Cramer et al., 1997). In some HMS fisheries, a logbook program may provide better\ninformation than a limited observer program for a far-ranging fishery. In other instances, an\nobserver program can provide important information that logbooks do not such as gear\nmodifications or other catch parameters that are not recorded in logbooks or may not be as\naccurately reported in logbooks due to the attention of the captain to marketable species,\nrather than unwanted species. As data on catch, discards, and landings improve, fishery\nmanagers can better determine appropriate measures to pursue bycatch reduction goals\n(NMFS, 1998b). Long-term data collection programs to evaluate these management\nChapter 3 - Strategy for Bycatch Reduction - 283","measures are particularly imperative in HMS fisheries, given the temporal and spatial\nvariability of the fisheries and of bycatch.\nAll bycatch estimates have some variability based on the robustness of the data used in\ncalculations. A level of acceptable probability (certainty) could be set to determine the level\nof confidence that can be placed in the recovery estimates to ensure that bycatch is\nminimized, to the extent practicable. However, bycatch estimates will continue to be made\nbased on widely varying data sources, that depend on the species of interest and the fishery.\nCollection of statistically robust data is problematic for wide ranging species that are not\nsubject to fishery-independent sampling. Further, stock-wide bycatch data are not currently\navailable from ICCAT. Discard data submitted to ICCAT for Atlantic tunas and swordfish\nmay be associated with large variance estimates due to differences in national data collection\nprograms. Using the bycatch strategy in this FMP as a platform, NMFS intends to continue\nto address bycatch concerns both domestically and internationally, including increasing data\ncollection through observer programs, time/area closures, and gear modifications.\n3.6 Interim Milestones (During Recovery)\nThe following alternatives address what actions should be taken to assess progress toward\nrecovery during the rebuilding period. During rebuilding, two considerations are of primary\nimportance: what to do with \"windfalls;\" and how to select and implement mid-course\ncorrections in the event that the trajectory deviates from the predicted path. Windfalls are\nunexpected stock surpluses. Managers must decide whether benefits from these unexpected\nsurpluses should be subject to fishing mortality immediately, or whether they should be left alone\nand allowed to contribute to more rapid rebuilding.\nStock assessment is the primary tool that will be used to evaluate the progress of stock\nrebuilding during the recovery period. Managers need to consider how frequently these\nassessments should be conducted as well as that type of course-correcting action should be taken\nif recovery is not on schedule. It should be noted that for tuna and swordfish, stock assessments\nare conducted at the international level and thus, scheduling of assessments is not under direct\ncontrol of NMFS. In addition, as described in Section 3.10, a SAFE report must be published\nannually. Each SAFE report will either summarize information that has become available since\nthe last stock assessment or include any results of the last stock assessment.\nFinal Action: Conduct a stock assessment for each species or species group every two to\nthree years\nSwordfish\nAssessment of swordfish resources by SCRS has customarily been performed every two\nyears. The most recent Atlantic swordfish stock assessment was completed in 1996 and included\ndata specific to the north and south Atlantic stocks. The next assessment is scheduled for 1999\nChapter 3 - Interim Milestones - 284","and SCRS scientists are working to improve data collection. This assessment will use sex-\nspecific catch statistics, catch per unit effort patterns from all fleets across the north/south stock\nboundary, and relative abundance trends from the Portuguese fleet. The international\ncoordination required to complete an assessment of swordfish resources throughout the Atlantic\nOcean must be considered in relation to reporting frequency needed to adequately track\nrebuilding progress. Information on Atlantic swordfish landings by the United States will be\nupdated more frequently as needed to assess the efficacy of unilateral management measures.\nAtlantic Tunas\nAssessment of the west Atlantic bluefin tuna stock by SCRS typically takes place every two\nto three years. The most recent assessment was completed in October 1998. The rebuilding\nprogram adopted by ICCAT in 1998 specifies that in 2000, and thereafter every two years, SCRS\nwill conduct a stock assessment of west Atlantic bluefin tuna and provide advice relative to the\nrebuilding program. If SCRS determines that a TAC greater than 2,700 mt WW will allow the\nmaximum sustainable yield target to be achieved within the 20-year rebuilding period with a\n50-percent or greater probability, or if a TAC less than 2300 mt WW is necessary to achieve the\nmaximum sustainable yield target within the 20-year rebuilding period with a 50-percent or\ngreater probability, then ICCAT may consider adjusting the rebuilding plan accordingly.\nYellowfin tuna and bigeye tuna and albacore tuna are assessed by ICCAT's SCRS\nperiodically. Under this final action, NMFS will recommend that assessments for any overfished\ntunas be conducted on a more regular basis.\nAtlantic Sharks\nStock assessments of the large coastal shark management group have been conducted every\ntwo years since 1992 by NMFS' Southeast Fisheries Science Center. An assessment took place\nin June 1998, the results of which are discussed in Section 2.4.1 and the executive summary is\nincluded in Appendix IV. A stock assessment has not been conducted for small coastal sharks or\npelagic sharks since before the 1993 FMP. SCRS is conducting a catch rate workshop for\npelagic sharks in 1999. This final action will ensure that small coastal sharks and pelagic sharks\nare assessed as regularly as large coastal sharks. This final action may allow for an assessment\nof large coastal sharks one year, followed by small coastal sharks the next year, and pelagic\nsharks the following year. However, for many shark species, particularly pelagic sharks,\nassessments should be conducted on an international level.\nConclusion\nRegular HMS stock assessments are crucial in order to define stock boundaries, to meet\nrecovery period goal, to estimate life histories, and to improve knowledge of stock dynamics.\nChapter 3 - Interim Milestones - 285","Final Action: Flexible \"framework\" for adopting management measures\nThis action gives NMFS the flexibility to consider different management methods in order\nto alter fishing mortality when rebuilding is off schedule. It allows a wide range of alternatives\nto ensure that recovery is achieved within the specified time period, such as adjustments to\nretention limits, minimum sizes, fishing seasons, time/area closures, etc. In addition, this\nflexibility also allows managers to consider alternatives that may have fewer social or economic\nimpacts. There will still be a stock assessment completed every two to three years but this\nalternative will involve various layers of agency review and public input to change the current\nmanagement measures which may alter the current fishing mortality rate. The FMP framework\nis more process-oriented, and less trigger-oriented, in determining remedial management. In\naddition, this action does not preclude NMFS from following the \"20-percent rule\" which NMFS\nhas rejected at this time.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is selected because it allows managers the flexibility to choose management\nmeasures which may have fewer economic or social impacts while still rebuilding overfished\nstocks while still decreasing fishing mortality.\nRejected Options for Interim Milestones\nRejected Option: Annual stock assessment\nAlthough a number of constituents have requested annual stock assessments, this alternative\nis rejected at this time for all HMS. This alternative would provide a mechanism to closely track\nrebuilding of HMS, however this frequency of stock assessment is considered unnecessary to\ntrack trends in stock size. This alternative would require an annual assessment of each HMS.\nLogistical constraints on conducting assessments and compiling information from all countries\nlanding HMS may limit assessment frequency. In addition, due to the slow change and the low\nlevel of precision in some HMS assessments, very little can be learned about changes in HMS\nstocks from one year to the next. Thus, this alternative would not result in an efficient use of\nscientific research and monitoring resources for HMS.\nLogistical constraints on conducting assessments and compiling information from all\ncountries landing HMS may limit assessment frequency. This alternative is not consistent with\nthe SCRS schedule. Finally, assessments of ICCAT species are not conducted on a regular basis,\nthus this alternative may not be realistic.\nChapter 3 - Interim Milestones - 286","Conclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it does not conform to current international standards. In\naddition, for long-lived HMS annual stock assessments are an unnecessary burden that exceeds\nany benefits because of difficulties associated with measuring inter-annual changes. For these\nreason, and because of logistical constraints, multi-year periods between assessments are\npreferred.\nRejected Option: Stock assessment when new information becomes available\nThis alternative would require a stock assessment when new scientific information becomes\navailable. This alternative could require assessments at a frequency that poses significant\nadministrative costs and that may represent an inefficient use of assessment resources. However,\nit would allow for an increase in response time if recovery was hampered by environmental\nfluctuations (e.g., decreasing recruitment) or by delinquent fishing practices (e.g., quota\noverharvests). NMFS prefers to establish a rebuilding program with a constant catch strategy.\nTherefore, an assessment will not be necessary more frequently than every two to three years.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it involves significant administrative costs and may\nrepresent an inefficient use of resources.\nRejected Option: Fixed trajectory and milestones to keep on trajectory\nThis alternative would require a stock assessment every two years. Modifications to the\nrecovery trajectory and milestones would be made by the agency in accordance with the\nguidelines and \"triggers\" built into the FMP. Under this option, if it is determined that the stock\nis not on its intended recovery trajectory, then immediate corrective action, perhaps including\ninternational action, would be required by the agency to return the stock to its recovery course.\nMilestones would be quantifiable, and would be tied to pre-determined quantified adjustments to\nget back on recovery trajectory. At its March 1998 meeting, the HMS AP suggested 80 percent\nof the biomass necessary to support the maximum sustainable yield in half of the selected\nrebuilding period as a \"hard and fast\" milestone. If recovery fell behind schedule, then an\nadjustment to the fishing mortality rate would be implemented to put the recovery back on track.\nIf recovery was ahead of schedule, the FMP could provide the flexibility to increase fishing\npressure or leave these \"extra\" fish \"in the bank\" to accelerate recovery. SCRS and NMFS\nwould be responsible for providing biennial or annual analyses, with appropriate confidence\nlimits, providing information on alternative measures (such as quota changes, catch composition\nbetween small and large fish, minimum sizes, etc.) to stay on trajectory. NMFS would then be\nresponsible, in accordance with the FMP framework, for implementing the necessary and\nappropriate management measures.\nChapter 3 - Interim Milestones - 287","Conclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it is inflexible and is not consistent with international\nmanagement strategies. The final actions will allow NMFS to maintain the rebuilding\nprojections and make any necessary changes without the rigid structure of this alternative.\nRejected Option: 20-Percent Rule\nThis alternative would trigger more restrictive regulatory constraints on fishing mortality if\nan assessment indicated that the recovery pace were 20 percent below expected levels. When\ntwo consecutive assessments indicate that recovery is on or ahead of schedule, NMFS, with input\nfrom the AP, may consider changes to the recovery schedule to take advantage of the unexpected\nbenefits. Such changes must include consideration of the best scientific information available,\nexpected social and economic impacts, international concerns, confidence intervals, and\nenforcement concerns.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it does not consider differences in the international stock\nassessment strategies. Under the final action selected, managers may use 20 percent as a\nthreshold or be more flexible, as advised by the SAFE report, ICCAT, and the AP.\n3.7 Uncertainty Issues\nAll metrics used in estimating the recovery trajectories have associated variations based on\nthe quantity and quality of the data used in stock assessments. A level of acceptable probability\n(certainty) must be set to establish targets and to determine the level of confidence that can be\nplaced in the recovery estimates to ensure that stocks are rebuilding within the constraints\nestablished by the Magnuson-Stevens Act (e.g., probability of less than X percent of reducing the\nresource below the minimum stock size threshold within the recovery period).\nFinal Action: For any management action under consideration, management should be at\nleast 50 percent sure of the desired effect.\nUnder this action, NMFS will choose management measures that have at least a 50-percent\nconfidence in target reference points (MSST, MFMT, FMSY, BMSY) utilized in developing\nrebuilding projections. If there are alternatives that have a greater than 50 percent probability of\nsuccess, NMFS will prefer the alternative with a greater than a 50-percent confidence unless\nthere are strong reasons to do otherwise (e.g., international agreement, a small increase in percent\nconfidence has much larger economic impacts than the other option) or the SAFE report\nrecommends a different level of confidence based on data concerns. In all cases, NMFS will\nstrive to be as risk-averse as possible. The Technical Guidelines suggest that rebuilding plans\nChapter 3 - Uncertainty Issues - 288","should be designed to possess a 50 percent, or higher, chance of achieving BMSY with the\nrebuilding time frame. In addition, the Technical Guidelines recommend that the probability of\nexceeding the minimum fishing mortality threshold be no greater than 20 to 30 percent, and\ncertainly smaller than 50 percent. Thus, this final action is consistent with the certainty levels\ndescribed in the Technical Guidelines.\nCollection of statistically robust data is problematic for an international fishery like HMS\nthat are not targeted by fishery-independent sampling. In addition, data submitted for Atlantic\nHMS may have large variance estimates due to differences in data collection programs.\nAtlantic swordfish\nThe Atlantic swordfish stock assessment model simulations indicate a high degree of\nrobustness to life history parameters but sensitivity to large changes in catches and catch per unit\neffort. This may indicate some uncertainty in results (SCRS, 1996). SCRS has determined that\nthere is a high probability that the swordfish population is significantly below its optimal level.\nThe uncertainty of the model increases when the model assumes the biomass is below BMSY.\nBecause of this uncertainty, SCRS will discontinue model projections, based on some models, if\nthe swordfish biomass is reduced below 0.20BM MSY.\nAtlantic tunas\nThis final action describes the current standard used by SCRS for its projections of west\nAtlantic bluefin tuna stock status. For example, the status quo total allowable catch for the west\nAtlantic bluefin tuna fishery of 2,500 mt WW carries with it a 50-percent probability of doubling\nthe spawning stock biomass in 20 years based on the two-line model. SCRS has not developed\nrecovery scenarios for bigeye tuna, but does use the 50-percent probability trajectory when\nprojecting catch and spawning stock biomass levels under various fishing mortality levels.\nAtlantic sharks\nIn 1997, NMFS used a 50-percent probability level that no further stock declines would\noccur when it reduced the large coastal shark commercial quota and recreational retention limit\nas an interim measure until a long-term rebuilding program could be developed. This level of\ncertainty was acceptable for an interim measure, especially given the impacts of such a quota\nreduction on fishermen and their communities. However, in developing the rebuilding program\nfor large coastal sharks, NMFS used a 70-percent probability as a guide in order to ensure that\nthe intended results of a management action are actually realized (Section 3.4.1). Conversely,\nNMFS used a low probability of a negative outcome as an additional guide in evaluating\npotential management measures (e.g., less than a 20-percent probability that stock sizes would\ndecrease under a given management measure).\nChapter 3 - Uncertainty Issues - 289","Conclusion\nThis alternative is selected because it provides assurance that rebuilding will occur despite\nuncertainties associated in stock assessments. Setting a 50-percent uncertainty level instead of a\nhigher level may mitigate any potential impacts on the fishery and fishermen while still meeting\nthe requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. In addition, this alternative allows NMFS to\nmeet ATCA and other international agreements.\nRejected Options for Uncertainty Issues\nRejected Option:\nFor any management action under consideration, management should be\n80 percent sure of desired effect.\nWhile this alternative is more risk-averse than the final action, it is not always realistic given\nthe international management of many HMS and the best scientific information available.\nHowever, the final action described above does not preclude NMFS from making decisions\nbased on an 80-percent probability of success. As explained in the final action, NMFS will strive\nto achieve confidence levels of at least 50 percent for all management actions.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it does not consider international agreements. In\naddition, this level of certainty is often times unrealistic given the currently available analyses on\nmany HMS.\n3.8 Monitoring, Permitting, and Reporting\n3.8.1 Introduction\nBoth the Magnuson-Stevens Act (16 U.S.C. 1801) and ATCA (16 U.S.C. 971)\nauthorize the Secretary of Commerce to collect information for the purpose of managing\nHMS fisheries. ATCA requires NMFS to establish collection of comparable real-time data\non recreational and commercial catches and landings through the use of permits, logbooks,\nlanding reports, for charter operations and tournaments, and programs to provide reliable\nreporting of the catch by private anglers. National Standard 9 directs NMFS to conduct \"a\nreview, and where necessary, an improvement of data collection methods, data sources, and\napplications of [bycatch] data.\" The collection of ecological, economic and sociological\ninformation about HMS fisheries enables NMFS to evaluate the effectiveness of current\nregulations, monitor compliance, and analyze potential management measures to rebuild\noverfished stocks and maintain stocks at optimum yield. In addition, fishermen and other\nconstituents often request access to these data to learn more about their fisheries.\nPermitting and reporting requirements that were in place prior to this FMP are described in\nChapter 3 - Monitoring/Permitting/Reporting - 290","Section 2.6. As required by the Magnuson-Stevens Act, Chapter 1 specifies the nature and\nextent of scientific data that are needed for effective implementation of this FMP. Obtaining\nnew information may also involve additional costs to the regulated community. This section\npresents alternatives for changing the permitting and reporting requirements in HMS\nfisheries. The associated analyses discuss ecological, social and economic impacts of the\nalternatives that were considered by NMFS.\nThe ecological impacts of these final actions are expected to be positive. Better\ninformation about effort, catch, bycatch and discards can only improve NMFS' ability to\nmanage sustainable fisheries. The social and economic impacts, on the other hand, are\nmixed. There will likely be social and perhaps economic impacts on fishermen from\nincreased permitting and reporting requirements (e.g., permit fees, labor required to\ncomplete logbooks, travel expenditures to attend workshops, expenses associated with\nhosting an observer). However, increased permitting and reporting requirements may have\nlonger-term positive social and economic consequences. For example, new reporting\nrequirements could improve the long-term economic outlook of HMS fishing communities\nto the extent that newly collected information contributes to rebuilding fisheries which will\nbenefit fishing-dependent incomes and activities. Collection of additional social and\neconomic data also helps NMFS assess the potential effects of various alternatives,\nimproving the agency's ability to make decisions that minimize negative social and\neconomic impacts to HMS fisheries. NMFS can authorize activities otherwise prohibited by\nthis FMP for the purposes consistent with the EFP provisions of 50 CFR part 600.745.\n3.8.2\nMonitoring, Permitting and Reporting Measures\nThe following alternatives do not have significant safety at sea implications, with the\nexception of the action that requires vessel monitoring systems on pelagic longline vessels.\nThese systems increase safety at sea due to improved communication with shore (depending\non the hardware), and very accurate position locations. It could be argues that completing\nlogbooks poses a safety threat because it requires time that could be used to maintain\nequipment or address other safety issues while at sea. However, typical captains keep a\nmaster log. Therefore, NMFS does not consider logbook reporting to be a significant safety\nthreat when captains are already collecting the necessary information.\nFinal Action:\nRequire all tuna vessels, commercial shark and swordfish vessels, and\ncharter/headboat vessels to obtain an annual vessel permit\nThis requirement has been in place for all tuna vessels and for commercial shark and\nswordfish vessels. This action extends that measure to require all charter/headboat operators\nto obtain a vessel permit in order to fish for HMS.\nChapter 3 - Monitoring/Permitting/Reporting - 291","Ecological Impacts\nThis action enables NMFS to monitor commercial and recreational landings and catch\nand release statistics more accurately, thereby enhancing HMS management and research\nefforts. The total universe of recreational fishermen, and their effort, catch and bycatch\n(including discards) is presently unknown. Estimates of some of these parameters are\ncurrently made using survey instruments, such as the Large Pelagic Survey and the Marine\nRecreational Fisheries Statistics Survey, as well as voluntary reporting from tournaments.\nA charter/headboat permit system will greatly improve information available to NMFS\nregarding the recreational HMS fisheries by providing an accurate measure of participation,\neffort, catch and bycatch (including discards) from one of its most significant components.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThere is an economic impact associated with the permit. Currently shark and swordfish\ncommercial permits cost $40 plus $10 for an additional permit. The charter vessel owner\nwill be charged a fee for the vessel permit (probably $20 to $40) to cover administrative\ncosts. In addition there are administrative costs associated with processing permits, as well\nas enforcement costs in ensuring that charter vessels are complying with permit\nrequirements. In terms of sociological impacts, some charter vessel captains and/or owners\nmay have a negative reaction to a management alternative that requires additional\npaperwork and regulatory burden on their business operation. Requiring permits of\nrecreational fishermen reduces the administrative costs of increasing the sampling of the\nLarge Pelagic Survey and increases the reliability of estimates made from that survey.\nConclusion\nThis final action greatly contributes to NMFS' collection of data from a significant\nnumber of HMS fishery participants at a relatively small social and economic cost. Permits\nallow NMFS to understand the extent of the universe of fishermen and to better serve those\nconstituents.\nFinal Action:\nRequire commercial shark and swordfish vessels and\ncharter/headboat vessels to submit logbooks for all HMS trips\nIf selected, all of the above mentioned vessels will be required to complete an HMS\nlogbook (pelagic logbook for commercial fishermen, charter logbooks for charter/headboat\nvessels). NMFS currently selects all commercial shark and swordfish vessels, and at least\ninitially, may select all charter/headboat vessels. These permitted vessel owners are\nresponsible for submitting logbook reports, including trip summaries, with catch and effort\ndata and discard information. Logbooks must be completed before offloading of HMS\nspecies in the case of one-day trips, or within 48 hours of each day's fishing activity (or\nbefore offloading) in the case of multi-day trips. In the short term, NMFS will be utilizing\nChapter 3 - Monitoring/Permitting/Reporting - 292","existing forms for charter/headboat reporting, which include the Northeast Multispecies\nlogbook and the Southeast Charterboat logbook. After NMFS evaluates the usefulness of\nthese forms, NMFS may decide to establish a separate form for HMS Charter/headboat\noperators. Charter/headboat operators who already submit the required logbooks under the\nNortheast Multispecies or Southeast Charterboat Permit programs do not need to submit\nadditional data at this time to NMFS. HMS will coordinate data analysis of these forms\nwith the regional offices and science centers. All collected information is kept confidential\nbut may be used in summary format.\nEcological Impacts\nLogbooks are used to estimate catch and effort statistics that are reported to ICCAT by\ngear type and used in stock assessments. These stock assessments are being used to create\nrebuilding scenarios and establish sustainable quotas. Existing charter logbooks collect\ninformation comparable to that currently collected from the billfish tournament reporting\nform and the pelagic logbook used for commercial gear: fishing location; gear; measures of\neffort (number of lines, hours fished, etc.); and number and disposition of catch (discarded\ndead, discarded alive, tagged, or kept) for each tuna, shark, swordfish, or billfish caught.\nInformation such as the vessel's name and permit number identify the fisherman.\nInformation on the number and size of fish is used to assess total and average weight of the\ntarget species being harvested. The effort expended allows estimation of catch per unit\neffort, an important component of stock assessments.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThe logbooks require some of the captain's time to fill out and send to the appropriate\nNMFS office. However, public comments have indicated significant support for this\nalternative among vessel captains, including charterboat captains due tot he importance of\ncollecting this type of data for stock assessments. Many captains already fill out such\nlogbooks and many view faxing their report to NMFS a small burden when weighed against\nthe benefit of supporting more effective HMS management. In terms of social impacts,\nsome vessel captains and/or owners may have a negative reaction to a management\nalternative that requires additional paperwork and regulatory burden on their business\noperation, especially in times of heavy fishing activity when maintenance and safety are\ncrucial. Logbook data submission by fishermen reduces NMFS administrative costs to\ncollect data.\nIn addition there will be administrative costs associated with processing logbook\ninformation, as well as enforcement costs in ensuring that vessels are complying with\nlogbook requirements. This program is costly to maintain because data must be compiled,\nentered, and analyzed for trends in catch and effort. However, fishermen supply information\nthat must be reported to ICCAT and therefore is necessary to rebuild overfished HMS stocks\nand to maintain stocks at optimum yield.\nChapter 3 - Monitoring/Permitting/Reporting - 293","Conclusion\nLogbook data forms the basis of NMFS' data collection efforts at a relatively small\nsocial and economic cost. In reference to the \"new\" provision which includes\ncharter/headboats in this requirement, many of these vessels that fish for HMS already\nsubmit logbooks for other fisheries and/or maintain private logbooks to record their fishing\nactivity. Therefore, NMFS expects that the benefits of collecting these data outweigh the\npotential burden on fishermen.\nFinal Action:\nRequire completion of logbook forms before offloading (for one-day\ntrips) or within 48 hours of each day's fishing activities (for multi-day\ntrips)\nThose vessels required to fill out logbooks must complete the logbook forms before\noffloading of HMS in the case of one-day trips, or within 48 hours of the completion of a\nday's fishing activities (or before landing) in the case of multi-day trips. Longline vessels\nfrequently soak gear overnight and haul in the morning. Logbooks must be completed for a\nparticular set within 48 hours of haulback, no matter what time of the day the haulback\noccurs. This measure is expected to increase the enforceability of HMS regulations,\nparticularly in the case of at-sea boardings, and to reduce error in reporting.\nPrior to the implementation of this FMP, longline vessel operators were required to\nsubmit logbook forms within seven days after the sale of swordfish offloaded after a trip, or\nwithin five days after the sale of shark offloaded after a trip. In this FMP, NMFS extends\nthe logbook requirement to tuna fishery participants who are permitted to use longline, hand\ngear, and purse seine gear. Extension of the logbook requirement to tuna permit holders was\ninitially proposed in the proposed consolidation of HMS regulations (61 FR 57361;\nNovember 6, 1996) and public comment was solicited at that time. The measure was re-\nproposed in the proposed rule that accompanied the draft FMP. Current regulations require\nthat those vessels that are selected by NMFS must submit logbooks. NMFS commonly\nselects 100 percent of longline vessels for reporting. It is anticipated that a smaller number\nof tuna permit holders, perhaps ten percent, will initially be selected for logbook reporting in\norder to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the new requirement.\nEcological Impacts\nEnforcement is a key component of HMS management. On occasion, there is a need\nfor a law enforcement officer to observe the logbook of a pelagic or bottom longline vessel\nduring or immediately following a trip. However, under the regulations in place prior to this\nFMP, submission of the logbook was required not later than the seventh day after sale of the\nswordfish off-loaded from a trip or no later than the fifth day after sale of the shark off-\nloaded from a trip. This new measure will increase enforceability of all pelagic and bottom\nlongline fishery management regulations by facilitating inspection of logbooks during at-sea\nChapter 3 - Monitoring/Permitting/Reporting - 294","or dockside inspections. It is also likely to discourage fraudulent data reporting, and reduce\nerroneous discard reporting that may occur due to poor recollection of when, where, and\nhow many fish were caught on a particular set during a multi-day fishing trip.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis measure does not impose any additional reporting requirements. Prior to\nimplementation of this FMP, fishery participants were required to retain information for\nlogbooks and submit their logbooks within a certain time after offloading. This measure\nmay cause some additional inconvenience by requiring more timely completion of the\nlogbook form. However, it is not likely to substantially increase the reporting burden for\nfishery participants. This measure will facilitate enforcement both at sea and at the dock and\nreduces the administrative costs of enforcement efforts.\nConclusion\nThis is the final action. NMFS proposed that logbooks be completed within 24 hours,\nbut re-considered when comments were received indicating potential safety implications of\nthe proposed measure. NMFS, therefore, implements the 48 hour requirement which should\nprovide for accurate data reporting and satisfy the enforcement objective while mitigating\nthe safety concerns. Implementation will result in more timely and accurate reporting of\ncatch and bycatch rates of immature fish or other regulatory or market-driven discards in the\npelagic and bottom longline fishery, consistent with NS 9.\nFinal Action:\nRequire tournament registration for all tournaments that land shark,\nswordfish, and tunas\nThis action requires tournament operators to notify NMFS of the purpose, dates, and\nlocation of any tournament involving score-keeping or awards for the capture of Atlantic\ntunas, swordfish, and sharks at least four weeks prior to commencement of the tournament.\nNMFS may select tournaments for mandatory reporting as well as registration. In the past,\nNMFS has worked with tournament operators to collect data in the past on a voluntary basis,\nhowever, there was no way of identifying the universe of tournaments and therefore,\nassessing fishing effort. NMFS may continue to sample tournaments on-site but this\ncollection of data will allow NMFS scientists to focus on analysis of data and rely on\nfishermen to collect the data for NMFS.\nEcological Impacts\nRequiring tournament operators to provide notification allows NMFS to improve\nmonitoring of recreational fishing catch, bycatch, and effort for tunas, swordfish, and sharks\nand therefore, this requirement supports rebuilding of these species. A similar measure was\nChapter 3 - Monitoring/Permitting/Reporting - 295","implemented as an interim rule for Atlantic billfish (63 FR 14030; March 24, 1998) and as a\nfinal action in Amendment One to the Atlantic Billfish FMP. NMFS may select\ntournaments for mandatory reporting as well as registration. In this respect, NMFS can\nselect times/areas to collect bycatch information to more accurately characterize bycatch in\ntournaments, which do not reflect non-tournament fishing patterns.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis requirement imposes a paperwork burden on tournament operators to register their\ntournaments, and if selected, submit data on tournament catch and effort. However, most\ntournaments probably already collect catch and effort data and this requirement may not\nimpose an economic burden on tournament operators. Tournament registration and reporting\nrequirements reduce the administrative costs to monitor tournament fishing effort. The\nadministrative costs of this final action include compiling and analyzing data and submitting\nthat data for use in stock assessments, if necessary. NMFS has worked with tournament\noperators to collect data in the past on a voluntary basis and therefore many tournament\noperators should not experience a social or economic impact from this final action.\nConclusion\nThis action will greatly improve NMFS' collection of data from a significant segment\nof the recreational HMS fishery at a relatively small social and economic cost. The\ntournament notification measure is critical to developing a sampling frame for tournaments\nto allow for better monitoring, data collection, and reporting of HMS tournaments. This\nrequirement is comparable to the logbook data that is submitted by charter/headboats, and\ncommercial shark and swordfish fishermen in that it collects catch and effort information as\nwell as the disposition of the catch by individual fish.\nFinal Action:\nRequire the use of a vessel management system (VMS) on all pelagic\nlongline fishing vessels\nThis action requires the owners and operators of all vessels fishing with pelagic\nlongline to submit position reports hourly using a VMS. VMS is an electronic tool that is\nprogrammed to transmit a global positioning system position report. NMFS has approved\ncertain VMS units for use in the Atlantic pelagic longline fishery. Tracking a series of\nsignals allows NMFS to determine the location and travel pattern of a vessel. This tool is\nparticularly useful in enforcing time/area closures which directly reduce bycatch, and has\nadded safety and economic benefits. Personal computers could be linked to VMS units\nvoluntarily, providing fishermen with better communication and possible electronic logbook\nreporting in the future. VMS is mandatory in the New England scallop fishery and in the\nHawaii pelagic longline fishery; both programs have proved very helpful in enforcing\ntime/area closures.\nChapter 3 - Monitoring/Permitting/Reporting - 296","This action eliminates the need for all swordfish to be offloaded by the closure time of\nthe directed fishery closure provided that no fishing activity of any kind takes place after the\nclosure until all swordfish are offloaded. In addition, this action allows pelagic longline\nfishermen to be exempt from the retention limit regarding incidental catch of swordfish\nduring a directed fishery closure. Therefore, pelagic longline fishermen can possess more\nthan 15 swordfish on board in the north Atlantic Ocean during a closure of the north Atlantic\ndirected swordfish fishery, provided that the swordfish were caught south of 5° N.\nEcological Impacts\nThis action will reduce the resources needed by NMFS and the USCG to enforce\ntime/area closures. Utilizing VMS will effectively increase the efficiency of enforcement\nactivities and may increase compliance with conservation measures. Without VMS,\ntime/area closures can be very difficult and expensive to enforce, requiring at-sea and\nflyover monitoring of the fleet. VMS is particularly useful if the area is large and/or transit\nthrough the area is permitted. VMS is considered a very successful aid to enforcement in\nother fisheries where it is used. The ecological cost of not enforcing a time/area closure\neffectively is further depletion of fully or overfished stocks with longer times to rebuilding.\nVMS may also allow more finely defined closure areas VS. the closure of large blacks.\nThis alternative will not result in increased catches of non-target finfish, although\nfishermen would be allowed to fish up until the date and time of the closure. Their\nestimated catch rates of swordfish will be considered when season projections are made\nfor closures.\nVMS could be used in the future for inseason quota monitoring, decreasing the\nlikelihood of premature closure and quota overharvests. VMS could also be used by\nobservers to report takes of protected species. This information could be shared with\nfishermen in nearby areas, thereby resulting in lower marine mammal bycatch rates.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nIn response to comments and through further research into newly available technologies,\nNMFS has changed the proposed requirements for the specifications of vessel management\nunits and communications service providers. VMS may cost as little as $1,800 (ARGOS\nunit) or as much as $3,500 per unit and installation can cost $100 - $1,000 (ARGOS and\nINMARSAT-C, respectively). Communication costs on the ARGOS units may cost a little\nas five dollars per day with no charges when the vessel is in port (i.e., not fishing).\nCommunication costs for data position reports only (no text messages included) will cost\napproximately $2.50 per day on the INMARSAT-C units, however, every day the unit is on\nwill be charged. These costs will be assumed by the vessel owner. If fishermen choose an\nINMARSAT unit, an optional personal computer for real-time logbook reporting could be\nlinked to the VMS at a cost of approximately $2,000. ARGOS presents fishermen with a less\nChapter 3 - Monitoring/Permitting/Reporting - 297","costly alternative to VMS but does not allow for two-way communication. There is a safety\nfeature of both the ARGOS and the INMARSAT-C units, which allows the fisherman to\nactivate an \"EPIRB-type\" signal on the unit. Vessels could be required to pay for upgrades\nto the system, however, it is not anticipated at this time that upgrades would be necessary.\nBoth ARGOS or INMARSAT-C units are able to accommodate for electronic catch\nreporting, if NMFS seeks to implement that program in the future. At this time, NMFS does\nnot consider the information provided by the VMS to be duplicative with logbook data. The\nVMS allows for near real-time data collection and accurate position reports.\nVMS has several social and economic benefits, namely that it provides a secure\ncommunication system and an emergency beacon and position report (immediate global\npositioning system distress signal), if needed. VMS would benefit fishermen, and safety of\nhuman life at sea, by increasing communication with markets, family members, vessel\nowners, and the Coast Guard. Fishermen may also be eligible for benefits for cooperating\nwith the NOAA Weather Service via their VMS. In addition, VMS could allow\nconfidential real-time logbook reporting if a personal computer is linked to the system\nwhich could decrease the paperwork burden on fishermen, observers, and NMFS. The\neconomic impacts of the VMS program are necessary to implement the time/area closures\neffectively. VMS can also increase revenues by allowing less burdensome regulations and\nmore fishing time (up to the time of a closure instead of being in port by the closure).\nHowever, the cost of a VMS unit may be considered burdensome by fishing vessel owners,\nparticularly by those vessels operating at the margin. (See Chapter 2 for a full description of\nthe social and economic characteristics of the longline fleet).\nVMS offers an administrative benefit to NMFS as well. The NMFS observer program\nfrequently has difficulties is assessing where vessels are fishing. The goal of the observer\nprogram is to place observers on vessels in a stratified sampling scheme depending on\nlocation of the trip. The VMS will allow managers to coordinate for observer sampling and\ncoverage in order to achieve coverage goals. Often, fishing vessel operators are documented\nfor not notifying NMFS of the trip start date in time to initiate observer coverage. With\nVMS, NMFS can identify trips that have started without the required observer and can seek\nfurther enforcement of observer regulations.\nFor some time, fishermen have requested that NMFS provide delayed offloading\nprovisions instead of a fixed closure date by which all fishermen must be at port and\noffloaded. Fishermen and dealers maintain that requiring all fish to be offloaded by the time\nof a closure creates a market glut, even though fishermen are notified 14 days in advance of\na closure and could avoid the glut by coming in early. Transportation and storage problems\nalso result from a \"drop dead\" closure date because all fish must be offloaded and dealers\nthen must be able to provide for shipping or cold storage space. NMFS established a pilot\nprogram for delayed offloading with VMS in 1998. Only one pelagic longline vessel owner\nparticipated in the pilot program, SO results are difficult to predict. Each year, there will be\nvarying conditions under which delayed offloading is more or less profitable (i.e., may\ndepend on imports or Canadian closures, etc.). NMFS estimates that with all pelagic\nChapter 3 - Monitoring/Permitting/Reporting - 298","longline vessels sending position reports, regulations may not have to be as restrictive for\nenforcement reasons and fishermen may further benefit economically. For example, it is\ncurrently illegal to possess greater than 15 swordfish in the north Atlantic during a directed\nfishery closure. Although these swordfish may have been caught in the south Atlantic\nduring an open fishery, enforcement agents have no way of proving the location of the\ncatch. With VMS, each vessel will be tracked and longline sets could be assigned to ocean\nareas, thus supporting that the swordfish were actually caught in the south Atlantic. This is\nexpected to lower costs to distant water fishermen who no longer have to offload in a\nforeign country in the south Atlantic.\nConclusion\nThis is a final action. VMS is essential to effective implementation and enforcement of\na time/area closure. Further, this final action implements the ICCAT recommendation for\nVMS. VMS also provides benefits of better communication with shore and with other ships\nas well as increased safety benefits. This measure may require a substantial one-time cost\nfor some small businesses, however, this cost is a necessary component of rebuilding the\nnorth Atlantic swordfish stock and restoring the full long-term economic vitality of the\nfishery. Leasing is probably not possible at this time, although if the industry worked with\nthe VMS distributor, a leasing arrangement might provide a more attractive economical\noption to vessel owners. In addition, if vessel owners can afford VMS, economic benefits\nmay increase due to less restrictive regulations.\nFinal Action:\nMandatory observer coverage in the Atlantic tunas fisheries and\ncommercial shark and swordfish fisheries, if selected\nThis measure requires all tuna vessels, and commercial shark and swordfish vessels to\ntake an observer on a trip, if selected. The purpose of this measure is to collect catch,\nbycatch, and effort information from these fisheries.\nEcological Impacts\nThis action is expected to have beneficial ecological effects for both HMS and other\nliving marine resources that interact with HMS. Observers are deployed on fishing vessels\nto gather ecological information about the composition and character of the total catch, both\nlanded and discarded. This information supplements logbooks, call-in reporting, and dealer\nreporting and is particularly valuable for collecting information about that portion of the\ncatch that is not brought to shore. This action also supports NMFS' implementation of\nNS 9 in HMS fisheries because it allows for collection of information about bycatch. Data\ncollected under this alternative will allow NMFS to explore management measures that\nsupport requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, National Environmental Policy Act,\nMarine Mammal Protection Act, and the Endangered Species Act, as well as the objectives\nChapter 3 - Monitoring/Permitting/Reporting - 299","of this FMP. These data enhance stock assessments as well as improve the effectiveness of\nmanagement measures.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action bears some cost to vessel operators. Vessel operators are required to house\nand feed observers at the same standard provided to the rest of the crew. Vessel operators\nmust also make all fish available to the observers which may slow down the pace of fishing\noperations. However, most of the implementation costs are covered by NMFS, e.g., training\nand employing observers. A single day of observer coverage costs approximately $650\nalthough that cost is variable depending on the characteristics of the fishery and the observer\nprogram. Safety at sea, for both observers and crew, must be a consideration in placing\nobservers in derby fisheries. This concern may be mitigated somewhat for the purse seine\nfishery, which operates under an individual vessel quota program that does not provide any\nincentive for vessel operators to go to sea in inclement weather in a \"race for fish.\"\nConclusion\nThis is the final action. It allows for collection of information that is important to\nrebuilding overfished HMS and protected species, managing discards and discard mortality,\nand meeting the objectives of this FMP and other applicable laws.\nFinal Action:\nVoluntary observer coverage of HMS charter/headboat vessels\nThis action establishes a voluntary at-sea observer program for HMS charter/headboat\nvessel trips. Current regulations allow NMFS to select any vessel in the Atlantic tuna\nfisheries , including charter/headboat vessels, to carry an observer. This action expands that\npractice as a matter of policy to all HMS charter/headboat vessels, with actual levels of\nimplementation subject to the availability of funding as well as the number of fishermen\nwho volunteer to participate. NMFS received a large volume of comments on this issue\nwhich indicate a high degree of interest in a voluntary program and concern that an observer\nmay reduce recreational enjoyment for some anglers. NMFS therefore believes there will be\nenough voluntary participants to establish an effective observer data collection program.\nThis action is consistent with the ICCAT requirement of five percent observer coverage for\nvessels fishing for bigeye tuna and yellowfin tuna. In addition, this final action would be\nconsistent with the ATCA requirement for comparable monitoring of recreational and\ncommercial fisheries.\nEcological Impacts\nThis action is expected to have beneficial ecological effects for both HMS and other\nliving marine resources that interact with HMS. Observers are deployed on fishing vessels\nChapter 3 - Monitoring/Permitting/Reporting - 300","to gather biological information about the composition and character of the total catch, both\nlanded and discarded. This information supplements and ground truths logbooks, call-in\nreporting, and dealer reporting and is particularly valuable for collecting information about\nthat portion of the catch that is not brought to shore. This action also supports NMFS'\nimplementation of NS 9 in HMS fisheries because it allows for collection of information\nabout discarded catch. Data collected under this measure will allow NMFS to explore\nmanagement measures that support requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act as well as\nthe objectives of this FMP. These data enhance stock assessments as well as improved\nmanagement measures.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nNMFS received a large volume of comments on this issue which indicate a high degree\nof interest in a voluntary program and concern that an observer may reduce recreational\nenjoyment for some anglers, thereby reducing angler consumer surplus. This action results\nin some cost to vessel operators. Vessel operators are required to house and feed observers\nat the same standard provided to the rest of the crew. However, most charter/headboat trips\nare probably day trips and therefore few captains would incur additional expenses of an\novernight trip with an observer. Most of the implementation costs are covered by NMFS,\ne.g., training and employing observers. A single day of observer coverage costs\napproximately $650 although that cost is variable depending on the characteristics of the\nfishery and the observer program.\nThis complies with the NS 10 requirement to promote safety at sea, because the\nobserver cannot place the vessel above its maximum carriage allowance. If a charter/\nheadboat captain volunteers to participate in the observer program, the vessel's safety gear\n(e.g., life jackets or personal flotation devices) must be sufficient for everyone aboard,\nincluding the observer. The owner of a six-pack (a vessel that can carry six customers)\nwould still be able to carry six passengers-for-hire as well as the observer, as long as the\nvessel's capacity was not exceeded and the vessel carried the correct amount of lifesaving\nequipment. The charter/headboat fleet has a disincentive to fish in dangerous or adverse\nconditions that might deter customers from returning. Because this action is not mandatory,\nNMFS will not impose the economic burden of placing an observer onboard charter/\nheadboats unless the captain volunteers to carry an observer for the purpose of data\ncollection.\nConclusion\nThis action will provide valuable data on recreational HMS fisheries, including release\nrates and handling mortality, hook-up rates, life history information, and social and\neconomic data that can only be obtained through the direct observation of fishing activities.\nAt the August 1998 HMS AP meeting, several AP members expressed concern about the\nproposal to establish mandatory observer coverage on charter vessels selected by NMFS,\nChapter 3 - Monitoring/Permitting/Reporting - 301","especially the economic impacts that would result if an observer were to replace a paying\ncustomer. AP members also suggested that a group of paying customers may not wish to\nhave an additional person present on their outing. NMFS recognizes these concerns, and\nconcludes that the expected ecological benefits of the proposed alternative can be achieved\nthrough a voluntary observer program. While a voluntary program is not a random sample,\nNMFS may select among the pool of volunteers to get an even distribution across time and\nareas. The voluntary observer program may be replaced in the future by a mandatory\nprogram if NMFS concludes that additional data collection is necessary.\nRejected Option:\nStatus quo permitting and reporting requirements\nEcological Impacts\nThe data collected under the current permitting and reporting requirements provide\nNMFS with important information about the commercial and recreational fisheries.\nHowever, implementing this alternative without increasing the quality and scope of\ninformation collected could adversely affect NMFS' ability to rebuild, monitor, and\nmaintain healthy HMS stocks, and minimize bycatch in HMS fisheries.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nWhile continuing the status quo alternative would impose no additional burden on the\nregulated community, a lack of improvements to the data system could contribute to\nsubstantial negative social and economic impacts in the long term.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because, given the requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens\nAct and ATCA, NMFS is committed to continued efforts to improve data collection\nmeasures. Failure to collect additional data could hinder the effective implementation of\nthis FMP, and thus may have significant negative ecological and social and economic\nconsequences.\nRequire vessel permits for all U.S. registered vessels fishing\nRejected Option:\nrecreationally for Atlantic highly migratory species\nEcological Impacts\nInformation collected from permit applications could be used by NMFS to monitor\nparticipation in HMS fisheries. The vessel permit would also provide additional information\nto support the development of recreational fishery management policy. For example, a\nChapter 3 - Monitoring/Permitting/Reporting - 302","recreational HMS permit database would provide NMFS with a sampling frame that is the\nbasis for fleet size calculations used for catch and effort estimates in fisheries that do not\nrequire mandatory reporting. This information would also improve monitoring and\nenforcement. Additional information on the vessels participating in HMS recreational\nfisheries would improve NMFS' ability to analyze impacts of potential management\nmeasures on small businesses.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nA measure to permit HMS anglers would increase the regulatory burden on recreational\nfishermen, by requiring that they participate in an annual permit process. However, the\nregulatory burden for both anglers and NMFS could be significantly reduced if HMS\npermitting were incorporated into the Angling category permit for Atlantic tunas, or\nexpanding the database to include other recreational angler alternatives. Many saltwater\nfishermen target multiple HMS; for example, some who target billfish also catch other\nlarge pelagic species like tuna and sharks. Tuna anglers are already required to hold a\nrecreational permit.\nAnnual permit issuance/renewal would not have a significant impact on small\nbusinesses. The renewal process would be automated, eliminating paperwork and mailing\ntime for forms. The universe of affected anglers could include the following: vessel owners\ncurrently holding Atlantic tunas permits in the Angling (recreational) category, billfish\nanglers, and shark anglers. The extent of overlap between these three groups is unknown,\nbut is likely to be significant. Thus, the universe of affected vessel owners is likely to be\nsmaller than the sum of the above estimates, as only one permit would be required for\nparticipation in any HMS recreational fishery.\nRecreational encounters with billfish and swordfish are generally rare, and landings are\neven less frequent, which makes scientifically-based sampling programs difficult to design\nand expensive to operate. Requiring tags may be a more feasible option for identifying the\nuniverse of recreational HMS fishermen, since anyone who lands a fish would obtain a tag,\nwhether a vessel owner or non-vessel owner. A program implemented through state and\nfederal cooperation has been in place for two years in North Carolina to test the use of tags\nfor monitoring the recreational fishery for bluefin tuna. A universal HMS recreational\nlanding tag program would require further consideration of self-reporting systems, program\ndesign and logistics, as well as obtaining public comments on how best to implement such a\nprogram. This option is included in the framework provisions; NMFS will continue to\nconsider possibilities for expanding HMS tagging programs in future rulemaking.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected at this time. NMFS currently requires permits in the\nrecreational Atlantic tunas fishery, which likely includes a large part of the universe of\nChapter 3 - Monitoring/Permitting/Reporting - 303","recreational HMS anglers who own vessels. In addition, there is currently very little\nrecreational effort directed at swordfish. Finally, NMFS believes that other final actions\nwill adequately address the recreational shark fishery. While NMFS rejects this alternative\nat this time, it will likely be subject to further consideration by NMFS and the HMS\nAdvisory Panel in the future.\nPermitting and Reporting Alternatives Included in the Framework\nA number of alternatives were not selected, but may be considered in the future under\nthe framework regulatory adjustment procedure outlined in Section 3.10. If NMFS\ndetermines that a potential alternative will have a significant impact on the environment or\nwould change the fundamental approach to management, NMFS will follow the FMP\namendment procedure which is also explained in Section 3.10. Some potential alternatives\nunder consideration include:\nEstablish a single permit for all HMS recreational fisheries;\nEstablish a single permit for all HMS commercial fisheries;\nRequire electronic logbook reporting for all HMS fisheries;\nEstablish a tagging system for all HMS caught in recreational fisheries;\nExtend the recreational call-in system to all tunas, swordfish and sharks; and\nEstablish a fax reporting system for tunas, swordfish and sharks caught in recreational\nfisheries.\n3.9 Safety of Human Life At Sea\nNational Standard 10 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act emphasizes the requirement that\nconservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, promote the safety of\nhuman life at sea. Fishing is an inherently dangerous activity where not all hazardous situations\ncan be foreseen or avoided. Fishermen are continuously exposed to high risk during transit\nand while fishing. Commercial fishermen are required to work extremely long, unregulated\nhours, often under very severe environmental conditions. Professional fishermen identified\ninexperience, inattention, and fatigue as the most likely contributors to safety problems (NRC,\n1991). Many HMS commercial fishermen fish in multiple geographical areas throughout the\nyear. This interregional activity greatly increases the local knowledge needed by vessel captains\nto operate safely. Fishery management measures may constrain both recreational and\ncommercial fishermen to fish under conditions that they would otherwise prefer to avoid. This\nFMP was reviewed by the HMS AP and HMS Consulting Parties, including the U.S. Coast\nGuard, during development of alternatives and regulations, to ensure that fishery managers\nrecognized any impact on the safety of human life at sea and minimize or mitigate those impacts\nwhere practicable. NMFS received comments on safety issues during the public comment period\nand has addressed those issues in the response to comments.\nChapter 3 - Safety of Human Life at Sea - 304","As domestic management measures become more restrictive and commercial and\nrecreational fishermen are faced with escalating costs and a near-stable or declining resource\nbase, fishermen are sometimes forced to minimize maintenance, which has implications for\nsafety. Cutbacks may mean less attention to preventive maintenance of fishing gear or to the\nvessel itself. Because many vessels that participate in HMS fisheries travel great distances from\nshore, selection of management measures must take into consideration economic losses and the\npotential effects on the safety of human life at sea. Some form of insurance is needed by fishing\nvessel owners to protect themselves against loss or damage to their vessels and potential financial\nliabilities that can result from injuries or damage to others, including their own crew members.\nIncreased vessel loss and crew claims increase insurance costs for all fishermen. Recognizing\nthese economic considerations should be a major motivation to address vessel safety issues\n(NRC, 1991).\nThe following safety considerations have been considered in evaluating the management\nmeasures outlined in this FMP.\nOperating environment:\nAn FMP should try to avoid creating situations that result in\nvessels going out farther, fishing longer, or fishing in weather\nworse than they generally would have in the absence of\nmanagement measures.\nGear and vessel loading:\nAn FMP should consider the safety and stability of fishing\nvessels when requiring specific gear or requiring the removal\nof gear from the water.\nLimited season and area:\nAn FMP should attempt to mitigate the effects caused by\n\"derby\" fisheries, and avoid them in new management regimes.\nIn both recreational and commercial fisheries, the primary responsibility for safety resides\nwith the vessel operator. NMFS does not have information regarding losses of recreational\nvessels. In 1996, 31 deaths and 69 vessel losses were documented by the U.S. Coast Guard\nresulting from fishing trips in the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico (USCG, 1996). Casualty\ndata from 1997 were specific to the type of vessel and illustrate the relatively low rate of\ncasualties in the Atlantic longline fishery. In 1997, there were two Atlantic longline vessels that\nsank and were reported by the USCG. One vessel sank as a result of a collision, but the three\npersons on board did not use survival craft. The other vessel caught fire which was attributed to\na battery spark and the four crew members were picked up in a life raft. One vessel was reported\nas a loss and the other vessel was later salvaged (USCG, 1997). In general, collisions stand out\nas a safety problem on the Gulf Coast while material failure incidents are high along the North\nAtlantic coast (NRC, 1991). Weather has been cited as a particular problem for the isolated\ndistant water pelagic longline fleet. HMS fishing vessels tend to have less machinery on board\nthan the larger processing vessels or trawling vessels.\nChapter 3 - Safety of Human Life at Sea - 305","Accidents on HMS vessels may occur when handling (landing or releasing) hooked billfish,\nlarge tunas and sharks or can occur as a result of fatigue (handling large numbers of fish).\nAccidents that can occur on longline vessels involve crew that are hooked and pulled overboard\nor injured by a \"springing\" leader resulting from the release of a fish. It is estimated there are\noccasionally hook-related accidents per year in the pelagic longline fleet. Accidents that can\noccur on purse seine vessels include general injuries caused by handling fish (e.g., poisoning\nfrom being stuck by fins), as well as accidents related to using the cables and winch to move\ngiant bluefin tuna.\nDamage to vessels in storms may result in bodily injury from broken windows or unstowed\ngear. Releasing large fish or protected species (large sea turtles or marine mammals) is difficult\nin rough seas and can result in bodily injury, especially back injuries for both recreational and\ncommercial fisheries. NMFS encourages the use of dehookers which may facilitate the release of\nlarge fish. NMFS advises vessel operators to avoid unsafe conditions, have regular U.S. Coast\nGuard inspections, purchase and maintain safety equipment, educate and train crew members or\npaying customers, and be prepared for emergencies. Further, NMFS encourages all HMS\nfishermen to use VMS for additional safety and communication benefits.\n3.9.1\nFishery Access and Weather-Related Vessel Safety\nThe following fishery management regulations have raised concerns by the fishermen\nin that they directly or indirectly pose a hazard to the crew or vessel safety under adverse\nweather or ocean conditions. Such measures particularly may affect, or have the potential to\naffect, the operation of fishing vessels and safety risks taken by vessel operators under\nadverse weather or ocean conditions.\nQuotas\nSafety Concern: Derby conditions and resulting decreased maintenance and attention to\nother safety precautions as a result of limited quota in the bluefin tuna, swordfish, and shark\nfisheries.\nMitigating Factors: The limited access program that is outlined in Chapter 4 of this\ndocument may reduce the potential for an increased derby fishery targeting sharks and\nswordfish. NMFS has prohibited the use of driftnet gear in the Atlantic swordfish fishery,\nthereby eliminating the unsafe conditions of that derby-style fishery. NMFS has also\nimplemented a 4,000-pound large coastal shark retention limit which may prevent small\nvessels from overloading their holds and becoming unstable and slows the derby effect of\nthe fishery. Effort controls in the General category bluefin tuna fishery are developed with\nthe assistance of fishery participants, and safety concerns are considered in developing these\nregulations. In addition, NMFS tries to avoid one day openings of the General category\nfishery in order to avoid sending fishermen out in unsafe weather conditions. Further,\nNMFS will establish commercial shark seasons in advance, which will allow shark\nChapter 3 - Safety of Human Life at Sea - 306","fishermen to know the length of the season ahead of time and should reduce the \"race for\nfish.\" Any overharvest or underharvest will be added to/subtracted from the same season in\nthe following fishing year. It has been suggested by HMS fishermen that ITQs may provide\na more practical solution to minimizing the derby effects in some HMS fisheries.\nSafety Concern: Destabilization of traditional fishing patterns which results in vessel\ncaptains fishing in unfamiliar waters and/or with unfamiliar gear due to reductions in\navailable quota.\nMitigating Factors: NMFS limits access to the directed and incidental shark and swordfish\nfisheries and to the tuna longline fishery in this FMP, in part to encourage stabilization of\nthe commercial fisheries. Industry representatives have emphasized to NMFS the\nimportance of defining and limiting the universe of participants, partly to allow effective\ndissemination of safety information and to allow development of a stable, experienced\nfishing fleet.\nBycatch Reduction Measures\nSafety Concern: Destabilization of traditional fishing patterns which results in vessel\ncaptains fishing in unfamiliar waters and/or with unfamiliar gear due to time/area closures.\nMitigating Factors: Time/area closures in the pelagic longline fishery will re-distribute\nfishing effort. Minimum sizes for sharks (bottom longline fishery) which may also act as\n\"time/area closures\" as they may cause fishermen to fish farther offshore, away from nursery\nareas. As a result of these new management measures, crowding can occur as vessels\n\"jockey\" for good fishing positions on the prime fishing grounds. These practices can pose\na safety threat to the captains and crews of those vessels.\nIndustry representatives have emphasized to NMFS the importance of defining and\nlimiting the universe of participants, partly to allow effective dissemination of safety\ninformation and to allow development of a stable, experienced fishing fleet. NMFS limits\naccess to the directed and incidental shark and swordfish fisheries in this FMP, in part to\nencourage stabilization of the commercial fisheries. NMFS will establish commercial shark\nseasons in advance, which will allow shark fishermen to know the length of the season ahead\nof time and should allow fishermen more time to plan their fishing trips to avoid bad weather.\nNMFS rejects the alternative to establish \"no-transit zones\" which would force\nfishermen to \"detour\" around large closed areas and which may have significant safety\nimplications. The time/area closure for pelagic longline vessels in the Mid-Atlantic has been\nmade smaller than that proposed in response to comments received that indicated a safety\nthreat to smaller vessels that would have to travel to the far side of the Gulf Stream in order\nto fish. The proposed Florida Straits closure has been rejected in this final FMP in favor of\nestablishing a larger area. The larger closed area may prevent smaller fishing vessels from\nChapter 3 - Safety of Human Life at Sea - 307","fishing \"around\" the closed area. This may reduce the safety concerns as vessels may be\nmotivated to pursue other fishing activities during a closure time in their area.\nUse of VMS allows vessels to travel through closed areas with their fishing gear\nstowed. VMS allows on-shore enforcement agents to monitor the travel pattern of a vessel.\nTravel pattern can indicate if a longline vessel is simply transiting an area, or if it is setting\ngear, waiting through the soak time, and hauling the gear back. Some VMS units increase a\nvessel's ability to communicate with shore, providing added safety assurances in the case of\nbad weather.\nRetention Limits\nSafety Concern: Injury to fishermen while attempting to measure and, if necessary, discard\nHMS, particularly sharks, to comply with the minimum size requirement.\nMitigating Factors: Handling large, feisty fish is inherently a risky task. Cuts and\nabrasions occur, as do more serious accidents related to entanglement of fishermen or their\nhands in fishing gear. The minimum size for tunas is a reasonable safety risk given that\ntunas a little larger or smaller than the minimum size are not likely to be unwieldy (27-inch\ncurved fork length minimum). Billfish, however must be released by all commercial vessels\nand the minimum size is such that billfish pose a safety risk for recreational fisherman as\nwell. With this FMP, NMFS implements a minimum size for all sharks in the recreational\nfishery (4.5 feet FL), with an exception that no minimum size applies to Atlantic sharpnose\nsharks. NMFS establishes a minimum size for ridgeback sharks (4.5 feet FL) in the\ncommercial fishery as well. Public comments suggest that many shark anglers and\ntournaments voluntarily follow minimum sizes equivalent to or higher that the one\nimplemented in this FMP. NMFS will include a discussion on the proper handling of\nreleased HMS, including large fish and protected species such as marine mammals and sea\nturtles as part of the agenda for public workshops and widespread dissemination of\ninformation. NMFS intends for experienced fishermen to share their experiences with\nothers in order to mitigate any safety concerns for the fishermen and the fish.\nSafety Concern: Incentive to fish in bad weather due to effort control measures.\nMitigating Factors: Effort controls in the General category bluefin tuna fishery such as\nmonthly quotas and \"restricted-fishing days\" may encourage fishermen to fish in conditions\nwhich they generally would avoid. These regulations can result in concentrated fishing\neffort at the beginning of the month until the quota is reached. Restricted-fishing days can\nexacerbate derby conditions since the fishing effort is concentrated on the open fishing days.\nA continuous season, without monthly or time-period subquotas or restricted-fishing days,\nmay partially alleviate the derby nature of the fishery as well some safety concerns. This\nissue has been discussed by the HMS AP and by the public at numerous public hearings.\nChapter 3 - Safety of Human Life at Sea - 308","While derby fishing conditions and weather-related access issues exist in the tuna\nfishery, to date they have not appeared to pose a substantial threat to safety at sea. Safety\nconcerns are considered in developing all effort control regulations. Restricted-fishing days\nmay alleviate the fatigue associated with many consecutive one day fishing trips. These\ndays off provide a needed \"rest\" for fishermen. In past years, NMFS has reopened a fishery\nwhen adverse weather conditions prevented fishermen from harvesting the quota. Effort\ncontrol regulations are intended to spread out the General category fishing season, both\ntemporally and geographically, in order to collect better scientific information and improve\nfishing opportunities and ex-vessel prices. They have been developed with the assistance of\nfishery participants, and NMFS and the public have regular opportunities to review these\nregulations through annual effort control specifications, public hearings, and the AP process.\nSafety Concern: Incentive to fish in bad weather or when fatigued due to the requirement to\nbe in port at the time of the directed fishery closure.\nMitigating Factors: Requiring fishermen to be in port or offloaded by the time of a directed\nfishery closure may place time constraints on fishing activities and travel back to shore,\nperhaps providing an incentive for vessels to take risks with adverse weather or fatigue that\nare not in the best interests of safety. NMFS finalizes regulations through this FMP to allow\nfor an ongoing VMS delayed offloading provision. With VMS operating under\nspecifications, vessels must cease fishing at the time of the closure but may offload at any\ntime after the closure, provided no fishing takes place until all HMS are offloaded.\nSafety Concern: Hazards resulting from limited vessel length upgrading in the limited\naccess program.\nMitigating Factors: NMFS has worked with the New England and Mid-Atlantic Fishery\nManagement Councils over the last few years in developing upgrading regulations that are\nconsistent across fisheries to reduce confusion and regulatory burdens on fishermen that\nparticipate in multiple fisheries under multiple jurisdictions. However, NMFS received\nnumerous comments that the majority of fishermen affected by the limited access system for\nthe Atlantic swordfish and shark fisheries do not participate extensively in fisheries that are\nunder the jurisdiction of these councils and that the vessel length and horsepower upgrading\nrestrictions developed, which are appropriate for trawl fisheries, are not appropriate for\nlongline fisheries. Further, increasing vessel length is an important part of increasing safety\nat sea, especially for vessels fishing further and further offshore due to time/area closures\nand other regulations. Therefore, NMFS implements the restrictions on vessel upgrading as\na final measure at this time to prevent substantial increases in the harvesting capacity of\nHMS vessels but will consider alternative criteria to control the harvesting capacity in ways\nthat minimize safety concerns. NMFS will assemble data on hold capacity, consider\nrequesting hold capacity information on permit applications, and consider proposing HMS -\nspecific vessel upgrading restrictions that account for necessary upgrades in horsepower and\nvessel length to address safety concerns.\nChapter 3 - Safety of Human Life at Sea - 309","Permitting and Reporting\nSafety Concern: Lack of sufficient rest or maintenance time due to reporting requirements.\nMitigating Factors: NMFS finalizes the requirement that pelagic logbooks must be\ncompleted within 48 hours of completing a set (instead of the proposed 24 hours) and before\noffloading HMS. NMFS feels that giving fishermen an extra 24 hours to complete the\nlogbook entry will minimize the safety concern. NMFS understands that it is current\npractice for vessel operators to complete a master or captain's log and NMFS recommends\nthat the pelagic logbook be treated as such. This facilitates enforcement of time/area\nclosures and other measures. NMFS is considering electronic logbook reporting in the\nfuture which may reduce the time needed to fill out paper forms and submit them to NMFS.\n3.9.2\nProcedures for Consideration of Management Adjustments\nThe views of fishery participants and other concerned citizens are obtained by the HMS\nManagement Division through regularly scheduled HMS Advisory Panel meetings as well\nas the ICCAT Advisory Committee, public hearings, public meetings, and constituent input\nthrough letters and phone calls. Scoping meetings were held for the development of this\nFMP and public hearings were held on the draft FMP, the Addendum, and the proposed and\nsupplemental rule. Public hearings are held regularly on proposed regulations. All HMS\nConsulting Parties are consulted during the public comment period of rulemakings. These\nConsulting Parties include the Department of State, the U.S. Coast Guard, the ICCAT\nCommissioners, fishery management councils, and other entities listed in the proposed HMS\nProcess (NMFS, 1997). These fora provide NMFS an opportunity to consider the\nimplications of proposed management measures, including their safety implications.\nProcedures to adjust the management measures are described in Section 3.10.4. NMFS will\nprovide flexibility to adjust measures for safety concerns to the degree possible (e.g., add\nweather and ocean conditions as factors to consider in framework measures when making\ninseason adjustments).\nTo date, safety issues have been considered by the full HMS AP. Under the Statement\nof Operating Procedures for the HMS AP, NMFS may establish a sub-panel of the HMS AP.\nFor some proposed management measures, this sub-panel would be established to monitor,\nevaluate, and report on the effect of management measures on vessel or crew safety,\nparticularly under adverse weather or ocean conditions. Observer data should also provide\nuseful information regarding some fishing techniques, hazards, etc. NMFS has instituted\nvoluntary observer coverage in the Charter/Headboat category which is expected to provide\nadditional information about the fishery.\nChapter 3 - Safety of Human Life at Sea - 310","3.9.3\nOther Safety Issues\nThere are other issues beyond fishery access and weather-related vessel safety that need\nto be considered in this HMS FMP. NMFS would like to avoid management measures that\nrequire hazardous at-sea inspections or enforcement, to the extent practicable, if other\ncomparable enforcement could be accomplished as effectively. VMS allows some fishery\nmanagement regulations to be enforced from a base station staffed by the U.S. Coast Guard\nor the NMFS Office for Law Enforcement. This may reduce the need for at-sea enforcement\nin some cases.\nGear and deployment restrictions proposed for the pelagic longline fishery in the\nAtlantic Offshore Cetacean Take Reduction Plan to reduce bycatch of marine mammals may\nraise safety concerns. For instance, requiring fishermen to haul their gear in the order it was\nset may force many vessels to operate on the margin of fuel consumption or carry more fuel\nin order to maintain the length of the trip despite extra travel time to the beginning of the\nmainline for hauling. The reverse haulback alternative is rejected, partly out of concern for\nsafety at sea. Conversely, the educational workshops for all HMS vessel operators could\nserve as platforms to remind vessel operators of their safety requirements and facilitate\ndiscussion about safety concerns. NMFS will work with the national weather service to\nsupport accurate weather forecast for offshore waters. Vessels with VMS may be able to\nwork cooperatively with the National Weather Service to provide information about offshore\nweather conditions.\n3.10 Ongoing Management\n3.10.1 An Introduction to FMP Amendments and Frameworks\nThe activities involved in continuing fishery management include monitoring,\nevaluation, adjustment, and revision. There are two primary methods that can be used to\nchange management measures included in an FMP: FMP amendment and framework\nregulatory adjustment. As described in Chapter 1, NMFS will follow the HMS process for\nall FMP amendments. FMP amendments are performed when the proposed action is\nsignificant (i.e., will have a significant impact on the environment or would change the\nfundamental approach to management). The eight phases of the HMS administrative\nprocess are as follows:\nPhase 1 -- Planning and Scoping.\nPhase 2 -- Preparation of Draft Documents; Consultations and Meetings.\nPhase 3 -- Initial Public Review and Comment Period; NEPA Public Review and\nComment Period; ANPR Public Review and Comment Period, if necessary; and Public\nHearings.\nChapter 3 - Ongoing Management - 311","Phase 4 -- Preparation of Revised Documents and Proposed Regulations; Consultations\nand Meetings.\nPhase 5 -- Final Public Review and Comment Period; Proposed Regulations Published\nfor Public Review and Comment.\nPhase 6 -- Preparation of Final Documents and Final Regulations.\nPhase 7 - Approval and implementation.\nPhase 8 - Continuing and contingency fishery management.\nUnlike FMP amendments, the framework regulatory adjustment procedure provides for\ntimely changes to the regulations that implement FMP management measures in response to\nnew information about the fishery. Framework adjustment lends flexibility and efficiency to\nthe regulatory process by allowing NMFS to make time-critical changes in the regulations,\nsuch as inseason adjustments, without the lengthy and cumbersome process of amending the\nFMP. Framework adjustment is not intended to circumvent the FMP amendment process\nthat must take place when circumstances in the fishery change substantially or when a\ndifferent management philosophy or objectives are adopted, triggering significant changes\nin the management system. Rather, framework adjustment is intended to make it possible to\nmanage fisheries and meet the objectives of the FMP more responsively under conditions\nrequiring timely management actions. As with an FMP amendment, framework adjustments\nmust go through extensive public and analytical review, including development and review\nby the APs. This includes a proposed rule, a public comment period, at least one public\nhearing, and a final rule. AP meetings will be held for a rulemaking if the agency deems it\nnecessary for purposes of consultations or AP review.\n3.10.2 Stock Assessment and Fishery Evaluation Report\nNS 2 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act requires that NMFS take into account the best\nscientific information available in developing FMPs and implementing regulations. For\nHMS, except sharks, NMFS relies on SCRS analyses. For sharks, NMFS directs the shark\nevaluation workshop process. The guidelines for implementation of NS 2 require\npreparation of an annual Stock Assessment and Fishery Evaluation (SAFE) report. The\nSAFE report will largely rely on SCRS assessments, the shark evaluation workshop\nassessments, and any new fishery information. These guidelines for a SAFE report are\nbelow.\n(e) (1) The SAFE report is a document or set of documents that provides [the Secretary]\nwith a summary of information concerning the most recent biological condition of stocks\nand the marine ecosystems in the [management unit] and the social and economic condition\nof the recreational and commercial fishing interests, fishing communities, and the fish\nprocessing industries. It summarizes, on a periodic basis, the best available scientific\ninformation concerning the past, present, and possible future condition of the stocks, marine\necosystems, and fisheries being managed under Federal regulation.\nChapter 3 - Ongoing Management - 312","(i) The Secretary has the responsibility to assure that a SAFE report or similar\ndocument is prepared, reviewed annually, and changed as necessary for each FMP. The\nSecretary or Councils may utilize any combination of talent from Council, state, Federal,\nuniversity, or other sources to acquire and analyze data and produce the SAFE report.\n(ii) The SAFE report provides information to the [Office for Sustainable Fisheries] for\ndetermining annual harvest levels from each stock, documenting significant trends or\nchanges in the resource, marine ecosystems, and fishery over time, and assessing the relative\nsuccess of existing state and Federal fishery management programs. Information on bycatch\nand safety for each fishery should also be summarized. In addition, the SAFE report may be\nused to update or expand previous environmental and regulatory impact documents, and\necosystem and habitat descriptions.\n(iii) Each SAFE report must be scientifically based, and cite data sources and\ninterpretations.\n(2) Each SAFE report should contain information on which to base harvest\nspecifications.\n(3) Each SAFE report should contain a description of the maximum fishing mortality\nthreshold and the minimum stock size threshold for each stock or stock complex, along with\ninformation by which the [Secretary] may determine:\n(i) Whether overfishing is occurring with respect to any stock or stock complex,\nwhether any stock or stock complex is overfished, whether the rate or level of fishing\nmortality applied to any stock or stock complex is approaching the maximum fishing\nmortality threshold, and whether the size of any stock or stock complex is approaching the\nminimum stock size threshold.\n(ii) Any management measures necessary to provide for rebuilding an overfished stock\nor stock complex (if any) to a level consistent with producing the maximum sustainable\nyield in such fishery.\n(4) Each SAFE report may contain additional economic, social, community, essential\nfish habitat, and ecological information pertinent to the success of management or the\nachievement of objectives of each FMP.\nEach year in January or February, NMFS will publish one SAFE report for the species\nin this FMP and for billfish. The SAFE report will follow the guidelines specified in NS 2\nand will be used by NMFS to develop and evaluate regulatory adjustments under the\nframework procedure or the FMP amendment process. This information will provide the\nbasis for determining annual harvest levels from each stock, documenting significant trends\nor changes in the resource, the bycatch, and the fishery over time, and assessing the relative\nsuccess of existing state and Federal fishery management programs. In addition, the SAFE\nreport will be used to update or expand previous environmental and regulatory impact\ndocuments, and ecosystem and habitat descriptions, including EFH.\nChapter 3 - Ongoing Management - 313","3.10.3 Advisory Panel and Continuing Fishery Management\nThe Assistant Administrator is responsible for implementing, monitoring, and\namending the HMS FMP and its implementing regulations. As required by section\n302(g)(4) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, NMFS established an HMS AP to assist in the\ncollection and evaluation of information relevant to the development of the HMS FMP and\nany subsequent amendments. Decisions and recommendations of the AP are advisory in\nnature. Following publication of the annual SAFE report, NMFS will convene the AP to\nevaluate management measures relative to the objectives of the FMP. NMFS may also\nconvene meetings of the AP at other appropriate times throughout the year. If NMFS, with\nthe assistance of the AP, concludes that the FMP must be amended to achieve the objectives\nof the FMP, NMFS will follow the HMS process for amending an FMP. Alternatively,\nNMFS may determine that it is not necessary to amend the FMP but that a regulatory\namendment is appropriate under framework provisions of the FMP to achieve the objectives\nof the FMP.\n3.10.4 Procedure for Adjusting the Management Measures\nBased on the annual SAFE report, deliberations of the AP, and other relevant factors,\nNMFS will determine whether any adjustments to the regulations are necessary to\nimplement the FMP's management measures and to achieve the management objectives and\nrebuilding programs stated in this FMP. Adjustments made through the framework to meet\nthe objectives of the FMP may include changes in:\nactions to implement ICCAT recommendations, as appropriate;\ndomestic quotas;\nAtlantic tunas Purse Seine category cap on bluefin tuna quota;\ncommercial retention limits;\nrecreational retention limits;\nmaximum sustainable yield or optimum yield levels based on the latest stock\nassessment or updates in the SAFE report;\nspecies size limits;\npermitting and reporting requirements;\ncomposition of the species groups;\nfishing year or season;\ntime/area restrictions;\ntarget catch requirements;\ngear prohibitions, modifications, or use restrictions;\neffort restrictions; and\nessential fish habitat.\nChapter 3 - Ongoing Management - 314","Optimum yield for many of the species in the management unit will change\nsubstantially as the stocks are rebuilt to the level necessary to provide the maximum\nsustainable yield. The resultant fishing mortality rate will therefore need adjusting as stocks\nrespond to changes both in the expected manners and in ways unpredictable at this time.\nThe benefits of and the costs of regulatory actions necessary to establish these fishing\nmortality rate adjustments can be managed better by maximizing the timeliness of their\nimplementation. However, it is imperative that members of the public have sufficient\nopportunity to comment on proposed management measures. The benefits of timeliness do\nnot exceed the costs of inadequate public participation. These expectations and constraints\nwere considered in developing the above list. The extent to which the regulations can be\nchanged through the framework is limited by the consistency each future regulation would\nhave with the FMP's goals and objectives. For example, any shark species that might be\nconsidered for inclusion in the FMP's prohibited category could be added only by amending\nthe FMP. But a change in recreational retention limits could be implemented through the\nframework process because the FMP uses retention limits to affect fishing mortality without\nspecifying the exact recreational retention limit to be applied to the each species in the FMP.\nThe goal is to implement regulatory changes by the start of the new fishing year or as\nsoon after a new stock assessment or updated SAFE report as possible. If NMFS determines\nthat adjusting the management measures is necessary to achieve the objectives of the FMP\nand its rebuilding programs, it will prepare a regulatory package including a discussion of\nthe need for action; the proposed adjustments to the management measures; analyses as\nrequired by applicable law of the social, economic, environmental, and ecological impacts of\nthe proposed measures; and the proposed rule. The comment period on the proposed rule\nwill generally be 45 days, but may be extended or reduced as appropriate. NMFS will hold\nat least one public hearing and an AP meeting, if necessary, on each proposed rule.\nAfter reviewing public comments and additional information or data that may be\navailable, NMFS will, if appropriate, make final determinations regarding consistency of the\nproposed conservation and management measures with the objectives of the FMP, the\nNational Standards, and other applicable law. Within 30 days of the close of the public\ncomment period on the proposed rule, NMFS will publish a final rule in the Federal Register.\nIf circumstances warrant during the year (e.g., changes in regulations in related\nfisheries), NMFS may take regulatory action independent of the SAFE report. NMFS will\nsubsequently follow the procedures outlined above.\nIn order to improve the information upon which EFH delineations are based, NMFS\nmay change or update the EFH provisions through a framework process analogous to the\nregulatory framework. The modified process is required because the EFH provisions have\nno accompanying regulations that can be modified under the standard framework procedure.\nUnder the analogous process, NMFS will publish a notice of the proposed changes in the\nFederal Register a notice of the changes to the EFH as approved. Components of the EFH\nprovisions that may be changed under this framework procedure include life history\nChapter 3 - Ongoing Management - 315","information of managed species, identification of threats to EFH and appropriate\nconservation measures, assessment of fishing impacts on EFH, identification of EFH habitat\nareas of particular concern, and any other subjects that contain no regulatory action.\n3.10.5 Shark Operations Team\nThe original Shark FMP established an Operations Team (OT) to advise NMFS and\nmonitor the shark fishery, evaluate the effectiveness of the FMP, and recommend necessary\nadjustments to management measures. The OT included representatives from the NMFS\nNortheast and Southeast Regional Offices and the Washington Office, staff and/or members\nfrom each of the five Councils, and scientists from the NMFS Northeast and Southeast\nFisheries Science Centers. NMFS typically convened the OT once a year.\nFinal Action:\nDissolve OT as superceded by HMS AP\nThis action dissolves the OT because the HMS AP serves an essentially similar\nadvisory role on Atlantic shark management.\nEcological Impacts\nThis action has no direct ecological impacts, although shark stocks may benefit from\nthe AP and NMFS addressing HMS fisheries in a multi-species context, particularly\nconcerning bycatch issues.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis action may decrease confidence in the management process through the loss of the\nOT forum for scientific debate specifically for sharks. However, the stock evaluation\nworkshops have generally been open to the public. This action is not expected to have\neconomic impacts.\nThis action reduces the administrative cost of managing the shark fishery by\nconsolidating the development and review of management measures into the HMS AP\nprocess.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because the HMS AP serves an essentially similar role to that\nprovided by the OT and because of the reduced administrative cost.\nChapter 3 - Ongoing Management - 316","Rejected Options for the Shark Operations Team\nRejected Option:\nStatus quo\nThis alternative would maintain the OT as separate group from the HMS AP to advise\nNMFS on Atlantic shark management.\nEcological Impacts\nThis alternative would have no direct ecological impacts.\nSocial and Economic Impacts\nThis alternative may provide NMFS with additional feedback and insight by providing\nadditional scientific debate in the shark management process. This alternative is not\nexpected to have economic impacts.\nThis alternative would increase the administrative costs of managing the shark fisheries\nby requiring meetings, planning time, and constituent time beyond that required for the\nHMS AP.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because of the administrative costs of maintaining two\nadvisory bodies that serve essentially similar roles and the need to manage HMS fisheries in\na comprehensive, multi-species way.\nChapter 3 - Ongoing Management - 317","References Cited in Chapter 3\nAlverson, D.L., M.H. Freeberg, S.A. Murawski, and J.G. Pope. (1994). A global assessment of fisheries bycatch\nand discards, Food and Agriculture Organization Fisheries Technical Paper No. 339, Rome, Italy, FAO,\n233 pp.\nAOCTRT. 1996. Atlantic Offshore Cetacean Take Reduction Plan. Final Draft submitted to NMFS, November 22,\n1996. 64 pp.\nBabcock, E.A., and E.K. Pikitch. 1998. The Effect of Bag Limits on Shark Mortality in the U.S. Atlantic\nRecreational Fishery. 1998 SEW Document SB-IV-25.\nBelle, S. (1997). Mortalities and healing processes associated with hook and line caught juvenile bluefin tuna and\ntwo different handling methods; control (untagged) and dart tagging, New England Aquarium Bluefin Tuna\nProject, Final report NOAA Award No. NA27FL0199-01.\nBerkeley, S.A. and R.E. Edwards. Personal communication. Presentation at July 1998 AP Bycatch meeting,\nAlexandria, VA.\nBerkeley, S. A. and R.E Edwards. 1997. Factors Affecting Billfish Capture and Survival in Longline Fisheries:\nPotential Application for Reducing Bycatch Mortality, SCRS/97/63.\nBranstetter, S. and G. Burgess. 1998a. Gulf and South Atlantic Fisheries Development Foundation and University\nof Florida. Commercial Shark Fishery Observer Program 1996. 1998 SEW Document SB-IV-1.\nBranstetter, S. and G. Burgess. 1998b. Gulf and South Atlantic Fisheries Development Foundation and University\nof Florida. Commercial Shark Fishery Observer Program 1997-1998. 1998 SEW Document SB-IV-2.\nBrewster-Geisz, K.K., and T.J. Miller. 1998. Management of the Sandbar Shark (Carcharhinus plumbeus):\nImplications of a Stage-Based Model. 1998 SEW Document SB-IV-4.\nBrown, C.A. and S. H. Gruber. 1988. Age Assessment of the Lemon Shark, Negaprion brevirostris, Using\nTetracycline Validated Vertebral Centra. Copeia 1988: 747-753.\nCasey, J. G., H.L. Pratt, C.E. Stillwell. 1985. Age and Growth of the Sandbar Shark, Carcharhinus plumbeus, from\nthe Western North Atlantic. Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 42:963-975.\nCastro, J. .I. and C.M. Woodley. 1997. Status of Shark Species. Document submitted in support of FAO\nconsultation on shark conservation and management.\nCortes, E. and G. Scott. 1998. Rates of Increase Per Generation for Large Coastal Species of Sharks from the U.S.\nAtlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. 1998 SEW Document SB-IV-10.\nCramer, J. and H.M. Adams. 1998a. Pelagic longline bycatch, Sustainable Fisheries Division Contribution SFD-\n97/98-06. 29 pp.\nChapter 3 - References - 318","Cramer, J., and H. Adams. 1998b. Large Pelagic Logbook Newsletter - 1996, NOAA Tech. Memo. NMFS-SEFSC-\n407. 61 pp.\nCramer, J. and G.P. Scott. 1998. Summarization of Catch and Effort in the Pelagic Longline Fishery and Analysis\nof the Effect of Two Degree Square Closures on Swordfish Landings and Discards, Sustainable Fisheries\nDivision Contribution MIA-97/98-17.\nCramer, J., A.R. Bertolino, and G.P. Scott. 1997. Estimates of recent shark bycatch by U.S. vessels fishing for\nAtlantic tuna and tuna-like species. SCRS/97/58.\nCramer, J. 1996. Species Report Caught in the U.S. Commercial Pelagic Longline, Gillnet, and Pair Trawl Fisheries\nFrom 1987 to 1995, Miami Lab. Contribution MIA-95/96-38. 91 pp.\nDitton, R. B., B.L. Bohnsack, and J.R. Stoll. 1998. A Social and Economic Study of the Winter Recreational\nAtlantic Bluefin Tuna Fishery in Hatteras, North Carolina. 82 pp.\nErhardt, N.M., R. Robbins, and F. Arocha. 1996. Age validation and growth of swordfish, Xiphias gladius, in the\nNorthwestern Atlantic. ICCAT, Coll. Vol. Sci. Pap., 45 (2).\nFAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). 1995. Code of conduct for responsible fisheries. Food and Agriculture\nOrganization of the United Nations, Rome. 41 pp.\nFisher, M.R. and R.B. Ditton. 1992. Characteristics of Billfish Anglers in the U.S. Atlantic Ocean. Marine Fisheries\nReview 54(1):1-6.\nGoodyear, C.P. 1998a. Effects of the HMS proposed time-area closure for swordfish on swordfish and billfish\ncatches, submitted as a public comment to the proposed rule by The Billfish Foundation, 2/22/99.\nGoodyear, C.P. 1998b. Analysis of the possible utility of time/area closures to minimize billfish bycatch by U.S.\npelagic longlines. Report to the Billfish Foundation. 12pp.\nHoey, J.J. 1998. NEFSC pelagic longline data review and analysis of gear, environmental, and operating Practices\nthat Influence pelagic longline Interactions with Sea Turtles, Final Contract report NOAA Contract -\n50EANA700063, 32 pp.\nJohnson, D.P., C.A. Brown, C. Yeung. 1999. Estimates of marine mammal and marine turtle bycatch by the U.S.\nAtlantic pelagic longline fleet in 1992-1997, Contribution #PRD-98/99-03.\nMace, P.M. 1997a. The Status of ICCAT Species Relative to Optimum Yield and Overfishing Criteria Recently\nproposed in the United States, also with Consideration of the Precautionary Approach. SCRS/97/74. 22 pp.\nMace, P.M. 1997b. Bycatch of Billfish in the Pelagic Longline Fishery, preliminary analyses. NMFS-SEFSC.\nMiami, FL.\nNMFS. 1999a. Amendment One to the Atlantic Billfish Fishery Management Plan.\nChapter 3 - References - 319","NMFS. 1999b. Final List of Fisheries for 1999; Update of regulations authorizing commercial fisheries under the\nMMPA, 64FR9067, February 24, 1999.\nNMFS. 1998a. 1998 Report of the Shark Evaluation Workshop. 109 pp.\nNMFS. 1998b. National Report of the United States: 1998, ICCAT Working Document, SCRS/98/117 revised.\n29 pp.\nNMFS. 1998c. Managing the Nation's Bycatch: Programs, Activities, and Recommendations for the National\nMarine Fisheries Service. NOAA. Washington, DC. June 1998. 174 pp.\nNMFS. 1997c. Administrative Procedures Applicable to the Management of Highly Migratory Species,\nSeptember 18, 1997. 62 FR 48990.\nNMFS. 1996. 1996 Report of the Shark Evaluation Workshop. 1998 SEW Document SB-IV-31. 80 pp.\nNRC. 1991. Fishing Vessel Safety: Blueprint for a National Program. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.\nRestrepo, V.R., G.G. Thompson, P.M. Mace, W.L. Gabriel, L.L. Low, A.D. MacCall, R.D. Methot, J.E. Powers,\nB.L. Taylor, P.R. Wade, J.F. Witzig. 1998. Technical guidance on the use of precautionary approaches to\nimplementing National Standard 1 of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.\nNOAA Tech. Memo. NMFS-F/SPO, 54 pp.\nRosenberg, A., P. Mace, G. Thompson, G. Darcy, W. Clark, J. Collie, W. Gabriel, A. McCall, R. Methot, J.\nPowers, V. Restrepo, T. Wainwright, L. Botsford, J. Hoenig, K. Stokes. 1994. Scientific review of definitions\nof overfishing in U.S. fishery management plans, NOAA Tech. Memo. NMFS -F/SPO-17. August 1994.\n205 pp.\nScott, G., J. Bennett, B. Slater, and P. Phares. 1998. Recent Recreational and Commercial Catches of Sharks Along\nthe U.S. East and Gulf of Mexico Coasts. 1998 SEW Document SB-IV-12.\nScott, G. P., P. J. Phares, and B. Slater. 1996. Recreational Catch, Average Size and Effort Information for Sharks\nin U.S. Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico Waters. 1996 SEW Document SB-III-5.\nSCRS. 1998a. 1998 SWO Detailed Report, Draft 2. 9 pp.\nSCRS. 1998b. Report of the ICCAT SCRS Bluefin Tuna Stock Assessment Session, September 14-23, 1998,\nGenoa, Italy, SCRS/98/22.\nSCRS. 1996a. Swordfish Detailed Report of the Swordfish Stock Assessment Session, October 2-9, 1996, Halifax,\nNova Scotia, Canada, SCRS/96/30.\nSkomal, G. and B. Chase (1996). Preliminary results on the physiological effects of catch and release on bluefin\ntuna (Thunnus thynnus) caught off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, ICCAT SCRS/96/126, 13 pp.\nSminkey, T. R. and J. A. Musick. 1995. Age and Growth of the Sandbar Shark, Carcharhinus plumbeus, Before\nand After Population Depletion. Copeia 1995(4): 871-883.\nChapter 3 - References - 320","Trent, L., D.E. Parshley, and J.K. Carlson. 1997. Catch and Bycatch in the Shark Drift Gillnet Fishery off Georgia\nand East Florida. Marine Fisheries Review 59(1): 19-28.\nUSCG. 1996. 1996 Commercial Fishing Vessel Deaths and Losses, updated through 12/31/96.\nUSCG. 1997. 1997 Commercial Fishing Industry Casualty Data, , updated through 12/31/97.\nWilson, D., B.J. McCay, D. Estler, M. Perex-Lugo, J. LaMarque, S. Seminski, A. Tomczuk. 1998. Social and\nCultural Impact Assessment of the Highly Migratory Species Fishery Management Plan and the Amendment\nto the Atlantic Billfish Fisheries Management Plan, NOAA-NMFS-HMS Contract, 178 pp.\nChapter 3 - References - 321","Chapter 4\nLimited Access\n4.1\nBackground\n2\n4.2\nPurpose and Need for Action\n2\n4.3\nLimitations on Access\n6\n4.4\nLimitations on Number of Permitted Vessels\n7\n4.5\nInitial Permit Issuance\n8\n4.5.1\nPermit Eligibility Period - Historic\n10\n4.5.2\nLandings Eligibility Period\n12\n4.5.3\nPermit Eligibility Period - Recent\n14\n4.5.4\nDirected Landings Thresholds\n16\n4.5.5\nIncidental Landings Threshold\n21\n4.5.6\nSwordfish Handgear\n23\n4.5.7\nBAYS Tuna Fishery\n26\n4.5.8 Appeals\n28\n4.5.8.1 Process\n29\n4.5.8.2 Hardship\n31\n4.5.9\nExemptions\n32\n4.6\nHarvest Limits\n33\n4.6.1\nLimits for Swordfish Directed Permit Holders During Directed Fishery Closures\n33\n4.6.2\nLimits for Incidental Limited Access Permit Holders\n34\n4.7\nTransferability of Permits\n36\n4.7.1\nTransferability Restrictions\n36\n4.7.2\nUpgrading Restrictions\n38\n4.7.3\nOwnership Restrictions\n39\n4.8\nEnvironmental Consequences\n40\n4.8.1\nNumber of Permit Categories\n41\n4.8.2\nLimits the Number of Vessels Permitted\n41\n4.8.3\nEligibility to Participate in the Directed and Incidental Fisheries\n41\n4.8.4\nAppeals Process\n42\n4.8.5\nTransferability Restrictions\n42\n4.8.6\nUpgrading Restrictions\n42\n4.8.7\nOwnership Restrictions\n42\n4.8.8\nHarvest Limits\n42\n4.8.9\nImpacts on Marine Mammal and Endangered Species\n43\n4.8.10\nMitigating Measures\n43\n4.8.11\nUnavoidable Adverse Impacts\n43\n4.8.12 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources\n44\nChapter 4 - Table of Cc","4.1 Background\nOn July 28, 1995 (60 FR 38785), NMFS published an Advanced Notice of Proposed\nRulemaking (ANPR) of its intent to implement a limited access program for the commercial\nAtlantic swordfish and Atlantic shark fisheries. An Issues and Options Paper (July 1995) was\ndeveloped and NMFS convened workshops (December 1995) to gain public input on the design\nand objectives of such a system.\nOn December 27, 1996 (61 FR 68202), NMFS published a proposed rule to implement\nlimited access in the Atlantic shark fishery. On February 26, 1997 (62 FR 8672), NMFS both\npublished the proposed rule to implement limited access in the Atlantic swordfish fishery and,\ndue to public requests to consider the two proposals simultaneously, extended the comment\nperiod on the proposed rule for Atlantic sharks to coincide with that for Atlantic swordfish. The\ncomment period for both proposed rules ended April 28, 1997. Twenty-three public hearings\nwere conducted from Maine to Texas, including the Caribbean.\nAs stated in these proposed rules, the goal of limited access in the Atlantic swordfish and\nshark fisheries is to begin to rationalize current harvesting capacity with the available quota, and\nreduce latent effort without significantly affecting the livelihoods of those who are substantially\ndependent on the fisheries (in other words, to prevent further overcapitalization). This limited\naccess system does not directly reduce fishing mortality in these fisheries but does complement\nother measures in this FMP.\nSince the publication of these proposed rules, a number of concerns were raised by the\npublic and the HMS Advisory Panel (AP) regarding the implementation of limited access in the\nAtlantic swordfish and shark fisheries. These concerns included the length of time since the\nclose of the comment period and the formation of the HMS AP. NMFS had additional concerns\nincluding the magnitude of changes from the proposed rule being considered, the magnitude of\nchanges in the swordfish and shark fisheries, and concern over the classification (significance or\nnon-significance under the Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 12866) if dates and\ntime periods were not updated. For these reasons, NMFS decided to re-propose limited access in\nthe Atlantic swordfish and shark fisheries in the draft HMS FMP (63 FR 57093). Based on the\ncomments received during the comment period on the draft HMS FMP and its proposed rule\n(64 FR 3154), NMFS has decided to implement limited access in the Atlantic swordfish and\nshark fisheries and place a permit restriction on vessels fishing for bigeye, albacore, yellowfin,\nand skipjack (BAYS) tuna in the longline category.\n4.2 Purpose and Need for Action\nExcess Number of Commercial Vessels\nAny reductions in quotas will exacerbate an existing problem that is already severe in both\nthe commercial Atlantic swordfish and shark fisheries: a mismatch of harvest capacity and\nresource productivity. In the Atlantic swordfish commercial fishery, approximately 300 vessels\nland at least one swordfish each year. While the individual vessels participating in the swordfish\nChapter 4 - Background 2","fishery may change from year to year, this active fleet size has remained relatively constant since\n1987. However, the number of permitted vessels increased from between 600 and 800 in the\nearly 1990s to just under 1,200 in 1995. Since then, the number of permits issued has declined\nslightly to approximately 1,000 in 1997. This slight decrease in permit holders may be due to the\nexiting of some larger vessels. However, the number of permitted vessels is still far in excess of\nthe number of vessels actually active in the fleet. The Atlantic commercial shark fishery has a\nsimilar problem. In 1996, there were approximately 2,257 shark permit holders; however,\nmandatory logbook data indicate that only about 565 vessels reported landing at least one large\ncoastal shark. Additional permit holders reported landing pelagic or small coastal sharks.\nThese percentages of active and inactive shark permit holders were approximately the same in\n1995 with only 25 percent of permit holders landing a large coastal shark. However, only 352 of\nthe active permit holders in 1995 were also active in 1996, indicating considerable ingress and\negress in this fishery.\nThis large reserve of inactive permits, or latent effort, in both fisheries represents a\nsubstantial potential for increased harvesting capacity that could intensify the derby fishing\nconditions that already exist. As progressively more Atlantic, Gulf, and Caribbean federal\nfisheries come under limited access provisions or more restrictive regulations, there will be\nprogressively more pressure put on those fisheries that remain open access. There is already\nevidence that vessels are spilling over from other fisheries and that many fishermen are\nattempting to enhance their future security by developing a catch history in alternative fisheries.\nThere are many problems associated with open access fisheries. The greater the number of\nfishing vessels participating, the more likely it is that individual fishing enterprises will become\nunprofitable or marginal. This need to produce a profit can lead to greater pressure to catch fish\nfaster. The resulting \"race for the fish\" or derby fishery produces market gluts, poor product\nquality, safety concerns, and may exacerbate bycatch problems. Shortened fishing seasons also\nmean that fresh fish may not be available to processors and consumers for prolonged periods or\nU.S. swordfish fishermen may lose their year-round market niche. Also, minimizing the derby\nfishery should allow the fishery as a whole to become more economically-viable.\nRationale for Limited Access\nLimited access is an important first step towards rationalization of fisheries. A permit\nlimitation program restricts access to a fishery by limiting the number of vessels allowed to\nharvest the resource. Assuming sufficient restrictions on the ability to gain a license and a\nprovision to make the licenses transferable, rent generated by the fishery resource is reflected in\nthe value of the license. If the initial licenses are provided to the fishermen at no cost, they may\nreceive a benefit when they exit the fishery by selling their license to the new entrants (refer to\nAppendix A to the Amendment 8 to the Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan, Gulf of Mexico\nFishery Management Council, Tampa, FL). The license becomes a barrier to entry, and only the\nmost efficient new entrants will be able to purchase a license and survive in the fishery. If the\ngroup of licensed fishermen is sufficiently small and communication costs are minimal, then the\nfishermen may cooperate to conserve the resource and increase their collective incomes (Muse,\n1991). Fishermen can be expected to have more difficulty communicating if they are\nChapter 4 - Purpose and Need for Action - 3","geographically spread out or if they have conflicting cultural differences. In such cases, they will\nstill tend to behave as if the fishery is an open access resource even if there are a reduced number\nof fishermen. Once limited access is fully implemented, NMFS will consider a buyback program\nto further match the fishing capacity to the available quota, and to reduce fishing effort.\nLimited access is expected to have several benefits associated with an economically-viable\nfishing fleet. Some positive benefits of limited access may include, but are not limited to, the\nfollowing:\nfishermen who make fewer risk-prone decisions, such as decisions to fish in adverse\n1.\nweather or to overload fishing vessels (NS 10);\na better defined universe of permit holders for education workshops, outreach\n2.\nprograms, and potentially increased communication between fishermen and managers\n(NS 2);\n3. fishermen who take more care deploying and retrieving gear and releasing bycatch, thus\nresulting in higher product quality, reduced bycatch and bycatch mortality, and less lost\ngear that may continue to \"ghost fish\" (NS 9);\nfishermen who spend more time seeking out fishing grounds with lower bycatch rates\n4.\nand/or less overcrowding (NS 9, 10);\nfishermen who have less incentive to circumvent regulations;\n5.\n6. better record keeping and higher accuracy of reporting (NS 2);\n7.\nincreased efficiency of enforcement; and\npreservation of the historically small owner/operator nature of these fisheries and their\n8.\nassociated communities (NS 8).\nAdditionally, to the extent that open access in the swordfish and shark fisheries contributes\nto derby fishing conditions, fishermen may fish in inshore areas in order to minimize transit time\nfrom fishing grounds to offloading sites. Fishing in inshore areas where immature swordfish and\nsharks predominate can have several negative ecological ramifications including higher catches\nof immature fish and associated higher effective fishing mortality rates, increased bycatch rates\nof undersized fish if a minimum size is implemented, and higher fishing effort (with increases in\nbycatch of immature fish) because more small fish than large fish must be caught to reach the\nsame weight-based commercial retention limit or quota. To the extent that this limited access\nsystem decreases derby fishing conditions, catches of immature fish may also decrease as\nfishermen fish further offshore where larger fish predominate.\nHistorically, management measures have treated both the commercial Atlantic swordfish\nand shark fisheries as common property resources and have been primarily directed at controlling\nthe amount of harvest rather than correcting the common property externality. This management\nphilosophy has led to increasingly complex and invasive management regulations designed to\nChapter 4 - Purpose and Need for Action - 4","correct symptoms resulting from the common property externality. If this market externality is\nleft uncorrected, this regulatory pattern can be expected to continue in both fisheries.\nAs overfished fisheries are subject to stricter management measures designed to promote\nrebuilding, fishing effort in open access fisheries is likely to intensify. There is evidence that\nvessels from other depleted fisheries have entered the Atlantic swordfish and shark fisheries;\nvessel owners may be attempting to enhance their future security by developing a catch history in\nalternative fisheries. One indication that these problems are becoming more severe is that prior\nto 1995, the U.S. swordfish longline fleet had not caught its quota; with the recent trend of\ndecreasing quotas, seasonal closures have occurred. Preventing further expansion of the fleet\nsize will help to prevent the fishing season from becoming even shorter in the future.\nGiven the Magnuson-Stevens Act mandate to rebuild overfished fisheries, limited access is\nan important first step toward a comprehensive rebuilding program for Atlantic swordfish and\nsharks. NMFS believes that the problems of overfishing and overcapitalization in these fisheries\nmust be addressed jointly to enable an economically-viable fishery to harvest a sustainable\nresource. Limited access, as described in this FMP, will not impact the \"capability of fishing\nvessels used in the fishery to engage in other fisheries\" (16 U.S.C. 1583 § 303(b)(6)(D)). This\nlimited access system does not restrict or limit vessel owners who currently hold permits in the\nAtlantic swordfish or shark fisheries from participating in other fisheries. Instead, this system\nrestricts vessels without historical landings from entering and participating in the Atlantic shark\nand swordfish fisheries. Sections 4.7.1 and 4.7.2 discuss the restrictions on transferability and\nupgrading of vessels with limited access permits. Both sets of restrictions were designed to be\nconsistent with similar restrictions proposed in other fisheries with the flexibility to change as the\nneeds of the fishermen change. The physical configuration of vessels currently participating in\nthese fisheries is such that the vessels can and do participate in other fisheries (such as reef fish,\nsnapper-grouper, dolphin) without requiring any vessel modifications. As such, NMFS does not\nbelieve limited access will inhibit fishermen from engaging in other fisheries.\nNMFS is aware that some of the actions implemented in this limited access system may\nimpact fishing communities. NMFS considered ways to minimize any impacts and to ensure\ncontinued participation of these communities in making the final decision. A full description of\nany impacts can be found in Chapter 9.\nIndividual Transferable Quotas (ITQs)\nCurrently, there is a moratorium on the formation and implementation of any new limited\naccess program based on individual transferable quotas (ITQs) until October 1, 2000. As\nrequired under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has\nconducted a study on the effectiveness of ITQs in addressing the problems of excess fishing\neffort and capacity. Their report was released in late 1998. This report can be found on the web\nat http://www.nap.edu/bookstore/isbn/0309063302.htm\nChapter 4 - Purpose and Need for Action - 5","The Magnuson-Stevens Act requires that any ITQ system approved on or after\nOctober 2000, should consider the findings of the NAS report and ensure that any program:\nestablishes procedures and requirements for the review and revision of the terms of any\n1.\nprogram;\n2. if appropriate, establishes procedures and requirements to renew, reallocate, or\nreissue ITQs;\nprovides for effective enforcement and management of the program including adequate\n3.\nobserver coverage;\n4. provides for a fair and equitable initial allocation of ITQs;\nprevents any person from acquiring an excessive share of the ITQs; and\n5.\nconsiders the allocation of a portion of the annual harvest in the fishery for entry-level\n6.\nfishermen, small vessel owners, and crew members who do not hold or qualify for an ITQ.\nITQs are a potential long-term management tool which can provide many of the benefits of a\nlimited access system while also increasing the value of the fishery. Under this type of system,\nonce a TAC or total landings quota is set for the fishery, each fisherman who holds an ITQ\nwould know their own individual quota and could plan their business accordingly. After\nOctober 1, 2000, NMFS may consider the option of an ITQ system for all HMS fisheries, based\non the limited access system established here, the final findings report of the NAS, and any other\nrelevant information and law.\n4.3 Limitations on Access\nPreviously, there have been no limits on the number of permits issued to commercial vessel\nowners for Atlantic swordfish or shark fishing. Anyone who owns a registered vessel capable of\ncatching Atlantic swordfish or sharks using authorized gear types, and for sharks, meets the\nearned income requirement, may obtain a permit for that vessel. In the shark fishery, if an owner\ndoes not meet the earned income requirement, the owner can still obtain a permit if the vessel\noperator meets the earned income requirement.\nFinal Action: Limit access to the Atlantic swordfish and shark fisheries\nUnder this action, only those fishermen qualify for a limited access permit, or those\nfishermen who buy a limited access permit from a vessel owner who is leaving the fishery, is\nallowed to operate in these fisheries. This action will reduce the overcapitalization problem in\nthese fisheries and will be a first step in rationalizing the available quota to the fishing capacity.\nThus, this action should alleviate some of the problems in the fisheries such as the derby fishery\nand market gluts as described in Section 4.2 above. It should be emphasized that fishermen who\nobtain limited access permits under this action are receiving a privilege, not a right in perpetuity,\nwhich may be withdrawn at some point in the future if necessary to rebuild the stock or for other\nmanagement purposes required by the Magnuson-Stevens Act or other law.\nChapter 4 - Limitations on Access - 6","Conclusion\nThis action is selected because it addresses rebuilding (NS 1) by removing the over-\ncapitalization in the fishery, safety at sea (NS 10) by reducing the derby fishery, and bycatch\nconcerns (NS 9) by giving fishermen an incentive to set and retrieve gear more carefully,\nconsistent with the objectives of limited access and this FMP.\nRejected Options for Limitations on Access\nRejected Option: Status quo\nUnder this alternative, any fisherman with a vessel and authorized gear interested in entering\neither the Atlantic swordfish or shark fisheries would be able to do SO for a fee. Also, fishermen\nwho have been issued a permit in these fisheries but do not consistently land either swordfish or\nsharks could become increasingly active in the fisheries. Given the overfished status of Atlantic\nswordfish and sharks, any increase in the number of participants, or the level of effective fishing\ncapacity would exacerbate problems in the fishery. These problems might be particularly acute if\nmanagement measures in other fisheries become more restrictive. Such restrictions might force\nadditional fishermen to enter, or become active in, the shark or swordfish fisheries. As described\nin Section 4.2 above, open access might shorten the fishing season, increase the derby effect, and\nincrease market gluts.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected due to concerns about rebuilding needs (NS 1), safety at sea\n(NS 10), and bycatch levels (NS 9) as described in Section 4.2 above.\n4.4 Limitations on Number of Permitted Vessels\nFinal Action: Remove latent effort\nThis action will restrict the number of permit holders in the Atlantic swordfish and shark\nfisheries by establishing permit and landings thresholds. This alternative will establish a two-\ntiered system consisting of directed and incidental permits. The two types of permits will allow\nthe directed fisheries to be defined and regulated separately from commercial fisheries that target\nother species, but that take swordfish and/or sharks incidentally. Persons holding directed\nfishing permits are eligible to participate in the directed fisheries, while those holding incidental\npermits have more restrictive management measures and are restricted to incidental fisheries.\nThis action will stop the growth of harvesting capacity in the Atlantic swordfish and shark\nfisheries, limit these fisheries to historic and current participants only thereby reducing latent\neffort, and begin the process of matching the level of fishing capacity to the available quota or\ntotal allowable catch. This action also reduces the incentive to target Atlantic swordfish or\nsharks when fishing for other species. A disadvantage of this system is that it could force\nfishermen in other fisheries who are unable to obtain a limited access permit, either directed or\nincidental, to discard swordfish and sharks that they are unable to avoid catching. This\nChapter 4 - Limitations on Number of Vessels - 7","disadvantage is mitigated to some extent because fishermen who land swordfish and/or sharks\nshould be permitted as described below.\nNote that fishermen holding limited access permits under this action are receiving a\nprivilege, not a right in perpetuity, which may be withdrawn at some point in the future if\nnecessary to rebuild the stock or for other management purposes required by the Magnuson-\nStevens Act or other applicable law.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it will restrict the growth of latent effort and reduce the\novercapitalization which is occurring in these fisheries.\nRejected Options for Limitations on Number of Permitted Vessels\nRejected Option: Cap the number of vessels at current levels\nThis alternative is the same as a permit moratorium. Any fisherman who currently holds an\nAtlantic swordfish or shark permit would receive a limited access permit. Under this alternative,\nthere would be no minimum landings threshold or other historical criteria; all current permit\nholders would qualify. However, many of these permit holders are not economically dependent\non these fisheries. Also, this alternative does not differentiate between those permit holders with\nhistorical participation and those who have no history of participation in the fishery (speculative\npermit holders).\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because, while restricting the growth of latent effort, it would not\nreduce the latent effort in the fisheries. Therefore, this alternative does not address the goal of\nrationalizing the current fishing effort with the current quota.\n4.5 Initial Permit Issuance\nCurrently, NMFS requires that both Atlantic swordfish and shark commercial permits be\nrenewed annually; however, there is no penalty for allowing a permit to lapse. Many permit\nholders have allowed their permits to lapse for varying lengths of time, in part because of the\nseasonal nature of the various fisheries. Harpooners and other handgear operators may have let\ntheir permits lapse due to the reduced availability of large fish. Thus, the permit and landings\neligibility periods need to be flexible.\nNOTE: Although the limited access chapter of this FMP combines the alternatives for\nthe commercial Atlantic swordfish and shark fisheries, these fisheries are separate. A\ntotal of five separate limited access permits are available: directed swordfish, incidental\nswordfish, swordfish handgear, directed sharks, and incidental sharks. To qualify for\nan Atlantic swordfish limited access permit, a fisherman must meet the swordfish\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 8","landings thresholds and permit eligibility time frames. To qualify for an Atlantic shark\nlimited access permit, a fisherman must meet the shark landings thresholds and permit\neligibility time frames. These requirements are outlined below.\nCatch Histories\nCatch histories are assumed to belong to the permit holders rather than to the vessel, i.e., if a\npermit holder sells one vessel and buys another, he/she retains the history of the vessel sold and\ndoes not acquire the history of the vessel purchased unless otherwise stated in a written\nagreement. Thus, persons or entities purchasing existing vessels have not also purchased that\nvessel's catch history (since the fisheries are currently open access, it would be imprudent for\nsomeone to pay money for a catch history from which he/she may never benefit). However, the\nestablishment of control dates for Atlantic swordfish and sharks by NMFS changed this\nassumption as several vessels were purchased after the control date with stipulations in the sales\ncontract that the vessel's catch history was being purchased as well. Therefore, NMFS will\naccept the transfer of a vessel's permit history with a written agreement signed by the buyer and\nthe seller verifying that the former owner transferred/sold the vessel's fishing and permit history.\nIt should be noted, however, that only the buyer of the vessel's fishing and permit history will be\neligible for a directed or incidental swordfish permit based on that vessel. The history will no\nlonger be attributable to the seller.\nNMFS will issue only one limited access permit for a single vessel's catch history. NMFS\nwill consider only vessel histories bought or sold in entirety; vessel histories cannot be split or\nconsolidated. One of the primary objectives of this limited access program is to freeze the\nharvesting capacity of the current fleet as a first step to rationalization of these fisheries, and\nallowing vessel histories to be split or consolidated might result in increases in fleet capacity.\nThe restriction on splitting vessel histories is intended to prevent increases in fleet capacity that\nwould result from multiple vessels qualifying for a limited access permit based on a single\nvessel's catch history. Similarly, landings may not be consolidated among vessels; permit\nholders may not pool landings from several ineligible vessels to meet eligibility requirements.\nThis restriction is intended to prevent increases in fleet capacity that would result from the\npooling of multiple ineligible vessel catch histories to be eligible for a limited access permit.\nOwners vs. Operators\nAs mentioned above, the Atlantic swordfish and shark fisheries are distinct fisheries despite\nthe combination of the limited access actions in this FMP. Accordingly, there are a number of\ndifferences in the specific measures selected as a result of different management histories. The\nissue of owners vs. operators in determining eligibility for limited access permits is one\ndifference resulting from distinct management histories that has implications for the limited\naccess system. In the Atlantic swordfish fishery, vessel permits have been issued solely to vessel\nowners; operators of fishing vessels are not issued vessel permits. The limited access system\nestablished in this FMP will not change this. Only vessel owners are eligible for a swordfish\nlimited access permit.\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 9","In the Atlantic shark fishery, permits have also been issued to vessel owners. However,\nshark regulations stipulated that either the owner or the operator could meet the earned income\nrequirement. If the operator met the earned income requirement and the owner did not, the\nvessel permit was valid only when that operator was operating the vessel (see 50 CFR\n78.4(a)(iii)). The operator could be removed from the permit the following year if the owner\nmet the earned income requirement without the operator. To maintain this historic balance\nbetween vessel owners and operators where the current permit requires the operator's presence,\nNMFS will issue shark limited access permits to vessel owners and require that permits are valid\nonly when the operator listed on the permit is onboard. This operator restriction is only valid\nuntil May 30, 2000. After that time, shark limited access permits renewed under this limited\naccess system will no longer have the operator listed and all limited access permits will be valid\nregardless of whether or not the operator listed on the permit is onboard.\n4.5.1 Permit Eligibility Period - Historic\nFinal Action: To be eligible for a limited access permit in the Atlantic swordfish or\nshark fisheries, vessel owners must have held a valid permit in the\nswordfish fishery (for a swordfish limited access permit) or the shark\nfishery (for a shark limited access permit) at any time between July 1,\n1994, through December 31, 1997\nThis action supports the goal of this limited access system: to freeze current harvesting\ncapacity and reduce latent effort. The beginning date of permit eligibility is July 1, 1994,\nwhich is a full year previous to the ANPR (60 FR 38785, July 28, 1995) and the\nannouncement of the availability of the options paper for limited access for Atlantic\nswordfish and sharks. The ending date of the permit eligibility is December 31, 1997, which\nis approximately a year after limited access was first proposed for the Atlantic swordfish and\nshark fisheries. This action will reduce latent effort without significantly affecting the\nlivelihoods of those who are substantially dependent (see definition below) on the fisheries.\nIn addition, including the permit database through 1997 ensures that fishermen who fish\nfor\nswordfish primarily in the south Atlantic can meet the historic eligibility period requirement.\n(U.S. fishermen who fish in the south Atlantic were not required to have a swordfish permit\nuntil October 1997 (62 FR 55357)).\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it advances the goals of limited access: to freeze\nharvesting capacity and reduce latent effort.\nRejected Options for the Historic Permit Eligibility Period\nRejected Option: To be eligible for a limited access permit in either the Atlantic\nswordfish or shark fisheries, vessel owners must have held a valid\npermit in either the swordfish fishery (for a swordfish limited access\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 10","permit) or the shark fishery (for a shark limited access permit) at any\ntime between July 1, 1994, through June 30, 1995\nThese dates were proposed in the ANPR as well as the associated concept papers. The\nbeginning date of permit eligibility is July 1, 1994, which is a full year previous to the\nANPR (60 FR 38785, July 28, 1995) and the announcement of the availability of the options\npaper for limited access for Atlantic swordfish and sharks. NMFS concludes that this\nalternative is too restrictive because it may exclude recent entrants to the fishery who\nparticipated in the scoping meetings and limited access workshops held in December 1995.\nAlso, this alternative does not match the goal of this limited access program, which is to\nfreeze current harvesting capacity.\nConclusion\nThis option is rejected because it may exclude recent, substantially dependent\nparticipants (see Section 4.5.4, below), inconsistent with the goal of limited access to reduce\nlatent effort only.\nRejected Option: To be eligible for a limited access permit in either the Atlantic\nswordfish or shark fisheries, vessel owners must have held a permit in\neither the swordfish fishery (for a swordfish limited access permit) or\nthe shark fishery (for a shark limited access permit) at any time between\nJuly 1, 1994, through December 31, 1995\nThis alternative defines a valid time period that corresponds to NMFS' development of\nthe limited access proposal. The end date of permit eligibility is December 31, 1995, which\nmarks the end of scoping meetings and workshops held to gain public input on the options\npaper and inform the public of the intention to develop a limited access proposal. At that\ntime, NMFS began developing the previously proposed rules to establish eligibility criteria\nbased on historical and current participation in the fisheries.\nHowever, given the length of time since the end of this eligibility period, NMFS now\nbelieves this time period is outdated and does not correspond to the goal of limited access to\nreduce latent effort only. Both the Atlantic swordfish and shark fisheries are dynamic and a\nnumber of participants enter and leave these fisheries each year. This is especially true with\nthe recent trend of decreasing quotas and shortened seasons. Also, since December 1995, a\nnumber of other changes in regulations in both fisheries have occurred which may have led\nto additional changes in the dynamics of both fisheries.\nConclusion\nThis option is rejected because it may exclude recent, substantially dependent\nparticipants (see Section 4.5.4, below), and because extending the historic eligibility time\nframe better meets the goal of limited access to reduce only latent effort.\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 11","4.5.2 Landings Eligibility Period\nFinal Action: To be eligible for a limited access permit in the Atlantic swordfish or\nshark fisheries, vessel owners must have reported landings in either\nthe swordfish fishery (for a swordfish limited access permit) or the\nshark fishery (for a shark limited access permit) at any time between\nJanuary 1, 1987, to December 31, 1997, (for swordfish) or January 1,\n1991, to December 31, 1997 (for shark)\nThe beginning dates of these time periods were chosen because: 1) 1987 was the first\nfull year of mandatory logbook reporting for swordfish, thus providing the earliest verifiable\nlandings data for all swordfish participants; 2) 1991 is three years before the shark control\ndate and before mandatory reporting for sharks thus providing for a longer time series than\nwould be possible if the landing eligibility period began with mandatory reporting; 3) a long\ntime series accommodates annual variations in historical participation; and 4) comments\nduring scoping meetings supported use of a long time series. Currently, 1997 is the most\nrecent complete year of logbook data fully entered and checked; thus, 1997 is the most\nrecent year which can be used to perform the initial qualification analyses. In addition, the\ncomment periods for both original limited access proposals for the Atlantic swordfish and\nshark fisheries ended in 1997. Thus, NMFS believes that entrants after 1997 knew and\nunderstood the risk to entering these fisheries at that time. This action is reasonably\nrestrictive while allowing for some recent entrants into the fisheries.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it matches the goal of limited access to reduce latent\neffort without significantly affecting the livelihood of those participants substantially\ndependent on these fisheries. This action allows recent, participating entrants to continue to\nparticipate, provided they meet the appropriate landings threshold, but is not so liberal that it\nwill allow speculative entrants to qualify.\nRejected Options for the Landings Eligibility Period\nRejected Option: To be eligible for a limited access permit in the Atlantic swordfish or\nshark fisheries, vessel owners must have reported landings in the\nswordfish fishery (for a swordfish limited access permit) or the shark\nfishery (for a shark limited access permit) at any time before the control\ndates in each respective fishery\nNMFS established a control date in the Atlantic swordfish fishery of August 31, 1991,\nand in the Atlantic shark fishery of February 22, 1994, as a means of discouraging entry into\nthese fisheries. These control dates mean that anyone entering the fishery after the above\ndate may not be assured of future access to the fishery if the number of participants in the\nfishery is limited at some time in the future. The continued expansion of permit holders\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 12","since the control dates were established indicates that these control dates have not been\neffective in discouraging entry into the fisheries.\nUsing the control date as the cutoff for determining eligibility, either in terms of having\na permit or having received proof of landings, would be the most restrictive of alternatives\npresented. In addition, despite efforts to advise potential entrants of the control dates, it is\npossible that some individuals were unaware of the date and have made substantial\ninvestment to enter the fisheries since then. This potential is increased by the length of time\nbetween publication of the control dates and publication of this FMP. NMFS believes that\ntoo much time has passed since the control dates were established to use them as criteria for\ndefining limited access systems in the swordfish and shark fisheries.\nAlso, the Atlantic shark FMP was implemented on April 26, 1993, and shark fishermen\nhad until July 1, 1993, to obtain an Atlantic shark permit. Using the shark control date as\nthe end cutoff date would allow less than one year of landings data to be used in determining\neligibility for the directed shark fishery. NMFS believes that an eight-month period is\ninsufficient to adequately document shark landings, especially because the large coastal\nshark fishery was closed for much of that time.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because the time since the established control date has been\nof sufficient length that recent entrants who are substantially dependent (see Section 4.5.4\nbelow) on the fishery would be excluded. Thus, this alternative may exclude active\nparticipants and is contrary to the goal of limited access.\nRejected Option: To be eligible for a limited access permit in the Atlantic swordfish or\nshark fisheries, vessel owners must have reported landings in the\nswordfish fishery (for a swordfish limited access permit) or the\nshark fishery (for a shark limited access permit) at any time between\nJanuary 1, 1987, to June 30, 1995, (for swordfish) or January 1, 1991,\nto June 30, 1995 (for shark)\nThe beginning dates for these time periods were chosen for the same reason as the\nselected action. June 30, 1995, is the end of the last full month prior to the date of\npublication (July 28, 1995) in the Federal Register of an ANPR announcing NMFS'\nintention to propose a temporary limited access system for the issuance of directed fishery\npermits for Atlantic swordfish and sharks. It is also the date proposed in the Concept Paper,\n\"Options for Establishing an Interim Permit Moratorium and Eligibility Criteria for the\nAtlantic Swordfish (or Shark) Fishery\" (NMFS, 1995) and the cutoff date preferred in the\ndraft proposed amendments for Atlantic swordfish and sharks. In addition, these dates are\nthe same as the preferred alternative in the original swordfish and shark proposed limited\naccess amendment.\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 13","This alternative is less restrictive than using the control dates and would allow potential\neligibility to the more current participants in the fishery, provided they could meet the\nassociated landings threshold. The intent of this alternative would be to reduce or preclude\nany further speculative rush of new entrants prior to establishment of limited access.\nHowever, the end of the eligibility period is over two years ago and may exclude fishermen\nwho did not enter the fisheries until late 1995 or after. Thus, NMFS believes that too much\ntime has passed for this alternative to meet the goals of limited access.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it may exclude recent participants and no longer\nreflects the goal of limited access of freezing current harvesting capacity and reducing latent\neffort only.\nRejected Option: To be eligible for a limited access permit in the Atlantic swordfish or\nshark fisheries, vessel owners must have reported landings in the\nswordfish fishery (for a swordfish limited access permit) or the shark\nfishery (for a shark limited access permit) at any time between\nJanuary 1, 1987 and the date of publication of final rule (for swordfish)\nor January 1, 1991 and the date of publication of final rule (for shark)\nUse of the publication date of the proposed rule as a cutoff date would be the most\nliberal of the alternatives presented here. Since this would be a date in the future, it would\nallow additional new entrants into the fishery (assuming other eligibility criteria such as\nlandings requirements are met). It is likely that the number of participants in the fishery\nwould increase, perhaps substantially, due to speculative entry and attempts to establish\ncatch histories. This would diminish the effectiveness of limited access as a mechanism for\nstabilizing fleet capacity. Other problems are the delays between data collection and\nelectronic availability of logbook records, the long period required to analyze the permit and\nlogbook data, and the length of time taken to notify permit holders of the results of these\nanalyses. NMFS estimates that it would take a minimum of four to six months for this\nseries of events to be completed.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because, while it is the least restrictive of all the alternatives,\nit would delay implementation of the final rule after publication by approximately four to\nsix months for the analyses to be complete.\n4.5.3 Permit Eligibility Period - Recent\nFinal Action: To be eligible for a limited access permit in the Atlantic swordfish or\nshark fisheries, vessel owners must have held a valid permit in the\nswordfish fishery (for a swordfish limited access permit) or the shark\nfishery (for a shark limited access permit) at any time between\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 14","June 1, 1998, to November 30, 1998, (for swordfish) or January 1,\n1998, to December 31, 1998 (for shark)\nThese two time periods represent recent fishing seasons for both fisheries. NMFS\nbelieves that it is reasonable to assume that fishermen interested in continued participation\nin these fisheries would have held valid permits during the most recent open season.\nHowever, because the fishing seasons are SO short for large coastal sharks (the most\nimportant commercial shark species), many fishermen may have decided not to fish during\nthe second fishing season of 1998. This season was open only from July 1, 1998, to\nAugust 4, 1998. Thus, to be fair to fishermen who fished only during the first season of the\nshark fishery, NMFS expanded this period to all of 1998 for shark fishermen. For Atlantic\nswordfish, the last open season began on June 1, 1998, and did not close. NMFS believes\nthat active participants interested in landing Atlantic swordfish would have held an active\nswordfish permit at some point during this open fishing season. Because these dates are in\nthe past, NMFS can complete logbook and permit database analyses before the date of\npublication of the final rule and speculative entrants will not be eligible for a limited access\npermit. This action, while fairly lenient, should still remove participants who have\nlegitimately exited from the fisheries. However, this alternative should not remove active\nparticipants whose permits may have lapsed for a short period of time.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because NMFS believes it is consistent with the goal of limited\naccess of removing latent effort while allowing active participants to continue to participate\nin the fisheries.\nRejected Options for the Recent Permit Eligibility Period\nRejected Option: To be eligible for a limited access permit in the Atlantic swordfish or\nshark fisheries, vessel owners must hold a valid permit in the swordfish\nfishery (for a swordfish limited access permit) or the shark fishery (for a\nshark limited access permit) on the date of publication of final rule\nThis alternative was suggested in the proposed limited access rules for both Atlantic\nswordfish and sharks to prevent anyone who had legitimately gotten out of the fishery from\nqualifying. However, this alternative would delay implementation of the final rule after\npublication until such time as everyone who qualified was notified. This alternative also\nwould prevent anyone whose permit had lapsed on the day of publication of the final rule\nfrom qualifying.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because, while eliminating those who have legitimately\nexited from the fishery, it may also remove active participants whose permits have lapsed,\neven if only for a day.\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 15","Rejected Option: To be eligible for a limited access permit in the Atlantic swordfish or\nshark fisheries, vessel owners must have held a valid permit in either\nthe swordfish fishery (for a swordfish limited access permit) or the\nshark fishery (for a shark limited access permit) at any time between\nJune 1, 1998, to August 31, 1998, (for swordfish) or July 1, 1998, to\nAugust 4, 1998 (for shark)\nAs with the selected action, these dates represent recent seasons for both fisheries.\nThese were the dates preferred in the draft FMP. However, in the limited access analysis\ncompleted after the draft FMP was released, NMFS discovered that these dates, at least for\nshark, may exclude active participants, especially given the short fishing season.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is consistent with the goal of limited access of removing latent effort\nwhile allowing active participants to continue to participate in the fisheries; however, it may\nexclude active participants, especially shark permit holders and is therefore rejected.\n4.5.4 Directed Landings Thresholds\nThe intent of the logbook and permit database analyses was to define a landings\nthreshold for directed permit holders associated with a threshold income that indicates which\npermit holders are \"not substantially dependent\" on these fisheries. Many permit holders\ntarget other species during the course of a year. As described in the Regulatory Impact\nReview for the Bluefin Tuna Fishery (NMFS, 1992), a figure of $5,000 in annual gross\nrevenues may be employed as the cutoff for \"not substantially dependent.\" Thus, any\nfisherman who earned less than $5,000 in annual gross revenues from the swordfish or shark\nfisheries would be considered \"not substantially dependent\" on that fishery. This is\nconsidered to be a lenient threshold, particularly since net revenues (gross revenues minus\ncosts) will be substantially less.\nTo determine the number of Atlantic swordfish that a permit holder would need to\nland to reach this threshold since 1987, NMFS applied recent average prices to the average\nsize swordfish landed by the commercial fishery, as follows. Swordfish landed in the\nAtlantic fishery by U.S. vessels recently averaged 67 lbs dw (90 lbs ww). The average\nex-vessel price paid to fishermen for this size fish was approximately $2.96 per lb dw1.\nThus, the average size fish had a landed value of about $198. Approximately 25 such\nswordfish would need to be landed per year to meet the $5,000 annual threshold in the\nswordfish fishery.\nA similar formula was used to calculate the number of sharks that a permit holder\nwould need to land to reach that threshold since 1991. The average weight of sharks in\n1\nLarkin et. al, 1998, used a figure of $2.96/lb whole weight. Given the recent decline in swordfish prices, NMFS believes that a figure\nof $2.96/lb dressed weight is reasonable price from which to obtain a proxy for $5,000.\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 16","1997 was approximately 43 lbs dw (60 lb ww). The ex-vessel price paid to fishermen for\nshark meat in 1997 averaged $0.55 per 1b dw and the average ex-vessel price paid to\nfishermen for shark fins was $11.67 per lb. Assuming fins constitute five percent of the\ntotal amount of shark meat, the average size shark landed has a value of approximately\n$49. Thus, 102 sharks are needed to meet the $5,000 annual gross revenue threshold in the\nshark fishery.\nFinal Action: Require landings of at least 25 swordfish or 102 sharks, or\ndocumentation indicating landings of at least $5,000 gross revenue\nworth of swordfish or sharks, per year in any two calendar years\nduring the landing eligibility period to be eligible for a directed\nswordfish or a directed shark limited access permit\nFor this action, swordfish vessel owners who meet the swordfish permit eligibility\nrequirements above must have landings of at least 25 swordfish per year in any two calendar\nyears during the landing eligibility period described above to qualify for a directed\nswordfish limited access permit. Shark vessel owners who meet the permit eligibility\nrequirements above must have landings of at least 102 sharks per year in any two calendar\nyears during the landing eligibility period described above in order to qualify for a directed\nshark limited access permit. The landing thresholds established by this action are equal to\napproximately $5,000 in gross revenues per year. However, because the ex-vessel price of\nswordfish or sharks depend on the size of the fish, the quality of the fish, and the market at\nthe time of offloading and the landings threshold in number of fish is used as a proxy for\n$5,000 gross revenue, NMFS will also accept documentation indicating the vessel owner\nlanded at least $5,000 gross revenue worth of swordfish (for a swordfish limited access\npermit) or shark (for a shark limited access permit). This documentation will only be\naccepted in an application or an appeal. Acceptable documentation includes documentation\nalready submitted to NMFS such as logbook records, official, verified sales slips attached to\nweigh out slips, or receipts from registered dealers.\nNMFS believes this action is fairly lenient in that it requires vessel owners to be\nsubstantially dependent on these fisheries for only two years but not SO lenient that it will\nallow speculative permit holders into the fisheries. The approach of using only two years of\ndata ensures that those owners who did not participate continuously during the full\nqualifying period, but instead chose to fish primarily for other species periodically, would\nnot be penalized inappropriately with subsequent exclusion for the directed fishery. NMFS\nestimates that 194 vessels will qualify for a directed swordfish limited access permit and 207\nvessels will qualify for a directed shark limited access permit. However, these numbers may\nchange based on applications.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it will remove fishermen who are not substantially\ndependent on these fisheries, while allowing recently dependent fishermen to qualify. This\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 17","action also minimizes negative economic and social impacts, consistent with the goals of\nlimited access and NS 8.\nTo be eligible for an Atlantic swordfish directed or incidental permit,\nFinal Action:\nfishermen must obtain at least an Atlantic shark incidental permit\nUnder this action, fishermen who wish to obtain an Atlantic swordfish directed or\nincidental permit must obtain an Atlantic shark limited access permit (directed or incidental)\nas well. Due to the non-selective nature of the gear, many swordfish vessels catch sharks\nincidentally. NS 9 requires minimizing bycatch to the extent practicable and this action\nwould ensure that swordfish directed fishermen who catch sharks incidentally can still land\nsome of those sharks. This action also ensures that those swordfish fishermen that\nincidentally catch sharks continue to report those catches/landings. This will aid in the\ncollection of the best scientific data (NS 2).\nNote that those vessels that qualify for a swordfish limited access permit may be\nautomatically eligible for an incidental shark permit. See Section 4.5.5 below.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it will minimize bycatch and regulatory discards,\nconsistent with NS 9. It also ensures continued reporting of all catches and landings,\nconsistent with NS 2.\nRejected Options for Directed Landings Thresholds\nRejected Option: Require landings of at least 18 swordfish per year in any two calendar\nyears during the landing eligibility period to be eligible for a directed\nswordfish limited access permit. Require landings of at least 250\nsharks before and 125 after control date to be eligible for a directed\nshark limited access permit\nThese options were the preferred alternatives in the previously proposed limited access\nrules. The number of swordfish and sharks used for these alternatives are based on the\ndefinition for \"not substantially dependent,\" as defined above, but using average prices and\nweights as specified in the previously proposed limited access amendments. For sharks, this\nalternative estimates that the gross revenue from shark fishing would average $5,000 per\nyear for the entire landings eligibility period of the previously proposed rule.\nNMFS believes these that landings thresholds are no longer appropriate. Since the\npreviously proposed limited access rules, average prices have changed, leading to a different\nnumber of fish required for the definition of \"substantially dependent.\" In addition, the\ncontrol date for sharks, while reasonable at the time of the previously proposed rule, may no\nlonger be indicative of currently active participants in the Atlantic shark fishery.\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 18","Conclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because of updated average price data which affect the \"not\nsubstantially dependent\" landings threshold, and because use of the control date for sharks is\nnot believed to be appropriate due to the time elapsed since that date.\nRejected Option: Require landings of at least 100 swordfish or 408 sharks per year in any\nfive calendar years during the landing eligibility period to be eligible\nfor a directed swordfish or a directed shark limited access permit\nRejected\nOption:\nRequire landings of at least 100 swordfish or 408 sharks per year in any\ntwo calendar years during the landing eligibility period to be eligible\nfor a directed swordfish or a directed shark limited access permit\nRejected Option: Require landings of at least 50 swordfish or 204 sharks per year in any\nfive calendar years during the landing eligibility period to be eligible\nfor a directed swordfish or a directed shark limited access permit\nRejected Option:\nRequire landings of at least 50 swordfish or 204 sharks per year in any\ntwo calendar years during the landing eligibility period to be eligible\nfor a directed swordfish or a directed shark limited access permit\nRejected Option: Require landings of at least 25 swordfish or 102 sharks per year in any\nfive calendar years during the landing eligibility period to be eligible\nfor a directed swordfish or a directed shark limited access permit\nRejected Option: Require landings of at least 12 swordfish or 51 sharks per year in any\nfive calendar years during the landing eligibility period to be eligible\nfor a directed swordfish or a directed shark limited access permit\nRejected Option: Require Landings of at least 12 swordfish or 51 sharks per year in any\ntwo calendar years during the landing eligibility period to be eligible\nfor a directed swordfish or a directed shark limited access permit\nThe landing thresholds shown in the above seven rejected options range from $2,500 to\n$20,00 gross revenues per year. Those options that require gross revenues at the higher end\n(e.g., $10,000 and $20,000) are restrictive in that they require vessel owners to have targeted\nAtlantic swordfish or sharks consistently for a period of time. The restriction is even higher\nif vessel owners needed to maintain these landings levels for a period of five years. Those\nalternatives may not be indicative of fishing practices in these fisheries. Vessel owners tend\nto fish for a number of species, especially given the short seasons due to reduced quotas\n(especially in the Atlantic shark fishery). NMFS believes those restrictive alternatives might\nseverely impact both participants and producers and may eliminate fishermen who are\nsubstantially dependent on the Atlantic swordfish and shark fisheries. The high levels of\ngross revenues per year with those alternatives that require two years of landings data are\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 19","more lenient but still could eliminate those vessel owners and operators who are truly multi-\nspecies fishermen.\nThose options above that require gross revenues at the low end (e.g., $2,500) might be\noverly lenient and might allow relatively inactive participants to continue in the fishery.\nThis might put undue financial stress of those vessels who are truly dependent on the\nfisheries.\nConclusion\nThese alternatives are rejected because they would not meet the objectives of limited\naccess to reduce latent effort without significantly affecting the livelihood of fishermen\nsubstantially dependent on the fisheries, and might severely impact fishery participants and\nproducers. In addition, some of the options would allow relatively inactive participants to\ncontinue in the fishery, inconsistent with the goal of this limited access system.\nRejected Option: To be eligible for an Atlantic shark directed or incidental permit, must\nobtain at least an Atlantic swordfish incidental permit.\nThis alternative is similar to the second final action above. However, unlike the\nswordfish fishery that regularly catches large coastal sharks and pelagic sharks, the bottom\nlongline fishery (primarily shark fishing) does not regularly catch swordfish or tuna,\naccording to observer data (Branstetter and Burgess, 1997). Many shark fishermen,\nespecially those concentrated in the Gulf of Mexico or those who also target Gulf reef fish\nand the snapper-grouper complex may not ever catch a swordfish. For these reasons,\nalthough NMFS believes swordfish limited access permit holders should have at least an\nincidental shark permit, NMFS does not believe shark limited access permit holders should\nbe required to obtain an incidental swordfish permit. Indeed, if shark limited access permit\nholders were required to obtain a swordfish limited access permit, shark fishermen who are\nalso in the Reef fish and Snapper grouper fisheries might decide to leave the shark fishery.\nIf this happens, shark bycatch mortality might increase as those fishermen who target reef\nfish and the snapper-grouper complex but left the shark fishery would still catch sharks but\nwould be forced to discard them.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it could minimize bycatch in the shark fishery\n(NS 9) by allowing some swordfish to be landed that would otherwise have to be discarded.\nHowever, this alternative would also increase regulatory discards of sharks and decrease\ndata if fishermen in other fisheries leave the shark fishery due to the requirement to obtain a\nswordfish limited access permit.\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 20","4.5.5 Incidental Landings Threshold\nFinal Action: Require landings of at least 11 swordfish during the landing eligibility\nperiod and establish a minimum earned income requirement for\nowners of more than 50 percent of their earned income from\ncommercial fishing through the harvest and first sale of fish or from\ncharter/headboat fishing, or those who had gross sales of fish greater\nthan $20,000 harvested from their vessel, during any one of the last\nthree calendar years to be eligible for a swordfish incidental limited\naccess permit. Require landings of at least seven sharks during the\nlanding eligibility period to be eligible for an incidental shark limited\naccess permit\nThis action requires landing an average of one swordfish or shark per year during the\npermit eligibility time period in order to qualify for an incidental limited access permit.\nNMFS believes this is a lenient threshold that will allow fishermen who currently land\nsharks or swordfish incidentally to continue doing so. NMFS believes that incidental\npermits should be issued only to those who have at least a minimal history of participation\nin fishing activities. An earned income requirement is one way of ensuring this\nparticipation. Current Atlantic shark permit holders provided earned income information to\nNMFS when they applied for a Federal shark permit. Swordfish permit holders, however,\ndid not. NMFS believes that the eligibility criteria for earned income needed to obtain a\ncommercial shark fishing permit ($20,000 per year from gross sales of fish or 50 percent of\ntheir earned income) provides a reasonable measure of active participation in commercial\nfisheries. An estimated 72 swordfish fishermen and 354 shark fishermen would qualify\nunder this threshold. These numbers may change due to applications.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it will continue to allow incidental landings, thus\nminimizing bycatch (NS 9). Fishermen with an incidental permit will be required to report\ncatch and landings, thus improving scientific data (NS 2).\nFinal Action:\nIf qualified for an initial directed or incidental swordfish limited access\npermit, will receive an incidental shark limited access permit\nThis action will allow those fishermen who qualify, under the qualifications described\nin Sections 4.5.1 through 4.5.4, for an initial directed or incidental swordfish limited access\npermit to receive an incidental shark permit. This action allows those swordfish fishermen\nwho qualify for an initial directed or incidental swordfish limited access permits to continue\nto fish for swordfish and land an incidental number of sharks. Thus, this action not only\nreduces latent effort by requiring qualification of Atlantic swordfish directed or incidental\npermits, but also minimizes shark bycatch mortality. However, fishermen who wish to enter\nthe swordfish fishery in the future must obtain, on their own, both a directed swordfish\nlimited access permit and, at a minimum, an incidental shark limited access permit. NMFS\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 21","estimates that 41 fishermen will receive an incidental shark limited access permit based on\nthis action.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it is expected to meet limited access objectives,\nminimize bycatch (NS 9), and increase scientific data (NS 2).\nRejected Options for the Incidental Landings Threshold\nRejected Option: Require landings of at least nine swordfish during the permit eligibility\nperiod and establish an minimum earned income requirement for\nowners of more than 50 percent of their earned income from\ncommercial fishing through the harvest and first sale of fish or from\ncharter/headboat fishing, or those who had gross sales of fish greater\nthan $20,000 harvested from their vessel, during any one of the last\nthree calendar years to qualify for an incidental swordfish limited\naccess permit. Require landings of at least three sharks before and two\nsharks after the control date to qualify for an incidental shark limited\naccess permit\nThis alternative represents the preferred alternative in the previously proposed Atlantic\nswordfish and shark limited access rules. For swordfish, this alternative would require\nlandings of approximately one swordfish per year for the nine years proposed as the\nlandings eligibility period in the previously proposed rule, and would establish a minimum\nearned income requirement. For sharks, this alternative would require participation both\nbefore and after the control date at an average of one shark per year.\nAt the time of the previously proposed limited access rules, NMFS believed that a\nlanding threshold of nine swordfish and a landings threshold using the control date for\nsharks was consistent with limited access objectives. However, NMFS now believes that,\ngiven the additional two years worth of landings data available, these thresholds should be\nupdated to the extent practicable.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected due to the availability of an additional two years of data\nsince limited access was first proposed for the Atlantic swordfish and shark fisheries. Thus,\nthis alternative is inconsistent with NS 2.\nRejected Option: If qualified for an initial directed or incidental shark limited access\npermit, no swordfish landings required to obtain an incidental swordfish\nlimited access permit\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 22","This alternative is similar to the second final action above; however, observer data\nindicate that directed shark fishermen do not catch swordfish incidentally during bottom\nlongline fishing operations (Branstetter and Burgess, 1997). Thus, this alternative could\nactually increase latent effort.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it could increase latent effort, contrary to the\nobjective of limited access to reduce latent effort.\n4.5.6 Swordfish Handgear\nAuthorized handgear in the Atlantic swordfish fisheries includes harpoon, rod and reel,\nand handline. Harpoon vessels formerly operating out of Rhode Island and Massachusetts\ntraditionally took extended trips for swordfish north and east of the Hudson Canyon and\nparticularly off Georges Bank. During such trips, they would land as many as 20 to 25 large\nswordfish over a ten-day period. However, due to decreased availability of the large\nswordfish they target, there are no known commercial harpoon fishermen (who use only\nharpoons) who have both a current permit and the specified landings required under the\nselected alternative for a directed permit. Without specific provisions, many handgear\nfishermen would otherwise be excluded from Atlantic swordfish fishing or be restricted to\nlanding only the specified incidental retention limits of two swordfish per trip. Therefore,\nNMFS has developed separate criteria to address the unique nature of this traditional fishery.\nAlthough handgear permits are not transferable to the directed or incidental fishery they\nare transferable among handgear permit holders, subject to upgrading restrictions (see\nSection 4.7). As the stock recovers and the traditional harpoon fishery returns, NMFS may\nconsider allowing directed permits (primarily longline) to transfer to a handgear permit.\nThis might decrease bycatch and aid in the conservation of the stock as the handgear fishery\nis highly size-and species-selective (NS 9). The handgear fishery will open and close with\nthe directed fishery. Handgear permit holders will be responsible for following all other\nregulations in the fishery including landing reports and participation in the NMFS observer\nprogram. Fishermen who are interested in this type of limited access permit must apply\nwithin 180 days of publication of the final rule (see Section 4.5.8).\nFinal\nAction:\nIssue a handgear permit to those fishermen who provide\ndocumentation of having been issued a swordfish permit for use with\nharpoon gear or those who landed swordfish with handgear as\nevidenced by logbook records, verifiable sales slips or receipts from\nregistered dealers, or state landings records\nNMFS will issue a directed fishery handgear permit to those former and current\nharpooners who apply if they provide documentation of having been issued a swordfish\npermit for use with harpoon gear or having landed swordfish with handgear as evidenced by\nlogbook records, verifiable sales slips or receipts from registered dealers, or state landings\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 23","records, and if they used only handgear to harvest swordfish. Beginning in 1984, NMFS has\nrecords of which swordfish permit recipients indicated on the permit application that\nharpoon was one of four primary gear types used. Since fishermen were not required to\nindicate the use of harpoon gear on the permit application, NMFS will also accept written\nevidence (logbook records; official, verifiable sales slips or receipts from registered dealers;\nor state landings records) that the fisherman landed swordfish with handgear.\nThe intent of this action is to allow those commercial fishermen who do not use\nlongline gear to target large swordfish to use handgear as large fish become sufficiently\nabundant. The eligibility criteria are intended to include those who previously used\nharpoons, but who have allowed their permits to lapse because of reduced abundance of\nlarge fish. A number of fishermen who qualify for the directed fishery or for the incidental\nfishery may be able to produce documentation which would qualify them for a handgear\npermit. However, as fishermen are only eligible for one type of swordfish limited access\npermit per vessel and due to the reduced availability of swordfish to handgear, NMFS\nexpects few fishermen who are eligible for a directed or an incidental swordfish limited\naccess permit to apply for a handgear permit. An estimated 40 former harpooners are\neligible for a handgear permit under these criteria.\nNMFS believes that this action meets the Magnuson-Stevens Act requirement to take\ninto consideration traditional fishing patterns of fishing vessels. Also, this action will allow\ntraditional handgear fishermen to participate more fully as the stock recovers.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it considers traditional fishing patterns (NS 8), but is not\nexpected to increase latent effort, consistent with the Magnuson-Stevens Act and the goals\nof limited access.\nFinal Action: Issue directed fishery handgear permits to those applicants who meet\nthe earned income requirement, i.e., those who had derived more than\n50 percent of their earned income from commercial fishing through the\nharvest and first sale of fish or from charter/headboat fishing, or those\nwho had gross sales of fish greater than $20,000 harvested from their\nvessel, during one of the three calendar years preceding the application\nThis action establishes historical involvement in commercial fishing as the basis for\neligibility. NMFS believes that the same minimum earned income requirement used for the\nswordfish incidental category permit is appropriate for the handgear category because it\nwould eliminate those who have not been active in commercial fisheries from the handgear\nfishery.\nNMFS believes that under this action, artisanal fishermen in the U.S. Virgin Islands and\nPuerto Rico, who have until now been exempt from having a Federal swordfish permit, will\nbe able to qualify for a handgear permit and continue fishing. In addition, this action allows\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 24","a way for interested commercial fishermen to participate in a traditional fishery. Thus, this\naction minimizes economic impacts.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it considers traditional fishing patterns (NS 8), but is not\nexpected to increase latent effort, consistent with the Magnuson-Stevens Act and the goals\nof limited access.\nRejected Options for Swordfish Handgear\nRejected Option: Open access\nThis approach would provide an open access directed fishery for new entrants as well as\nprevious participants, provided they used only handgear. Numerous comments stated that\nthe handgear category should be open access because there are no satisfactory eligibility\ncriteria that can be applied. Several commenters emphasized the advantages of the\ntraditional handgear category, especially the highly size-selective and species-selective\nnature of the harpoon fishery. Since handgear is highly selective and targets mostly large\nfish, there would be little mortality of undersized swordfish or other bycatch. However,\nretaining open access in any segment of the commercial swordfish fishery would undermine\nthe objective of eliminating latent capacity in the fishery. In addition, vessel owners with a\ndirected swordfish permit are allowed to fish for swordfish using handgear. NMFS does not\nsupport leaving the handgear segment of the swordfish fishery open access because of the\nsame potential for overcapitalization that has already occurred in the other segments of the\nAtlantic swordfish fishery.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it would not reduce latent effort, and it is\ninconsistent with the goals of limited access.\nRejected Option: Require handgear permit applicants meet the swordfish permit and\nlandings history requirements\nThis alternative would not provide exceptions or exemptions from the requirement to\nobtain a directed swordfish permit by meeting the permit and landings history requirements\nand using only currently authorized gear types. Under such an alternative, traditional\nhandgear fishermen could not land or possess swordfish unless they could meet the directed\nor incidental limited access permit eligibility criteria. Additionally, this FMP requires\nmandatory permits for all commercial fishermen who land Atlantic swordfish with handgear\n(U.S. Virgin Islands and other areas are currently exempt from having a swordfish permit).\nUnder this alternative, fishermen in those areas who have never held or been required to\nhold a swordfish permit would be excluded from their artisanal fishery because they could\nnot meet the historic permit and/or landings requirements.\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 25","Conclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it does not meet the limited access objective of not\nsignificantly affecting the livelihoods of fishermen dependent on the fishery, and is\ntherefore, inconsistent with NS 8. It does not consider any artisinal fishing communities in\nthe Caribbean, and could discriminate against residents in various States (NS 4).\n4.5.7 BAYS Tuna Fishery\nIn comments on the previously proposed limited access system, constituents noted that\nthe lack of a similar proposal for the pelagic longline BAYS fishery would leave a \"back\ndoor\" open for entry into the multi-species pelagic longline fishery. If this happens, discards\nof swordfish and sharks might increase, contrary to the goals of limited access, this FMP,\nand the Magnuson-Stevens Act. To prevent this from happening, NMFS is finalizing\nactions which will ensure that all HMS longline fishermen carry a permit for the HMS with\nwhich they interact.\nThese actions will affect only fishermen who have an Atlantic tuna Longline permit\n(formally known as an Incidental permit). These actions will not affect General, Angling,\nCharter/Headboat, Purse Seine, or Harpoon tuna permit holders.\nFinal Action: If a fisherman qualified for an initial directed or incidental swordfish\nlimited access permit, NMFS will issue an Atlantic tuna longline\npermit. Fishermen without an Atlantic tuna longline permit will not\nbe allowed to fish for Atlantic swordfish, except by fishermen with a\nswordfish handgear permit\nUnder this action, fishermen who qualify for an initial directed or incidental Atlantic\nswordfish limited access permit are allowed to fish for and land Atlantic tuna according to\nthe regulations regarding the use of the Atlantic tuna longline permit. This alternative will\nallow swordfish limited access permit holders to land tuna, and is therefore consistent with\ncurrent BAYS regulations. In the future, fishermen wishing to enter the swordfish fishery\nwould need to obtain not only a shark limited access permit (see Section 4.5.4), but also an\nAtlantic tuna longline permit. This action and the action below will reduce latent effort in\nHMS fisheries. NMFS estimates that 105 fishermen, who did not have an Atlantic tuna\nincidental permit, will receive an Atlantic tuna longline permit based on this criteria.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it is consistent with current regulations. In combination\nwith the action below, this alternative is consistent with the goal of limited access to reduce\nlatent effort without significantly affecting the livelihoods of fishermen substantially\ndependent on the fisheries (NS 8). In addition, as described above, this action is also\nconsistent with the Magnuson-Stevens Act and will reduce discards in the longline\nfisheries (NS 9).\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 26","Final Action: If a fisherman is not eligible for an initial swordfish or shark directed\nor incidental limited access permit but had a valid Atlantic Tuna\nIncidental Permit as of December 31, 1998, then NMFS will issue\ninitial incidental swordfish and shark limited access permits;\nfishermen without these limited access permits are not allowed to fish\nfor Atlantic tuna with longlines\nUnder this action, those commercial longline fishermen who have an Atlantic tuna\nincidental permit to fish for and land BAYS tuna and bluefin tuna incidentally would be\ngiven incidental swordfish and shark limited access permits. This action will not have a\nnegative economic impact tuna fishermen because the fishermen would not be required to\nbuy a permit. In fact, this action would have a positive impact as this action allows longline\nfishermen to land swordfish and sharks incidentally. Thus, this action will decrease\nswordfish and shark bycatch mortality as BAYS fishermen would be able to land swordfish\nand sharks, subject to incidental harvest limits (see Section 4.6). The last day of the recent\npermit eligibility time period is December 31, 1998. This is an extension over the eligibility\ntime period which was preferred in the draft FMP: August 31, 1998. NMFS believes that\nanyone interested in longlining for Atlantic tuna would have had a valid Atlantic tuna\nincidental permit in 1998. This alternative, in conjunction with the action above eliminates\nthe growth of latent effort and is consistent with the goals for limited access. Any fisherman\nwishing to enter HMS commercial fisheries (i.e., pelagic longline) in the future will need to\nobtain an Atlantic tuna longline permit, a swordfish limited access permit, and a shark\nlimited access permit. NMFS estimates that 141 fishermen will receive an incidental\nswordfish limited access permit and 157 fishermen will receive an incidental shark limited\naccess permit under this criteria in this FMP.\nConclusion\nAs with the action above, this action is selected because it minimizes bycatch (NS 9), is\nnot expected to have negative economic impacts on producers, and is consistent with the\nobjective of limited access to reduce latent effort.\nRejected Options for the BAYS tuna fishery\nRejected Option: Status quo\nCurrently, fishermen who have an Atlantic tuna incidental permit can target BAYS tuna\nand land bluefin tuna incidentally. These fishermen may catch swordfish and sharks\nincidentally due to the non-selective nature of the gear, but are not currently required to\nhave a swordfish or shark permit. Under limited access, these incidentally caught swordfish\nand sharks could not be landed by Atlantic tuna fishermen unless the fisherman holds a\ndirected or incidental swordfish or shark permit. This alternative, in conjunction with\nlimited access, would increase the regulatory discards of swordfish or sharks since tuna\nfishermen would still catch swordfish and sharks but would be forced to discard them.\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 27","Conclusion\nThis action is rejected because it may increase bycatch (NS 9) and does not meet the\nlimited access objective of reducing latent effort.\nRejected Option: Require a directed or incidental swordfish limited access permit to land\nBAYS tuna with longline gear; allow one year to obtain a directed or\nincidental swordfish limited access permit if not eligible\nUnder this alternative, any commercial BAYS tuna longline fisherman who wishes to\ncontinue to land tuna would be required to obtain a directed or incidental swordfish limited\naccess permit within one year. If the fisherman obtained a directed permit, in conjunction\nwith the final actions of Sections 4.5.4 and 4.5.5, he/she would also need to obtain at least\nan incidental shark permit. This alternative could have severe economic impacts on tuna\nfishermen because those fishermen who may be substantially dependent on the tuna fishery\nbut do not fish for Atlantic swordfish or sharks would be required to buy a limited access\npermit from a participant in these fisheries.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it could have adverse economic impacts on tuna\nfishermen.\n4.5.8 Appeals\nAfter an analysis of landings and permit histories, NMFS will notify all permit holders\n(Atlantic swordfish, shark, and tuna longline) by letter of their eligibility status for the\ndirected or incidental swordfish or shark fisheries and issue the appropriate initial limited\naccess permits to those who qualify. These swordfish and shark permits will be effective\nfrom June 1, 1999, until the regular date of their renewal (the vessel owner's birthday).\nIf a fisherman qualifies for the directed or incidental permit and agrees with NMFS'\ndetermination, no action is required until the date of their annual permit renewal. If NMFS\ndoes not issue an initial limited access permit, or if an incidental permit is issued rather than\na directed permit, a current permit holder may submit an application with appropriate\ndocumentation for the type of permit which he or she believes he or she is qualified to\nreceive.\nNOTE: NMFS will not automatically issue handgear permits. Any person or\nentity wishing to receive a handgear permit must submit an application and furnish\nthe appropriate documentation necessary to demonstrate his or her eligibility, as\noutlined in this FMP.\nAll applications for limited access permits must be submitted to NMFS within 90 days\nof publication of the final rule. NMFS will make all attempts to circulate the final rule to\ninterested constituents (fax notice, letter to permit holders, etc.). Any previously issued\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 28","Atlantic swordfish or shark permit will be invalid as of June 1, 1999. All persons wishing to\nremain in the fishery will need a limited access permit, or a combination of limited access\npermits, to be renewed annually following the current NMFS permit renewal procedure (i.e.,\nthere is no need to \"re-qualify\").\n4.5.8.1\nProcess\nFinal Action: Written applications and appeals only\nThe Chief of the Highly Migratory Species Management Division will evaluate all\napplications and accompanying documentation, then notify the applicant by letter of\nNMFS' decision to approve or deny the permit application. If the application is\napproved, then NMFS will issue the appropriate initial limited access permit(s). If\ndenied, the applicant may appeal the decision within 90 days of receipt of the notice of\ndenial. NMFS will issue provisional directed or incidental fishery permits, as\nappropriate, pending the outcome of an appeal, but not pending the outcome of an\napplication.\nNMFS will consider only written appeals. Landings eligibility criteria require\nevidence of documented legal landings during the time frame from January 1, 1987,\nthrough December 31, 1997 (for swordfish), or from January 1, 1991, through\nDecember 31, 1997 (for sharks). Landings documentation that NMFS will consider in\nsupport of an appeal for an Atlantic swordfish limited access permit is restricted to\nofficial NMFS logbook records or weigh out slips that were submitted to NMFS prior\nto March 2, 1998 (60 days after the cutoff date for eligible landings). Landings\ndocumentation that NMFS will consider in support of an appeal for Atlantic shark\nlimited access permits is also restricted to official NMFS logbook records and weigh\nout slips during the time period that logbook reporting was mandatory. However,\nNMFS will also accept, verifiable sales slips or receipts from registered dealers, or state\nlandings records from the period January 1, 1991, to July 1, 1993 (the date that Federal\ncommercial shark permits became mandatory). NMFS will count only those Atlantic\nswordfish or sharks that were landed legally when the owner had a valid permit toward\nthe eligibility requirement. No other proof of catch history will be considered. NMFS\nwill issue swordfish handgear permits to those fishermen who provide verifiable\nevidence of having been issued a swordfish permit for use with handgear or to those\nfishermen who provide verifiable evidence of having met the earned income\nrequirement. Such evidence includes, but is not limited to, permits, verifiable sales\nslips, or receipts from registered dealers. Photocopies of the written documents are\nacceptable in the original appeal or application; NMFS may request the originals at a\nlater date. NMFS will refer any submitted materials that are of questionable\nauthenticity to the NMFS Office of Enforcement for investigation.\nNMFS will designate NOAA employees as appeals officers. These officers will\nconsider disputes concerning eligibility for directed and incidental fishery permits. The\nappeals officers will review cases individually but will confer regularly to ensure\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 29","consistency. The sole grounds for an appeal is that NMFS used incorrect or incomplete\nlandings data in the eligibility analysis or improperly considered the applicant's earned\nincome documentation, if applicable. Absent good cause for further delay, the appeals\nofficers will review the written appeals for no more than 30 days before making a\nrecommendation to the Director of the Office of Sustainable Fisheries, who will render\nthe final decision.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it provides all fishermen with equal and reasonable\nopportunities to appeal, consistent with NS 4.\nRejected Options for the Appeals Process\nRejected Option: Written with option for oral hearing\nThis alternative would allow applicants to appeal in written format, under the\nguidelines set out in the above action, and also present an appeal in person at an oral\nhearing if the written appeal were denied. Those applicants who chose to have an oral\nhearing would be required to submit written documentation at least 30 days prior to the\nhearing to allow the appeals officers time to review the materials. Only valid\ndocumentation as specified above would be considered. If no proof or valid\ndocumentation were provided as the basis of the appeal, the request for an oral hearing\ncould be denied. Persons appealing would be limited to 30 minutes of oral testimony.\nAll oral hearings would be arranged before the appeals officers make their\nrecommendations to the Office Director, and all decisions rendered by the Office\nDirector would be final.\nThis alternative was not selected due to the logistical problems associated with\nhearing oral appeals in several regions and the possibility that it would discriminate\nagainst those fishermen who reside in areas where the oral appeals were not heard,\npotentially inconsistent with NS 4.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected due to logistical problems and potential inconsistencies\nwith NS 4.\nRejected Option: No appeals\nThe alternative of not establishing an appeals process is rejected because it could be\nperceived as unfair and is inconsistent with due process.\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 30","Conclusion\nRejected; this alternative is rejected because it could be perceived as unfair.\n4.5.8.2 Hardship\nFinal Action: No hardship cases will be heard during the appeals process\nThis action requires fishermen to meet the eligibility requirements described in the\nsections above to qualify for limited access in either the swordfish or shark fisheries.\nNMFS believes that given the lenient eligibility time frame, the low landings\nthresholds, and the fact that this system was previously proposed twice, that this action\nis fair and reasonable. In addition, allowing hardship cases may be inconsistent with\nthe objectives of limited access as it would allow continued overcapitalization to some\nextent. In lieu of hearing hardship cases, NMFS has attempted to include exemptions\n(Section 4.5.9) for common situations heard during the comment periods. Furthermore,\nNMFS has made these limited access permits transferable with upgrading restrictions.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because NMFS believes the lenient eligibility requirements do\nnot justify hearing hardship cases.\nRejected Options for Hardship during an Appeal\nRejected Option: Hardship cases heard during the appeals process\nDuring the public hearings conducted for the previously proposed limited access\nsystem and in letters to the agency, NMFS received comments that the proposed\neligibility and landings time frames and thresholds could result in a significant number\nof appeals. NMFS also received comments that limited hardship cases should be\nheard (tragic loss, family emergencies, etc.) and that fishermen should have enough\ntime to gather information after long fishing trips and to conduct thorough reviews.\nHowever, NMFS believes that the lenient permit eligibility time frame and low\nlandings thresholds, in addition to several modifications from the previously proposed\nrules based on public comment, should minimize the volume of appeals and hardship\ncases. In addition, hardship cases make it extremely difficult to ensure consistency\nbetween decisions on the appeals. Appeals officers may vary in their interpretation\nand/or evaluation of similar cases. By not allowing hardship cases, NMFS can ensure\nthat everyone is treated equally with no extraneous information harming or helping\ntheir cases.\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 31","Conclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because NMFS believes that the changes to the limited\naccess system since the previously proposed rules and the relatively lenient permit and\nlandings thresholds should reduce, if not eliminate, the number of possible hardship\ncases.\n4.5.9 Exemptions\nNMFS establishes two exemptions to the eligibility criteria in order to be consistent\nwith the overall intent of limited access, to accommodate for the dynamic aspect of these\nfisheries since NMFS first began rulemaking in mid-1995, and to address the effects of\ndelays in implementation of this limited access system.\nThe first exemption states that persons who purchased a qualifying vessel and that\nvessel's landings history after December 31, 1997 (this must be stated explicitly in a\nwritten agreement), are exempt from the requirement to have owned a vessel issued a valid\nFederal Atlantic swordfish or shark permit at any time from July 1, 1994, through\nDecember 31, 1997. Such persons must have purchased vessels and their associated\nlandings histories that meet the landings eligibility criteria described above, through\ndocumented transfer at the time of purchase, and must own a swordfish-permitted vessel at\nany time during the period June 1, 1998, to November 30, 1998, or a shark-permitted vessel\nat any time in 1998. This exemption provides a mechanism to account for vessel sales after\n1997 and should not result in any increase in the number of current participants. Without\nsuch an exemption, qualifying vessels could be eliminated despite legitimate purchases of\nvessels and their associated landings histories because the current owner did not own a\nvessel issued a valid Federal Atlantic swordfish or shark permit before December 31, 1997.\nSuch cases will be considered during the application process; thus, fishermen who feel they\nqualify for a permit under the terms of this exemption must apply within 90 days of the\npublication of the final rule.\nThe second exemption applies to those fishermen who first obtained a Federal\nswordfish or shark permit in 1997. Those fishermen are exempt from the requirement to\ndocument a second year of Atlantic swordfish or shark landings as described above. Rather,\nsuch fishermen may document, for the directed permit, landings of at least 25 swordfish or\n102 sharks during 1997 (equal to the $5,000 substantially dependent threshold), or, for an\nincidental permit, landings of at least one Atlantic swordfish or shark during 1997. This\nexemption provides for persons that first obtained Federal swordfish or shark permits in\n1997 and who may have commented on the draft HMS FMP to be eligible for directed or\nincidental permits, as appropriate. All other eligibility requirements still apply as described\nin this Chapter. Fishermen who did not automatically receive a limited access permit but\nfeel they meet this exemption must apply. Under this exemption, NMFS estimates that four\nfishermen are eligible to receive a directed swordfish limited access permit, four fishermen\nare eligible to receive a directed shark limited access permit, five fishermen are eligible to\nChapter 4 - Initial Permit Issuance - 32","receive an incidental swordfish limited access permit, and 26 fishermen are eligible to\nreceive an incidental shark limited access permit.\n4.6 Harvest Limits\nDuring directed swordfish closures previous regulations allow swordfish longline fishermen\nto land up to 15 swordfish per trip and all other gears, except handgear, to land up to two\nswordfish per trip until the incidental set aside is filled; handgear users are not allowed to land\nany Atlantic swordfish during closures. Squid trawl fishermen may land up to five swordfish per\ntrip until the incidental set aside is filled regardless of directed swordfish closures. During an\nAtlantic shark fishing closure of any species group, shark permit holders may not land any sharks\nfrom that species group.\n4.6.1\nLimits for Swordfish Directed Permit Holders During Directed Fishery\nClosures\nFinal Action:\nStatus quo - allow 15 swordfish per vessel per trip for directed\nswordfish limited access permit holders during a directed fishery\nclosure until the incidental set-aside is filled\nThis action will allow directed swordfish limited access permit holders to land\n15 swordfish per vessel per trip until the incidental swordfish set aside is filled. The\nprevious proposed rule for swordfish limited access proposed to reduce the longline harvest\nlimit during a directed fishery closure from 15 to five swordfish per trip until the set aside is\nfilled. NMFS received numerous comments that this reduction would eliminate the fresh\nmarket niche that U.S. fishermen can maintain under the status quo harvest limit. NMFS\nestablishes this action to minimize economic impacts and allow fishermen to maintain their\nyear-round fresh market niche.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it is consistent with current regulations, is not expected\nto increase bycatch (NS 9), and will help fishermen maintain the current year-round U.S.\nfresh market niche (NS 8).\nRejected Options for Harvest Limits for Swordfish Directed Permit Holders During\nDirected Fishery Closures\nRejected Option: Allow five swordfish per vessel per trip for directed swordfish permit\nholders until the incidental swordfish set aside is filled during a directed\nfishery closure\nThis was NMFS' preferred alternative in the previously proposed swordfish limited\naccess system. NMFS received comments suggesting that this limit may increase bycatch\nChapter 4 - Harvest Limits - 33","mortality and decrease the value of swordfish as it would reduce the year-round fresh fish\nmarket. Due to these comments, NMFS decided to maintain the status quo.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it might increase bycatch mortality, inconsistent\nwith NS 9, and have negative economic impacts through the loss of the current year-round\nU.S. fresh market niche (NS 8).\nRejected Option: No swordfish for directed swordfish permit holders during a directed\nfishery closure\nThis alternative would require directed swordfish permit holders who are fishing for\nother species during a swordfish closure to discard any swordfish caught. This might\nincrease bycatch mortality and would eliminate the current year-round fresh fish market for\ndomestic fishermen.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it might increase bycatch mortality, inconsistent\nwith NS 9, and have negative economic impacts to fishermen (NS 8).\n4.6.2 Limits for Incidental Limited Access Permit Holders\nWithout limits on the landings of incidentally caught Atlantic swordfish and sharks, the\npotential exists for significant numbers of fish to be landed, thereby defeating the purpose of\nlimited access and hindering the rebuilding process. For these reasons, NMFS limits the\nlandings of incidentally caught Atlantic swordfish and sharks by all gears.\nFinal Action:\nFor swordfish incidental limited access permits, allow five swordfish to\nbe landed per trip for squid trawl vessels or two swordfish to be landed\nper trip for all other gear types. For shark incidental limited access\npermit holders, allow five large coastal sharks to be landed per vessel\nper trip for all gear types, and a total of 16 pelagic or small coastal\nsharks, all species combined, to be landed per vessel per trip for all\ngear types\nThe incidental harvest limits for swordfish are based on current regulations. For sharks,\nthese limits represent the average number of sharks caught incidentally (either during a large\ncoastal shark (LCS) closure or caught by pelagic longline fishermen not targeting sharks)\nper trip in 1996 and 1997. Analyses indicated only a few trips targeting swordfish or tuna\ncaught a number of sharks above the limit in this action. Analyses performed on the pelagic\nlongline logbook indicate that during the 1996 LCS closures over 75 percent of 1,562 trips\ncaught a maximum of one LCS (50 percent of the trips did not report catching any LCS).\nThe mean number of LCS caught during these trips is larger than one because ten percent of\nChapter 4 - Harvest Limits - 34","the trips caught a maximum of nine to 80 LCS (only one percent of the trips caught 80\nLCS). Of the 1,631 trips in 1996 where sharks were not targeted, over 75 percent of the\ntrips caught a maximum of five pelagic sharks (50 percent of the trips did not report\ncatching any pelagic sharks). The mean number of pelagic sharks per trip is larger than five\nbecause ten percent of the trips caught a maximum of 25 to 286 pelagic sharks (only one\npercent of the trips caught 286 pelagic sharks). Analyses performed on 1997 data were\nsimilar but indicated lower means (two LCS and 11 pelagic sharks). In order to comply\nwith NS 9, NMFS decided to use the larger numbers from 1996 for the shark limits.\nThis action will also aid enforcement because the harvest limits are per trip rather than\nper day. NMFS believes that these limits are appropriate for those fishermen whose\ninteractions with these species are truly incidental in nature.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it meets the goal of limited access to rationalize fleet\ncapacity to available quota, and addresses enforcement concerns.\nRejected Options for Harvest Limits for Incidental Limited Access Permit Holders\nRejected Option: No limit on fishery harvest for incidental limited access permit holders\nWithout limits on Atlantic swordfish and shark landings in the incidental fishery, the\npotential exists for the incidental fishery to target and harvest substantial numbers of fish\nwhich could result in the premature closure of the directed fishery. Limiting the directed\nfishery without a similar limit on the incidental fishery would be inconsistent with the goal\nof rationalizing fleet capacity to available quota.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it is not consistent with the goal of limited access to\nrationalize fleet size given the available quota.\nRejected Option: For swordfish incidental limited access permits, allow five swordfish\nper vessel per trip for squid trawl vessels or two swordfish per vessel\nper trip for all other gear types. For shark incidental limited access\npermit holders, allow one large coastal shark per vessel per day for all\ngear types, and allow a total of three pelagic or small coastal sharks, all\nspecies combined, per vessel per day for all gear types\nFor swordfish, these incidental limits are consistent with current regulations and were\nthe preferred alternatives in the previously proposed limited access rule. For sharks, these\nlimits represent the average number of sharks caught incidentally (either during a large\ncoastal shark closure or caught by pelagic longline fishermen targetting swordfish or tuna,\nnot sharks) per set in 1996 and 1997. Although the analyses for these limits had high\nChapter 4 - Harvest Limits - 35","standard deviations, the mean number of sharks caught incidentally was consistent for over\n75 percent of the sets. In other words, the analyses indicated only a few sets caught numbers\nof sharks above the limit stated above. This alternative is not selected due to enforcement\nconcerns in calculating per day harvest limits. Also, vessels that fish for extended periods\ncould conceivably harvest substantial numbers of sharks.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because monitoring landings on a daily basis is more\ndifficult than monitoring on a per trip basis.\n4.7 Transferability of Permits\n4.7.1 Transferability Restrictions\nCurrently, Atlantic swordfish and shark permits are only valid for the vessel and owner\nto whom they were issued. However, since there were no eligibility requirements and no\nlimit on the number of permits issued prior to the implementation of limited access, there\nhas been no need to make permits transferable. Since the establishment of control date in\nthese fisheries, some individuals have purchased a vessel having an existing permit before\nthe control date and included the vessel's catch history in the sales agreement.\nFinal Action: Limited access permits are transferable with or without the sale of the\npermitted vessel, or to a replacement vessel owned or purchased by the\noriginal permitee (subject to upgrading restrictions - see following\nsection), but not under any other circumstances\nLimited access is a mechanism for freezing the level of fishing capacity until a more\ncomprehensive management system is developed. However, fisheries are dynamic, both in\nterms of the natural resource and the human component, and NMFS believes it is important\nto make allowances for inevitable changes, to the extent practicable. Vessels may sink or\ndeteriorate beyond repair, and some vessel owners will exit the fishery. This action allows a\nreasonable level of transferability to accommodate circumstances such as death or\npermanent disability of the permitee, or replacement of a damaged, destroyed, or aging\nvessel, without hindering the objectives of limited access.\nNMFS believes that transfers involving the documented purchase of a permitted vessel\nare acceptable as long as the transfer does not increase the number or capacity of permitted\nvessels in the fleet. Providing a means to transfer directed and incidental permits with or\nwithout the sale of the permitted vessel will allow permittees to permanently retire from the\nAtlantic swordfish or shark fisheries and sell all assets in that fishery. It will also provide\nopportunities for new entrants to the fisheries, although these new entrants will likely have\nto pay the price of the capitalized value of the permit(s) and possibly the vessel.\nChapter 4 - Transferability of Permits - 36","Conclusion\nThis action is seclected because it will not increase the number or capacity of permitted\nvessels but will allow for the dynamic nature of these fisheries, consistent with the goals of\nlimited access and NS 6. It also minimizes adverse economic impacts to fishermen,\nconsistent with NS 8.\nRejected Options for Transferability of Permits\nRejected Option: Status quo: No transferability of limited access permits\nThis alternative would prevent owners from selling their permits or transferring their\npermits to another vessel. Under limited access, this would be the most effective means of\nreducing the number of permits through attrition, but it would also have adverse economic and\nsocial effects. This alternative could be perceived as an unfair penalty against families of\nindividuals who are no longer able to fish. Vessels that are lost or are no longer seaworthy\ncould not be replaced, thus providing an incentive to \"stretch\" the life of a vessel (inconsistent\nwith NS 10). Also, the value of a vessel offered for sale would likely be diminished if it could\nnot reenter the fishery, particularly if the vessel had limited utility in alternative fisheries.\nThus, NMFS rejects the complete prohibition of transfers as unnecessarily inflexible, although\nit would accomplish the goals of this limited access program.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it is an unnecessarily inflexible means of\naccomplishing the goals of this limited access program, is inconsistent with NS 10, and may\nincrease bycatch, inconsistent with NS 9.\nRejected Option: Require that fishermen submit/purchase two directed limited access\npermits to qualify to transfer one directed limited access permit\nThis alternative would require fishermen wishing to enter either the directed swordfish\nor the directed shark fisheries to purchase two directed limited access permits to obtain one\ndirected limited access permit. Additionally, if the fisherman wishes to enter the directed\nswordfish fishery, he/she would also have to obtain an incidental shark permit and an\nAtlantic tuna longline permit (see above). This alternative would reduce harvesting capacity\nin the fisheries over time as original limited access permittees leave the fishery. This\nalternative is not selected at this time as it reduces not only latent effort but also active\neffort. In the long term, NMFS may consider this alternative; however, in this first step\ntowards rationalizing fleet size with the quota, this alternative is not considered appropriate.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected at this time because it may reduce active effort in addition to\nlatent effort, inconsistent with goals of this proposed limited access system.\nChapter 4 - Transferability of Permits - 37","4.7.2 Upgrading Restrictions\nPrior to this FMP and implementing rule, there were no restrictions on upgrading\nvessels' harvesting capacity. NMFS believes that this issue is a critical component of any\nplan to address overcapitalization and excess fleet capacity.\nFinal Action: Adopt NEFMC and MAFMC upgrading restrictions\nThe New England and Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Councils have adopted\nlimited access policies that make upgrading restrictions consistent across fleets of fisheries.\nNMFS agrees that consistency with other fishery management plans affecting the same\nfleets is important. These regulations allow for one vessel upgrade provided the upgrades\ndo not exceed 20 percent of the horsepower (HP), and ten percent of the length overall\n(LOA), gross registered tonnage (GRT), and net tonnage (NT) of the vessel's baseline.\nChanges to LOA, GRT, and NT must be performed at the same time; changes in HP may be\ncarried out separately. The vessel baseline dates for vessels without existing baselines\nwould be established on the date of publication of this final rule. These regulations are\nsimilar to those alternatives in the previously proposed limited access rules. As such,\nNMFS believes these restrictions, while allowing for a slight increase in harvesting capacity,\nprovide vessel owners reasonable flexibility in refurbishing an existing vessel or acquiring a\nreplacement vessel with improved safety characteristics.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected at this time because it may increase harvesting capacity slightly\nbut will promote safety at sea (NS 10) and address consistency issues across fisheries.\nHowever, NMFS will continue to collect data and may consider alternate upgrading\nrestrictions, like hold capacity, in the future.\nRejected Options for Upgrading Restrictions\nRejected Option: No upgrading allowance from originally-permitted vessel\nThis alternative minimizes a vessel owner's flexibility to enhance the performance of\nan existing vessel or to replace that vessel. This alternative would not allow any upgrades to\nexisting vessels and would require replacement vessels to meet the same specifications as\nthe original vessel. This alternative might unduly hinder fishermen who are substantially\ndependent on more than one fishery and might be inconsistent with NS 10 if vessel upgrades\ncould improve safety at sea.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it might unduly hinder fishermen who are\nsubstantially dependent on more than one fishery and might be inconsistent with NS 10.\nChapter 4 - Transferability of Permits - 38","Rejected Option: No upgrading restrictions\nThis alternative would maximize a vessel owner's flexibility to enhance the\nperformance of an existing vessel or to replace that vessel. However, unrestricted upgrading\nin terms of LOA, GRT, hold capacity, and other relevant factors could defeat the purpose of\nlimited access system by significantly increasing fleet harvesting capacity. Individuals who\nupgraded their vessels substantially could also be disadvantaged in the long term if future\nfishing shares were to be based on pre-limited access catch histories, or on a formula not\ninvolving individual catch histories.\nConclusion:\nThis alternative is rejected because it could significantly increase harvesting capacity,\nthus defeating the purpose of this limited access system.\n4.7.3 Ownership Restrictions\nCurrently, the database of permitted vessels indicates that no single person or entity\nowns more than one percent of Atlantic swordfish or shark permits. However, without\nrestrictions on permit transferability allowed under the limited access system, individual\nentities could acquire what some might consider to be an excessive percentage of the\npermits in the swordfish fishery. NMFS believes that ownership restrictions are an effective\ntool for preserving the historical small owner/operator nature of the fishery.\nFinal Action:\nRestrict the number of Atlantic swordfish or shark permitted vessels\nthat any one person or entity may own or control to no more than five\npercent of the swordfish or shark permitted vessels in the directed\nfisheries.\nThis action limits the percentage of the total swordfish or shark permitted fleet that any\none person or entity may own or control, thus preventing significant consolidation and\nmaintaining the individual owner/operator character of the swordfish and shark fisheries.\nThe actual cap on the number of vessels one entity may own will vary according to the size\nof the fleets. However, it should be noted that no single entity exceeds the percentage\nthreshold at this time.\nConclusion\nThis action is selected because it will help maintain the small owner/operator nature of\nthese fisheries, consistent with NS 8.\nChapter 4 - Transferability of Permits - 39","Rejected Options for Ownership Restrictions\nRejected Option: No restrictions on ownership\nAt present, there are no limits on the number of swordfish-permitted or shark-permitted\nvessels any one person or entity may own. Under this alternative, consolidation of\nownership of swordfish-permitted vessels would be limited only by existing antitrust law.\nNMFS believes that this alternative would not adequately preserve the historical small\nowner/operator nature of the fishery.\nConclusion\nThis alternative is rejected because it would not adequately preserve the historical\nsmall owner/operator nature of the fisheries and their associated communities, inconsistent\nwith NS 8.\n4.8 Environmental Consequences\nThere are few potential negative environmental consequences that could result from any of the\nactions concerning the final limited access system. In fact, there are a number of clear advantages,\nin terms of resource conservation and economic efficiency, that are associated with implementation\nof this limited access system. These advantages accrue because there will be fewer incentives for\ncommercial fishermen to subvert the management system. Positive potential environmental\nconsequences relate to the ultimate number of participants and the extent to which the fishery is\nconcentrated within the fishing year. A large number of participants fishing for a relatively small\nquota is likely to result in the usual problems associated with the \"race for the fish.\"\nFor the Atlantic swordfish and shark fisheries, limiting the number of participants through the\nfinal actions will likely have little direct environmental consequence. Because catch volume and\nthe average size of landed fish can be limited through annual or seasonal quotas, time and area\nclosures, minimum size restrictions, and other means, with or without access controls, the\ntheoretical direct biological effects of limited access by itself may be minor. However, in\nsituations where there is a serious bycatch problem for undersized fish, gamefish or marine\nmammals and endangered species, the bycatch problem may be exacerbated by the derby fishing\nconditions associated with open access. If a reduction in the number of participants alleviates\nderby fishing conditions, the number of interactions with undersized fish, gamefish of all sizes or\nprotected species could conceivably be lessened due to fishermen having more time to choose\nfishing grounds and set and retrieve gear carefully. However, since the reduction in latent effort\nitself is unlikely to significantly reduce the effective fishing effort and since there will still be a\ncompetitive fleet-wide quota, the current derby fishing conditions may not be substantially\nalleviated. The final limited access system will, however, reduce the likelihood that future derby\nfishing conditions will intensify.\nThe environmental consequences of the alternatives outlined above are examined below.\nSince, in general, the environmental consequences are minimal and do not vary substantially\nChapter 4 - Environmental Consequences - 40","between the alternatives considered for each issue, the detailed descriptions of alternatives are not\nrepeated here.\n4.8.1 Number of Permit Categories\nImplementing a two-tiered permit system, in itself, will have few environmental\nconsequences. Harvest levels are not directly affected SO that the biological environment of\nfishery resources and the human environment of fishermen will not be affected. Permit\napplication and reporting requirements for fishermen will not change SO that net economic\nbenefits will be unchanged and no increase in compliance costs should be incurred.\n4.8.2 Limits the Number of Vessels Permitted\nUnder open access, quotas can still be controlled, as noted above. However, measures\nsuch as commercial quotas can lead to derby fishing conditions under open access, with\nconsequences for bycatch of undersized fish and other protected species. To the extent that\nderby fishing can lead to lower prices due to market gluts, fishermen may feel the need to\ncompensate for lower prices by producing a higher volume, with further pressure on the\ntargeted and bycatch stocks. Limiting the number of vessels in the directed fishery is the first\nstep towards balancing the available quota with the effort required to harvest it, thereby\nreducing the likelihood that derby fishing conditions will develop or intensify. Limiting the\nnumber of incidental fishery permits will prevent an expansion of fishing effort in fisheries\nthat primarily direct effort on other species but that catch swordfish and sharks incidentally.\nPreventing increases in fishing mortality from incidental fisheries will contribute to stock\nrebuilding for swordfish and large coastal sharks and will help prevent overfishing of pelagic\nand small coastal sharks.\nA reduction in derby fishing conditions would benefit the biological environment by\nallowing more accurate tracking of harvest so that quota over and underharvests will be\nreduced, as well as potentially increased survival of released bycatch. The physical\nenvironment would benefit from less intense derby fishing conditions in that more time can be\ntaken retrieving gear, thereby reducing gear loss and associated \"ghost fishing.\" The human\nenvironment will also benefit if derby conditions are reduced because there would be less\npressure to fish during inclement weather, which should improve human safety at sea.\n4.8.3 Eligibility to Participate in the Directed and Incidental Fisheries\nCriteria used to determine eligibility to participate in the directed and incidental\nfisheries, such as holding a current permit over certain periods and meeting landings\nthresholds for a specified time period, will have few biological consequences on fishery\nresources because total fishing effort will not be affected directly by the limited access\nsystem, as noted above. For the same reasons, reassigning permits as directed or incidental, in\nitself, will have no direct environmental consequences. If landings criteria are used to\ndetermine eligibility, then speculative fishermen may be denied directed permits, which could\nresult in some net economic loss. However, this economic loss should be minimal because\nChapter 4 - Environmental Consequences - 41","speculative permit holders, by definition, have not contributed to the net economic gain in the\ncommercial fisheries.\n4.8.4 Appeals Process\nEstablishing an appeals process to review documents submitted in support of eligibility\ncriteria to participate in the directed or incidental fisheries will have no environmental\nconsequences because fishing effort, reporting requirements, and compliance costs will not be\naffected directly. Possible increases in the number of participants in the fisheries due to\npermits awarded as a result of appeals will have limited environmental consequences because\nharvest levels are controlled by quotas, commercial retention limits, and time-area closures\nthat are not affected directly by the limited access system. Reduction of derby fishing\nconditions may lead to lower compliance costs as the incentive for circumventing regulations\nis diminished.\n4.8.5 Transferability Restrictions\nAllowing limited transferability of directed and incidental permits should have few\nenvironmental consequences because fishing effort will not be directly affected. Allowing\nsale of permits with or without the permitted vessel or transfer of permits to vessels of similar\nharvesting capacity will not affect overall fleet harvesting capacity. Some net economic\nbenefit may be realized by fishermen who exit the fishery if the capitalized cost of the permit\nis substantial. This will further reduce the incentive to target swordfish or sharks when fishing\nfor other species, although increases in regulatory discards may result from the unavoidable\ncatches of swordfish and sharks that cannot be landed.\n4.8.6 Upgrading Restrictions\nAllowing replacement vessels or refurbished vessels a one-time upgrade of no more than\n20 percent of the horsepower and ten percent of the vessel length, gross registered tonnage, or\nnet tonnage will allow minor increases in fleet capacity. Environmental consequences will\nbe insignificant because harvest levels, reporting costs, and compliance costs will not be\ndirectly affected.\n4.8.7 Ownership Restrictions\nRestricting the number of swordfish- and shark-permitted vessels in the directed fisheries\nthat any one person or entity can own or control to no more than five percent of the directed\nfleet will have few environmental consequences because overall fishing effort, reporting costs,\nand compliance costs will not be directly affected.\n4.8.8 Harvest Limits\nImplementing incidental harvest limits could lead to some net economic loss if some\nfishermen exit the fishery because they cannot retain all of their swordfish or shark incidental\nChapter 4 - Environmental Consequences - 42","catch. However, reduced incidental landings should contribute to increased rates of stock\nrebuilding or decreased likelihood of overfishing. Some net economic loss may occur because\nthe alternative methods for reducing swordfish and shark incidental catches may reduce\ncatches of target species, although any reduction in catches are expected to be minimal.\nCompliance costs may increase slightly in that enforcement agents will need to check the type\nof commercial permit held.\n4.8.9 Impacts on Marine Mammal and Endangered Species\nMarine mammals and sea turtles are known to be taken in the drift gillnet and longline\nsectors of the Atlantic shark fishery. Under the Marine Mammal Authorization Program, the\nsoutheast shark drift gillnet fishery is a Category II fishery (occasional take), the shark bottom\nlongline fishery is a Category III fishery (no known take), and the Atlantic swordfish longline\nfishery is a Category I fisheries (frequent incidental take).\nNo impacts on marine mammals and endangered species are expected to result from the\nfinal limited access measures. However, this FMP cumulatively has significant changes in the\nAtlantic swordfish and shark fisheries, in terms of quota levels, fishery operation, and\npotentially bycatch and bycatch mortality rates. To that end, NMFS reinitiated consultation\non this FMP. The overall impact on protected species depends on the extent to which changes\nin fishing effort in the swordfish and shark fisheries would result in effort changes in other\nfisheries and the relative take rates in those fisheries. For example, reductions in allowable\ncatches in the shark fishery may result in a shifting of effort to other fisheries that may have\nhigher take rates.\n4.8.10 Mitigating Measures\nNo significant environmental impacts are expected to result from the final limited access\nmeasures; therefore, no mitigating measures for the limited access measures are included. For\ndiscussion of the cumulative environmental impacts in the final FMP, see Chapter 8.\n4.8.11 Unavoidable Adverse Impacts\nThe unavoidable adverse impact of this limited access system is that it will transform a\nfishery that was previously open to all U.S. residents into one that will be restricted to those\npermit holders who can demonstrate at least a threshold level of historical landings. This\nadverse impact is unavoidable because of the mismatch that has been created by escalating\nfleet capacity combined with a dwindling resource. If this action is not taken, and new\nfishermen continue to enter the fishery, it is highly likely that many businesses will suffer\nsevere economic hardship in the future (see Chapter 7). If this action is not taken, it is also\nlikely that effective fishing pressure on the resource will increase, thus leading to further\ndeclines in net benefits as the fishing season collapses and the \"race for the fish\" intensifies.\nTo mitigate this impact, NMFS is allowing the transferability of permits. This will allow\nfishermen willing to leave the fishery to sell their permit, with or without the vessel, to\nfishermen willing to enter the fishery. In an open access system where fleet capacity has met\nChapter 4 - Environmental Consequences - 43.","or exceeded that needed to harvest the surplus production from the resource (as is the case for\nswordfish and sharks), individuals compete to catch as many fish as possible as quickly as\npossible, often resulting in poor fishing practices such as hasty deployment and retrieval of\ngear that may result in many fish being killed but not landed, and selection of fishing grounds\nfor proximity to land or high catch rates of target species without regard for bycatch of other\nspecies or undersized individuals.\n4.8.12 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources\nNo irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources are expected.\nChapter 4 - Environmental Consequences - 44","References Cited in Chapter 4\nAppendix A to the Amendment 8 to the Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan, Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management\nCouncil, Tampa, Florida.\nBranstetter, S. and G. Burgess. 1997. Gulf and South Atlantic Fishery Development Foundation and University of\nFlorida. Commercial Shark Fishery Observer Program 1996. 1996 SEW Document SB-III-1 and 1998 SEW\nDocument SB-IV-1.\nLarkin, Sherry L., Donna J. Lee, Charles M. Adams. 1998. Costs, Earnings, and Returns to the U.S. Atlantic Pelagic\nLongline Fleet in 1996. Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences. University of Florida. Staff Paper SP 98-9.\nGainsville, FL. 46 p.\nMagnuson-Stevens Act (16 U.S.C. 1801, § 2)\nMuse, B. 1991. Survey of Individual Quota Programs. Draft report. Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission.\nJune. 32 p.\nNMFS. 1992. Regulatory Impact Review for the Bluefin Tuna Fishery. NOAA. U.S. Department of Commerce.\nNMFS. 1995. Options for Establishing an Interim Permit Moratorium and Eligibility Criteria for the Atlantic\nSwordfish (or Shark) Fishery. NOAA. U.S. Department of Commerce. 20 p.\nChapter 4 - References - 45"]}