{"Bibliographic":{"Title":"Programmatic supplemental environmental impact statement for Alaska groundfish fisheries implemented under the authority of the Fishery management plans for the Groundfish fishery of the Gulf of Alaska and the Groundfish of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands area : public review draft. Volume 4","Authors":"","Publication date":"2001","Publisher":""},"Administrative":{"Date created":"08-21-2023","Language":"English","Rights":"CC 0","Size":"0001802614"},"Pages":["ALASKA GROUNDFISH FISHERIES\nDRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SUPPLEMENTAL\nENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT\nVOLUME IV\nChapter 4 (Continued)\nSH\n222\n.A4\nP7\n2001\nv.4\nQ\nUnited States Department\nof Commerce\nNOAA\nNational Oceanic and\nAtmospheric Administration\nNational Marine Fisheries Service\nAlaska Region\nJanuary 2001","SH\n222\nA4\nAlaska Groundfish Fisheries\nPT\nDraft Programmatic Supplemental\n2001\nEnvironmental Impact Statement\nv.4\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY\nVOLUME I\nChapter 1 Purpose and Need for Action\nChapter 2 Alternatives Including the Proposed Action\nVOLUME II\nChapter 3 Affected Environment\nLIBRARY\nVOLUME III\nJUN 18 2013\nChapter 4 Environmental and Economic Consequences\nNational &\nAtmospheric Administration\nVOLUME IV\nU.S. Dept. of Commerce\nChapter 4 Environmental and Economic Consequences (Continued)\nVOLUME V\nChapter 5 List of Preparers\nChapter 6 List of Agencies, Organizations, and Persons to Whom Copies of Statement are Sent\nChapter 7 Literature Cited\nVOLUME VI\nAppendix A Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands Fisheries Management Plan Amendment Summaries\nAppendix B Gulf of Alaska Fisheries Management Plan Amendment Summaries\nAppendix C Regulatory Amendment Summaries\nAppendix D Notice of Intent\nAppendix E Scoping Notice\nAppendix F Scoping Report; Notice of Availability\nAppendix G North Pacific Fishery Management Council Comprehensive Management Goals\nAppendix H Non-Target Species List\nVOLUME VII\nAppendix I Sector and Regional Profiles of the North Pacific Groundfish Fisheries\nVOLUME VIII\nAppendix J Cumulative Impacts Assessment","TABLE OF CONTENTS\nPage\nTitle\nSection\nEnvironmental and Economic Consequences\n4-1\nChapter 4\n4.1-1\n4.1\nDescription of Alternatives\nPolicy to Increase Protection to Marine Mammals and Seabirds\n4.1.1\n4.1-1\n(Alternative 2)\n4.1-1\nSummary of Alternative 2 Regime\n4.1.1.1\n4.1-4\n4.1.1.2\nFormulation of Alternatives\n4.1-4\nSelection of Case Studies\n4.1.1.3\nIdentification of Fisheries Involved in Selected\n4.1.1.4\n4.1-7\nCase Studies\nManagement Tools to Address the Selected Cases\n4.1-9\n4.1.1.5\nDevelopment of the Alternative Fishery\n4.1.1.6\n4.1-12\nManagement Plan Regime\nThe Two Alternative Regimes Emphasizing\n4.1.1.7\nMarine Mammal and Seabird Protection\n4.1-15\nMarine Mammal/Seabird Protection Alternative 2.1\n4.1.1.8\n4.1-16\n(\"Low and Slow\")\nMarine Mammal and Seabird Protection Alternative 2.2\n4.1.1.9\n(\"Short-Burst\")\n4.1-17\n4.1.1.10 Characterization of the Fisheries after the\nImplementation of Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2\n4.1-26\nPolicy to Increase Protection to Target Species (Alternative 3)\n4.1-35\n4.1.2\nSummary of Alternative 3 Regime\n4.1-42\n4.1.2.1\nDiscussion of Tools Reviewed\n4.1-46\n4.1.2.2\nDefinition of Tools and Their Use in the Alternative\n4.1.2.3\nManagement Regime\n4.1-56\nRecordkeeping and Reporting Requirements and\n4.1.2.4\n4.1-63\nObserver Program\nPolicy to Increase Protection to Non-Target Species (Alternative 4)\n4.1-65\n4.1.3\nSummary of Alternative 4 Regime\n4.1-65\n4.1.3.1\nFormulation of Alternative Management Regime\n4.1-68\n4.1.3.2\nDevelopment of Specific Management Measures for\n4.1.3.3\nNon-Target Species Groups\n4.1-77\nPolicy to Increase Protection to Habitat (Alternative 5)\n4.1-108\n4.1.4\nSummary of Alternative 5 Regime\n4.1-108\n4.1.4.1\nConsideration of Alternative Management\n4.1.4.2\n4.1-113\nMeasures\nTools Selected for Consideration in Alternative\n4.1.4.3\nManagement Regime\n4.1-117\nDefinition of Alternative Management Regime\n4.1-120\n4.1.4.4\nPolicy to Increase Socioeconomic Benefits (Alternative 6)\n4.1-123\n4.1.5\nSummary of Alternative 6 Regime\n4.1-123\n4.1.5.1\nDevelopment of the Alternative 6.1\n4.1.5.2\n4.1-125\nConsideration of Other Management Measures\n4.1.5.3\nfor Alternative 6.1\n4.1-138\nDevelopment of Alternative 6.2\n4.1.5.4\n4.1-144\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\ni","4.1.6\nDescription of Analytical Model Used in Preparing Programmatic\nSEIS\n4.1-145\n4.1.6.1 Introduction\n4.1-145\n4.1.6.2\nStock Projection Model for Certain Target Species\n4.1-145\n4.1.6.3\nMultispecies Inseason Management Model\nUsed to Estimate Annual Catch for Each\nAlternative\n4.1-153\n4.1.6.4\nMethod Used to Estimate the 1997-1999 Catch\nof Total Allowable Catch Species and Prohibited\nSpecies\n4.1-162\n4.1.6.5\nMethod Used to Estimate the 1997-1999 Bycatch of\nNon-Target Species\n4.1-162\n4.1.6.6\nMethods Used to Estimate Exvessel Value and\nProduct Value\n4.1-163\n4.2\nEffects of Alternatives on Marine Mammals\n4.2-1\n4.2.1\nEffects of the Alternatives on Steller Sea Lions\n4.2-3\n4.2.1.1\nEffects of Alternative 1 (No Action) on Steller\nSea Lions\n4.2-4\n4.2.1.2\nEffects of Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 (Increased\nProtection for Marine Mammals and Seabirds)\non Steller Sea Lions\n4.2-21\n4.2.1.3\nEffects of Alternative 3 (Increased Protection for\nTarget Species) on Steller Sea Lions\n4.2-31\n4.2.1.4\nThe Effects of Alternative 4 (Increased Protection\nfor Non-Target Species)\non Steller Sea Lions\n4.2-32\n4.2.1.5\nThe Effects of Alternative 5 (Increased Protection for\nHabitat)\non Steller Sea Lions\n4.2-33\n4.2.1.6\nThe Effects of Alternative 6.1 (Increased\nLong-Term Socioeconomic Benefits) on Steller\nSea Lions\n4.2-35\n4.2.1.7\nEffects of Alternative 6.2 (Increased Socioeconomic\nBenefit - Narrow Focus) on Steller Sea Lions\n4.2-36\n4.2.2\nEffects of the Alternatives on Northern Fur Seals\n4.2-37\n4.2.2.1\nEffects of Alternative 1 on Northern Fur Seals\n4.2-38\n4.2.2.2\nThe Effects of Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 (Increased\nProtection for Marine Mammals and Seabirds) on\nNorthern Fur Seals\n4.2-40\n4.2.2.3\nThe Effects of Alternative 3 (Increased Protection of\nTarget Species) on Northern Fur Seals\n4.2-41\n4.2.2.4\nThe Effects of Alternative 4 (Increased Protection\nfor Non-Target Species) on Northern Fur Seals\n4.2-42\n4.2.2.5\nThe Effects of Alternative 5 (Increased Protection\nfor Habitat) on Northern Fur Seals\n4.2-43\n4.2.2.6\nThe Effects of Alternative 6.1 (Increased\nLong-Term Socioeconomic Benefits) on\nNorthern Fur Seals\n4.2-44\n4.2.2.7\nThe Effects of Alternative 6.2 (Increased\nSocioeconomic Benefit - Narrow Focus) on Northern\nFur Seals\n4.2-44\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nii","Effects of the Alternatives on Harbor Seals\n4.2-46\n4.2.3\nThe Effects of Alternative 1 on Harbor Seals\n4.2-46\n4.2.3.1\nThe Effects of Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 (Increased\n4.2.3.2\nProtection for Marine Mammals and Seabirds) on\nHarbor Seals\n4.2-48\nThe Effects of Alternative 3 (Increased Protection for\n4.2.3.3\nTarget Species) on Harbor Seals\n4.2-49\nThe Effects of Alternative 4 (Increased Protection\n4.2.3.4\nfor Non-Target Species) on Harbor Seals\n4.2-49\nThe Effects of Alternative 5 (Increased Protection for\n4.2.3.5\nHabitat)\non Harbor Seals\n4.2-50\nThe Effects of Alternative 6.1 (Increased Long-\n4.2.3.6\nTerm Socioeconomic Benefits) on Harbor Seals\n4.2-51\nThe Effects of Alternative 6.2 (Increased\n4.2.3.7\nSocioeconomic Benefit - Narrow Focus) on\n4.2-51\nHarbor Seals\nEffects of the Alternatives on Other Pinnipeds\n4.2-53\n4.2.4\n4.2.5 Effects of the Alternatives on Baleen Whales\n4.2-55\nEffects of the Alternatives on Toothed Whales\n4.2-56\n4.2.6\nEffects of the Alternatives on Sea Otters\n4.2-58\n4.2.7\n4.2-60\n4.2.8 Summary\nConsistency with the Marine Mammal Protection\n4.2.8.1\n4.2-60\nPolicy Objective\nOverall Effects of Alternative 1 on Marine\n4.2.8.2\n4.2-60\nMammals\nContrasts Between Alternative 1 and the Other\n4.2.8.3\n4.2-61\nAlternatives\nPlacement of the Alternatives Along the Effects\n4.2.8.4\n4.2-65\nContinuum\n4.3-1\nEffects of the Alternatives on Seabirds\n4.3\n4.3-1\nInformation Gaps\n4.3.1\nAlternative 1 the Current Management Policy for Seabirds\n4.3-3\n4.3.2\n4.3-3\n4.3.2.1 Introduction\n4.3-4\nAgency Responsibilities\n4.3.2.2\n4.3-5\nDescription of Alternative 1\n4.3.2.3\nDirect and Indirect Effects of the Alternatives on Seabirds\n4.3-12\n4.3.3\nEffects of Alternative 1 on Seabirds\n4.3-15\n4.3.3.1\nEffects of Alternative 2 (Increased Protection for\n4.3.3.2\nMarine Mammals and Seabirds) on Seabirds\n4.3-32\nEffects of Alternative 3 (Increased Protection of\n4.3.3.3\nTarget Species) on Seabirds\n4.3-38\nEffects of Alternative 4 (Increased Protection for\n4.3.3.4\nNon-Target Species) on Seabirds\n4.3-41\nEffects of Alternative 5 (Increased Protection for\n4.3.3.5\nHabitat)\non Seabirds\n4.3-43\nEffects of Alternative 6 (Increased Socioeconomic\n4.3.3.6\nBenefits) on Seabirds\n4.3-45\nSummary of the Effects of the Alternatives on Seabirds\n4.3.4\n4.3-48\nEffects of the Alternatives on Target Groundfish Species\n4.4-1\n4.4\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\niii","4.4.1\nPollock\n4.4-1\n4.4.2\nPacific Cod\n4.4-21\n4.4.3 Sablefish\n4.4-53\n4.4.4 Atka Mackerel\n4.4-63\n4.4.5 Rockfish\n4.4-83\n4.4.5.1\nPacific Ocean Perch\n4.4-83\n4.4.5.2\nNorthern Rockfish\n4.4-102\n4.4.5.3\nShortraker and Rougheye Rockfish\n4.4-115\n4.4.5.4\nOther Slope Rockfish in the Gulf of Alaska\n4.4-126\n4.4.5.5\nPelagic Shelf Rockfish\n4.4-132\n4.4.5.6\nGulf of Alaska Demersal Shelf Rockfish\n4.4-139\n4.4.5.7\nOther Rockfish\n4.4-143\n4.4.5.8\nThornyhead Rockfish\n4.4-150\n4.4.6\nFlatfish\n4.4-155\n4.4.6.1\nEastern Bering Sea Yellowfin Sole\n4.4-155\n4.4.6.2\nEastern Bering Sea Rock Sole\n4.4-163\n4.4.6.3\nFlathead Sole\n4.4-171\n4.4.6.4\nEastern Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska\nArrowtooth Flounder\n4.4-178\n4.4.6.5\nGreenland Turbot\n4.4-189\n4.4-195\n4.4.6.6\nAlaska Plaice and Other Flatfish\n4.4.6.7\nGulf of Alaska Flatfish\n4.4-203\n4.4.7\nSummary of the Effects of the Alternatives on Target Groundfish\nSpecies\n4.4-208\n4.4.7.1\nSignificance of the Impacts of Alternative 1\n4.4-208\n4.4.7.2\nComparison of Alternative 1 and the Other\nAlternatives\n4.4-213\nEffects of the Alternatives on Non-Target (Forage, Other, and Nonspecified)\n4.5\n4.5-1\nSpecies\n4.5.1\nCurrent Management by Fishery Management Plan Species\n4.5-1\nCategory\n4.5-1\n4.5.1.1\nNon-target Species\n4.5.1.2\nOverview of Effects of Status Quo Management on\nNon-Target Species\n4.5-2\n4.5.2\nImpacts of Alternatives on Case Study Species Groups Selected for\nAlternative 4\n4.5-8\n4.5.2.1 Skates\n4.5-10\n4.5.2.2 Grenadiers\n4.5-21\n4.5.2.3\nSquids\n4.5-26\n4.5.3\nImpacts of Alternatives on Other Non-Target Species\n4.5-32\n4.5.3.1\nPredicted Catch of Forage Species Under Each\nAlternative\n4.5-34\n4.5.3.2\nPredicted Catch of Other Species Under Each\nAlternative\n4.5-36\n4.5.3.3\nPredicted Catch of Nonspecified Species Under\nEach Alternative\n4.5-42\n4.5.4\nSummary of Alternative 4, Regime to Increase Protection to\nNon-Target Species\n4.5-45\n4.6\nEffects of the Alternatives on Prohibited Species\n4.6-1\n4.6.1\nSummary of Current Management\n4.6-1\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\niv","Species That Are Prohibited and How They Are Managed\n4.6.1.1\nUnder Groundfish Fishery Management Plans\n4.6-1\nSummary of Prohibited Species Catch Management\n4.6.1.2\nMeasures in the\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nGroundfish Fishery Management Plan\n4.6-5\nSummary of Prohibited Species Catch Management\n4.6.1.3\nMeasures in\nthe Gulf of Alaska Groundfish\nFishery Management Plan\n4.6-14\nSummary of Status Quo Fishery Management\n4.6.1.4\nPlan Management\nof Prohibited Species\n4.6-19\nImpacts of the Alternatives on Prohibited Species\n4.6-20\n4.6.2\n4.6-22\n4.6.2.1\nPacific Halibut\n4.6-44\n4.6.2.2\nKing and Tanner Crabs\n4.6.2.3\nPacific Herring\n4.6-55\n4.6-68\n4.6.2.4\nPacific Salmon\nSummary of Effects of Alternatives on Prohibited Species\n4.6-106\n4.6.3\nSummary of Impacts on Pacific Halibut\n4.6-107\n4.6.3.1\nSummary of Impacts on King and Tanner Crabs\n4.6-108\n4.6.3.2\nSummary of Impacts on Pacific Herring\n4.6-109\n4.6.3.3\nSummary of Impacts on Pacific Salmon Species\n4.6-111\n4.6.3.4\nEvaluation of the Significance of Status Quo\n4.6.3.5\nManagement on Prohibited Species\n4.6-112\nEffects of the Alternatives on Habitat, Including Essential Fish Habitat\n4.7-1\n4.7\nSummary of the Current Regime with Regard to Habitat\n4.7.1\n4.7-1\nManagement Policy\n4.7.1.1\nFishing Equipment Restrictions\n4.7-3\n4.7-4\n4.7.1.2\nProhibited Species\nTime and Area Closures\n4.7-6\n4.7.1.3\n4.7-7\n4.7.1.4\nYear-round Closure Areas\n4.7-9\n4.7.1.5\nSummary\nImpacts of the Alternatives on Essential Fish Habitat\n4.7-10\n4.7.2\n4.7-11\n4.7.2.1\nAlternative 1\nImpacts of Alternatives 2 through 6 on Essential\n4.7.2.2\nFish Habitat Relative to Alternative 1\n4.7-19\nImpacts of Alternatives 1 Through 6 on Nonbenthic\n4.7.2.3\nEssential Fish Habitat\n4.7-34\n4.7-34\n4.7.2.4\nSummary\nEconomic and Social Effects of the Alternatives\n4.8-1\n4.8\n4.8-2\n4.8.1\nAlternative 1\nAlternative 1 Impacts on the Catcher Vessels\n4.8.1.1\nDelivering to Inshore Processors\n4.8-2\nAlternative 1 Impacts on the Processing Sector\n4.8-3\n4.8.1.2\nAlternative 1 Impacts on Consumers of Groundfish\n4.8.1.3\n4.8-5\nProducts\nAlternative 1 Impacts on Nonconsumptive and\n4.8.1.4\nNonuse Values\n4.8-5\nAlternative 1 Impacts on Prohibited Species Catch\n4.8.1.5\nand Groundfish Discards\n4.8-5\nAlternative 1 Impacts on Fishing Vessel Safety\n4.8.1.6\n4.8-6\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nV","4.8.1.7\nAlternative 1 Impacts on Excess Capacity\n4.8-6\n4.8.2\nImpacts of Alternative 2 (Comparison Between Alternatives 1 and 2)\n4.8-6\n4.8.2.1 Alternative 2.1 Impacts on the Catcher Vessels\nDelivering to Inshore Processors\n4.8-7\n4.8.2.2\nAlternative 2.1 Impacts on the Processing Sector\n4.8-11\n4.8.2.3\nAlternative 2.1 Impacts on Consumers of Groundfish\nProducts\n4.8-15\n4.8.2.4\nAlternative 2.1 Impacts on Nonconsumptive and\nNonuse Values\n4.8-15\n4.8.2.5\nAlternative 2.1 Impacts on Prohibited Species Catch\nand Groundfish Discards\n4.8-15\n4.8.2.6\nAlternative 2.1 Impacts on Fishing Vessel Safety\n4.8-16\n4.8.2.7\nAlternative 2.1 Impacts on Excess Capacity\n4.8-16\n4.8.2.8\nAlternative 2.2 Impacts on the Catcher Vessels\nDelivering to Inshore Processors\n4.8-16\n4.8.2.9\nAlternative 2.2 Impacts on the Processing Sector\n4.8-19\n4.8.2.10\nAlternative 2.2 Impacts on Consumers of Groundfish\nProducts\n4.8-21\n4.8.2.11 Alternative 2.2 Impacts on Nonconsumptive and\nNonuse Values\n4.8-21\n4.8.2.12 Alternative 2.2 Impacts on Prohibited Species Catch\nand Groundfish Discards\n4.8-21\n4.8.2.13 Alternative 2.2 Impacts on Fishing Vessel Safety\n4.8-22\n4.8.2.14 Alternative 2.2 Impacts on Excess Capacity\n4.8-22\n4.8.3\nImpacts of Alternative 3 (Comparison Between Alternatives 1\nand 3)\n4.8-22\n4.8.3.1\nAlternative 3 Impacts on the Catcher Vessels Delivering\nto Inshore Processors\n4.8-22\n4.8.3.2\nAlternative 3 Impacts on the Processing Sector\n4.8-25\n4.8.3.3\nAlternative 3 Impacts on Consumers of Groundfish\nProducts\n4.8-27\n4.8.3.4\nAlternative 3 Impacts on Nonconsumptive and Nonuse\nValues\n4.8-27\n4.8.3.5\nAlternative 3 Impacts on Prohibited Species Catch\nand Groundfish Discards\n4.8-28\n4.8.3.6\nAlternative 3 Impacts on Fishing Vessel Safety\n4.8-28\n4.8.3.7\nAlternative 3 Impacts on Excess Capacity\n4.8-29\n4.8.3.8\nFurther Consideration of Mesh Size Regulations\n4.8-29\n4.8.4\nImpacts of Alternative 4 (Comparison Between Alternatives 1\nand 4)\n4.8-30\n4.8.4.1\nAlternative 4.1 Impacts on Catcher Vessels\nDelivering to Inshore Processors\n4.8-30\nAlternative 4.1 Impacts on Processing Sector\n4.8.4.2\n4.8-31\n4.8.4.3\nAlternative 4.1 Impacts on Consumers of Groundfish\nProducts\n4.8-32\n4.8.4.4\nAlternative 4.1 Impacts on Nonconsumptive and\nNonuse Values\n4.8-33\n4.8.4.5\nAlternative 4.1 Impacts on Prohibited Species Catch\nand Groundfish Discards\n4.8-33\n4.8.4.6\nAlternative 4.1 Impacts on Fishing Vessel Safety\n4.8-33\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nvi","Alternative 4.1 Impacts on Excess Capacity\n4.8-33\n4.8.4.7\nAlternative 4.2 Impacts on Catcher Vessel\n4.8.4.8\nDelivering to Inshore Processors\n4.8-33\nAlternative 4.2 Impacts on Processing Sector\n4.8-35\n4.8.4.9\n4.8.4.10 Alternative 4.2 impacts on Consumers of Groundfish\n4.8-36\nProducts\n4.8.4.11 Alternative 4.2 Impacts on Nonconsumptive and\n4.8-36\nNonuse Values\nAlternative 4.2 Impacts on Prohibited Species Catch\n4.8.4.12\nand Groundfish Discards\n4.8-36\nAlternative 4.2 Impacts on Fishing Vessel Safety\n4.8-36\n4.8.4.13\n4.8.4.14 Alternative 4.2 Impacts on Excess Capacity\n4.8-36\n4.8.4.15 Further Consideration of Squid Area Closure\n4.8-37\nRegulations\nImpacts of Alternative 5 (Comparison Between Alternatives 1\n4.8.5\n4.8-37\nand 5)\nAlternative 5 Impacts on the Catcher Vessels\n4.8.5.1\nDelivering to Inshore Processors\n4.8-37\nAlternative 5 Impacts on the Processing Sector\n4.8-40\n4.8.5.2\nAlternative 5 Impacts on Consumers of Groundfish\n4.8.5.3\n4.8-42\nProducts\nAlternative 5 Impacts on Nonconsumptive and\n4.8.5.4\nNonuse Values\n4.8-43\nAlternative 5 Impacts on Prohibited Species\n4.8.5.5\nCatch and Groundfish Discards\n4.8-43\nAlternative 5 Impacts on Fishing Vessel Safety\n4.8-44\n4.8.5.6\nAlternative 5 Impacts on Excess Capacity\n4.8-44\n4.8.5.7\nFurther Consideration of Changing Gear Allocations\n4.8-44\n4.8.5.8\nImpacts of Alternative 6 (Comparison Between Alternatives 1\n4.8.6\n4.8-44\nand 6)\nObjectives of Alternative 6.1\n4.8-45\n4.8.6.1\nAlternative 6.1 General Impacts on Economic\n4.8.6.2\n4.8-45\nPerformance\nAlternative 6.1 Impacts on Vessel Owners Including\n4.8.6.3\nOwners of\nCatcher/Processors\n4.8-47\nAlternative 6.1 Impacts on Owners of Processing\n4.8.6.4\nPlants Other than Catcher/Processors\n4.8-48\nAlternative 6.1 Impacts on Vessel and Processing\n4.8.6.5\nCrew and Other Employees\n4.8-49\nAlternative 6.1 Impacts on Communities Including\n4.8.6.6\nBusinesses and Employees in Support Sectors\n4.8-49\nAlternative 6.1 Impacts on the Public\n4.8-50\n4.8.6.7\nAlternative 6.1 Impacts on Fishing Vessel Safety\n4.8-50\n4.8.6.8\nAlternative 6.1 Impacts on Harvest and Processing\n4.8.6.9\nCapacity and Capital\n4.8-51\nAlternative 6.1 Impacts on the Competitiveness\n4.8.6.10\nof Markets\n4.8-51\n4.8.6.11 Alternative 6.1 Impacts on Prohibited Species Catch\nand Groundfish Discards\n4.8-52\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\nvii","4.8.6.12 Timing and Breadth Of Implementation\n4.8-52\n4.8.6.13 Allocation of Catch Rights Under Alternative 6.1\n4.8-53\n4.8.6.14 Multispecies Complications with Alternative 6.1\n4.8-54\n4.8.6.15 Other Elements of Alternative 6.1\n4.8-54\n4.8.6.16 Potential Synergies Between Alternative 6.1 and the\nGoals of Other Alternatives\n4.8-57\n4.8.6.17 Alternative 6.2 Impacts on the Catcher Vessels\nDelivering to Inshore Processors\n4.8-58\n4.8.6.18 Alternative 6.2 Impacts on the Processing Sector\n4.8-60\n4.8.6.19 Alternative 6.2 Impacts on Consumers of Groundfish\nProducts\n4.8-61\n4.8.6.20 Alternative 6.2 Impacts on Nonconsumptive and\nNonuse Values\n4.8-61\n4.8.6.21 Alternative 6.2 Impacts on Prohibited Species Catch\nand Groundfish Discards\n4.8-62\n4.8.6.22 Alternative 6.2 Impacts on Fishing Vessel Safety\n4.8-62\n4.8.6.23 Alternative 6.2 Impacts on Excess Capacity\n4.8-62\n4.8.7\nImpacts of the Alternatives on the Human Environment\n4.8-62\nImpacts of Alternative 1 on Industry Sectors\n4.8.7.1\nand on Communities and Regions\n4.8-64\n4.8.7.2\nImpacts of Alternative 2 on Industry Sectors\nand on Communities and Regions\n4.8-69\n4.8.7.3\nImpacts of Alternative 3 on Industry Sectors\nand on Communities and Regions\n4.8-77\n4.8.7.4\nImpacts of Alternative 4 on Industry Sectors\nand on Communities and Regions\n4.8-80\nImpacts of Alternative 5 on Industry Sectors\n4.8.7.5\nand on Communities and Regions\n4.8-86\nImpacts of Alternative 6 on Industry Sectors\n4.8.7.6\nand on Communities and Regions\n4.8-90\nEffects of the Proposed Alternatives on Subsistence Use of\n4.8.8\nMarine Resources\n4.8-97\nPotential Salmon Bycatch Effects\n4.8-98\n4.8.8.1\nPotential Steller Sea Lion Subsistence Use Effects\n4.8.8.2\n4.8-99\nSummary of Economic and Social Effects of the Alternatives\n4.8-103\n4.8.9\nSummary of Social and Economic Impacts of\n4.8.9.1\nAlternative 1\n4.8-103\nSummary of Social and Economic Impacts of\n4.8.9.2\nAlternatives 2.1 Through 6.2\n4.8-105\n4.9\nEffects of the Alternatives on the Ecosystem\n4.9-1\nPrinciples and Policies of Ecosystem-Based Management\n4.9-1\n4.9.1\nEvaluation of Alternative 1 Relative to\n4.9.1.1\nEcosystem-Based Management Standards\n4.9-3\nEcosystem Impacts of the Alternatives\n4.9-17\n4.9.2\n4.9.2.1 Effects on Predator-Prey Relationships, Including\nIntroduction of Nonindigenous Species\n4.9-19\nEffects on Energy Flow and Balance, Including Fish\n4.9.2.2\nRemovals and Fish Processing Waste\n4.9-30\n4.9.2.3\nEffects on Biological Diversity\n4.9-35\n4.9.3\nSummary of Effects\n4.9-38\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nviii","4.9-38\n4.9.3.1\nEcosystem-level Ecological Impacts\nEcosystem-Based Management Objectives\n4.9-41\n4.9.3.2\nEffects of the Alternatives on Management and Enforcement\n4.10-1\n4.10\n4.10-1\n4.10.1\nAlternative 1\nBasis for Comparing the Effects of the Alternative\n4.10-2\n4.10.2\nComparing Alternatives to the Status Quo\n4.10-4\n4.10.3\n4.10-4\n4.10.3.1 Alternative 2\n4.10-6\n4.10.3.2 Alternative 3\n4.10-6\n4.10.3.3 Alternative 4\n4.10-6\n4.10.3.4 Alternative 5\n4.10-7\n4.10.3.5 Alternative 6\nOther Environmental Consequences Associated with the Groundfish\n4.11\n4.11-1\nFishery\n4.11-1\n4.11.1\nMarine Debris\n4.11-3\n4.11.2 Fish Processing Waste\n4.11-4\n4.11.3\nAccidents at Sea\n4.11-4\n4.11.4 Nonindigenous Species\n4.11-5\n4.11.5 Fishing Industry Logistical Support Facilities\n4.11-5\n4.11.6 Environmental Justice\nEnergy Requirements and Conservation Potential of Various Alternative\n4.12\n4.12-1\nRegimes\n4.13-1\n4.13\nCumulative Effects\n4.13-1\n4.13.1 Objectives and Approach\n4.13-1\n4.13.1.1 Objectives\n4.13-2\n4.13.1.2 Approach\n4.13.1.3\nSummary of Cumulative Effects Assessment\n4.13-10\nProcedure\n4.13.2 Historical Review of Effects Resulting From Incremental\n4.13-11\nDecision-making\n4.13-11\n4.13.2.1 Historical Review Methodology\n4.13-13\n4.13.2.2 Historical Review Summary\n4.13-16\n4.13.3 External Effects\n4.13-17\n4.13.3.1 Human Controlled Events\n4.13-18\n4.13.3.2 Natural Events\n4.13-21\n4.13.4 Cumulative Effects Analyses Summaries\n4.13-21\n4.13.4.1 Marine Mammals\n4.13-28\n4.13.4.2 Seabirds\n4.13-33\n4.13.4.3\nTarget Groundfish Species\n4.13-51\n4.13.4.4\nNon-Target Species\n4.13-53\n4.13.4.5 Prohibited Species\n4.13-56\n4.13.4.6 Essential Fish Habitat\n4.13-63\n4.13.4.7 Socioeconomics\n4.13-73\n4.13.4.8 Ecosystem\n4.14-1\n4.14\nSummary of Environmental Consequences\n4.14-1\n4.14.1 Introduction\n4.14.2 Analytical Approach to Evaluating Alternatives\n4.14-1\n4.14-2\n4.14.3\nSummary of Environmental Consequences\n4.14.4 Comparison of Effects of Management Alternatives Compared\nto Status Quo\n4.14-3\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\nix","TABLES\nLevels of Concern for Potential Negative Competitive Interactions Between a Target Fishery and the\nTable 4.1-1\nWestern and Eastern Stocks of Steller Sea Lions in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands and Gulf of\nAlaska Fishery Management Areas\nTable 4.1-2\nTools Ranked for Current and Potential Use for Increasing Protection to Marine Mammals and\nSeabirds\nTable 4.1-3\nManagement Actions for Steller Sea Lion Protection in \"Low and Slow\" Alternative 2.1\nSpecific Management Actions for Seabird Protection for Both the \"Low and Slow\" (Alternative 2.1)\nTable 4.1-4\nand the \"Short Burst\" (Alternative 2.2)\nTable 4.1-5\nManagement Actions for Steller Sea Lion Protection in \"Short Burst\" Alternative 2.2\nEstimated Biomass Distributions for Each Species, Management Area, and Season\nTable 4.1-6\nDaily Catch Rates for Pollock, Pacific Cod, and Atka Mackerel Under Alternative 2.1\nTable 4.1-7\nExample Total Allowable Catch Distribution (Using 2000 Total Allowable Catches for all but\nTable 4.1-8\nAleutian Islands Pollock, which was set to 25,000 Metric Tons), Prescribed Daily Catch Rates, and\nNumber of Days of Fishing Resulting under Alternative 2.1\nDetermination of Total Allowable Catches for Pollock, Pacific Cod, and Atka Mackerel in the\nTable 4.1-9\nEastern Bering Sea, Gulf of Alaska, and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands for Alternative 2.2 (in\nMetric Tons)\nTime Line of Management Measures to Protect Target Species in the Groundfish Fisheries of the\nTable 4.1-10\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands and Gulf of Alaska, 1978-2000\nManagement Tools Ranked for Current and Potential Use for Increasing Protection to Target Species\nTable 4.1-11\nListing of Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands and Gulf of Alaska Target Species or Species Complexes\nTable 4.1-12\nand Their Groundfish Tier Designations Under Amendments 56/56\nRatings of Current and Potential Use of Management Tools for Non-Target Species\nTable 4.1-13\nSkate Species Identified During Recent and Previous Alaska Fisheries Science Center Bottom\nTable 4.1-14\nTrawl Surveys\nEstimated Catch (Metric Tons) of All Skate Species Combined by Gear and Target Fishery\nTable 4.1-15\nEstimated Aggregate Biomass (Metric Tons) of Skate Species Complex from Bottom Trawl Surveys\nTable 4.1-16\nEstimated Biomass (Metric Tons) of Common Skate Species from Recent Bottom Trawl Surveys\nTable 4.1-17\nTable 4.1-18\nLife History Information Available for BSAI and GOA Skate Species\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nX","TABLES\n(continued)\nTotal Allowable Catches (Metric Tons) Set Under Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 for the Skate Complex\nTable 4.1-19\nby Area\nEstimated Catch (Metric Tons) of All Grenadier Species Combined by Gear and Target Fishery\nTable 4.1-20\nEstimated Aggregate Biomass (Metric Tons) of Grenadier Species Complex from Trawl Surveys\nTable 4.1-21\nEstimated Biomass (Metric Tons) for Common Grenadier Species in the Gulf of Alaska, 1999\nTable 4.1-22\nObserved Gulf of Alaska Fishery Catch (Metric Tons) of Grenadiers by Average Depth and Gear\nTable 4.1-23\nType, 1999\nLife History Information Available for Common Gulf of Alaska Grenadier Species\nTable 4.1-24\nTotal Allowable Catches (Metric Tons) Set for Grenadier Complex by Area\nTable 4.1-25\nEstimated Catch (Metric Tons) of All Squid Species Combined by Gear and Target Fishery\nTable 4.1-26\nEstimated Proportion of Pelagic Pollock Fishery Catch Duplicated as a Result of Closed Areas for\nTable 4.1-27\nSquid\nTools Ranked for Current and Potential Use for Increasing Protection to Habitat\nTable 4.1-28\nProduct Mix as Percentage of Total Production for Pollock Processors by Sector, Season, and Year\nTable 4.1-29\nBSAI Maximum Allowable Catch by Alternative and Species Based on 2001-2005 Average\nTable 4.1-30\n(1,000 Metric Tons)\nGulf of Alaska Maximum Allowable Catch by Alternative and Species Based on 2001-2005 Average\nTable 4.1-31\n(1,000 Metric Tons)\nPercent Change in Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Maximum Allowable Catch Relative to\nTable 4.1-32\nAlternative 1, by Alternative and Species (Based on 2001-2005 Average)\nPercent Change in Gulf of Alaska Maximum Allowable Catch Relative to Alternative 1, by\nTable 4.1-33\nAlternative and Species (Based on 2001-2005 Average)\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Projected Catch by Alternative and Species Based on 2001-2005\nTable 4.1-34\nAverage (1,000 Metric Tons)\nGulf of Alaska Projected Catch by Alternative and Species Based on 2001-2005 Average\nTable 4.1-35\n(1,000 Metric Tons)\nPercent Change in Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Catch Relative to 1997-1999 Average by\nTable 4.1-36\nAlternative and Species Based on 2001-2005 Average\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nxi","TABLES\n(continued)\nPercent Change in Gulf of Alaska Catch Relative to 1997-1999 Average by Alternative and Species\nTable 4.1-37\nBased on 2001-2005 Average\nTable 4.1-38\nPercent Change in Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Catch Relative to Alternative 1 by Alternative and\nSpecies Based on 2001-2005 Average\nTable 4.1-39\nPercent Change in Gulf of Alaska Catch Relative to Alternative 1, by Alternative and Species Based\non 2001-2005 Average\nTable 4.1-40\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Projected Catch as a Percentage of Maximum Allowable Catch by\nAlternative and Species Based on 2001-2005 Average\nTable 4.1-41\nGulf of Alaska Projected Catch as a Percentage of Maximum Allowable Catch by Alternative and\nSpecies Based on 2001-2005 Average\nTable 4.2-1\nCriteria for Intensity of Effects Scores\nTable 4.2-2\nChanges to the Atka Mackerel Fishery Begun in 1999 to Reduce Competitive Interactions with Steller\nSea Lions\nChanges to the Pollock Fisheries in the Bering Sea, Aleutian Islands, and Gulf of Alaska Begun in\nTable 4.2-3\n1999 to Reduce Competitive Interactions with Steller Sea Lions\nEstimated Pollock Catches and Percent Caught in the Steller Sea Lion Conservation Area in the\nTable 4.2-4\nEastern Bering Sea\nEstimated Pollock Catches (mt) and Percent Caught in Steller Sea Lion Critical Habitat in the\nTable 4.2-5\nGulf of Alaska\nChange in Annual Catch (by Metric Tons) and Percent Change in Annual Catch of Important Steller\nTable 4.2-6\nSea Lion Prey under Each Alternative Compared to Alternative 1\nDifference in Seasonal and Areal Catch Proportions and Number of Days of Fished (Pollock, Pacific\nTable 4.2-7\nCod, and Atka Mackerel Fisheries) under Alternative 2.1 and Compared to Alternative 1\nCatches under Alternative 2.2 for Pollock, Pacific Cod, and Atka Mackerel in the Eastern Bering Sea,\nTable 4.2-8\nGulf of Alaska, and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands, Their Seasonal Distribution (25 Percent to\nEach), and the Reduction in Catch Relative to Alternative 1\nExpected Catch Distribution (Metric Tons and Percent by Season and Area) of the Fisheries Under\nTable 4.2-9\nAlternative 1 if Distributed in the Time and Area Strata Proposed Under Alternative 2.1\nExpected Seasonal Catch Distribution, Number of Days Fished and Daily Catch Rate of Fisheries\nTable 4.2-10\nUnder Alternative 2.1 Relative to Alternative 1\nTable 4.2-11\nChanges in Seasonal Catch Distribution and the Number of Days Fished by Season Between\nAlternative 2.2 and Alternative 1\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nxii","TABLES\n(continued)\nChanges in Expected Catch (Metric Tons) from Areas Closed under Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2,\nTable 4.2-12\nRelative to Alternative 1\nSummary of Effects of Alternative 1 on Marine Mammals\nTable 4.2-13\nSummary of Scores for Each Programmatic Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement\nTable 4.2-14\nAlternative Reflecting the Levels of Protection They Provide for Marine Mammals\nChronology of Management Measures to Protect Seabirds Under the Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea\nTable 4.3-1\nand Aleutian Islands Groundfish Fisheries Management Plans and Other Regulatory Actions\nBird Species or Species Groups Impacted by Direct Effects (i.e., Incidentally Taken) in the BSAI and\nTable 4.3-2\nGOA Groundfish Fisheries, 1993-1999, by Gear Type\nSeabird Species Most Likely to be Impacted by Potential Indirect Effects of the Bering Sea and\nTable 4.3-3\nAleutian Islands and Gulf of Alaska Groundfish Fisheries\nDirect and Indirect Effects of Alternative 1 on Seabirds\nTable 4.3-4\nScoring System for Relating Effects of the Alternatives on Seabirds\nTable 4.3-5\nVarious Sources of Seabird Mortality in the BSAI and GOA\nTable 4.3-6\nSummary of Effects of the Alternatives on Seabirds, Relative to Alternative 1\nTable 4.3-7\nEstimate of Average Catch, Acceptable Biological Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass,\nTable 4.4-1\nfor Eastern Bering Sea Pollock, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nLower and Upper Bounds of Estimated Average Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass for\nTable 4.4-2\nEastern Bering Sea Pollock, by Alternative\nEstimated Average Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass for Gulf of Alaska Pollock, 2001\nTable 4.4-3\nto 2005, by Alternative\nLower and Upper Bounds of Estimated Average Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass for\nTable 4.4-4\nGulf of Alaska Pollock, by Alternative\nHighest and Lowest Values for Average Total Biomass, Spawning Biomass, Catch, and Age for\nTable 4.4-5\nPacific Cod\nTable 4.4-6\nParameters Used in Model Runs\nKey Parameters Used to Model the Impacts of Alternative 1 on Pacific Cod\nTable 4.4-7\nEstimated Average Catch, Acceptable Biological Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass for\nTable 4.4-8\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Pacific Cod, 2001 to 2005, by Alternatives\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nxiii","TABLES\n(continued)\nTable 4.4-9\nLower and Upper Bounds of Estimated Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass for Bering Sea\nand Aleutian Islands Pacific Cod, by Alternative\nTable 4.4-10\nEstimated Average Catch, Acceptable Biological Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass for\nGulf of Alaska Pacific Cod, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nTable 4.4-11\nLower and Upper Bounds of Estimated Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass for Gulf of\nAlaska Pacific Cod\nTable 4.4-12\nKey Parameters Used to Model the Impacts of Alternative 2.1 on Pacific Cod\nTable 4.4-13\nKey Parameters Used to Model the Impacts of Alternative 2.2 on Pacific Cod\nTable 4.4-14\nKey Parameters Used to Model the Impacts of Alternative 2.2 on Pacific Cod\nTable 4.4-15\nKey Parameters Used to Model the Impacts of Alternative 4.1 on Pacific Cod\nTable 4.4-16\nKey Parameters Used to Model the Impacts of Alternative 4.2 on Pacific Cod\nTable 4.4-17\nKey Parameters Used to Model Impacts of Alternative 5 on Pacific Cod\nTable 4.4-18\nKey Parameters Used to Model the Impacts of Alternative 6.1 on Pacific Cod\nTable 4.4-19\nKey Parameters Used to Model the Impacts of Alternative 6.1 on Pacific Cod\nTable 4.4-20\nEstimated Average Catch, Acceptable Biological Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass for\nSablefish, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nTable 4.4-21\nLower and Upper Bounds of Average Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass for Sablefish,\nby Alternative\nTable 4.4-22\nProportion of Sablefish Catch that Occurred Within Closed Areas, 1999\nTable 4.4-23\nEstimated Acceptable Biological Catch and Catch for Gulf of Alaska Atka Mackerel, 2001-2005,\nby Alternative\nTable 4.4-24\nEstimated Average Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass for Bering Sea and Aleutian\nIslands Atka Mackerel, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nTable 4.4-25\nLower and Upper Confidence Bounds of Estimated Average Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total\nBiomass for Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Atka Mackerel, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nTable 4.4-26\nTAC Specifications for Skates and Grenadiers by Area, in Metric Tons\nTable 4.4-27\nEstimated Average Catch, Acceptable Biological Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass for\nEastern Bering Sea Pacific Ocean Perch, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nxiv","TABLES\n(continued)\nLower and Upper Bounds of Estimated Average Catch, Spawning Biomass and Total Biomass for\nTable 4.4-28\nEastern Bering Sea Pacific Ocean Perch, by Alternative\nEstimated Catch, Acceptable Biological Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass for Aleutian\nTable 4.4-29\nIslands Pacific Ocean Perch, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nLower and Upper Bounds of Estimated Average Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass for\nTable 4.4-30\nAleutian Islands Pacific Ocean Perch, by Alternative\nGulf of Alaska Pacific Ocean Perch-Five Year Population Model Projections of Average Catch,\nTable 4.4-31\nAcceptable Biological Catch, Average Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass, by Alternative\nLower and Upper Bounds of Estimated Average Catch, Average Spawning Biomass, and Average\nTable 4.4-32\nTotal Biomass for Gulf of Alaska Pacific Ocean Perch\nEastern Bering Sea Pacific Ocean Perch Bycatch Model Projections of Average Catch, 2001 to 2005,\nTable 4.4-33\nin Metric Tons, by Alternative\nAleutian Islands Pacific Ocean Perch Five-Year Bycatch Model Projections of Average Catch in\nTable 4.4-34\nMetric Tons by Alternative, 2001-2005\nGulf of Alaska Pacific Ocean Perch Five-Year Bycatch Model Projections of Average Catch,\nTable 4.4-35\n2001-2005, in Metric Tons, by Alternative\nEastern Bering Sea Other Red Rockfish Bycatch Model Projections of Average Catch, 2001 to 2005,\nTable 4.4-36\nin Metric Tons, by Alternative\nAleutian Islands Sharpchin/Northern Rockfish Bycatch Model Projections of Average Catch, 2001\nTable 4.4-37\nto 2005, in Metric Tons, by Alternative\nGulf of Alaska Northern Rockfish Bycatch Model Projections of Average Catch, 2001 to 2005, in\nTable 4.4-38\nMetric Tons, by Alternative\nEastern Bering Sea Other Red Rockfish Bycatch Model Projections of Average Catch, 2001 to 2005,\nTable 4.4-39\nin Metric Tons, by Alternative\nAleutian Islands Shortraker/Rougheye Rockfish (Trawl) Bycatch Model Projections of Average\nTable 4.4-40\nCatch, 2001 to 2005, in Metric Tons, by Alternative\nAleutian Islands Shortraker/Rougheye Rockfish (Hook-and-Line) Bycatch Model Projections of\nTable 4.4-41\nAverage Catch, 2001 to 2005, in Metric Tons, by Alternative\nGulf of Alaska Shortraker/Rougheye Rockfish Bycatch Model Projections of Average Catch, 2001\nTable 4.4-42\nto 2005, in Metric Tons, by Alternative\nTotal Allowable Catch Specifications for Skates and Grenadiers, in Metric Tons, by Area\nTable 4.4-43\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\nXV","TABLES\n(continued)\nTable 4.4-44\nGulf of Alaska Other Slope Rockfish-Bycatch Model Projections of Average Catch, 2001 to 2005,\nin Metric Tons, by Alternative\nTable 4.4-45\nGulf of Alaska Pelagic Shelf Rockfish Model Projections of Average Catch, 2001-2005, in Metric\nTons by Alternative\nTable 4.4-46\nProjections of Acceptable Biological Catch and Catch for Gulf of Alaska Demersal Shelf Rockfish,\n2001-2005, in Metric Tons, by Alternative\nTable 4.4-47\nEastern Bering Sea Other Rockfish Bycatch Model Projections of Average Catch, 2001 to 2005, in\nMetric Tons, by Alternative\nTable 4.4-48\nAleutian Islands Other Rockfish-Five Year Bycatch Model Projections of Average Catch, 2001-\n2005, in Metric Tons, by Alternative\nTable 4.4-49\nTotal Allowable Catch Specifications for Skates and Grenadiers by Area, in Metric Tons\nTable 4.4-50\nModel Projections of Average Catch, Acceptable Biological Catch, Average Spawning Biomass, and\nAverage Fishing Mortality for Thornyhead Rockfish, 2001 to 2005, in Metric Tons, by Alternative\nTable 4.4-51\nLower and Upper Bounds of Estimated Average Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass for\nGulf of Alaska Thornyhead Rockfish\nTable 4.4-52\nBering Sea Yellowfin Sole Estimated Average Catch, Acceptable Biological Catch, Spawning\nBiomass, and Total Biomass, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nTable 4.4-53\nUpper and Lower Bounds for Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass, Bering Sea Yellowfin\nSole, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nTable 4.4-54\nEstimated Average Catch, Acceptable Biological Catch (ABC), Average Spawning Biomass and\nTotal Biomass, for Bering Sea Rock Sole, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nTable 4.4-55\nLower and Upper Bounds Estimated Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass for Bering Sea\nRock Sole, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nTable 4.4-56\nEstimated Average Catch, Acceptable Biological Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass, for\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Flathead Sole, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nTable 4.4-57\nLower and Upper Estimated Average Catch, Average Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass for\nFlathead Sole, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nTable 4.4-58\nEstimated Average Catch, Acceptable Biological Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass,\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Arrowtooth Flounder, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nTable 4.4-59\nEstimated Acceptable Biological Catch, Average Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass for Gulf of\nAlaska Arrowtooth Flounder, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nxvi","TABLES\n(continued)\nLower and Upper Bounds of Estimated Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass, for Bering\nTable 4.4-60\nSea and Aleutian Islands Arrowtooth Flounder, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nLower and Upper Bounds of Estimated Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass, for Gulf of\nTable 4.4-61\nAlaska Arrowtooth Flounder, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nEstimated Average Catch, Acceptable Biological Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass, for\nTable 4.4-62\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Greenland Turbot, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nUpper and Lower Bounds of Estimated Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass, for Bering\nTable 4.4-63\nSea and Aleutian Islands Greenland Turbot, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nEstimated Average Catch, Acceptable Biological Catch, Spawning Biomass, and Total Biomass, for\nTable 4.4-64\nBering Sea/Aleutian Islands Alaska Plaice, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nLower and Upper Bounds of Estimated Average Catch, Average Spawning Biomass, and Average\nTable 4.4-65\nTotal Biomass for Alaska Plaice, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nProjected Catch of Other Flatfish Species, Excluding Alaska Plaice, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative,\nTable 4.4-66\nin Metric Tons\nProjected Catch of Gulf of Alaska Rex Sole, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative, in Metric Tons\nTable 4.4-67\nProjected Catch of Gulf of Alaska Deep Water Flatfish, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative, in Metric Tons\nTable 4.4-68\nProjected Catch of Gulf of Alaska Shallow Water Flatfish, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative, in Metric\nTable 4.4-69\nTons\nProjected Catch of Gulf of Alaska Flathead Sole, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative, in Metric Tons\nTable 4.4-70\nTable 4.4-71\nSignificance Evaluations of Effects\nSignificance of Status Quo on Four Effects on Target Groundfish Species\nTable 4.4-72\nComparison of Status Quo and Other Alternatives\nTable 4.4-73\nRanking Scores, Relative to Alternative 1 (Status Quo) for Each Alternative over Four Effects for\nTable 4.4-74\nTarget Groundfish Species\nEstimated Total Catch (Metric Tons) by Fishery Management Plan Category, 1997 to 1999 Average\nTable 4.5-1\nfor Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nEstimated Total Catch (Metric Tons) by Fishery Management Plan Category, 1997 to 1999 Average\nTable 4.5-2\nfor Gulf of Alaska\nEstimated Catches (Metric Tons) of Non-Target Species Groups, 1997 to 1999, with Average\nTable 4.5-3\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\nxvii","TABLES\n(continued)\nTable 4.5-4\nEffects of Alternatives on Skate Catch (Metric Tons) for Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nTable 4.5-5\nEffects of Alternatives on Skate Catch (Metric Tons) for Gulf of Alaska.\nTable 4.5-6\nEffects of Alternatives on Grenadier Catch (Metric Tons) for Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.5-7\nEffects of Alternatives on Grenadier Catch (Metric Tons) for Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nTable 4.5-8\nEffects of Alternatives on Squid Catch (Metric Tons) for Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nTable 4.5-9\nEffects of Alternatives on Squid Catch (Metric Tons) for Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.5-10\nPotential Reduction in Squid Catch If Specified Areas Were Closed to Pollock Fishing\nTable 4.5-11\nEffects of Alternatives on 5-Year Average (2001-2005) Predicted Catch for Bering Sea and Aleutian\nIslands by Category\nTable 4.5-12\nEffects of Alternatives on 5-Year Average Predicted Catch for Gulf of Alaska by Category\n(2001-2005)\nTable 4.5-13\nEffects of Alternatives on Smelt Catch (Metric Tons) in Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nTable 4.5-14\nEffects of Alternatives on Smelt Catch (Metric Tons) in Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.5-15\nEffects of Alternatives on Other Pelagic Forage Fishes (Metric Tons) in Bering Sea and Aleutian\nIslands\nTable 4.5-16\nEffects of Alternatives on Other Pelagic Forage Fishes (Metric Tons) in Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.5-17\nEffects of Alternatives on Sleeper Shark Catch (Metric Tons) in Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nEffects of Alternatives on Sleeper Shark Catch (Metric Tons) in Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.5-18\nEffects of Alternatives on Salmon Shark Catch (Metric Tons) in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nTable 4.5-19\nEffects of Alternatives on Salmon Shark Catch (Metric Tons) in the Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.5-20\nEffects of Alternatives on Spiny Dogfish Catch (Metric Tons) in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nTable 4.5-21\nEffects of Alternatives on Spiny Dogfish Catch (Metric Tons) in the Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.5-22\nEffects of Alternatives on Unidentified Shark Catch (Metric Tons) in the Bering Sea and Aleutian\nTable 4.5-23\nIslands\nTable 4.5-24\nEffects of Alternatives on Unidentified Shark Catch (Metric Tons) in the Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.5-25\nEffects of Alternatives on Sculpin Catch (Metric Tons) in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nxviii","TABLES\n(continued)\nEffects of Alternatives on Sculpin Catch (Metric Tons) in the Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.5-26\nEffects of Alternatives on Octopus Catch (Metric Tons) in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nTable 4.5-27\nEffects of Alternatives on Octopus Catch (Metric Tons) in the Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.5-28\nEffects of Alternatives on Other Fish Catch (Metric Tons) in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nTable 4.5-29\nEffects of Alternatives on Other Fish Catch (Metric Tons) in the Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.5-30\nEffects of Alternatives on Jellyfish Catch (Metric Tons) in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nTable 4.5-31\nEffects of Alternatives on Jellyfish Catch (Metric Tons) in the Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.5-32\nEffects of Alternatives on Attached Benthos Catch (Metric Tons) in the Bering Sea and Aleutian\nTable 4.5-33\nIslands\nEffects of Alternatives on Attached Benthos Catch (Metric Tons) in the Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.5-34\nEffects of Alternatives on Mobile Benthos Catch (Metric Tons) in the Bering Sea and Aleutian\nTable 4.5-35\nIslands\nEffects of Alternatives on Mobile Benthos Catch (Metric Tons) in the Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.5-36\nImpacts of Non-Target Species Catch by Alternative Relative to Alternative 1 for Each Species\nTable 4.5-37\nGroup\nChronology of Management Measures to Control Bycatch of Prohibited Species in the Groundfish\nTable 4.6-1\nFisheries of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) and Gulf of Alaska, 1935-2000\nEstimated Bycatch of Pacific Halibut (Metric Tons of Mortality), King Crab, Tanner Crab, Pacific\nTable 4.6-2\nHerring, Chinook Salmon, and Other Salmon Taken in Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Groundfish\nFisheries, 1977-1999ª\nProhibited Species Catch Apportionments for the 2000 Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Fisheries\nTable 4.6-3\nProhibited Species Catch Apportionments for the 2000 Gulf of Alaska Fisheries\nTable 4.6-4\nCriteria for Rating Alternatives Relative to Alternative 1 for Each Species\nTable 4.6-5\nHalibut Fishing Mortality From All Sources in All IPHC Areas Combined, Round Weight in Metric\nTable 4.6-6\nTons\nBering Sea Aleutian Islands Pacific Halibut Bycatch, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative, in Metric Tons\nTable 4.6-7\nGOA Pacific Halibut Bycatch, 2001-2005, by Alternative, in Metric Tons\nTable 4.6-8\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nxix","TABLES\n(continued)\nTable 4.6-9\nAbundance Estimates from the 1999 NMFS Trawl Survey for Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab\nSpecies\nTable 4.6-10\nEstimated Numbers of Red King Crab Bycatch for the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands, 2001 to\n2005, by Alternative\nTable 4.6-11\nEstimated Numbers of Bairdi Tanner Crab Bycatch for the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands, 2001\nto 2005, by Alternative\nTable 4.6-12\nEstimated Numbers of Other Tanner Crab (Mostly Opilio) Bycatch for the Bering Sea and Aleutian\nIslands, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nTable 4.6-13\nEstimated Numbers of Other King Crab Bycatch for the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands, 2001 to\n2005, by Alternative\nTable 4.6-14\nEstimated Numbers of Red King Crab Bycatch for the Gulf of Alaska, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nTable 4.6-15\nEstimated Numbers of Bairdi Tanner Crab Bycatch for the Gulf of Alaska, 2001 to 2005, by\nAlternative\nTable 4.6-16\nEstimated Amounts of Opilio and Other Tanner Crab Bycatch for the Gulf of Alaska, 2001 to 2005,\nby Alternatives\nTable 4.6-17\nEstimated Amounts of Other King Crab Bycatch for the Gulf of Alaska, 2001 to 2005, by\nAlternatives\nTable 4.6-18\nForecast Pacific Herring Run Biomass (Metric Tons) by Management Area for 2000\nTable 4.6-19\nEstimated Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Pacific Herring Catch, in Metric Tons, and Percent\nChange, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nTable 4.6-20\nEstimated Gulf of Alaska Pacific Herring Catch, in Metric Tons, and Percent Change, 2001 to 2005,\nby Alternative\nTotal Groundfish Catch and Estimated Bycatch of Chinook and Other Pacific Salmon in U.S.\nTable 4.6-21\nGroundfish Fisheries, 1990 to 1999\nTable 4.6-22\nEstimated Catch in Directed Salmon Fisheries by Alaska Region, 1997 to 1999\nTable 4.6-23\nEstimated Stock Origin of Chinook and Chum Salmon Catch in the BSAI\nTable 4.6-24\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Chinook Salmon Bycatch, in Numbers of Fish, and Percent Change,\n2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nTable 4.6-25\nEstimated Gulf of Alaska Chinook Salmon Bycatch, in Numbers of Fish, and Percent Change, 2001\nto 2005, by Alternative\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nXX","TABLES\n(continued)\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Other Salmon Species Bycatch, in Numbers of Fish, by Alternative\nTable 4.6-26\nGulf of Alaska Other Salmon Species Bycatch, in Numbers of Fish, by Alternative\nTable 4.6-27\nEvaluation of Impacts to Prohibited Species under Alternative 1\nTable 4.6-28\nCriteria for Rating Alternatives Relative to Alternative 1 for Each Species\nTable 4.6-29\nSummary of the Effects on Prohibited Species of Each Alternative Relative Alternative 1\nTable 4.6-30\nChronology of Management Measures to Protect Habitat under the Bering Sea and Aleutian Island,\nTable 4.7-1\nand Gulf of Alaska Groundfish Fishery Management Plans\nTime-Series of Groundfish Trawl Closure Areas in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands and Gulf\nTable 4.7-2\nof Alaska, 1995-1999\nRating of Impacts to Essential Fish Habitat Under Alternative 1\nTable 4.7-3\nAverage Bycatch and Bycatch Rates of Habitat Areas of Particular Concern Biota, in the Bering Sea\nTable 4.7-4\nand Aleutian Islands, 1997-1999\nAverage Bycatch and Bycatch Rates of Habitat Areas of Particular Concern Biota, in the Gulf of\nTable 4.7-5\nAlaska, 1997-1999\nProjected Catch by Gear of Habitat Areas of Particular Concern Biota, for the Bering Sea and\nTable 4.7-6\nAleutian Islands, in Metric Tons, 2001-2005\nProjected Catch by Gear of Habitat Areas of Particular Concern Biota, for the Gulf of Alaska,\nTable 4.7-7\n2001-2005, in Metric Tons\nComparison of Area of Benthic Habitat Protection from Bottom Trawling, by Alternative\nTable 4.7-8\nProjected Total Effort for Fishing Gear that Contacts the Seafloor in Target Fisheries, by Alternative\nTable 4.7-9\nin 2001\nProjected effort of Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Target Fisheries, by Alternatives, in 2001\nTable 4.7-10\nProjected effort for Gulf of Alaska Target Fisheries, by Alternative, in 2001\nTable 4.7-11\nScoring System for Ranking the Effects of the Alternatives on Benthic Essential Fish Habitat\nTable 4.7-12\nRecent Change Between Alternative 1 and Alternatives 2-6 in Projected Catch of Habitat Areas of\nTable 4.7-13\nParticular Concern Biota by Gear and Region\nScores for Each Alternative Reflecting Levels of Protection for Benthic Essential Fish Habitat\nTable 4.7-14\nRelative To Alternative 1\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nxxi","TABLES\n(continued)\nTable 4.8-1\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor\nGroup and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nTable 4.8-2\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value\nRelative to Alternative 1, by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nTable 4.8-3\nGulf of Alaska Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on\n2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nTable 4.8-4\nGulf of Alaska Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative 1, by Inshore\nProcessor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nTable 4.8-5\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and\nAlternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nTable 4.8-6\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to\nAlternative 1, by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nTable 4.8-7\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Hook-and-Line Groundfish Exvessel Value by\nInshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nTable 4.8-8\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Hook-and-Line Percent Change in Groundfish\nExvessel Value Relative to Alternative 1, by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on\n2001-2005 Average\nTable 4.8-9\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Pot Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore\nProcessor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Pot Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel\nTable 4.8-10\nValue Relative to Alternative 1, by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005\nAverage\nTable 4.8-11\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Trawl Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore\nProcessor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nTable 4.8-12\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Trawl Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessell\nValue Relative to Alternative 1, by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005\nAverage\nTable 4.8-13\nGulf of Alaska Hook-and-Line Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and\nAlternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nTable 4.8-14\nGulf of Alaska Hook-and-Line Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative\n1, by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nTable 4.8-15\nGulf of Alaska Pot Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based\non 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nxxii","TABLES\n(continued)\nGulf of Alaska Pot Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative 1, by\nTable 4.8-16\nInshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nGulf of Alaska Trawl Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based\nTable 4.8-17\non 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nGulf of Alaska Trawl Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative 1, by\nTable 4.8-18\nInshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Hook-and-Line Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor\nTable 4.8-19\nGroup and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Hook-and-Line Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value\nTable 4.8-20\nRelative to Alternative 1, by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Pot Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and\nTable 4.8-21\nAlternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Pot Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to\nTable 4.8-22\nAlternative 1, by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Trawl Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and\nTable 4.8-23\nAlternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Trawl Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to\nable 4.8-24\nAlternative 1, by Inshore Processor Group, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor\nTable 4.8-25\nGroup, Alternative and Species Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value\nTable 4.8-26\nRelative to Alternative 1, by Inshore Processor Group, Alternative and Species Based on 2001-2005\nAverage\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Total Product Value by Processor Group and\nTable 4.8-27\nAlternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Percent Change In Total Product Value Relative\nTable 4.8-28\nto Alternative 1, by Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nGulf of Alaska Total Product Value by Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005\nTable 4.8-29\nAverage, in Millions of Dollars\nGulf of Alaska Percent Change In Total Product Value Relative to Alternative 1, by Processor Group\nTable 4.8-30\nand Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nxxiii","TABLES\n(continued)\nTable 4.8-31\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Total Product Value by Processor Group and Alternative, Based on\n2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nTable 4.8-32\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Percent Change In Total Product Value Relative to Alternative 1,\nby Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nTable 4.8-33\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Total Exvessel Value by Year and Alternative\nin Millions of Dollars\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Island Percentage in Change in Annual Total Exvessel\nTable 4.8-34\nValue Relative to Alternative 1 by Year and Alternative\nTable 4.8-35\nGulf of Alaska Total Exvessel Value by Year and Alternative in Millions of Dollars\nGulf of Alaska Percent Change in Annual Total Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative 1, by Year\nTable 4.8-36\nand Alternative\nTable 4.8-37\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Total Exvessel Value by Year and Alternative in Millions of Dollars\nTable 4.8-38\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Percent Change in Annual Total Exvessel Value Relative to\nAlternative 1, by Year and Alternative\nTable 4.8-39\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Total Product Value by Year and Alternative\nin Millions of Dollars\nTable 4.8-40\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Percent Change in Annual total Product Value\nRelative to Alternative 1, by Year and Alternative\nGulf of Alaska Total Product Value by Year and Alternative in Millions of Dollars\nTable 4.8-41\nTable 4.8-42\nGulf of Alaska Percent Change in Annual Total Product Value Relative to Alternative 1, by Year and\nAlternative\nTable 4.8-43\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Total Product Value by Year and Alternative in Millions of Dollars\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Percent Change in Annual Total Product Value Relative to\nTable 4.8-44\nAlternative 1, by Year and Alternative\nPercent of Groundfish Catch on Observed Vessels off Alaska That Would Have Been Displaced By\nTable 4.8-45\nAlternative 2.1 by Area (Only East of 170°W for the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands), Target and\nVessel Class, 1997-1999\nTable 4.8-46\nPercent of Groundfish catch on observed Vessels Off Alaska That Would Have Been Displaced by\nAlternative 2.1 by area (only west of 170°W for the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands), Target and\nVessel Class, 1997-1999\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nxxiv","TABLES\n(continued)\nPercent of Groundfish Catch on Observed Vessels Off Alaska That Would Have Been Displaced By\nTable 4.8-47\nAlternative 3 by Area, Target, and Vessel Class, 1997-1999\nPercent of Groundfish Catch on Observed Vessels Off Alaska That Would Have Been Displaced By\nTable 4.8-48\nAlternative 4 By Area, Target and Vessel Class, 1997-1999\nPercent of Groundfish Catch on Observed Vessels off Alaska That Would Have Been Displaced by\nTable 4.8-49\nAlternative 5 by Area, Target and Vessel Class, 1997-99\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Total Discards by Alternative and Species Based\nTable 4.8-50\non 2001-2005 Average, in Metric Tons\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Total Discards Percent Change Relative to\nTable 4.8-51\nAlternative 1, by Alternative and Species Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Metric Tons\nSummary of Impacts of Alternatives on Fishing and Processing Sectors\nTable 4.8-52\nImpacts of Alternative 1 on Fishing and Processing Sectors\nTable 4.8-53\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 1 on Catcher Vessels\nTable 4.8-54\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 1 on Catcher/processors\nTable 4.8-55\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 1 on Inshore Plants and Motherships\nTable 4.8-56\nImpacts of Alternative 1 on Regional Processing\nTable 4.8-57\nImpacts of Alternative 1 on Regional Catcher Vessels\nTable 4.8-58\nImpacts of Alternative 2.1 on Fishing and Processing Sectors\nTable 4.8-59\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 2.1 on Catcher Vessels\nTable 4.8-60\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 2.1 on Catcher/processors\nTable 4.8-61\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 2.1 on Inshore Plants and Motherships\nTable 4.8-62\nImpacts of Alternative 2.1 on Regional Processing\nTable 4.8-63\nImpacts of Alternative 2.1 on Regional Catcher Vessels\nTable 4.8-64\nImpacts of Alternative 2.2 on Fishing and Processing Sectors\nTable 4.8-65\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 2.2 on Catcher Vessels\nTable 4.8-66\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 2.2 on Catcher/processors\nTable 4.8-67\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nXXV","TABLES\n(continued)\nTable 4.8-68\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 2.2 on Inshore Plants and Motherships\nTable 4.8-69\nImpacts of Alternative 2.2 on Regional Processing\nTable 4.8-70\nImpacts of Alternative 2.2 on Regional Catcher Vessels\nTable 4.8-71\nImpacts of Alternative 3 on Fishing and Processing Sectors\nTable 4.8-72\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 3 on Catcher Vessels\nTable 4.8-73\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 3 on Catcher Processors\nTable 4.8-74\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 3 on Inshore Plants and Motherships\nTable 4.8-75\nImpacts of Alternative 3 on Regional Processing\nTable 4.8-76\nImpacts of Alternative 3 on Regional Catcher Vessels\nTable 4.8-77\nImpacts of Alternative 4.1 on Fishing and Processing Sectors\nTable 4.8-78\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 4.1 on Catcher Vessels\nTable 4.8-79\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 4.1 on Catcher/processors\nTable 4.8-80\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 4.1 on Inshore Plants and Motherships\nTable 4.8-81\nImpacts of Alternative 4.1 on Regional Processing\nTable 4.8-82\nImpacts of Alternative 4.1 on Regional Catcher Vessels\nTable 4.8-83\nImpacts of Alternative 4.2 on Fishing and Processing Sectors\nTable 4.8-84\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 4.2 on Catcher Vessels\nTable 4.8-85\nSummary of Alternative 4.2 Impacts on Catcher/processors\nTable 4.8-86\nSummary of Alternative 4.2 on Inshore Plants and Motherships\nTable 4.8-87\nImpacts of Alternative 4.2 on Regional Processing\nTable 4.8-88\nImpacts of Alternative 4.2 on Regional Catcher Vessels\nTable 4.8-89\nImpacts of Alternative 5 on Fishing and Processing Sectors\nTable 4.8-90\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 5 on Catcher Vessels\nTable 4.8-91\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 5 on Catcher/processors\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nxxvi","TABLES\n(continued)\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 5 on Inshore Plants and Motherships\nTable 4.8-92\nImpacts of Alternative 5 on Regional Processing\nTable 4.8-93\nImpacts of Alternative 5 on Regional Catcher Vessels\nTable 4.8-94\nImpacts of Alternative 6.1 on Fishing and Processing Sectors\nTable 4.8-95\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 6.1 on Catcher Vessels\nTable 4.8-96\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 6.1 on Catcher/processors\nTable 4.8-97\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 6.1 on Inshore Plants and Motherships\nTable 4.8-98\nImpacts of Alternative 6.1 on Regional Processing\nTable 4.8-99\nTable 4.8-100 Impacts of Alternative 6.1 on Regional Catcher Vessels\nTable 4.8-101 Impacts of Alternative 6.2 on Fishing and Processing Sectors\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 6.2 on Catcher Vessels\nTable 4.8-102\nSummary of Impacts of Alternative 6.2 on Catcher/processors\nTable 4.8-103\nTable 4.8-104 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 6.2 on Inshore Plants and Motherships\nTable 4.8-105 Impacts of Alternative 6.2 on Regional Processing\nTable 4.8-106 Impacts of Alternative 6.2 on Regional Catcher Vessels\nEstimated Catch (Number of Fish) in Alaskan Region Salmon Fisheries, 1997 and 1998\nTable 4.8-107\nMatrix of Relationships and Impacts Between the Groundfish Fishery and Sea Lion Subsistence\nTable 4.8-108\nTable 4.8-109 Documented Subsistence Harvest of Steller Sea Lions, Alaska Coastal Communities, Selected Years\nEstimated Subsistence Harvest of Steller Sea Lions by Alaska Region, 1992-1998\nTable 4.8-110\nTable 4.8-111 Estimated Subsistence Harvest of Steller Sea Lions for Selected Communities, 1992-1998\nSummary of the Significance of Economic and Social Impacts of Alternative 1\nTable 4.8-112\nSummary of the Economic and Social Rankings of Alternatives 2.1 Through 6.2\nTable 4.8-113\nNorth Pacific Fishery Management Council Goals and Objectives for Ecosystem-Based\nTable 4.9-1\nManagement\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nxxvii","TABLES\n(continued)\nTable 4.9-2\nIndicators of Amounts of Energy Removal and Redirection and Trophic Position of Removals for the\nEastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands and the Gulf of Alaska for the Alternative 1 and Percent\nChange Between Other Alternatives for 2005\nTable 4.9-3\nScoring System for Effects of the Alternatives on Predator-Prey Relationships, Energy Flow and\nBalance and Diversity\nTable 4.9-4\nAssessment of the Impact of the Alternative 1 on the Environment and Summary of Scores for Each\nAlternative, Reflecting Relative Levels of Protection for Predator-prey Relationships, Energy Flow\nand Balance, and Diversity\nTable 4.9-5\nScoring System for Ranking How Well Each Alternative Achieves Ecosystem-Based Management\nGoals\nTable 4.9-6\nScores for Each Alternatives Relative Level of Achieving Ecosystem-Based Management Goals\nTable 4.10-1\nPrimary Management Measures Suggested by National Marine Fisheries Service to Implement the\nAlternatives\nTable 4.13-1\nPrinciples of Cumulative Effects Analysis\nTable 4.13-2\nStepwise Procedure for Cumulative Effects Analysis\nTable 4.13-3\nAlaska State Fisheries Information\nTable 4.13-4\nSummary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Steller Sea Lions\nTable 4.13-5\nSummary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Northern Fur Seals\nTable 4.13-6\nSummary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Harbor Seals\nTable 4.13-7\nSummary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Other Pinnepeds\nTable 4.13-8\nSummary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Sea Otters\nTable 4.13-9\nSummary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Baleen Whales\nTable 4.13-10\nSummary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Toothed Whales\nTable 4.13-11\nSummary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Northern Fulmars\nTable 4.13-12\nSummary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Short-Tailed Albatross\nTable 4.13-13\nSummary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Other Albatross and Shearwaters\nTable 4.13-14\nSummary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Piscivorous Seabirds\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nxxviii","TABLES\n(continued)\nTable 4.13-15 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Spectacled and Steller's Eider\nTable 4.13-16 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Other Seabirds\nTable 4.13-17 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Walleye Pollock in the Eastern Bering Sea\nand the Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.13-18 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Pacific Cod in the Eastern Bering Sea and\nthe Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.13-19 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Atka Mackerel in the Bering Sea and\nAleutian Islands\nTable 4.13-20 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Atka Mackerel in the Gulf of Alaska\nSummary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Sablefish\nTable 4.13-21\nTable 4.13-22 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Greenland Turbot in the Bering Sea and\nAleutian Islands\nSummary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Deep Water Flatfish in the Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.13-23\nTable 4.13-24 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Arrowtooth Flounder in the Bering Sea and\nAleutian Islands and the Gulf of Alaska\nSummary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Flathead Sole in the Bering Sea and Aleutian\nTable 4.13-25\nIslands\nTable 4.13-26 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Flathead Sole in the Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.13-27 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Rock Sole in the Bering Sea and\nAleutian Islands\nSummary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Other Flatfish in the Bering Sea and Aleutian\nTable 4.13-28\nIslands\nTable 4.13-29 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Rex Sole in the Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.13-30 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Yellowfin Sole in the Bering\nSea and\nAleutian Islands\nTable 4.13-31 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Shallow Water Flatfish in the\nGulf of\nAlaska\nTable 4.13-32 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Northern Rockfish in the Bering Sea and\nAleutian Islands and Gulf of Alaska\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nxxix","TABLES\n(continued)\nTable 4.13-33 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Pacific Ocean Perch in the Bering Sea and\nAleutian Islands\nSummary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Pacific Ocean Perch in the Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.13-34\nTable 4.13-35\nSummary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Thornyheads in the Gulf of Alaska\nTable 4.13-36 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for all Other Rockfish\nTable 4.13-37\nSummary of Identified Prohibited Species Cumulative Effects\nTable 4.13-38 Essential Fish Habitat Identified Cumulative Effects\nCumulative Fishery Sector and Consumer Value Effects\nTable 4.13-39\nTable 4.13-40\nCumulative Regional and Community Socioeconomic Effects\nTable 4.13-41\nEcosystem Cumulative Effect Summary\nTable 4.14-1\nSummary of Environmental Consequences\nComparison of Effects by Alternative for Analysis Categories used in the SEIS. Percentages\nTable 4.14-2\nRepresent the Percent of Species in the Analysis Category that Exhibited Negative (Orange), Neutral\n(Yellow) or Positive (Green) Scores.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nXXX","FIGURES\nTemporal distribution of a hypothetical fishery under the \"low and slow\" Alternative 2.1.\nFigure 4.1-1\nTemporal distribution of a hypothetical fishery under the \"short-burst\" Alternative 2.2.\nFigure 4.1-2\nTrawl exclusion zones during summer (June-November) around Steller sea lion rookeries and\nFigure 4.1-3\nhaulouts in the North Pacific Ocean.\nTrawl exclusion zones during winter (November-June) around Steller sea lion rookeries and haulouts\nFigure 4.1-4\nin the North Pacific Ocean.\nFrequency distribution of consumption rates of walleye pollock among 20 species of pollock\nFigure 4.1-5\nconsumers in the eastern Bering Sea from 1985 to 1988 (Livingston 1993) shown as a bar graph in\nthe top panel and represented by a normal distribution shown in the bell curves in both panels. The\nunits of the abscissa are of equivalent scales showing the percent of the standing stock biomass\nconsumed in the lower panel.\nAreas closed to pollock, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel fisheries under Alternative 2.1.\nFigure 4.1-6\nAreas currently closed to pollock and all trawl fisheries under the status quo and Alternative 2.2.\nFigure 4.1-7\nEastern Bering Sea year-round closed areas to all fishing. These areas represent 20 percent of the\nFigure 4.1-8\neastern Bering Sea management areas.\nAleutian Islands year-round closed areas to all fishing. These areas represent 20 percent of the\nFigure 4.1-9\nAleutian Islands management areas out to 1000 m.\nGulf of Alaska year-round closed areas to all fishing. These areas represent 20 percent of the Gulf\nFigure 4.1-10\nof Alaska management areas out to 1000 m.\nFive different skate (bathyraja) species from one haul, 2000 Bering Sea slope.\nFigure 4.1-11\nDistribution of skate species (1999 survey) and skate catch in the eastern Bering Sea, 1999.\nFigure 4.1-12\nDistribution of skate species (1999 survey) and skate catch in the Gulf of Alaska, 1999.\nFigure 4.1-13\nDistribution of skate species (1997 survey) and skate catch in the Aleutian Islands, 1999.\nFigure 4.1-14\nThe giant grenadier, Albatrossia pectoralis.\nFigure 4.1-15\nDepth distribution of grenadier biomass in the 1999 Gulf of Alaska survey.\nFigure 4.1-16\nThe magistrate armhook squid, Berryteuthis magister\nFigure 4.1-17\nDistribution of squid species from bottom trawl and midwater surveys (dots) and catch (shaded\nFigure 4.1-18\nsquares), 1997-1999.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nxxxi","FIGURES\n(continued)\nFigure 4.1-19\nSquid closures (inside black outlines) applied to pelagic trawl gear, all seasons.\nFigure 4.1-20\nFlow chart describing management actions to protect habitat based on Alternative 5.\nFigure 4. 1-21\nExample of open areas for directed bottom trawl fisheries for flatfish in the eastern Bering Sea, based\non Alternative 5. Effort units are number of hauls per 25 square kilometers. Open areas were\ndetermined by including 90 percent of the directed flatfish effort during 1997-1999.\nFigure 4.1-22\nExample of open areas for directed bottom trawl fisheries for Atka mackerel in the Aleutian Islands,\nbased on Alternative 5. Effort units are number of hauls per 25square kilometers. Open areas were\ndetermined by including 90 percent of the directed Atka mackerel effort during 1997-1999.\nFigure 4.1-23\nExample of open areas for directed bottom trawl fisheries for flatfish in the Gulf of Alaska, based on\nAlternative 5. Effort units are number of hauls per 25 square kilometers. Open areas were\ndetermined by including 90 percent of the directed flatfish effort during 1997-1999.\nFigure 4.1-24\nWeekly catch/processor pollock production as percentage of annual total.\nFigure 4.1-25\nWeekly shoreside pollock production as percentage of annual total.\nFigure 4.1-26\nWeekly mothership pollock production as percentage of annual total.\nFigure 4.2-1\nAll trawl fishery exclusion zones implemented in 1992 and the Atka mackerel trawl exclusion zone\nimplemented in 1999 in Area 541.\nFigure 4.2-2\nAll trawl fishery exclusion zones implemented in 1991-1993 (10- and 20-nm radius) and the pollock\ntrawl exclusion zones enacted under the revised final reasonable and prudent alternatives, including\nboth 10- and 20-nm radius zones around Steller sea lion rookeries and haulouts and the Aleutian\nIslands region.\nFigure 4.2-3\nSpatial dispersion of the eastern Bering Sea pollock fisheries in January-March and July-October\n1998-2000 as measured by number of 100 km2 cells where fishing occurred and the average pollock\ncatch in each cell.\nFigure 4.2-4\nPercent of annual eastern Bering Sea pollock catch caught in each month, 1998-1999, in metric tons.\nFigure 4.2-5\nEstimated daily catch rates of pollock (mt) by the eastern Bering Sea pollock fishery in\nJanuary-March 1998-2000.\nFigure 4.2-6\nSpatial dispersion of the Gulf of Alaska pollock fisheries in January-March June- August, and\nSeptember-October 1998-2000 as measured by number of 100 km2 cells where fishing occurred and\nthe average pollock catch in each cell.\nFigure 4.2-7\nPercent of annual Gulf of Alaska pollock catch caught each month.\nFigure 4.2-8\nEstimated daily catch rates of pollock by the Gulf of Alaska pollock fishery in January-March\n1998-2000.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nxxxii","FIGURES\n(continued)\nEffects continuums for Steller sea lions, northern fur seals and harbor seals illustrating the relative\nFigure 4.2-9\ndegrees of protection offered by each alternative. The scores represent the averages, by alternative,\nacross effects categories as listed in table 4.2-14.\nRelationship between fishing effort and number of birds hooked in the Bering Sea and Aleutian\nFigure 4.3-1\nIslands, 1993-1994.\nRelationship between fishing effort and number of birds hooked in the Gulf of Alaska, 1993-1999.\nFigure 4.3-2\nOverlap of 1999 groundfish bottom trawl fishery with a proposed Steller's eider critical habitat.\nFigure 4.3-3\nOverlap of 1999 groundfish pot gear fishery with proposed Steller's eider critical habitat.\nFigure 4.3-4\nAlternative 3 buffer zones and areas of no fishing for the eastern Bering Sea.\nFigure 4.4-1\nAlternative 3 buffer zones and areas of no fishing for the Gulf of Alaska.\nFigure 4.4-2\nSablefish maturity and fishery selectivity by age.\nFigure 4.4-3\nAleutian Islands areas closed year-round to all fishing-These areas represent 20 percent of the\nFigure 4.4-4\nAleutian Island management areas out to 1000.\nAleutian Islands Atka mackerel maturity and fishery selectivity by age.\nFigure 4.4-5\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands flathead sole maturity and selectivity.\nFigure 4.4-6\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Alaska plaice maturity and selectivity.\nFigure 4.4-7\nAll catch (retained and discarded) by fishery management plan species category in each area, 1997\nFigure 4.5-1\nto 1999. Proportions are based on weight. Non-target species include the forage, nonspecified, other,\nand prohibited species categories.\nThe Bristol Bay pot sanctuary and the winter halibut savings area.\nFigure 4.6-1\nFigure 4.6-2\nThe three herring savings areas.\nThe chum salmon savings area, the chinook salmon savings areas, and the catcher vessel operational\nFigure 4.6-3\narea.\nThe Pribilof Islands Habitat Conservation Area, the red king crab savings area, and the nearshore\nFigure 4.6-4\nBristol Bay trawl closure area.\nThe crab bycatch limitation zones and regulatory Areas 512 and 516.\nFigure 4.6-5\nOpilio Tanner crab bycatch limitation zone.\nFigure 4.6-6\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\nxxxiii","FIGURES\n(continued)\nFigure 4.6-7\nKodiak Island trawl closure areas.\nManagement areas defined by the International Pacific Halibut Commission.\nFigure 4.6-8\nLength frequency of halibut observed in Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands and Gulf of Alaska\nFigure 4.6-9\ngroundfish fisheries, 1997-1999.\nFigure 4.6-10 Observed locations of recent halibut bycatch in bottom trawls, with target fishery distributions.\nAlternative 2.1 closures (pink) with trawl halibut bycatch and target fishery locations.\nFigure 4.6-12\nAlternative 2.1 closures with longline halibut bycatch and cod longline fishery locations.\nFigure 4.6-13\nAlternative 3 closures (pink) with observed bottom trawl halibut bycatch.\nFigure 4.6-14\nFigure 4.6-15\nAlternative 3 closures with observed halibut longline bycatch and fishery locations.\nAlternative 5 closed area (pink) and observed bottom trawl halibut bycatch locations.\nFigure 4.6-16\nFigure 4.6-17\nHistorical catch of Pacific herring in Alaska.\nSpatial distribution of herring bycatch within Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands pelagic pollock fishery,\nFigure 4.6-18\n1997-1999.\nAlternative 2.1 closures with status quo herring bycatch 1997-1999 for comparison.\nFigure 4.6-19\nAlternative 3 Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands closures with status quo herring bycatch, 1997-1999\nFigure 4.6-20\nfor comparison.\nSalmon management areas established by Alaska Department of Fish and Game.\nFigure 4.6-21\nDistribution of salmon bycatch in the pelagic trawl fishery based on 1997-1999.\nFigure 4.6-23\nAlternative 2.2 closures (pink) with chinook salmon bycatch in pelagic trawl fisheries 1997-1999 for\nFigure 4.6-24\ncomparison.\nAlternative 3 closures and existing closures under Alternative 1 (pink), Bering Sea and Aleutian\nFigure 4.6-25\nIslands chinook salmon bycatch in pelagic trawl, 1997-1999.\nAlternative 4 closures in addition to existing closures under Alternative 1 (pink), BASAI chinook\nFigure 4.6-26\nsalmon bycatch in pelagic trawl, 1997-1999.\nDistribution of Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands chum salmon bycatch in pelagic trawl, 1997-1999.\nFigure 4.6-27\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nxxxiv","FIGURES\n(continued)\nAlternatives 2.1 and 2.2 proposed closed areas in addition to Alternative 1 (pink) and Bering Sea and\nFigure 4.6-28\nAleutian Islands chum salmon bycatch in pelagic trawl, 1997-1999.\nAlternative 3 proposed closed areas in addition to Alternative 1 (pink) and Bering Sea and Aleutian\nFigure 4.6-29\nIslands chum salmon bycatch in pelagic trawl, 1997-1999.\nAlternative 4 proposed closed areas in addition to Alternative 1 (pink) and Bering Sea and Aleutian\nFigure 4.6-30\nIslands chum salmon bycatch in pelagic trawl, 1997-1999.\nMarine protected areas off Alaska where trawling is prohibited year-round to protect fish and crab\nFigure 4.7-1\nhabitat.\nZones around Steller sea lion rookeries and haulouts where pollock trawling is prohibited to reduce\nFigure 4.7-2\ncompetition for prey. The no-trawling zones were temporarily extended under court order in August\n2000.\nTrends in number of groundfish fishing vessels, that caught groundfish off Alaska 1993 to 1997.\nFigure 4.9-1\nYear-round trawl closure areas established to protect fish and crab habitat.\nFigure 4.9-2\nTotal discard rates of Alaska groundfish, all areas and species combined, 1993-1998, with\nFigure 4.9-3\nprojections through 2003.\nEstimated levels of total discards (target species, prohibited species, and non-target species) under\nFigure 4.9-4\nAlternative 1 from 2001-2005 and under Alternatives 2.1 through 6.2 in 2005. These estimates\nassume that improved retention requirements for yellowfin sole and rock sole in the Bering Sea and\nshallow water flatfish in the Gulf of Alaska begin in 2003 and will cause zero discards for those\nspecies beginning in 2003, over all alternatives except 6.1, which removes improved retention\nrequirements.\nFramework for cumulative effects analysis.\nFigure 4.13-1\nAnalytical framework for cumulative effects analysis.\nFigure 4.13-2\nExample of a Tier 1 matrix.\nFigure 4.13-3\nExample of a Tier 2 matrix.\nFigure 4.13-4\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nXXXV","4.6\nEffects of the Alternatives on Prohibited Species\nIn this chapter, the status quo management measures applied to protect prohibited species are summarized.\nIn general, the status quo fishery management plan (FMP) management regime achieves the Alternative 4\nobjective to prevent overfishing, maintain healthy stocks, and rebuild depressed stocks of prohibited species\nwithin the scope of federal groundfish fisheries. Although status quo management remains in place and no\nadditional measures are proposed to increase protection to prohibited species under Alternative 4, the effects\nof status quo management on each prohibited species are evaluated in detail. The predicted effects of each\nalternative management regime on each prohibited species group are outlined: Pacific halibut, king and Tanner\ncrabs, Pacific herring, and Pacific salmon species.\n4.6.1\nSummary of Current Management\nSpecies That Are Prohibited and How They Are Managed Under Groundfish Fishery\n4.6.1.1\nManagement Plans\nProhibited species cannot be retained if caught in groundfish fisheries. They must be returned to sea with\nminimal harm. Species prohibited in groundfish fisheries are those which were traditionally harvested by\ndirected commercial fisheries prior to development of the domestic groundfish fisheries under the Fishery\nConservation and Management Act (the Magnuson-Stevens Act). Directed fisheries for these species are\nmanaged by NMFS and other agencies, including the states of Alaska, Washington, and Oregon, and the\nInternational Pacific Halibut Commission. The prohibited species FMP category was established to address\nresource competition between traditional directed fisheries and the more recently developed groundfish fisheries.\nIn this section, management of and impacts to prohibited species under the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\n(BSAI) and Gulf of Alaska (GOA) groundfish FMPs are analyzed.\nProhibited species include king crabs, Paralithodes and Lithodes species; Tanner crabs, Chionoecetes species;\nPacific herring, Clupea harengus pallasi; Pacific halibut, Hippoglossus stenolepis; and Pacific salmon and\nsteelhead trout, Oncorhynchus species. Besides the general prohibition on retention, prohibited species catch\n(PSC) limits (also known as bycatch caps, directed fishing standards, and maximum retainable bycatch limits)\nand time and area closures have been implemented for some prohibited species. All king and Tanner crabs are\nprohibited species, but only bairdi Tanner crab, opilio Tanner crab (also called snow crab), and red king crab\nhave PSC limits. Pacific halibut, Pacific herring, and Pacific salmon species also have PSC limits in the BSAI,\nbut steelhead do not. Bycatch is also controlled by time and area closures that prohibit fishing in areas with\nhigh concentrations of prohibited species. Extensive area closures have been established for red king crab, and\nsavings areas, which are areas closed to fishing when certain salmon limits are reached in groundfish fisheries.\nThese management measures are all discussed in detail below.\nReducing the impacts of groundfish fisheries on prohibited species and reducing bycatch and discards in general\nare significant management objectives of the BSAI and GOA FMPs. Thirty-four BSAI and twenty GOA FMP\namendments have been implemented in the past 20 years to control bycatch and associated mortality\nof\nprohibited species (Table 4.6-1; Appendices A and B). Numerous regulatory measures have established or\nmodified bycatch limits, seasons, gear restrictions and allocations, time and area closures, bycatch rate\nstandards, recordkeeping and reporting, observer requirements, and enforcement to reduce bycatch and discards\n(Appendix C). In fact, most of the early BSAI and GOA FMP amendments specifically address limiting\nbycatch of these species, first by the foreign fleet, and subsequently by the joint venture and domestic fleets.\nMany prohibited species management measures were initially implemented despite a lack of apparent problems\nwith prohibited species stocks, and therefore may be viewed as precautionary measures. For example, limiting\ncrab bycatch to the extent possible in the groundfish fisheries has always been emphasized, regardless of the\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-1","Table 4.6-1 Chronology of Management Measures to Control Bycatch of Prohibited Species in the\nGroundfish Fisheries of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) and Gulf of Alaska,\n1935-2000\nEffective\nManagement Action\nYear\n1935\nTrawls prohibited except for shrimp and flounder fishing in BSAI.\n1937\nUse of dynamite prohibited in BSAI.\n1938\nUse of gillnets prohibited for catching halibut in BSAI.\n1942\nTrawls permitted except for salmon and herring fishing in BSAI.\n1944\nUse of trawls prohibited for catching halibut in BSAI.\n1948\nFive-inch minimum mesh size required for trawls in BSAI.\n1959\nTrawls prohibited for taking any crab species in BSAI. Trawling prohibited in Bristol Bay king crab pot\nsanctuary in BSAI.\n1967\nHalibut nursery area closed to halibut fishing in BSAI. Foreign fisheries prohibited around Fox Islands\nin BSAI.\n1969\nPribilof Islands area closed to foreign fishing.\n1972\nPot gear prohibited for catching halibut in BSAI.\n1973\nUse of tangle nets prohibited for catching crab in BSAI.\n1974\nCatch quotas established for Japanese groundfish fisheries limit effort for BSAI pollock and flatfish\nand GOA Pacific ocean perch and sablefish.\n1975\nCatch quotas established for USSR groundfish fisheries in BSAI. Trawling prohibited in winter halibut\nsavings area and along most of the Aleutian Islands.\n1976\nMagnuson-Stevens Act passed, providing national standards and regulations for managing federal\nfisheries to 200 miles.\n1977\nPreliminary groundfish FMPs implemented with groundfish optimum yields; closures of foreign\nfisheries when any one species limit is attained; several closure areas in BSAI and GOA extended\nfrom bilateral agreements; prohibited status for halibut, salmon, crabs, and shrimp.\n1979\nGOA FMP implemented with no retention of prohibited species (salmonids, halibut, shrimp, herring,\ncrab, scallops); expansion of time-area closures to reduce halibut bycatch; restrictions on use of non-\npelagic trawls by foreign fleets; limit of 25 percent of TALFF taken December 1 to May 31 to\nminimize halibut bycatch; domestic trawlers restricted by halibut PSC limits for five areas for\nDecember 1-May 31; halibut and Tanner crab PSC limits for domestic fishermen included; depth\nrestrictions on use of foreign longlines seaward of 500 m May 1-September 30 to minimize bycatch\nof halibut. Created new species OY for grenadiers (rattails) to protect them from bycatch (since\nrescinded, GOA-5). Pacific cod TALFF allocated to foreign longlines around Chirikov to reduce\nbycatch of other species, permitted directed longlining for Pacific cod to reduce halibut bycatch,\nrequired foreign vessel operators to report bycatch and discard of salmon and halibut.\n1980\nSet OY and four species categories, required biodegradable panels on sablefish pots to minimize\nbycatch of small sablefish, and established four species categories (target, PSC, unallocated, other)\n(GOA-8).\n1982\nBSAI FMP implemented with specific management objective to rebuild halibut; established PSC\ncategory for halibut, salmon, crabs; expanded time-area closures for foreign fisheries to reduce\nbycatch of juvenile halibut; set bycatch policy for domestic fishermen; set target observer coverage\nin\nforeign fisheries at 35-40 percent. Set chinook PSC of 65,000 fish for foreign trawl fishery (BSAI -\n1a). Closed waters east of 140°W to foreign fishery and restricted domestic fishery to pelagic\ntrawling between 140 and 147°W (GOA-10). Prohibited pot longline gear for sablefish, partially to\neliminate ghostfishing (GOA-12).\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-2","Table 4.6-1 (Cont.)\nChronology of Management Measures to Control Bycatch of Prohibited Species\nin the Groundfish Fisheries of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands and Gulf of\nAlaska, 1935-2000\nEffective\nManagement Action\nYear\nPSC bycatch reduction schedule established for BSAI foreign trawl fishery, allowed domestic trawling\n1983\nin pot sanctuary and halibut savings area in BSAI, set 1986 goal of 17,473 salmon (BSAI-3). Closed\nGOA southeast to foreign trawl fisheries to protect halibut, allowed foreign longlines to fish shallower\nthan 500 m in winter halibut savings area, until halibut bycatch reached 105 mt.\nSet BSAI groundfish OY cap at 2 million mt, allowed domestic trawling in winter halibut savings area\n1984\nwith observers and Bristol Bay pot sanctuary until halibut PSC limit is reached (BSAI -7). Raised\nhalibut PSC to 270 mt in western GOA and 768 mt in central GOA and exempted domestic pelagic\ntrawl fishery from halibut PSC limit.\nSet BSAI salmon PSC at 27,957 salmon (26,000 chinook) (BSAI-8). Established reporting\n1985\nrequirements and directed fishing definitions (BSAI-9, GOA-14). Revised OYs and implemented\nframework for setting and revising halibut PSC limits (GOA-14).\nPSC bycatch limits and zones established in BSAI domestic and JV flatfish trawl fisheries, set Bristol\n1987\nBay trawl closure area (Area 512) to all trawling year-round, allowed RD discretion to set target\nspecies as PSC once TAC is reached (BSAI-10). Established four red King crab bottom trawl closed\nareas during February 15-June 15 around Kodiak Island to protect crab, revised OYs, implemented\nframework for setting and revising PSC limits, revised reporting requirements, (GOA-15).\nBegan pilot observer program in Dutch Harbor and Kodiak, revised ABC definition (BSAI-11). Added\n1988\nsteelhead and salmon to PSC list and established target, other, and nonspecified categories,\nrequired 30-day comment period for annual specifications and PSC limits (BSAl-11a/GOA-16).\nRequired weekly reporting, established PSC limits for foreign and JV fisheries, set limits on retention\n1989\nof bycatch after target fishery closes (BSAI-12/GOA-17). Area 516 closed to trawling seasonally\nduring crab molting period. Endorsed voluntary herring bycatch plan. Adopted policy on full utilization\nof BSAI and GOA groundfish.\nEstablished crab and halibut PSC limits (BSAI-12a). New observer program, data reporting system,\n1990\nand directed fishing standards implemented (BSAI-13/GOA-18). Pot, jig, hand, and troll gear\nexempted from GOA halibut PSC limits.\nProhibited pollock roe-stripping as wasteful (BSAI-14/GOA-19). Allowed seasonal apportionment of\n1991\nPSC limits, established vessel incentive program to reduce bycatch rates of red king crab and halibut\nbycatch, refined overfishing, specification process and fishing gear definitions (BSAI-16/GOA-21).\nEstablished herring savings areas and hotspot authority (BSAI-16a). Season for BSAI yellowfin sole\nfishery changed to May 1. BSAI flatfish fisheries delayed to May 1 to reduce halibut and crab\nbycatch.\nRegional Administrator authorized to approve experimental fishing permits to reduce bycatch (BSAI-\n1992\n17/GOA-22). Established time and area closures for bycatch reduction, delayed rockfish trawl\nopening to Monday closest to July 1 to reduce salmon bycatch and groundfish trawl fisheries to\nJanuary 20 to reduce salmon and halibut bycatch, expanded VIP for all trawl fisheries and GOA,\nhalibut PSC limits established for BSAI non-trawl fisheries, and redefined VIP and PSC limits in GOA\n(BSAI-19/GOA-24).\nGillnets and seines prohibited for groundfish fishing in BSAI. Careful release requirements\n1993\nestablished for halibut bycatch in groundfish longline fisheries in BSAI and GOA, halibut PSC limit\nset at 3,775 mt for halibut trawl fishery with regulatory framework for revisions (BSAI-21). Crab\nbycatch performance standards set for pelagic trawl fishery in BSAI. Kodiak Island crab protection\nzones made permanent (GOA-26). Set performance-based pelagic trawl definition in BSAI and GOA.\nEstablished a separate species category for Atka mackerel (GOA-31).\nCouncil adopts minimum mesh-size requirements for trawl codends used in pollock, cod, and rock\n1994\nsole fisheries in BSAI. NMFS published vessel specific bycatch rates on the Internet, required\nobservers to monitor salmon discards, eliminated primary halibut PSC but kept 3,775 mt trawl limit\n(BSAI-25). Gillnets and seines prohibited.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-3","Table 4.6-1 (Cont.)\nChronology of Management Measures to Control Bycatch of Prohibited Species\nin the Groundfish Fisheries of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands and Gulf of\nAlaska, 1935-2000\nEffective\nManagement Action\nYear\n1995\nHalibut and sablefish IFQ program implemented (BSAI-15/GOA-20). BSAI chum salmon savings\narea, chinook salmon savings area, red king crab savings area, and Pribilof Islands Habitat\nConservation Area established to protect crabs (BSAI-21a; 21b; 35). Established minimum trawl\nmesh size in BSAI. BSAI jig gear exempted from halibut PSC.\n1996\nBSAI red King Crab Savings Area permanently established as year-round trawl closure area.\nVoluntary salmon donation program implemented to reduce bycatch and waste (BSAI-26/GOA-29).\n1997\nNearshore Bristol Bay closed to all trawling year-round. PSC limits for red king crab and bairdi\nTanner crab reduced and for opilio Tanner crab implemented (BSAI-37; 41). Overfishing definitions\nimplemented (BSAI-44/GOA-44).\n1998\nEstablished PSC limits for opilio Tanner crab in trawl fisheries and opilio Tanner crab bycatch\nlimitation zone (BSAI-40). Improved retention/improved utilization program implemented for pollock\nand cod ( BSAI-49/GOA-49). Prohibited species donation program redefined to include halibut (BSAI-\n50/ GOA-50). Forage fish category and ban on fishing implemented (BSAI-36/GOA-39).\n1999\nRevised overfishing definitions implemented (BSAI-56/GOA-56).\n2000\nBottom trawl ban in BSAI pollock fisheries (BSAI-57). Chinook salmon PSC limits reduced to 29,000\nfish in four years (pending) (BSAI-58). GOA demersal shelf rockfish full retention to account for\nbycatch (pending). Sponge and coral identified as HAPC-biota types under prohibited species\ncategory in BSAI and GOA pending).\nNotes: BSAI - Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nFMP - Fishery Management Plan\nGOA - Gulf of Alaska\nHAPC - habitat areas of particular concern\nJV - joint venture\nOY - optimum yield\nPSC - prohibited species catch\nTAC - total allowable catch\nTALFF - total allowable level of foreign fishing\nUSSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics\nVIP - Vessel Incentive Program\nmt - metric tons\ncondition of crab stocks and much higher levels of crab bycatch (both immature and female crabs) in the\ndirected crab fisheries.\nSection 2.7.2 describes the overall evolution of the BSAI and GOA FMPs by identifying the trends in\nmanagement actions prior to the Magnuson-Stevens Act and in the roughly twenty-plus years since the GOA\nand BSAI FMPs were implemented in 1979 and 1982, respectively. It catalogs the different management\nregimes recommended by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (the Council) as the fisheries changed\nfrom a mostly foreign fishery to joint ventures between foreign and domestic fleets to, finally, a fully domestic\nfishery in 1987 in the GOA and 1991 in the BSAI. In the first few years of federal management, the Council\nadopted the tenets of the international bilateral agreements of limiting bycatch through prohibited species catch\nlimits and protecting target species and domestic fisheries. For instance, the trawl ban for halibut, initiated in\nthe bilateral agreements, was carried over in the original groundfish FMPs. The management regime developed\nfrom closing areas to bottom trawling (e.g., the entire GOA to protect halibut) to bycatch reduction plans of\nprohibited species and closed areas around Kodiak Island and the eastern Bering Sea (e.g., crab and chinook\nsalmon).\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-4","In this following section, the history of prohibited species management measures implemented under the BSAI\nand GOA FMPs are reviewed in detail. For each FMP, the application of primary management tools-area\nclosures and bycatch limits-to each prohibited species group is described, as is the rationale followed by the\nCouncil and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in applying these management tools. First, area\nclosures applied to protect prohibited species are described, both by reducing catch and by protecting important\nhabitat. Next, the bycatch limits used to directly control catches of prohibited species are outlined. Then all\nother management tools applied under each FMP to increase protection for prohibited species are discussed,\nincluding reporting requirements, the Observer Program, and experimental fishing permits.\nSummary of Prohibited Species Catch Management Measures in the Bering Sea and\n4.6.1.2\nAleutian Islands Groundfish Fishery Management Plan\nCatches of prohibited species have been monitored throughout the foreign, joint venture, and domestic\ngroundfish fisheries (Table 4.6-2). The BSAI FMP, implemented in 1982, included regulations to control the\nbycatch of halibut, crab, and salmon by foreign fisheries. More than thirty plan amendments enhanced the\nprotection of prohibited species through closed areas, bycatch limits, and other measures. In 1988, Amendment\n11a revised the list of prohibited species and added steelhead and Pacific salmon to the existing list of king and\nTanner crabs, Pacific herring, and Pacific halibut, and established target, other, and nonspecified categories.\nClosed Areas\nClosed areas have been used to limit impacts of groundfish fisheries on prohibited species both before the\nFMPs and throughout the course of FMP management. These closures are often implemented in season in\nconcert with bycatch limits, which are described in the next subsection. In this subsection, the history of\nclosures applied to protect prohibited species are reviewed, in generally chronological order.\nA pot sanctuary and halibut savings area were included in the original BSAI FMP; however, Amendment 1\nallowed domestic trawling within the areas beginning in 1984 since these closures hampered development of\nthe domestic fishery (Figure 4.6-1). It allowed year-round domestic trawling and longlining in the winter\nhalibut savings area and Bristol Bay pot sanctuary and eliminated the Misty Moon grounds south of the\nPribilof Islands from the winter halibut savings area.\nAmendment 7 opened the winter halibut savings area under a 105 mt halibut PSC limit for the entire Bering\nSea beginning June 1 each year. The FMP provided incentives for reaching this goal by allocating supplemental\ngroundfish within a fishing season to nations on the basis of their bycatch performance. The Japanese fleet\nsuccessfully accomplished bycatch reductions by allocating its bycatch allowance among participating vessels.\nIf a vessel allocation was exceeded for any species, that vessel had to stop fishing unless it purchased unused\nbycatch shares from other vessels. This system resulted in an overall bycatch savings by the entire fleet, and\nit represented the first working system of individual vessel bycatch accountability.\nConcern about unregulated Pacific herring bycatch in trawl fisheries led to the development of herring PSC\nlimits under Amendment 16 (described below) and implementation of herring bycatch limits that, when attained,\ntrigger closures of established areas to trawling under Amendment 16a. Areas with relatively high bycatch rates\nof Pacific herring were identified from data collected by observers on foreign and joint venture (JV) vessels.\nFrom this information, three time and area closures (called herring savings areas) were established, taking into\naccount herring migration patterns (Figure 4.6-2). These herring savings areas close to trawling when a herring\nPSC limit is attained. Like other PSC limits, the herring PSC limit (set at 1 percent of estimated herring\nbiomass) is apportioned among specified trawl fisheries. If a bycatch allowance is attained, Area 1 closes June\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-5","Table 4.6-2 Estimated Bycatch of Pacific Halibut (Metric Tons of Mortality), King Crab, Tanner Crab,\nPacific Herring, Chinook Salmon, and Other Salmon Taken in Bering Sea and Aleutian\nIslands Groundfish Fisheries, 1977-1999\nYear\nPacific\nKing Crabs\nTanner Crabs\nPacific\nChinook\nOther\nHalibut\n(all species)\n(all species)\nHerring\nSalmon\nSalmon\n(mt)\nNo. of Crabs\nNo. of Crabs\n(mt)\nNo. of Fish\nNo. of Fish\n1977\n1,758\n599,623\n17,600,000\nNA\n47,840\n1978\n3,030\n1,227,931\n17,300,000\nNA\n44,548\n1979\n3,269\n1,007,796\n18,000,000\nNA\n107,706\n1980\n5,571\n1,147,671\n11,400,000\n783\n115,036\n6,726\n1981\n3,866\n1,817,152\n6,300,000\n287\n36,218\n5,800\n1982\n2,869\n573,919\n2,400,000\n1,986\n15,644\n7,686\n1983\n2,575\n1,034,157\n3,000,000\n2,513\n10,334\n32,134\n1984\n2,830\n691,088\n3,000,000\n1,257\n11,274\n72,195\n1985\n2,538\n1,225,073\n2,700,000\n4,539\n11,069\n10,598\n1986\n3,364\n275,066°\n7,200,000°\n4,018°\n9,237\n14,433\n1987\n3,462\n147,386°\n7,400,000°\n487c\n22,221\n4,799\n1988\n5,344\n88,033°\n3,100,000°\n351c\n30,320\n3,709\n1989\n4,393\n207,70°\n3,800,000°\n2,527°\n40,354\n5,545\n1990\n5,176\n109,20°\n1,731,725°\n3,379\n13,990\n16,661\n1991\n6,046\n255,607\n14,498,270\n3,252\n35,766\n31,987\n1992\n6,466\n315,788\n19,613,453\n3,758\n37,372\n38,919\n1993\n4,684\n388,664\n18,881,490\n1,076\n45,964\n243,246\n1994\n5,711\n359,436\n15,059,028\n1,711\n43,636\n94,508\n48,191d\n1995\n5,264\n7,695,643\n969\n23,079\n21,780\n28,682\n1996\n5,131\n4,730,000\n1,391\n63,531\n78,649\n76,290d\n1997\n4,753\n7,798,267\n1,313\n51,137\n69,725\n49,051°\n1998\n4,660\n6,196,155\n912\n48,387\n67,977\n1999\n4,326\n154,519°\n2,759,364\n1,084\n17,285\n64,637\nNotes: 1999 data are preliminary. Sources: Guttormsen et al. 1990; Queirolo et al. 1995; NPFMC 1995; Williams\n1997.\nOther salmon species catch combined with chinook salmon.\n'Foreign and joint-venture bycatch only.\nRed king crab only.\neBairdi Tanner crab only.\nNA - data not available\n15 to July 1, Area 2 closes from July 1 to August 15, and Area 3 closes during the winter months (September\n1 through March 1) for specified fisheries.\nAnalysis of bycatch and hotspot areas was greatly enhanced by the implementation of the domestic observer\nprogram in 1990, and development of Geographic Information System (GIS) technology. In the early 1990s,\nGIS technology was used to evaluate proposed trawl closure areas to protect blue king crab (Paralithodes\nplatypus) habitat around the Pribilof Islands, and to define hotspot closure areas to control bycatch of chinook\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-6","Bering Sen\n5%\\\nFo. Sancture\nWinter I Indil-u\nSTY\nStringt\nSAN\nSEN\n5-13\nGulf of Alaska\n17045\n16545\n160%\nFigure 4.6-1 The Bristol Bay pot sanctuary and the winter halibut savings area.\nBering Sear\nSummer\nWinter\nSummer Area 1\nArea 3\nArea 2\n56N\nXXXXXXX\nSAN\nGulf of Alaska\n175W\n170W\n165W\n160W\nFigure 4.6-2 The three herring savings areas.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-7","Bering\n000000\nChum Salmon\nSavings\nArea\n1\nChinook\nSalmon\nSavings\nAreas\n54N\nGulf of Alaska\nFigure 4.6-3 The chum salmon savings area, the chinook salmon savings areas, and the catcher vessel\noperational area.\nsalmon, O. tshawytscha, and chum salmon (O. keta). The chum salmons savings area (Figure 4.6-3),\nimplemented under Amendment 35, closes to all trawling during August 1-31, and remains closed if a bycatch\nlimit of 42,000 chum salmon is taken in the catcher vessel operational area. Trawling is prohibited in the\nchinook salmon savings areas upon attainment of a bycatch limit of 48,000 chinook salmon in the BSAI under\nAmendment 21b. Beginning in 1995, the Pribilof Islands Habitat Conservation Area (Figure 4.6-4) was closed\nto all trawling on a year-round basis under Amendment 21a.\nClosure of the Bristol Bay red king crab fishery in 1994 due to poor stock conditions brought about a flurry\nof regulatory activity to control crab bycatch. A new trawl closure area, called the red king crab savings area\n(Figure 4.6-4), was established by emergency rule in 1995, and made permanent under Amendment 37. This\n4,000 nm2 area in outer Bristol Bay was a prime fishing ground for rock sole and other flatfish, but it was\nfound to have high densities of adult male red king crabs. In adopting this area closure, the Council expressed\nconcerns about bycatch and unobserved mortality of these crab. Amendment 37 also prohibited all trawling\non a year-round basis in the nearshore waters of Bristol Bay to protect juvenile red king crab and critical\nrearing habitat that could be impacted by trawling. This nearshore area encompasses about 19,000 nm2. The\nthird management measure adopted under Amendment 37 was a reduction of existing PSC limits for red king\ncrab taken in trawl fisheries. Based on the 1996 survey abundance index, the 1997 PSC limit was established\nat 100,000 red king crab in Zone 1 (Figure 4.6-5).\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-8","Bering Sea\nBristol Bay\nosure Area\nBristol Bay RKC\nSavings Area\nPribilof Islands Habitat\n56N\nArea\nGulf Alaska\nFigure 4.6-4 The Pribilof Islands Habitat Conservation Area, the red king crab savings area, and the\nnearshore Bristol Bay trawl closure area.\nBycatch Limits\nBycatch limits have been used in association with area closures throughout the history of fishing in the BSAI.\nIn 1982, Amendment la established a prohibited species catch limit of 55,250 chinook salmon for foreign trawl\nfisheries, which was annually allocated among foreign nations. Any nation that exceeded its salmon allocation\nwould be prohibited from fishing in much of the Bering Sea for the remainder of the season. This set\na\nprecedent for fleetwide bycatch limits that trigger area or entire fisheries closures. This amendment responded\nto concerns expressed by Alaska Natives over the apparent increase in the incidental bycatch of western Alaska\nchinook salmon in the foreign trawl fisheries.\nIn 1983, Amendment 3 reduced the incidental catch of Pacific halibut (50 percent reduction), Pacific salmon\n(75 percent reduction), and king and Tanner crabs (25 percent reduction) by the foreign trawl fisheries over\na 5-year period. It set a specific goal of 17,473 salmon by 1986. Amendment 5 was subsequently withdrawn\nbecause it was redundant to Amendment 3. Amendment 8 set the 1984 and 1985 salmon PSC limits at 38,441\nand 27,957 salmon (26,000 chinook salmon), respectively, from negotiations between the Japanese fishing\nindustry and western Alaska Native representatives.\nBycatch of these prohibited species remained low through 1985, but increased with development of relatively\nunconstrained joint-venture (JV) operations until 1987 when bycatch limits for these fisheries were established.\nDuring the transition period from foreign to fully domestic groundfish fisheries stimulated by a rapid increase\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-9","in JV operations, conservation policies adopted by the Council had the effect of restoring depleted stocks such\nas yellowfin sole; Pacific ocean perch; and sablefish (Megrey and Wespestad 1990). Based on good\nmanagement, healthy fish stocks, the potential for hefty profits, and also the Bristol Bay red king crab fishery\ncollapse, vessels were quickly built or converted for participation in JV and domestic groundfish fisheries in\nthe North Pacific Ocean. This transition period was an era of relatively few fishing regulations for U.S.\ngroundfish vessels, and yet bycatch concerns of domestic halibut longliner fishermen and crab pot fishermen\nwere recognized and addressed.\nIn 1987, BSAI Amendment 10 established bycatch limitation zones and PSC limits for red king crab, bairdi\nTanner crab, and Pacific halibut (Figure 4.6-5). This amendment specified PSC limits of 135,000 red king\ncrabs and 80,000 bairdi Tanner crabs in Zone 1, and 326,000 bairdi Tanner crabs in Zone 2. These PSC\nlimits applied to domestic and JV fisheries for yellowfin sole and other flatfish only. When this fishery reached\nthe specified PSC limit, vessels were prohibited from flatfish fishing within that zone. In addition to PSC limits,\nall trawling was prohibited from Area 512 (160°W to 162°W, south of 58°N) in Bristol Bay to protect red king\ncrab stocks. A halibut PSC limit of 828,000 fish was set for joint ventures and would close Zone 1 when\nexceeded. Trawlers in the southern portion of Zone 1 had a red king crab PSC limit of 12,000 crabs. This\namendment replaced emergency orders enacted in 1986 that closed areas and set bycatch rates for PSC species.\nJV operations peaked in 1987, giving way to a rapidly developing domestic fishery. Bycatch further increased\nwith development of the fully domestic fleet, but was quickly limited by regulation. Bycatch limits for Pacific\nhalibut, Pacific herring, red king crab, and Tanner crab kept the bycatch from reaching higher levels. In 1989,\nAmendment 12a to the FMP further addressed bycatch concerns by establishing a seasonal closure in Area 516\nand establishing bycatch limits for crab and Pacific halibut for all trawl fisheries. Total annual PSC limits\nwere 200,000 red king crabs and 1,000,000 bairdi Tanner crabs for a Zone 1 closure, 3,000,000 bairdi Tanner\n60°N\n65°N\n55°N\nZone 2\n60°N\nClosed\n50°N\n55°N\nZone 1\n160°W\n180°W\n170°W\n150°W\nFigure 4.6-5 The crab bycatch limitation zones and regulatory Areas 512 and 516.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-10","crabs for a Zone 2 closure, and 5,333 mt of halibut for a BSAI closure. In 1992, halibut bycatch limits were\nextended to nontrawl fisheries (Amendment 21) and established in terms of mortality rather than total catch.\nPSC limits 3,775 mt of halibut bycatch mortality for trawl fisheries and 900 mt of halibut bycatch mortality\nfor nontrawl fisheries were established. PSC limits are further seasonally apportioned into specified fisheries\n(Table 4.6-3), and several simulation models have been used to analyze alternative bycatch management\nmeasures in seeking optimal PSC apportionment (Smith 1993).\nThe Council endorsed a voluntary herring bycatch plan negotiated by industry and western Alaska Native\nrepresentatives. During March 28-June 26, 1989, an emergency rule implemented limits on retention of 20\npercent for groundfish after the target fishery closed, 4 percent for longline sablefish, 20 percent for trawl\nsablefish, 1 percent for groundfish, and 10 percent for Greenland turbot and Pacific ocean perch. The Council\nadopted a policy encouraging full utilization of groundfish.\nAmendment 12a expired December 31, 1990, and was replaced by Amendment 16, which maintained the\nexisting PSC limits during 1991. It established five PSC allocation categories, provided for seasonal\nallocations, and established a penalty system directed at individual trawl vessels for excessive bycatch rates\nby requiring vessels to cease fishing for a set period. This latter system was disapproved by the Secretary of\nCommerce based on concerns regarding due process (on appeals) and the use of observer data. In its place,\na vessel incentive program (VIP) was implemented. The VIP imposes fines for vessels exceeding bycatch rate\nstandards. These standards for maximum retainable bycatch (MRB) rates are established preseason.\nUnfortunately, very few cases have been prosecuted due to insufficient staff resources necessary to investigate\nand prosecute such a case. It also adopted via emergency rule, domestic and JV apportionments of bairdi\nTanner and king crab and halibut PSC limits. An emergency action implemented a 600-mt trawl herring PSC\nlimit and closed an area northwest of the Pribilof Islands.\nAmendment 16 was eventually replaced by Amendment 19, which was effective only for the 1992 fishing year\nand reduced the secondary limit to 5,033 mt. (This action was eventually superceded by Amendment 21, which\nsimply converted the PSC limits from catch limits to mortality limits.) As a result, the smaller difference\nbetween the primary and secondary limits made it difficult for NMFS to monitor the primary limit in a manner\nto allow closures before the secondary limit was reached; therefore, most trawl closures ensuing from bycatch\nrestrictions were implemented under the secondary limit. At this point, the effectiveness of a primary PSC limit\nto reduce halibut bycatch came into question. NMFS was finding that initial closure of bycatch limitation zones\nactually often increased bycatch rates by forcing fisheries to move to areas with lower groundfish catch per\nunit effort and higher halibut bycatch rates.\nAmendment 19 addressed a number of bycatch control measures. It revised the fishery definitions to monitor\nfishery-specific bycatch allowances and assign vessels to fisheries to enhance the VIP, expanded the VIP to\naddress halibut bycatch in all trawl fisheries, and revised management of the trawl fishery categories for PSC\naccounting, delayed the start of the trawl fishery from January 1 to January 20 to reduce salmon and halibut\nbycatch rates, and changed directed fishing standards (bycatch rates) to further limit halibut bycatch in bottom\ntrawl fisheries. Both amendments were effective beginning in 1992.\nBy the end of December 1991, the BSAI fishery was fully Americanized and the Council set PSC limits for\nhalibut (over three seasons), herring, red king crab, and bairdi Tanner crab for five fishery categories. The\nentire BSAI groundfish harvest (2,126,600 mt, worth $351 million exvessel) was taken by only 391 U.S.\nvessels (Kinoshita et al. 1993). Along with Americanization of the fleet came domestic conflicts over allocation\nand bycatch, leading to an array of regulations intended to control this bycatch. Amendment 16 apportioned\nPSC limits for trawl fishery categories; allowed apportionments of halibut PSC limits between hook-and-line\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-11","Table 4.6-3 Prohibited Species Catch Apportionments for the 2000 Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nFisheries\nFishery Group\nHalibut\nHerring\nRed King Crab\nBairdi Tanner Crab\nOpilio\nMortality\n(mt)\n(No. of Animals)\nTanner Crab\nZone 1\nZone 2\nCap (mt)\nZone 1\nCOBLZ\nYellowfin sole\n958\n169\n12,600\n312,163\n637, 448\n3,109,815\nJan 20-Mar 31\n285\nApr 1-May 10\n210\nMay 11-Jul 14\n52\nJul 15-Dec 31\n410\nRock sole/other flatfish\n842\n24\n70,005\n334,407\n545,832\n940,470\nJan 20-Mar 29\n485\nMar 30-Jul 10\n176\nJul 11-Dec 31\n180\nTurbot/sablefish/\n11\n44,370\narrowtooth flounder\nRockfish\n75\n9\n10,884\n44,370\nJul 11-Dec 31\nPacific cod\n1,550\n24\n12,600\n167,411\n298,116\n133,545\nPollock/mackerel/other\n2,500\n1,616\n1,795\n16,019\n27,720\n77,430\nspecies\nTOTAL\n3,675\n1,853\n97,000\n830,000\n2,520,000\n4,350,000\nNotes: Includes 7.5 percent CDQ Allocation\nUnused PSC allowances may be rolled into the following seasonal apportionment.\n30 percent of the red king crab PSC for the rock sole fishery is apportioned to the 56-56°10\" RKCSA strip.\nAccounts for the reductions in halibut and crab PSCs due to ban on pollock bottom trawling (halibut:\n100\nmt;\n-\nRKC: -3,000; Zone 1 bairdi: -20,000; Zone 2 bairdi: -30,000; opilio: -150,000 crab)\nAccounts for adjustments due to changes in biomass for herring, red king crab, Zone 2 bairdi, and opilio.\nCOBLZ - C. opilio Bycatch Limitation Zone\nand pot gear; allowed seasonal allocations of halibut PSCs, and established fishing gear restrictions (definition\nof pelagic trawl gear, biodegradable panels, and halibut excluders on pot gear).\nAmendment 25 was approved to respond to the concerns about the usefulness of the primary PSC limit and\nits potential for exacerbating halibut bycatch rates in the BSAI trawl groundfish fisheries. The intent was to\neliminate the primary PSC limit and use only the overall (secondary) halibut bycatch mortality limit established\nfor the BSAI trawl fisheries. This action was necessary to promote the management and conservation of halibut\nand other fish resources as specified in the objectives of the Magnuson-Stevens Act and the FMPs, and to better\nmeet the original intent of Amendment 12a.\nTwo FMP amendments were adopted in 1996 to manage the bycatch of crab. Amendment 41 reduced existing\nPSC limits for bairdi Tanner crab taken in BSAI trawl fisheries. Under this amendment, PSC limits in Zones\n1 and 2 are based on total abundance of bairdi Tanner crab as indicated by the NMFS trawl survey. Based\non 1996 abundance (185 million crabs), the PSC limit was specified at 750,000 crabs in Zone 1 and 2,100,000\ncrab in Zone 2 for 1997 fisheries. Amendment 40 established new PSC limits for opilio Tanner crab taken in\nBSAI trawl fisheries. PSC limits for this species will be based on its total abundance as indicated by the NMFS\nstandard trawl survey and will be apportioned among trawl fisheries as bycatch allowances. The annual opilio\nTanner crab PSC limit will be set at 0.1133 percent of its abundance index, with a minimum PSC of 4.5 million\nopilio Tanner crab and a maximum of 13 million. The opilio Tanner crab taken within the opilio Tanner crab\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-12","bycatch limitation zone (Figure 4.6-6) would accrue toward the bycatch allowance specified for individual\ntrawl fisheries. Upon attainment of an opilio Tanner crab bycatch allowance apportioned to a particular trawl\ntarget fishery, that fishery would be prohibited from fishing within the bycatch limitation zone.\nOther Management Measures\nIn addition to the primary management tools of area closures and bycatch limits, there are numerous secondary\nmeasures applied through the FMPs to monitor and limit the effects of groundfish fisheries on prohibited\nspecies. These include reporting requirements, the observer program, and experimental fishing permits.\nManagement measures with some indirect effects on prohibited species bycatch include improved retention/\nimproved utilization (IR/IU), and revised overfishing definitions for target species. The history of each\nmanagement measure is described below.\nAmendment 9 implemented reporting requirements in 1986. Rapid growth of the domestic groundfish fleet led\nto the development of reporting requirements of catch information by vessels that process their catch at sea.\nWhile fish tickets collected catch data from vessels landing at shore-based processing facilities, the action was\naimed at collecting necessary and timely catch information from at-sea processors on extended trips.\nIn 1987, a voluntary observer program deploying four observers on seven vessels was initiated off Dutch\nHarbor and Kodiak. In 1990, a domestic observer program was implemented under Amendment 13 to replace\nthe interim voluntary program as domestic fishing replaced foreign fishing. The purpose of this comprehensive\ndata collection program for the domestic groundfish fishery was to provide adequate and reliable data on which\nBering Sea\n58N\nDonut Hole\n57N\n56N\nSnow Crab Bycatch\nLimitation Zone\n55N\n54N\nGulf of Alaska\nAleutian Islands\n175W\n170W\n165W\n160W\n185W\n180W\nFigure 4.6-6 Opilio Tanner crab bycatch limitation zone.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-13","to (1) base in-season and interseason management decisions; (2) efficiently carry out their resource\nmanagement responsibilities; and (3) measure fishery performance against existing and proposed management\nmeasures.\nThe domestic Observer Program provides information for stock assessment and in-season management,\nincluding the ability to accurately assess catch and bycatch in the fisheries. Three problems were later identified\nfor observer coverage payment. It was not an equitable system in that some operations paid for 100 percent\ncoverage and others paid nothing, it limited the ability of NMFS to effectively manage the observer program,\nand it may result in a conflict of interest that could reduce the credibility of observer data. The research plan,\nunder Amendment 27, was designed to address these three problems. Industry support for such a change was\ndemonstrated by the willingness and ability of the industry to convince Congress and the President to amend\nthe Magnuson-Stevens Act to allow the North Pacific Fisheries Research Plan to be established and paid for\nby a broad-based system of user fees. The proposed plan was to apply to the groundfish, halibut, and BSAI\ncrab fisheries. Instead, implementation was delayed one year, then replaced with a modified pay-as-you-go\nsystem adopted under Amendment 47. Fees were collected by NMFS in the first year of implementation, which\nwere later returned when the research plan was repealed. The Council took final action on a regulatory\namendment package of changes to the Observer Program in June 2000.\nAmendment 17 authorized experimental fishing permits (EFPs) that later would be used to experiment with\nfishing practices to reduce bycatch. Numerous EFPs have been issued to test gear modifications, observer\nsampling, methodology, bycatch mortality reduction techniques, and other measures.\n4.6.1.3\nSummary of Prohibited Species Catch Management Measures in the Gulf of Alaska\nGroundfish Fishery Management Plan\nMany prohibited species management measures implemented in the BSAI FMP are also used in the GOA\nFMP. As in the BSAI, the primary management measures applied to protect prohibited species in the GOA\nare closed areas and bycatch limits, with the support of secondary measures such as the observer program,\nexperimental fishing permits, and individual fishing quotas (IFQs). In this section, the history of GOA\nprohibited species management measures is summarized.\nTo protect halibut, crabs, salmon, herring, scallop, and shrimp, the original GOA FMP was implemented prior\nto the Magnuson-Stevens Act time and area closures for foreign fisheries. Extensive foreign trawl closures were\nexpanded in the GOA FMP to reduce halibut bycatch. Bottom trawls in the foreign fisheries were prohibited\nin the central and western GOA seasonally between December 1 and May 1. Domestic trawlers had halibut\nPSC limits of 29 mt in the western GOA and 52 mt in the central GOA for December 1 through May 1.\nAbout 20 plan amendments enhanced the protection of non-target species through closed areas, bycatch limits,\nand other measures. Amendment 2 to the GOA FMP assigned the total foreign quota for Pacific cod (1,500\nmt) to longlines in the Chirikof area, between 140°W and 157°W, to reduce potential trawl halibut bycatch.\nIt allowed for sufficient flexibility to apportion the reserve and maintain a Total Allowable Level of Foreign\nFishing (TALFF) that would achieve the OY, prevent overfishing, allow JVs to continue, and provide for an\nexpanding domestic fleet. In 1980, Amendment 8 established four species categories to mirror those\nimplemented in the BSAI FMP: (1) target (pollock, Pacific cod, flounders, Pacific ocean perch, other rockfish,\nsablefish, ka mackerel, squid, and thornyhead rockfish); (2) other species (sculpins, sharks, skates, eulachon,\nsmelts, capelin, and octopus; (3) nonspecified (all others); and (4) unallocated (later named prohibited species).\nUnder that system, there was a threat of closure of the groundfish fishery when one of those species of no\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-14","commercial value was present in high abundance. The term unallocated species replaced the term prohibited\nspecies. This category, later changed back to prohibited species, included crab, herring, salmon, and other\nspecies that must be avoided, and if caught, must be returned to the sea immediately.\nClosed Areas\nMany management measures in the original FMP were designed to protect the halibut resource and fishery.\nAfter experiencing how the fisheries operated under the plan for a year, it was evident that several provisions\ncould be removed without compromising halibut conservation goals. New data and practical experience\nindicated that instituting the above changes would allow for a less burdensome regulatory environment for\nfishermen. Amendment 4 removed measures that were deemed no longer necessary to protect halibut: (1) five\noriginal regulatory areas were reduced to three (western, central, eastern); (2) a restriction that allowed only\n25 percent of foreign quota to be taken between December 1 and May 1 was removed because mostly pelagic\ntrawls were being used in winter; (3) the domestic one-hour tow restriction was removed; (4) the domestic\nrequirement for off-bottom trawls was removed.\nIn 1982, Amendment 10 closed southeast Alaska to all foreign fisheries to protect halibut and allowed only\npelagic trawling with recording net sound devices all year between 140°W and 147°W. Domestic halibut PSC\nlimits were increased from 29 mt to 270 mt in the western area and 52 mt to 768 mt in the central area for\nDecember 1, 1983, to May 31 for 1984 and 1985; domestic pelagic trawlers were exempted from PSC limits.\nEmergency rules in 1984 and 1985 exempted GOA domestic fishermen using pelagic trawls (mainly for pollock\nin Shelikof Strait) from halibut PSC closures. The trawling restrictions on foreign vessels off southeast Alaska\nwere very significant at the time and represented one more step along the way to complete Americanization of\nGOA fisheries. No foreign vessels caught or processed fish in the GOA after 1988.\nAn emergency rule in 1986, followed by a final rule for Amendment 15 in 1987, created three types of closures\nareas for king crab around Kodiak Island and closed four areas (Marmot Flats, Barnabas, Towers/Alitak Flats,\nand ChirikofIsland) (Figure 4.6-7) to bottom trawls during February 15 through June 15 (during the king crab\nmolting period). The Kodiak Island closures are still in effect, as are the fixed and trawl gear halibut PSC\nlevels, although the fixed-gear level was dropped to 300 mt with implementation of the halibut IFQ program.\nThe Shelikof Strait conservation zone was incorporated as part of the revised final reasonable and prudent\nalternatives (RPAs) to protect Steller sea lions in the GOA in 1999.\nBycatch Limits\nIn 1985, prohibited species catch limits for halibut in the GOA were placed in a framework procedure for\nsetting limits for domestic and JV trawl fisheries under Amendment 14. Plan amendments would no longer be\nneeded to change PSC limits, and the limits would be by area and by specific trawl group (domestic, joint\nventure, and foreign), rather than domestic and JV trawlers combined, SO each fishery, not all, would suffer\nthe consequences of taking too much bycatch. When the PSC limit is reached there would be a closure just to\non-bottom trawling, not all trawling as under previous regulations. The limits would apply all year, not just\nfrom December 1 through May 31.\nIn addition to the Kodiak Island closures, Amendment 15 also established an administrative procedure for\nsetting PSC limits. In 1987, a voluntary observer program deploying four observers on seven vessels was\ninitiated off Dutch Harbor and Kodiak.\nAmendment 18, established 1989 halibut PSC limits for fixed-gear (750 mt) and trawl gear (2,000 mt), set a\nregulatory framework for revisions beginning in 1991, and extended the types I through III Kodiak king crab\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-15","closures for three more years. An emergency order apportioned halibut PSC limits by quarter. An emergency\naction in 1990 (1) exempted pot gear with halibut excluder devices and biodegradable panels; (2) hook-and-line\njig gear; (3) hand troll gear; and (4) the demersal shelf rockfish hook-and-line fishery. A regulatory amendment\nfollowed in 1991 to extend the first three actions and to revise the definition of pelagic trawl gear. By 1991,a\n10 mt halibut PSC was set for demerial shelf rockfish (DSR) through a regulatory amendment. Amendment\n26 made permanent the closures first implemented under Amendment 18 that were to sunset at the end of 1992.\nGOA crab stocks in the vicinity of Kodiak Island remain depressed. The last good year class produced was\nin 1973 to 1974, and recent surveys failed to detect signs of rebuilding.\nIn 1991, Amendment 21 apportioned PSC limits for trawl fishery categories; allowed apportionments of halibut\nPSC limits between hook-and-line and pot gear; allowed seasonal allocations of halibut PSCs, and established\nfishing gear restrictions (definition of pelagic trawl gear, biodegradable panels, and halibut excluders on pot\ngear Table 4.6-4). Through emergency action, the Council recommended a rockfish trawl closure to reduce\nsalmon bycatch set a maximum salmon bycatch rate of 01 percent salmon/mt of deep water flatfish.\nAmendment 22 authorized experimental fishing permits that later would be used to experiment with fishing\npractices to reduce bycatch. Amendment 24 addressed a number of bycatch control measures. It revised the\nfishery definitions to monitor fishery-specific bycatch allowances and assign vessels to fisheries to enhance the\nVIP, expanded the VIP to address halibut bycatch in all trawl fisheries, and revised management of the trawl\nfishery categories for PSC accounting, delayed the start of the trawl fishery from January 1 to January 20 to\nreduce salmon and halibut bycatch rates, and changed directed fishing standards (bycatch rates) to further limit\nhalibut bycatch in bottom trawl fisheries. The latter two amendments were effective beginning in 1992.\nOther Management Measures\nIn 1990, a domestic observer program was implemented under Amendment 18. Amendment 22 authorized\nEFPs, which later would be used to experiment with fishing practices to reduce bycatch. Numerous EFPs have\nbeen issued to test gear modifications, observer sampling methodology, bycatch mortality reduction techniques,\nand other measures. An IR/IU program for all groundfish target fisheries was implemented under Amendment\n49 in 1998. The prohibited species donation program was implemented under Amendments 29 and 50 to reduce\nwaste and bycatch and to donate food to the needy. In 1999, Amendment 56 revised the ABC and overfishing\ndefinitions set under Amendment 44 to be more precautionary (see descriptions of these programs under BSAI\nFMP).\nTable 4.6-4 Prohibited Species Catch Apportionments for the 2000 Gulf of Alaska Fisheries\nPSC Limits for Halibut\nHook-and-Line\nQuarter\nTrawl\n1st quarter\n600 mt\n30%\n1st trimester\n250 mt\n86%\n2nd quarter\n400 mt\n20%\n2nd trimester\n15 mt\n5%\n3rd quarter\n600 mt\n30%\n3rd trimester\n25 mt\n9%\n4th quarter\n400 mt\n20%\nDSR\n10 mt\nTotal\n2,000 mt\nTotal\n300\nTrawl Apportionments\nShallow Water\nComplex\nTotal\n1\n500 mt\n100 mt\n600 mt\n2\n100 mt\n400 mt\n3\n200 mt\n600 mt\n4\nNo apportionment\n400 mt\nNotes: DSR - demersal shelf rockfish\nmt - metric ton\nPSC - prohibited species catch\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-16","56°N\n58°N\n57°N\nIsland\nUgak\nC\nMarmot\n152°W\nFlats\nType III\nBarnabas\nType II\nd\nType I\nArea\nd\nSitkinak\nFigure 4.6-7 Kodiak Island trawl closure areas.\n153°W\nCape\nisland\nb\nGulf of Alaska\nStrait\na\nAlitak Flats/Towers\nf\nKodiak\nd\n154°W\na\nCape\nLow\n155W\nChirikof Island\nb\nC\nPeninsula\na\nb\nAlaska\n156°W\nd\nC","","Summary of Status Quo Fishery Management Plan Management of Prohibited Species\n4.6.1.4\nThe Magnuson-Stevens Act mandates a balance between conservation and economics of the fisheries, that is,\nthe Secretary of Commerce must weigh biological, social, and economic factors in decisionmaking. The\nmultispecies nature of bycatch is a dilemma for both policymakers designing bycatch regulations and fishermen\nattempting to abide by them. Regulations designed to reduce bycatch of one species, e.g., Pacific halibut, may\nhave in some cases resulted in an increase in bycatch rates of other PSC species, such as bairdi Tanner crab.\nThe bycatch of a prohibited species in the groundfish fisheries decreases the amount of those species that can\nbe taken by fishermen in directed fisheries for those species, SO it has been controlled by management measures,\nbut not without cost to groundfish fisheries. In particular, halibut bycatch management measures have\nconstrained groundfish harvests. Typically, all bycatch mortality (4,665 mt) allocated to trawl and longline\nfisheries is taken, along with lesser amounts from pot fisheries and fisheries within Alaska state waters\n(Williams, 1997). Attainment of halibut bycatch mortality limits has caused many closures over the years, and\nthese closures have decreased the amount of groundfish caught. For example, 6 closures were implemented\nin 1994, 12 closures in 1995, and 14 closures in 1996 due to Pacific halibut, bycatch allowances being attained\nby specific fisheries. A summary of the 1996 closures is shown in Table 4.6-3. Pacific halibut bycatch limits\naffected bottom trawl fisheries in particular; consequently, portions of fishing quotas annually specified for\nmost flatfish species have remained unharvested (Witherell 1995). Longline fisheries have also been constrained\nby Pacific halibut bycatch, and careful release requirements have been implemented to improve survival of\nhalibut discards (Smith 1995). However, implementation of an IFQ system for Pacific halibut and sablefish\nlongline fisheries in 1995 allowed for more selective longline fisheries with lower bycatch (Adams 1995).\nReducing halibut bycatch has been the objective of numerous industry-initiated proposals in recent years.\nSeveral trawlers voluntarily use bycatch reduction devices in their nets to release incidentally caught halibut\nwith minimal harm, and testing of these devices is ongoing.\nOverall crab bycatch has been a function of crab abundance and PSC limits. High bycatches of king and\nTanner crabs (mostly opilio Tanner crab) were taken in the 1970s by foreign fisheries, but regulations and\nincentives implemented with the FMP in 1982 reduced crab bycatch to much lower levels. In the domestic\ngroundfish fisheries, bycatch of red king crab and bairdi Tanner crabs have been kept in check with PSC limits\nfor trawl fisheries. Bycatch of opilio Tanner crab increased drastically in the early 1990s (Table 4.6-2),\ncorresponding to an expanding crab population, SO opilio Tanner crab PSC limits were established in 1996.\nCrab bycatch regulations have been based on concerns that trawling impacts crab populations directly in terms\nof trawl-induced mortality and indirectly through habitat degradation. Observed mortality, as measured by\ncrab bycatch, has accounted for a small percentage of crab populations. For example, bycatch amounted to\nonly 0.5 percent of the red king crab, 1.2 percent of the bairdi Tanner crab, and 0.1 percent of the opilio Tanner\ncrab population on average, for 1992 through 1995 (NPFMC 1996). Because bycatch is small relative to other\nsources of mortality, time and area closure are thought to be more effective than PSC limits in reducing impacts\nof trawling on crab stocks (Witherell and Harrington 1996). As such, numerous trawl closure areas have been\ninstituted to address concerns about unobserved mortality (crab wounded or killed but not captured), and\npossible habitat degradation due to trawling and dredging.\nThe bycatch of Pacific herring and salmon has been controlled by time and area closures triggered by bycatch\nlimits. Pacific herring closures have been effective at maintaining an acceptable level of bycatch in years when\nherring are abundant on the fishing grounds. This situation occurred in 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995, when\nherring savings areas 2 and 3 were closed to trawling for fisheries directed at pollock, rock sole, yellowfin sole,\nand other flatfishes. Similarly, salmon bycatch limits are expected to trigger closures only during years when\nexceptionally high bycatch rates are encountered by the trawl fleet. During the first year of implementation\nin 1994, the chum salmon savings area was closed to all trawling from August 20 through November 12.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-19","Without this closure, bycatch might have exceeded the record set in 1993, when over 240,00 chum salmon were\ntaken (Table 4.6-2). By far, the highest bycatch rates for chum salmon occur during August, September, and\nOctober, with almost no chum salmon taken in other months (NPFMC 1995).\nPSC bycatch is also controlled by nonregulatory means. Many measures have been embraced by the trawl\nand longline fleet to control and reduce bycatch of Pacific halibut, crab, and salmon. A GIS application has\nbeen used by the BSAI trawl and longline fleet to identify hotspots by using bycatch rates reported by\nindividual vessels (Gauvin et al. 1995; Smoker 1996). Bycatch rate information from individual vessels is\nreceived at a central location, aggregated daily, and then quickly relayed back to the entire fleet in the form of\nmaps, SO that hotspot areas can be avoided. PSC rates are reduced and corresponding higher groundfish\ncatches can then be realized by the fleet. Unfortunately, because this is a voluntary program, nonparticipating\nvessels with high bycatch rates may keep the fleet as a whole from catching the entire quota of flatfish. Some\nbycatch reduction may also come in the form of peer pressure. Individual vessel bycatch rates are now\npublished on the Internet. Vessels with high bycatch rates may face peer pressure to lower their bycatch.\nFurther reductions in bycatch may be achieved with individual vessel incentives. The current system tends to\npenalize vessels that adopt bycatch reducing tactics because they will probably have reduced catches of target\nspecies (Huppert et al. 1992). This external cost is due to the race for fish (and bycatch), as fish are allocated\non a first-come-first-served basis. These external costs would be reduced if fishermen paid for the fish they use,\nor had defined property rights to those resources (NMFS 1996). Under an individual bycatch quota system,\nalso called a vessel bycatch account system, each vessel would have an incentive to reduce its bycatch rate to\nmaximize its catch of groundfish. Vessels with low bycatch rates would benefit by being able to catch\nadditional groundfish without being shut down by vessels with higher bycatch rates, as they are with current\nfleetwide bycatch limits. A vessel bycatch account system could result in more groundfish being caught overall\nwith less overall bycatch of prohibited species. Development of av program is continuing.\n4.6.2\nImpacts of the Alternatives on Prohibited Species\nIn this section, direct and indirect effects of each alternative on each prohibited species group are described.\nAs with other non-target species (Section 4.5), catch is characterized as the primary direct effect of each\nalternative on prohibited species. Although all prohibited species by definition must be returned to the sea with\na minimum of harm, catch reported under each alternative equals mortality for prohibited species, a very\nconservative assumptions. This assumption forms the basis for the qualitative discussion of the potential\neffects of the alternatives in terms of changes in the population dynamics of prohibited species. Halibut is an\nexception. Halibut PSC limits are set and monitored in terms of bycatch mortality based on estimates of\ndiscard mortality rates. Therefore, the estimates in these reports are based on those discard mortality rates,\nsome of which are much less than 100 percent. In Section 4.5, whether management attention has increased\nor decreased for each non-target species is evaluated under each alternative, to better meet the objectives:\nprevent overfishing, maintain healthy stocks, and rebuild depressed stocks. Although Alternative 4 was not\ndesigned specifically to meet these objectives for individual prohibited species stocks, it would leave in place\nall Alternative 1 measures that are already designed to minimize the impacts of groundfish fisheries on\nprohibited species (see above). Therefore, Alternatives 1 and 4 are treated as equivalent throughout the\ndiscussion of prohibited species impacts.\nIn this section, the predicted impacts of groundfish fishery management on prohibited species are discussed,\nbeginning with the predicted effects of Alternative 1 on each prohibited species group, including an evaluation\nof the significance of those effects (Table 4.6-5). The pertinent question in each case is whether management\nobjectives would be met: the objectives are to prevent overfishing, maintain healthy stocks, and rebuild\ndepressed stocks of non-target species.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-20","Table 4.6-5 Criteria for Rating Alternatives Relative to Alternative 1 for Each Species\nScore\nEffect\n-2\n-1\n+0\n+1\n+2\nUnknown\nDecreases 10\nDecreases\nNA\nBycatch in\nIncreases over\nIncreases 10\nWithin + 10\ngroundfish\n25 percent\nto 25 percent\npercent of\nto 25 percent\nover 25\npercent\nfishery\nstatus quo\nSpatial and\nSubstantially\nMarginally\nSame amount\nMarginally\nSubstantially\nNA\nless spatial or\nless spatial or\ntemporal\nmore spatial\nmore spatial\nof spatial and\nconcentration\nand temporal\nor temporal\ntemporal\ntemporal\ntemporal\nconcentration\nconcentration\nconcentration\nof bycatch\nconcentration\nconcentration\nMarginally\nSubstantially\nSpawning\nSpawning\nSubstantially\nMarginally\nSame amount\nhabitat of the\nof spawning\nless spawning\nless spawning\nhabitat\nmore\nmore\nhabitat\nhabitat\nhabitat\nspecies is\ndisruption by\nspawning\nspawning\ndisruption\ndisruption\ndisruption\nunknown\ngroundfish\nhabitat\nhabitat\nfishery\ndisruption\ndisruption\nPrey of the\nMarginally\nSubstantially\nPrey\nSubstantially\nMarginally\nSame amount\nspecies is\nof prey\nless prey\nless prey\ncompetition\nmore prey\nmore prey\n(10 to 25\n(more than 25\nunknown\n(removal of\n(more than 25\n(10 to 25\n(+10 percent)\nremoved by\npercent)\npercent)\nprey species\npercent)\npercent)\nremoved by\nremoved by\nby groundfish\nremoved by\nremoved by\nfishery\nfishery\nfishery\nfishery)\nfishery\nfishery\nThe ratings used to assess the impacts of Alternative 1 on prohibited species groups are as follows:\nNS - no significant impact, assigned when there is evidence that status quo does not affect the\nsustainability of the stock.\nCS(+) - conditionally significant positive impact, assigned when there is some evidence and/or some\nuncertainty about evidence of a gain in population sustainability due to this alternative.\nCS(-) - conditionally significant adverse impact, assigned when there is some evidence and/or some\nuncertainty about evidence of loss of population sustainability due to this alternative.\nS(+) - significant positive impact, assigned when there is conclusive evidence of a gain in stock\nsustainability due to this alternative.\nS(-) - significant adverse impact, assigned when there is conclusive evidence of loss of stock\nsustainability due to this alternative.\nU - unknown impact, assigned when there is no information to evaluate the impact on the population.\nFor each alternative, a qualitative score is applied to the metrics of catch, spatial and temporal concentration\nof catch, spawning or other habitat disruption, and competition for prey. The scores applied below only reflect\ndirectional changes relative to Alternative 1 to examine differences among alternatives. The scores do not\nindicate higher or lower probabilities of meeting the alternative objectives. Scores for each metric are reported\nwithin each alternative and summarized in a table for all prohibited species in Section 4.6.3. Prohibited species\nwith different effects between FMP areas are summarized separately for the BSAI and GOA; otherwise the\neffects apply to both areas. The following rationale is used to apply scores:\nGiven uncertainty in model estimates of catch, the following ranges are used to assess differences:\nNo change from Alternative 1 (alternative catch is within -10 percent to 10 percent)\nMinor to moderate change from Alternative 1 (more than 10 percent but not more than 25 percent)\nSignificant change from Alternative 1 (more than 25 percent)\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-21","To apply scores to indirect effects, the following general criteria are used, and specific justification is provided\nfor each score in the associated impacts analysis section.\nOnly one alternative is specifically designed to address the spatial and temporal concentration of the catch in\ntarget groundfish fisheries (both strategies of Alternative 2), which might alter these patterns for bycatch.\nOther alternatives address the issue less directly, but differences among alternatives can still be judged. All\nelse being equal, spatial and temporal concentration of bycatch would be expected to change relative to the\nAlternative 1 concentration of bycatch if areas or seasons are closed or opened and TACs for target species\nare not adjusted proportionally.\nFirst, the fisheries that incidentally catch the bycatch species in question are determined. Then, alternatives\nthat close areas and or seasons for the same amount of TAC in the target fishery that catches the non-target\nspecies as bycatch are assumed to likely display marginally more spatial and temporal concentration of\nbycatch. Alternatives opening areas or seasons for the same amount of TAC are assumed to potentially lessen\nconcentration of catch marginally. Alternatives that close times and areas and increase TAC might result in\nsubstantially more concentration of the target fishery in time and space, and therefore more concentrated\nbycatch, and those that open areas and decrease TAC might result in substantially less concentration.\nAlternatives that close areas but attempt to reduce TAC proportionally could result in the same amount of\nspatial and temporal concentration of bycatch as status quo management.\nA similar rationale might be applied to judge relative effects on spawning habitat, if it is known. The\ncombination of gear types and closed areas proposed by an alternative might result in marginally more or less\nprotection for spawning habitat, depending on the location of the closed areas in relation to spawning habitat.\nThe difference between marginal changes and substantial changes should be based on the amount of spawning\nhabitat protected or impacted relative to Alternative 1; small amounts would rate a +1, whereas large ramounts\nwould rate +2. The rationale for any score is justified in each impact sections. If there is absolutely no\ninformation on spawning habitat, all alternatives are assigned as unknown as a last resort.\nFor prey competition, whether the catch of prey species changes under the alternative is determined using\ninformation from the appropriate section (e.g., if the bycatch species eats pollock, whether removals of pollock\nincrease or decrease under the particular alternative is determined). If prey of the species is not caught by the\nfishery, a +0 is assigned to all alternatives. Percent changes are all relative to status quo, as are comparisons\nof catch among alternatives. If absolutely no information exists on what the bycatch species eats, all\nalternatives are assigned a score of unknown as a last resort.\n4.6.2.1\nPacific Halibut\nPacific halibut are the largest flatfish in the North Pacific Ocean, achieving weights over 227 kg (500 lbs) and\nlengths over 250 cm (8 ft). They are found from the Sea of Japan throughout the Bering Sea and GOA to\nsouthern California, inhabiting a wide range of bottom types (Eschmeyer et al. 1983). Adult halibut are active\nswimmers capable of long migrations, but most remain in the same general region each year, traveling from\nsummer inshore feeding grounds to deeper offshore winter spawning grounds. Halibut are predators throughout\ntheir lives, feeding on small crustaceans and fish as juveniles and on a wide range of fish species as adults,\nincluding commercial groundfish species such as Pacific cod, sablefish, pollock, turbot and other flatfish, and\nrockfish species. In addition, halibut feed on pelagic forage fish such as sand lance and herring, and benthic\nanimals such as octopus, crabs, and bivalves (IPHC 1998). There are few predators of Pacific halibut aside\nfrom humans, although conflicts have arisen between human predators and marine mammals, which have been\nobserved foraging on halibut hooked on longlines but not yet landed (Bell 1981).\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-22","Pacific halibut are jointly managed by the International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC), NMFS, and the\nCouncil. Halibut stocks are currently considered healthy, and support diverse commercial, sport, and\nsubsistence fisheries in both the United States and Canada (IPHC 1998). Halibut bycatch is controlled in\nNorth Pacific groundfish fisheries using PSC caps, or bycatch limits, which are released seasonally and may\napply to specific target fisheries. The IPHC tracks bycatch mortality in the Alaska groundfish fisheries (IPHC\nAreas 2C, 3 and 4, Figure 4.6-8) using catch and discard mortality data collected by groundfish observers.\nIn IPHC areas outside Alaska, the IPHC must estimate discard mortality rates by other means (see Williams\n2000), as well as the bycatch itself.\nStock assessments and total allowable harvest limits for halibut take all removals into account, including\nbycatch in groundfish fisheries (Clark and Hare 1998, IPHC 1998). Bycatch as a proportion of total halibut\nfishing mortality in all IPHC management areas combined has varied from over 40 percent in the 1970s to less\nthan 15 percent in recent years (Table 4.6-6). (Data on mortality from personal use and directed fishery\ndiscards are missing in early years, thus the proportion of bycatch mortality is potentially overestimated for\nthose years.) Alaska groundfish fisheries take the majority (more than 90 percent) of halibut bycatch (IPHC\n1998), and most fish taken are below the legal size limit for directed halibut fisheries (81 cm). These halibut\nare considered juveniles, that is, they have not completed migrations to their home grounds. Migration rates\nof juvenile halibut are used in concert with bycatch information for the groundfish fisheries to estimate\nappropriate yield reductions for the directed halibut fishery in each IPHC management area (Clark and Hare\n1998).\nThere were two general decreases in the proportion of total halibut mortality taken as bycatch (Table 4.6-6).\nThe first, in the early 1980s, reflects a combination of the steady increase in directed halibut landings and\nBSAI and GOA FMP management measures applied to reduce halibut bycatch in foreign groundfish fisheries.\n130°W\n120°W\n160°W\n150°W\n140°W\n170°E\n180°\n170°W\n65°N\n65°N\nRussia\nAlaska\nBering Sea\n60°N\n60°N\n4E\n3A\n4D\nAC\nKodiak Is\nClosed\n2C\n55°N\n3B\n55°N\n4A\n4B\nQueen Charlotte Is\nAleutian Is\n4A\nGulf of Alaska\n2B\n4B\n50°N\n50°N\nVancouver Is.\n2A\n45°N\n45°N\n140°W\n130°W\n120°W\n170°E\n180°\n170°W\n160°W\n150°W\nFigure 4.6-8 Management areas defined by the International Pacific Halibut Commission.\nThe second decrease was observed in the late 1990s following the full utilization of groundfish by the domestic\nindustry. New FMP amendments aimed at reducing impacts to halibut in domestic groundfish fisheries resulted\nin this decline in halbut bycatch mortality.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-23","Because the IPHC management process accounts for halibut bycatch mortality, incidental catch in groundfish\nfisheries is not considered detrimental to halibut populations, assuming that bycatch is estimated accurately.\nHowever, halibut bycatch is considered a significant allocation and utilization issue by the fishing industry and\nfishery managers, especially since the halibut IFQ program was implemented. The focus of this section is on\npreventing overfishing, maintaining healthy stocks, and rebuilding depressed stocks of non-target species, not\non allocation or utilization (social) issues. Therefore, Alternative 1 prohibited species management under the\nFMPs is believed to provide adequate protection for halibut stocks by preventing overfishing and maintaining\nthe healthy stock, assuming the way the IPHC manages the stock as a whole remains unchanged. While the\nanalysis below is based on the assumption that healthy halibut stocks are maintained as long as bycatch does\nnot exceed halibut TAC, even if NMFS were to remove bycatch limits in place under Alternative 1 (as in\nAlternative 3), the IPHC would not likely support increases in the proportion of halibut TAC taken and\ndiscarded as bycatch in groundfish fisheries. Conversely, decreases in bycatch mortality from groundfish\nfisheries would not necessarily afford better protection to halibut stocks as both the legal and sub-legal sized\nportion of this mortality would likely be allocated to the directed halibut fisheries either immediately or in the\nfuture in the form of increased yield. However, this re-allocation of mortality could be viewed as positive from\na social and economic perspective.\nAll alternatives would leave halibut bycatch caps in place except for Alternatives 3 and 6.2. In predicting\nimpacts to halibut under each of the remaining alternatives, the total bycatch mortality of Pacific halibut would\nbe limited to 5,033 mt per year in the BSAI, and 2,300 mt in the GOA (e.g., the 2000 Alternative\nspecifications). Comparisons of impacts of the alternatives focus on the expected percentage change in amount\nof bycatch predicted by the model for (1) predicted 2001-2005 bycatch mortality versus observed bycatch for\nthe most recent years (1997-1999), and for (2) predicted bycatch under Alternatives 2 to 6 versus that\npredicted under Alternative 1. These expected changes are shown in Tables 4.6-7 and 4.6-8 for Pacific halibut.\nBecause the halibut stock assessment is not done by NMFS, no appropriate information is available to\nquantitatively incorporate changes in halibut spawning stock biomass, population age structure, or other\npopulation effects resulting from changes in halibut bycatch within the analysis. Instead, potential population\neffects are outlined qualitatively in the discussion of each alternative, based on more limited information from\nobserver data. While 50 to 60 percent of halibut bycatch is below the directed fishery size limit of 81 cm, there\nare differences in catch by gear type which may result in different population effects. The projected halibut\nbycatch in each major gear type is assumed to follow the general pattern observed in 1997 to 1999 (Figure 4.6-\n9). While there are more data from the BSAI than the GOA, bottom trawls generally appear to catch a higher\nproportion of smaller halibut than longlines in both areas.\nThe Alternative 1 PSC limit of 5,033 mt in the BSAI would be reached only under Alternative 6.2 in the year\n2001, while the GOA bycatch cap of 2,300 mt is limiting under Alternatives 1 and 4, and would be exceeded\nunder Alternatives 3 and 6.2. The performance in the GOA reflects the fact that status quo PSC constraints\nwere left in place under Alternatives 1 and 4 without any other substantial changes to the fisheries, but these\nconstraints were relaxed under Alternatives 3 and 6.2. Because the effects of each alternative were very similar\nbetween FMP areas and the IPHC manages halibut fisheries on a coastwide basis, we discuss results for both\nthe BSAI and GOA under each alternative.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-24","Halibut Fishing Mortality From All Sources in All IPHC Areas Combined, Round Weight\nTable 4.6-6\nin Metric Tons\nBycatch\nRecreational\nPersonal\nDirected\nBycatch\nTotal\nYear\nCommercial\nMortality\nPercent of\nWastage\nFishery\nFishery\nUse\nTotal\n24,043\n47\n0\n0\n11,475\n1974\n12,854\n0\n7,181\n23,555\n29\n1975\n16,661\n0\n0\n0\n24,619\n33\n0\n8,294\n1976\n16,612\n0\n0\n7,103\n20,481\n35\n0\n0\n1977\n13,198\n180\n7,385\n20,886\n35\n0\n0\n1978\n13,271\n231\n23,160\n40\n1979\n13,596\n345\n0\n0\n9,218\n11,281\n24,986\n45\n1980\n13,192\n513\n0\n0\n25,155\n36\n677\n0\n0\n8,963\n1981\n15,515\n29\n0\n7,464\n25,766\n1982\n17,499\n803\n0\n30,722\n21\n0\n0\n6,565\n1983\n23,151\n1,006\n6,146\n34,414\n18\n1984\n27,120\n1,147\n0\n0\n4,645\n41,035\n11\n1985\n33,846\n1,579\n0\n965\n51,240\n10\n1,930\n5,285\n1986\n41,996\n2,029\n0\n13\n0\n1,642\n6,804\n52,632\n1987\n41,911\n2,275\n57,965\n15\n3,094\n0\n1,178\n8,844\n1988\n44,849\n8,231\n53,174\n15\n1989\n40,373\n3,348\n0\n1,222\n21\n3,599\n0\n998\n10,775\n52,524\n1990\n37,152\n52,900\n22\n1,206\n1,343\n11,865\n1991\n34,383\n4,102\n53,696\n23\n3,902\n664\n757\n12,241\n1992\n36,132\n9,630\n51,294\n19\n4,858\n555\n491\n1993\n35,760\n49,031\n21\n778\n10,225\n1994\n33,014\n4,460\n555\n23\n318\n155\n9,611\n41,466\n1995\n26,470\n4,911\n8,725\n42,816\n20\n318\n209\n1996\n28,580\n4,983\n53,662\n15\n175\n8,152\n5,663\n318\n1997\n39,353\n7,820\n56,440\n14\n318\n217\n1998\n42,065\n6,019\n58,727\n13\n5,503\n318\n237\n7,779\n1999\n44,890\nSource: IPHC Stock Assessment Data Website and Williams 2000\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-25","Table 4.6-7 Bering Sea Aleutian Islands Pacific Halibut Bycatch, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative, in\nMetric Tons\nProjection\nAlternative\nYear\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\n2000\n3,828\n3,828\n1,396\n4,410\n3,828\n3,402\n2,602\n3,631\n3,828\n2001\n3,693\n2,843\n1,380\n3,834\n3,687\n3,300\n2,908\n3,526\n5,168\n2002\n3,411\n2,753\n1,374\n3,826\n3,406\n3,090\n2,768\n3,300\n4,505\n2003\n3,281\n2,766\n1,368\n3,843\n3,278\n2,995\n2,702\n2,953\n4,113\n2004\n3,390\n2,866\n1,364\n3,689\n3,388\n3,078\n2,768\n3,284\n4,140\n2005\n3,545\n2,956\n1,359\n3,816\n3,542\n3,193\n2,857\n3,411\n4,403\n3,464\n2,837\n1,369\n3,802\n3,460\n3,131\n2,801\n3,295\n4,466\nRecent average 1997-1999\n4,239\n4,239\n4,239\n4,239\n4,239\n4,239\n4,239\n4,239\n4,239\nPercent change (from\n-18\n-33\n-68\n-10\n-18\n-26\n-34\n-22\n5\nrecent)\nPredicted average, 2001-\n0\n-18\n-60\n10\n0\n-10\n-19\n-5\n29\n2005\nBycatch limit\n5,033\n5,033\n5,033\n5,033\n5,033\n5,033\n5,033\n5,033\n5,033\nTable 4.6-8 GOA Pacific Halibut Bycatch, 2001-2005, by Alternative, in Metric Tons\nProjection\nAlternative\nYear\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\n2000\n2,332\n2,333\n1,543\n2,758\n2,333\n2,333\n2,188\n2,359\n2,332\n2001\n2,334\n1,953\n1,476\n2,430\n2,334\n2,334\n2,166\n2,352\n3,711\n2002\n2,322\n1,958\n1,440\n2,402\n2,322\n2,322\n2,102\n2,245\n3,376\n2003\n2,301\n1,940\n1,477\n2,393\n2,301\n2,301\n2,019\n2,182\n3,171\n2004\n2,281\n1,910\n1,384\n2,453\n2,294\n2,294\n1,997\n2,191\n3,090\n2005\n2,296\n1,976\n1,480\n2,300\n2,297\n2,297\n2,027\n2,214\n3,226\nPredicted average 2001-\n2,307\n1,947\n1,451\n2,396\n2,310\n2,310\n2,062\n2,237\n3,315\n2005\nRecent average 1997-1999\n2,425\n2,425\n2,425\n2,425\n2,425\n2,425\n2,425\n2,425\n2,425\nPercent change (from\n-5\n-20\n-40\n-1\n-5\n-5\n-12\n-8\n37\nrecent)\nPercent change from\n0\n-16\n-37\n4\n0\n0\n-11\n-3\n44\nAlternative 1\nBycatch limit\n2,300\n2,300\n2,300\n2,300\n2,300\n2,300\n2,300\n2,300\n2,300\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-26","Legal size limit = 81 cm\n4000\n4000\nLegal size limit = 81 cm\nBSAI 1997-1999\nGOA 1997-1999\n3000\nall observed halibut lengths\n3000\nall observed halibut lengths\nbottom trawl\n2000\n2000\nlongline\npelagic trawl\n1000\n1000\n0\n0\n200\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n0\n50\n100\n150\nhalibut length (cm)\nFigure 4.6-9 Length frequency of halibut observed in Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands and Gulf of\nAlaska groundfish fisheries, 1997-1999. Source: NMFS\nBering Sea Aleutian Islands and Gulf of Alaska\nImpacts of Alternative 1\nHalibut bycatch mortality is predicted to be 3,300 to 3,800 mt for 2000-2005 in the BSAI under Alternative\n1, and approximates the bycatch limit of 2,300 mt in all projection years in the GOA. In this and all\nsubsequent analyses, the catch in all prediction years is averaged to determine proportions of bycatch mortality\nby fishery and gear type. The majority of halibut bycatch in the BSAI is taken in trawl fisheries, specifically\nthose targeting Pacific cod (33 percent of total catch by weight), yellowfin sole (18 percent), and rock sole (14\npercent). Longline fisheries targeting Pacific cod take the next largest proportion of halibut bycatch under\nAlternative 1(14 percent). Overall, 80 percent of BSAI halibut bycatch is predicted in bottom trawl fisheries,\n16 percent in longline fisheries, 4 percent in pelagic trawl fisheries, and less than 1 percent in all other gear\ntypes under Alternative 1.\nThe majority of halibut bycatch in the GOA is also taken in trawl fisheries, specifically those targeting Pacific\ncod (32 percent of total catch by weight), the shallow water flatfish complex (13 percent), and the deep water\nflatfish complex (11 percent). Longline fisheries targeting Pacific cod take the next largest proportion of\nhalibut bycatch under Alternative 1 (11 percent). Overall, 86 percent of GOA halibut bycatch is predicted in\nbottom trawl fisheries, 12 percent in longline fisheries, and less than 2 percent all other gear types under\nAlternative 1. Proportions of bycatch mortality by gear are compared to those estimated for other alternatives\nin each FMP area to determine whether bycatch size composition might change (based on information presented\nin Figure 4.6-9), and therefore whether different population effects might be expected.\nThe total predicted bycatch mortality in the BSAI is, on average, 18 percent lower than the recently observed\naverage bycatch of 4,239 mt, but predicted bycatch is lower than recently observed bycatch under all\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-27","alternatives. The decrease from recently observed bycatch mortality is not considered to be significant, because\nthe model does not incorporate changes in halibut population size. In the GOA, the total predicted bycatch\nmortality would be on average 5 percent lower than the recently observed average bycatch of 2,425 mt, but this\nis largely a function of the cap in place under Alternative 1, which varied in 1997-1999, but did not vary in\nthe model projections. The bycatch in each FMP area would still be mostly juveniles, as recently observed,\nand this juvenile mortality would continue to be taken into account within the halibut stock assessments and\nIPHC quota setting process. While no significant impacts to halibut populations are predicted under\nAlternative 1 FMP management, in combination with Alternative 1 IPHC management, the bycatch mortality\nof juvenile halibut would continue to reduce yields that would otherwise be realized in future years by the\ndirected halibut fishery.\nExamples of indirect impacts to Pacific halibut would be concentration of bycatch in space or time, resulting\nin the overharvest of a distinct genetic component of the stock, destruction of spawning habitat or disruption\nof spawning aggregations, and removal of halibut prey by groundfish fisheries. Because Pacific halibut are\nconsidered a single coastwide stock from the Bering Sea down to the U.S. west coast, there are no smaller\ncomponents of the stock that concentration of bycatch in space or time could have any significant impacts on.\nIn addition, halibut bycatch appears to be evenly spread throughout the fisheries that take it (Figures 4.6-10\nand 4.6-11).\nHalibut spawn throughout the BSAI and GOA in the winter, but the largest major spawning ground identified\nby IPHC off Yakutat is currently closed to all groundfish trawling. Halibut spawn in deep waters (over 200\nfathoms or 400 m), while most groundfish fisheries take place in shallower areas of the continental shelf. In\naddition, most bottom trawl groundfish fisheries occur between March and November, while halibut spawning\ntakes place November to March, SO that spawning halibut are generally not exposed to bottom trawl fisheries.\nTherefore, no significant impacts to halibut spawning habitat or spawning aggregations are expected from\ngroundfish fisheries as managed under Alternative 1. Halibut are apex predators, which eat target groundfish\nspecies as well as non-target groundfish and invertebrate species, most of which are caught in groundfish\nfisheries. Because halibut have flexible feeding habits, they respond to short-term localized shortages of one\nprey species by substituting another. While halibut have shown a decrease in size at age over time, it is\ncurrently hypothesized that this change may be due to long-term climatic variability, and not to removal of prey\nby groundfish fisheries (Clark et al. 1999). Therefore, removal of prey by groundfish fisheries is not expected\nto have any significant impacts on the sustainability of the Pacific halibut population.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 1 is the baseline and is always assigned a +0.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.1\nUnder Alternative 2.1, to increase protection to marine mammals and seabirds halibut bycatch mortality is\npredicted to be 2,800 mt to 3,800 mt in the BSAI, and 1,900 mt to 2,300 mt in the GOA. This regime would\nalter fisheries for Pacific cod, Atka mackerel, and pollock in the BSAI by closing critical habitat areas to\nfishing and reducing TACs for these species by the estimated fraction of biomass within critical habitat.\nHalibut bycatch limits would be left in place under this alternative. The decrease in halibut bycatch mortality\nunder Alternative 2.1 (16 to 18 percent lower than that predicted under Alternative 1 in each FMP area) would\nbe due to reductions in Pacific cod fishing, while bycatch in flatfish trawl fisheries would be unaffected. The\nproportion of halibut bycatch in BSAI trawl Pacific cod fisheries would drop to 29 percent and in longline\nfisheries to 13 percent, while the proportion from flatfish trawl fisheries would increase (21 percent in yellowfin\nsole, 16 percent in rock sole). Overall, proportions of bycatch by gear type in the BSAI would not be greatly\nchanged (81 percent bottom trawl, 15 percent longline, 4 percent pelagic trawl) SO no changes are predicted\nin the length composition of BSAI bycatch relative to Alternative 1.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-28","1997-1999 bottom trawl halibut bycatch\n1997-1999 bottom trawl cod targets\n1997-1999 bottom trawl flatfish targets\nFigure 4.6-10 Observed locations of recent halibut bycatch in bottom trawls,\nwith target fishery distributions.\n1997-1999 longline halibut bycatch\n1997-1999 longline cod targets\nFigure 4.6-11 Observed locations of recent halibut bycatch on longlines, with\ncod longliner target fishery.","","In the GOA, the proportion of halibut bycatch mortality taken in Pacific cod trawl fisheries would be reduced\nto 20 percent, while the proportion of bycatch in shallow water flatfish trawl fisheries would increase to 20\npercent and that in deep water flatfish would remain similar to Alternative 1 at 12 percent. As in the BSAI,\nthe proportion of halibut bycatch taken by gear type would be similar to Alternative 1, at 87 percent bottom\ntrawl and 11 percent longline. No changes in the size composition of halibut bycatch are predicted in the GOA\nfor Alternative 2.1.\nWhile total halibut bycatch mortality in the BSAI is somewhat lower under this alternative than under\nAlternative 1, no significant effects are expected to result on the halibut stock from this alternative in\ncombination with Alternative 1 IPHC management. Bycatch mortality would continue to reduce yields to the\ndirected halibut fishery, perhaps at a slightly lower rate than under Alternative 1.\nIn comparing alternatives, 2.1 scores a +1 for reducing catch in the range of 10-25 percent relative to\nAlternative 1. While Alternative 2.1 would use specific measures to control the spatial and temporal\ndistribution of catch for Pacific cod, it would not alter flatfish trawl fisheries in any way. Bycatch of halibut\nwould be reduced, but could still occur within the closed areas if taken in directed trawl flatfish fisheries\n(Figure 4.6-12), not cod trawl or longline fisheries (Figure 4.6-13). Because cod fisheries take up to half of\nhalibut bycatch in both the BSAI and GOA under Alternative 1, at least half the halibut bycatch would not be\naffected at all by Alternative 2.1. Therefore, measures implemented in Alternative 2.1 are expected to reduce\nthe spatial and temporal concentration of halibut bycatch only for up to half of the bycatch, and how the other\nhalf would change, if at all, cannot be predicted. Overall, spatial and temporal concentration of halibut bycatch\nmight be marginally reduced from that observed under Alternative 1, SO a +1 is assigned for this effect.\nBecause some cod fisheries might extend into deeper waters due to area closures in the GOA, and some more\ncod fishing could occur in the winter season due to the even distribution of TAC in four periods of the year,\nsome increased impacts to halibut spawning habitat or aggregations could happen under Alternative 2.1.\nHowever, since these changes would only apply in the cod fishery, and no changes would presumably occur\nin flatfish fisheries, the increased impact to spawning halibut would be marginal, SO this metric receives a score\nof -1. Catches of halibut prey (we use all groundfish catch combined since halibut are apex predators) are\nreduced under Alternative 2.1 by 20 percent in the BSAI and by 33 percent in the GOA (Table 4.9-2). Because\nthe GOA is the center of halibut abundance, we use the percent change in catch of halibut prey this area to\nassign our rating to compare alternatives; Alternative 2.1 scores a +2, for reducing the removal of halibut prey\nby groundfish fisheries by over 25 percent relative to status quo.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.2\nAlternative 2.2 to increase protection to marine mammals and seabirds results in the most substantial changes\nto halibut bycatch relative to the status quo. Halibut bycatch is predicted to be 1,400 mt to 1,500 mt in the\nBSAI and 1,400 mt to 1,500 mt in the GOA because TACs for Pacific cod, pollock, and Atka mackerel were\nsubstantially reduced to the point at which fisheries for these species would represent no more of a disturbance\nthan a passing storm to foraging Steller sea lions. The primary effect under Alternative 2.2 results from\nreductions in Pacific cod TAC; halibut bycatch in (the now negligible) Pacific cod trawl fisheries is predicted\nto fall to negligible amounts, with significant reductions in longline bycatch as well.\nProportions of BSAI halibut bycatch mortality by fishery are estimated to be 36 percent from rock sole trawl,\n20 percent from yellowfin sole trawl, and 5 percent from Pacific cod longline. The overall proportion of BSAI\nbycatch by gear type under this alternative is 88 percent bottom trawl, 10 percent longline, and 1 percent\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-31","This page intentionally left blank\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-32","1997-1999 bottom trawl halibut bycatch\n1997-1999 bottom trawl cod targets\n1997-1999 bottom trawl flatfish targets\nFigure 4.6-12 Alternative 2.1 closures (pink), with trawl halibut bycatch and\ntarget fishery locations.\n1997-1999 longline halibut bycatch\n1997-1999 longline cod targets\nN\nS\nFigure 4.6-13 Alternative 2.1 closures with longline halibut bycatch and cod\nlongline fishery locations.","","pelagic trawl. In the GOA, 25 percent of halibut bycatch mortality is taken in shallow water flatfish trawl\nfisheries, 17 percent in deep water flatfish trawl fisheries, 9 percent in rex sole trawl fisheries, and 8 percent\nin Pacific cod longline fisheries. Alternative 2.2 halibut bycatch in the GOA is taken 90 percent by bottom\ntrawl and 9 percent by longline, with all other gears at less than 1 percent each.\nThe shift in bycatch mortality by gear type predicted here may result in a higher proportion of smaller, younger\njuvenile halibut taken relative to Alternative 1, because trawls tend to catch smaller halibut than longlines.\nHowever, total predicted halibut mortality would be substantially (60 percent BSAI, 37 percent GOA) lower\nthan that predicted under Alternative 1, SO the absolute amount of smaller halibut removed could be the same\nor lower than Alternative 1. Assuming no changes to halibut management by the IPHC, neither of these effects\nis expected to have any significant impact on the halibut stock, because they would be accounted for in stock\nassessments and quota setting (and legal-sized halibut not caught as bycatch would be reallocated to directed\nfisheries). Bycatch mortality would continue to reduce yields to the directed halibut fishery, but to a lesser\nextent than under Alternative 1.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 2.2 scores +2 for reducing catch by more than 25 percent relative to\nAlternative 1. While Alternative 2.2 would reduce TACs to control spatial and temporal distributions of catch\nfor Pacific cod, it would not alter flatfish trawl fisheries in any way. Because cod fisheries take up to half of\nhalibut bycatch in both the BSAI and GOA under Alternative 1 management, a significant amount of halibut\nbycatch mortality would not be affected at all by Alternative 2.2. The reduction in halibut bycatch overall\nwould likely reduce spatial and temporal concentrations of halibut bycatch relative to Alternative 1, but only\nmarginally because flatfish fisheries are not affected, SO a +1 is assigned to this metric. No increase in fishing\nin deep water or during the winter is expected under this alternative, SO no changes from Alternative 1 are\nexpected for impacts to spawning habitat or aggregations; +0 is assigned to this metric. Catches of halibut\nprey (all groundfish catch are combined since halibut are apex predators) are reduced under Alternative 2.2\nby 80 percent in the BSAI and by 54 percent in the GOA (Table 4.9-2). Alternative 2.2 scores +2 for reducing\nthe removal of halibut prey by groundfish fisheries by over 25 percent relative to Alternative 1.\nImpacts of Alternative 3\nThe regime to increase protection to target species by balancing conservative management for target stocks\nwhile maximizing yields for those stocks. Therefore, Alternative 1 bycatch restraints would be lifted under\nAlternative 3 to allow all (conservatively determined) target species quotas to be caught. Predicted halibut\nbycatch under Alternative 3 would increase modestly relative to Alternative 1, ranging from 3,700 mt to 4,400\nmt in the BSAI and from 2,300 mt to 2,700 mt in the GOA. These are potentially underestimates of halibut\nbycatch mortality if there were truly no constraint on halibut bycatch, for reasons explained below.\nUnder Alternative 3, the majority of the predicted BSAI halibut bycatch would occur in the rock sole trawl\nfishery (27 percent), followed by Pacific cod trawl (25 percent) and yellowfin sole trawl (16 percent) fishery.\nCod longline fisheries would account for 12 percent of BSAI halibut bycatch under this alternative, and the\noverall proportion by gear is 84 percent bottom trawl, 13 percent longline, and 3 percent pelagic trawl. Halibut\nbycatch mortality predicted under this alternative would increase by 10 percent relative to that predicted for\nAlternative 1, but it still does not exceed the bycatch limit established for 2000. While this result could be\nencouraging, it is likely an artifact of the input data, which reflects active avoidance of halibut by the fisheries\nunder Alternative 1, as well as the lack of halibut population dynamics in the simulation model. Therefore, it\ncannot be argued that in reality halibut bycatch in the BSAI would remain at this low level in the absence of\nbycatch caps. It is possible that halibut bycatch might remain in this range if target fisheries still actively\navoided halibut, but were allowed to take the full TACs.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-35","In the GOA, halibut bycatch is predicted to exceed the current PSC limit of 2,300 mt in almost all projection\nyears in the absence of any bycatch caps under Alternative 3. However, bycatch mortality is an average of only\n4 percent higher than that predicted for Alternative 1. The discussion above regarding input data reflecting\nactive avoidance of halibut by the fishery applies here as well-halibut bycatch could be much higher than this\nif caps were removed. There is no way to predict the magnitude of bycatch in the GOA if there were absolutely\nno avoidance of halibut by the fisheries, however the proportions may be instructive. The highest predicted\nproportion of GOA halibut bycatch mortality would be taken by the Pacific cod trawl fishery (25 percent),\nfollowed by shallow water flatfish trawl (19 percent), rex sole trawl (15 percent), Pacific cod longline (10\npercent), and deepwater flatfish trawl (8 percent). Catch proportion by gear type would be altered only slightly\nfrom Alternative 1, to 88 percent bottom trawl and 11 percent longline.\nDespite the moderate increase in halibut bycatch mortality under Alternative 3, no significant impacts to halibut\npopulations would be expected if IPHC management practices were to remain the same, accounting for the\nincreased bycatch in stock assessment and quota setting. Bycatch mortality of the magnitude predicted here\nwould not exceed any recently observed level, and would still be lower than that observed during foreign\ngroundfish fisheries. However, as explained above, bycatch mortality could be much higher than predicted here\nin the absence of bycatch caps, and concentration within the directed halibut fishery is predicted to increase\ndirectly (perhaps exponentially) with the resulting increase in foregone yield.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 3 scores a +0 for maintaining catch within +10 percent of that predicted\nfor Alternative 1, although an argument could be made for assigning a negative value because catches of\nhalibut would likely increase by more than the magnitude predicted here. Alternative 3 would close 20 percent\nof each FMP area to fishing with all gears, but would not reduce TAC proportionally for all species. In fact,\nthe catches of nearly all trawl caught flatfish would be higher under this alternative (Section 4.3) due to the\nrelease of halibut bycatch caps, but would have to be taken from a smaller area (Figures 4.6-14 and 4.6-15).\nIt is likely that the spatial concentration of halibut bycatch would increase substantially under Alternative 3\nrelative to Alternative 1. Therefore, Alternative 3 is assigned a score of -2 for this metric. No changes to\nimpacts on halibut spawning aggregations or habitat are expected as a result of Alternative 3, because nothing\nindicates that there would be more fishing in deeper habitats or during the winter, SO a +0 is assigned. Catch\nof all groundfish (use as a proxy for halibut prey) would decrease 10 percent in the BSAI and 14 percent in\nthe GOA under Alternative 3 (Table 4.9-2). Therefore, a +1 is assigned to Alternative 3 for reducing\ncompetition for halibut prey in the range of 10 to 25 percent relative to Alternative 1.\nImpacts of Alternative 4.1\nAlternative 4.1, which would increase protection to non-target species, would establish an aggregate TAC for\nskates in the BSAI and GOA, an aggregate TAC for grenadiers in the GOA, and several pelagic trawl area\nclosures in the Bering Sea to protect squid. Because the aggregate TACs for skates and grenadiers never\nlimited target groundfish fisheries and there is little halibut bycatch in pelagic trawls, predicted halibut bycatch\nunder Alternative 4.1 is virtually identical to that predicted under Alternative 1, both in terms of total catch and\ndistribution by fishery and gear type. Therefore, the same nonsignificant impacts to halibut populations are\npredicted under this alternative as under Alternative 1, for the same reasons. Scores for all metrics are +0, as\nno changes are made from Alternative 1.\nImpacts of Alternative 4.2\nAlternative 4.2, which would also increase protection to non-target species, could establish a more conservative\naggregate TAC for BSAI skates designed to protect weaker skate stocks within the complex. Squid closures\nwould also be in place under Alternative 4.2. In this case, the lower skate TAC is predicted to constrain the\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-36","1997-1999 bottom trawl halibut bycatch\n1997-1999 bottom trawl cod targets\n1997-1999 bottom trawl flatfish targets\nFigure 4.6-14 Alternative 3 closures (pink), with observed bottom trawl halibut\nbycatch.\n1997-1999 longline halibut bycatch\n1997-1999 longline cod targets\nFigure 4.6-15 Alternative 3 closures with observed halibut longline bycatch and\nfishery locations.","","longline Pacific cod target fishery, which catches the majority of skates in the BSAI. Halibut bycatch mortality\nin this FMP area is predicted to be 3,000 mt to 3,400 mt under Alternative 4.2, slightly lower than that of\nAlternative 1. Pacific cod trawl fisheries would take 37 percent of this bycatch mortality, followed by\nyellowfin sole (20 percent) and rock sole (16 percent) fishery. Pacific cod longline fisheries would take only\n5 percent of halibut bycatch mortality under this alternative, and the overall BSAI breakdown by gear would\nbe 90 percent bottom trawl, 6 percent longline, and 4 percent pelagic trawl.\nThe shift in bycatch mortality by gear type predicted here is more pronounced than that predicted under\nAlternative 2.2, and could result in a higher proportion of bycatch of smaller, younger juvenile halibut relative\nto Alternative 1 because a higher proportion of bycatch is predicted from bottom trawl gear. In this case, the\nshift may not be balanced by the modest reduction (10 percent) in overall halibut bycatch mortality predicted\nfor Alternative 4.2 relative to Alternative 1. These are still subtle differences when viewed in the context of\nIPHC management of halibut stocks, however, and given continued accounting for halibut bycatch mortality\nin stock assessment and quota setting. No significant effects to halibut populations are predicted under this\nalternative. Bycatch mortality of juvenile halibut would continue to reduce yields in directed halibut fisheries.\nIn the GOA, an additional TAC would be set to protect grenadiers under this alternative. Neither the grenadier\nTAC nor the GOA skate TAC would limit directed fisheries, and therefore no changes to halibut\nbycatchmortality or the distribution of mortality between fisheries and gear types would be observed in the\nGOA relative to Alternative 1. As under Alternative 1 FMP and IPHC management, no significant effects on\nGOA halibut stocks are predicted as a result of Alternative 4.2.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 4.2 scores a +0 for maintaining catch within 10 percent of that predicted\nfor Alternative 1. Closures to cod longline fisheries could happen earlier in the year due to the skate TAC\nproposed in this alternative, but it is likely that the constraining skate TAC would be apportioned to cod\nfisheries throughout the year as other limiting TACs are under Alternative 1 to avoid temporal concentration\nof bycatch. Given this assumption, Alternative 4.2 is rated +0 for spatial and temporal concentrations of\nhalibut bycatch relative to Alternative 1. No changes in the depth or seasonality of fisheries are predicted as\na result of this alternative, SO +0 is assigned for disruption of halibut spawners and spawning habitat. The\ncatch of all groundfish would be reduced by 10 percent in the BSAI and by less than 1 percent in the GOA,\nSO Alternative 4.2 is rated +1.\nImpacts of Alternative 5\nAlternative 5 represents one way to increase protection to habitat; by shifting fisheries away from the use of\nbottom trawl gear to the extent possible and by closing areas with historically low fishing impact to all future\nbottom trawling. This alternative is based on the assumption that bottom trawls have more impact on habitat\nthan other fishing gear types. In the BSAI, halibut bycatch mortality under Alternative 5 is predicted to range\nfrom 2,600 mt to 2,900 mt, a moderate decrease relative to status quo and similar to that predicted for\nAlternative 2.1. Under Alternative 5, Pacific cod longline fisheries would take 27 percent of BSAI halibut\nbycatch mortality, followed by yellowfin sole trawl fishery (23 percent) and the rock sole trawl (22 percent)\nfishery. Pacific cod trawl fisheries would not exist under this alternative, and therefore would take no halibut.\nThe proportion of BSAI halibut bycatch by gear type is predicted to be 66 percent bottom trawl, 29 percent\nlongline, and 5 percent pelagic trawl.\nIn the GOA, halibut bycatch mortality is also predicted to decline slightly under Alternative 5, ranging from\n2,000 mt to 2,200 mt. The Pacific cod longline fishery is predicted to take the highest proportion of halibut\nbycatch mortality (31 percent), followed by shallow water flatfish (19 percent), rex sole (11 percent), and deep\nwater flatfish (10 percent) trawl fisheries. The distribution of bycatch mortality by gear type is altered\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-39","substantially relative to Alternative 1, to 59 percent bottom trawl, 32 percent longline, 7 percent pelagic trawl,\nand 2 percent pot.\nAlternative 5 appears to be the only alternative that would increase the proportion of halibut bycatch mortality\ntaken by longlines; this could result in a higher proportion of older, larger halibut typically taken as bycatch\ncompared with that observed under Alternative 1. This difference, like those described for other alternatives,\nwould be accounted within halibut stock assessments and quota determinations made by the IPHC, and\ntherefore is not predicted to have any significant impact on halibut populations. There could be more direct\ntradeoffs in terms of foregone yield to the directed fisheries under this alternative as opposed to the others since\na higher proportion of legal-sized halibut could potentially be caught as bycatch. However, the reduction in\nyield to the directed halibut fishery is not predicted to be greatly lower under Alternative 5 than that predicted\nfor Alternative 1 FMP management.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 5 scores +1 for reducing catch by 10 to 25 percent from that predicted\nfor Alternative 1. Closed areas under this alternative would only apply to bottom trawl fisheries, and would\nbe implemented with a proportional reduction in flatfish TACs. While many halibut bycatch locations observed\nunder Alternative management would still be subject to bottom trawl fishing under Alternative 5 (Figure 4.6-\n16), no increase is expected in the concentration of halibut bycatch relative to Alternative management, SO this\nmetric receives a +0 for Alternative 5. The closures under Alternative 5 would prevent any extension of\ntrawling into deep habitats used by spawning halibut, which is considered a substantial increase in protection\nfor halibut spawning habitat. However, because these deeper areas are not heavily fished with bottom trawls\nunder Alternative 1 management, the decrease in actual disruption to halibut spawning habitat and aggregations\nwould be marginal relative to Alternative 1, SO this metric is assigned a score of +1. There would be no\ndifference in total catch biomass under Alternative 5 compared with Alternative 1, SO the removal of halibut\nprey would not change relative to Alternative 1 under Alternative 5 (score is +0).\nImpacts of Alternative 6.1\nAlternative 6.1 would increase the economic efficiency of fisheries by establishing a rights-based management\nsystem that would reduce or eliminate bycatch and discards associated with the status quo race for fish.\nBycatch caps would not be removed in Alternative 6.1, but it is assumed that higher target species yields could\nbe achieved for a given level of bycatch relative to Alternative 1. Halibut bycatch under Alternative 6.1 is\npredicted to be 3,000 to 3,600 mt in the BSAI and 2,200 mt to 2,300 mt in the GOA; generally in the same\nrange or lower than that predicted for Alternative 1 FMP management. In the BSAI, Pacific cod trawl fisheries\nwould have the highest predicted proportion of halibut bycatch mortality, at 28 percent, followed by rock sole\ntrawl (24 percent), yellowfin sole trawl (15 percent), and Pacific cod longline (12 percent) fisheries. The\npredicted proportion of BSAI halibut bycatch mortality by gear type is 83 percent bottom trawl, 13 percent\nlongline, and 4 percent pelagic trawl. GOA fisheries would also look remarkably similar to Alternative 1 under\nAlternative 6.1, with Pacific cod trawl fisheries taking 26 percent of halibut bycatch mortality, followed by\nshallow water flatfish (16 percent) and rex sole (14 percent) trawl fisheries, and Pacific cod longline fisheries\n(9 percent). Under Alternative 6.1, 88 percent of GOA halibut bycatch mortality would be attributed to bottom\ntrawls, 10 percent to longlines, and less than 2 percent to all other gear types.\nGiven that it was not the intent of this alternative to reduce bycatch overall, but to reduce bycatch rates per\ncatch of target species, it is not surprising that the results predicted here are not substantially different from\nthose of Alternative 1 with respect to halibut bycatch mortality. Given continued IPHC management under\nAlternative 6.1, the same nonsignificant impacts to halibut populations are predicted, for the same reasons\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-40","Figure 4.6-16 Alternative 5 closed area (pink) and observed bottom trawl halibut bycatch locations.\n1997-1999 bottom trawl halibut bycatch\n1997-1999 bottom trawl flatfish targets\n1997-1999 bottom trawl cod targets\nE\nN\nS\nW","","listed under Alternative 1. As with all other alternatives, bycatch mortality of halibut would continue to reduce\nyields to directed halibut fisheries.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 6.1 scores a +0 for maintaining catch within 10 percent of that predicted\nfor Alternative 1. Rights-based management systems could allow for more slowly paced fisheries, which could\nreduce the temporal concentration of halibut bycatch relative to Alternative 1. In addition, incentives to avoid\nhalibut bycatch might encourage fishermen to leave areas of high halibut bycatch, thus potentially reducing\nspatial concentration relative to Alternative 1. Because these are indirect effects of a rights-based management\nregime, it is difficult to predict the magnitude of change relative to Alternative 1. The reduction in spatial and\ntemporal concentration of halibut bycatch would be marginal relative to Alternative management, because\nhalibut are widespread and halibut bycatch would not be greatly reduced under Alternative 6.1. Therefore, a\n+1 is assigned to Alternative 6.1 for its potential reduction in the spatial and temporal concentration of halibut\nbycatch. Nothing in this alternative indicates that a change in fishing would take place during the winter or\nin the deeper waters used by halibut for spawning, SO a +0 is assigned for disruption of spawning habitat. The\nchange in total groundfish catch between Alternatives 6.1 and 1 would be negligible, SO a +0 is assigned for\nremoval of halibut prey in the comparison of alternatives.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.2\nAlternative 6.2, which would maximize groundfish catch, is predicted to increase halibut bycatch more than\nany other alternative, to 3,800 mt to 100 mt in the BSAI and 2,300 mt to 3,700 mt in the GOA. This bycatch\nlevel might go even higher than predicted here, because input data reflect the active avoidance of halibut by\ngroundfish fisheries, while halibut bycatch limits would be removed altogether under Alternative 6.2. The\ndistribution of halibut bycatch by fishery is predicted to remain similar to Alternative 1.\nDespite the substantial increase in halibut bycatch mortality under Alternative 6.2, no significant impacts to\nhalibut populations would be expected if IPHC management practices were to remain the same, accounting for\nthe increased bycatch in stock assessment and quota setting. Bycatch mortality of the magnitude predicted here\nis similar to that observed during foreign groundfish fisheries. However, as explained above, bycatch mortality\ncould be much higher than predicted here in the absence of bycatch caps, and the resulting yield losses to the\ndirected halibut fishery would likely not be tolerated by IPHC or halibut IFQ owners.\nIn comparing of alternatives, Alternative 6.2 scores -2 for increasing halibut bycatch by more than 25 percent\nrelative to Alternative predictions. While there would be an overall increase in halibut catch under this\nalternative, there is nothing to indicate whether fisheries would expand from traditional fishing grounds and\nseasons, or would remain in the same areas and seasons while taking the higher bycatch. It seems more likely\nthat there would be an increase in spatial and temporal concentration of halibut bycatch under this alternative\nthan a decrease, or even a maintenance of status quo levels. A -1 is assigned for this metric under Alternative\n6.2, because fishermen might not avoid areas of high halibut bycatch in the absence of caps, which would only\nmarginally increase spatial and temporal concentration of bycatch because the fishery would have expanded\ninto these areas. Nothing in Alternative 6.2 indicates that a change in fishing would take place during the\nwinter or in the deeper waters used by halibut for spawning, so a +0 is assigned for disruption of spawning\nhabitat. The increase in 2001-2005 average total halibut bycatch in the groundfish fishery between\nAlternatives 6.2 and 1 would be 29 percent in the BSAI and 44 percent in the GOA, SO a -2 is assigned for\nremoval of halibut prey in comparing alternatives.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-43","King and Tanner Crabs\n4.6.2.2\nThe BSAI king and Tanner crab FMP defers federal management of the crab fisheries to the State of Alaska.\nCrab stocks are managed by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G), with harvest strategies\nestablished by the Alaska Board of Fisheries. No crab fisheries currently exist in federal waters of the GOA.\nSpecies descriptions and fishery history for each crab species are given in Section 3.4. Crab management and\ninformation is slightly different among FMP areas, SO the BSAI and GOA are discussed separately in this\nimpacts analysis.\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nTime and area closures, PSC limits, and gear restrictions were first used to control crab bycatch in the foreign\ngroundfish fisheries off Alaska. These management measures were extended to the JV fisheries and then the\ndomestic fisheries as they developed. In addition, the VIP was used to decrease the bycatch rates for red king\ncrab. Bycatch limits for red king crab and bairdi Tanner crab kept the bycatch from reaching high levels. In\ngeneral, crab PSC limits are a function of crab abundance, and represent about 1 percent or less of the\nestimated annual abundance. Bycatch of opilio Tanner crab was unconstrained until 1998, when bycatch\nlimits were established (Witherell 1997). Bycatch of opilio Tanner crab (also called snow crab) in the\ngroundfish fisheries decreased from 5.28 million crabs in 1997 to 1.54 million crabs in 1999, due to the\nbycatch caps and to decreasing abundance of the crabs. The average bycatch for bairdi Tanner crabs from\n1997 to 1999 was 1,461,500 crabs. Red king crab 1997-1999 bycatch averaged 71,433 crabs, and other king\ncrab bycatch was 45,826 crabs.\nBairdi Tanner crab, opilio Tanner crab, and Saint Matthew Island blue king crab populations have recently\ndeclined and are all defined as overfished. The Council adopted rebuilding plans for these overfished stocks.\nThe rebuilding plans are projected to rebuild these stocks within 10 years. Directed fisheries for bairdi Tanner\ncrab and Saint Matthew Island blue king crab, and Pribilof Island stocks of red and blue king crabs are\ncurrently closed. The bairdi Tanner crab fishery has been closed since 1997. Saint Matthew blue king crab\nand Pribilof Island red and blue king crab fisheries were closed in 1999. The concurrent Pribilof Islands red\nand blue king crab fishery is closed due to low abundance, however, these stocks are not overfished.\nAbundance estimates for each BSAI crab stock are listed in Table 4.6-9.\nTable 4.6-9 Abundance Estimates from the 1999 NMFS Trawl Survey for Bering Sea and Aleutian\nIslands Crab Species\nRed king crab (Bristol Bay and Pribilof Islands stocks)\n63.8 million\nOther king crab (survey estimate is blue king only)\n4.9 million\nBairdi Tanner crab\n349,4 million\nOpilio Tanner crab\n1,401.0 million\nImpacts of Alternative 1\nProjected bycatch of red king crab under Alternative 1 would be about 58,500 to 62,300 crabs (Table 4.6-10).\nThis represents about 0.1 percent of the red king crab population based on the most recent abundance estimates\n(Stevens, et al. 2000). The bycatch of bairdi Tanner crabs is about 1.2 million crabs, which represents 0.34\npercent of the 1999 bairdi Tanner crab survey estimate (Table 4.6-11). Bycatch of other Tanner crabs\n(primarily opilio) ranges from 3.1 to 3.3 million crabs, or about 0.24 percent of the 1999 opilio Tanner crab\npopulation (Table 4.6-12). The other king crab category consists of mostly golden king crab, and to a smaller\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-44","extent blue king crab. Blue king crabs live in areas of very low trawl effort (around Saint Matthew and Saint\nLawrence Islands) or in areas that are closed to trawling (around the Pribilof Islands). Population estimates\nare available from the NMFS trawl survey for blue king crab, but not for golden king crab. Golden king crabs\nare found primarily near the Aleutian Islands. ADF&G conducts the Aleutian Islands golden king crab pot\nsurvey, however, there are no absolute estimates of abundance. Bycatch of other king crabs ranges from 52,000\nto 56,000 crabs, which is estimated to be less than 1 percent of the population of blue and golden king crabs\n(Table 4.6-13). These levels of bycatch sustained by each crab species represent a small and likely\nnonsignificant impact on the crab populations, even at their currently depressed levels. Simulations of the time\nto rebuild to the B msy level for opilio Tanner crab showed no difference when trawl bycatch was added (NPFMC\n2000f). Areas currently closed to nonpelagic trawling in the Bering Sea to protect crab species are the red king\ncrab savings area, the nearshore Bristol Bay no trawling zone, and the Pribilof Islands habitat conservation\narea. In our comparing alternatives, Alternative 1 is always assigned a +0 for each metric applied.\nTable 4.6-10 Estimated Numbers of Red King Crab Bycatch for the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands,\n2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nAlternative\nProjection Year\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\n64,924\n82,380\n62,759\n2000\n62,759\n62,759\n40,912\n102,526\n62,759\n59,626\n54,995\n40,912\n98,744\n61,527\n58,674\n73,081\n81,699\n107,743\n2001\n61,897\n40,915\n98,843\n59,441\n57,106\n69,798\n79,922\n102,582\n2002\n59,674\n54,444\n58,511\n54,589\n40,917\n99,018\n58,392\n56,298\n68,219\n61,544\n99,369\n2003\n40,923\n97,638\n59,198\n56,916\n69,686\n79,639\n90,113\n2004\n59,321\n55,377\n102,452\n40,919\n98,877\n60,508\n57,924\n71,482\n80,723\n2005\n60,663\n56,168\n57,383\n70,453\n76,705\n100,452\nAverage 2001 - 2005\n60,013\n55,115\n40,917\n98,624\n59,813\nPercent change from\n67\n0\n-8\n-32\n64\n0\n-4\n17\n28\nAlternative 1\nTable 4.6-11 Estimated Numbers of Bairdi Tanner Crab Bycatch for the Bering Sea and Aleutian\nIslands, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nAlternative\nProjection\nYear\n5\n6.1\n6.2\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n2000\n1,217,131\n1,217,131\n702,729\n1,562,340\n1,217,131\n1,213,013\n1,130,894\n1,261,966\n1,217,131\n1,627,289\n1,200,464\n1,161,087\n1,251,082\n2001\n1,203,131\n1,116,922\n705,620\n1,514,485\n1,204,214\n1,558,998\n2002\n1,171,423\n1,105,969\n707,443\n1,511,215\n1,172,105\n1,169,036\n1,149,529\n1,225,787\n1,516,349\n1,153,727\n1,143,294\n1,069,134\n2003\n1,156,091\n1,107,204\n709,665\n1,509,072\n1,150,413\n1,451,959\n2004\n1,167,915\n1,118,764\n705,744\n1,496,436\n1,168,276\n1,165,277\n1,148,242\n1,222,953\n1,236,700\n1,522,375\n1,181,094\n1,181,744\n1,155,448\n2005\n1,184,662\n1,128,670\n709,718\n1,500,861\n1,201,131\n1,535,394\nAverage\n1,176,644\n1,115,506\n707,638\n1,506,414\n1,175,220\n1,174,050\n1,151,520\n2001-\n2005\nPercent\nchange\n2\n30\nfrom\n0\n-5\n-40\n28\n0\n0\n-2\nAlternative\n1\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-45","Table 4.6-12 Estimated Numbers of Other Tanner Crab (Mostly Opilio) Bycatch for the Bering Sea\nand Aleutian Islands, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nProjection\nAlternative\nYear\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\n2000\n3,303,887\n3,303,887\n1,669,731\n3,895,650\n3,303,887\n3,225,670\n3,123,373\n3,142,152\n3,303,887\n2001\n3,262,709\n2,945,291\n1,674,559\n3,721,749\n3,247,268\n3,176,053\n3,402,814\n3,109,850\n4,160,337\n2002\n3,158,627\n2,918,519\n1,678,113\n3,721,209\n3,148,906\n3,090,623\n3,292,485\n3,026,708\n3,897,607\n2003\n3,104,101\n2,924,976\n1,682,047\n3,718,375\n3,089,917\n3,046,711\n3,236,985\n2,755,855\n3,747,187\n2004\n3,141,815\n2,961,868\n1,676,429\n3,668,536\n3,136,674\n3,079,708\n3,285,516\n3,013,199\n3,688,218\n2005\n3,203,747\n2,998,423\n1,682,517\n3,698,418\n3,191,180\n3,132,692\n3,349,024\n3,063,485\n3,786,846\nAverage\n3,174,200\n2,949,816\n1,678,733\n3,705,657\n3,162,789\n3,105,157\n3,313,365\n2,993,819\n3,856,200\n2001-\n2005\nPercent\nchange\nfrom\n0\n-7\n-47\n17\n0\n-2\n4\n-6\n21\nAlternative\n1\nTable 4.6-13 Estimated Numbers of Other King Crab Bycatch for the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands,\n2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nProjection\nAlternative\nYear\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\n2000\n56,126\n56,126\n56,698\n56,598\n56,126\n54,728\n54,644\n45,638\n56,126\n2001\n55,180\n45,299\n56,391\n49,226\n54,963\n53,691\n62,664\n44,898\n66,559\n2002\n52,672\n44,434\n55,833\n49,362\n52,535\n51,494\n58,614\n42,889\n59,115\n2003\n52,128\n44,553\n55,583\n49,702\n51,697\n51,123\n57,269\n41,951\n56,680\n2004\n53,451\n45,472\n55,295\n49,819\n53,379\n52,361\n59,480\n43,566\n57,880\n2005\n54,965\n46,317\n55,307\n50,323\n54,625\n53,721\n61,776\n44,799\n59,599\nAverage\n53,679\n45,215\n55,682\n49,686\n53,440\n52,478\n59,961\n43,621\n59,967\n2001-\n2005\nPercent\nchange\nfrom\n0\n-16\n4\n-7\n0\n-2\n12\n-19\n12\nAlternative\n1\nImpacts of Alternative 2.1\nAlternative 2.1 is designed to increase protection to marine mammals and seabirds through area closures and\nTAC reductions in proportion to the biomass of target species within the area closures. These changes only\napply to pollock, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel fisheries. Under Alternative 2.1 a small reduction in crab\nbycatch would occur due to reduced TACs in Pacific cod and Atka mackerel fisheries from closure of areas\nto fishing. Most of the bycatch of crab in the BSAI comes from the yellowfin sole, rock sole, and other flatfish\nand Pacific cod fisheries. The five-year average (2001 to 2005) bycatch of red king crab would be reduced\nby about 8 percent, from 60,000 to 55,000 crabs. The five-year average bycatch of bairdi Tanner crab would\nbe reduced by about 5 percent, from 1,180,000 to 1,120,000 crabs. Opilio Tanner crab bycatch would be\nreduced by about 7 percent, from 3.17 million to 2.95 million crabs. Other king crab would be reduced by\nabout 16 percent, from 54,000 to 45,200 animals. A larger reduction occurs in the other king crab bycatch\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-46","because most of the bycatch comes from the Pacific cod and Atka mackerel fisheries. A substantial portion\nof the bycatch for the other crab species is from the flatfish fisheries, which would not be directly affected by\nAlternative 2.1 Reduction in the TAC for Pacific cod could result in increased predation on crabs.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 2.1 is assigned a +0 for maintaining catches of red king, bairdi Tanner,\nand other Tanner crabs within +10 percent of Alternative catches, and a +1 for reducing other king crab\nbycatch in the range of 10 to 25 percent relative to Alternative 1.\nThe spatial and temporal concentration effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab, because there is some\ninformation on stock structure and protection from trawling for different stocks that has been put in place. The\nhabitat effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab because key habitat areas are known and currently under\nprotection from non-pelagic trawling. For the other species groups, spatial and temporal effects are +0 since\nmost bycatch comes from the flatfish fisheries, which are unaffected by Alternative 2.1. Habitat effects are\nunknown for species other than red king crab because the habitat requirements of these species are not known.\nThe prey competition effect is assigned a +0 because trawl fisheries catch very few, if any, prey species of\ncrab.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.2\nAlternative 2.2 is also designed to increase protection to marine mammals and seabirds, but achieves the goal\ndifferently from Alternative 2.1 by setting very low TACs for pollock, Atka mackerel, and Pacific cod.\nAlternative 2.2 would result in the lowest bycatches of crab (except for other king crab) of all the alternatives,\ndue mostly to the further reduction in the TACs in the cod fishery from Alternative 2.1. Bycatch of red king\ncrab would be reduced by 32 percent, from 60,000 crabs in Alternative 1 to 41,000 crabs. Bycatch of bairdi\nTanner crab would be reduced by 40 percent, from 1.18 million crabs to 708,000 crabs. Opilio Tanner crab\nbycatch would decline by 47 percent, from 3.17 million to 1.68 million crabs. Other king crab bycatch would\nincrease by about 4 percent, from the Alternative 1 bycatch of 54,000 crabs to 56,000 crabs under Alternative\n2.2, due to an increase in the Greenland turbot pot fishery catch in the Aleutian Islands. However, because the\ndiscard mortality rates are typically assumed to be low in pot fisheries, the bycatch mortality could decrease\nunder Alternative 2.2. The decreased bycatch of other king crab in the cod and Atka mackerel fisheries would\nbe offset by the increased bycatch in the Greenland turbot fishery.\nLower bycatches could lead to increases in crab stocks. This could also lead to increased availability of crab\nstocks for their respective target fisheries and for the ecosystem. More crabs would be available as prey and\npredators in the ecosystem Additionally, the lower TAC on Pacific cod could increase predation on crab,\nbecause presumably more Pacific cod would also be available for the ecosystem.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 2.2 is assigned a +2 for reducing bycatch of red king crabs, bairdi\nTanner crabs, and other Tanner crabs by more than 25 percent relative to Alternative 1, and a +0 for\nmaintaining the bycatch of other king crab within +10 percent of that predicted for Alternative 1.\nThe spatial and temporal concentration effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab, because there is some\ninformation on stock structure, and protection from trawling for different stocks has been put in place. The\nhabitat effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab because key habitat areas are known and currently under\nprotection key habitat areas are known and currently under protection from nonpelagic trawling. For the other\nspecies groups, spatial and temporal effects are +0 since most bycatch comes from the flatfish fisheries which\nwould be unaffected by Alternative 2.2. Habitat effects are unknown for species other than red king crab\nbecause the habitat requirements of these species are not known. The prey competition effect is assigned a +0\nbecause trawl fisheries catch very few, if any, prey species of crab.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-47","Impacts of Alternative 3\nAlternative 3 is designed to set more conservative target species TACs but achieve more of the TAC as yield,\nin part by removing bycatch limits. Bycatch of crab would increase under Alternative 3 (except for other king\ncrab) over Alternative 1, to the highest levels of all alternatives except 6.2. Although Alternative 3 would\nremove bycatch constraints (PSC caps) in general, the predicted increase in crab catch seen here more likely\nreflects the removal of the halibut PSC limit than any changes to crab PSC limits or area closures. Catches\nof rock sole and flathead sole would increase under Alternative 3 (but would be generally constrained by\nhalibut PSC caps under Alternative 1), which would result in more bycatch of crab in those fisheries. The\nbycatch of red king crab would increase 64 percent over Alternative 1, from an average of 60,000 to 98,600\ncrabs. Approximately 76 percent of the bycatch of red king crab would come from the rock sole fishery under\nAlternative 3. The bycatch of bairdi Tanner crab would increase by 28 percent, and the bycatch of opilio\nTanner crab would increase by 17 percent over Alternative 1. Bycatch of the other king crab would be low\nin the rock sole and flathead sole fisheries, SO it would not increase under Alternative 3, but it would decrease\nby about 7 percent, from 53,700 to 49,700 crabs.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 3 is assigned a +0 for maintaining the bycatch of other king crab within\n+10 percent of that predicted for Alternative 1, a -1 for increasing bycatch of other Tanner crabs in the range\nof 10 to 25 percent, and a -2 for increasing bycatch of red king crabs and bairdi Tanner crabs by more than\n25 percent relative to Alternative 1.\nThe spatial and temporal concentration effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab because there is some\ninformation on stock structure, and protection from trawling for different stocks has been put in place. The\nhabitat effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab because key habitat areas are known and currently under\nprotection from non-pelagic trawling. For the other species groups, spatial and temporal effects are +0 because\ndistribution of bycatch would not change significantly from Alternative 1. Habitat effects are unknown for\nspecies other than red king crab because the habitat requirements of these species are not known. The prey\ncompetition effect is assigned a +0 because trawl fisheries catch very few, if any, prey species of crab.\nImpacts of Alternative 4.1\nAlternative 4.1 would establish TACs for skates in the BSAI, and closed certain areas to pelagic trawling to\nprotect squid aggregations. The predicted catch of skates did not reach the TAC used in Alternative 4.1, and\ntherefore no fisheries were constrained by the skate TAC. Measures designed to protect squid only affected\npollock fisheries, which catch almost no crab. There is less than 1 percent change in bycatch of crabs for\nAlternative 4.1 compared to Alternative 1, therefore the difference between alternatives would be negligible\nfor crab stocks. Alternative 4.1 is assigned a +0 for all metrics in our comparison of alternatives since it is\nidentical to status quo in terms of effects on crabs.\nImpacts of Alternative 4.2\nAlternative 4.2 would establish a more conservative TAC for BSAI skates, but would be otherwise identical\nto Alternative 4.1. The skate TAC would constrain fisheries under this alternative, but would have the largest\neffect on longline Pacific cod fisheries, which have lower crab bycatch than Pacific cod or flatfish trawl\nfisheries. Because there were few effects of this skate TAC on bottom trawl fisheries, bycatch of crabs would\nbe less than 5 percent lower under Alternative 4.2 compared to Alternative 1. This represents very little\nchange. In comparing alternatives, a +0 is assigned to all metrics for Alternative 4.2, since there would be no\nsignificant changes in catch or management of any crab species relative to Alternative 1.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-48","Impacts of Alternative 5\nAlternative 5 is designed to increase protection to habitat by closing large areas to bottom trawling, and by\nshifting fisheries to nonbottom trawl gear where possible. Shifting large amounts of TACs to other gear types\nis responsible for the somewhat counterintuitive result that bycatch of crabs for Alternative 5 would be higher\nthan Alternative 1 (except for bairdi Tanner crab, for which there would be no change). Red king crab bycatch\nwould increase by 17 percent from 60,000 to 70,000 crabs. Bycatch of bairdi Tanner crab would be\nunchanged, and bycatch of other Tanner crab would increase by 4 percent. The bycatch of other king crab\nwould increase by 12 percent from 53,700 to 60,000 crabs. The Pacific cod pot fishery and the rock sole\nfishery bycatches of king crabs would increase under Alternative 5 resulting in higher overall bycatches of king\ncrabs even though the Pacific cod trawl fishery bycatch would be eliminated. In general, fewer bairdi Tanner\nand opilio Tanner crabs would be caught in the Pacific cod fisheries, resulting in little impact on their bycatch\nfor Alternative 5.\nArea closures could benefit crabs more than the results from the simulation model predict under this alternative.\nAlternative 1 crab management would rely heavily on area closures to provide protection to different life stages\nand sexes of crabs, as well as to crab habitat. Alternative 5 would restrict bottom trawling only to those areas\nwith high historical impact from bottom trawls, thus protecting all habitat that has received little impact to date.\nBycatch of crabs under Alternative 1 management is low relative to estimated crab abundance in the BSAI,\nand the increase in bycatch predicted here would still be very low compared with estimated abundance.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 5 is assigned a +0 for maintaining the bycatch of bairdi Tanner crabs\nand other Tanner crabs within +10 percent of that predicted for Alternative 1, and a -1 for increasing bycatch\nof red king crabs and other king crabs in the range of 10 to 25 percent relative to Alternative 1.\nAlternative 5 would close most of the Bering Sea, leaving open that area where 90 percent of bottom trawl\nfishing currently occurs. This would protect most of the area where opilio Tanner crab occur, thus protecting\nthe species' habitat. However, because most of the bycatch and trawl effort occurs under Alternative 1 in the\nareas that would remain open in Alternative 5, there is little change from Alternative 1. The spatial and\ntemporal concentrations effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab, because there is some information on stock\nstructure and protection from trawling for different stocks has been put in place. The habitat effect is assigned\na +0 for red king crab because key habitat areas are known and currently under protection from nonpelagic\ntrawling. For the other species groups, spatial and temporal effects are +0 because distribution of bycatch does\nnot change significantly from Alternative 1. Habitat effects are unknown for species other than red king crab,\nbecause the habitat requirements of these species are not known. The prey competition effect is assigned a +0\nbecause trawl fisheries catch very few, if any, prey species of crab.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.1\nAlternative 6 would increase economic benefits through a system of rights-based management. Because the\nrights-based system is designed to reduce bycatch and discards by eliminating the race for fish, more target\nspecies catch could be achieved within a given bycatch limit. The PSC limits would not be removed under this\nalternative, and would still trigger area closures for crabs and would not be absolute limits on crab catch, as\nunder Alternative 1. Red king crab bycatch would increase under Alternative 6.1 by 28 percent, from 60,000\ncrabs to 76,700 crabs. Bycatch of red king crab would be lower in the Pacific cod and yellowfin sole fisheries,\nbut would increase in the rock sole fishery. Other king crab bycatch would decrease by 19 percent, from\n53,700 crabs to 43,600 crabs. Bycatch of other king crab would be lower for the Pacific cod and yellowfin\nsole and Greenland turbot fisheries, and would not be affected by the rock sole fishery, resulting in an overall\ndecrease in bycatch. Other opilio Tanner crab bycatch would decrease slightly, by 6 percent from Alternative\n1, and bairdi Tanner crab bycatch would not change.\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-49","In comparing alternatives, Alternative 6.1 is assigned a +1 for decreasing the catch of other king crabs in the\nrange of 10 to 25 percent, a +0 for maintaining the bycatch of bairdi Tanner crabs and other Tanner crabs\nwithin +10 percent of that predicted for Alternative 1, and a -2 for increasing bycatch of red king crabs by\nmore than 25 percent relative to Alternative 1.\nThe spatial and temporal concentrations effect is assigned a 0 for red king crab because there is some\ninformation on stock structure and protection from trawling for different stocks has been put in place. The\nhabitat effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab because key habitat areas are known and they are currently\nunder protection from nonpelagic trawling. For the other species groups spatial and temporal effects are +0\nbecause distribution of bycatch does not change significantly from Alternative 1. Habitat effects are unknown\nfor species other than red king crab, because the habitat requirements of these species are not known. The prey\ncompetition effect is assigned a +0 because trawl fisheries catch very few, if any, prey species of crab.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.2\nGroundfish TACs are set at the overfishing level for Alternative 6.2. The PSC caps are removed, as well as\nthe 2 million mt combined catch cap for the BSAI. There are market constraints for flatfish, resulting in\ncatches that are still well below the TACs. Closed areas are the same as for the status quo.\nAlternative 6.2 would result in the highest levels of bycatch; however, the bycatch would still be very low\nrelative to the total population abundance. The distribution of bycatch between fisheries would not change\nsignificantly from Alternative 1. In comparing alternatives, Alternative 6.2 is assigned a -2 for increasing\nbycatch of red king crab and Tanner crab over 25 percent, and a -1 for other king crab and other Tanner crab\nfor increasing catch 10 to 25 percent.\nTrawl effort occurs on the margin of the opilio Tanner crab population; however, effort could shift to areas\nof higher abundance of opilio Tanner crab with bycatch caps eliminated. Bairdi Tanner crab could be impacted\nmore by the lifting of the caps since more of the bottom trawl effort currently occurs where bairdi Tanner crab\noccur; however some of the population distribution is protected by the red king crab savings area, the Bristol\nBay nearshore closure, and the Pribilof Islands habitat conservation area. If the markets for flatfish were to\nincrease and flatfish were actually fished at the OFL, much higher catches of crabs would result and bycatch\nmay become significant. The spatial and temporal concentrations effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab\nbecause there is some information on stock structure and protection from trawling for different stocks has been\nput in place. The habitat effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab because key habitat areas are known and they\nare already under protection from nonpelagic trawling. For the other species groups spatial and temporal\neffects are assigned a +0 because distribution of bycatch does not change significantly from Alternative 1.\nHabitat effects are unknown for species other than red king crab, because the habitat requirements of these\nspecies are not known. Increased bottom trawling in areas not currently protected could lead to unknown\nimpacts due to disruption of the seafloor. The prey competition effect is assigned a +0 because trawl fisheries\ncatch very few, if any, prey species of crab.\nGulf of Alaska\nRegulations have been an effective deterrent to excessive bycatches of crab in the GOA. Bycatch of crabs has\nbeen controlled through area closures in crab habitat. On-bottom trawling is prohibited in these areas. In\ngeneral, crab bycatches are believed to be a small fraction of the available resources of prohibited species.\nHowever, abundance estimates for GOA king and Tanner crab stocks are not readily available, and many of\nthese stocks are considered depressed. Directed crab fisheries are closed in federal waters in the GOA.\nDirected crab fisheries occur in state waters in southeast Alaska. Although observed and projected crab\nbycatch in the GOA is relatively small in magnitude, what proportion of each crab stock is taken as bycatch\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-50","cannot be determined. The average bycatch for 1997 to 1999 in the GOA was 232,040 for bairdi Tanner crab,\n5,300 for opilio and other Tanner crab, 251 for red king crab, and 1,575 for other king crabs.\nImpacts of Alternative 1\nThe average bycatch of red king crab for 2001 to 2005 would be 242 crabs (Table 4.6-14). Bycatch of bairdi\nTanner crab would be 228,800 crabs under Alternative 1 (Table 4.6-15). Other Tanner crab bycatch\n(primarily deep water species) would be about 5,500 crabs (Table 4.6-16). Bycatch of other king crab\n(primarily golden king crabs) would be 1,500 crabs (Table 4.6-17). While these crab bycatches would be very\nsmall relative to those in the BSAI (Tables 4.6-10 through 4.6-13), what proportion of GOA crab stocks they\nrepresent cannot be determined. In comparing alternatives, status quo is always assigned a +0 for each effect\nevaluated.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.1\nThis alternative regime would increase protection to marine mammals and seabirds by closing Steller sea lion\ncritical habitat to fishing for pollock and Pacific cod and by reducing TACs for these species in proportion to\ntheir biomass estimated within the closed areas. Alternative 2.1 results in a 21 percent lower bycatch of Tanner\ncrab compared to Alternative 1, due to the lower TAC for Pacific cod. Most of the bycatch of Tanner crab\nin the GOA comes from the Pacific cod pot fishery and the flathead sole trawl fishery. Other bairdi Tanner\ncrab bycatch would be reduced by 15 percent, and there would be essentially no change in bycatch of red king\ncrab (less than 2 percent) and other king crabs (less than 5 percent) compared to Alternative 1.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 2.1 is assigned a +1 for decreasing bycatch of bairdi Tanner and other\nTanner crabs in the range of 10 to 25 percent relative to Alternative 1, and a +0 for maintaining the bycatch\nof red king and other king crabs within 10 percent of that predicted for Alternative 1.\nThe spatial and temporal concentration effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab because there are existing areas\nclosed to trawling to protect red king crab. The habitat effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab because habitat\nareas are known and currently under protection from nonpelagic trawling. For the other species groups, spatial\nand temporal effects are +0, because most bycatch comes from the flatfish fisheries, which would be unaffected\nby Alternative 2.1. Habitat effects are unknown for species other than red king crab, because the habitat\nrequirements of these species are not known. The prey competition effect is assigned a +0 because trawl\nfisheries catch very few, if any prey species of crab.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.2\nAlternative 2.2 would increase protection to marine mammals and seabirds by reducing TACs for pollock,\nPacific cod, and Atka mackerel to very low levels. Alternative 2.2 would result in the lowest bycatch of crabs\n(except for other king crabs) of any alternative, due primarily to the low TAC on Pacific cod. The bycatch of\nred king crab would be reduced to 180 crabs from 242 crabs in Alternative 1. Bycatch of bairdi Tanner crab\nwould be reduced by about 50 percent from 228,800 under Alternative 1 to 111,700 crabs. Other Tanner crab\nbycatch would be reduced from 5,500 to 3,800 crabs. Other king crab bycatch would decline to 1,300 crabs\nfrom 1,500 crabs under Alternative 1. The decreased bycatch could contribute to rebuilding of the depressed\nGOA crab stocks, however the potential increase in Pacific cod stocks could increase predation on crabs,\nreversing the effect somewhat.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-51","Table 4.6-14 Estimated Numbers of Red King Crab Bycatch for the Gulf of Alaska, 2001 to 2005, by\nAlternative\nAlternative\nProjection\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nYear\n2000\n195\n192\n157\n245\n193\n193\n388\n236\n195\n2001\n216\n245\n183\n264\n219\n219\n388\n245\n406\n2002\n222\n234\n167\n264\n226\n226\n367\n232\n395\n2003\n241\n239\n173\n266\n243\n243\n333\n237\n384\n2004\n261\n250\n183\n278\n257\n259\n324\n250\n380\n2005\n270\n264\n197\n289\n266\n267\n337\n259\n385\nAverage 2000-2005\n242\n246\n181\n272\n242\n243\n350\n245\n390\nPercent change from Alternative 1\n0\n2\n-25\n12\n0\n0\n45\n1\n61\nTable 4.6-15 Estimated Numbers of Bairdi Tanner Crab Bycatch for the Gulf of Alaska, 2001 to 2005,\nby Alternative\nProjection\nAlternative\nYear\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\n2000\n251,900\n268,500\n139,459\n265,696\n252,054\n252,054\n381,690\n222,404\n251,900\n2001\n264,261\n188,110\n108,602\n225,734\n238,864\n238,864\n365,112\n218,284\n391,626\n2002\n250,086\n188,321\n111,052\n228,478\n251,123\n251,123\n336,090\n206,634\n359,992\n2003\n224,216\n182,076\n121,380\n225,730\n232,415\n232,415\n307,887\n196,392\n326,162\n2004\n196,836\n160,774\n95,518\n231,368\n235,515\n221,674\n300,536\n194,001\n314,765\n2005\n208,573\n187,815\n122,091\n206,371\n227,057\n220,840\n311,649\n196,037\n323,798\nAverage 2000- 2005\n228,794\n181,419\n111,729\n223,536\n236,995\n232,983\n324,255\n202,269\n343,269\nPercent change from\n0\n-21\n-51\n-2\n4\n2\n42\n-12\n50\nAlternative1\nTable 4.6-16 Estimated Amounts of Opilio and Other Tanner Crab Bycatch for the Gulf of Alaska,\n2001 to 2005, by Alternatives\nProjection\nAlternative\nYear\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\n2000\n6,040\n6,062\n4,380\n6,700\n6,069\n6,069\n6,059\n5,513\n6,040\n2001\n5,824\n4,709\n3,832\n5,709\n5,592\n5,592\n5,524\n5,415\n8,686\n2002\n5,768\n4,779\n3,918\n5,835\n5,702\n5,702\n5,309\n5,252\n8,013\n2003\n5,601\n4,707\n3,995\n5,806\n5,557\n5,557\n5,081\n5,122\n7,699\n2004\n5,093\n4,406\n3,515\n5,908\n5,481\n5,274\n5,012\n5,101\n7,472\n2005\n5,162\n4,677\n3,799\n5,095\n5,461\n5,457\n5,116\n5,146\n7,760\nAverage 2000- 2005\n5,490\n4,656\n3,812\n5,671\n5,558\n5,516\n5,209\n5,207\n7,926\nPercent change from Alternative1\n0\n-15\n-31\n3\n1\n0\n-5\n-5\n44\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-52","Estimated Amounts of Other King Crab Bycatch for the Gulf of Alaska, 2001 to 2005, by\nTable\n4.6-17\nAlternatives\nProjection\nAlternative\nYear\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\n1,242\n1,355\n2000\n1,355\n1,353\n1,098\n1,316\n1,358\n1,358\n979\n1,386\n997\n1,321\n1,833\n2001\n1,440\n1,338\n1,224\n1,217\n1,386\n2002\n1,402\n1,318\n1,204\n1,225\n1,398\n1,398\n982\n1,283\n1,799\n2003\n1,458\n1,387\n1,242\n1,248\n1,454\n1,454\n1,007\n1,335\n1,782\n1,797\n2004\n1,491\n1,450\n1,398\n1,326\n1,544\n1,531\n1,042\n1,417\n1,043\n1,480\n1,819\n2005\n1,589\n1,528\n1,372\n1,421\n1,588\n1,577\n1,474\n1,469\n1,014\n1,367\n1,806\nAverage\n1,476\n1,404\n1,288\n1,287\n2000-\n2005\nPercent\nchange\n-13\n-13\n0\n0\n-31\n-7\n22\nfrom\n0\n-5\nAlternative\n1\nWhen comparing alternatives, Alternative 2.2 is assigned a +2 for decreasing bycatch of bairdi Tanner and\nother Tanner crabs by more than 25 percent, and a +1 for decreasing bycatch of red king crab and other king\ncrab in the range of 10 to 25 percent relative to Alternative 1.\nThe spatial and temporal concentration effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab, because there are existing\nareas closed to trawling to protect red king crab. The habitat effect is assigned a +0 for red king because\nhabitat areas are known and currently under protection from nonpelagic trawling. For the other species groups\nspatial and temporal effects are +0, because most bycatch comes from the flatfish fisheries, which are\nunaffected by Alternative 2.2. Habitat effects are unknown for species other than red king crab, because the\nhabitat requirements of these species are not known. The prey competition effect is assigned a +0 because\ntrawl fisheries catch very few, if any, prey species of crab.\nImpacts of Alternative 3\nAlternative 3 would release halibut PSC caps to allow for the fuller achievement (conservatively set) TACs\nfor target species. Changes in predicted crab bycatch under this alternative are likely a function of lack of\nhalibut PSC constraints in combination with changes in target species TACs. There would be an increase of\n12 percent in bycatch for red king crab, from 242 crabs for Alternative 1 to 272 crabs. Bycatch of bairdi\nTanner crab would decline slightly, by about 2 percent. Other Tanner crab bycatch would increase slightly,\nby about 3 percent. Bycatch of other king crab would be affected the most, with a decrease of about 14\npercent, from 1,500 crabs to 1,300 crabs. The other king crab bycatch reductions would occur in the Pacific\ncod trawl, deep water flatfish, and Pacific ocean perch fisheries.\nAlternative 3 is assigned a +1 for reducing bycatch of other king crabs in the range of 10 to 25 percent in\ncomparing alternatives, a -1 for increasing bycatch of red king crabs between 10 to 25 percent, and a +0 for\nmaintaining bycatch of bairdi Tanner and other Tanner crabs within +10 percent of that predicted for\nAlternative 1.\nThe spatial and temporal concentration effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab because there are existing areas\nclosed to trawling to protect red king crab. The habitat effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab because habitat\nareas are known and currently under protection from nonpelagic trawling. For the other species groups spatial\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-53","and temporal effects are +0 because distribution of bycatch would not change significantly from Alternative\n1. Habitat effects are unknown for species other than red king crab, because the habitat requirements of these\nspecies are not known. The prey competition effect is assigned a +0 because trawl fisheries catch very few,\nif any, prey species of crab.\nImpacts of Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2\nAlternatives 4.1 and 4.2 would implement TACs for grenadiers in the GOA. Grenadiers are primarily caught\nas bycatch in longline fisheries directed at sablefish. These fisheries do not have high bycatch of crab, and they\nwould be largely unaffected by the grenadier TACs. Therefore, there would be essentially no change in bycatch\nfor crabs under Alternative 4.1 or Alternative 4.2 compared to Alternative 1, and there would be no change in\ncrab management. All metrics for Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 are assigned +0 for each crab species in comparing\nalternatives.\nImpacts of Alternative 5\nAlternative 5 would increase protection to habitat by closing large areas to bottom trawling, and by shifting\nfisheries to nonbottom trawl gear where possible. Shifting large amounts of TACs to other gear types could\ngive unexpected results in terms of bycatch. The Alternative 5 regime could result in a substantial increase\n(42 percent) in bycatch for bairdi Tanner crab, from 228,800 crabs to 324,300 crabs. This increased bycatch\nwould result from an increase in the Pacific cod pot fishery TAC, where most of the bycatch of bairdi Tanner\ncrab occurs. However, the discard mortality rate in that fishery may be quite low. Red king crab bycatch\nwould also increase from 242 to 350 crabs. Other bairdi Tanner crab bycatch is predicted to be 5,200 crabs,\na decline of about 5 percent. Other king crab bycatch would decline by about 33 percent to 1,000 crabs. The\nother king crab bycatch reductions would occur due to reductions in the Pacific cod trawl, Pacific ocean perch,\ndeep water flatfish, and rex sole trawl fisheries.\nArea closures could benefit crabs more than the results from the simulation model predict under this alternative.\nAlternative 1 crab management relies heavily on area closures to provide protection to different life stages and\nsexes of crabs, as well as to crab habitat. Alternative 5 would restrict bottom trawling only to those areas with\nhigh historical effort from bottom trawls, thus protecting all habitat which has received little effort to date.\nUnfortunately, the effects of these additional area closures on GOA crab stocks are not able to be assessed with\ncurrent information, even though it is suspected they would be positive.\nAlternative 5 is assigned a +2 for decreasing bycatch of other king crabs by more than 25 percent, a -2 for\nincreasing bycatch of red king and bairdi Tanner crabs by more than 25 percent, and a +0 for maintaining the\nbycatch of bairdi Tanner crabs within +10 percent of that predicted for Alternative 1.\nThe spatial and temporal concentration effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab because there would be existing\nareas closed to trawling to protect red king crab. The habitat effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab because\nhabitat areas are known and currently under protection from nonpelagic trawling. For the other species groups\nspatial and temporal effects are +0 because distribution of bycatch would not change significantly from\nAlternative 1. Habitat effects are unknown for species other than red king crab, because the habitat\nrequirements of these species are not known. The prey competition effect is assigned a +0 because trawl\nfisheries catch very few, if any, prey species of crab.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.1\nAlternative 6.1 would increase economic benefits through a rights-based cooperative management system that\nwould decrease the discards and bycatch associated with the open access race for fish. In this system,\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-54","Alternative 1 bycatch caps would be maintained, but it is assumed that a higher proportion of target species\ncatch would be possible for a given amount of bycatch. Bycatch of red king crab would not change under\nAlternative 6, while other crab bycatch would decrease. Other bairdi Tanner crab bycatch would decrease by\n5 percent, from 5,500 to 5,200 crabs. Other king crab bycatch would decrease by 7 percent, from 1,500 to\n1,400 crabs. Bairdi Tanner crab bycatch would decrease by 12 percent, from 229,000 to 202,000 crabs due\nto decreases in the Pacific cod pot and flathead sole trawl fisheries.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 6.1 is assigned a +1 for decreasing bycatch of bairdi Tanner crabs in\nthe range of 10 to 25 percent relative to Alternative 1, and a +0 for maintaining bycatch of red king, other king,\nand other Tanner crabs within +10 percent of that predicted for Alternative 1.\nThe spatial and temporal concentrations effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab because there are existing\nareas closed to trawling to protect red king crab. The habitat effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab because\nhabitat areas are known and currently under protection from nonpelagic trawling. For the other species groups,\nspatial and temporal effects are +0 because distribution of bycatch would not change significantly from\nAlternative 1. Habitat effects are unknown for species other than red king crab, because the habitat\nrequirements of these species are not known. The prey competition effect is assigned a +0 because trawl\nfisheries catch very few, if any, prey species of crab.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.2\nGroundfish TACs would be set at OFL for Alternative 6.2. The PSC caps would be removed, however, there\nare market constraints for flatfish fisheries, resulting in catches that would still be well below the TACs.\nClosed areas would be the same as under Alternative 1.\nAlternative 6.2 would result in the highest levels of bycatch. The distribution of bycatch between fisheries\nwould not change significantly from Alternative 1. In comparing alternatives, Alternative 6.2 is assigned a -2\nfor increasing bycatch of red king crab, other king crab and other Tanner crab over 25 percent, and a -1 for\nother Tanner crab for increasing catch 10 to 25 percent. Alternative 6.1 is assigned a +0 for monitoring and\nmanagement of crab stocks, because it would make no significant changes to Alternative 1 crab bycatch\nmanagement.\nThe spatial and temporal concentrations effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab because there are existing\nareas closed to trawling to protect red king crab. The habitat effect is assigned a +0 for red king crab because\nhabitat areas are known and currently under protection from nonpelagic trawling. For the other species groups,\nspatial and temporal effects are +0 because distribution of bycatch would not change significantly from status\nquo. Habitat effects are unknown for species other than red king crab, because the habitat requirements of\nthese species are not known. The prey competition effect is assigned a +0 because trawl fisheries catch very\nfew, if any, prey species of crab.\n4.6.2.3\nPacific Herring\nPacific herring are relatively small fish (30 to 40 cm), which occur in huge schools. They are found in pelagic\nwaters throughout the North Pacific Ocean, ranging from Korea and Japan to central California, and rarely\nsouth to the Baja Peninsula (Eschmeyer et al. 1983). Mature (age 3 and up) herring migrate from offshore\nfeeding grounds to form large spawning aggregations in shallow inshore waters during the spring of each year,\nreleasing millions of eggs that adhere to kelp and other vegetation. Pacific herring feed on plankton during all\ntheir life stages, and in turn are important prey for other fish, marine mammals, and seabirds (Schweigert 1997,\nLivingston 1995, ADF&G 1985). Herring populations, like those of other small pelagic fish species, are\nsubject to wide fluctuations in abundance. The causes suggested for these fluctuations range from natural\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-55","causes to overfishing (and underfishing), pollution effects (including the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill), disease,\nclimate variability, and combinations of factors (Pearson et al. 1999).\nHerring are managed by ADF&G, with quotas allocated by the Alaska Board of Fisheries, but the process is\ndifferent than for crab stocks, for which an FMP exists, and management authority is delegated to the state.\nA draft FMP for BSAI herring was prepared in the early 1980s, but never finalized because herring were\ndeemed fully utilized in state waters. All directed herring fishing occurs in state waters. There are records of\nherring harvest as far back as 1878, with substantial harvests beginning in 1900 (Figure 4.6-17). Pacific\nherring currently support diverse commercial and subsistence fisheries for food, bait, and specialized roe\nproducts, including sac roe and roe on kelp. The ADF&G manages each herring stock separately, opening sac\nroe fisheries during seasons of maximum marketability and timing closures to ensure that quotas are not\nexceeded. Herring quotas are based on a variable exploitation harvest rate policy. The target maximum\nexploitation rate of 20 percent of the spawning stock removed by the fishery is rarely exceeded (only by\naccident, and then not by much), and lower exploitation rates are usually applied if stocks approach low levels.\nWhen a given herring stock falls below the level thought necessary to guarantee sustained production, directed\nfisheries for that stock are closed to allow recovery (Funk et al. 1990). Table 4.6-18 lists each managed\nherring stock with the run size predicted for 2000.\nTable 4.6-18 Forecast Pacific Herring Run Biomass (Metric Tons) by Management Area for 2000\nBSAI Areas\nBiomass\nGOA Areas\nBiomass\nBristol Bay\n119,004\nSoutheast\n(Togiak)\nKuskokwim Area\nKah Shakes / Cat Island\n3,909\nSecurity Cove\n3,293\nSitka Sound\n32,727\nGoodnews Bay\n4,241\nSeymour Canal\n3,091\nCape Avinof\n2,607\nHobart / Houghton\n3,273\nNelson Island\n4,247\nNunivak Island\n2,566\nPrince William Sound\n21,806\nCape Romanzof\n2,334\nCook Inlet\nn/a\nNorton Sound\n24,476\nKodiak Island\nn/a\nPort Clarence\nn/a\nAlaska Peninsula\nn/a\nTotal BSAI\n162,768\nTotal GOA\n64,806\nHerring bycatch is controlled in the BSAI groundfish industry using bycatch limits that trigger area closures\n(see introductory section above). Herring bycatch is taken almost exclusively in fisheries directed at pollock.\nBefore full observer coverage in the late 1980s, this bycatch in foreign and JV groundfish fisheries may have\nbeen as high as 7,300 mt to 9,100 mt (ADF&G 2000). Recently, bycatch of herring in groundfish fisheries\nhas been very low compared to both herring biomass (1 percent or less) and herring catch in directed fisheries\n(ADF& 2000). The predicted bycatch of Pacific herring under each alternative, including Alternative 1, is\nlisted in Tables 4.6-19 and 4.6-20. In part, because NMFS does not conduct stock assessments for Pacific\nherring, it was not possible to incorporate herring population dynamics within the simulation model used to\npredict catches under each alternative. Stability in herring populations is assumed in making these projections\nand in comparing bycatch with biomass; while this may not be entirely realistic, the herring PSC limit is\ndesigned to scale with herring biomass as measured each year. Therefore, the PSC limit would keep herring\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-56","1990\n1980\nFigure 4.6-17 Historical catch of Pacific herring in Alaska. Source: ADF&G 2000\n1970\nAlaska Herring Harvests,\n1960\n1900-1994\n1950\n1940\n1930\nForeign (Bering Sea)\nReduction and Food\n1920\nSac Roe\n1910\nBait\n1900\n20,000\n0\n160,000\n140,000\n120,000\n100,000\n80,000\n60,000\n40,000","","catch in proportion to biomass. Herring PSC limits were removed under Alternatives 3 and 6.2, and the\npotential effects of this removal are discussed below. NMFS does not collect information on herring size\ncomposition in groundfish fisheries, SO it was not possible to draw conclusions as to whether shifts in the\nproportion of herring bycatch by gear type would change size composition of bycatch. However, the bycatch\nof herring is low enough under all alternatives that shifts in size composition may not be significant.\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands and Gulf of Alaska\nImpacts of Alternative 1\nBycatch of Pacific herring in the years 2001 to 2005 is predicted to range from almost 1,100 mt to 1,200 mt\nin the BSAI and from 9 to 16 mt in the GOA under Alternative 1 (Tables 4.6-19 and 4.6-20). This would be\nslightly higher on average than that observed in 1997 to 1999 in the BSAI, and likely results from the projected\nincrease in pollock catch associated with the slightly higher predicted biomass of BSAI pollock (Section 4.4.1).\nIn this and all subsequent analyses, catch in all prediction years is averaged to determine proportions of herring\nbycatch by fishery and gear type. About 94 percent of all BSAI herring catch is predicted from Bering Sea\npelagic trawl fisheries for pollock, 5 percent from bottom trawl fisheries for yellowfin sole, and less than 1\npercent from all other fisheries combined. The tiny amount of Pacific herring bycatch predicted in the GOA\nwould also be taken primarily in pollock fisheries (12 percent bottom trawl pollock and 78 percent pelagic trawl\npollock). Assuming no large variations from the year 2000 forecast biomass of Pacific herring, bycatch of the\nmagnitude predicted here represents less than 1 percent of BSAI herring biomass, and less than 0.05 percent\nof GOA herring biomass. Thus, bycatch of Pacific herring in groundfish fisheries under Alternative 1 would\nbe very small and unlikely to have significant impacts on herring populations.\nTable 4.6-19 Estimated Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Pacific Herring Catch, in Metric Tons, and\nPercent Change, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nAlternative\nProjection\nYear\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\n1,067\n1,064\n1,066\n1,081\n860\n1,064\n2000\n1,064\n1,064\n169\n1,177\n938\n1,705\n1,163\n700\n170\n858\n791\n793\n2001\n961\n1,205\n962\n1,358\n2002\n1,193\n883\n170\n1,008\n959\n1,154\n919\n170\n1,004\n972\n975\n1,114\n887\n2003\n1,103\n1,061\n847\n1,149\n169\n956\n926\n927\n2004\n1,049\n878\n1,157\n942\n170\n1,030\n995\n997\n1,170\n933\n1,320\n2005\n1,337\n971\n928\n930\n1,145\n914\nPredicted average, 2001-\n1,133\n864\n170\n2005\n1,037\n1,037\n1,037\n1,037\nRecent average, 1997-1999\n1,037\n1,037\n1,037\n1,037\n1,037\nPercent change from recent\n9\n-17\n-84\n-6\n-10\n-10\n10\n-12\n-18\n-18\n1\n-19\n18\nPercent change from\n0\n-24\n-85\n-14\nAlternative 1\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-59","Table 4.6-20 Estimated Gulf of Alaska Pacific Herring Catch, in Metric Tons, and Percent Change,\n2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nProjection\nAlternative\nYear\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\n2000\n11\n11\n5\n12\n11\n11\n10\n9\n11\n2001\n9\n5\n5\n9\n9\n9\n8\n8\n14\n2002\n9\n5\n5\n8\n9\n9\n8\n8\n13\n2003\n12\n7\n5\n9\n12\n12\n11\n10\n16\n2004\n14\n8\n5\n11\n14\n14\n13\n12\n19\n2005\n16\n9\n5\n13\n16\n16\n15\n13\n20\nPredicted average 2001-2005\n12\n7\n5\n10\n12\n12\n11\n10\n16\nRecent average 1997-1999\n13\n13\n13\n13\n13\n13\n13\n13\n13\nPercent change from recent\n-7\n-49\n-62\n-24\n-7\n-7\n-16\n-24\nPercent change from\n0\n-46\n-59\n-18\n0\n0\n-10\n-18\n34\nAlternative 1\nExamples of indirect impacts to Pacific herring would be spatial and temporal concentrations of bycatch,\nresulting in the overharvest of a distinct genetic component of the stock, destruction of spawning habitat and\ndisruption of spawning aggregations, and competition for prey. Herring bycatch does not appear to be\nconcentrated in space, but rather is spread throughout the pollock fishery under status quo management (Figure\n4.6-18). Although there is some amount of herring bycatch throughout the year, it is higher in September and\nOctober (pollock B season during 1997 to 1999). We can see no significant impacts occurring to herring\nstocks from spatial or temporal concentration of herring bycatch.\nFederal groundfish fisheries do not take place in the nearshore shallow environments where herring congregate\nto spawn, SO no impacts to herring spawning habitat or aggregations are predicted as a result of these fisheries.\nHerring prey on zooplankton, including larvae of pollock, sand lance, and smelt. Zooplankton are not caught\nin groundfish fisheries. The only way groundfish fisheries might possibly have any impact on herring prey\nwould be severe overfishing of species such as pollock to an extent that limited pollock larval abundance. This\nlevel of groundfish overfishing has not been observed over the course of FMP management, and is not likely\nto be in the future under Alternative 1 or any other alternative. Therefore, no significant indirect impacts to\nherring stocks are expected to result from groundfish fishing under the BSAI and GOA FMPs.\nAlternative 1 is always rated +0 in our system for comparing alternatives.\nImpacts of Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2\nAlternatives designed to increase protection to marine mammals and seabirds are predicted to result in reduced\nherring bycatch relative to Alternative 1. In the BSAI, the reduction would be moderate for Alternative 2.1\n(700 mt to 1,100 mt bycatch) and substantial for Alternative 2.2 (170 mt herring bycatch each year, Table 4.6-\n19). While each alternative manages groundfish fisheries quite differently, the predicted reductions in herring\nbycatch would result from pollock TAC reductions of varying magnitudes. These alternatives would have a\nsimilar result in the GOA, reducing the already small herring bycatch by nearly half, to approximately 5 mt\nper year under Alternative 2.2 (Table 4.6-20). The majority of herring bycatch would still come from pollock\nfisheries under both alternatives in both areas, and the proportion of bycatch taken by gear type would remain\nunchanged from Alternative 1 under Alternative 2.1. The larger reductions in pollock TAC under Alternative\n2.2 would result in redistribution of herring bycatch by gear type in both areas, so that bycatch would be 77\npercent in pelagic and 22 percent in BSAI bottom trawl fisheries (14 percent yellowfin sole bottom trawl), and\ntaken 58 percent by bottom trawl in the GOA. It is possible that different segments of herring populations\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-60","1997-1999.\n4.6-18 Spatial distribution of herring bycatch within Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands pelagic pollock fishery,\n1997-1999 pelagic trawl herring bycatch\n1997-1999 pelagic trawl pollock targets\nFigure","","might be affected by bycatch relative to Alternative 1, due to the combination of time and area management in\nAlternative 2.1 or due to the shift in proportion of bycatch by gear type under Alternative 2.2. However,\nAlternative 2.1 catches would be similar to those of Alternative 1 relative to herring biomass, and Alternative\n2.2 catches would be an even smaller proportion of biomass in each area (0.1 percent in the BSAI and 0.01\npercent in the GOA). Therefore, based on the extremely small proportion of the populations captured,\nsignificant impacts to herring populations would not be expected under Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2. Additional\nherring would be available to the ecosystem, particularly under Alternative 2.2, although whether the addition\nof 0.9 percent more biomass would significantly affect ecosystem interactions dependent on Pacific herring\ncannot be determined.\nWhile the impacts to herring may not be considered significant under either Alternative 2.1 or 2.2 or Alternative\n1, the differences between these alternatives and Alternative 1 can appear large when expressed as a percent\nchange in catch. Alternative 2.1 scores +1 for reducing herring bycatch in the range of 10 to 25 percent, while\nAlternative 2.2 scores +2 for reducing bycatch over 25 percent relative to Alternative 1 in the BSAI. GOA\ncatches are SO small across all alternatives that percent change differences were not considered and rated in the\nsummary table.\nThe area closures applied to the pollock fisheries under Alternative 2.1 would protect herring nearer to shore\nwithin Steller sea lion critical habitat (Figure 4.6-19), but are not expected to result in increased concentration\nof herring bycatch in the areas remaining open due to the concurrent pollock TAC reduction. In addition, the\ntemporal management measures applied in Alternative 2.1 would prevent fishing in open areas from becoming\nconcentrated in time, both by distributing TAC evenly between four seasons and by limiting daily catch rates\nto the average observed under Alternative 1. Alternative 2.1 would be expected to result in marginally less\nconcentration of pollock catch (and therefore herring bycatch) in space and time relative to Alternative 1, SO\nAlternative 2.1 scores +1 for reducing concentration of catch in the comparison of alternatives. Alternative 2.2\nprovides additional protection and is scored +2 for spatial and temporal concentration. Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2\ndo not result in any changes from Alternative 1 effects on spawning habitat or prey removal, SO they score a +0\nfor each of these indirect effects on herring stocks.\nImpacts of Alternative 3\nAlternative 3 is designed to increase protection to target species and is predicted to produce similar or slightly\nless bycatch of Pacific herring than under Alternative 1, ranging from 900 mt to 1,100 mt in the BSAI and from\n8 mt to 13 mt in the GOA (Tables 4.6-19 and 4.6-20). In the BSAI, the small decrease in herring bycatch\npredicted relative to Alternative 1 is due to more conservative management of pollock stocks, resulting in smaller\npollock TACs. The proportion of herring bycatch by fishery would remain almost identical to Alternative 1 in\nthe BSAI, with 92 percent taken in the pelagic pollock fishery, and 6 percent taken in the yellowfin sole bottom\ntrawl fishery. The proportion of herring bycatch in the GOA would also be similar to Alternative 1, with 73\npercent taken in pelagic pollock, 14 percent in bottom trawl pollock, and the remainder in other bottom trawl\nfisheries. As under the previously discussed alternatives, bycatch of this magnitude is predicted to be less than\n1 percent of herring biomass in the BSAI, and a minuscule proportion of herring biomass in the GOA.\nHowever, Alternative 3 has the potential for impacts on herring populations, because it would remove PSC\nlimits to better achieve target species TACs. This could result in higher herring bycatch in years of high herring\nabundance, as area closures presumably would not occur in the BSAI in the absence of a herring PSC limit.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-63","This page intentionally left blank\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-64","1997-1999 pelagic trawl herring bycatch\n1997-1999 pelagic trawl pollock targets\nFigure 4.6-19 Alternative 2.1 closures with status quo herring bycatch,\n1997-1999, for comparison.\n1997-1999 pelagic trawl herring bycatch\n1997-1999 pelagic trawl pollock targets\nFigure 4.6-20 Alternative 3 Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands' closures with\nstatus quo herring bycatch, 1997-1999 for comparison.","","In comparing alternatives, Alternative 3 scores +1 for reducing herring bycatch in the range of 10 to 25 percent\nrelative to Alternative 1. Because Alternative 3 closes areas to fishing without a concurrent reduction in TAC,\nit could increase spatial concentration of herring bycatch. However, the closed areas in the BSAI might not\naffect the pollock fishery to a great extent (Figure 4.6-20), SO the change from Alternative 1 concentration of\nherring bycatch in space and time would be expected to be marginal (-1 rating) under Alternative 3. No changes\nwould be expected from Alternative 1 impacts to herring spawning habitat or competition for prey under\nAlternative 3, SO it scores +0 for each of these indirect effects.\nImpacts of Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2\nAlternatives 4.1 and 4.2 would only affect herring bycatch in the BSAI; GOA predicted bycatch would be\nidentical to Alternative 1 and would therefore be expected to have identical effects (as discussed under\nAlternative 1). Several BSAI areas would be closed to pelagic pollock fishing and pollock TACs would be\nlowered by 18.5 percent under Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 to increase protection to squid species. (There were also\ndifferent TAC levels for skates and grenadiers, which would not affect pollock fisheries and therefore would not\nalter herring bycatch.) As a result, predicted bycatch of Pacific herring is reduced by approximately 18 percent\nrelative to Alternative 1 in the BSAI, ranging from 800 to 1,100 mt (Table 4.6-19). No changes are predicted\nfor the distribution of bycatch by fishery relative to Alternative 1. Under Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2, which aim\nto increase protection to non-target species, herring bycatch would remain less than 1 percent of current\nestimated herring biomass, SO significant impacts to herring stocks would be unlikely.\nIn comparing alternatives, both Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 score a +1 for decreasing bycatch of BSAI Pacific\nherring in the range of 10 to 25 percent relative to Alternative 1. Squid closures applied under these alternatives\nwould not be expected to increase or decrease the spatial or temporal concentrations of herring bycatch relative\nto Alternative 1 because they are implemented with a concurrent TAC reduction, SO both alternatives earn a\nscore of +0 for this metric. Prey competition is also scored +0 for both alternatives.\nImpacts of Alternative 5\nAlternative 5, to increase protection to habitat, would shift fisheries from bottom trawls to other gear types and\nclose certain areas to bottom trawling, based on the assumption that bottom trawls have greater impacts on\nbenthic habitats than other gear types. Because most herring bycatch is in pollock fisheries, and most pollock\nare already taken in pelagic trawl gear under Alternative 1, there would be only small (if any) changes to herring\nbycatch under Alternative 5 (Table 4.6-19). In the BSAI, herring bycatch is predicted to range from 1,100 mt\nto 1,200 mt, essentially the same as under Alternative 5. The BSAI distribution by fishery would also be\npractically the same as Alternative 1, 94 percent pelagic pollock and 5 percent bottom trawl yellowfin sole. In\nthe GOA, catches would be shifted by gear type, SO that 92 percent of herring bycatch is taken in pelagic pollock\nand the remainder in bottom trawl fisheries. Herring bycatch in the GOA would range from 8 mt to 15 mt under\nAlternative 5, essentially the same as Alternative 1 (Table 4.6-20). Because herring bycatch would be limited\nto less than 1 percent of estimated biomass under Alternative 5, significant impacts to herring stocks would be\nunlikely.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 5 scores +0 for maintaining herring bycatch within +10 percent of that\npredicted for Alternative 1. Area closures under this alternative apply only to bottom trawl fisheries, and no\nspatial or temporal changes would be prescribed for pelagic trawl fisheries, SO Alternative 5 scores +0 for\nmaintaining the same level of spatial and temporal concentrations of herring bycatch as Alternative 1. No\nchanges are expected from the Alternative 1 impacts to herring spawning habitat or competition for prey under\nAlternative 5, SO it's scored +0 for each of these indirect effects.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-67","Impacts of Alternative 6.1\nBycatch of herring under Alternative 6.1 is predicted to be 850 mt to 960 mt in the BSAI and 8 to 13 mt in the\nGOA (Tables 4.6-19 and 4.6-20). In each area, bycatch in general is assumed to be reduced by approximately\n20 percent relative to Alternative 1 due to increased fishery efficiency achieved through cooperative\nmanagement, which would eliminate the bycatch and discards associated with the open access race for fish. The\ndistribution of herring bycatch by fishery would be identical to that predicted for Alternative 1 in both the BSAI\nand the GOA. As with all other alternatives, the bycatch of Pacific herring predicted under Alternative 6.1\nwould be less than 1 percent of estimated herring biomass in the BSAI, and less than 0.05 percent in the GOA.\nImpacts to herring populations under Alternative 6.1 and all other alternatives would be very small, and unlikely\nto be significant.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 6.1 scores +1 for decreasing bycatch of Pacific herring in the range of\n10 to 25 percent relative to Alternative 1. No spatial or temporal changes relative to Alternative 1 are\nprescribed for pollock fisheries under Alternative 6.1, SO no changes in spatial or temporal concentrations of\nherring bycatch are predicted (score is +0). No changes are expected from Alternative 1 impacts to herring\nspawning habitat or competition for prey under Alternative 6.1 SO it scores +0 for each of these indirect effects\nImpacts of Alternative 6.2\nBy increasing TACs of groundfish species to the absolute maximum permitted by law, management under\nAlternative 6.2 would increase bycatch of herring to range from 1,400 mt to 1,700 mt in the BSAI and 11\nto\n20 mt in the GOA (Tables 4.6-19 and 4.6-20). Although this is the highest bycatch predicted for any\nalternative, it is still a very small proportion of estimated herring biomass, and would not be expected to have\nsignificant impacts on herring populations. However, the removal of the bycatch limits under Alternative 6.2\ncould potentially allow higher herring bycatch than predicted by the simulation model, which is based on input\ndata of herring caps and closed areas. Removal of PSC limits might increase the probability of significant\nimpacts to herring populations.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 6.2 scores 1 for increasing bycatch of Pacific herring in the range of 10\nto 25 percent relative to Alternative 1. No spatial or temporal changes relative to Alternative 1 management\nare prescribed for pollock fisheries under Alternative 6.2, SO no changes in spatial or temporal concentrations\nof herring bycatch are predicted (score is +0). No changes are expected from Alternative 1 impacts to herring\nspawning habitat or competition for prey under Alternative 6.2, SO it scores +0 for each of these indirect effects.\n4.6.2.4\nPacific Salmon\nPacific salmon are anadromous fishes, meaning that they are spawned in fresh water, grow to maturity in salt\nwater, and migrate back to fresh water to spawn. Pacific salmon generally spawn only once and then die. Their\nanadromous life history makes salmon populations dependent on terrestrial, freshwater, and marine ecosystems\nfor survival. While directed fishing and bycatch clearly have effects on salmon populations, anadromy subjects\nsalmon to numerous additional human activities, including hydroelectricity generation, agriculture, urban and\nsuburban development, logging, etc., all of which also have impacts on salmon stocks. Each salmon species\nspends different amounts of time in fresh and salt water, and has different habitat and prey requirements; thus\neach species may respond differently to human activities and environmental changes. In addition, each salmon\nspecies is composed of genetically distinct stocks, which generally return to the same river where they were\nspawned. Therefore, relatively small localized impacts within spawning habitat can have significant effects on\nindividual salmon stocks, in addition to the large-scale, long-term climate changes, which can have significant\neffects on marine survival of multiple salmon stocks. It is not possible to address all factors that affect salmon\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-68","populations within this analysis, but it is important to recognize the complexity of impacts to salmon from\nsources beyond fishing.\nFive salmon species occur in Alaska: chinook (king), sockeye (red), coho (silver), pink (humpback), and chum\n(dog). Individual species descriptions, fishery history, and management of Pacific salmon are outlined in detail\nin Section 3.7.3. Numerous federal and state agencies are involved in salmon management, including NMFS,\nADF&G, and state agencies in Washington, Oregon, and California. Directed salmon fisheries are usually\nmanaged to allow for a certain number of spawners to survive the fishery and proceed upstream. This means\nthat in some years there is no directed fishery for certain stocks, in order to maintain an escapement necessary\nto ensure sustained yields. However, lower landings may also reflect market conditions, not stock conditions.\nIn general, meeting escapement goals for each stock is necessary to maintain healthy population levels.\nThe federal groundfish FMPs contain a measure designed to lower salmon bycatch in the BSAI: a bycatch action\nlevel that triggers time and area closures. This measure is awaiting final approval at the time of this writing (64\nFR 244, December 21, 1999, Proposed Rules, 71392 to 71395). This BSAI chinook salmon bycatch action\nlevel will be reduced incrementally over the next four years. Specifically, the chinook salmon bycatch action\nlevel that triggers closures in specific chinook salmon savings areas will be reduced from the present 48,000 fish\nto 41,000 fish in 2000, 37,000 fish in 2001, 33,000 fish in 2002, and 29,000 fish in 2003 and subsequent years.\nIn the event that the chinook salmon bycatch action level is triggered before April 15, the chinook salmon\nsavings areas would close immediately. The closure would be removed on April 15, but would be reinitiated\non September 1 and continue through the rest of the year. If the action level were reached after April 15, but\nbefore September 1, then the chinook salmon savings areas would close on September for the rest of the year.\nIf the action level were reached after September 1, the action level could close immediately and not reopen until\nthe following January 1. These closures would only apply to pollock fisheries, which currently take over 90\npercent of salmon bycatch in the BSAI. The lower bycatch action levels, in combination with the additional\ntimes for closures in specific areas, are expected to result in lower chinook salmon bycatch than recently\nobserved. While this management action is not final, and the simulation model input data reflects fishery\nbehavior in the presence of higher chinook salmon bycatch action levels, the effects of this updated management,\nalong with the impacts of each alternative, are discussed in the paragraphs and subsections that follow.\nIn this section the analysis is divided into two groups for salmon: chinook salmon and other salmon, which\ncontains all four other salmon species. These groupings follow from official catch records kept by the NMFS\nAlaska Region for each year, which were used in the simulation model to predict catches. The simulation model\nuses a standardized base period, 1997-1999, with the realization that different base periods would result in\ndifferent predictions. In the BSAI, according to groundfish fishery observer data, the overwhelming majority\n(96 percent between 1997 to 1999) of other salmon bycatch is chum salmon. While chum salmon dominate\nother salmon bycatch in the GOA as well (56 percent between 1997 and 1999, but higher in prior years see\nTable 4.6-21), there are also catches of coho salmon (14 percent), pink salmon (3 percent), and sockeye salmon\n(1 percent). In assessing the impacts of each alternative on salmon, the other salmon category is assumed to\ncontain the same proportions by species as observed in each area over the 1997-1999 base period. While the\nabundance of each salmon species could change over the next five years, potentially changing the species\ncomposition within the other salmon category, it is not possible to predict these changes with any accuracy.\nUnlike many other marine species, considerable information is available about the stock structure of salmon\npopulations, at least in fresh water. Every river draining into the North Pacific Ocean potentially has one or\nmore stocks (termed runs) of one or more species of salmon. This is important to the impacts analysis because\nthe status of each run may be very different. For example, some chinook salmon runs in Alaska are very large\nand considered healthy, while certain runs of chinook salmon in Washington and Oregon have recently been\nlisted as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) (Section 2.9). Although salmon\nstocks in Alaska are considered very healthy compared with those on the U.S. west coast,\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-69","Total Groundfish Catch and Estimated Bycatch of Chinook and Other Pacific Salmon in\nTable 4.6-21\nU.S. Groundfish Fisheries, 1990 to 1999a\nNumber of Fish\nTotal\nYear\nRegion\nCatch\nGroundfish\nChinook\nChum\nCoho\nSockeye\nPink\n(mt)\nDomestic\n1990\nBSAI\n1,706,379\n14,085\n16,202\n153\n30\n31\n30,501\nBSAI\n1991\n2,154,903\n48,873\n29,706\n396\n79\n79\n79,133\n1992\nBSAI\n1,963,523\n41,955\n40,090\n1,266\n14\n80\n83,405\nBSAI\n1993\n1,754,384\n45,964\n242,895\n321\n22\n8\n289,210\n20\n202\n140,811\n1994\nBSAI\n1,855,031\n44,380\n95,978\n231\n21\n44,859\n1995\nBSAI\n1,830,295\n23,079\n20,901\n858\n0\n141,200\n1996\nBSAI\n1,755,872\n63,205\n77,771\n218\n5\n1\n117,753\n1997\nBSAI\n1,740,663\n50,218\n67,349\n114\n3\n69\n69,237\n128,203\n1998\nBSAI\n1,531,838\n58,966\n79.233\n1999\nBSAI\n1,243,051\n16,861\n62,372\n64\n21,085\n1990\nGOA\n244,397\n16,913\n2,541\n1,482\n85\n53,844\n1991\nGOA\n269,616\n38,894\n13,713\n1,129\n51\n57\n17,727\n1992\nGOA\n269,797\n20,462\n86\n33\n0\n38,308\n1993\nGOA\n255,434\n24,465\n55,268\n306\n15\n799\n80,853\n1994\nGOA\n239,503\n13,973\n40,033\n46\n103\n331\n54,486\n1995\nGOA\n216,585\n14,647\n64,067\n668\n41\n16\n79,439\n1996\nGOA\n202,054\n15,761\n3,969\n194\n2\n11\n19,937\n18,539\n1997\nGOA\n230,448\n15,119\n3,349\n41\n7\n23\n13,539\n30,480\n1998\nGOA\n245,115\n16,941\n32.230\n1999\nGOA\n217.680\n24,943\n7,293\n0\n617\n1990\nWOC\n4,478\n617\n0\n0\n0\n6,165\n11\n132\n0\n23\n6,331\n1991\nWOC\n198,953\n5,100\n1992\nWOC\n155,333\n4,863\n36\n201\n0\n0\n71\n20\n126\n3,313\n8,373\n1993\nWOC\n99,698\n4,843\n39\n0\n61\n4,001\n1994\nWOC\n175,731\n3,626\n275\n6\n2,433\n15,991\n1995\nWOC\n103,598\n11,577\n200\n1,775\n0\n0\n3,437\n1996\nWOC\n129,489\n3,152\n196\n89\n563\n5,410\n1997\nWOC\n147,221\n4,404\n139\n304\n0\n1998\nWOC\n147,396\nna\nna\nna\nna\nna\nna\n1999\nWOC\n140,001\nna\nna\nna\nna\nna\nna\nJoint Venture\n1990\nBSAI\n133,438\n147\n2\n3\n0\n0\n152\n0\n0\n0\n0\n1990\nGOA\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n9,308\n1990\nWOC\n172,069\n9,141\n133\n34\nNotes: Through October 9, 1999. For 1998 and 1999, the estimates of non-chinook salmon have not yet been\nseparated by species and are thus listed as a single value.\nOne steelhead was reported in 1991 and five steelheads were reported in 1993.\nAt-sea processing only\nBSA - Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nGOA - Gulf of Alaska\nmt - metric tons\nna - not available\nWOC - Washington-Oregon-California\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-70","the potential impacts of bycatch in groundfish fisheries on salmon stocks depend on which stocks are present\nin the bycatch. For example, after two previous years of very low runs, the summer 2000 chinook and chum\nsalmon runs in the Yukon and Kuskokwim River drainages (ADF&G Region 3, Figure 4.6-21) were so low that\neven subsistence fishing was prohibited, resulting in a federal disaster declaration. Subsistence fishing, as\ndefined by the Alaska constitution, is the priority use of the state's fisheries resources. Therefore, a subsistence\nclosure emphasizes the serious concern for the health of the stocks in question and potential impacts of any\ngroundfish bycatch of these same stocks, even though groundfish bycatch may or may not have affected the\ninitial cause of the decline.\nSeveral questions are addressed in this analysis, requiring multiple levels of information. First, as with all other\nnon-target species, total bycatch of salmon by species group is examined in relation to directed salmon fishery\nlandings for 1997-1999 (Table 4.6-22) and overall estimates of abundance if available. For example, during\nyears when Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim catches are large, it would intuitively lead one to the conclusion that the\nimpacts of groundfish bycatch are lower than during years when the directed salmon catches are low (e.g., we\nuse the direct salmon catch as an index on salmon stock abundance). The potential impacts to selected stocks\nare examined in the SEIS, including ESA listed chinook salmon stocks and western Alaska chinook and chum\nsalmon stocks. Because there is no way to determine the stock origin of a salmon from observer data, (in the\nabsence of coded wire tags), we rely on studies that have used scale pattern analysis, coded-wire tag recapture\ndata, and genetic analysis to estimate the origins of salmon caught as bycatch in groundfish fisheries (Table 4.6-\n23). Information from several of these studies is used to estimate the amount of salmon bycatch for selected\nstocks under each alternative.\nChinook Salmon\nChinook salmon are the largest of the Pacific salmon species. They range throughout the North Pacific Ocean\nand Bering Sea from Japan to southern California (and have been introduced outside this native range). Chinook\nsalmon have complex life histories among individual stocks, with different freshwater residence times, migratory\npatterns, and maturity schedules. Two different types or races of chinook salmon have been defined based on\njuvenile life history: stream-type chinook, which remain in fresh water for 1 to 2 years, and ocean-type chinook,\nwhich leave fresh water before they are one year old and mature in estuaries and coastal marine waters.\nChinook salmon return from sea to spawn after 1 to 5 or more years at sea, thus exhibiting variable spawning\nages even within the same cohort (Myers et al. 1998). During their varied years at sea, chinook salmon tend\nto live and occupy deeper ocean depths than other salmon, accounting, in part, for the high bycatch rate of\nchinook salmon in the pollock groundfish fisheries. Stock status of chinook salmon ranges from healthy to\nendangered under the ESA, depending upon the stock. In this section, impacts to ESA-listed chinook salmon\nstocks are of particular concern, as are the currently depressed western Alaska chinook salmon stocks. To be\nconsistent with stock identification studies, western Alaska stocks are defined as those originating from the\nArctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim areas (ADF&G Region 3) and from Bristol Bay, part of ADF&G Region 2.\nEndangered and threatened chinook stocks are listed in Table 2.9-1. As described in detail in Section 2.9,\nrepeated ESA Section 7 consultations determined that the current BSAI and GOA groundfish fisheries are not\nlikely to jeopardize the continued existence of ESA-listed chinook salmon. These consultations recognized that\n(1) the catch of ESA-listed salmon would be limited specifically by measures proposed to limit the total bycatch\nof chinook salmon; (2) the total chinook salmon bycatch should be minimized to the extent possible; (3) chinook\nsalmon bycatch should not in any case exceed 55,000 fish per year in the BSAI and 40,000 fish per year in the\nGOA; and (4) further development of incentive programs designed to further reduce salmon bycatch in the\ngroundfish fisheries should be encouraged by NMFS and the Council (see also Section 2.9). No alternative\nwould result in projected catches of chinook salmon above 55,000 fish in the BSAI or 40,000 fish in the GOA\n(Tables 4.6-24 and 4.6-25). Therefore, no significant additional impacts on ESA-listed chinook salmon stocks\nare predicted under any alternative.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-71","ARCTIC OCKAN\nBarraw\nBEAUFORT SEA\nCHUKCHISEA\nArctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim\n(Region 3)\n-\nKotzebue\nName\nRiver\nMission\nFairbanks\nBERING SEA\nRever\nRiver\nCentral\n(Region 2)\nXixer\nAnchorage\nBethel\nValdez .\n*\nCorddva\nDillingham\n*Konal\nPresent\nToglak\nJuneau\n/\nYakutat\nNaknek\nSisteed\nAlextim\nSrissia issue\nPetersburg\n**\nKodlak\nPasses\nGULF\nWrangell\nSitka\nPare\nOF\nChignik\nKetchlkan\nALASKA\nSoutheast\nWestward\n(Region 1)\n(Region 4)\nDiscuss\nE-\nPACIFIC OCEAN\nFigure 4.6-21 Salmon management areas established by Alaska Department of Fish and Game.\nTable 4.6-22 Estimated Catch in Directed Salmon Fisheries by Alaska Region, 1997 to 1999\nADF&G Region (Number of Fish)\nSpecies\nYear\nSoutheast\nCentral\nBristol Bay\nAYK\nWestward\nAll Alaska\n(Region 1)\n(Region 2)\n(Region 2)\n(Region 3)\n(Region 4)\nChinook\n1997\n300,000\n63,000\n80,000\n170,000\n40,000\n653,000\n1998\n240,000\n80,000\n140,000\n90,000\n30,000\n580,000\n1999\n190,000\n80,000\n30,000\n100,000\n30,000\n430,000\nChum\n1997\n11,790,000\n2,340,000\n320,000\n400,000\n1,410,000\n16,260,000\n1998\n15,700,000\n1,370,000\n400,000\n380,000\n1,240,000\n19,090,000\n1999\n14,900,000\n3,150,000\n720,000\n270,000\n1,920,000\n20,960,000\nCoho\n1997\n1,970,000\n240,000\n50,000\n240,000\n680,000\n3,180,000\n1998\n2,990,000\n370,000\n130,000\n340,000\n850,000\n4,680,000\n1999\n3,570,000\n380,000\n20,000\n40,000\n640,000\n4,650,000\nPink\n1997\n28,980,000\n28,324,000\n0\n0\n14,250,000\n71,554,000\n1998\n42,530,000\n30,700,000\n30,000\n590,000\n30,920,000\n104,770,000\n1999\n77,700,000\n45,870,000\n0\n0\n22,030,000\n145,600,000\nSockeye\n1997\n2,480,000\n8,610,000\n12,160,000\n120,000\n7,720,000\n31,090,000\n1998\n1,380,000\n3,230,000\n10,040,000\n130,000\n7,940,000\n22,720,000\n1999\n1,160,000\n5,150,000\n26,100,000\n80,000\n12,500,000\n44,990,000\nNotes: AYK - Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim\nADF&G - Alaska Department of Fish and Game\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-72","Table 4.6-23 Estimated Stock Origin of Chinook and Chum Salmon Catch in the Bering Sea and\nAleutian Islands\nPercent of\nStock Origin\nSpecies\nReference/Catch Source\nTotal Catch\n10\nChum\nKondzela et al. 1999\nJapan\nRussia\n21\nSalmon\nBycatch in BSAI (1996)\nWestern Alaska\n14\nFall Yukon\n2\nAlaska Peninsula\n6\nPrince William Sound and southeast Alaska\n27\nBritish Columbia\n14\nWashington\n5\n8\nWilmot et al. 1998\nJapan\nRussia\n24\n31\nBycatch in BSAI (1995)\nWestern Alaska\nFall Yukon\n8\nAlaska Peninsula\n5\nPrince William Sound and southeast Alaska\n4\nBritish Columbia\n13\nWashington\n8\n13\nPatton et al. 1998\nJapan\n37\nRussia\n19\nBycatch in domestic groundfish\nWestern and central Alaska\nfisheries (1994)\nNorthern southeast Alaska\n12\nSouthern southeast Alaska and British Columbia\n17\nWashington State\n3\n26\nWilmot et al. 1998\nJapan\n25\nRussia\nBycatch in BSAI (1994)\nWestern Alaska\n23\nFall Yukon\n3\nAlaska Peninsula\n3\nPrince William Sound and southeast Alaska\n5\nBritish Columbia\n10\n5\nWashington\n14\nChinook\nMyers and Rogers 1988\nAsia\n60\nWestern Alaska\nSalmon\n17\nBycatch in foreign JV groundfish\nCentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska and British Columbia\n9\nfisheries (1979 to 1982)\n39\nDavis 1990\nAsia\n58\nWestern Alaska\n3\nDirected catch in foreign drifnet\nCentral Alaska\nfisheries (1985)\n18\nMyers et al. 1987\nAsia\n70\nWestern Alaska\n10\nDirected catch in foreign driftnet\nCentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska and British Columbia\n2\nfisheries (1975 to 1981)\nManagement of chinook salmon bycatch is different between the BSAI and the GOA. There is no chinook\nsalmon bycatch action level that triggers time and area closures in the GOA. Therefore, the predicted effects\nof each alternative are described separately for the BSAI and the GOA.\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-73","Table 4.6-24 Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Chinook Salmon Bycatch, in Numbers of Fish, and\nPercent Change, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nAlternative\nProjection Year\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\n2000\n41,484\n41,484\n41,484\n5,341\n41,088\n41,484\n41,560\n38,596\n33,353\n42,180\n36,118\n66,077\n2001\n44,945\n26,144\n5,343\n32,345\n31,096\n31,165\n2002\n45,544\n32,763\n5,343\n37,945\n36,826\n36,883\n43,242\n36,580\n51,997\n2003\n41,931\n34,136\n5,344\n37,843\n37,109\n37,171\n39,828\n33,794\n43,677\n32,279\n44,019\n2004\n40,170\n32,847\n5,335\n35,725\n35,558\n35,614\n37,888\n2005\n44,471\n35,381\n5,342\n38,788\n38,448\n38,518\n41,976\n35,735\n50,608\nPredicted average\n43,412\n32,254\n5,341\n36,529\n35,807\n35,870\n41,023\n34,902\n51,276\n2001-2005\n38,829\n38,829\nRecent average\n38,829\n38,829\n38,829\n38,829\n38,829\n38,829\n38,829\n1997-1999\nPercent change from\n12\n-17\n-86\n-6\n-8\n-8\n-6\n-10\nrecent\nPercent change from\n0\n-26\n-88\n-16\n-18\n-17\n-6\n-20\n18\nAlternative 1\nUnder Amendment 58, bycatch limit would be reduced from 48,000 to 29,000 fish in 4 years.\nNotes:\nTable 4.6-25 Estimated Gulf of Alaska Chinook Salmon Bycatch, in Numbers of Fish, and Percent\nChange, 2001 to 2005, by Alternative\nAlternative\nProjection Year\n6.2\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n16,788\n15,562\n17,682\n2000\n17,682\n17,676\n8,100\n19,105\n17,800\n17,800\n2001\n14,314\n7,645\n7,444\n15,109\n14,482\n14,482\n13,785\n13,146\n21,742\n19,045\n2002\n14,370\n8,357\n7,810\n13,587\n14,203\n14,203\n13,681\n12,953\n7,785\n14,816\n17,632\n17,632\n17,093\n15,659\n23,514\n2003\n17,734\n10,138\n20,604\n20,751\n20,230\n18,249\n27,856\n2004\n20,933\n11,661\n7,583\n17,629\n7,401\n19,315\n23,027\n23,066\n22,597\n20,172\n30,952\n2005\n22,945\n12,847\n16,036\n24,622\nPredicted average 2001-\n18,059\n10,130\n7,604\n16,091\n17,990\n18,027\n17,477\n2005\n21,350\n21,350\n21,350\n21,350\n21,350\nRecent average 1997-\n21,350\n21,350\n21,350\n21,350\n1999\nPercent change from\n-15\n-53\n-64\n-25\n-16\n-16\n-18\n-25\nrecent\nPercent change from\n0\n-44\n-58\n-11\n0\n0\n-3\n-11\n36\nAlternative 1\nChinook Salmon in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nImpacts of Alternative 1\nUnder Alternative 1, chinook salmon bycatch is predicted to range from 40,000 to 46,000 fish between 2000\nand 2005 (Table 4.6-24). Bycatch in this range is equivalent to about 6 to 11 percent of all directed Alaska\nchinook salmon landings, or 16 to 35 percent of Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim and Bristol Bay directed chinook\nlandings between 1997 and 1999 (Table 4.6-21). Run forecasts are not available for most chinook stocks, SO\nwe cannot easily determine what proportion of the chinook salmon population is taken as bycatch cannot be\neasily determined. About 92 percent of this salmon bycatch is predicted to come from the pelagic trawl pollock\nfishery, 7 percent from the Pacific cod bottom trawl fishery, and the remaining 1 percent from all other fisheries.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-74","This prediction does not account for the presumed reduction in total chinook salmon bycatch in the BSAI that\nwould result from closures in the chinook salmon savings areas triggered by lower chinook salmon bycatch\nlevels proposed under BSAI Amendment 58. In addition, the proportion of salmon taken by fishery may shift\nslightly, away from pelagic pollock fisheries and toward bottom trawl cod and other fisheries, because the\nproposed lower chinook salmon bycatch levels would only apply to the pollock fishery. Because pollock and\nPacific cod fisheries occur at different times and with different gears, this shift may alter the size and stock\ncomposition of chinook salmon bycatch. However, the majority of chinook bycatch would probably still be in\nthe pollock fishery.\nAssuming that 58 to 70 percent of BSAI chinook bycatch may be of western Alaska origin (Table 4.6-22),\nbycatch of western Alaska chinook stocks could range from 23,000 to 32,000 fish in the next five years under\nAlternative 1 without the proposed reduction in chinook salmon bycatch levels proposed under BSAI\nAmendment 58. This represents 10 to 25 percent of directed chinook salmon landings in the combined Arctic-\nYukon-Kuskokwim and Bristol Bay areas between 1997 and 1999 (Table 4.6-21). While this bycatch appears\nto be substantial relative to current directed fishery landings, directed fishery landings from these same stocks\nin earlier years were much higher and this bycatch level would be less substantial under those levels.\nFurthermore, high interannual variations in run sizes of many salmon stocks and of directed fishery landings\nadds largely to the uncertainty in projecting potential impacts from estimated future bycatch levels. Also, this\nprediction does not account for changes in chinook salmon bycatch management under BSAI Amendment 58.\nSalmon fisheries are managed by ADF&G and other agencies to meet an escapement goal of a certain number\nof spawners for each river system. Meeting escapement goals is considered equivalent to maintaining healthy\nstocks. In general, spawners are counted on their way upstream, after their numbers have already been reduced\nby natural mortality at sea, bycatch at sea, and directed fisheries downstream. Therefore, chinook salmon\nbycatch is only likely to have had a significant adverse impact on those stocks for which there are no directed\nfisheries and escapement goals are not met. At present, these conditions may potentially apply only to Yukon\nand Kuskokwim chinook salmon stocks in Alaska. (For other chinook salmon runs in Alaska, directed fisheries\nexist and escapement goals are met.) The amount of western Alaska chinook salmon bycatch in groundfish\nfisheries as managed up to 1999 could represent a potentially significant impact to western Alaska chinook\nsalmon stocks if escapement goals are not met for these stocks. This impact could be reduced by changes to\nchinook salmon bycatch management that will be implemented under BSAI FMP Amendment 58. However,\nit is difficult to determine whether bycatch in groundfish fisheries causes significant impacts on these chinook\nsalmon salmon stocks without further research on the stock composition of chinook salmon salmon bycatch in\ncurrent BSAI fisheries. Estimates of stock composition are 15 years old at best, and it is clear that chinook\nsalmon salmon stock size can change between years enough to alter the mix of salmon present in the Bering Sea.\nSince western Alaska stocks are depressed, it is possible that the dated estimates of stock composition\noverestimate their presence in bycatch, and thus potential impacts to these stocks from bycatch are overestimated\nunder Alternative 1 and all other alternatives. Conversely, with no directed fisheries, including subsistence\nfisheries in 2000, these depressed stocks may be at such low numbers and in poor population health, that any\nbycatch underestimates the potential impacts to the stocks.\nExamples of indirect impacts to Pacific salmon would be spatial and temporal concentrations of bycatch,\nresulting in the overharvest of a distinct genetic component of the stock, destruction of spawning habitat/\ndisruption of spawning aggregations, and competition for prey. Chinook salmon salmon bycatch appears to be\nconcentrated in space somewhat relative to the overall distribution of pollock fishing under Alternative 1 (Figure\n4.6-22). Although there is some amount of chinook salmon bycatch throughout the year, it is higher in\nSeptember and October (pollock B season during 1997 to 1999). No significant impacts would be expected to\noccur to chinook salmon stocks from spatial or temporal concentrations of chinook salmon bycatch. Examples\nof indirect impacts to salmon species would be destruction of spawning habitat, disruption of spawning\naggregations; and competition for prey. Groundfish fisheries take place at sea, not in the freshwater spawning\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-75","habitat occupied by spawning aggregations of anadromous Pacific salmon. While other human activities may\naffect spawning salmon and their habitat, federal groundfish fisheries do not. Salmon prey on zooplankton and\nforage fish (sand lance, capelin, herring) while at sea. Catch of these salmon prey items in groundfish fisheries\nranges from small (forage fish, Section 4.5.2) to none (zooplankton), SO competition for prey between groundfish\nfisheries and salmon is not expected to be significant.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.1\nAlternative 2.1 would increase protection to marine mammals and seabirds and is predicted to result in slightly\nlower chinook salmon bycatch relative to Alternative 1, with catches ranging from 26,000 to 41,000 fish\nbetween 2000 and 2005 (Table 4.6-24). Chinook salmon bycatch is reduced because Alternative 2.1 would\nclose Steller sea lion critical habitat to fishing for pollock, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel and would reduce\nthe TAC of each of these species in proportion to the biomass of each species within critical habitat. While\nchinook salmon bycatch is reduced to the equivalent of 4 to 10 percent of all chinook salmon catch in Alaska\nor 10 to 32 percent of Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim and Bristol Bay directed chinook salmon landings under\nAlternative 2.1, the proportion that would be taken by the fishery is unchanged from Alternative 1 (92 percent\npollock, 6 percent cod trawl). As with Alternative 1, overall chinook salmon bycatch might be lower under\nAlternative 2.1 than predicted here due to proposed lower chinook salmon bycatch levels, which may trigger\nmore restrictive time and area closures.\nChanges in the locations of fisheries under Alternative 2.1 could result in a different stock composition of\nbycatch relative to Alternative, because different salmon stocks are known to have distinct migratory patterns\nwhile at sea (Myers et al. 1998). However, not enough information is available to predict how the proportions\nmight change. Therefore, for this and all subsequent analyses, the stock composition proportions estimated under\nAlternative 1 are applied (Table 22). Bycatch of western Alaska chinook salmon stocks could range from\n15,000 to 29,000 fish under Alternative 2.1, which is approximately 7 to 22 percent of recently observed\ndirected fishery landings from Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim and Bristol Bay areas combined. The combination\nof management actions proposed under this alternative and BSAI Amendment 58 are expected to decrease\nchinook salmon bycatch further from these predictions, thereby further reducing bycatch of western Alaska\nchinook salmon.\nAlternative 2.1 scores a +2 in the comparison of alternatives for reducing chinook salmon bycatch by over 25\npercent relative to Alternative 1. The spatial and temporal concentrations of chinook salmon bycatch would be\nexpected to decrease substantially relative to Alternative 1 (score is +2), primarily because the concentration\nof bycatch within Steller sea lion critical habitat would be eliminated under Alternative 2.1 (Figure 4.6-23). In\naddition, this alternative would limit temporal concentration of bycatch through the use of both closed seasons\nand daily catch rate limits. As under Alternative 1, no effects to salmon spawning habitat are expected from\ngroundfish fishing (score is +0). If herring and forage fish are assumed to be primary components of chinook\nsalmon diets, catch of both types of fish would be reduced in the range of 10 to 25 percent, SO this Alternative\n2.1 scores a +1 for reducing take of chinook salmon prey species.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.2\nAlternative 2.2 management would result in the most substantial decreases in chinook salmon bycatch relative\nto Alternative 1, due to large reductions in pollock and Pacific cod TACs. Chinook salmon bycatch is predicted\nto remain around 5,300 fish in all projection years (Table 4.6-24). This represents 1 percent or less of recently\nobserved Alaska chinook salmon landings and less than 3 percent of recent Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim and\nBristol Bay directed chinook salmon landings. Under this alternative, approximately 92 percent of chinook\nsalmon bycatch would still be taken in pelagic pollock fisheries, but almost none would be taken in Pacific cod\ntrawl fisheries. The next highest proportion of chinook salmon bycatch is predicted in yellowfin sole and other\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-76","flatfish fisheries under this alternative; these proportions only become significant because these fisheries are not\naffected by Alternative 2.2 and their tiny chinook salmon bycatch appears larger in comparison to the drastically\nreduced bycatch in pollock and cod fisheries. The proposed changes to chinook salmon bycatch action levels\nunder Amendment 58 will no longer matter under this alternative, as none of the bycatch action levels would\nbe reached.\nWestern Alaska chinook salmon bycatch under this alternative could range from 3,000 to 3,700 fish, which is\n1 to 2 percent of recently observed directed landings in Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim and Bristol Bay. This is the\nsmallest potential impact of any alternative on western Alaska chinook salmon stocks.\nAlternative 2.2 scores +2 in the comparison of alternatives for reducing chinook salmon bycatch by over 25\npercent relative to Alternative 1. The spatial and temporal concentrations of chinook salmon bycatch would be\nexpected to decrease substantially relative to Alternative 1 (score is +2). As under Alternative 1, no effects to\nsalmon spawning habitat are expected from groundfish fishing (score is +0). If herring and forage fish are\nassumed to be primary components of chinook salmon diets, catch of both types of fish would be reduced in the\nrange of more than 25 percent, SO Alternative 2.2 scores +2 for reducing take of chinook salmon prey species.\nImpacts of Alternative 3\nUnder Alternative 3, chinook salmon bycatch is predicted to range from 32,000 to 41,000 fish between 2000\nand 2005 (Table 4.6-24), amounting to 5 to 10 percent of recently observed directed Alaska chinook salmon\ncatches. This is slightly lower than that predicted for Alternative 1, primarily because pollock TACs would be\nset more conservatively under Alternative 3. Proportions of chinook salmon bycatch taken by fishery remain\nidentical to those of Alternative 1: 92 percent pelagic pollock, 7 percent Pacific cod trawl, and 1 percent all other\nfisheries. Unlike the other alternatives, Alternative 3 would remove Alternative 1 PSC chinook salmon bycatch\naction levels that trigger closures in the chinook salmon savings areas.\nChinook salmon bycatch originating from western Alaska could range from 19,000 to 29,000 fish under\nAlternative 3, assuming that western Alaska stocks are 58 to 70 percent of all chinook salmon taken as bycatch\n(Figure 4.6-24). These numbers are 8 to 22 percent of recently observed Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim and Bristol\nBay directed chinook salmon catches, similar to both Alternatives 1 and 2.2. Because PSC chinook salmon\nbycatch levels that trigger closures in the chinook salmon savings areas are removed, the bycatch of western\nAlaska chinook salmon would not decrease as under the other alternatives.\nAlternative 3 receives a score of +1 for reducing chinook salmon bycatch in the range of 10 to 25 percent\nrelative to that predicted for Alternative 1. The spatial and temporal concentrations of chinook salmon bycatch\nwould be expected to increase relative to Alternative 1 (score -1), primarily because of the concentration of\nbycatch to the region south of the proposed additional closure. The increased concentration would be minor\nrelative to Alternative 1 because pollock catch within the catcher vessel operation area is restricted under\nAlternative 1. As under Alternative 1, no effects to salmon spawning habitat would be expected to occur from\ngroundfish fishing (score is +0). If herring and forage fish are assumed to be primary components of chinook\nsalmon diets, catch of both types of fish are within 0 to 10 percent of Alternative, SO this alternative scores +0\nfor impacts on chinook salmon prey species.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-77","This page intentionally left blank\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-78","1997-1999 pelagic trawl chinook bycatch\n1997-1999 pelagic trawl pollock targets\nFigure 4.6-22 Distribution of salmon bycatch in the pelagic trawl fishery,\n1997-1999.\n1997-1999 pelagic trawl chinook bycatch\n1997-1999 pelagic trawl pollock targets\nFigure 4.6-23 Alternative 2.2 closures (pink) with chinook salmon bycatch in\npelagic trawl fisheries, 1997-1999, for comparison.","","Impacts of Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2\nAlthough Alternative 4 would increase protection to non-target species, it has two different components\n(Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2). The effects on BSAI chinook salmon bycatch would be identical under both, SO\nAlternatives 4.1 and 4.2 are discussed together. Chinook salmon bycatch would be reduced somewhat under\nAlternatives 4.1 and 4.2 relative to Alternative 1, ranging from 31,000 to 41,000 fish (Table 4.6-24). This\nreduced bycatch is due to an 18.5 percent reduction in pollock TAC implemented under both alternatives in\nassociation with areas closed to protect squid aggregations. Although skate TACs would be set under both\nalternatives (a high TAC under Alternative 4.1 and a lower TAC under Alternative 4.2), the skate TACs would\nneither constrain nor affect fisheries with generally low salmon bycatch, such as Pacific cod longline fisheries.\nBycatch of this number of chinook salmon represents about 5 to 10 percent of recently observed directed Alaska\nchinook salmon landings. The proportion of chinook salmon taken by fishery would change only slightly under\nAlternatives 4.1 and 4.2, to 90 percent pelagic pollock, 8 percent Pacific cod trawl, and 2 percent from all other\nfisheries. As with most other alternatives, these model projections do not account for the presumed reduction\nin total chinook salmon bycatch in the BSAI that would result from the closures in the chinook salmon savings\nareas triggered by the lower chinook salmon bycatch levels proposed under BSAI Amendment 58.\nWestern Alaska chinook salmon bycatch could range from 18,000 to 29,000 fish under Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2,\nbut again this does not consider the presumed reduction in total chinook salmon bycatch in the BSAI that would\nresult from closures in the chinook salmon savings areas triggered by lower chinook salmon bycatch levels\nproposed under Amendment 58. The projected numbers represent 8 to 22 percent of recently observed Arctic-\nYukon-Kusokwim and Bristol Bay chinook salmon landings.\nAlternatives 4.1 and 4.2 score +1 for reducing chinook salmon bycatch in the range of 10 to 25 percent relative\nto that predicted for Alternative 1. Under both alternatives, spatial and temporal concentrations of chinook\nsalmon bycatch would be expected to decrease relative to Alternative 1 (score is +1), primarily because the\nsquid closed areas encompass areas of relatively high chinook salmon bycatch (Figure 4.6-25) and pollock catch\nwould be reduced to account for the closed areas. The decrease in concentration would be minor relative to\nAlternative 1 because these regions are small. As under Alternative 1, no effects to salmon spawning habitat\nare expected from groundfish fishing (score is +0). If herring and forage fish are assumed to be primary\ncomponents of chinook salmon diets, catches would be within 10 percent to 25 percent of Alternative 1, so this\nalternative scores a +1 for impacts on chinook salmon prey species.\nImpacts of Alternative 5\nAlternative 5 would increase protection to habitat, and would result in a decrease in chinook salmon bycatch\nrelative to that predicted for Alternative 1, with predicted bycatch between 38,000 and 43,000 fish (Table 4.6-\n24). This is the smallest decrease of all alternatives except 6.2 which would increase bycatch. Under\nAlternative 5 levels of fishing would be maintained similar to Alternative 1, but with reduced use of bottom\ntrawl gear. Because most salmon bycatch is in pelagic trawl pollock fisheries under Alternative 1, the changes\nmade under Alternative 5 would have little effect on salmon bycatch, aside from switching the proportion in\nfisheries to 98 percent pelagic pollock and 2 percent from all other fisheries. No chinook salmon bycatch would\nbe taken in Pacific cod trawl fisheries, as no Pacific cod trawl fisheries would exist under Alternative 5. As with\nother alternatives, chinook salmon bycatch could decrease with the implementation of BSAI Amendment 58,\nbut the exact magnitude of the decrease cannot be predicted.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-81","This page intentionally left blank\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-82","1997-1999 pelagic trawl chinook bycatch\n1997-1999 pelagic trawl pollock targets\nFigure 4.6-24 Alternative 3 closures and existing closures under Alternative 1\n(pink), Bering Sea Aleutian Islands chinook salmon bycatch in\npelagic trawl, 1997-1999.\n1997-1999 pelagic trawl chinook bycatch\n1997-1999 pelagic trawl pollock targets\nFigure 4.6-25 Alternative 4 closures in addition to existing closures under\nAlternative 1 (pink), Bering Sea Aleutian Islands chinook salmon\nbycatch in pelagic trawl, 1997-1999.","","The catch of western Alaska chinook salmon could range from 22,000 to 30,000 fish under Alternative 5. This\nwould result in similar levels of catch to those predicted under Alternative 1, in the range of 10 to 23 percent\nof recently observed Arctic-Yukon-Kusokwim and Bristol Bay directed chinook salmon landings. This bycatch\nof western Alaska fish might be lower under the smaller Amendment 58 chinook salmon bycatch levels, which\ntrigger specific time and area closures.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 5 scores a +0 for maintaining chinook salmon bycatch within +10 percent\nof Alternative 1. The spatial and temporal concentration of chinook salmon bycatch would not change relative\nto Alternative 1 because pelagic pollock fisheries are not affected (score +0). As under Alternative 1, no effects\nto salmon spawning habitat would be expected from groundfish fishing (score +0). If herring and forage fish\nare assumed to be primary components of chinook salmon diets, catch of both types of fish would be within 0\nto 10 percent of Alternative 1, SO this alternative scores +0 for impacts on chinook salmon prey species.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.1\nAlternative 1, which would increase economic benefits, is predicted to result in lower chinook salmon bycatch\nrelative to Alternative 1, ranging from 32,000 to 37,000 fish between 2000 and 2005 (Table 4.6-24). This\nbycatch level is equivalent to about a 5 to 18 percent decrease from recently observed directed chinook salmon\nlandings in Alaska. The distribution of chinook salmon bycatch by fishery is very similar to that of Alternative\n1 at 91 percent from pelagic pollock, 7 percent from bottom trawl cod, and 2 percent from all other fisheries.\nAlternative 6.1 would not remove Alternative 1 bycatch action levels, but would assume that a greater\nproportion of target species could be caught within these levels due to implementation of a rights-based\nmanagement system. Therefore, bycatch of chinook salmon would likely be decreased further with the\nprogressively lower chinook salmon bycatch level, which would trigger time and area closures under the\nproposed BSAI FMP Amendment 58.\nUnder Alternative 6.1, the catch of western Alaska chinook salmon could range from 19,000 to 26,000 fish,\nassuming that these stocks make up 58 to 70 percent of all chinook salmon bycatch. This represents 8 to 20\npercent of recently observed Arctic-Yukon-Kusokwim and Bristol Bay directed chinook salmon landings. As\nwith other alternatives, total chinook salmon bycatch could decrease with implementation of BSAI Amendment\n58.\nAlternative 6.1 scores +1 in the comparison of alternatives for reducing chinook salmon bycatch in the range\nof 10 to 25 percent relative to Alternative 1. The spatial and temporal concentration of chinook salmon bycatch\nis expected to decrease relative to Alternative 1 because the race for fish would be minimized under a rights-\nbased management system (score is +1). As under Alternative 1, no effects to salmon spawning habitat are\nexpected from groundfish fishing (score is +0). If herring and forage fish are assumed to be primary\ncomponents of chinook salmon diets, bycatch of prey fish would decrease within 10 to 25 percent of Alternative\n1, SO this alternative scores +1 for impacts on chinook salmon prey species.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.2\nAlternative 6.2, maximize groundfish catch, would result in higher chinook salmon bycatch relative to\nAlternative 1, ranging from 44,000 to 66,000 fish between 2001 and 2005 (Table 4.6-24). This level of bycatch\nis equivalent to about 12 to 69 percent increase from recently observed directed chinook salmon landings in\nAlaska. Alternative 6.2 would remove Alternative 1 bycatch levels. Therefore, bycatch of chinook salmon\nwould likely be increased further.\nAlternative 6.2 scores 1 in the comparison of alternatives for increasing average 2001 to 2005 chinook salmon\nbycatch in the range of 10 to 25 percent relative to Alternative 1. Spatial and temporal concentrations of\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-85","chinook salmon bycatch would increase relative to Alternative 1 because bycatch action levels would be lifted\n(score -1). As under Alternative 1, no effects to salmon spawning habitat would be expected from groundfish\nfishing (score +0). If herring and forage fish are assumed to be primary components of chinook salmon diets,\nbycatch of prey fish would increase within 10 to 25 percent of Alternative 1, SO Alternative 6.2 scores a -1 for\nimpacts on chinook salmon prey species.\nChinook Salmon in the Gulf of Alaska\nImpacts of Alternative 1\nUnder Alternative 1, chinook salmon bycatch in the GOA would range from 14,000 to 23,000 fish between 2000\nand 2005 (Table 4.6-25). This bycatch is equivalent to 2 to 4 percent of recently observed directed chinook\nsalmon landings in all of Alaska. As in the BSAI, most of this bycatch would be taken in pollock fisheries (69\npercent pelagic trawl and 7 percent bottom trawl), with smaller amounts in bottom trawl pelagic shelf rockfish\n(8 percent), Pacific cod (6 percent), and rex sole (5 percent) fisheries. There are no current or proposed bycatch\nlevels or closed areas for chinook salmon in the GOA.\nBecause catch patterns of coded-wire-tagged chinook salmon bycatch in this fishery have not been analyzed little\ninformation exists on the stock composition of GOA chinook salmon bycatch, SO it is difficult to determine how\nthis bycatch affects individual chinook salmon stocks. Western Alaska stocks are thought to make up a smaller\nproportion of GOA chinook salmon bycatch than BSAI chinook bycatch, but it is not possible to determine how\nmuch smaller. Therefore, to analyze potential impacts to western Alaska chinook salmon from GOA groundfish\nfisheries, a very conservative assumption is made; that the proportion of these stocks in GOA bycatch is the\nsame as the lowest estimated proportion in BSAI bycatch, 58 percent. This assumption results in a high upper\nbound on potential impacts to these depressed chinook salmon stocks from GOA groundfish fisheries. Based\non this assumption, bycatch of western Alaska chinook salmon in the GOA would be no higher than 8,000 to\n13,000 fish between 2000 and 2005, a maximum of 3 to 10 percent of recently observed western Alaska chinook\nsalmon landings. Given that bycatch of western Alaska chinook salmon would likely be in the lower end of this\nrange, impacts to these stocks from GOA fisheries would likely be small. However, research on stock\ncomposition of chinook salmon bycatch in the GOA is necessary to determine whether there would be any\nsignificant impacts to individual chinook salmon stocks.\nPacific Northwest chinook salmon stocks may compose a larger proportion of GOA bycatch than they do of\nBSAI bycatch. While some Pacific Northwest stocks are listed as endangered or threatened under the ESA\n(Section 2.9), none of the catches predicted here would exceed the incidental take limit of 40,000 fish accepted\nunder ESA Section 7 consultation. Therefore, no significant impacts to ESA-listed chinook salmon are predicted\nunder Alternative 1 or any other alternative.\nAs discussed above, Alaska salmon fisheries are generally managed by ADF&G and other federal and state\nagencies to meet an escapement goal of a certain number of spawners for each river system. Meeting\nescapement goals is considered equivalent to maintaining healthy stocks. In general, spawners are counted on\ntheir way upstream, after their numbers have already been reduced by natural mortality at sea, bycatch at sea,\nand directed fisheries downstream. Therefore, chinook salmon bycatch is only likely to have had a significant\nadverse impact on those stocks for which there are no directed fisheries and escapement goals are not met. At\npresent, these conditions may potentially apply only to Yukon and Kuskokwim chinook salmon stocks in Alaska,\nbecause directed fisheries exist and escapement goals are met for chinook salmon runs in other areas of Alaska,\nparticularly the major chinook salmon runs in the Copper River and southeast Alaska. If it is true that western\nAlaska stocks compose a small proportion of chinook salmon bycatch in the GOA, then there may be no\nsignificant impacts to chinook salmon from GOA groundfish fisheries as managed under Alternative 1.\nHowever, as stated above, further research on the stock composition of salmon bycatch is necessary to make\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-86","this determination for GOA fisheries. Furthermore, because high annual variability in run size is the norm for\nmany stocks, the precise stock composition of salmon bycatch in the GOA is likely to vary considerably from\nyear to year.\nExamples of indirect impacts to Pacific salmon would be spatial and temporal concentrations of bycatch,\nresulting in the overharvest of a distinct genetic component of the stock, destruction of spawning habitat and\ndisruption of spawning aggregations, and competition for prey. Impacts occurring to chinook salmon stocks\nfrom spatial or temporal concentrations of chinook salmon bycatch in the GOA are unknown. Groundfish\nfisheries take place at sea, not in the freshwater spawning habitat occupied by spawning aggregations of\nanadromous Pacific salmon. While other human activities may affect spawning salmon and their habitat, federal\ngroundfish fisheries do not. Salmon prey on zooplankton and forage fish (sand lance, capelin, herring) while\nat sea. Catch of these salmon prey items in groundfish fisheries ranges from small (forage fish, Section 4.5.2)\nto none (zooplankton), SO competition for prey between groundfish fisheries and salmon is not expected to be\nsignificant.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.1\nAlternative 2.1, would increase protection to marine mammals and seabirds would close all GOA Steller sea\nlion critical habitat to pollock, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel fishing, and would reduce TACs in proportion\nto the biomass inside critical habitat. This would result in lower chinook salmon bycatch relative to Alternative\n1, in the range of 8,000 to 17,000 fish between 2000 and 2005 (Table 4.6-25). This represents approximately\n1 to 4 percent of recently observed total directed chinook salmon landings in all of Alaska. The lower bycatch\nwould be primarily due to the restrictions on the pollock fishery under Alternative 2.1, and to a lesser extent the\nPacific cod fishery. The proportion of chinook salmon bycatch taken by fishery changes slightly from\nAlternative 1, with 65 percent taken in pollock fisheries (54 percent pelagic trawl and 11 percent bottom trawl),\n13 percent in pelagic shelf rockfish trawl, 7 percent in rex sole trawl, and only 5 percent in Pacific cod trawl\nfisheries.\nChanges in the locations of fisheries due to area closures under Alternative 2.1 could result in a different stock\ncomposition of bycatch relative to Alternative 2.1, but because the composition of bycatch under Alternative\n1 is unknown, it is difficult to determine how it would change. Therefore, the maximum potential bycatch of\nwestern Alaska chinook salmon stocks is estimated using the same assumptions as for Alternative 1, that 58\npercent of GOA chinook salmon bycatch might originate from these stocks. This might result in bycatch of\n4,000 to 10,000 fish under Alternative 2.1, possibly as much as 2 to 8 percent of recent Arctic-Yukon-\nKusokwim and Bristol Bay chinook salmon landings, but very likely in the low end of this range.\nAlternative 2.1 rates a +2 for decreasing chinook salmon bycatch by more than 25 percent relative to predicted\nAlternative 1 bycatch. Impacts occurring to chinook salmon stocks from spatial or temporal concentrations of\nchinook salmon bycatch in the GOA are unknown. Relative to Alternative 1, the spatial and temporal\nconcentrations of chinook salmon bycatch in the GOA would decrease substantially (score +2), primarily\nbecause the concentration of bycatch within Steller sea lion critical habitat would be eliminated under\nAlternative 2.1. In addition, Alternative 2.1 limits temporal concentration of bycatch through the use of both\nclosed seasons and daily catch rate limits. As under Alternative 1, no effects to salmon spawning habitat would\nbe expected from groundfish fishing (score +0). If herring and forage fish are assumed to be primary\ncomponents of chinook salmon diets, catch of forage fish would be reduced in the range of more than 25 percent,\nSO this alternative scores a +2 for reducing take of chinook salmon prey species. However, it should be noted\nthat the bycatch of Pacific herring was SO small in the GOA that it was not ranked in Alternative 2.1. Likewise,\nthe bycatch of smelts was quite small, dropping 47 percent, from only 34 mt to 18 mt under Alternative 2.1.\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-87","Impacts of Alternative 2.2\nAlternative 2.2 would reduce TACs for pollock, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel to very low levels. This would\nresult in the lowest predicted bycatch of chinook salmon for all alternatives in the GOA, ranging from 7,400 to\n8,100 fish between 2000 and 2005 (Table 4.6-25), which is 1 to 2 percent of directed Alaska chinook salmon\nlandings between 1997 to 1999. The proportion of bycatch by fishery would also be modified under Alternative\n2.2, to 54 percent from pollock fisheries (32 percent pelagic trawl and 22 percent bottom trawl), 22 percent from\npelagic shelf rockfish, 9 percent from rex sole, and less than 1 percent from Pacific cod trawl fisheries.\nThis redistribution by fishery could change the currently unknown stock composition of bycatch to a different\nunknown composition, because different target fisheries take place in different seasons and areas. However,\npotential western Alaska chinook salmon bycatch is estimated using Alternative 1 information: catches from\nthese stocks would likely be less than 4,500 fish under Alternative 2.2, or 2 to 4 percent of recent Arctic-Yukon-\nKusokwim and Bristol Bay chinook salmon landings.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 2.2 scores a +2 for decreasing chinook salmon bycatch by more than 25\npercent relative to that predicted for Alternative 1. Impacts occurring to chinook salmon stocks from spatial\nor temporal concentrations of chinook salmon bycatch in the GOA are unknown. Relative to Alternative 1, the\nspatial and temporal concentrations of chinook salmon bycatch in the GOA would decrease substantially (score\n+2). As under Alternative 1, no effects to salmon spawning habitat would be expected from groundfish fishing\n(score +0). If herring and forage fish are assumed to be primary components of chinook salmon diets, catch of\nforage fish would be reduced in the range of more than 25 percent, SO this alternative scores a +2 for reducing\ntake of chinook salmon prey species. However, it should be noted that the bycatch of Pacific herring would be\nSO small in the GOA that it was not ranked in Alternative 2.2.\nImpacts of Alternative 3\nUnder Alternative 3, target species protection would be balanced with maximizing sustainable yields. Chinook\nsalmon bycatch in the GOA would range from 14,000 to 19,000 fish under Alternative 3 (Table 4.6-25), which\nis slightly reduced relative to Alternative 1. The level of bycatch predicted for Alternative 3 would be roughly\nequivalent to 2 to 4 percent of recently observed Alaska chinook salmon landings. The reductions in bycatch\nunder Alternative 3 would likely be due to slightly more conservative management of pollock, which would\nresult in lower pollock TACs. The proportion of bycatch that would be taken by each fishery reflects this\nreduction in pollock catch: 67 percent of chinook salmon bycatch from the pollock fishery (60 percent pelagic\ntrawl and 7 percent bottom trawl), 14 percent in rex sole trawl, 7 percent in pelagic shelf rockfish trawl, and\n5 percent in Pacific cod trawl fisheries.\nThis is not a large change from Alternative 1 and would not be expected to result in radically different stock\ncomposition of chinook salmon bycatch in the GOA. Assuming an upper bound of 58 percent western Alaska\nchinook salmon in this bycatch, catches from these stocks would be less than 8,000 to 13,000 fish under\nAlternative 3, or less than 3 to 9 percent of Arctic-Yukon-Kusokwim and Bristol Bay chinook salmon landings\nbetween 1997 to 1999.\nAlternative 3 scores +1 in the comparison of alternatives for reducing chinook salmon bycatch in the range of\n10 to 25 percent relative to Alternative 1. Impacts occurring to chinook salmon stocks from spatial or temporal\nconcentrations of chinook salmon bycatch in the GOA are unknown. Relative to Alternative 1, the spatial and\ntemporal concentrations of chinook salmon bycatch would increase (score -1), primarily because of the\nconcentration of bycatch to the region adjacent to the proposed additional closure areas. As under Alternative\n1, no effects to salmon spawning habitat would be expected from groundfish fishing (score +0). If herring and\nforage fish are assumed to be primary components of chinook salmon diets, catch of both types of fish are within\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-88","10 percent to 25 percent of Alternative 1, SO this alternative scores a +1 for impacts on chinook salmon prey\nspecies. However, it should be noted that the bycatch of Pacific herring would be SO small in the GOA that it\nwas not ranked in Alternative 3. Likewise, the bycatch of smelts would be quite small, dropping from 34 mt\nto 28 mt under Alternative 3.\nImpacts of Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2\nAlternatives 4.1 and 4.2 had very similar results for bycatch of chinook salmon in the GOA, SO they are\ndiscussed together. Under these alternatives, skate and grenadier TACs would be set in the GOA, and the\ngrenadier TAC would be refined between Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2. However, neither set of TACs would\nconstrain any fisheries, SO the results of Alternatives 4.1 an 4.2 would be virtually identical to those predicted\nfor Alternative 1, as would the expected impacts (score +0 for all types of impacts).\nImpacts of Alternative 5\nAlternative 5 would result in similar or slightly lower chinook salmon bycatch relative to Alternative 1, ranging\nfrom 14,000 to 23,000 fish between 2000 and 2005 (Table 4.6-25). This is equivalent to 2 to 5 percent of 1997\nto 1999 directed chinook salmon landings in all of Alaska. Alternative 5 would balance current fisheries with\nreduced use of bottom trawls to protect benthic habitat, SO many fisheries would be restricted to pelagic trawls\nor fixed-gear. This would change the distribution of chinook salmon bycatch by fishery somewhat, to 76 percent\nfrom pelagic trawl pollock, 9 percent from pelagic shelf rockfish trawl, and 8 percent from rock sole trawl\nfisheries. There would be no bottom trawl pollock or Pacific cod fisheries in the GOA under Alternative 5, thus\nno chinook salmon bycatch. The Pacific ocean perch fishery would be switched to pelagic gear under\nAlternative 5, and its chinook salmon bycatch would be triple or quadruple that expected under Alternative 1.\nHowever, this result was based on limited data SO it may not reflect the true magnitude of the change in chinook\nsalmon bycatch if a major rockfish fishery were switched from bottom trawl to pelagic gear.\nAs with other alternatives, this shift in bycatch by fishery could alter the stock composition of chinook salmon\nbycatch, but by how much cannot be determined with the current limited information. Assuming an upper limit\nof 58 percent western Alaska chinook salmon bycatch, catch of these fish would number less than 8,000 to\n13,000 under Alternative 5, representing less than 3 to 10 percent of recent Arctic-Yukon-Kusokwim and Bristol\nBay directed chinook salmon landings.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 5 scores a +0 for maintaining chinook salmon bycatch within 10 percent\nof Alternative 1. Alternative 5 would not substantially alter the distribution of pelagic trawl fisheries for pollock\nwithin the GOA, so impacts would be similar to Alternative 1 for Alternative 5 (score +0).\nImpacts of Alternative 6.1\nAlternative 6.1, which would increase economic benefits through a rights-based management system, would\neliminate the discards and bycatch associated with the open access race for fish. It was assumed that a higher\nproportion of target species could be caught for a given level of bycatch under Alternative 6.1, SO chinook\nsalmon bycatch is predicted to be lower under this alternative relative to Alternative 1, ranging from 13,000 to\n20,000 fish over the projection period (Table 4.6-25). This amount of bycatch is about 2 to 5 percent of all\nAlaska chinook salmon landings between 1997 to 1999. The distribution of bycatch by fishery would be similar\nto Alternative 1: 68 percent from pollock fisheries (62 percent pelagic trawl and 6 percent bottom trawl), 13\npercent from rex sole, 8 percent from pelagic shelf rockfish, and 5 percent from Pacific cod trawl fisheries.\nWhile it is just as difficult to determine what the stock composition of chinook salmon bycatch would be under\nAlternative 6.1 as under any other alternative, it is likely to be more similar to Alternative 1 than other\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-89","alternatives which would alter fishing patterns more radically. Using the conservative assumption that western\nAlaska salmon stocks are no more than 58 percent of all GOA chinook salmon bycatch, catch of these fish under\nAlternative 6 would be less than 8,000 to 12,000 chinook salmon, a maximum of 3 to 9 percent of 1997 to 1999\nArctic-Yukon-Kusokwim and Bristol Bay chinook salmon landings.\nAlternative 6.1 scores +1 for reducing chinook salmon bycatch in the range of 10 to 25 percent relative to\nAlternative 1. The spatial and temporal concentration of chinook salmon bycatch would decrease under a rights-\nbased management system (score +1). As under Alternative 1, no effects to salmon spawning habitat would be\nexpected from groundfish fishing (score +0). Bycatch of prey fish would be within 0 to 10 percent of\nAlternative 1, SO this alternative scores a +0 for impacts on chinook salmon prey species.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.2\nAlternative 6.2 scores -2 in the comparison of alternatives for increasing average 2001-2005 chinook salmon\nbycatch in the range of more than 25 percent relative to Alternative 1. The spatial and temporal concentration\nof chinook salmon bycatch would increase relative to Alternative 1 because the bycatch levels would be lifted\n(score - -1). As under Alternative 1, no effects to salmon spawning habitat would be expected from groundfish\nfishing (score +0). Bycatch of prey fish would be greater nanAlternative 1, SO this alternative scores a -1 for\nimpacts on chinook salmon prey species.\nOther Salmon Species in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nAs described above, this management category contains all salmon species except chinook salmon. In the BSAI,\nother salmon is composed almost exclusively of chum salmon. Between 1997 and 1999, fishery observers\nidentified 96 percent of BSAI other salmon as chum salmon, 3 percent as unidentified salmon, and less than\n1\npercent as coho salmon. According to groundfish observer data, between 1997 and 1999, pink salmon and\nsockeye salmon were taken in miniscule amounts in the BSAI, and steelhead and cutthroat trout were not\nobserved in BSAI fisheries. For this analysis, the other salmon category in the BSAI is assumed to continue\nto have this species composition between 2000 to 2005, and most of the BSAI discussion is limited to impacts\non chum salmon.\nChum salmon are the second largest of the Pacific salmon after chinook salmon. They have the widest natural\nspawning range of any Pacific salmon species, from Korea throughout the North Pacific Ocean, Bering Sea,\nand Arctic Ocean, and down the U.S. west coast to Monterey Bay, California. Unlike stream type races of\nchinook salmon and other salmon species, chum salmon spend little time in fresh water as juveniles, and are\ntherefore thought to be more affected during the juvenile stage by estuarine and marine conditions than by\nfreshwater conditions relative to other salmon species. Chum salmon generally return to fresh water to spawn\nafter 3 to 5 years at sea (Johnson et al. 1997). Coastwide, the status of chum salmon stocks ranges from healthy\nto listed as threatened under the ESA. Neither of the two Pacific Northwest chum salmon stocks listed as\nthreatened under the ESA are thought likely to enter Alaskan waters (Section 2.9), SO no impacts to ESA-listed\nchum salmon stocks are expected from federal groundfish fisheries off Alaska under any management system.\nWhile most Alaska chum salmon stocks are considered healthy, the Yukon and Kuskokwim River chum salmon\nruns were seriously depressed in 2000, resulting in commercial, recreational, and subsistence fishery closures\nand a federal disaster declaration. Therefore, the limited available stock identification information is used (Table\n4.6-22) to assess the proportion of chum salmon bycatch that may originate from these western Alaska rivers,\nand thus the potential impacts of groundfish fisheries on these depressed stocks.\nThere is currently an other salmon bycatch level of 42,000 fish in the BSAI, and a chum salmon savings area,\nwhich is closed to all trawling during the period of high chum salmon bycatch, August 1 to 31 of each year.\nThese measures were implemented under BSAI FMP Amendment 35. Like the chinook salmon bycatch levels\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-90","that trigger time and area closures described above, the other salmon action level serves as a trigger to close the\nchum salmon savings area seasonally if it is reached in a given year, and not as an absolute limit on chum\nsalmon catch. Unlike the chinook salmon bycatch level, catch of other salmon only counts toward the limit of\n42,000 fish if it is taken within a limited area of the BSAI, the catcher vessel operation area. This is why catch\nof other salmon generally exceeds 42,000 fish per year, and also why the chum salmon savings area has never\nbeen closed to fishing outside of August 1 to 31. However, catch of other salmon has been considerably lower\nsince these management measures were implemented in 1995 than in the years immediately prior to\nimplementation.\nProposed BSAI Amendment 58 will alter management of chinook salmon bycatch in the BSAI as described\nabove. While this amendment contains no measures that directly address the bycatch of other salmon in the\nBSAI, there could be indirect effects of more restrictive chinook salmon bycatch management on chum and other\nsalmon bycatch. To comply with lower bycatch limits and more extensive closed seasons for chinook salmon,\npollock fisheries may alter historical fishing patterns, which may in turn affect bycatch of chum salmon. It is\ndifficult to determine how bycatch of other salmon might change in terms of species composition, direction, or\nmagnitude, but it is recognized as a possibility.\nImpacts of Alternative 1\nUnder Alternative 1, BSAI bycatch of other salmon is predicted to range from 62,000 to 71,000 fish between\n2000 and 2005 (Table 4.6-26). Assuming that 96 percent of this bycatch is chum salmon, catches of just this\nspecies are predicted to range from about 59,000 to 68,000 fish, which represents 0.28 to 0.42 percent of total\nchum salmon directed landings between 1997 to 1999 in Alaska (Table 4.6-21 for landings data). Other salmon\nbycatch would be distributed among fisheries under Alternative 1 as follows: 98 percent in pelagic pollock\nfisheries and 2 percent from all other trawl fisheries combined.\nTable 4.6-26 Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Other Salmon Species Bycatch, in Numbers of Fish, by\nAlternative\nAlternative\nProjection Year\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n63,504\n50,568\n62,796\n62,796\n62,918\n62,796\n62,796\n8,711\n62,693\n2000\n102,408\n46,045\n69,388\n55,427\n49,624\n45,933\n68,890\n40,710\n8,700\n2001\n56,860\n80,858\n56,267\n56,359\n71,137\n70,720\n51,963\n8,696\n58,943\n2002\n52,418\n68,212\n65,148\n54,207\n8,692\n58,736\n57,182\n57,256\n65,521\n2003\n68,109\n62,329\n49,823\n61,926\n51,770\n8,697\n55,760\n54,282\n54,371\n2004\n55,183\n78,547\n58,738\n69,055\n68,608\n55,705\n8,691\n60,423\n58,643\n2005\n79,627\n54,461\n54,554\n67,486\n53,942\n67,058\n50,871\n8,695\n56,697\nPredicted average\n2001-2005\n60,530\n60,530\n60,530\n60,530\n60,530\n60,530\n60,530\nRecent average 1997-\n60,530\n60,530\n1999\n-10\n-10\n11\n-11\n-86\n-6\nPercent change from\n11\n-16\nrecent\n19\n-15\n-19\n-19\n1\n-20\nPercent change from\n0\n-24\n-87\nAlternative 1\nBycatch of this magnitude would appear to have no significant impact on chum salmon as a species relative to\ndirected fishing. However, stock composition in bycatch and in directed fishery landings would have to be\nconsidered. Most directed fishery landings (70 to 80 percent) are from southeast Alaska chum stocks, while\nonly about 30 percent of BSAI chum bycatch originates from southeast Alaska and British Columbia (Table\n4.6-22). Clearly there are negligible impacts to the robust southeast Alaska chum salmon runs. The greater\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-91","concern is about currently depressed western Alaska chum salmon runs. Assuming that 19 percent of chum\nsalmon bycatch in BSAI groundfish fisheries originates from western Alaska stocks, catch from these stocks\ncould range from 11,000 to 13,000 fish between 2000 and 2005. This would be the equivalent of 1.3 to 1.5\npercent of the combined Arctic-Yukon-Kusokwim and Bristol Bay chum salmon landings observed between\n1997 and 1999. This predicted bycatch is very small in proportion to directed landings, even for these depressed\nstocks. While impacts to western Alaska chum salmon stocks from bycatch in groundfish fisheries cannot be\nruled out, the best information indicates that impacts would likely be low. The bycatch of coho, pink, and\nsockeye salmon under Alternative 1 would be negligible, especially when compared with directed landings for\neach of these species. Therefore, no significant impacts of BSAI federal groundfish fisheries are predicted for\nthese salmon species.\nExamples of indirect impacts to Pacific salmon would be spatial and temporal concentrations of bycatch,\nresulting in the overharvest of a distinct genetic component of the stock, destruction of spawning habitat and\ndisruption of spawning aggregations, and competition for prey. Chum salmon bycatch would appear to be\nconcentrated in space somewhat relative to the overall distribution of pollock fishing under Alternative (Figure\n4.6-27). No significant impacts would occur to chum salmon stocks from spatial or temporal concentrations\nof chum salmon bycatch. Examples of indirect impacts to salmon species would be destruction of spawning\nhabitat, disruption of spawning aggregations, and competition for prey. Groundfish fisheries take place at sea,\nnot in the freshwater spawning habitat occupied by spawning aggregations of anadromous Pacific salmon.\nWhile other human activities could affect spawning salmon and their habitat, federal groundfish fisheries do not.\nSalmon prey on zooplankton and forage fish (sand lance, capelin, herring) while at sea. Catch of these salmon\nprey items in groundfish fisheries ranges from small (forage fish, Section 4.5.2) to none (zooplankton), SO\ncompetition for prey between groundfish fisheries and salmon would not be significant.\nImpacts of Alternative 1 on spatial concentration of catch, spawning habitat, and competition are rated + 0.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.1\nAlternative 2.1 would increase protection to marine mammals and seabirds and would reduce other salmon\nbycatch moderately relative to that predicted under Alternative 1, to roughly 41,000 to 63,000 fish between 2000\nand (Table 4.6-26). This reduction would result from lower TACs in the pollock fishery, which stem from\nSteller sea lion critical habitat area closures and proportional foregone catch. The changes to Pacific cod and\nAtka mackerel fisheries under Alternative 2.1 have little additional effect on other salmon bycatch, as most\nwould be taken in pollock fisheries (still 98 percent under Alternative 2.1). Assuming that other salmon bycatch\nwould be 96 percent chum salmon, catches of this species are predicted to range from 39,000 to 60,000 fish,\nwhich is approximately equivalent to 0.19 to 0.36 percent of recently observed Alaskan chum salmon directed\nfishery landings.\nThe area closures implemented under Alternative 2.1 could change the stock composition of other salmon\nbycatch, because different salmon stocks are known to have different marine migration patterns. However, how\nstock composition would change cannot be determined, SO the most recently collected stock composition\ninformation would still be applied to estimate the catch from each stock in this and all subsequent alternative\nimpacts analyses. Assuming that western Alaska stocks compose 19 percent of chum salmon catch in BSAI\ntrawl fisheries, bycatch of western Alaska chum salmon could range from 7,400 to 11,000 fish under Alternative\n2.1. This represents about 1 percent of directed chum salmon landings in the Arctic-Yukon-Kusokwim and\nBristol Bay areas between 1997 to 1999, a relatively small potential impact on these depressed stocks.\nAlternative 2.1 scores +1 for reducing other salmon bycatch in the range of 10 to 25 percent relative to\nAlternative 1 predicted bycatch. Other impacts of groundfish fishing on the spatial distribution of catch is\nassumed to be similar to those observed under Alternative 1 because other salmon bycatch is very low. When\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-92","considering impacts on competition for prey, other salmon are assumed to consume small fish. Given this\nassumption, Alternative 2.1 is ranked a +1 relative to Alternative 1.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.2\nAlternative 2.2, short burst increased protection to marine mammals and seabirds, would reduce fisheries for\npollock, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel substantially in order to reduce potential disturbances to foraging Steller\nsea lions. Due to large reductions in pollock fishery TACs, Alternative 2.2 would result in the lowest predicted\nbycatch of other salmon in the BSAI of any alternative, approximately 8,700 fish in each of the years 2000 to\n2005 (Table 4.6-26). The majority of this bycatch would still come from pelagic trawl pollock fisheries (94\npercent), with the remainder from other trawl fisheries. If bycatch of other salmon were still 96 percent chum\nsalmon under this alternative, predicted catch of chum salmon would be around 8,300 fish each year, or 0.05\npercent of observed directed Alaska chum landings between 1997 and 1999.\nEstimated bycatch of depressed western Alaska chum salmon stocks would also be lowest under Alternative 2.2,\nabout 1,600 fish per year. This level of bycatch would be very small (0.2 percent) compared to recently\nobserved directed chum salmon landings in the Arctic-Yukon-Kusokwim and Bristol Bay areas. Bycatch at this\nlow level would be unlikely to impede rebuilding of depressed stocks, and could have no significant population\neffects at all.\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 2.2 scores a +2 for BSAI other and chum salmon by reducing bycatch\nby more than 25 percent relative to that predicted for Alternative 1. The spatial and temporal concentrations\nof chum salmon bycatch in the BSAI would decrease substantially relative to Alternative 1 (score +2), primarily\nbecause the concentration of bycatch within Steller sea lion critical habitat would be eliminated under\nAlternative 2.2 (Figure 4.6-27). In addition, Alternative 2.2 would limit temporal concentration of bycatch\nthrough the use of both closed seasons and daily catch rate limits. As under Alternative 1, no effects to salmon\nspawning habitat would be expected from groundfish fishing (score +0). Assuming that other and chum salmon\ndiets include small fish and jellyfish, Alternative 2.2 ranks a +2 relative to Alternative 1.\nImpacts of Alternative 3\nBycatch of other salmon would be reduced relative to Alternative 1 under Alternative 3, ranging from 50,000\nto 63,000 fish over the projection period (Table 4.6-26). Alternative 3 would balance conservative target\nspecies TAC setting with increased ability for fisheries to achieve TACs by releasing PSC caps. Other salmon\nbycatch would decrease despite the lifting of the bycatch levels that would trigger specific time and area\nclosures, primarily due to a lower pollock catch based on more conservative TAC setting. Pelagic pollock\nfisheries would still account for 98 percent of other salmon bycatch under Alternative 3. Assuming 96 percent\nchum salmon in other salmon bycatch, chum salmon bycatch would range from 48,000 to 60,000 fish under\nAlternative 3, or 0.29 to 0.30 percent of directed chum salmon landings in Alaska between 1997 and 1999.\nBycatch of chum salmon originating from western Alaska stocks could range from 9,000 to 11,000 fish under\nAlternative 3, assuming that these stocks make up 19 percent of all chum salmon bycatch. This number of fish\nis equivalent to about 1 to 2 percent of 1997 to 1999 Arctic-Yukon-Kusokwim and Bristol Bay directed chum\nsalmon landings. Impacts to these depressed stocks would be relatively low under Alternative 3.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-93","This page intentionally left blank\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-94","1997-1999 pelagic trawl chum bycatch\n1997-1999 pelagic trawl pollock targets\nFigure 4.6-26 Distribution of Bering Sea Aleutian Islands chum salmon\nbycatch in pelagic trawl, 1997-1999.\n1997-1999 pelagic trawl chum bycatch\n1997-1999 pelagic trawl pollock targets\nFigure 4.6-27 Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 proposed closed areas in addition\nto Alternative 1 (pink) and Bering Sea Aleutian Islands\nchum salmon bycatch in pelagic trawl, 1997-1999.","","Comparing alternatives, Alternative 3 scores a +1 for BSAI other and chum salmon by reducing salmon bycatch\nby 10 percent to 25 percent relative to Alternative 1. Spatial and temporal concentrations of bycatch in the\nBSAI would increase relative to Alternative 1 (score is -1), because increased pelagic trawl fishing could occur\nin regions of higher chum salmon bycatch (Figure 4.6-28). As under Alternative 1, no effects to salmon\nspawning habitat would be expected from groundfish fishing (score +0). Assuming that other salmon diets\ninclude small fish and jellyfish, Alternative 3 ranks a +0 relative to Alternative 1.\nImpacts of Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2\nBoth versions of Alternative 4, which would increase protection to non-target species, would implement area\nclosures and pollock TAC reductions to protect squid aggregations. This would reduce other salmon bycatch\nas well. A progressively lower skate TAC would also be implemented in Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2, which would\nhave little to no effect on other salmon bycatch (there would be no difference in bycatch of other salmon between\nAlternatives 4.1 and 4.2). Bycatch of other salmon would range from 46,000 to 63,000 fish between 2000 and\n2005 under Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 (Table 4.6-26), and 98 percent of it were still taken in pelagic trawl pollock\nfisheries. Chum salmon bycatch is estimated to range from 44,000 to 60,000 fish under Alternatives 4.1 and\n4.2, approximately 0.27 to 0.31 percent of recently observed directed chum salmon landings in all of Alaska.\nWestern Alaska chum salmon bycatch could range from 8,000 to 11,000 fish under Alternative 4, about 0.8 to\n1.5 percent of directed chum salmon catches in the Arctic-Yukon-Kusokwim and Bristol Bay regions between\n1997 and 1999.\nIn comparing alternatives, both Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 score +1 for reducing other and chum salmon bycatch\nin the range of 10 to 25 percent relative to Alternative 1. Squid closures under Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 would\nnot affect spatial and temporal concentrations of salmon bycatch in the BSAI (score +0) (Figure 4.6-29). As\nunder status quo management, no effects to salmon spawning habitat are expected from groundfish fishing\n(score +0). Assuming that other salmon diets include small fish and jellyfish, Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 are\nranked a +1 relative to status quo.\nImpacts of Alternative 5\nAlternative 5, increased protection to habitat, would mainly restrict the use of bottom trawl gear, based on the\nassumption that bottom trawls have more habitat impacts than any other type of fishing gear. Since most other\nsalmon are caught in pelagic trawl pollock fisheries under Alternative 1, and these fisheries would not be\nchanged by management under Alternative 5, catches of other salmon would be nearly identical to those\npredicted for Alternative 1, ranging from 62,000 to 71,000 fish over the projection period (Table 4.6-26). This\namounts to 60,000 to 68,000 chum salmon, assuming chum salmon make up 96 percent of other salmon. About\n98 percent of the predicted other salmon bycatch would still be taken by pelagic trawl pollock fisheries under\nAlternative 5.\nAs under Alternative 1, bycatch of western Alaska chum salmon could range from 11,000 to 13,000 fish under\nAlternative 5. This would be the equivalent of 1.3 to 1.5 percent of the combined Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim\nand Bristol Bay chum salmon landings observed between 1997 and 1999.\nAlternative 5 scores +0 in the comparison of alternatives for maintaining BSAI chum salmon and other salmon\nbycatch within +10 percent of Alternative 1 levels. Alternative 5 would not affect spatial and temporal\nconcentrations of BSAI chum salmon or other salmon bycatch (score +0). As under Alternative 1, no effects\nto salmon spawning habitat would be expected from groundfish fishing (score +0). Assuming that other salmon\ndiets include small fish, Alternative 5 ranks a +0 relative to Alternative 1.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-97","This page intentionally left blank\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-98","1997-1999 pelagic trawl chum bycatch\n1997-1999 pelagic trawl pollock targets\nFigure 4.6-28 Alternative 3 proposed closed areas in addition to Alternative\n1 (pink) and Bering Sea Aleutian Islands chum salmon bycatch\nin pelagic trawl, 1997-1999.\n1997-1999 pelagic trawl chum bycatch\n1997-1999 pelagic trawl pollock targets\nFigure 4.6-29 Alternative 4 proposed closed areas in addition to Alternative 1\n(pink) and Bering Sea Aleutian Islands chum salmon bycatch in\npelagic trawl, 1997-1999.","","Impacts of Alternative 6.1\nAlternative 6.1 assumes that a greater proportion of target species catch could be taken for a given level of\nprohibited species bycatch, because the rights-based management system implemented under this alternative\nwould decrease bycatch and discards. Therefore, BSAI other salmon bycatch would be reduced relative to that\npredicted for Alternative 1, ranging from 50,000 to 57,000 fish between 2000 and 2005 (Table 4.6-26). The\nproportion of other salmon bycatch taken by fishery would not change under Alternative 6.1; 98 percent is\npredicted from the pelagic trawl pollock fishery. Of all other salmon bycatch, chum salmon bycatch would\nrange from 48,000 to 55,000 fish under Alternative 6.1, equivalent to approximately 0.26 to 0.30 percent of\n1997-1999 directed Alaskan chum salmon landings.\nAssuming that 19 percent of chum salmon caught in BSAI fisheries originate from western Alaska stocks, chum\nsalmon bycatch from these depressed stocks could range from 9,000 to 10,000 fish under Alternative 6.1. This\nrepresents a small proportion of recently observed Arctic-Yukon-Kusokwim and Bristol Bay chum salmon\nlandings, equivalent to about 0.9 to 1.4 percent. More recent data (Wilmont et al. 1998) show that, on average,\n31 percent of chum salmon bycatch in the BSAI originate from western Alaska stocks (Table 4.6-22).\nIn comparing alternatives, Alternative 6.1 scores +1 for reducing other salmon bycatch in the range of 10 to 25\npercent relative to Alternative 1. The spatial and temporal concentrations of chum salmon bycatch would\ndecrease relative to Alternative 1 because the race for fish would be minimized under a rights-based management\nsystem (score +1). As under Alternative 1, no effects to salmon spawning habitat would be expected from\ngroundfish fishing (score +0). If jellyfish, herring, and forage fish are assumed to be primary components of\nchum salmon diets, bycatch of prey fish would decrease Alternative 1, and Alternative 6.1 therefore scores a\n+1.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.2\nAlternative 6.2 scores a -1 for increasing other salmon bycatch in the range of 10 to 25 percent relative to\nAlternative 1. The spatial and temporal concentrations of chum salmon bycatch would increase relative to\nAlternative 1 (score 1). As under Alternative 1, no effects to salmon spawning habitat would be expected from\ngroundfish fishing (score +0). If jellyfish, herring, and forage fish are assumed to be primary components of\nchum salmon diets, bycatch of prey fish would decrease within 10 to 25 percent of status quo, giving Alternative\n6.2 a score of -1.\nOther Salmon Species in the Gulf of Alaska\nThe other salmon category is more diverse in the GOA than in the BSAI. While chum salmon are still the\nmajority of other salmon bycatch in the GOA (56 percent according to 1997 to 1999 observer data, while other\nsources show more than 90 percent; Table 4.6-21), there are significant contributions by unidentified salmon\n(26 percent) and coho salmon (14 percent). Unidentified salmon are an artifact of the reporting system at shore\nplants; the species composition of unidentified salmon in the GOA are expected to reflect the same proportions\nas the entire bycatch of salmon. Therefore, at least 77 percent of these unidentified salmon are probably chinook\nsalmon, which are not part of this category, SO the unidentified salmon are not considered further here. Pink\nsalmon (3 percent) and sockeye salmon (1 percent) compose very small proportions of other salmon bycatch,\nand steelhead and cutthroat trout were not observed in the GOA groundfish fisheries between 1997 and 1999.\nFor this analysis, the other salmon category in the GOA is assumed to continue to have this species composition\nbetween 2000 and 2005. While much of the discussion will focus on impacts to chum salmon in the GOA, the\nimpacts to coho, pink, and sockeye salmon are described briefly as well.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-101","There are no current or proposed other salmon bycatch action levels that trigger time and area closures in the\nGOA. However, this bycatch is generally low relative to GOA chinook salmon bycatch and to other salmon\nbycatch in the BSAI. Little information on stock composition of salmon bycatch in the GOA is available, but\nthe most conservative assumption is used to compare the each species bycatch with stock landings of concern\nas if all bycatch could be from that stock.\nImpacts of Alternative 1\nAlternative 1 in the GOA is predicted to result in other salmon bycatch ranging from 6,000 to 10,000 fish\nbetween the years 2000 and 2005 (Table 4.6-27). About 76 percent of this catch would be taken in pollock\nfisheries, with much smaller proportions from trawl fisheries for northern rockfish (8 percent), pelagic shelf\nrockfish (4 percent), and shallow water flatfish (3 percent), and the remainder from all other trawl fisheries.\nAssuming the species composition described above, catch of chum salmon would range from 3,400 to 5,900 fish\nover the projection period. This amount of bycatch is equivalent to 0.02 to 0,03 percent of all chum salmon\nlandings in Alaska between 1997 and 1999. In the unlikely event that all of this bycatch were from the\ndepressed western Alaska chum salmon stocks, it would be equivalent to 0.34 to 0.82 percent of recently\nobserved landings from the Arctic-Yukon-Kusokwim and Bristol Bay areas. The actual bycatch of western\nAlaska chum salmon in GOA groundfish fisheries would likely be an even smaller proportion of these stocks.\nTherefore, significant impacts on western Alaska or other healthier chum salmon stocks are not predicted as a\nresult of bycatch in GOA groundfish fisheries under Alternative 1.\nIf 14 percent of other salmon catch is coho salmon, then bycatch of this species in GOA groundfish fisheries\nwould range from 900 to 1,400 fish between 2000 and 2005. This is approximately equivalent to 0.02 to 0.05\npercent of all Alaskan directed coho salmon landings observed between 1997 and 1999. Pink salmon catch in\nGOA groundfish fisheries could range from 100 to 200 fish under Alternative 1 between 2000 and 2005,\nrepresenting 0.0001 to 0.0003 percent of the recently observed Alaska landings for this species. Sockeye salmon\nbycatch could range from 60 to 100 fish between 2000 and 2005, representing 0.0001 to 0.0004 percent of\n1997-1999 Alaskan directed sockeye salmon fishery landings. While the stock origin for any of these bycaught\nsalmon cannot be determined, significant impacts are not predicted, even at the stock level for coho, pink, or\nsockeye salmon, due to these very small amounts of bycatch in the GOA groundfish fisheries under Alternative\n1. Even if all these fish were from the same run of a given species (which is doubtful), changes in population\nsize on the order of 1,000 fish or less would be difficult to distinguish from population measurement error for\nmost salmon stocks.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-102","Table 4.6-27 Gulf of Alaska Other Salmon Species Bycatch, in Numbers of Fish, by Alternative\nProjection\nAlternative\nYear\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\n2000\n7,519\n7,522\n3,455\n7,851\n7,521\n7,521\n7,945\n6,529\n7,519\n6,036\n6,151\n6,151\n6,651\n5,416\n8,518\n2001\n6,140\n3,360\n3,528\n2002\n6,119\n3,624\n3,488\n5,340\n6,140\n6,140\n6,487\n5,328\n7,591\n2003\n7,808\n4,454\n3,509\n5,940\n7,830\n7,830\n8,182\n6,651\n9,587\n2004\n9,365\n5,179\n3,336\n7,274\n9,375\n9,376\n9,773\n7,916\n11,581\n12,860\n2005\n10,506\n5,874\n3,529\n8,307\n10,502\n10,507\n10,890\n8,815\n6,825\n10,027\nPredicted average\n7,988\n4,498\n3,478\n6,580\n8,000\n8,001\n8,396\n2001-2005\nRecent average 1997-\n8,200\n8,200\n8,200\n8,200\n8,200\n8,200\n8,200\n8,200\n8,200\n1999\nPercent change from\n-3\n-45\n-58\n-20\n-2\n-2\n2\n-17\nrecent\nPercent change from\n0\n-44\n-56\n-18\n0\n0\n5\n-15\n26\nAlternative 1\nIn the comparison of alternatives, Alternative 1 is the baseline and as such is rated +0 for each metric.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.1\nAlternative 2.1 would increase protection to marine mammals and seabirds, would close Steller sea lion critical\nhabitat to fishing for pollock, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel, and reduce TACs for these species in proportion\nto biomass in closed areas. These actions would reduce bycatch of other salmon relative to Alternative 1,\nprimarily because of reduced pollock fishing. Predicted catch of other salmon under Alternative 2.1 would be\n3,400 to 7,500 fish over the projection period (Table 4.6-27). The distribution of bycatch by fishery would be\naltered slightly relative to Alternative 1, with 63 percent of bycatch taken in pollock fisheries, 12 percent in\nnorthern rockfish, 7 percent in pelagic shelf rockfish, 6 percent in shallow water flatfish, and the remainder in\nall other trawl fisheries.\nWhile area closures and redistribution of other salmon catch by fishery under Alternative 2.1 could change the\nspecies composition of other salmon catch, there is no way to determine how. Therefore, species composition\nare assumed to remain as observed under Alternative 1 to make the following predictions in this and all\nsubsequent alternative impact analyses. Chum salmon catch (56 percent of other salmon) could range from\n1,900 to 4,200 fish between 2000 and 2005 under Alternative 2.1, or about 0.01 to 0.02 percent of recent\ndirected chum salmon landings in Alaska. As above, we assume that all of this bycatch could potentially come\nfrom the depressed western Alaska chum salmon stocks as a worst-case scenario. If this were the case, western\nAlaska chum salmon bycatch could amount to 0.19 to 0.58 percent of observed Arctic-Yukon-Kusokwim and\nBristol Bay runs between 1997 and 1999.\nAssuming the Alternative 1 species composition of other salmon, coho salmon catch under Alternative 2.2 could\nrange from 500 to 1,000 fish, or 0,01 to 0,03 percent of recently observed Alaska coho landings. Pink salmon\ncatch under this alternative could range from 70 to 150 fish, and sockeye salmon catch could range from 30 to\n75 fish, both of which represent minute amounts of directed fishery landings for each of these species.\nIn the comparison of alternatives, Alternative 2.1 scores +2 for reducing other salmon bycatch by more than 25\npercent relative to Alternative 1 predicted bycatch. Spatial and temporal concentration, spawning habitat\ndisruption, and prey competition are scored +0, +0, and +1, respectively.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-103","Impacts of Alternative 2.2\nAlternative 2.2 would reduce TACs for pollock, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel to very low levels in order to\nprevent disturbances to foraging Steller sea lions. These large reductions in pollock fishing would result in the\ngreatest reduction in other salmon bycatch of any alternative, with a predicted to range from 3,300 to 3,500 fish\n(Table 4.6-27). The proportion of other salmon bycatch taken by fishery under Alternative 2.2 would be 50\npercent from pollock fisheries, 17 percent from northern rockfish, 12 percent from pelagic shelf rockfish, 9\npercent from shallow water flatfish, and the remainder from all other trawl fisheries.\nThe bycatch of chum salmon under Alternative 2.2 could range from 1,900 to 2,000 fish between 2000 and\n2005, assuming that chum salmon make up 56 percent of other salmon. This represents about 0.01 percent of\ndirected chum salmon landings in Alaska between 1997 and 1999. In the unlikely event that all this chum\nbycatch were from the depressed western Alaska chum salmon stocks, it would be approximately equivalent to\n0.19 to 0.28 percent of Arctic-Yukon-Kusokwim and Bristol Bay chum salmon landings over 1997 to 1999.\nCoho salmon catch could approach 500 fish under Alternative 2.2 between 2000 and 2005, which is about 0.015\npercent of recent directed landings of coho salmon in Alaska. Pink salmon catch is predicted to be about 60 fish\nper projection year under Alternative 2.2, and sockeye salmon catch would be in the neighborhood of 35 fish.\nThese are infinitesimal proportions of directed landings for pink and sockeye salmon in Alaska.\nAlternative 2.2 scores +2 for reducing other salmon bycatch by more than 25 percent relative to Alternative 1.\nSpatial and temporal concentration, spawning habitat disruption, and prey competition are scored +0, +0, and\n+2, respectively.\nImpacts of Alternative 3\nUnder Alternative 3, other salmon bycatch would range from 5,300 to 8,300 fish between 2000 and 2005 (Table\n4.6-27). The slight reduction in bycatch relative to Alternative 1 is likely due to more conservative TAC setting\nfor pollock, which would result in lower pollock catches. The distribution of other salmon bycatch by fishery\nwould change only slightly from Alternative 1: 77 percent in pollock fisheries, 8 percent in northern rockfish,\n4 percent in pelagic shelf rockfish, 3 percent in shallow water flatfish, and the remainder in all other trawl\nfisheries.\nChum salmon bycatch under Alternative 3 would be 3,000 to 4,400 fish, assuming chums are 56 percent of\nother salmon bycatch. Bycatch of this number of fish is roughly equal to 0.01 to 0.03 percent of directed\nAlaskan chum salmon landings. Making the extremely conservative assumption that all these chum salmon\ncould be of western Alaskan origin, this bycatch would represent 0.30 to 0.61 percent of Arctic-Yukon-\nKusokwim and Bristol Bay chum salmon landings recorded between 1997 and 1999.\nCoho salmon bycatch under Alternative 3 would range from 750 to 1,200 fish, the equivalent of 0.02 to 0.04\npercent of directed coho salmon landings between 1997 and 1999 in all of Alaska. Pink salmon bycatch would\nrange from 100 to 170 fish, and sockeye salmon bycatch could be 50 to 80 fish under Alternative 3. These\nbycatches are extremely small relative to recent directed fishery landings for pink and sockeye salmon.\nIn the comparison of alternatives, Alternative 3 scores +1 for reducing the bycatch of other salmon in the range\nof 10 to 25 percent relative to that predicted for Alternative 1. Although Alternative 3 would release PSC\nbycatch limits to better achieve full harvests of target species, there are currently no PSC limits on other salmon\nbycatch in the GOA. Therefore, Alternative 3 prescribes no changes to Alternative 1 and scores a +0 for all\nother metrics.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-104","Impacts of Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2\nBycatch of other salmon is virtually identical to that predicted for Alternative 1 under Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2.\nThese alternatives would increase protection for selected case study non-target species by setting TACs for\nskates and grenadiers in the GOA. Neither the skate TAC nor the higher (Alternative 4.1) or lower (Alternative\n4.2) grenadier TACs would constrain any fisheries that have significant bycatch of other salmon. Therefore,\nthe distribution of bycatch by fishery, the expected bycatch of each species, and the nonsignificant impacts\npredicted to other salmon species under Alternative 1 all apply to Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 as well. In the\ncomparison of alternatives, these Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 score +0 for all metrics, with the exception of prey\ncompetition which is scored +1.\nImpacts of Alternative 5\nAlternative 5 would increase protection to habitat would alter fisheries to minimize the use of bottom trawls.\nBecause most other salmon are caught in pelagic trawl pollock fisheries, bycatch of other salmon would be very\nsimilar to Alternative 1 levels, ranging from 6,500 to 10,900 fish (Table 4.6-27). The distribution of catch by\nfishery reflects the changes in gear types prescribed under this alternative to some extent: 75 percent of bycatch\nwould be from pelagic pollock fisheries, 7 percent from northern rockfish, and 4 percent each from pelagic shelf\nrockfish and shallow water flatfish. Bycatch of other salmon in the Pacific ocean perch fishery would triple\nunder Alternative 5 relative to Alternative 1, as a result of shifting the fishery from bottom trawl gear to pelagic\ntrawl gear. However, this predicted change is based on very little information from actual pelagic trawl Pacific\nocean perch fisheries, SO it may not reflect the actual magnitude of other salmon bycatch if this rockfish fishery\nwere switched exclusively to pelagic trawl gear.\nChum salmon bycatch under Alternative 5 would range from 3,600 to 6,100 fish over the projection period,\nassuming 56 percent chum in the other salmon category. This amount of bycatch is equivalent to about 0.02\nto 0.04 percent of all chum salmon fishery landings in Alaska from 1997 to 1999. If all of this bycatch were\nfrom the depressed western Alaska chum salmon stocks, which is very unlikely, it would represent 0.36 to 0.84\npercent of Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwin and Bristol Bay directed chum salmon landings over the last three years.\nThis is the highest potential level of bycatch from these depressed chum salmon stocks predicted for any\nalternative in the GOA, and it would still appear be small enough to represent no significant impact to western\nAlaska chum salmon stocks.\nCoho salmon bycatch under Alternative 5 would range from 900 to 1,500 fish, approximately 0.02 to 0.05\npercent of directed coho salmon landings observed in Alaska between 1997 and 1999. Pink salmon bycatch is\npredicted to range from 130 to 220 fish under Alternative 5, and sockeye salmon bycatch would range from 60\nto 110 fish. These bycatches represent 0.0001 to 0.0003 percent of directed pink salmon catch, and 0.0001 to\n0.0005 percent of directed sockeye salmon catches in Alaska between 1997 and 1999. As with chum salmon,\nthese are the highest predicted bycatch levels for any alternative in the GOA, and they all appear insignificant\nrelative to directed fishery catches for each species.\nThe comparison of alternative management regimes relative to Alternative 1 shows that Alternative 5 would\nscore a +0 with respect to catch, spatial and temporal concentrations of catch, impacts on spawning habitat, and\nprey competition.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.1\nBycatch of other salmon in the GOA under Alternative 6.1, which would increase economic benefits, would be\nreduced relative to Alternative 1, ranging from 5,300 to 8,800 fish (Table 4.6-27). This is because this rights-\nbased management system is assumed to reduce the bycatch and discards associated with the open access race\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-105","for fish, SO that a higher proportion of target species could be taken for a given bycatch level. The distribution\nof bycatch by fishery under Alternative 5 is very similar to that predicted for Alternative 1: 72 percent of other\nsalmon bycatch is taken in pollock fisheries, 7 percent in northern rockfish, 4 percent each in pelagic shelf\nrockfish and shallow water flatfish, and the remainder in all other trawl fisheries.\nAssuming that 56 percent of other salmon bycatch is chum salmon, chum bycatch under Alternative 6 would\nrange from 3,000 to 5,000 fish. This is equivalent to about 0.01 to 0.03 percent of directed chum salmon fishery\nlandings in Alaska between 1997 and 1999. If the extremely conservative assumption is made that all this chum\nsalmon bycatch is from the depressed western Alaska stocks, this bycatch amount would be about 0.30 to 0.69\npercent of recently observed Arctic-Yukon-Kusokwim and Bristol Bay chum salmon landings.\nCoho salmon bycatch under Alternative 6 could range from 750 to 1,200 fish, or about 0.02 to 0.04 percent of\ndirected coho fishery landings in Alaska between 1997 and 1999. Pink salmon bycatch would range from 100\nto 180 fish, and sockeye salmon bycatch would range from 50 to 90 fish, each of which represents a tiny fraction\nof directed fishery landings for these species.\nAlternative 6.1 scores +1 for reducing bycatch of other salmon in the range of 10 to 25 percent relative to\nAlternative 1. Spatial temporal concentration, spawning habitat disruption, and prey competition are scored\n+0, +0, and +1, respectively.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.2\nAlternative 6.2 scores -2 for increasing bycatch of other salmon in the range of more than 25 percent relative\nto Alternative 1. Spatial temporal concentration, spawning habitat disruption, and prey competition are scored\n+0, +0, and -1, respectively.\nSummary of Effects of Alternatives on Prohibited Species\n4.6.3\nIn this section, the general effects of Alternative 1 and all other alternatives on prohibited species in federal\ngroundfish fisheries are summarized: Pacific halibut, king and Tanner crabs, Pacific herring, and Pacific salmon\nspecies. The objective is to prevent overfishing, maintain healthy stocks, and rebuild depressed stocks of\nprohibited species. Given these objectives, the most important direct effect of groundfish fisheries on prohibited\nspecies, and the one management has the most control over, is direct take as bycatch. The analysis is\nconcentrated on this direct effect, including a brief discussion of indirect effects of fishing on prohibited species.\nThe summary sections below are reprinted from Section 4.6.1; and follow the very detailed analysis of impacts\nof each alternative. At the end of this section is a summary table that evaluates the significance of the impacts\nof Alternative 1 on each prohibited species in terms of direct and indirect effects (Table 4.6-28).\nAlthough prohibited species is a smaller category of animals than target groundfish species (or other non-target\nspecies), there is considerable diversity within this category in the biology, stock structure, and management of\nthese species. The one thing prohibited species have in common is that they are all subject to directed fisheries,\nwhich are managed by other agencies. After that, the similarities break down. As an overview, the range is\nfrom Pacific halibut, which are considered a single healthy coastwide stock from Alaska to California and are\nmanaged by one international agency., to Pacific salmon, which comprise at least five species, each of which is\ncomposed of multiple stocks whose health varies from robust to endangered, and for which fisheries are\nmanaged on a stock specific basis by multiple state, federal, and international agencies.\nThe full complexity of the status quo federal groundfish management system in the BSAI and GOA becomes\napparent when the measures implemented to reduce impacts to prohibited species are examined, along with their\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-106","interaction with management measures designed for the issues of increased importance under the alternatives.\nHowever, several useful generalities emerge from the analyses in Section 4.6.1 with respect to prohibited\nspecies. In general, potential changes in the management of pollock fisheries would affect the bycatch of herring\nand salmon, while changes in the management of other groundfish fisheries would have lesser effects, or none\nat all on these species. Conversely, changes to pollock fisheries would have almost no real effect on halibut and\ncrab bycatch. Changes to the management of Pacific cod fisheries (all gears), and trawl fisheries for flatfish\nwould affect halibut and crabs bycatch. As with any other issue, there is no one-size-fits-all management\nmeasure that addresses prohibited species bycatch in groundfish fisheries. If status quo management appears\npiecemeal with respect to limiting impacts on prohibited species, that is because specific issues have been\naddressed in real time as they became apparent with specific management measures. It is important to remember\nthat the analysis in this SEIS evaluates a model regime in which increased protection to prohibited species is\ngiven the highest priority for management, while current management is representative of an attempt to balance\ncompeting objectives.\nSummary of Impacts on Pacific Halibut\n4.6.3.1\nAlternative 1 both monitors and limits bycatch of Pacific halibut in groundfish fisheries, often constraining\ncatches of some groundfish target species to well below their annual TACs. Current IPHC management\naccounts for halibut bycatch mortality when conducting stock assessments and when setting quotas for directed\nhalibut fishing in each IPHC management area. None of the alternatives, including Alternative 1, are predicted\nto result in significant positive or negative impacts to halibut populations. Halibut stocks are considered healthy\nunder status quo FMP management in combination with IPHC management, and none of the alternatives are\npredicted to result in significant changes in halibut bycatch mortality except Alternative 2.2, which is predicted\nto decrease halibut bycatch mortality in the BSAI. The policy objectives of Alternative 4 are met for Pacific\nhalibut by any of the alternatives, because none of the predicted bycatch levels remotely approach or exceed the\nTACs for the stock. When management proposed under each alternative is combined with IPHC management,\nthe objectives are met equally well by all alternatives.\nIt is not that there are no impacts at all from halibut bycatch in groundfish fisheries, just that there are no likely\nimpacts to the halibut population itself. Halibut IFQ owners would prefer to see yields increase in their directed\nfisheries rather than be taken as bycatch in other fisheries, and even international relations are affected by this\nbycatch when yields are reduced to Canadian halibut fisheries as a result of bycatch in Alaska. Of course,\nreduced halibut bycatch in groundfish fisheries necessarily means reduced yields in these fisheries as well,\nwhich also results in significant social and economic concerns. Halibut populations are well-managed by IPHC,\nand halibut bycatch mortality is meticulously monitored and limited in FMP groundfish fisheries, but this issue\nis likely to remain contentious as long as competing user groups for halibut exist.\nExamples of some indirect impacts of the groundfish fisheries on Pacific halibut would be destruction of\nspawning habitat, disruption of spawning aggregations, and competition for prey. Halibut spawn throughout\nthe BSAI and GOA in the winter, but the largest major spawning ground identified by IPHC off Yakutat is\ncurrently closed to all groundfish trawling. Most bottom trawl groundfish fisheries occur between March and\nNovember, while halibut spawning takes place November to March, SO spawning halibut are generally not\nexposed to bottom trawl fisheries. Halibut are apex predators that eat target groundfish species as well as non-\ntarget groundfish and invertebrate species, most of which are caught in groundfish fisheries. Because halibut\nhave flexible feeding habits, they respond to short-term localized shortages of one prey species by substituting\nanother. While halibut have shown a decrease in size at age over time, this change may be due to long-term\nclimatic variability, not to removal of prey by groundfish fisheries (Clark et al. 1999). Therefore, removal of\nprey by groundfish fisheries is not expected to have any significant impacts on the sustainability of the Pacific\nhalibut population.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-107","4.6.3.2\nSummary of Impacts on King and Tanner Crabs\nCrab stocks are at generally low levels in both the BSAI and GOA, SO in this instance whether any of the\nalternatives would prevent overfishing of crabs or the rebuilding of depressed crab stocks is evaluated. Bycatch\nin BSAI groundfish fisheries alone, amounting to less than 1 percent of estimated population size for each crab\nspecies under all alternatives, cannot be viewed as overfishing; however, in combination with heavy fishing\npressure from directed crab fisheries, even relatively small bycatch takes of crabs could contribute to\noverfishing However, this is not likely because of the conservative harvest rates established under the crab\nrebuilding plans and the fact that directed fisheries are closed for crab stocks with very low abundance. In the\nGOA, it is not possible to determine what proportion of each crab stock is taken as bycatch, because there are\nno abundance estimates for GOA king and Tanner crabs, as there are in the BSAI. As crab abundance has\nfallen, directed fishing on crab stocks in federal waters in the GOA has been eliminated by ADF&G in an\nattempt to rebuild crab stocks.\nThe important question, then, is how each alternative might help or hurt the rebuilding of depressed crab stocks\nin the BSAI and GOA. The groundfish FMPs can indirectly enhance the rebuilding plans for crabs by limiting\ncrab bycatch and protecting crab habitat. The status quo FMPs contain bycatch limitation and habitat\nprotection measures for crab stocks, and the Alternatives 2.1, 2.2, 4.1, 4.2, and 5 would leave these protective\nmeasures in place. Alternatives 2.1, 3 and 5 would close more area to bottom trawl fishing relative to\nAlternative 1, potentially protecting more crab habitat and thereby contributing more to rebuilding crab stocks\nthan Alternative 1. Alternative 2.2 would reduce fishing considerably in both FMP areas for marine mammal\nprotection, thereby indirectly reducing crab bycatch for most species, potentially contributing more to rebuilding\nthan Alternative 1. Conversely, bycatch of some crabs would increase under Alternative 5 due to the indirect\neffects of protecting habitat from bottom trawling by reallocating TACs to other gear types. Alternative 3 would\nrelease management control over crab bycatch entirely by eliminating bycatch caps; this action would be\ninconsistent with the objectives of Alternative 4.\nThe bycatch of crab in groundfish fisheries may be SO low relative to population size under all alternatives that\nreductions in bycatch provided by some alternatives might have no discernible rebuilding effect on crab stocks\nbeyond what Alternative 1 already provides. For example, the largest change in crab bycatch would occur under\nAlternative 2.2 for other Tanner crabs, where predicted 2001-2005 average catch would be 1.7 million crabs,\na 47 percent reduction from the Alternative 1 predicted average of 3.2 million crabs. If the estimate of other\nTanner crab abundance is correct, this change of 1.5 million crabs would represent 0.11 percent of total\nabundance. It is not possible to determine whether an increase in abundance on the order of less than 1 percent\nof the population size would significantly increase the probability of rebuilding the Tanner crab stock.\nConversely, increases in crab bycatch, which also represent less than 1 percent abundance difference, might not\nimpede rebuilding any more than Alternative 1 bycatch. In the GOA, for which there are no reliable crab\nabundance estimates, it is even more difficult to determine whether crab stocks would respond to changes in\nbycatch predicted for each alternative. Generally, the asssumption is that very small changes in abundance\nwould not result in significant positive or negative population impacts, while very large changes could have some\nmeaningful effect. The analysis does not indicate large changes in abundance for crab due to bycatch alone\nunder any alternatives.\nExamples of indirect impacts of the groundfish fisheries on prohibited crab species would be destruction of\nhabitat, disruption of spawning aggregations, and competition for prey. Areas identified as important juvenile\nrearing habitat of red king crabs have already closed to all trawling under BSAI Amendment 37 and under GOA\nAmendment 26, thus eliminating impacts in these areas. Other area closures would be triggered by bycatch\nlimits, SO they do not afford year-round habitat protection, but could protect seasonal crab aggregations. The\nimpacts to crab habitat or aggregations would be reduced by these area closures. Crabs are generally benthic\nfeeders that prey on invertebrates such as clams, polychaete worms, brittle stars, basket stars, and other crabs.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-108","Bycatch of these animals in groundfish fisheries is very low (Section 4.5.2, \"Mobile Benthos\"), SO direct\ncompetition for prey between prohibited crab species and federal groundfish fisheries is not significant.\nHowever, evaluating the impacts of fishing on the benthic environment inhabited by prohibited crabs and their\nprey is an area of active ongoing research. (Section 4.7).\nSince the crab bycatch is less than 1 percent of the population for all four crab species categories, the catch\neffect under Alternative 1 is not significant (Table 4.6-28). Spatial and temporal effects are not significant for\nevery species category in the BSAI. There are separate stocks in the Bering Sea for red king crab, which are\nmanaged separately and protected by no trawl zones. Pribilof Islands blue king crab stocks are protected by\nthe Pribilof Islands Conservation Zone, and very little trawling effort occurs around the Saint Matthew blue king\ncrab stock. Bairdi Tanner crab are considered one stock in the Bering Sea, as are opilio Tanner crab. Red king\ncrab and other king crab are given a nonsignificant rating for the habitat effect (Table 4.6-28). Key red king\ncrab juvenile and adult habitat areas in the Bering Sea are currently protected by closed areas in Bristol Bay\nand around the Pribilof Islands. Other king crab habitat is protected by the Pribilof Islands closure area and\nthe lack of groundfish effort near Saint Matthew Island. The effect of groundfish fishing on bairdi and opilio\nTanner crab habitat is unknown because the habitat requirements of these species are not fully understood.\nThere could be some negative effects on bairdi and opilio Tanner crab habitat due to the distrurbance of the\nbottom by trawl fishing, however, since important bairdi and opilio Tanner crab areas are not known, the effects\nof fishing are not known. It appears that the measures in place to protect king crab habitat from trawling also\nprotect an average of 18.4 percent of the total surveyed abundance of bairdi Tanner crab based on survey results\nduring 1996 to 1999 (NPFMC 1999). Only a small portion of the opilio Tanner crab occurs in areas currently\nclosed to groundfish trawling. The effects of groundfish fishing on benthic organisms used as prey by crabs are\nconsidered insignificant due to the very low numbers of brittle stars, worms, and other prey species caught by\nthe trawl fisheries.\nIn the GOA, bycatch effects resulting from the groundfish fisheries cannot be determined because absolute\npopulation estimates of crab stocks are not available. All directed crab fisheries are currently closed in the GOA\ndue to low relative abundance, except some isolated areas in southeast Alaska. Trawl closures have been\nimplemented around Kodiak Island to protect red king crab habitat. Habitat areas for other crab species are\nunknown. The spatial and temporal effects are nonsignificant for red king crab because important areas have\nalready been closed. However, for the other species categories, the stock structure is not known. The\ngroundfish fisheries effects on GOA red king crab habitat are considered insignificant due to the closed areas\nalready established for this purpose. The effect on habitat for the other crab species groups is unknown, because\nthe habitat requirements of these species are not known\nSummary of Impacts on Pacific Herring\n4.6.3.3\nA system to limit herring bycatch in BSAI pollock fisheries was established in 1990 (BSAI FMP Amendment\n16a). The system is designed to limit herring bycatch at 1 percent of estimated herring biomass by closing large\nareas where herring concentrate. Herring bycatch attributed to the GOA groundfish fisheries is estimated to be\nsuch a small percentage of the total herring biomass in the GOA that closures are not believed necessary to limit\nbycatch (bycatch never reaches 0.1 percent of biomass, let alone 1 percent in the GOA). Based on the best\nestimates of herring bycatch and ADF&G's best estimates of herring biomass, no significant adverse effects to\nherring stocks are expected from groundfish fishing under Alternative 1 or other alternatives.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-109","Table 4.6-28 Evaluation of Impacts to Prohibited Species under Alternative 1\nEffect\nPacific Herring\nHalibut\nChinook Salmon\nOther Salmon\nOther Salmon\n(BSAI and GOA)\n(BSAI and GOA)\n(BSAI)\n(GOA)\n(BSAI)\n(GOA)\nBycatch\nNS\nNS\nCS(-)\nU\nCS(-)\nNS\nSpatial\nNS\nNS\nU\nU\nU\nNS\ntemporal\nconcentration\nof bycatch\nSpawning\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nhabitat\ndisruption\nPrey\nNS\nNS\nU\nU\nU\nNS\ncompetition\nEffect\nRed King\nOther\nBairdi\nOther\nRed King\nOther\nBairdi\nOther\nCrab\nKing\nTanner\nTanner\nCrab\nKing Crab\nTanner\nTanner\n(BSAI)\nCrabs\nCrab\nCrabs\n(GOA)\n(GOA)\nCrab\nCrabs\n(BSAI)\n(BSAI)\n(BSAI)\n(GOA)\n(GOA)\nBycatch\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nU\nU\nU\nU\nSpatial\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nU\nU\nU\ntemporal\nconcentration\nof bycatch\nSpawning\nNS\nNS\nU\nU\nNS\nU\nU\nU\nhabitat\ndisruption\nPrey\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\ncompetition\nNotes:\nBSAI - Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nCS(-) - Conditionally significant adverse\nGOA - Gulf of Alaska\nNS - not significant\nU - unknown\nIn this SEIS, it was not possible to measure effects of herring bycatch at very small spatial and temporal scales.\nWhile it is unlikely that catches of the magnitude predicted here would have significant impacts on Alaskan\nPacific herring populations as a whole, there is a remote possibility of significant adverse impacts to an\nindividual small herring stock if all or the majority of the predicted BSAI bycatch is comprised of fish from one\nstock. For example, if the entire status quo BSAI pollock TAC were taken within an area about half the size of\nherring savings area 1 (Figure 4.6-3) at exactly the time when herring were aggregated there after spawning,\nthere is a distinct possibility of significant impact to a single spawning stock of herring. However, this scenario\nis implausible under the alternatives presented. None of the alternatives constrain fisheries in space and/or time\nwithout a concurrent TAC reduction, except for Alternative 3. The area remaining open under Alternative 3\nwould still be 80 percent of that open under Alternative 1, so we believe that the potential for fishery\nconcentration under Alternative 3 is unlikely to be great enough to pose a threat to individual herring stocks\n(coincidentally, pollock TACs are lower under this alternative relative to Alternative 1 due to more conservative\nsingle species management). The analysis is recognized to be not at the scale of the individual herring stock,\ntherefore the possibility of impacts to individual herring stocks cannot be ruled out, but significant impacts are\nunlikely for the reasons listed above.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-110","Examples of indirect impacts to Pacific herring would be destruction of spawning habitat, disruption of\nspawning aggregations, and competition for prey. Federal groundfish fisheries do not take place in the nearshore\nshallow environments where herring congregate to spawn, SO no impacts to herring spawning habitat or\naggregations are predicted as a result of these fisheries. Herring prey on zooplankton, including pollock larvae,\nsand lance larvae, and smelt larvae. Zooplankton are not caught in groundfish fisheries. The only way\ngroundfish fisheries might possibly have any impact at all on herring prey would be through severe overfishing\nof species like pollock to an extent which would limit pollock larval abundance. This level of groundfish\noverfishing has not been observed over the course of FMP management, and is not likely to be in the future\nunder any alternative. Therefore, no significant indirect impacts to herring stocks are expected to result from\ngroundfish fishing under the BSAI and GOA FMPs.\nSummary of Impacts on Pacific Salmon Species\n4.6.3.4\nBycatch of Pacific salmon is closely monitored under Alternative 1, and regulated with bycatch limits, which\ntrigger closed areas in the BSAI. While estimates of salmon bycatch are not explicitly included in the\nmanagement of directed salmon fisheries, these fisheries are managed for escapement within each stock's river\nof origin, which is measured after bycatch of salmon in open ocean groundfish fisheries have taken place. For\nthe purpose of this SEIS, it is assumed that the agencies managing salmon fisheries estimate escapement\ncorrectly and have set escapement levels that maintain healthy salmon stocks. Therefore, bycatch in groundfish\nfisheries does not have significant population impacts for salmon stocks that meet escapement goals, although\nit may reduce yields to directed salmon fisheries by varying amounts. While yield reduction to directed fisheries\nmay be a significant allocation and utilization issue, these social issues are not the focus of this analysis. Most\nsalmon fisheries in Alaska are healthy, and bycatch represents a very small proportion of directed catch in most\nof these fisheries, especially for pink, sockeye, and coho salmon.\nFor salmon stocks for which escapement into spawning habitat is considered insufficient to maintain continued\ndirected fishery yields (or the survival of the population itself in the case of ESA-listed species), bycatch in\ngroundfish fisheries might constitute a significant adverse impact to these stocks, depending on the proportion\nof these stocks in the bycatch. Potential groundfish fishery impacts to ESA-listed salmon species were\ninvestigated, as well as the currently depressed western Alaska chinook and chum salmon stocks, which are the\nonly stocks we are aware of that meet the conditions of potentially significant impact from groundfish bycatch.\nOf the salmon species listed as endangered or threatened under the ESA, only chinook salmon and steelhead\ntrout stocks are expected to migrate into the areas managed under the BSAI and GOA groundfish FMPs (Section\n2.9.4). No steelhead trout have been observed recently in BSAI or GOA groundfish fisheries, SO no impacts\nto these ESA-listed (or any steelhead) stocks are predicted under Alternative 1, or any other alternative. The\npredicted bycatch of chinook salmon in both the BSAI and GOA groundfish fisheries do not exceed the upper\ntake limits accepted under ESA Section 7 consultation (55,000 chinook salmon in the BSAI and 40,000 chinook\nsalmon in the GOA), under Alternative 1 or any other alternative. Therefore, no significant impacts to ESA-\nlisted salmon species are presently expected from groundfish fisheries.\nWestern Alaska stocks of chinook salmon and chum salmon are currently depressed. During the summer of\n2000 there were closures of commercial, recreational, and subsistence fishing for chinook salmon and chum\nsalmon in the Yukon and Kuskokwim river systems, resulting in a federal disaster declaration. It is possible that\nescapement goals will not be met for 2000. Information on stock composition in open ocean fisheries indicates\nthat a high proportion of chinook salmon bycatch (58 to 70 percent) and a smaller proportion of chum salmon\nbycatch (19 percent) in BSAI groundfish fisheries may originate from western Alaska stocks. The proportion\nof GOA chum and chinook salmon bycatch that is of western Alaskan origin is currently unknown.\nUnder status quo FMP management (1980 to 1999), the historical catches of western Alaska chinook salmon\ntaken as bycatch in the BSAI groundfish fisheries may have been substantial, the equivalent of up to 10 to 25\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-111","percent of recent directed chinook salmon fishery landings for these stocks. The Council has taken steps to\nreduce impacts on western Alaska stocks (NMFS 1999) and the final rule, with reduced bycatch action levels\nand increased seasonal closures, was scheduled for implementation later in 2000. While the simulation model\nresults do not reflect this management action, chinook salmon bycatch in the BSAI, and therefore any impacts\nto western Alaska stocks, are expected to be reduced as a result of this action. However, it is not possible to\npredict the magnitude of this reduction, thus it is difficult to predict whether any significant benefits to western\nAlaska stocks would result in the future. Updated information on salmon stock composition of BSAI and GOA\ngroundfish bycatch would be necessary to make that determination. New stock identification studies on salmon\nbycatch are needed to refine salmon stock composition data in BSAI and GOA groundfish fisheries. The only\nalternative predicted to decrease the bycatch of chinook salmon (and therefore western Alaska chinook salmon)\nsubstantially to a point at which impacts might not be significant is Alternative 2.2, which would reduce pollock\nand cod fisheries dramatically.\nIn contrast to chinook salmon, better stock identification information is available for chum salmon caught as\nbycatch in BSAI groundfish fisheries. According to this information, estimated BSAI bycatch of western Alaska\nchum salmon is low (less than 2 percent) relative to recently observed western Alaska directed fishery catches,\nand all estimated chum salmon bycatch in the GOA is extremely small (less than 1 percent) compared to western\nAlaska directed chum salmon catches. If the stock composition information is correct, the impacts to western\nAlaska chum salmon from bycatch in groundfish fisheries are likely to be insignificant.\nSome examples of indirect impacts from groundfish fisheries to salmon species would be destruction of\nspawning habitat, disruption of spawning aggregations, competition for prey, or disruption of food sources used\nby salmon. Since, groundfish fisheries take place at sea and not in freshwater spawning habitat, there are no\nsignificant impacts on salmon spawning habitat as a result of these fisheries. Salmon prey on zooplankton and\nforage fish (sand lance, capelin, herring) while at sea. Bycatch of these salmon prey items in groundfish\nfisheries ranges from low (forage fish) to none (zooplankton), SO competition for prey between groundfish\nfisheries and salmon is not significant. Groundfish trawl fisheries often catch jellyfish and other soft-bodied\npelagic organisms that are eaten both by juvenile and adult chum salmon. However, whether this has any effect\non these salmon at sea is not known at this time.\nOne possible indirect impact of groundfish fisheries on salmon at sea could be shifts in population abundance,\nconcentrations, or locations of prey items on which juvenile and adult salmon feed or on predators that feed on\nsalmon. Again, these effects, if any, are unknown and are presumed to be insignificant.\n4.6.3.5\nEvaluation of the Significance of Status Quo Management on Prohibited Species\nIn this section, the predicted impacts of groundfish fishery management on prohibited species are ranked. First,\nthe predicted effects of status quo management on prohibited species are ranked, including evaluation of the\nsignificance of the effects of Alternative 1 (Table 4.6-28). The pertinent question in each case is whether\nmanagement objectives would be met to prevent overfishing, maintain healthy stocks, and rebuild depressed\nstocks of non-target species.\nThe ratings to assess the impacts of status quo on prohibited species groups are as follows:\nNS - no significant impact, assigned when there is evidence that status quo does not affect the\nsustainability of the stock.\nCS(+) - conditionally significant positive impact, assigned when there is some evidence and/or some\nuncertainty about evidence of a gain in population sustainability due to this alternative.\nCS(-) - conditionally significant adverse impact, assigned when there is some evidence and/or some\nuncertainty about evidence of loss of population sustainability due to this alternative.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-112","S(+) - significant positive impact, assigned when there is conclusive evidence of a gain in stock\nsustainability due to this alternative.\nS(-) - significant adverse impact, assigned when there is conclusive evidence of loss of stock\nsustainability due to this alternative.\nU - unknown impact, assigned when there is no information to evaluate the impact on the population.\nFor each alternative, a qualitative score is applied to the effects of catch, spatial and temporal concentrations\nof catch, spawning or other habitat disruption, and competition for prey. Table 4.6-29 provides the criteria for\nranking the alternative relative to Alternative 1. The scores applied below only reflect directional changes\nrelative to the status quo to examine differences among alternatives. The scores do not indicate higher or lower\nprobabilities of meeting the policy objectives. Scores for each effect are reported within each alternative and\nsummarized in a table for all prohibited species. Table 4.6-30 contains the ordinal index for each of several\ntypes of potential effects of each alternative relative to Alternative 1. The index is represented by the values {-2,\n-1, +0, +1, +2). An index value of +0 indicates that there is no expected change relative to Alternative 1. A\nnegative index value indicates that the impact of the alternative is expected to be worse than Alternative 1. A\npositive index value indicates that the impact of the alternative is expected to be better than Alternative 1. Since\nthe index values only contains ordinal information, they can only be used to make ordinal comparisons. For\nexample, an index value of +2 is better than a value of +1, but it is not true that a +2 is twice as good or twice\nas large as a +1. In short, index values are simply place holders that represent ordering. Therefore, it is not\npossible to obtain meaningful summary information by performing numerical operations (e.g., adding or\nsubtracting values) using two or more of the index values.\nTable 4.6-29 Criteria for Rating Alternatives Relative to Alternative 1 for Each Species\nScore\nEffect\nUnknown\n0\n1\n2\n-2\n-1\nDecreases 10\nDecreases\nnot\nIncreases 10\nWithin +10\nBycatch in\nIncreases\napplicable\npercent to 25\nover 25\npercent to 25\npercent of\ngroundfish\nover 25\nstatus quo\npercent\npercent\nfishery\npercent\npercent\nSubstantially\nMarginally\nnot\nSame\nSpatial and\nSubstantially\nMarginally\napplicable\nless spatial\nless spatial\namount of\ntemporal\nmore spatial\nmore spatial\nor temporal\nspatial and\nor temporal\nconcentration\nand temporal\nor temporal\nconcentration\ntemporal\nconcentration\nof bycatch\nconcentration\nconcentration\nconcentration\nSubstantially\nSpawning\nSame\nMarginally\nSpawning\nSubstantially\nMarginally\nhabitat of\nless\namount of\nless\nhabitat\nmore\nmore\nthe species\nspawning\nspawning\nspawning\ndisruption by\nspawning\nspawning\nis unknown\nhabitat\nhabitat\ngroundfish\nhabitat\nhabitat\nhabitat\ndisruption\ndisruption\ndisruption\ndisruption\nfishery\ndisruption\nPrey of the\nSame\nMarginally\nSubstantially\nSubstantially\nMarginally\nPrey\nspecies is\nless prey\namount of\nless prey\ncompetition\nmore prey\nmore prey\nunknown\n(10 to 25\n(more than\n(10 to 25\n(removal of\n(more than\nprey\npercent)\n25 percent)\n25 percent)\npercent)\n(+10 percent)\nprey species\nremoved by\nremoved by\nremoved by\nremoved by\nby groundfish\nremoved by\nfishery\nfishery\nfishery\nfishery\nfishery)\nfishery\nGiven uncertainty in model estimates of catch, the following ranges are defined to assess differences (Table 4.6-\n29):\nNo change from status quo (alternative catch within -10 to 10 percent of catch from Alternative 1)\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-113","Minor to moderate change from status quo (less than 25 percent change from Alternative 1)\nSignificant change from status quo (more than 25 percent change from Alternative 1)\nOnly one alternative is specifically designed to address the spatial and temporal concentration of the catch in\ntarget groundfish fisheries (both versions of Alternative 2), which might alter the patterns for bycatch. Other\nalternatives address the issue less directly, but differences between alternatives can still be judged. All else being\nequal, spatial and temporal concentration of bycatch would be expected to change relative to the status quo\nconcentration of bycatch if areas or seasons were closed or opened and TACs for target species were not\nadjusted proportionally.\nTo assess the effects of the alternatives on temporal and spatial concentrations of bycatch of prohibited species,\nwhich fisheries catch the bycatch species in question was determined; then followed by what alternatives would\nclose areas and or seasons, and whether any of them would increase TAC, decrease TAC, or leave TAC at\ncurrent levels. Each alternative would display marginally different spatial and temporal concentration of\nbycatch. It is assumed that alternatives that concentrate groundfish fishing in both time and space would be\nmore likely to result in concentration of bycatch of prohibited species (depending on time, area, gear type, and\nspecies in question). The effects of concentrated bycatch in time and space may be exacerbated by increases\nin groundfishTAG should such increases be an element of a particular alternative (Alternative 3 for example)\nand thus receive a negative score (e.g., -1 or -2). Similarly, such effects of concentrated bycatch could be\nreduced and receive a positive score (e.g., +1 or +2) if the alternative were to result in decreases in TAC below\ncurrent levels. Alternatives which close areas but attempt to reduce TAC proportionally are assumed to result\nin the same amount of spatial and temporal concentration of bycatch as Alternative 1 and would be scored +0.\nTable 4.6-30 Summary of the Effects on Prohibited Species of Each Alternative Relative to\nAlternative 1\nSpecies, Species Group,\nRankings by Alternative\nFMP Area, Effects\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nPacific halibut, all areas\nCatch relative to status quo\n0\n1\n2\n0\n0\n0\n1\n0\n-2\nSpatial and temporal concentration\n0\n1\n1\n-2\n0\n0\n0\n1\n-1\nSpawning habitat disruption\n0\n-1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n1\n0\n0\nPrey competition\n0\n2\n2\n1\n0\n1\n0\n0\n-2\nRed king crab, BSAI\nCatch relative to status quo\n0\n0\n2\n-2\n0\n0\n-1\n-2\n-2\nSpatial and temporal concentration\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nSpawning habitat disruption\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrey competition\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nRed king crab, GOA\nCatch relative to status quo\n0\n0\n1\n-1\n0\n0\n-2\n0\n-2\nSpatial and temporal concentration\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nSpawning habitat disruption\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrey competition\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nOther king crab, BSAI\nCatch relative to status quo\n0\n1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n-1\n1\n-1\nSpatial and temporal concentration\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nSpawning habitat disruption\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nPrey competition\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.6-114","(Cont.)\nTable\nto\nAlternative\nSpecies,\nSpecies\nRankings\nGroup,\nby\nEffects\nFMP\nArea,\n2.1\n2.2\n4.1\n4.2\n6.1\n6.2\n1\n3\n5\nOther\nking\ncrab,\nrelative\nCatch\nstatus\nto\nquo\n0\n0\n1\n1\n0\n0\n2\n0\n-1\nconcentration\ntemporal\nSpatial\nand\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nSpawning\ndisruption\nhabitat\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\ncompetition\nPrey\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nBairdi\nTanner\ncrab,\nBSAI\nCatch\nrelative\nstatus\n-2\n-2\nto\nquo\n0\n0\n2\n0\n0\n0\n0\nconcentration\nSpatial\ntemporal\nand\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nSpawning\ndisruption\nhabitat\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\ncompetition\nPrey\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nBairdi\nTanner\ncrab,\nGOA\nCatch\nrelative\nstatus\n-2\nto\nquo\n0\n1\n2\n0\n0\n0\n-2\n1\nconcentration\ntemporal\nSpatial\nand\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nSpawning\ndisruption\nhabitat\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\ncompetition\nPrey\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nOther\nTanner\nBSAI\ncrab,\nCatch\nrelative\nstatus\n-1\nto\nquo\n0\n0\n2\n-1\n0\n0\n0\n0\nconcentration\ntemporal\nSpatial\nand\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nSpawning\ndisruption\nhabitat\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\ncompetition\nPrey\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nOther\nTanner\ncrab,\nCatch\nrelative\nto\nquo\n0\n1\n2\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n-2\nconcentration\ntemporal\nSpatial\nand\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nSpawning\ndisruption\nhabitat\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\ncompetition\nPrey\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPacific\nherring,\nBSAI*\nCatch\nrelative\nstatus\n-1\nto\nquo\n0\n1\n2\n1\n1\n1\n0\n1\nconcentration\ntemporal\nSpatial\nand\n0\n1\n2\n-1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nSpawning\ndisruption\nhabitat\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrey\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n*GOA\nunder\nall\nalternatives\nrate\nthem\nChinook\nsalmon,\nBSAI\nrelative\nCatch\nstatus\n-1\nto\nquo\n0\n2\n2\n1\n1\n1\n0\n1\nconcentration\ntemporal\nSpatial\nand\n-1\n0\n2\n2\n1\n1\n0\n1\n-1\nSpawning\ndisruption\nhabitat\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\ncompetition\nPrey\n-1\n0\n1\n2\n0\n1\n1\n0\n1\nChinook\nsalmon,\nrelative\n-2\nto\n0\n2\n2\n1\n0\n0\n0\n1\nconcentration\nSpatial\ntemporal\nand\n0\n2\n2\n-1\n0\n0\n0\n1\n-1\ndisruption\nSpawning\nhabitat\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\ncompetition\nPrey\n0\n2\n2\n1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n-1\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-115","Species, Species Group,\nRankings by Alternative\nFMP Area, Effects\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nOther salmon (chum), BSAI\nCatch relative to status quo\n0\n1\n2\n1\n1\n1\n0\n1\n-1\nSpatial and temporal concentration\n0\n2\n2\n-1\n0\n0\n0\n1\n-1\nSpawning habitat disruption\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrey competition\n0\n1\n2\n0\n1\n1\n0\n1\n-1\nOther salmon, GOA\nCatch relative to status quo\n0\n2\n2\n1\n0\n0\n0\n1\n-2\nSpatial and temporal concentration\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nSpawning habitat disruption\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrey competition\n0\n1\n2\n0\n1\n1\n0\n1\n-1\nA similar rationale might be applied to judge relative effects on spawning habitat, if it is known. The\ncombination of gear types and closed areas proposed by an alternative might result in marginally more or less\nprotection for spawning habitat, depending on the location of the closed areas in relation to spawning habitat.\nThe difference between marginal changes and substantial changes should be based on the amount of spawning\nhabitat protected or impacted relative to Alternative 1; small amounts would rate +1 where as large amounts\nwould rate a +2. The rationale for any score is justified in each of the impacts sections. If there is absolutely\nno information on spawning habitat, a \"U\" is assigned for unknown to all alternatives as a last resort.\nTo assess the effects of groundfish fisheries on prey competition, whether the catch of prey species changes\nunder the alternative using the information from the appropriate section is determined (e.g., if the bycatch\nspecies eats pollock, determine whether removals of pollock would increase or decrease under the particular\nalternative). If the prey of the species is not caught by the fishery, +0 is assigned to all alternatives (no change).\nPercent changes are all relative to status quo, as with comparisons of catch among alternatives. If there is\nabsolutely no information on what the bycatch species eats, a \"U\" is assigned to all alternatives.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.6-116","Effects of the Alternatives on Habitat, Including Essential Fish Habitat\n4.7\nSummary of the Current Regime with Regard to Habitat Management Policy\n4.7.1\nThis introductory section summarizes the historical development of current fisheries management in\nrelationship to habitat protection. Section 4.7 then analyzes the Alternative 1 fishery in terms of its impacts\non habitat and compares them to the expected effects of the other alternatives.\nEfforts to integrate habitat considerations into the fishery management process go back to passage of the\nFishery Conservation and Management Act (the Magnuson-Stevens Act) in 1976. The Magnuson-Stevens Act\nestablished eight regional fishery management councils and charged them to recommend management plans for\ncommercial and recreational fish species occurring in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) throughout\ntheir ranges. Some believed this directive gave the councils authority to consider fishery-related habitat issues\nnearshore and further inland, even though it is the states that have responsibility for managing fisheries within\nconditions. 1 Although some efforts were made to address significant fishery\nthe\nterritorial\nunder\nmost\nsea\nhabitat issues, the councils and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) concentrated largely on ocean\nharvest during the first decade under the Magnuson-Stevens Act.\nA chronology of management measures taken by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (the Council)\nover the years with the primary intent or secondary effect of protecting habitat, is shown in Table 4.7-1.\nIn 1983, NMFS adopted a National Habitat Conservation Policy, uniting its Magnuson-Stevens Act authority\nwith its advisory responsibilities and authority under the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (FWCA) and the\nNational Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The Habitat Conservation Policy provided guidance to the agency\nregarding its interactions with the councils and other federal and state agencies. It also focused NMFS's habitat\nconservation efforts on specific habitat problems affecting fishery resources, marine mammals, and endangered\nmarine species. Although the new NMFS policy alerted other agencies and the councils to NMFS's intent, it\ndid not clarify the councils' role regarding fishery-related habitat issues. The NMFS habitat policy was\nincorporated into the agency's Alaska Region fishery management plans (FMPs) through Bering Sea and\nAleutian Islands (BSAI) Amendment 9 and Gulf of Alaska (GOA) Amendment 14.\nIn 1986, Congress amended the Magnuson-Stevens Act, essentially codifying elements of the NMFS Habitat\nConservation Policy and giving the regional councils new authority and responsibility to include \"readily\navailable\" habitat information in all fishery management plans. The amendments direct the regional councils,\nwith guidance from NMFS, to evaluate the effect that changes in habitat could have on managed fisheries.\nAdditionally, the 1986 amendments gave the councils the opportunity to recommend habitat management\nmeasures for ongoing and proposed federal or state activities that could adversely affect fishery resources under\na regional council's management authority. Federal agencies were required to respond specifically and\nsubstantively to the regional council's recommendations.\n1 For exceptions, see Magnuson-Stevens Act, Public Law 94-265, Section 306 (b).\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-1","Table 4.7-1 Chronology of Management Measures to Protect Habitat under the Bering Sea and Aleutian\nIsland, and Gulf of Alaska Groundfish Fishery Management Plans\nYear\nRegulation\n1978\nGOA groundfish FMP implemented with descriptions of fish habitat, gear restrictions, and area\nclosures to foreign fishing.\n1982\nBSAI groundfish FMP implemented with descriptions of fish habitat, gear restrictions and several no-\ntrawl zones.\n1983\nNMFS adopts a National Habitat Conservation Policy.\n1985\nIntentional discarding of fishing gear and debris prohibited.\n1986\nMagnuson-Stevens Act amended to give councils authority to take action to protect habitat from\nfishing impacts and recommend other habitat protection measures. NMFS habitat policy added to\nFMPs (BSAI-9, GOA-14)\n1987\nTrawling prohibited year-round in red king crab habitat, Area 512 in central Bristol Bay (BSAI-10).\nTrawl closure areas implemented around Kodiak Island to protect juvenile red king crab habitat (GOA-\n15).\n1988\nCouncil adopts its habitat protection policy\n1989\nTrawling prohibited in Area 516 during molting period for red king crabs (BSAI-12a).\n1990\nKodiak trawl closures extended (GOA-18).\n1993\nKodiak no-trawl zones made permanent (GOA-26).\nPribilof Islands Habitat Conservation Area established to protect juvenile red king crab habitat (BSAI-\n1995\n21a). Bottom trawling prohibited in Red King Crab Savings Area, established by emergency rule.\nNearshore Bristol Bay closed to all trawling year-round (BSAI-37). Red King Crab Savings Area\n1997\npermanently established as year-round trawl closure area (BSAI-37).\n1998\nAll trawling prohibited in the eastern GOA (GOA-41).\nEFH is defined for groundfish and other FMP species (BSAI-55, GOA-55).\n1999\nNonpelagic (bottom) trawls prohibited in BSAI pollock fisheries (BSAI-57). The Sitka Pinnacles Marine\n2000\nReserve is implemented (GOA-59 expected). HAPC biota is assigned to the prohibited species\ncategory, and a proposal to prohibit commercial harvest of corals and sponges is adopted by the\nCouncil (proposed BSAI-65 and GOA-65). Analysis conducted of a proposal to prohibit nonpelagic\ntrawling in Cook Inlet, to protect crab habitat.\nNotes: amendment numbers are cited where appropriate.\nBSAI - Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nGOA - Gulf of Alaska\nEFH - essential fish habitat\nFMP - fisheries management plan\nIn September 1988, the Council adopted the following policy statement, along with guidelines for carrying it\nout:\nThe Council shall assume an aggressive role in the protection and enhancement of habitats important to\nmarine and anadromous fishery resources. It shall actively enter Federal decision-making processes\nwhere proposed actions may otherwise compromise the productivity of fishery resources of concern to the\nCouncil. Recognizing that all species are dependent on the quantity and quality of their essential\nhabitats, it is the policy of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council to:\nConserve, restore, and maintain habitats upon which commercial, recreational and subsistence marine\nfisheries depend, to increase their extent and to improve their productive capacity for the benefit of\npresent and future generations. (For purposes of this policy, habitat is defined to include all those things\nphysical, chemical, and biological that are necessary to the productivity of the species being managed.)\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-2","This policy shall be supported by three policy objectives which are to:\n(1) Maintain the current quantity and productive capacity of habitats supporting important commercial,\nrecreational and subsistence fisheries, including their food base. (This objective will be implemented\nusing a guiding principle of no net habitat loss caused by human activities.)\n(2) Restore and rehabilitate the productive capacity of habitats which have already been degraded by\nhuman activities.\n(3) Maintain productive natural habitats where increased fishery productivity will benefit society.\nIn light of these three habitat policies, the Council and NMFS enacted certain measures, which were designed,\nat least in part, to protect habitat from potential negative impacts from the groundfish fisheries. These\nmeasures include gear restrictions, time and area closures, and harvest restrictions. Of these three measures,\nthe most widely used is closure of areas to certain gear types. A chronology of these closures is provided in\nTable 4.7-2.\nIn 1996, the Magnuson-Stevens Act was amended to include additional provisions for habitat protection. The\nMagnuson-Stevens Act defined essential fish habitat (EFH), as \"those waters and substrate necessary to fish\nfor spawning breeding, feeding, or growth to maturity,\" and required councils to \"define and identify EFH\" for\nits managed fisheries, and \"to minimize to the extent practicable adverse effects on such habitat caused by\nfishing, and identify other actions to encourage the conservation and enhancement of such habitat.\" In June\n1998, the Council adopted five amendments intended to comply with the new EFH requirements:\n1. Amendment 55 to the FMP for the groundfish fishery of the BSAI.\n2. Amendment 55 to the FMP for groundfish fishery of the GOA.\n3. Amendment 8 to the FMP for the commercial king and Tanner crab fisheries in the BSAI.\n4. Amendment 5 to the FMP for scallop fisheries off Alaska.\n5. Amendment 5 to the FMP for the salmon fisheries in the EEZ off Alaska.\nThese amendments were approved by the Secretary of Commerce on January 20, 1999 (64 FR 29216).\nThe amendments defined EFH on the basis of general distribution, as all habitat within a general distribution\nfor a species life stage, for all information levels and under all stock conditions. They also started to identify\nhabitat areas of particular concern (HAPC) using the criteria set our by the Interim Final Rule on EFH 62\nFR 66531 December 19, 1998) (ecological importance, sensitivity, exposure, and rarity of the habitat). More\ninformation on this process and on the HAPC types and areas identified in the EFH amendments is available\nin Section 2.8.\nManagement measures intended to protect habitat, as of September 2000, are described in the subsections that\nfollow.\n4.7.1.1 Fishing Equipment Restrictions\nSeasonal and areal restrictions on the use of specified equipment\nMany gear types and fisheries are prohibited seasonally or in some areas. Trawl fisheries are closed by\nregulation from January 1 to January 20 (BSAI Amendment 19, GOA Amendment 24). Longline fisheries for\nhalibut and sablefish are prohibited from January 1 to March 15. Nonpelagic trawl (e.g., bottom trawl) gear\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-3","has been prohibited in the directed pollock fishery in the BSAI (BSAI Amendment 57). See Section 4.7.1.3 for\nmore information on seasonal restrictions.\nEquipment modifications to allow escapement of particular species or life stages (e.g., juveniles)\nPots used to harvest groundfish are required to have a minimum mesh size or rings, to reduce the capture of\njuvenile and female crabs (BSAI Amendment 16, GOA Amendment 21). Escape panels have been used for\ntrawl gear to reduce capture of halibut and pollock (John Gauvin, Groundfish Forum, personal\ncommunication). Although a proposal for trawl mesh restrictions was evaluated several years ago, it was not\nimplemented due to enforcement difficulties and other concerns. Recent research suggests that because many\npollock escaping from trawls may have delayed mortality (Alaska Fisheries Development Foundation 1999),\na regulation specifying a minimum mesh size may be counterproductive.\nProhibitions on anchoring or setting equipment in sensitive areas\nNo anchoring (or fishing) by vessels holding a Federal fisheries permit or by vessels engaged in commercial\nor sport halibut fishing is allowed in a 2.5 nm2 area surrounding the pinnacles off Cape Edgecumbe (GOA\nAmendment 59). Other sensitive areas have been closed to trawling to protect habitat from potential adverse\neffects (Section 4.7.1.3).\nProhibitions on fishing activities that cause significant physical damage to habitat\nMany fishing methods (including chemicals, explosives, hydraulic dredges, bottom gillnets, etc.) have been\nprohibited to protect habitat from physical damage. By regulation, only specified gear types (pot, longline,\ntrawl, jig) may be used.\n4.7.1.2 Prohibited Species\nCatch of prohibited species, including any species of Pacific salmon, steelhead trout, Pacific halibut, Pacific\nherring, king crab, and Tanner crab, must be minimized and all such catch (with certain exceptions) must be\nreturned to the sea immediately with a minimum of injury. Catch allowances of these species are set in\nregulations for each fishery and gear type, and fisheries are closed when the allowances are reached.\nAmendments 65/65 to the groundfish FMPs were adopted by the Council in April 2000. These amendments\nif approved by the Secretary of Commerce, will add corals and sponges, which provide structural habitat for\nfishes to a new category of prohibited species. Corals and sponges are a deep water living substrate identified\nas a type if HAPC in the EFH amendments. They are the subject of large-scale commercial fisheries elsewhere\nin the world, and are also subject to damage from some kinds of fishing gear. The Council action would\nprohibit the sale, barter, trade, and processing of corals and sponges, but all on retention of these species.\nRetention of species currently included in the prohibited species category including Pacific salmon, steelhead\ntrout, Pacific halibut, Pacific herring, king crab, and Tanner crab is not allowed. Amendments 65/65 are\nintended as Part One of a process of developing HAPC amendments. The second part will involve developing\na more comprehensive and interactive process for HAPC indentification.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-4","Time-Series of Groundfish Trawl Closure Areas in the Bering Sea and Aleutian\nTable 4.7-2\nIslands and Gulf of Alaska, 1995-1999\nYear\nLocation\nSeason\nArea Size\nNotes\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands\n8,000 nm2\nClosure in place since 1987\n1995\nArea 512\nYear-round\n4,000 nm2\nClosure in place since 1987\nArea 516\n3/15-6/15\n5,000 nm2\nRe-closed if 42,000 chum salmon bycaught\nChum Salmon Savings\n8/1-8/31\nArea\n9,000 nm2\nClosed if 48,000 chinook salmon bycaught\nChinook Salmon\nTrigger\nSavings Area\n30,000 nm2\nClosed to specified fisheries when trigger\nHerring Savings Area\nTrigger\nreached\n30,000 nm2\nClosed to specified fisheries when trigger\n1995\nZone 1\nTrigger\nreached\n50,000 nm2\nClosed to specified fisheries when trigger\nZone 2\nTrigger\nreached\n7,000 nm2\nEstablished in 1995\nPribilof Islands\nYear-round\n4,000 nm2\nEstablished in 1995; pelagic trawling allowed\nRed King Crab Savings\nYear-round\nArea\n900 nm2\n12-mile no-fishing zones around 3 haulouts\nWalrus Islands\n5/1-9/30\n5,800 nm2\n10-mile no-trawl zones around 27 rookeries\nSteller Sea Lion\nYear-round\nRookeries\n5,100 nm2\n20-mile extensions around 8 rookeries\nSteller Sea Lion\nSeasonal ext.\nRookeries\n1996 same closures in effect as in 1995\n1997 same closures in effect as in 1995 and 1996, with two additions:\nNotes\nLocation\nSeason\nArea size\n19,000 nm2\nExpanded area 512 closure\nBristol Bay\nYear-round\n90,000 nm2\nClosed to specified fisheries when trigger\nOpilio Tanner Crab\nTrigger\nBycatch Limitaion Zone\nreached\n1998 same closures in effect as in 1995, 1996, and 1997.\n1999 Additional closures to protect Steller sea lion critical habitat.\n2000 Additional closures to protect Steller sea lion critical habitat.\nGulf of Alaska\nYear\nLocation\nSeason\nArea size\nNotes\n1,000 nm2\nClosures in place since 1987\n1995\nKodiak\nYear-round\n500 nm2\nClosures in place since 1987\nKodiak\n2/15-6/15\n3,000 nm2\n10-mile no-trawl zones around 14 rookeries\nSteller Sea Lion\nYear-round\nRookeries\n1,900 nm2\n20-mile extensions around 3 rookeries\nSteller Sea Lion\nSeasonal ext.\nRookeries\n1996 and 1997 same closures in effect as in 1995\n1998 same closures in effect as in 1995, 1996, and 1997, with one addition:\nNotes\nLocation\nSeason\nArea size\n52,600 nm2\nAdopted as part of license limitation program\nAlternative Alaska\nYear-round\n1999 Additional closures to protect Steller sea lion critical habitat\n2000 A 2.5 nm2 closure to all fishing (with exception of salmon) in Sitka Pinnacles Marine Reserve off Cape\nEdgecumbe\nProposed: A 7,000 nm2 closure to bottom trawling in Cook Inlet\nNotes: nm2 - square nautical mile\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-5","4.7.1.3 Time and Area Closures\nSeasonal Closures\nSeasonal closures have been primarily adopted to reduce the impacts of fisheries on prohibited species and\nmarine mammals. Seasonal time and area closures also provide added protection to the habitat within the\nclosure area.\nThe Chum Salmon Savings Area was established to limit the amount of chum salmon that can be taken\nincidentally by trawl gear (BSAI Amendment 35). This hotspot area is closed during the month of\nAugust, and remains closed if a trigger is reached. The area encompasses about 5,000 nm2.\nThe Chinook Salmon Savings Areas were designated based on high bycatch rates of chinook salmon\ntaken in the pollock fishery. The total area encompasses about 9,000 nm2. The areas were first\nestablished in 1995 (BSAI Amendment 21b), then later modified when the bycatch limit was reduced\nin 1999 (BSAI Amendment 58). The trigger limit is scheduled to be reduced as follows: 48,000\nsalmon in 1999 41,000 in 2000, 37,000 in 2001, 33,000 in 2002, and 29,000 in 2003. Accounting\nfor the cap begins January 1 and continues year-round Non-pollock fisheries are exempt from the\nclosure, and those fisheries' chinook prohibited species catch (PSC) bycatch is not counted toward the\ncap because observer data have shown that few chinook salmon are taken by this fishery.\nThree Herring Savings Areas were established to limit the amount of herring taken as bycatch in trawl\nfisheries (BSAI Amendment 16a). Two of these areas are closed in the summer months, and one in\nthe winter. These areas were established based on seasonal abundance of herring in given areas.\nTogether, the herring savings areas encompass about 30,000 nm2.\nTwo bycatch limitation zones were established to limit the amount of Tanner crab taken incidentally\nin trawl fisheries. These zones were first established under BSAI Amendment 10, then modified under\nAmendment 12a. Each zone is closed to trawling in designated target fisheries when a specified\namount of bycatch is taken in those fisheries. Tanner crab bycatch zones encompass about 80,000\nnm2.\nThe year-round closure of Area 512 (BSAI Amendment 10, 1987) was extended to Area 516 with a\nseasonal closure (BSAI Amendment 12a, 1989) in order to protect red king crabs from trawls when\nthe crabs are molting. Area 516 encompasses about 4,000 nm2.\nThe Opilio Tanner crab bycatch limitation zone is closed when a limited amount of these crabs is\ntaken incidentally in specified trawl fisheries (BSAI Amendment 40). This area encompasses about\n90,000 nm2.\nDuring the summer months, all fishing vessels are prohibited within 12 nm of the three major Pacific\nwalrus haulouts in Bristol Bay (BSAI Amendment 17).\nOn July 19, 2000, all trawl fishing was enjoined by court order within Steller sea lion critical habitat\narea (as defined in 50 CFR 226.202) in the BSAI and the GOA west of 144°W, pending development\nof a comprehensive biological assessment. Before this order, a complex set of seasonal and area\nclosures was already in place to reduce the interactions of pollock fisheries and sea lions.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-6","4.7.1.4 Year-round Closure Areas\nYear-round closure areas have been established to protect habitat, reduce bycatch, and reduce competition with\nmarine mammals (Figure 4.7-1). These closure areas may be considered marine protected areas under common\nusage, in that the habitat is protected from trawl gear impacts. However, the National Research Council has\nadopted a narrower definition (National Research Council 1999c), under which a marine protected area is \"a\nspatially defined area in which all populations are free of exploitation.\" Under that definition, none of these\nclosure areas would entirely qualify.\nThe nearshore Bristol Bay closure area encompasses 19,000 nm2 (BSAI Amendment 37). This area\nmeets all HAPC criteria in that it is contains rare habitat types (bryozoans and other living substrates);\nit is important ecologically, that is, the ecosystem for young-of-the-year red king crab survival\nstructure is necessary for young-of-the-year red king crab survival (McMurray et al. 1984, Rounds\net al. 1989, Rodin 1989); and it is a habitat type thought to be vulnerable and highly sensitive to\nfishing gear damage (Auster and Langton 1999). The closure area also encompasses areas where red\nking crab pod, a behavior that occurs when the crabs grow and move away from the epifaunal\nstructure (Dew 1990). For a review of how this area was evaluated as a marine protected area, refer\nto Ackley and Witherell (1999).\nThe Pribilof Islands Habitat Conservation Area encompasses 7,000 nm2 (BSAI Amendment 21a).\nThis area meets all HAPC criteria in that it contains rare habitat types (shell hash); it is important\necologically, and it is needed for juvenile blue king crab survival (Armstrong et al. 1985); and it is\nvulnerable to damage from bottom trawls via crushing, burying, and siltation. Other gear types\nprobably do not significantly alter or impact this habitat.\nThe Red King Crab Savings Area covers 4,000 nm2 2 (BSAI Amendment 37). This area does not meet\nall HAPC criteria, but contains a known concentration of adult red king crab. It contains primarily\na sand/silt substrate, which does not appear as sensitive to the impacts of fishing gear as some other\nsubstrates.\nThe southeast Alaska no-trawl area covers about 52,600 nm2. This area contains a vast amount of\ndeep water living substrates, including red tree coral. This closure was adopted as part of the license\nlimitation program (GOA Amendment 41).\nThe Sitka Pinnacles Marine Reserve covers 2.5 nm2 2 (GOA Amendment 59). It is an unusually\nproductive area that contains great concentrations of spawning lingcod and a variety of rockfish\nspecies, which find shelter in the algae and anemones along the rock walls. The Alaska Department\nof Fish and Game (ADF&G) and NMFS worked together to close the area to commercial fishing for\ngroundfish and halibut, or anchoring by groundfish or halibut vessels. Commercial and recreational\nsalmon fishing remains open.\nIn September, 2000, the Council approved Amendment 60, which if approved by the Secretary of\nCommerce will prohibit nonpelagic trawling in Cook Inlet. The purpose is to control crab bycatch\nmortality and protect crab habitat in an area that has depressed king and Tanner crab stocks. The\narea to be protected covers about 7,000 mm², including State waters, where consistent restrictions have\nbeen imposed by the Alaska Board of Fisheries.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-7","RUSSIA\nALASKA\nCANADA\n(U.S.)\nBERING SEA\n(Proposed)\n200m\nPinnacle\nClosure\nALEUTIAN ISLANDS\nGULF OF ALASKA\nFigure 4.7-1 Marine protected areas off Alaska where trawling is prohibited year-round to protect\nfish and crab habitat.\nThe red king crab protection zones around Kodiak Island were established under GOA Amendment\n26 to reduce crab bycatch and unobserved crab mortality, and, to a lesser extent, provide habitat\nprotection. Trawling is prohibited in some areas year-round, whereas other areas are closed on a\nseasonal basis. The year-round areas encompass about 1,000 nm2.\nYear-round closures to pollock trawling extending out to 10 nm have been implemented around 71\nSteller sea lion rookeries and haulouts (46 in GOA, and 25 in the BSAI; Figure 4.7-2). It is assumed\nthat one half of the total closed area indicated in the figure is comprised of land, resulting in\napproximately 22,000 nm2 of area covered by water being closed to trawling. These closures were\nimplemented by regulatory amendments in 1992: BSAI Amendment 20 and GOA Amendment 25.\nThe entire Aleutian Islands management area is closed to pollock fishing year-round to reduce\ninteractions of Steller sea lions and trawl fisheries targeting pollock.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-8","RUSSIA\nALASKA\nCANADA\n(U.S.)\nBERING SEA\n200m\nALEUTIAN ISLANDS\nGULF OF ALASKA\nFigure 4.7-2 Zones around Steller sea lion rookeries and haulouts where pollock trawling is\nprohibited to reduce competition for prey. The no-trawling zones were temporarily\nextended under court order in August 2000. Source: NMFS\n4.7.1.5 Summary\nAdequate habitat is essential for maintaining the productivity of fishery resources, and some species or life\nstages require particular habitats for food, reproduction, and shelter from predators. Numerous fishery\nregulations is implemented to protect benthic habitat in the North Pacific Ocean. The primary focus of these\nregulations is to prevent potential damage to vulnerable crab habitat from bottom trawl gear. In the Bering Sea,\nthree large areas were closed to groundfish trawling and scallop dredging to reduce potential adverse impacts\non king crabs and crab habitat. The shallow areas in particular contain complex living and non-living\nsubstrates, which are essential for juvenile crab survival and are considered to be very sensitive to bottom\ntrawling. In the GOA, several discrete trawl closure areas were established around Kodiak Island to reduce\ncrab bycatch, but also serve to protect crab habitat. A very large no-trawling area, containing extensive coral\ndistribution and other high relief habitat, was established off southeast Alaska. Fishing with all gear types has\nbeen prohibited in an area around two nearshore pinnacles identified as rare, vulnerable, and ecologically\nimportant habitat. A proposal to close Cook Inlet to bottom trawling was approved by the Council in\nSeptember 2000 to protect that area's crab habitat. The protected areas comprise a relatively large portion of\nthe continental shelf. Three Bering Sea area closures specifically designed to protect benthic habitat together\nencompass about 30,000 nm2 (89,500 km ². Putting this in perspective, the area is more than twice the size\nof Georges Bank off the east coast of the United States. The GOA closures encompass about 47,000 nm2\n(140,200 km ²), but a vast majority (80 percent to 90 percent) of this area is off the continental shelf. A further\nanalysis of the extent of protected areas is contained in Section 4.7.2.1. Some marine scientists and\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-9","conservation groups (e.g., Agardy 1994, Lauck et al. 1998, Allison et al. 1998) have suggested that marine\nreserves should be at least 20 percent of available habitat in order to be effective. Most protected areas off\nAlaska allow fishing by gear other than trawl gear and may therefore not meet all criteria for \"marine protected\nareas.\" These closures to trawling do, however, approach the 20 percent threshold percentage.\n4.7.2\nImpacts of the Alternatives on Essential Fish Habitat\nIn this section, the effects of the Alternative 1 and the other alternatives on EFH are examined. EFH is defined\nin the Magnuson Stevens Act as those waters and substrate necessary to fish for spawning, breeding, feeding,\nor growth to maturity. In addition, provisions call for the description of measures for avoiding, mitigating, or\noffsetting impacts to EFH. Consistent with these provisions, this analysis focuses on the following question:\nDo the alternative management regimes, including Alternative 1, result in conditions that offer protection to\nand minimization of adverse impacts to EFH?\nAlternative 5, the regime specifically designed to protect EFH, is focused on management measures that would\nreduce adverse impacts to benthic EFH, wherever practical. Benthic EFH encompasses seafloor habitat that\nis generally believed to be at greater risk to the impacts of fishing than nonbenthic habitat in the water column,\nalthough EFH does encompass nonbenthic habitat in the water column. In Section 4.7.2.3, the reader is\nreferred to the appropriate sections that discuss elements of nonbenthic EFH.\nDuring development of Alternative 5, it was inferred from the literature that area restrictions to bottom\ntrawling, transferring catch of target species to fixed-gear or pelagic trawl gear, and closing specific areas with\nsensitive habitat to all fishing, would result in more protection to benthic EFH. In attempting to predict the\neffects of the alternative regimes on benthic EFH, this interference was adhered to. An important assumption\nhere is that the adverse impacts to benthic habitat caused by bottom trawl gear are greater per unit of fish\nharvested than for fixed-gear. This assumption is based on conventional knowledge, although it is recognized\nthat comparative scientific studies among different gear types have not been performed and that fixed-gear (pots\nand longlines) or pelagic trawl gear that come in contact with the seafloor can also disturb benthic EFH.\nHowever, most scientific studies of gear impacts have dealt with mobile gear such as beam trawls, otter trawls,\nand scallop dredges (Auster and Langton 1999, Jennings and Kaiser 1998, Hall 1999b) because these gears\nare recognized as having the greatest potential for contact and damage to the seafloor and associated biota.\nThe impacts of bottom trawling on benthic habitat are described in Section 3.2. In general, relative to unfished\nhabitat, areas fished with bottom trawls are expected to have reduced habitat complexity and species diversity\nand changes in species composition. The level of habitat complexity depends on the structural components of\nthe living and non-living benthic environment. Habitat complexity is reduced when epifauna that form\nstructures are removed or damaged. Sedimentary bedforms are smoothed, and infauna that forms burrows and\npits are removed. Worldwide studies of the effects of bottom trawling have generally found that trawling\nreduces habitat complexity (Auster and Langton 1999) and these findings have been confirmed by studies\nconducted in Alaska (Freese et al. 1999, McConnaughy et al. 2000). The extent of the impacts depends on\nfactors such as habitat type, natural disturbance, and the intensity and spatial distribution of bottom trawling.\nIt is important to note that specific impacts to habitat from different management regimes are very difficult to\npredict. In order to evaluate the effects of fishing on habitat features, detailed information on the distribution\nand abundance of habitat types, the life history of living substrates, and the natural disturbance regime would\nbe needed. This information is generally incomplete for Alaskan waters. Knowledge of how fishing effects\ndifferent habitat types under a variety of circumstances is also lacking, and it may never be possible to fully\nand quantitatively account for all factors involved in determining how an ecosystem will respond to fishing\nactivities. Given those caveats, this evaluation of impacts focuses on the quantifiable features of each\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-10","alternative, assuming a comparable level of fishing-induced habitat disturbance across all alternatives. Greater\nhabitat disturbance is expected with less habitat protection.\nThe effects of the alternatives on EFH are analyzed as follows: first, direct and indirect impacts of the\nAlternative 1 on EFH are examined; and second how the alternative regimes perform relative to Alternative\n1 are examined. The analysis is focused around two main issues pertaining to EFH: (1) habitat complexity and\n(2) minimization of adverse impacts. Habitat complexity is a fundamental feature of the benthic environment\nthat has been shown to be adversely impacted by fishing activity. Minimization of adverse impacts directly\nrelates to provisions in the Magnuson-Stevens Act to avoid, mitigate, or offset impacts to EFH. Within each\nmain issue the following key questions are addressed:\nRegarding habitat complexity\n- Is the alternative consistent with efforts to protect living substrates?\n- Is the alternative consistent with efforts to protect nonliving substrates?\nRegarding minimization of adverse impacts\n- Does the alternative result in protection to benthic biodiversity?\n4.7.2.1 Alternative 1\nAlternative 1 is mostly the result of management actions established prior to enactment of EFH provisions of\nthe Magnuson-Stevens Act. Most historical management actions that addressed habitat concerns focused on\nprotection of crab habitat. Recently, more consideration has been given to broader scope habitat issues that\nconsider groundfish habitat, due to the EFH provisions, which require the development of management\nmeasures to minimize, to the extent practicable, adverse impacts to EFH caused by fishing.\nThe model regime developed for Alternative 5 represents a focused approach to minimizing adverse impacts\nof fishing activities on EFH.\nTable 4.7-3 presents a summary of the effects of the status quo on EFH, rated in according to significance.\nThe following gives the rationale for the ratings.\nTable 4.7-3 Rating of Impacts to Essential Fish Habitat Under Alternative 1\nDirect Effects\nImpact Rating\nIssue\nCS (-)\nRemoval and damage to HAPC biota by bottom trawl gear\nHabitat complexity\nRemoval and damage to HAPC biota by fixed-gear\nCS (-)\nModification of nonliving substrates by bottom trawl gear\nNS\nModification of nonliving substrates by fixed-gear\nNS\nIndirect Effects\nCS (-)\nMinimization of adverse\nBenthic biodiversity\nNotes: HAPC - habitat areas of particular concern\nNS - not significant\nCS - conditionally significant impact (+/-)\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-11","Removal and Damage to Habitat Areas of Particular Concern Biota by Bottom Trawl Gear\nHabitat areas of particular concern include living substrates that provide high microhabitat complexity, which\nserves as cover for groundfish and other organisms. A detailed description of HAPC as related to EFH is\nprovided in Section 2.8.3. Four groups of organisms have been identified as HAPC in Alaska: coral, sponges,\nanemones, sea whips, and sea pens. Under Alternative 1, a specific protective measure for HAPC (Amendment\n65), which has been passed by the Council, will, if allowed by the Secretary of Commerce, prohibit the sale\nof gorgonian coral and sponges and makes HAPC biota prohibitive species. Under the status quo, a specific\nprotective measure for HAPC biota (Amendment 65), which has been passed by the Council, will, if approved\nby the Secretary of Commerce, categorize these as prohibited species that may not be sold, traded, bartered,\nor processed, but may be retained for personal use. Given that, in the past, gorgonian coral (mainly Primnoa)\nhas been harvested in Alaska for use as jewelry and that corals and sponges trade occurs worldwide, this\nmeasure should benefit these biota by preventing the development of a commercial fishery. Nevertheless, living\nsubstrate will still be inadvertently impacted through fishing activities.\nWith respect to groundfish fisheries that use bottom trawl gear, bycatch and unobserved damage and mortality\nto HAPC biota are rated as a conditionally significant adverse impact. This determination is based on mortality\nof HAPC biota that can be directly attributed to the bottom trawl groundfish fishery. However, information\nis not available to unequivocally determine whether or not this mortality constitutes significant damage to the\nHAPC component of EFH, and should be the subject of future research.\nDocumentation of localized depletions, changes in benthic community structure, and acute damage all indicate\nthat HAPC biota and other living substrates are directly impacted by bottom trawl fisheries (Freese et al. 1999,\nMcConaughey et al. 2000). Criteria to determine acceptable levels of mortality to HAPC biota have not been\nestablished. Such criteria would need to consider fishing induced mortality relative to such characteristics as\nnatural mortality, fecundity, abundance, and growth rates. Many of the deep water areas that HAPC biota\ninhabit are characterized as stable environments dominated by long-lived species. In such areas the impacts\nof fishing can be substantial and long term (Auster and Langton, 1999). Species such as red tree coral\n(Primnoa) are very long lived (more than 100 years old), and would therefore not easily recover if damaged\nby bottom trawls (Risk et al. 1998; Andrews et al. 1999, Krieger and Wing 2000).\nThe only quantifiable measure of the expected impact to such HAPC biota are estimates of the bycatch of living\nsubstrates derived from the bycatch projection model described in Section 4.1.6. Observer data from 1997 to\n1999 provides information to estimate the bycatch of these organisms in the BSAI and GOA groundfish\nfisheries (Tables 4.7-4 and 4.7-5). These data provide documentation that HAPC biota are taken in the\nfisheries. The projected bycatch by trawl gear for 2001-2005 of corals, anemones, sponges, and sea pens\nand sea whips under Alternative 1 is shown for the BSAI and the GOA in Tables 4.7-6 and 4.7-7 In the\nBSAI, 137 mt of coral, 293 mt of anemones, 1,756 mt of sponges, and 3 mt of sea whips and sea pens would\nbe caught by bottom trawls. In the GOA the bycatch would be smaller, 25 mt of coral, 61 mt of anemones,\n24 mt of sponges, and 5 mt of sea pens. There is also unobserved mortality and damage to HAPC biota that\nwould not be reflected as bycatch (Freese et al. 1999, Krieger and Wing 2000). Assuming that most bycatch\nHAPC biota die, then observed bycatch is a minimum estimate of fishing-induced mortality.\nTo know whether removals at the levels indicated in the previous paragraph would affect the productivity of\nFMP species, would require detailed knowledge of the role benthic organisms play in life histories of target\nspecies and the ecosystem. Such information is not available and not easily determined, particularly in a\nmarine environment such as the North Pacific Ocean.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-12","Removal and Damage to Habitat Areas of Particular Concern Biota by Fixed-gear\nAs with fisheries that use bottom trawl gear, bycatch and unobserved damage and mortality to HAPC biota\ncaused by fixed-gear (pots and longlines) are rated as a conditionally significant adverse impact. This rating\nis justified by a similar rationale given for bottom trawl gear. Mortality and damage to HAPC biota can be\ndirectly attributed to fixed-gear fisheries, yet information is not available to unequivocally determine whether\nor not this mortality would constitute substantial damage to the HAPC component of EFH. Longline and pot\ngear can damage HAPC biota by hooking, crushing, and plowing. Pots and longline groundlines being\nretrieved from the bottom can shear sessile organisms. Our assumption is that fixed-gear has less impact on\nHAPC biota than mobile gear, such as bottom trawls. However, in some cases, fixed-gear may have a greater\nimpact due to its ability to be more easily fished on a wider range of habitat types, such as rougher substrates\n(e.g., boulders with coral) than mobile gear.\nThe projected total 2001-2005 bycatch by fixed-gear of HAPC biota under Alternative 1 is shown for the\nBSAI and the GOA in Tables 4.7-6 and 4.7-7. In the BSAI, 42 mt of coral, 303 mt of anemones, 396 mt of\nsponges, and 9 mt of sea pens and sea whips would be caught with fixed-gear. In the GOA, the fixed-gear\nbycatch would be 1 mt of coral, 27 mt of anemones, 9 mt of sponges, and 4 mt of sea pens and sea whips.\nModification of Nonliving Substrates by Bottom Trawl Gear\nThe modification of nonliving substrates by bottom trawl gear is rated as a nonsignificant impact. Nonliving\nsubstrates such as boulders, cobbles and sandwaves can be disturbed by bottom trawls (Auster and Langton\n1999). For example, gear can overturn boulders and cobbles and smooth sandwaves. In addition, boulder\npiles could be dispersed, thus reducing the number of crevices. In most cases the structural integrity, and hence\nthe complexity of the habitat would not be greatly reduced. When nonliving substrates are disturbed, however,\nthe organisms living on them may die or be damaged (this effect is addressed under the previous subsection,\n\"Removal and Damage to HAPC Biota from Bottom Trawl Gear\").\nModification of Nonliving Substrates by Fixed-Gear\nThe modification of nonliving substrates by fixed-gear is rated as a nonsignificant impact. This rating is\njustified by a rationale identical to that for bottom trawl gear (addressed in the previous paragraph).\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.7-13","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATICSEIS\nSponge\n0.0000\n0.3549\n0.0000\n0.0353\n0.0299\n1.1935\n0.0001\n0.8776\n0.0298\n0.4392\n7.6210\n0.0330\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.7507\n0.5558\n8.8228\n0.4056\n0.0035\n0.0000\n0.0209\n0.7717\n0.0215\nTable 4.7-4 Average Bycatch and Bycatch Rates of Habitat Areas of Particular Concern Biota, in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands,\nBycatch Rate (kg/mt Target)\nSeawhip/\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0022\n0.0002\n0.0000\n0.0261\n0.0037\n0.0004\n0.0001\n0.0016\n0.0000\n0.0915\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0025\n0.0285\n0.0003\n0.0000\n0.0002\n0.0000\n0.0043\n0.0000\n0.0000\nPen\nAnemone\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0314\n0.0008\n0.0019\n0.8241\n0.2087\n0.0027\n0.0021\n0.0067\n0.0112\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0071\n2.0704\n0.5793\n0.0548\n0.0000\n0.8052\n0.0000\n0.0075\n1.2211\n0.0391\n0.0000\n0.0027\n0.0000\n0.0137\n0.0088\n0.0632\n0.0001\n0.0007\n2.0850\n0.0000\n0.0551\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0501\n0.0477\n0.2549\n0.0210\n0.0828\n0.0117\n0.0414\n0.0536\n0.0000\n0.8140\nCoral\n1,000,879\n917\n15,254\n22,634\n104,437\n17,283\n60,565\n22,987\n20,533\n14,259\n8\n12\n2\n2\n10,778\n8,881\n121\n1\n20,539\n4\n565\n4\n242\n521\n706\n107,531\n4,741\nTarget\nCatch\n(mt)\n0\n0\n8,032\n17\n3,688\n517\n20,173\n613\n6,263\n4\n0\n72,281\n67,681\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n393\n181,207\n43,618\n8,091\n17\n0\n12\n3\n5\nSponge\n0\n0\n50\n220\n0\n3\n8\n23\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n2,731\n221\n11\n26\n20\n6\n0\n0\n2\n0\n0\n1\nSeawhip/\n4.7-14\nPen\nBycatch (kg)\nAnemone\n0\n0\n829\n86,063\n33\n48\n55\n95\n63\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n22,315\n409\n25,080\n5,893\n185\n0\n455\n0\n2\n711\n12,641\n1\n0\n0\n6\n1,428\n152\n3,830\n1,266\n14\n714\n18,517\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n515\n180\n432\n8,904\n56\n0\n30\n0\n197\n61\nCoral\nGear\nBTR\nPTR\nBTR\nPTR\nHAL\nBTR\nBTR\nBTR\nBTR\nBTR\nBTR\nHAL\nHAL\nHAL\nBTR\nHAL\nBTR\nBTR\nBTR\nBTR\nBTR\nHAL\nBTR\nHAL\nPot\nPot\nPot\nEastern Aleutian\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nCentral Aleutian\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nArea\nBering Sea\nBering Sea\nBering Sea\nBering Sea\nBering Sea\nBering Sea\nBering Sea\nBering Sea\nBering Sea\nWestern\nIslands\nIslands\nBSAI\nBSAI\nBSAI\nBSAI\nBSAI\nBSAI\nBSAI\nBSAI\n1997-1999\nShortraker/rougheye\nArrowtooth flounder\nPacific ocean perch\nPacific ocean perch\nOther red rockfish\nOther red rockfish\nGreenland turbot\nGreenland turbot\nGreenland turbot\nGreenland turbot\nGreenland turbot\nTarget Fishery\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nOther rockfish\nOther rockfish\nYellowfin sole\nFlathead sole\nOther Flatfish\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nJANUARY 2001\nRock sole\nPollock\nPollock\nPollock\nPollock","Table 4.7-4 (Cont.) Average Bycatch and Bycatch Rates of Habitat Areas of Particular Concern Biota, in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands,\nJANUARY 2001\n-\nSponge\n0.0050\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0786\nBycatch Rate (kg/mt Target)\n-\nSeawhip/\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0006\nPen\n-\nAnemone\n2.4824\n0.0847\n0.0000\n0.0511\n-\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.5989\n0.0821\nCoral\n-\n186\n6\n3\n571\nTarget\nCatch\n(mt)\n0\n0\n45\n37,995\n1\nSponge\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nSeawhip/\n4.7-15\nPen\nBycatch (kg)\nAnemone\n462\n0\n0\n29\n60\n15\n0\n0\n342\n3,026\nCoral\nGear\nHAL\nBTR\nHAL\nHAL\nPot\nkg/mt - kilograms per metric ton\nAleutian Islands\n1997-1999\nArea\nBering Sea\nBering Sea\nBering Sea\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nBSAI\nNotes: BTR - bottom trawl\nHAL - hook-and-line\nPTR - pelagic trawl\nmt - metric tons\nkg - kilograms\nTarget Fishery\nUndefined\nSablefish\nSablefish\nSablefish\nSablefish","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATICSEIS\n0.0000\n0.0112\n0.3663\n0.1468\n0.0000\n0.1993\n0.2806\n0.0030\n0.1340\n0.0208\n0.0092\n0.0000\n0.0532\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0416\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0025\n0.6241\n0.0000\n0.1353\n0.2999\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.4069\nSponge\nTable 4.7-5 Average Bycatch and Bycatch Rates of Habitat Areas of Particular Concern Biota, in the Gulf of Alaska, 1997-1999\nBycatch Rate (kg/mt target)\nSea whips\n0.0000\n0.0060\n0.0024\n0.0053\n0.0000\n0.0567\n0.0019\n0.0893\n0.0000\n0.0236\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0017\n0.0007\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0061\n0.0000\n0.0474\n0.2404\n0.1417\n0.0000\n2.3420\n0.5522\n0.4105\nAnemone\n0.0011\n0.0222\n0.1521\n0.0011\n0.0000\n0.0464\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0969\n0.0136\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.8642\n0.0138\n0.0000\n0.0000\n4.8175\n0.0000\n0.0276\n0.8124\n0.1488\n0.0000\n0.0026\n0.0000\n0.0261\n0.0009\n0.4676\n0.0071\n0.0004\n0.0000\n0.0127\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.1788\n0.0837\n0.0052\n0.3055\n0.0000\n0.0140\n0.0000\n0.0000\n0.0000\nCoral\ncatch (mt)\n4\n2,097\n2,157\n5\n2,024\n484\n10,765\n12,863\n2,001\n37,926\n2,465\n226\n1,938\n14\n193\n97,171\n203\n1,812\n6,564\n1,320\n19\n11,143\n27\n2\n2\n21\nTarget\n0\n24\n733\n317\n0\n403\n136\n33\n1,724\n788\n23\n0\n103\n0\n0\n0\n245\n1,968\n141\n55\n0\n0\n27\n0\n0\n1\nSponge\n4.7-16\nSea whips\n0\n13\n5\n0\n115\n0\n895\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n11\n1\n961\n3\n5\n0\n0\n0\n68\n0\n0\n0\nBycatch (kg)\nAnemone\n0\n99\n306\n0\n267\n4,419\n14\n90\n0\n0\n0\n176\n90\n0\n0\n481\n4,741\n5,767\n55\n110\n0\n18\n154\n0\n0\n9\n0\n58\n1,626\n321\n0\n53\n3\n28\n0\n34\n1,153\n0\n25\n0\n0\n0\n324\n549\n7\n6\n0\n156\n0\n0\n0\n41\nCoral\nkg/mt - kilograms per metric ton\nGear\nBTR\nBTR\nBTR\nBTR\nBTR\nHAL\nBTR\nBTR\nPTR\nHAL\nBTR\nHAL\nBTR\nHAL\nBTR\nBTR\nPTR\nHAL\nBTR\nHAL\nBTR\nHAL\nBTR\nPot\nPot\nPot\nHAL - hook-and-line\nNotes: BTR - bottom trawl\nPTR - pelagic trawl\nmt - metric tons\nDemersal shelf rockfish\nShortspine thornyhead\nShortspine thornyhead\nkg - kilograms\nTarget fishery\nShallow water flatfish\nShallow water flatfish\nPelagic shelf rockfish\nPelagic shelf rockfish\nShortraker/rougheye\nShortraker/rougheye\nOther slope rockfish\nOther slope rockfish\nArrowtooth flounder\nArrowtooth flounder\nPacific ocean perch\nPacific ocean perch\nDeep water flatfish\nNorthern rockfish\nFlathead sole\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nJANUARY 2001\nSablefish\nSablefish\nRex sole\nPollock\nPollock","Table 4.7-6 Projected Catch by Gear of Habitat Areas of Particular Concern Biota, for the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands, in Metric Tons,\nJANUARY 2001\n149.7\n0.0\n42.5\n0.8\n468.5\n5.7\n358.5\n0.2\n2,764.7\n395.8\n2.7\n1.9\n1.5\n11.2\n0.0\n0.1\n6.2\n0.0\n117.3\n0.0\n32.7\n0.5\n366.2\n3.9\n242.4\n314.6\n1.9\n1.4\n1.0\n7.6\n0.1\n2,113.7\n0.1\n6.1\n48.6\n0.0\n43.5\n4.9\n0.2\n1.1\n282.9\n1,333.6\n401.0\n3.9\n0.6\n1.3\n15.2\n484.1\n0.1\n0.0\n5\nNotes: catches other than from the flatfish and Atka mackerel fisheries were subtracted manually from Alternative 5.\n137.5\n0.0\n37.5\n0.7\n294.3\n3.9\n99.2\n0.2\n1,762.4\n384.6\n2.3\n1.7\n1.0\n3.0\n0.1\n0.0\n4.2\n0.0\n137.4\n0.0\n40.9\n0.7\n3.9\n302.8\n0.2\n1,762.8\n393.3\n2.3\n1.7\n1.0\n9.5\n296.1\n0.1\n4.1\n0.0\n114.9\n0.0\n0.6\n463.2\n283.2\n2,544.9\n392.4\n2.2\n1.4\n8.9\n0.1\n1.1\n39.1\n4.1\n0.1\n3\n4.7-17\n0.0\n119.5\n0.0\n68.9\n216.7\n0.6\n50.9\n0.0\n1,323.6\n0.0\n762.5\n0.4\n0.6\n0.2\n1.5\n0.1\n2.2\n0.0\n144.7\n0.0\n39.5\n0.5\n273.4\n3.6\n218.5\n1,622.3\n1.2\n1.0\n6.8\n0.1\n0.1\n389.7\n1.7\n2.1\n0.0\n137.2\n0.0\n40.9\n0.7\n4.9\n302.8\n0.2\n1,755.5\n393.3\n2.3\n1.7\n1.3\n9.5\n293.1\n0.1\n1\nHook-and-Line\nHook-and-Line\nHook-and-Line\nHook-and-Line\nPelagic trawl\nBottom trawl\nPelagic trawl\nBottom trawl\nPelagic trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nPelagic trawl\nGear\nPots\nPots\nPots\nPots\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n2001-2005\nSea pens and sea whips\nAnemones\nSponges\nCorals\nBiota","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATICSEIS\nTable 4.7-7 Projected Catch by Gear of Habitat Areas of Particular Concern Biota, for the Gulf of Alaska, 2001-2005, in Metric Tons\n93.9\n39.2\n30.9\n6.2\n32.1\n1.4\n0.0\n0.4\n0.1\n4.8\n0.0\n0.1\n0.0\n1.5\n8.5\n4.8\n0.0\n22.3\n56.8\n21.4\n22.0\n0.9\n0.0\n0.3\n6.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.0\n0.9\n5.9\n3.9\n0.0\n3.5\n0.0\n11.3\n37.0\n67.9\n16.5\n0.4\n1.4\n0.0\n0.4\n1.6\n1.5\n0.9\n0.0\n0.1\n9.1\n9.4\n0.0\n5\naTTaal catches other than from the flatfish and Atka mackerel fisheries were subtracted manually from Alternative 5.\n60.0\n26.5\n24.2\n25.1\n4.2\n0.0\n0.3\n0.0\n7.4\n4.7\n0.0\n0.1\n1.1\n0.1\n1.1\n4.3\n0.0\nAlternative\n59.7\n26.6\n24.2\n25.1\n0.0\n0.3\n0.0\n7.4\n4.6\n0.0\n4.3\n0.0\n4.1\n0.1\n1.1\n0.1\n1.1\n23.6\n63.9\n25.2\n21.1\n1.0\n0.0\n0.3\n0.0\n6.2\n4.0\n0.0\n3.6\n0.0\n0.1\n0.1\n1.1\n3\n27.6\n36.8\n21.6\n4.7-18\n2.2\n12.1\n0.0\n1.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n1.0\n0.7\n0.8\n0.0\n1.0\n0.0\n25.5\n52.3\n22.2\n23.4\n0.0\n0.0\n3.9\n2.0\n0.0\n2.3\n0.0\n2.1\n0.0\n0.0\n1.1\n0.1\n1.1\n25.2\n60.2\n26.5\n24.2\n0.0\n0.3\n0.0\n7.4\n0.1\n1.1\n0.1\n1.1\n4.7\n0.0\n4.3\n0.0\n1\nHook-and-Line\nHook-and-Line\nHook-and-Line\nHook-and-Line\nBottom trawl\nPelagic trawl\nBottom trawl\nPelagic trawl\nBottom trawl\nPelagic trawl\nBottom trawl\nPelagic trawl\nGear\nPots\nPots\nPots\nPots\nSea pens and Sea Whips\nBiota\nJANUARY 2001\nAnemone\nSponge\nCoral\nNotes:","Indirect Effects - Minimization of Adverse Impacts\nBenthic Biodiversity\nThe effects of Alternative 1 on benthic biodiversity is rated as a conditionally significant adverse impact. The\nadverse effects of bottom trawling and other mobile fishing gears on benthic biodiversity has been documented\nfor Alaska and other regions (Auster and Langton 1999, McConaughey et al. 2000). This rating is supported\nby past recognition that Alternative 1 has impacts that justify year-round bottom trawl closure areas that\nprovide some protection to EFH (see Section 4.7). We also recognize that the spatial distribution of these\nclosed areas do not likely protect the full range of habitat types in the BSAI and GOA.\nMany fish species depend on particular habitat features. Thus, a management measure that protects benthic\nbiodiversity may result in conditions that offer protection to the EFH of most fish species. One way to protect\nbenthic biodiversity is a properly designed network of marine reserves (Murray et al. 1999). Given the limited\ninformation on distribution and abundance of habitat types in waters off Alaska, evaluation of the impacts of\nAlternative 1 is based primarily on the size of bottom trawl closure area and secondarily on the spatial\ndistribution of these closure areas.\nUnder Alternative 1, year-round closures to bottom trawling are 16 percent, 18 percent, and 21 percent of the\nbenthic EFH in the Bering Sea, Aleutian Islands, and GOA, respectively (Table 4.7-8). Although these\npercentages are near the 20 percent recommendation for marine reserves (Agardy 1994, Lauck et al. 1998,\nAllison et al. 1998), the primary focus of the Alternative 1 closure areas is crab habitat. This habitat is\ngenerally relatively shallow, thus it does not encompass a wide range of habitat types and depths, which would\nprotect a wide range of EFH for other species. The exception is the bottom trawl closure area in southeast\nAlaska, which encompasses a wide range of habitat types and depths. There are generally no area restrictions\nin the deeper waters that encompass the outer continental shelf and upper slope of the central and western GOA\nand BSAI. The Aleutian Islands region, in particular, is an area with high habitat complexity and high\nabundance and diversity of coral species (Heifetz 2000). Within the areas currently open to bottom trawl\nfishing, specific areas or \"hotspots\" are repeatedly fished each year, while other areas are undisturbed or fished\nvery lightly (e.g., Coon and Heifetz 1999, Fritz et al. 1998). Presumably, an area is repeatedly trawled because\nthere are high catches per unit of effort (CPUEs) of target species, and the bottom topography is suitable (i.e.,\ntrawlable). In many cases, these areas likely correspond to the preferred habitat of adult groundfish species.\nIn some cases, fixed-gear may adversely impact benthic biodiversity. Thus, the conditionaly significant adverse\nrating is also justified by the near absence of year-round closure areas that provide protection to EFH from\ndisturbances caused by fixed-gear. The Sitka Pinnacles Marine Reserve and nearshore areas of some marine\nmammal protection zones are the only areas closed to fixed-gear fisheries. Some specific geographic areas with\nsensitive habitat (e.g., gorgonian corals) are probably the most susceptible to fixed-gear impacts.\nImpacts of Alternatives 2 through 6 on Essential Fish Habitat Relative to Alternative 1\n4.7.2.2\nRemoval and Damage to Habitat Areas of Particular Concern Biota\nThe bycatch projection model provides estimates of bycatch of coral, anemones, sponges, and sea pens and sea\nwhips for each alternative analyzed in this supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS). The model\noutput by gear type is shown in Tables 4.7-6 and 4.7-7 and is intended to illustrate the general effects to EFH\nthat can be expected under each alternative. Bycatch of living substrates should be viewed as a gear-specific\nindex of impacts, because there is unobserved damage that could result in mortality or reduced viability of\nliving substrates, and the relationship between damage and observed catch likely differs among gear types. If\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-19","a particular fishery tends to catch more or less HAPC biota, this could indicate more or less impact,\nrespectively, for that fishery. However, a comparison of total catch of coral, anemomes, sea pens, or sponges\nover all fisheries, even within a gear type, may not be a useful measure to compare habitat impacts of the\ndifferent alternatives. There is little or no information relating catch to bottom impact between different gear\ntypes. One type of trawl footrope, for example, may be particularly efficient at catching and retaining an\norganism relative to the impact it has on the bottom habitat, while another footrope design may not retain the\norganism while causing an equivalent impact. In addition, under some alternatives, total catch may be\ninfluenced by large changes in certain target fisheries, as predicted by the bycatch model. While in some\nfisheries, changes directly dictated by the alternatives may be predicted with reasonable certainty, other\nchanges, particularly large increases in the take\nof underutilized species, such as flatfish, are the result of indirect consequences, and may not be accurately\nestimated.\nBycatch data collected during 1997-1999, show the take of coral, anemones, sponges, sea pens, and sea whips\nby fishery (Tables 4.7-4 and 4.7-5). As explained in the previous paragraph, the confidence in projected catch\nestimates among alternatives may vary depending on the fishery.\nIn summary, for the 1997-1999 data in the BSAI:\nCoral are taken primarily in trawl fisheries for Aleutian Islands Pacific ocean perch, yellowfin sole,\nPacific cod, and Atka mackerel, and an undefined hook-and-line fishery.\nAnemones are taken by the hook-and-line fishery for Pacific cod, the trawl fisheries for rock sole and\nflathead sole, and the trawl fishery for Pacific cod.\nSponges are taken as bycatch primarily in the BSAI rock sole fishery, the undefined hook-and-line\nfishery, the Pacific cod trawl fishery, the Aleutian Islands Pacific ocean perch fishery, and the BSAI\nyellowfin sole fishery.\nSea pens and sea whips are taken primarily in the hook-and-line fishery for Pacific cod, with a small\namount taken in the eastern Bering Sea pollock fishery.\nIn summary, for the 1997-1999 data for the Gulf of Alaska:\nCoral are observed primarily in bottom trawl fisheries for pollock in Area 620, deep water flatfish in\nthe central GOA, and to a lesser extent in bottom trawl fisheries for rockfish and in the hook-and-line\nfishery for sablefish.\nThe bottom trawl fisheries for shallow water flatfish and Pacific cod and the hook-and-line fishery for\nPacific cod accounts for most of the bycatch of sea anemones.\nSponges are taken as bycatch primarily by the Pacific ocean perch bottom trawl fishery, Pacific cod\npot fishery, Pacific cod trawl fishery, and the deep water flatfish fishery. They are also taken in the\nshallow water flatfish fishery, the rex sole fishery, and the pelagic rockfish trawl fishery.\nThe bottom trawl and hook-and-line fisheries for Pacific cod account for most bycatch of sea pens and\nsea whips.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-20","Table 4.7-8 Comparison of Area of Benthic Habitat Protection from Bottom Trawling, by\nAlternative\nAlternative\nArea\n5\n6.1 and 6.2\n1\n2.1 and 2.2\n3\n4\nEastern Bering Sea\n702,868\n702,868\nTotal area\n702,868\n702,868\n702,868\n702,868\nClosed areas\n6,076\n6,076\nSteller sea lion16\n6,076\n6,076\n6,076\n6,076\nSteller sea lion2b\n9,568\n51,331\n9,568\n9,568\n9,568\n9,568\n0\n0\n0\n517,932\n0\nEssential fish habitat\n0\n0\n0\nHabitat areas of particular concern\n0\n0\n0\n0\n109,492\n109,492\n109,492\n109,492\n109,492\nStatus quo other 1°\n109,492\n131,339\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nTarget species\n59,800\n577,732\n577,732\n535,969\n446,393\n577,732\nOpen areas 1e\n587,300\nOpen areas 2f\n593,376\n587,300\n455,960\n587,300\n69,370\n35\n16\n90\n16\nPercent protected 1d\n16\n16\n18\n18\n92\nPercent protected 2d\n18\n24\n37\nAleutian Islands\n59,124\n59,124\n59,124\n59,124\n59,124\n59,124\nTotal area\nClosed Areas\n10,509\n10,509\nSteller sea lion 1 superscript(b)\n10,509\n10,509\n10,509\n10,509\n9,568\nSteller sea lion 2b\n9,568\n29,720\n9,568\n9,568\n9,568\n0\n0\n33,676\n0\nEssential fish habitat\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n6,393\nHabitat areas of particular concern\n0\n0\nStatus quo other 1c\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n6,691\n0\n0\n0\nTarget species\n39,047\n0\n39,047\n39,047\n18,895\n32,356\nOpen areas 1e\n8,546\n48,615\n48,615\n48,615\n41,924\n48,615\nOpen areas 2e\n18\nPercent protected 1d\n18\n18\n29\n18\n86\n34\n100\n34\nPercent protected 2f\n34\n68\n45\nGulf of Alaska\n310,757\n310,757\n310,757\n310,757\n310,757\n310,757\nTotal area\nClosed areas\n13,630\n13,630\n13,630\nSteller sea lion 1 superscript(b)\n13,630\n13,630\n13,630\n0\n0\nSteller sea lion 2b\n0\n0\n0\n109,874\n0\n0\n0\n174,927\n0\nEssential fish habitat\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n7,493\nHabitat areas of particular concern\n0\n51,773\n51,773\nStatus quo other 1°\n51,773\n51,773\n51,773\n51,773\n3, ,139\n3,139\n3,139\n3,139\n3,139\nStatus quo other 2c\n3,139\n54,656\n0\n0\n0\nTarget species\n0\n0\n59,795\n242,215\n242,215\n132,341\n187,559\n242,215\nOpen areas 1e\n245,354\nOpen areas 2\n245,354\n245,354\n190,698\n245,354\n62,934\n39\n21\n80\n21\nPercent protected 1d\n21\n21\n22\n81\n22\nPercent protected 2d\n22\n57\n40\nall area values are in km2 of benthic habitat S 500 m in depth.\nNotes:\nSteller sea lion 1 areas are closed year-round to bottom trawl. Steller sea lion 2 areas are closed seasonally or for specific fisheries.\nStatus Quo other 1 areas are closed year-round to bottom trawl. Status Quo other 2 areas are closed to seasonally or specific fisheries.\nPercent protected 1 only includes year-round closures. Percent 2 includes year-round, seasonal, and specific fishery closures.\nepen areas 1 are open to fishing year-round for all species.\nOpen areas 2 include year-round, seasonal, and specific openings.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-21","Alternative 2\nThe objective of Alternative 2 is protection of marine mammals and seabirds by reducing potential adverse\nimpacts of groundfish harvest. These affects include direct take, competition for prey, disturbance, and\ndegradation of habitat. Alternative 2 would only directly affect the distribution and catch amounts of the\npollock, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel fisheries. There are two approaches analyzed under Alternative 2.\nAlternative 2.1 is based on a series of time and area closures combined with TAC reductions. Alternative 2.2\nuses only time closures combined with TAC reductions. Alternative 2 would reduce the take in all pollock,\nPacific cod, and Atka mackerel fisheries with the reduction being greater under Alternative 2.2, which also\nwould result in a reduced BSAI yellowfin sole fishery. The Aleutian Islands Pacific ocean perch fishery would\nincrease under both options, and the BSAI undefined hook-and-line fishery would increase under Alternative\n2.2.\nIn the BSAI, the following would occur:\nCoral catch in trawl fisheries would increase under Alternative 2.1 as result of the increase in the\nPacific ocean perch fishery, but decrease under Alternative 2.2 due to further reductions in the Pacific\ncod, Atka mackerel and yellowfin sole fisheries. The increase in coral catch in the fixed-gear fishery\nunder Alternative 2.2 is due to the large increase in the undefined hook-and-line fishery.\nAnemone trawl catch would decrease in all primary bycatch fisheries. Anemones would decrease\nconsiderably in the Pacific cod hook-and-line fishery under Alternative 2.2.\nSponge trawl bycatch would decrease overall, but increase in the Pacific ocean perch fishery. The\nsponge bycatch in the undefined hook-and-line fishery would increase considerably under Alternative\n2.2.\nSea pen and sea whip catches would increase primarily in the Pacific cod hook-and-line fishery.\nIn the GOA, the following would occur:\nCoral catch would change slightly overall in both trawl and hook-and-line fisheries.\nAnemone catches would decrease for both trawl and hook-and-line gear\nSponge catches would decrease slightly for trawl and hook-and-line, decrease considerably in pot\nfisheries.\nSea pen and sea whip catch would decrease considerably for both gear types.\nAlternative 3\nThe Alternative 3 regime would reduce the acceptable biological catch (ABC) of all species and the bycatch\nmodel projection, in most cases, indicated lower catches for those species. However, the bycatch model does\nproject an increase in the fully utilized Pacific ocean perch fishery in the central GOA and large increases in\nsome flatfish fisheries that are currently underutilized. In the BSAI, the model indicates a 100 percent\nincrease\nin the rock sole fishery and a 50-percent increase in the flathead sole fishery. In the GOA, the bycatch model\nindicates a 35 percent increase in the shallow water flatfish fishery and threefold increase in the rex sole fishery.\nIn the BSAI, the following would occur:\nCoral take would be reduced slightly in both trawl and hook-and-line fisheries.\nAnemone take in trawl bycatch would increase as a result of the predicted large increases in the rock\nsole and flathead sole fisheries.\nSea pen and sea whip catches decrease for trawl and fixed-gear fisheries\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-22","Increased sponge bycatch in the predicted expansion of the BSAI rock sole fishery would exceed the\ncombined reduction in bycatch by all other fisheries, resulting in a 37 percent increase of total sponge\nbycatch in the BSAI.\nIn the GOA, the following would occur:\nCoral take would be reduced slightly in both trawl and hook-and-line fisheries.\nThere would be a slight increase in the trawl take of anemones as a result of the large increase in the\nshallow water flatfish fishery predicted by the model.\nSea pen and sea whip catches would decrease for trawl and fixed-gear fisheries.\nSponge catches in the GOA would be reduced in trawl and pot gear fisheries.\nThe validity of the predicted increase in the take of sponges and anemones in the BSAI and anemones in the\nGOA is dependent on the validity of the prediction of large increases in target catches in the BSAI rock sole\nfishery and the GOA shallow water flatfish fishery. While most target catches are reduced by the uncertainty\ncoefficient in Alternative 3, many flatfish fisheries would be underutilized and unconstrained by ABCs.\nWhether effort in those fisheries would increase as predicted by the model is questionable without\nunderstanding better the processes constraining the catch under status quo and how those constraints would\napply under Alternative 3.\nAlternative 4\nThe objective of the Alternative 4 is to prevent overfishing, maintain healthy stocks, and rebuild depressed\nstocks of non-target species while providing for sustainable fisheries. Under Alternative 4, TACs would be\nestablished for BSAI and GOA skates, and a GOA TAC would be set for grenadiers. In addition, areas closed\nto protect squid aggregations would be established in the Bering Sea. The pollock TAC would be reduced\nbased on historical catch in closed areas. The measure mainly would reduce the BSAI pollock fishery, which\ntakes a small amount of sea pens and sea whips, and the BSAI hook-and-line fishery for Pacific cod, which\ntakes a significant proportion of the anemone and sea pen and sea whip bycatch and a small proportion of the\ncoral and sponge bycatch.\nIn the BSAI, the following would occur:\nCoral catch would remain the same in the trawl fisheries and decrease slightly overall due to reduction\nin the Pacific cod hook-and-line fishery.\nAnemone catch would remain similar to Alternative lexcept for a significant decrease due to the\nreduction in the Pacific cod hook-and-line fishery under Alternative 4.2.\nThe sponge catch would decrease slightly overall due to reduction in the Pacific cod hook-and-line\nfishery.\nSea pen and sea whip hook-and-line bycatch would decrease significantly due to reduction in the\nPacific cod hook-and-line fishery under Alternative 4.2 and trawl bycatch would decrease slightly due\nto reduction of the eastern Bering Sea pollock fishery.\nIn the GOA there would be very little change in bycatch of HAPC biota by gear type.\nAlternative 5\nAlternative 5 is specifically designed to increase protection to EFH. It would eliminate bottom trawl fishing\nfor all species except for flatfish and Atka mackerel. The bycatch of benthic habitat in the Pacific ocean perch,\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-23","Pacific cod, and pollock trawl fisheries would thus be eliminated. Much of the Pacific cod catch taken by\ntrawls under Alternative 1 would be taken instead by fixed-gear such as pots and longlines, and the bycatch\nmodel predicts a corresponding 25 percent increase in HAPC biota in the BSAI flathead sole fishery and a 20\npercent increase in the BSAI rocksole fishery.\nIn the BSAI, the following would occur:\nCoral catch would be reduced over 60 percent in the trawl fishery and increase slightly in the longline\nfishery.\nAnemone catch would eliminated from the trawl fishery for Pacific cod but increase in the flathead sole\nand rock sole fisheries. The anemone catch in the hook-and-line fishery increases greatly as the Pacific\ncod catch shifts to hook-and-line gear.\nSponge catch would also be eliminated from the trawl fishery for Pacific cod, but increase greatly in\nthe rock sole fishery. There would be a slight increase in the take of sponges in the hook-and-line\nfishery for Pacific cod.\nSea pen and sea whip catches would increase considerably due to expansion in the Pacific cod hook-\nand-line fishery, while catches would be eliminated from Pacific cod and pollock trawl fisheries.\nIn the GOA, the following would occur:\nCoral catch would be reduced significantly by the elimination of bottom trawling in the pollock and\nPacific ocean perch fisheries and increases in the hook-and-line fisheries.\nAnemone catch in the Pacific cod trawl fisheries would be eliminated, but greatly increase in the hook-\nand-line fishery.\nSponge catch would be eliminated from the Pacific ocean perch and Pacific cod trawl fisheries, but\nincrease in the Pacific cod pot fishery.\nSea pen and sea whip catches would be eliminated from the bottom trawl Pacific cod fishery, but\nincrease in the Pacific cod hook-and-line fishery.\nAlternative 6\nThe model predicts that HAPC bycatch would be reduced under Alternative 6, with all bycatch rates reduced\nby about 20 percent. Under Alternative 6.1, in the BSAI there would be general bycatch reductions in most\nfisheries, except for increased bycatch of anemones and sponges in the BSAI rock sole and flathead sole\nfisheries due to increased effort. In the GOA, the model predicts reduced bycatch of all HAPC species for each\ngear type.\nIn the BSAI, the following would occur:\nCoral catch would decrease for both gear types under Alternative 6.1, and increase slightly for both\ngear types under Alternative 6.2.\nAnemones catch would decrease for fixed-gear, but increase for trawl gear under Alternative 6.1, due\nto large increases in the rock sole and flathead sole fisheries, and increase for both gear types\n(considerably for trawl gear) under Alternative 6.2.\nSponge catch would decrease for fixed-gear, but increase for trawl gear under Alternative 6.1 due to\nlarge increases in the rock sole and flathead sole fisheries. Under Alternative 6.2, sponge bycatch\nincreases considerably for trawl gear type and remains about the same as Alternative 1 for fixed-gear\nSea pen and sea whip catches would decrease for both gear types in Alternative 6.1 and increase for\nboth gear types under Alternative 6.2.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-24","In the GOA, the following would occur:\nCoral bycatch would decrease for both gear types under Alternative 6.1 and increase for both gear\ntypes under Alternative 6.2.\nAnemone catch would decrease for both gear types (slightly for trawl gear) under Alternative 6.1 and\nincrease considerably for both gear types under Alternative 6.2.\nSponge catch would decrease for both gear types under Alternative 6.1 and increase for both gear\ntypes under Alternative 6.2.\nSea pen and sea whip catches would decrease under Alternative 6.1 for both gear types and increases\nonly a little, particularly for trawl gear, under Alternative 6.2.\nModification of Nonliving Substrates\nA reasonable approximation for comparing the relative intensity of impacts to nonliving components of benthic\nEFH is the amount of fishing effort for various gear types. Estimates of fishing effort by the major target\nfisheries were compared (hours fished for bottom trawls, or number of pots or hooks set with fixed-gear)\namong alternatives. Projected 2001 catch biomass of target species in their target fisheries under the\nalternatives were used to estimate effort levels, and the effort levels under Alternatives 2 through 6 were\ncompared to the projected effort level in 2001 for Alternative 1. A detailed description of the catch projection\nmodel is provided in Section 4.1.6. The functional relationship assumed between catch and effort is C = qEB,\nwhere C is the catch biomass, E is fishing effort, q is the catchability coefficient, and B is biomass. The\nbeginning year biomass in 2000 is identical for all alternatives, and the catchability coefficient within a fishery,\nfrom year 2000 to 2001, is assumed to remain substantially unchanged. Thus the changes in catch should\nprimarily reflect changes in effort.\nTo convert catch estimates to effort estimates (i.e., hours fished, pots or hooks set), several regression\ncoefficients of catch (of target species) on effort of particular fisheries in the 1998 SEIS (NMFS 1998i) were\nused to scale catches to effort. The data used for this analysis were obtained from the North Pacific Observer\nProgram database, and consist of hauls between 1990 and 1997 that were of satisfactory performance (i.e., no\nproblems were encountered in deploying the gear). The regression of catch on effort differs from the catch\nmodel presented above in that the effect of variations in biomass on catch are not considered. For this reason,\nthe regression coefficients were applied only to the projected catches in 2001.\nRegressions for flatfish and rockfish trawl fisheries in the 1998 SEIS (NMFS 1998i) were recomputed to\nprovide more detailed target fishery descriptions. For example, the eastern Bering Sea flatfish regression in\nthe 1998 SEIS was broken into separate regressions for yellowfin sole, rock sole, flathead sole, and other\nflatfish.\nThe catches from the various sections of the GOA were generally combined for this analysis. For most\nfisheries, the catch projection model provides the trawl catch for the combination of pelagic and bottom trawls.\nBecause most trawl fisheries are conducted predominately with bottom trawls, the trawl catches in these\nfisheries were assigned to bottom trawls. In addition, several trawl fisheries for rockfish were intended to be\nallocated to pelagic trawl gear under Alternative 5. This occurred for Pacific ocean perch in the central and\nwestern GOA. For several other rockfish fisheries, historical data on pelagic trawl catches did not exist in\nsufficient quantities to provide model input data, and model runs were made with the input data from bottom\ntrawls. Rockfish fisheries in this group included the Aleutian Islands Pacific ocean perch, eastern Bering Sea\nPacific ocean perch and other red rockfish, and GOA pelagic shelf rockfish and northern rockfish. The bottom\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-25","trawl catches were set to zero for these fisheries. For each alternative examined in the paragraph that follows,\nthe total estimated effort by gear type and area is shown in Table 4.7-9.\nTable\n4.7-9\nProjected Total Effort for Fishing Gear that Contacts the Seafloor in Target Fisheries, by\nAlternative in 2001\nAlternative\nArea\nGear\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nBSAI\nBottom\n116\n103\n52\n124\n117\n117\n91\n133\n142\ntrawl\nBSAI\nLongline\n113,017\n75,181\n20,142\n97,201\n113,016\n34,789\n183,238\n113,081\n149,363\nBSAI\nPot\n289\n188\n41\n248\n289\n289\n493\n289\n369\nGOA\nBottom\n22\n17\n13\n22\n22\n22\n8\n27\n33\ntrawl\nGOA\nLongline\n51,129\n47,683\n42,118\n46,238\n51,140\n51,140\n74,129\n51,531\n65,266\nGOA\nPot\n226\n121\n53\n183\n225\n225\n494\n221\n307\nNotes: aTToosands of hours fished, or thousands of hooks or pots set.\nAlternative 1\nAlternative 1 has objectives and management measures identical to those currently in place. The estimated\neffort of various target fisheries is shown in Tables 4.7-10 and 4.7-11. The Alternative 1 values are used as\na baseline to infer relative shifts in effort in Alternatives 2 through 6. The BSAI bottom trawl fishery for\npollock is not shown because it is eliminated in all other alternatives. The dominant fisheries in the BSAI\ninclude the flatfish trawl fisheries (yellowfin sole, rock sole, flathead sole, and other flatfish), the Atka mackerel\ntrawl fisheries in each of the three areas of the Aleutian Islands, and the Pacific cod trawl and longline fisheries\n(Table 4.7-10). The estimated combined raw effort for the BSAI flatfish fisheries was approximately 83,000\nhours, and the estimated raw effort for the BSAI Pacific cod trawl fishery was approximately 27,000 hours.\nAlthough the catch of Atka mackerel is comparable to the catch of several of the flatfish species, the estimated\neffort is considerably less due to the higher ratio of catch to effort of Atka mackerel in their target fisheries\n(Table 4.7-10). In the GOA, the dominant fisheries with respect to effort are the pelagic trawl pollock fishery\nand the Pacific cod bottom trawl fishery (Table 4.7-11). The flatfish and Pacific cod fisheries contribute the\nmost to bottom trawl effort, with the sum of bottom trawling effort from the deep water flatfish, shallow water\nflatfish, rex sole, and flathead sole fisheries being 6,000 hours, whereas the Pacific cod trawl fishery\ncontributed approximately 11,000 hours.\nAlternative 2\nUnder Alternative 2.1, total BSAI trawling effort would be reduced 12 percent compared to Alternative 1,\nwhereas the total longline and pot effort would decrease 33 percent and 35 percent, respectively (Table 4.7-9).\nThe corresponding reductions under Alternative 2.2 are 55 percent, 82 percent, and 86 percent. In the GOA,\ntotal bottom trawling effort under Alternative 2.1 would be reduced 26 percent compared to Alternative 1,\nwhereas the total longline and pot effort would be reduced 7 percent and 46 percent, respectively. The\ncorresponding reductions of effort under Alternative 2.2 are 43 percent, 18 percent, and 77 percent, for bottom\ntrawl, longline, and pot fisheries. Such reductions in trawl effort would be expected to have a beneficial effect\non benthic habitat.\nBottom Trawl Impacts. Under Alternative 2.1, the BSAI trawl fisheries show substantial reductions in\nestimated effort. Effort would be reduced by 40 percent in the BSAI Pacific cod trawl fishery, declining from\n27,600 hours to 16,500 hours. Effort in the Atka mackerel trawl fisheries would be reduced by 75 percent,\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-26","74 percent, and 72 percent in the eastern, central, and western Aleutian Islands respectively (Table 4.7-10).\nThe analytical model predicts that the Aleutian Islands Pacific ocean perch trawl fishery would experience\nincreased effort by 22 percent.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.7-27","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n142,935.4\n368.7\n34.7\n61.6\n23.3\n2.2\n13.1\n1,128.5\n0.1\n0.0\n1.5\n2.4\n1.9\n5,299.5\n1.6\n6.2\n107,891.6\n27.3\n61.6\n23.3\n2.2\n718.9\n0.0\n289.1\n1.0\n13.1\n0.1\n1.6\n1.3\n4,470.3\n1.6\n6.1\nTable 4.7-10 Projected effort of Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Target Fisheries, by Alternatives, in 2001\n493.2\n0.0\n61.6\n10.8\n2.2\n643.8\n0.0\n0.0\n0.9\n1.4\n178,569.1\n13.1\n1.1\n4,024.8\n0.0\n5\n29,599.3\n28.6\n61.6\n10.9\n289.1\n8.7\n2.2\n718.9\n0.0\n1.0\n0.1\n1.6\n1.3\n4,470.3\n1.5\n4.2\nAlternative\n107,826.8\n289.1\n28.6\n61.6\n10.9\n8.7\n2.2\n718.9\n0.0\n1.0\n1.6\n0.1\n1.3\n4,470.3\n1.5\n4.1\n61.6\n23.3\n2.2\n92,532.1\n247.9\n20.6\n643.8\n0.0\n0.0\n1.3\n1.0\n4,024.8\n13.1\n0.1\n1.0\n3\nWestern Aleutian Islands\nEastern Aleutian Islands\nCentral Aleutian Islands\nTotal Aleutian Islands\nEastern Bering Sea\n14,953.0\n41.0\n0.0\n27.2\n10.9\n7.9\n2.9\n718.9\n0.0\n0.2\n0.4\n0.4\n0.1\n4,470.3\n1.9\n4.7-28\nBSAI\n2.2\n69,991.7\n188.0\n16.5\n61.6\n10.9\n8.7\n2.2\n718.9\n0.0\n0.3\n0.4\n0.4\n0.1\n4,470.3\n1.9\nPC/E is the slope of the regression of the catch per unit of effort.\n2.1\n107,827.9\n27.6\n61.6\n10.9\n8.7\n2.2\n718.9\n0.0\n1.0\n1.6\n1.3\n4,470.3\n1.5\n289.1\n0.1\n1\nNotes: Thousands of hours fished, or hooks or pots set.\n0.00074\n0.05914\n0.03790\n0.02030\n0.02880\n0.01780\n0.01090\n0.00033\n0.05430\n0.04550\n0.27439\n0.27439\n0.27439\n0.00025\n0.09490\nBSAI - Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nC/Eb\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nGear\nLongline\nLongline\nLongline\nPot\nPacific ocean perch\nPacific ocean perch\nOther red rockfish\nArea/target\nSpecies\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nYellowfin sole\nFlathead sole\nOther flatfish\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nJANUARY 2001\nRock sole\nSablefish\nSablefish","JANUARY 2001\n1.1\n11.8\n20,766.7\n307.4\n13.8\n0.7\n2.7\n5.9\n4.0\n0.9\n44,499.1\n2.1\n0.0\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.5\n1.5\n6.2\n0.7\n8.5\n13,889.8\n221.2\n11.2\n37,641.3\n1.3\n2.7\n3.6\n0.6\n1.9\n0.0\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.6\n1.2\n3.1\n6.1\n0.0\n36,835.5\n494.2\n0.0\n37,293.5\n0.8\n2.4\n1.9\n0.4\n0.0\n1.6\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n9.1\n3.1\nTable 4.7-11 Projected Effort for Gulf of Alaska Target Fisheries, by Alternative, in 2001\n5\n0.7\n13,552.9\n224.9\n11.4\n37,586.9\n0.9\n2.8\n1.7\n1.2\n0.4\n1.2\n0.0\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.6\n1.2\n9.1\n4.2\nAlternative\n0.7\n8.5\n13,552.9\n224.9\n11.4\n37,586.9\n0.9\n2.8\n1.7\n1.2\n0.4\n1.2\n0.0\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.6\n1.2\n4.1\n0.7\n8.5\n12,390.7\n182.7\n8.3\n33,847.3\n0.9\n2.3\n3.5\n3.0\n0.4\n1.2\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n0.0\n0.4\n0.8\n3\n0.8\n3.5\n5,721.0\n52.8\n36,396.9\n0.7\n2.9\n3.0\n1.2\n0.4\n1.5\n0.0\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.6\n1.2\n0.1\n4.7-29\n2.2\n0.7\n2.8\n10,004.0\n121.2\n3.5\n37,679.0\n0.9\n2.8\n3.6\n0.6\n1.3\n0.0\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.6\n1.2\n1.1\n2.1\nC/E is the slope of the regression of catch per unit of effort.\n0.7\n8.5\n225.6\n11.4\n37,586.5\n2.8\n1.4\n0.6\n0.0\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.6\n1.2\n13,542.1\n1.1\n1.1\n1.1\n1\nNotes: aTToosands of hours fished, or hooks or pots set.\n0.0915\n0.12843\n0.00092\n0.06105\n0.05729\n0.00033\n0.03983\n0.0165\n0.0142\n0.0173\n0.0213\n0.0577\n0.0889\n0.0577\n0.0192\n0.0063\n0.0758\n0.0359\nC/Eb\nBottom trawl\nPelagic trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nPelagic trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nBottom trawl\nGear\nLongline\nLongline\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nPot\n(Central and western)\n(Central and western)\nShallow water flatfish\nPelagic shelf rockfish\n(Areas 640 and 650)\nShortraker/rougheye\nArrowtooth flounder\nTarget Species\nPacific ocean perch\nDeepwater flatfish\nNorthern rockfish\nFlathead sole\nThornyheads\nPacific cod\nSablefish\nRex sole\nPollock\nPollock","In terms of absolute effort, however, effort changes in the Atka mackerel and Pacific ocean perch fisheries\nwould be considerably less than in the cod fishery.\nIn the GOA, the Pacific cod trawl fishery would see a reduction in effort by 70 percent, whereas the shallow\nwater flatfish fishery would experience an increase in effort by 150 percent. However, the shallow water\nflatfish fishery harvests are relatively small compared to other trawl fishery, SO the total increase in overall\neffort in the GOA would be small.\nUnder Alternative 2.2, the predicted reductions in the trawl fisheries mentioned above are generally more\nsevere, when compared to Alternative 2.1. For example, the BSAI yellowfin sole trawl fishery would show a\ndecrease in effort of 56 percent, and the GOA flathead sole trawl fishery showed a decrease in effort of 28\npercent. In contrast, Pacific ocean perch fisheries in the eastern Bering Sea, Aleutian Islands, and GOA would\nshow effort increases of 29 percent, 24 percent, and 31 percent, respectively, in bottom trawl effort. However,\nthe absolute effort in the Pacific ocean perch fisheries is small compared to that in the flatfish fisheries.\nFixed-Gear Impacts. Under Alternative 2.1, the Pacific cod longline and pot fisheries would show substantial\nreductions in both the BSAI and the GOA. The BSAI Pacific cod longline and pot fisheries each would show\na reduction in effort of 35 percent. In the GOA, the Pacific cod longline and pot fisheries would show\nreductions in effort of 26 percent and 46 percent, respectively. Under Alternative 2.2, the Pacific cod longline\nand pot fisheries show more substantial reductions in both the BSAI and the GOA than in Alternative 2.1.\nAlternative 3\nThe total BSAI trawling effort under Alternative 3 would increase 7 percent from Alternative 1, whereas the\ntotal longline and pot efforts would each decrease 14 percent (Table 4.7-9). In the GOA, the total bottom\ntrawling effort under Alternative 3 would be reduced 3 percent from Alternative 1, whereas the total longline\nand pot effort would be reduced 10 percent and 19 percent, respectively. Thus, the effects of bottom trawling\nto the benthic environment is expected to be relatively similar to that observed under Alternative 1.\nBottom Trawl Impacts. Under Alternative 3, reductions in effort in the BSAI trawl fisheries would occur\nprimarily in the BSAI Pacific cod fishery, the Aleutian Islands Atka mackerel fisheries, and the Aleutian\nIslands Pacific ocean perch fishery. In the GOA, reductions in effort would occur in the fisheries for Pacific\ncod, arrowtooth flounder, deep water flatfish, flathead sole, the thornyheads, northern rockfish, and pelagic\nrockfish. The BSAI rock sole fishery would increase its effort by 115 percent, and the GOA shallow water\nflatfish and rex sole fisheries would increase their efforts by 148 percent and 170 percent, respectively.\nFixed-Gear Impacts. In the BSAI, the Pacific cod longline and pot fisheries each would reduce their effort by\n14 percent, and the longline sablefish fisheries each would reduce their effort by 10 percent. Note, however,\nthat the absolute level of longline effort would be much higher in the cod fishery than the sablefish fishery.\nReductions of similar magnitude would occur in the GOA fixed-gear Pacific cod and sablefish fisheries.\nAlternative 4\nThe total BSAI bottom trawling effort under Alternative 4.1 would increase 1 percent from Alternative 1, and\nthe total longline and pot effort would remain unchanged (Table 4.7-9). The total longline effort under\nAlternative 4.2 would be reduced 69 percent. In the GOA, the total bottom trawling effort under Alternative\n4.1 and 4.2 would be unchanged from the Alternative 1. Thus, the effects of bottom trawling to the benthic\nenvironment is expected to be similar to those observed under Alternative 1.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-30","Bottom Trawl Impacts. Under Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2, the estimated effort would remain unchanged or\nminimal for all BSAI trawl fisheries. In the GOA under Alternative 4.1 and Alternative 4.2, efforts in the\nflathead sole and arrowtooth flounder fisheries would be reduced by 29 percent and 12 percent, respectively;\nthe shallow water flatfish and rex sole fisheries would increase their efforts by 17 percent and 10 percent,\nrespectively.\nFixed-Gear Impacts. Under Alternative 4.1 in the BSAI and GOA, all fixed-gear fisheries would remain\nunchanged from the Alternative 1 levels. Under Alternative 4.2 in the BSAI, the Pacific cod longline fishery\nwould show a 73 percent decline in effort compared to Alternative 1.\nAlternative 5\nThe total BSAI trawling effort under Alternative 5 would decrease 20 percent from Alternative 1, whereas total\nlongline and pot efforts would increase 62 percent and 71 percent, respectively (Table 4.7-9). In the GOA, the\ntotal trawling effort under Alternative 5 would decrease 44 percent from Alternative 1, whereas the total\nlongline and pot efforts would increase 45 percent and 119 percent, respectively. The overall reduction in\nbottom trawling would be expected to have beneficial effects on the benthic environment.\nBottom Trawl Impacts\nSeveral trawl fisheries would be eliminated under Alternative 5, including the BSAI Pacific cod fishery, and\nthe GOA Pacific cod, shortraker/rougheye, thornyhead, and other rockfish fisheries. The shortraker/rougheye,\nthornyhead, and other rockfish target fisheries in the GOA are relatively small. However, the Pacific cod\nbottom trawl fisheries are substantial, accounting for 27,600 hrs and 11,400 hrs in the BSAI and GOA under\nAlternative 1, respectively. The elimination of these bottom trawl fisheries should be beneficial to benthic\nhabitat. The GOA pollock fishery shift to pelagic gear under Alternative 5, would eliminate a bottom trawl\nfishery that accounts for approximately 670 hrs under Alternative 1. The Pacific ocean perch fishery in the\nwestern and central GOA would also shift to pelagic trawl gear; these areas would account for nearly all of\nthe Pacific ocean perch trawl harvest under Alternative 1. Under Alternative 5, there would be no Pacific\nocean perch bottom trawl harvest. The eastern, central, and western Atka mackerel fisheries would show effort\nreductions of approximately 10 percent.\nIn the GOA, the arrowtooth flounder, deep water flatfish, and flathead sole bottom trawl fisheries would show\neffort decreases of 29 percent, 16 percent, and 32 percent, respectively. The BSAI rock sole and flathead sole\ntrawl fisheries would show increases of 20 percent and 25 percent, respectively, and the GOA shallow water\nflatfish and rex sole fisheries would increases in effort by 118 percent and 68 percent, respectively. These\nincreases would occur despite reduced TAC for flatfish under Alternative 5, and likely reflect that flatfish are\ncurrently not constrained by their TAC or ABC catch levels. Thus, catch could increase despite a decrease in\nthe TAC. The effect of these increases in the flatfish fisheries indicates more trawling effort in flatfish habitat\nfrom these fisheries. However, the overall catch of BSAI flathead sole would increase only slightly under\nAlternative 5 (see Section 4.4.6.3), SO other fisheries that harvest flathead sole would have a reduction in catch\nand presumably effort.\nFixed-Gear Impacts. The effort of the Pacific cod longline and pot fisheries would increase in the BSAI and\nthe GOA, largely reflecting the reallocation of the TAC to fixed-gear. The BSAI Pacific cod longline and pot\nfisheries would increase their catches by 66 percent and 71 percent, respectively, from Alternative 1. The GOA\nPacific cod longline and pot fisheries would increase their catches by 172 percent and 119 percent, respectively,\nfrom Alternative 1. The Aleutian Islands and eastern Bering Sea sablefish fisheries would each show a\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-31","decrease in catch of 10 percent. Other fixed-gear fisheries in the BSAI and GOA would show minimal or no\nchanges.\nAlternative 6.1\nThe total BSAI bottom trawling effort under Alternative 6.1 would increase 14 percent from Alternative 1,\nwhereas the total longline and pot efforts would remain unchanged (Table 4.7-9). In the GOA, the total bottom\ntrawling effort under Alternative 6.1 would increase 21 percent from Alternative 1, whereas the total longline\nand pot efforts would remain unchanged. These increases in bottom trawling effort would be expected to have\ndetrimental effects on the benthic environment.\nBottom Trawl Impacts. In the BSAI, the rock sole and flathead sole fisheries would increase their efforts by\n115 percent and 51 percent, respectively, from Alternative 1; the Aleutian Islands Pacific ocean perch fishery\nwould show a relative increase of 6 percent. All other trawl fisheries in the BSAI would remain unchanged\nor change by only minimal amounts. In the GOA, the rex sole, shallow water flatfish, Pacific ocean perch, and\narrowtooth flounder fisheries would increase their efforts by 182 percent, 149 percent, 62 percent, and 26\npercent, respectively. All other trawl fisheries in the GOA would remain unchanged or change only by minimal\namounts.\nFixed-Gear Impacts. In the BSAI and GOA, the Pacific cod and sablefish fixed-gear fisheries would show\nno or minimal changes in effort from the Alternative 1 values.\nAlternative 6.2\nThe total BSAI bottom trawling effort under Alternative 6.2 would increase 22 percent from Alternative 1, and\nthe total longline and pot efforts would increase 32 percent and 28 percent, respectively (Table 4.7-9). In the\nGOA, the total bottom trawling effort under Alternative 6.1 would increase 50 percent from Alternative 1, and\nthe total longline and pot efforts would increase 28 percent and 36 percent, respectively. These increases in\nbottom trawling effort would be expected to have detrimental effects on the benthic environment.\nBottom Trawl Impacts. In the BSAI, the bottom trawl effort of the yellowfin sole and other flatfish fisheries\nwould remain unchanged from Alternative 1, whereas all other trawl fisheries would increase their efforts in\namounts ranging from 7 percent (Aleutian Islands Pacific ocean perch) to 115 percent (rock sole). In the GOA,\nthe northern rockfish, deep water flatfish, and arrowtooth flounder trawl fisheries would show relative declines\nin fishing effort. All other fisheries would increase their efforts relative to the Alternative 1, ranging from a\n12 percent (pelagic shelf rockfish) to a 315 percent (shallow water flatfish) increase.\nFixed-Gear Impacts. The Aleutian Islands sablefish longline fishery would increase its effort 19 percent\nrelative to Alternative 1, whereas the eastern Bering Sea sablefish fishery would increase its effort by 57\npercent. The BSAI Pacific cod longline and pot fisheries would increase their efforts by 33 percent and 28\npercent, respectively.\nIn the GOA, the Pacific cod longline fishery would increase its effort by 53 percent relative to Alternative 1,\nwhereas the Pacific cod pot fishery increased its effort by 36 percent. The sablefish longline fishery would\nincrease its effort by 18 percent.\nBenthic Biodiversity. As with the evaluation of Alternative 1, the geographic extent of fishing with bottom\ntrawls was examined as one indication of the level of protection to benthic biodiversity. This extent was\nestimated using bathymetric maps, accurate to depths of 500 m or less. This area is a reasonable\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-32","approximation of the amount of benthic EFH for most groundfish species, although a considerable portion of\nthe distribution of EFH for species such as shortspine thornyheads, sablefish, and deep water flatfish occurs\nat depths greater than 500 m (Fritz et al. 1998). In computing the area of benthic habitat protection\nattributable to the various alternatives, the amount of benthic habitat already closed to bottom trawling is\naccounted for. For example, if an alternative results in 100 km2 of benthic habitat being closed to bottom\ntrawling, and such closure overlaps with Alternative 1 closure of 60 km then only 40 km2 would be attributed\nto that alternative.\nThe area of benthic EFH is 702,868 km2 in the eastern Bering Sea, 59,124 km2 in the Aleutian Islands and\n310,757 km2 in the Gulf of Alaska (GOA) (Table 4.7-8). Under Alternative 1, the percentage of the total\nbenthic EFH area protected from bottom trawling year-round is 16 percent, 18 percent, and 21 percent, in the\neastern Bering Sea, Aleutian Islands, and GOA, respectively. Other areas closed only for part of the year may\nalso afford some protection to benthic habitat. For example, seasonal closures in the vicinity of sea lion\nrookeries and in red king crab nursery areas. If these partially closed areas are considered, then the percentage\nof total benthic EFH area that is protected, at least partially, from bottom trawling under Alternative 1\nincreases to 18 percent, 34 percent, and 22 percent in the eastern Bering Sea, Aleutian Islands, and GOA,\nrespectively. However since it is unknown to what degree these partially closed areas offer protection to EFH,\nonly year-round closed areas are considered to be beneficial to EFH in this analysis.\nAlternatives 2.1. 2.2, 4. 6.1, and 6.2\nAlternatives 2.1, 2.2, 4, 6.1, and 6.2, would all close the same amount of benthic EFH year-round to bottom\ntrawling, as represented by Alternative 1 (Table 4.7-8). Alternative 2 would provide for some increased\nseasonal protection to benthic EFH because large areas of benthic habitat in addition to those closed under the\nAlternative 1 would be closed seasonally to specific fisheries in order to protect of Steller sea lions 51,300 km2\nin the eastern Bering Sea, 29,700 km2 in the Aleutian Islands, and 109,870 km2 in the GOA. Closing these\nareas would provide partial protection to benthic habitat to the extent that other trawl fisheries are restricted.\nFor example, these closures would provide protection from pollock, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel fisheries,\nbut would not provide protection to benthic habitat from bottom trawl rockfish or flatfish fisheries. Alternative\n4 includes a closure area for the protection of squid in the eastern Bering Sea but it is only closed to the pelagic\ntrawl pollock fishery, and thus would not offer increased protection to benthic habitat.\nAlternative 3\nAlternative 3 offers considerable habitat protection by closing 20 percent of benthic EFH to all fishing year-\nround. Compared to management under the Alternative 1, Alternative 3 would entail additional closures of\n131,340 k 6,690 and 54,660 km2 in the eastern Bering Sea, Aleutian Islands, and GOA, respectively.\nCombined with existing Alternative 1 closures, this would result in protection from bottom trawling for 35\npercent, 29 percent, and 39 percent of benthic EFH in the eastern Bering Sea, Aleutian Islands, and GOA,\nrespectively. However, this alternative does not include any decrease in TAC. Thus, there would likely be a\nshift in fishing effort to other areas, which could offset the some of the alternative's protective value.\nAnother way that Alternative 3 could lead to increased habitat protection is that the 20 percent closure areas\nwould provide protection to a wide diversity of habitat types, thus promoting biodiversity. These closures are\nsystematically placed throughout the Alaska region and are distributed across depth contours. Setting up a\nnetwork of open and closed areas in such a systematic fashion could help ensure that representative habitat\ntypes are protected. This network could also provide a means for scientific comparison of treatment and\ncontrol areas. Little is known about the effects of fishing on EFH in Alaska and the resulting effects on\nproductivity of target species and the ecosystem. Provided research support is available to make comparative\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-33","observations inside and outside these areas, considerable insight into rational measures to minimize adverse\nimpacts to EFH could be gained from applying such a measure.\nAlternative 5\nAlternative 5 would provide extensive habitat protection because bottom trawling is restricted to specified\nareas. The areas that would remain open to bottom trawling under Alternative 5 correspond to the current\ndistribution of fishing effort in the Atka mackerel and flatfish fisheries. Accompanying this closure are\ndecreases in TAC for Atka mackerel and flatfish. Alternative 5 would also prohibit all fishing in specified\nHAPC areas in the vicinity of high gorgonian coral abundance. The restriction of bottom trawling to specified\nopen areas under Alternative 5 would add 517,930 km², 33,680 km2 174,930 km2 to existing bottom trawl\nclosures in the eastern Bering Sea, Aleutian Islands, and GOA, respectively. HAPC areas account for a\nrelatively small portion of the closed areas in Alternative 5, adding only 6,390 km2 in the Aleutian Islands and\n7,490 km2 in the GOA. Combining Alternative 5 EFH and HAPC closures with existing Alternative 1 closures\nwould result in year-round protection from bottom trawling of 90 percent, 86 percent, and 80 percent of benthic\nEFH in the eastern Bering Sea, Aleutian Islands, and GOA, respectively.\nAlthough Alternative 5 would protect extensive areas from the impacts of bottom trawling, the areas which\nwould remain open to Atka mackerel and flatfish fishing likely correspond to the preferred habitat of adult life\nstages of Atka mackerel and flatfish. How important habitat biodiversity is to these species is unknown.\n4.7.2.3\nImpacts of Alternatives 1 Through 6 on Nonbenthic Essential Fish Habitat\nEFH is defined as those waters and substrate necessary to fish for spawning, breeding, feeding, or growth to\nmaturity. In this definition \"waters\" includes aquatic areas and the associated physical, chemical, and\nbiological properties used by fish. Substrate includes sediment, hard bottom, structures underlying the waters,\nand associated biological communities. The primary components of nonbenthic EFH would include the\nphysical and chemical properties of the water column, and the main biological component would consist of\nnonbenthic prey of groundfish. As outlined in Section 3.3.1.13 on forage fish and Section 3.3.2 on ecological\nrelationships between target species and other species, the dominant nonbenthic prey that fisheries could impact\ndirectly would be target species such as Atka mackerel and walleye pollock and nontarget species such as\ncapelin and other forage fish. Impacts of the alternatives on Atka mackerel, pollock, and forage fish are\ncovered in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. The main influence of fishing vessels on physical and chemical water\nproperties would be through ship discharges of organic and inorganic material. These aspects are covered in\nSection 4.11.\n4.7.2.4\nSummary\nTo summarize the level of EFH protection among alternatives, a system to rank four direct effects and one\nindirect effect was developed in order to compare alternatives relative to Alternative 1 (Table 4.7-12). The\nsummary table contains an ordinal index for each type of potential effect of each alternative relative to\nAlternative 1. The effects rankings are based on analyses in the preceding impacts sections. The ranking\nsystem consists of five metric levels: -2 reflects significantly less protection than Alternative 1, - -1 reflects\nmarginally less protection than Alternative 1, +0 the same or negligibly different level of protection, +1\nmarginally more protection, and +2 significantly more protection. Since the index values only contain ordinal\ninformation, they can only be used to make ordinal comparisons. For example, an index value of +2 is better\nthan a value of +1, but it is not true, in general, that a +2 is twice as good or provides twice as much protection\nas a regime receiving a score of +1. Therefore, it is not possible to obtain meaningful summary information\nby performing numerical operations (e.g., adding, subtracting, averaging) using two or more index values.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-34","Recognizing that such general terminology is inherently subjective, criteria were applied to define the terms\nsignificantly less, marginally less, negligibly, marginally more, and significantly more. The criteria for the\nrankings are shown in Table 4.7-12. These criteria are generally self-explanatory for all effects except those\ninvolving HAPC biota. To assign relative levels of removal or damage of HAPC biota to each alternative,\nthe percent increase or decrease of estimated bycatch relative to Alternative 1 is considered (Table 4.7-13).\nFor each gear type (trawl or fixed-gear) there are four types of biota (coral, anemone, sponges, sea pens and\nsea whips) and two regions (BSAI, GOA) resulting in eight elements per gear type. The degree and\nconsistency of increase or decrease was used to distinguish among the alternatives and were grouped into the\nfollowing categories:\nSame level of removal/damage (+0): no element increases or decreases 10 percent or more.\nMarginally less removal/damage (+1): decrease of 5 to 20 percent for majority of elements, or one or\ntwo elements decrease 50 percent or more and no other elements increase more than 20 percent.\nMuch less removal/damage (+2): majority of elements decrease 20 percent or more and no element\nincreases more than 20 percent.\nMuch more removal/damage (-2): majority of elements increase 20 percent or more and no element\ndecreases more than 20 percent.\nMarginally more removal/damage (-1): increase of 5-20 percent for majority of elements, or one or two\nelements increase 50 percent or more and no other elements decrease greater than 20 percent.\nTable 4.7-14 gives the rankings for the effects by alternative. The rationales for the rankings for each effect\nare explained in the subsections that follow.\nRemoval and Damage of HAPC Biota\nFor some alternatives, the bycatch model predicts a large increase in particular fisheries, which would also\nincrease HAPC biota captured or damaged during fishing activities. The fisheries in question are for\nunderutilized species, such as certain flatfish. In some cases, a large increase in an undefined fishery greatly\ninfluences the relative change in estimated damage or removal by a gear type for a particular alternative. In\nthese cases, a range of rankings is provided to indicate the increased uncertainty.\nFor Alternative 2, HAPC biota bycatch would generally decrease in the trawl fisheries, particularly in\nAlternative 2.2. Removal is marginally less for Alternative 2.1 and much less for Alternative 2.2, under which\nfive of eight species/region comparisons would decrease more than 20 percent relative to Alternative 1.\nBycatch would decrease in fixed-gear as well, marginally less for Alternative 2.1, under which only half of the\ncomparisons would decrease more than 20 percent. Under Alternative 2.2, five comparisons would decrease\nmore than 50 percent; however, there would be a large increase in the take of corals and sponges in the\nundefined hook-and-line fishery in the BSAI. If the results for that fishery were discounted, there would be\nmuch less removal of HAPC biota by fixed-gear under Alternative 2.2. Due to the uncertainty as to the validity\nof that result, a range of marginally less or marginally more removal of HAPC biota by fixed-gear is indicated\nfor Alternative 2.2.\nFor Alternative 3, the trawl fishery bycatch of HAPC biota would decrease in most fisheries, except certain\nflatfish trawl fisheries which are predicted to increase considerably. Depending on the validity of these\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-35","CHAPTER DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\ntrawl effort more than\nround to bottom trawl\nAmount of fixed-gear\nfishing more than 25\n25 percent less than\npercent greater than\nMuch less removal/\nMuch less removal/\neffort more than 25\nAmount of bottom\ndamage of HAPC\ndamage of HAPC\npercent less than\nArea closed year\n2\n2\nstatus quo.\nstatus quo.\nstatus quo.\nbiota\nbiota\nTable 4.7-12 Scoring System for Ranking the Effects of the Alternatives on Benthic Essential Fish Habitat\nremoval/damage of\nremoval/damage of\ntrawl fishing 10-25\nAmount of bottom\npercent more than\ntrawl effort 10-25\nArea closed year-\npercent less than\ngear effort 10-25\npercent less than\nAmount of fixed-\nround to bottom\nMarginally less\nMarginally less\nHAPC biota\nHAPC biota\nstatus quo.\nstatus quo.\nstatus quo.\n1\n1\nof fixed-gear effort\nclosed year round\nremoval/damage\nremoval/damage\npercent) amount\npercent) amount\nfishing as status\nof bottom trawl\neffort as status\nto bottom trawl\nas status quo.\nas status quo.\nas status quo.\nSame (+/- 10\nSame (+/- 10\nSame (+/- 10\npercent) area\nSame level\nSame level\n0\n0\nScore\nquo.\nquo.\ngreater than status quo.\nAmount of bottom trawl\ngreater than status quo.\nArea closed year round\nto bottom trawl fishing\nAmount of fixed-gear\neffort 10-25 percent\neffort 10-25 percent\nremoval/damage to\nremoval/damage to\n10-25 percent less\nMarginally more\nMarginally more\n4.7-36\n-1\n-1\nHAPC biota.\nHAPC biota.\nstatus quo.\neffort is more than 25\nround to bottom trawl\nfishing more than 25\nAmount of fixed-gear\nMuch more removal/\npercent greater than\nremoval/damage to\ntrawl effort is more\ngreater than status\nAmount of bottom\ndamage to HAPC\nArea closed year\npercent less than\nthan 25 percent\n-2\n-2\nHAPC biota.\nMuch more\nstatus quo.\nstatus quo.\nNotes: HAPC - habitat area of particular concern\nbiota.\nquo.\nRemoval/ damage of\nRemoval/ damage of\nHAPC biota by fixed-\nby bottom trawl gear\nnonliving substrates\nnonliving substrates\nBenthic biodiversity\nIndirect Effects\nDirect Effects\nbottom trawl gear\nHAPC biota by\nModification of\nModification of\nby fixed-gear\ngear\nHabitat complexity\nadverse impacts\nMinimization of\nIssue\nIssue\nJANUARY 2001","Recent Change Between Alternative 1 and Alternatives 2-6 in Projected Catch of\nTable 4.7-13\nHabitat Areas of Particular Concern Biota by Gear and Region\nTrawl Gear\n6.2\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands\n0\n0\n-65\n-15\n9\nCoral\n6\n-13\n-16\nAnemone\n-7\n-27\n57\n1\n0\n-3\n24\n59\n0\n0\n-24\n20\n57\nSponge\n-8\n-25\n45\n-18\n16\nSea pens and sea whips\n-27\n-74\n-17\n-9\n-8\n-36\nGulf of Alaska\n-7\nCoral\n1\n9\n0\n-1\n-54\n-12\n27\n6\n-1\n0\n-38\n-6\n56\nAnemone\n-13\n-39\n-13\n0\n0\n-56\n-9\n27\nSponge\n-3\n-11\n-81\n-15\n3\nSea pens and whips\n-58\n-82\n-14\n0\n0\nFixed-Gear\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nCoral\n-4\n66\n-4\n0\n-8\n8\n-20\n4\n-20\n18\nAnemone\n-28\n-83\n-6\n0\n-67\n60\n0\n-2\n2\n-20\n1\nSponge\n-1\n93\n0\n-20\n18\nSea pens and whips\n-28\n-85\n-6\n0\n-68\n61\nGulf of Alaska\nCoral\n1\n-9\n-6\n1\n1\n31\n-19\n26\n-5\n0\n0\n156\n-19\n48\nAnemone\n-16\n-54\n-14\n0\n0\n112\n-20\n18\nSponge\n-41\n-80\n-17\n0\n0\n116\n-21\n11\nSea pens and whips\n-47\n-77\npredicted increases, there will be marginally less removal or marginally more removal of HAPC biota by trawl\ngear compared to Alternative 1. Removal of HAPC biota by fixed-gear would be marginally less where in\nseven of eight comparisons Alternative 3 resulted in decreases between 5 and 20 percent compared to\nAlternative 1.\nAlternative 4.1 would have approximately the same level of removal of HAPC biota as Alternative 1 for both\ntrawl and fixed-gear. Alternative 4.2 would have approximately the same level of removal as Alternative 1 for\ntrawl gear, and marginally less removal by fixed-gear.\nAlternative 5 would have much less bycatch of HAPC biota by trawl gear than Alternative 1 and much more\nremoval of HAPC biota by fixed-gear fisheries.\nThe ranking for Alternative 6.1 depends on such factors as the validity of the increase in the BSAI rock sole\nand flathead sole fisheries, the assumed 20 percent reduction in bycatch rates, and the relative value of corals\nand seawhips versus anemones and sponges. Because there is considerable uncertainty regarding these factors,\nAlternative 6.1 is considered to result in only marginally more or less removal and damage to HAPC biota by\ntrawl gear. If the 20 percent bycatch rate reduction assumption is valid for fixed-gear, there appear to be\ninsignificant differences in removal or damage by fixed-gear compared to Alternative 1. Compared to\nAlternative 1, the bycatch model predicts that Alternative 6.2 would result in a moderate increase in the\namount of HAPC biota taken as bycatch by trawl gear and only a slight increase in bycatch of HAPC biota\nby fixed-gear.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-37","The index values contained in this table only contain ordinal information and can only be used to make ordinal comparisons. For example, an index value of +2 is\nbetter than a value +1, but not necessarily twice as good. Therefore, it is not possible to obtain meaningful summary information by performing numerical operations\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n6.2\nScores for Each Alternative Reflecting Levels of Protection for Benthic Essential Fish Habitat Relative To Alternative 1\n-2\n-1\n-2\n-2\n0\n6\n-1 or 1\n6.1\n-1\n-1\n0\n0\n-2\n-2\n5\n2\n2\n2\n4.2\n0\n0\n2\n1\n0\n4\nAlternatives\n4.1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n-1 or 1\n3\n0\n2\n1\n1\n4.7-38\n1 or -1\n2.2\n2\n2\n2\n0\n(e.g., adding, subtracting, averaging) using two or more of the index values.\n2\n2.1\n2\n1\n0\n1\n1\n-1/+1 - marginal, or minor change from Alternative 1.\n-2/+2 - Moderate or major change from Alternative 1.\n1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0 - no change/difference from Alternative 1.\nRemoval/damage of HAPC\nRemoval/damage of HAPC\nsubstrates by bottom trawl\nbiota by bottom trawl gear\nModification of nonliving\nModification of nonliving\nsubstrates by fixed-gear\nbiota by fixed-gear\nEffects\nBiodiversity\ngear\nIndirect Effects\nDirect Effects\nTable 4.7-14\nMinimization\ncomplexity\nof adverse\nJANUARY 2001\nimpacts\nHabitat\nIssue\nNotes:","Modification of Nonliving Substrates\nThe ranking for the amount of disturbance to nonliving substrates by bottom trawl gear is based on the amount\nof bottom trawl effort. Relative to Alternative 1, only Alternatives 6.1 and 6.2 would result in more\ndisturbance to nonliving substrates by bottom trawl gear. Alternative 6.1 would result in a marginal increase\nin bottom trawl effort of 16 percent. Alternative 6.2 would result in a significant increase in bottom trawl\neffort of 27 percent. Alternative 2.2 and Alternative 5 would result in significant decreases in bottom trawl\neffort; 53 percent for Alternative 2.2 and 28 percent for Alternative 5. While greater decreases in bottom trawl\nwould be expected under Alternative 5 in the Bering Sea, in the model configuration, Alternative 5\nunexpectedly results in increased catches and hence effort in shallow water flatfish fisheries in the Bering Sea.\nThe validity of this increase is uncertain. The model generated this result probably because flatfish catches are\ncurrently not limited by their TAC limit. Thus, effort increased in the model despite decrease in the TAC for\nflatfish under Alternative 5. Alternative 3 and Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 would result in nearly identical\ndisturbance to nonliving substrates from bottom trawl gear compared to Alternative 1.\nThe ranking for the amount of disturbance to nonliving substrates by fixed-gear is based on the amount of\nfixed-gear effort. Only Alternative 5 and Alternative 6.2 would result in more disturbance to non-living\nsubstrates caused by fixed-gear. Relative to Alternative 1, Alternative 5 would significantly increase fixed-gear\neffort, 57 percent; and Alternative 6.2 would significantly increase fixed-gear effort, 31 percent. Alternatives\n2.1, 2.2, and 4.2 would result in significantly less habitat disturbance from fixed-gear; 26 percent, 62 percent,\nand 48 percent, respectively. In the GOA Alternatives 3 and 6 and Alternatives 2.1, 4.1, and 4.2 would result\nin disturbance from fixed-gear nearly identical habitat to Alternative 1. Alternative 6 and Alternative 4.1 would\nresult in disturbance to nonliving substrates from fixed-gear nearly identical to Alternative 1.\nBenthic Biodiversity. The ranking for impacts on benthic biodiversity is based on the amount of area closed\nyear-round to bottom trawling. No alternatives would result in greater adverse impact to benthic biodiversity\nthan Alternative 1. Alternatives 3 and 5 would provide significant increases in the area of year-round closure\nto bottom trawl fishing. The increase in the year-round closure area to bottom trawl fishing would be 103\npercent and 399 percent for Alternatives 3 and 5, respectively. Alternative 4 and Alternatives 2.1, 2.2, 6.1,\nand 6.2 would result in the same area of year-round closure as Alternative 1.\nNot considered in the ranking tables is the impact of the spatial configuration of the area closures on benthic\nbiodiversity. The systematically placed network of closure areas for Alternative 3 could help ensure that a\ndiversity of habitats are protected in the BSAI and GOA. This network could also provide a means of\nconducting scientific experiments on the effects of fishing on open and closed areas. Little is known about the\neffects of fishing on EFH in Alaska now these effects would influence productivity. Considerable insight into\nrational measures to minimize adverse impacts to biodiversity could be gained from applying such a\ncombination of management measures.\nConclusion\nIn conclusion, the linkage between fishing and habitat characteristics is not known with great precision for\nAlaskan fisheries. The absence of fish stocks below their minimum stock size thresholds (Section 4.4) implies\nthat the status quo fishery has not had significant impacts on the productivity of stocks in the BSAI and GOA.\nHowever, the destructive effects of fishing practices, particularly bottom trawling, on benthic organisms and\ncommunity structure is increasingly recognized (e.g., Auster and Langton 1999) and concerns are being raised\nabout the ecological implications of these effects. An example of such effects is the removal and damage to\nHAPC biota. Such biota are believed to provide important habitat for fish, and this removal is considered a\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-39","potential problem. It seems wise for future management strategies to take this into account and take steps to\nprevent significant reductions.\nAlternative regimes that provide additional protection and additional information may provide the most\nprotection to EFH. Open and closed areas, properly arrayed over fishing grounds and habitat, could allow\nscientific comparisons of the impacts of fishing on benthic EFH. A management regime with aspects of\nAlternatives 3 and 5 could improve protection to benthic EFH and enable scientific validation of protective\nmeasures. Properly designed, such a management regime could increase protection to habitat with a minimal\nadverse impact on the economic rewards from the fishery. The status quo fishery is very valuable.\nPrecautionary measures are justified that enable EFH to be protected and simultaneously allow evaluation of\nthe impacts of the fishery. Such measures may allow benefits of the resource to be realized without adversely\nimpacting future productivity.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.7-40","4.8\nEconomic and Social Effects of the Alternatives\nThe principal question being addressed by this supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) is what\nare the effects on the human environment of the proposed action and alternatives to the proposed action. This\nsection focuses on the expected economic and social effects of each alternative policy, including the status quo\nregime. The analysis of the alternative is intended to illustrate the general effects of at least one approach to\nimplement each of the policy frameworks.\n1. groundfish exvessel value\n2. total exvessel value\n3. average harvesting cost\n4. groundfish product value\n5. average processing cost\n6. preemption of processing sectors\n7. preemption of vessel classes\n8. net benefits to domestic seafood consumers\n9. nonconsumptive and non-use value\n10. groundfish discards\n11. prohibited species catch\n12. vessel safety\n13. excess capacity\n14. labor payments by catcher vessels\n15. labor payments by catcher/processors\n16. labor payments by other groundfish processors\n17. total labor employment\n18. groundfish exvessel value by region of landings\n19. total exvessel value by region of landing\n20. inshore groundfish product value by region of operation\n21. inshore groundfish processing labor payment by region of operation\n22. inshore groundfish processing labor payment by region of operation\n23. groundfish exvessel value by region of vessel owner\n24. total exvessel value by region of vessel owner\n25. subsistence use of living marine resources\nThis list includes commonly used measures of the economic and social effects of commercial fisheries, as well\nas, effects that reflect the economic and social concerns identified during the scoping process. Therefore, the\nlist includes many of the direct and indirect effects of the alternatives and indicators or surrogates for other\ndirect and indirect effects that are more difficult to measure or model. For example, estimates on labor\npayments serve as an indicator of the contribution of the groundfish fisheries to a community's employment\nlevels. Similarly, total and groundfish exvessel values by region of landing are subject to local and state taxes\nand are surrogate indicators for fishery-generated tax revenue to local and state governments. They are also\nan indicator of the demand for support services by the groundfish fisheries in individual communities, which\nneed a certain level of fisheries activity to survive economically.\nWe discuss the model projections and qualifications and the following basic set of direct effects of the\ngroundfish fisheries of Alternatives 1-6 in Sections 4.8.1-4.8.6, respectively:\n1.\ngroundfish exvessel value\n2.\naverage harvesting cost\n3.\ngroundfish product value\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-1","4.\naverage processing cost\n5.\nnet benefits to domestic seafood consumers\n6.\nnonconsumptive and non-use value\n7.\ngroundfish discards\n8.\nprohibited species catch\n9.\nvessel safety\n10.\nexcess capacity\nWith one exception, we discuss the other categories of effects in section 4.8.7, which address potential effects\nfrom the perspectives of regions and communities associated with the fishery. In Section 4.8.8, we discuss the\neffects of each alternative on the subsistence use of living marine resources. Finally, we provide a summary\nof the economic and social effects of the alternatives in Section 4.8.9.\nAll of the quantitative estimates presented in this section are based on the output of the catch and bycatch\nprojection model described in Section 4.1.6. The inputs to that model include the mean acceptable biological\ncatch (ABC) by species and area for each of 5-years (2001-2005) that were generated by running each species-\nspecific simulation model 1,000 times. Therefore, the variability in the estimates of ABCs across the 1,000\nsimulations is not captured by the catch and bycatch model and is not reflected in the projections discussed in\nthis section.\n4.8.1\nAlternative 1\nThis section contains both quantitative and qualitative assessments of a basic set of economic and social effects\nof Alternative 1, the current management regime. More detailed discussions of these effects are included in\nsubsequent discussions of the differences between Alternative 1 and each of the alternative model regimes.\nOther economic and social effects are discussed in Section 4.8.7. We make references to a common set of\ntables in Sections 4.8.1-4.8.6; those tables are at the end of Sections 4.8.6.\n4.8.1.1\nAlternative 1 Impacts on the Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nAlternative 1 Impacts on Exvessel Value for Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nA summary of the model projections of the exvessel value of BSAI and GOA groundfish delivered to inshore\nprocessors under Alternative 1 is followed by a qualitative assessment of those projections.\nModel Projections\nThe following discussion is of the model projections of the trends and 5-year means (2001-2005) of the\nexvessel value for groundfish delivered to inshore processors under the current management regime. The\nregulatory assumptions for these projections are the status quo regulations. However, changes that will occur\nas a result of implementing increased retention and utilization regulations for flatfish in 2003 are not accounted\nfor in the model projections for Alternative 1 or any other alternative. This is because the effects of those\nregulations on catch, bycatch, discards, product quality and value, and the economic viability of the existing\nflatfish fisheries are unknown at this time. The projections also do not account for the potential impacts of\nfurther changes to harvesting activities in sea lion critical habitat that may be required by court rulings and\nregulations.\nFor Alternative 1, the 5-year mean estimate of exvessel value for all Gulf of Alaska (GOA) and Bering Sea\nand Aleutian Islands (BSAI) groundfish delivered to inshore processors is $255 million (Table 4.8-1). Under\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-2","Alternative 1, exvessel value first declines and then rises such that Alaska-wide exvessel value in 2005 is\napproximately 5 percent higher than the 5-year mean (Table 4.8-33). The 5-year mean estimate for the GOA\nis $113 million. Exvessel value in 2005 is projected at $123 million, which is about 11 percent higher than\nthe 5-year mean level. For the BSAI, the 5-year mean for exvessel value is $142 million, while the level in 2005\nis projected at $146 million.\nThe Alternative 1 area-wide 5-year mean estimate of exvessel value for hook-and-line gear is $74 million\n(Table 4.8-7). The corresponding estimates for pot and trawl gear, respectively, are $11.3 million and $170\nmillion (Tables 4.8-9 and 4.8-11). The estimates by gear type for the BSAI and GOA separately are in Tables\n4.8-13 through 4.8-24.\nFor Alternative 1, the 5-year mean estimates of the exvessel value by species and processor group for the GOA\nand BSAI combined are in Table 4.8-25. Pollock, Pacific cod, and sablefish account for nearly 95 percent of\nthese projections of the exvessel value of groundfish delivered to inshore processors.\nAlthough the BSAI and GOA groundfish fisheries under the current management regime are expected to\ncontinue to generate an important share of the total exvessel value of all domestic commercial fisheries, the use\nof the race for fish to allocate total allowable catches (TACs) and prohibited species catch (PSC) limits among\ncompeting fishermen has resulted in unnecessarily low exvessel values. It is expected to continue to do SO by\ndecreasing the following: (1) retention rates (2) product recovery rates, (3) product quality, and (4) the ability\nof fishermen to take fuller advantage of seasonal demand for some seafood products, to prevent seasonal\nmarket gluts, or to take advantage of seasonal differences in product quality.\nQualifications\nThe model projections of exvessel value discussed above may be biased either upward or downward for a\nvariety of reasons. Fixed prices equal to the 1997-1999 average exvessel prices are used to value projections\nof retained catches. Actual prices may rise or decline with levels of catch, changes in market conditions, or\nother factors. The use of historical prices for pollock is likely to underestimate value since exvessel prices for\nBSAI pollock are expected to rise as a result of increases in product quality and value made possible by the\nAmerican Fisheries Act (AFA) cooperatives. Catch estimates from the simulations may be overstated or\nunderstated as they assume no change in bycatch rates, retention rates, allocations of prohibited species, etc.\nThe net impact of upward and downward bias in the projections of exvessel value is difficult to determine;\nhowever, we expect that the model projections understate exvessel value, assuming current regulatory and\nmarket conditions.\nAlternative 1 Impacts on Costs for Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nAlthough harvesting cost data generally are not available for the BSAI and GOA groundfish fisheries, some\ngeneral statements can be made about the effect of the current management regime on harvesting costs. The\nuse of the race for fish to allocate TACs and PSC limits among competing fishermen has increased both fixed\nand variable harvesting costs substantially.\nAlternative 1 Impacts on the Processing Sector\n4.8.1.2\nAlternative 1 Impacts on Product Value for Processors\nA summary of the model projections of the product value of BSAI and GOA groundfish through primary\nprocessing under Alternative 1 is followed by a qualitative assessment of those projections.\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-3","Model Projections\nThe following discussion is of the model projections of the 5-year means (2001-2005) and trends of the product\nvalue for groundfish for processors. The regulatory assumptions for these projections are the status quo\nregulations. However, changes that will occur as a result of implementing increased retention and utilization\nguidelines in 2003 are not accounted for in the model. The projections also do not account for the potential\nimpacts of further changes to harvesting activities in sea lion critical habitat that may be required by court\nrulings and regulations.\nFor Alternative 1, the 5-year mean estimate of product value for all BSAI and GOA groundfish is $1,207\nmillion (Table 4.8-27). Product value first declines and then rises such that Alaska-wide groundfish product\nvalue in 2005 is approximately 4 percent higher than the 5-year mean (Table 4.8-39). The 5-year mean estimate\nfor the GOA is $218 million. GOA product value in 2005 is projected at $239 million, which is about 10\npercent higher than the 5-year mean level. For the BSAI, the 5-year mean for product value is $989 million,\nwhile the level in 2005 is projected at $1,016 million. Pollock and Pacific cod account for about 80 percent of\nthese projections of product value, while flatfish and sablefish each account for another 6 percent.\nAlthough the BSAI and GOA groundfish fisheries under the current management regime are expected to\ncontinue to generate an important share both of the total product value of all domestic commercial fisheries and\nof domestic fishery exports, the use of the race for fish to allocate TACs and PSC limits among competing\nfishermen has resulted in unnecessarily low product values. It is expected to continue to do SO by decreasing\n(1) retention rates, (2) product recovery rates, (3) product quality, and (4) the ability of processors either to\ntake fuller advantage of seasonal demand for some seafood products and seasonal differences in product quality\nor to prevent seasonal market gluts.\nQualifications\nAs was the case for the projections of exvessel value, the projections of product value may be biased for a\nvariety of reasons. The simulations use 1996 to 1998 average prices and 1999 product mixes to estimate\nproduct value from projected catches. Product prices are likely to change over time as levels of production and\nmarket conditions change, and processors can be expected to alter product mix to take advantage of changes\nin relative product prices. The use of historical product prices and the 1999 product mixes may underestimate\nproduct value for the pollock fishery (particularly the inshore component) since average product value per unit\nof pollock catch is expected to rise as a result of increases in product quality and value made possible by the\nAFA cooperatives. Cooperatives were already in place in the catcher/processor sector in 1999, but were not\nimplemented until 2000 for the inshore and mothership sectors. Catch estimates from the simulations may\nbe\noverstated or understated as they assume no change in bycatch rates, retention rates, allocations of prohibited\nspecies, etc. The net impact of upward and downward bias in projections of product value is difficult to\ndetermine; however, as with the projections of exvessel value, the model projections understate product value,\nassuming current regulatory and market conditions.\nAlternative 1 Impacts on Cost for Processors\nAlthough processing cost data generally are not available for the BSAI and GOA groundfish fisheries, some\ngeneral statements can be made about the effect of the current management regime on processing costs. The\nuse of the race for fish to allocate TACs and vessel limits among competing fishermen has resulted in excess\nprocessing capacity, which has increased both fixed and variable processing costs substantially.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-4","Alternative 1 Impacts on Consumers of Groundfish Products\n4.8.1.3\nThe BSAI and GOA groundfish fisheries are expected to continue to provide high and relatively stable levels\nof seafood products to domestic and foreign markets. Estimates of the final market value of BSAI and GOA\nseafood products are not available; however, it would be substantially greater than $1.2 billion, the projected\n5-year mean of the product value of BSAI and GOA groundfish after primary processing with Alternative 1.\nHowever, by decreasing both the quantity and quality of groundfish products available to consumers, the race\nfor fish, which would continue under the current management regime will prevent some potential consumer\nbenefits from being attained.\nAlternative 1 Impacts on Nonconsumptive and Nonuse Values\n4.8.1.4\nStudies have shown significant willingness to pay on the part of the general public for the existence of species\n(and the preservation of endangered species) as well as the preservation of wilderness areas that the individuals\nnever expect to see. Estimates of nonconsumptive and nonuse values for various levels of the many\ncomponents of the BSAI and GOA ecosystems are not available at this time. Therefore, it is not possible to\nquantify the expected level of nonconsumptive and nonuse benefits that will occur under the current\nmanagement regime.\nAlternative 1 Impacts on Prohibited Species Catch and Groundfish Discards\n4.8.1.5\nAn extensive at-sea observer program was developed for the foreign fleets and then extended to the domestic\nfishery once it had all but replaced participation by foreign fishing and processing vessels. The observer\nprogram resulted in fundamental changes in the nature of the bycatch problem. First, by providing good\nestimates of total groundfish catch and non-groundfish bycatch by species, it eliminated much of the concern\nthat total fishing mortality was being underestimated due to fish that were discarded at sea. Second, it made\nit possible to establish, monitor and enforce the groundfish quotas in terms of total catch as opposed to only\nretained catch. Third, it made it possible to implement and enforce bycatch quotas for the non-groundfish\nspecies that by regulation had to be discarded at sea. Finally, it provided extensive information that managers\nand the industry could use to assess methods to reduce bycatch and bycatch mortality. In summary, the\nobserver program provided fishery managers with the information and tools necessary to prevent bycatch from\nadversely affecting the stocks of the bycatch species themselves. Therefore, the bycatch in the groundfish\nfishery is principally not a conservation problem but it can be an allocation problem. Although this does not\nmake it less controversial, it does help identify the types of information and management measures that are\nrequired to reduce bycatch to the extent practicable, as is required by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery\nConservation Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act).\nThe attempts of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (the Council) and National Marine Fisheries\nService (NMFS) to address bycatch in the groundfish fisheries have demonstrated the need for a better\nunderstanding of (1) the levels of bycatch, (2) the fishing practices and techniques that can decrease bycatch\nmortality, and (3) the population, ecosystem, social, and economic effects of bycatch and of bycatch\nmanagement measures. In addition, improved decisions require increased efforts to ensure that fishermen,\nfishery managers, and the public more fully consider the impacts of their bycatch decisions. The use of the\nrace for fish to allocate fish among competing fishermen has been identified as a major impediment to fishermen\nfully considering the impacts of their bycatch decisions.\nWith the current management regime, prohibited species bycatch and groundfish discards are expected to\nremain principally an allocation issue, not a conservation issue. Fishermen will not have adequate incentives\nto control bycatch. Relatively high cost methods will continue to be used to control bycatch and the benefits\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-5","of decreasing bycatch will continue to be unnecessarily low; therefore, smaller reductions in bycatch will be\npracticable than would otherwise be the case.\nFrom an economic perspective, the costs of PCS and groundfish discards will both continue to include: (1) the\ncost imposed on the groundfish fleet by having to stay within the PSC limits and to meet the retention\nrequirements for pollock and Pacific cod, (2) the cost imposed on some sectors of the groundfish fleet by other\nsectors using groundfish as discards, (3) the cost of PSC imposed on crab, halibut, herring, and salmon\nfishermen (including commercial, recreational, and subsistence fishermen) in terms of reduced catch and value,\n(4) the cost of any net adverse ecological effects associated with discarding fish at sea and (5) the management\nand enforcement costs associated with controlling these two types of bycatch. The second and third types of\ncosts are the opportunity costs of using prohibited species and groundfish as discards. In the case of a TAC\nthat is not utilized fully, the opportunity cost of using that species as discard may be very low. All but the first\ntype of cost are external costs from the perspective of groundfish fishermen. These external costs are the\nreason why, from the nation's perspective, fishermen tend to use too many fish as discards.\nAlternative 1 Impacts on Fishing Vessel Safety\n4.8.1.6\nConcerns about vessel safety have been raised by fishermen, fishery managers, the public, Congress, and\nAlaska Governor Tony Knowles. The high risks faced by fishermen at sea and the effects of fishery regulations\non those risks are recognized broadly. The Magnuson-Steven Act national standard 10 highlights the issue of\nfishing vessel safety; it states that Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable,\npromote the safety of human life at sea. In a recent press release, Governor Knowles discussed the issue of\nfishing vessel safety and stated that According to the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health,\nAlaska fishermen face a workplace mortality rate 20 times the national average, and that rate is highest-more\nthan 50 times the national average-among those who fish farthest from shore. The risk to fishermen is\nexpected to remain high under the current management regime. This is in part due to the continued use of (1)\nthe race for fish to allocate TACs and PSC limits among competing fishermen and (2) regulations that require\nfishermen to operate farther from shore or in areas and seasons with more hazardous weather conditions.\nAlternative 1 Impacts on Excess Capacity\n4.8.1.7\nThe current management regime includes a variety of measures that were intended, at least in part, to limit\nexcess harvesting and processing capacity. As indicated by recent problem statements prepared by the Council,\nthe measures have not been successful in eliminating excess capacity as one of the major management problems\nfor the BSAI and GOA groundfish fisheries. High levels of excess harvesting and processing capacity are\nexpected to continue to exist and to decrease the net benefits from the groundfish fisheries by more than $100\nmillion annually.\nImpacts of Alternative 2 (Comparison Between Alternatives 1 and 2)\n4.8.2\nAlternatives 2.1 and 2.2 are intended to provide additional protection for marine mammals and seabirds. This\nsection contains both quantitative and qualitative assessments of select economic and social effects of\nAlternatives 2.1 and 2.2. Other economic and social effects of Alternatives 2. 1 and 2.2 are discussed in Section\n4.8.7.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.8-6","Alternative 2.1 Impacts on the Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\n4.8.2.1\nAlternative 2.1 Impacts on Exvessel Value for Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nIn this section, we provide a summary of the model projections of the exvessel value of BSAI and GOA\ngroundfish delivered to inshore processors under Alternative 2.1 and the differences between the projections\nfor Alternatives 1 and 2.1, followed by a qualitative assessment of those projections.\nModel Projections\nThe following discussion is of the model projections of the 5-year means (2001-2005) of the exvessel value\nfor groundfish delivered to inshore processors. The discussion focuses on estimates for Alternative 2.1 and\nthe differences between the estimates for Alternative 2.1 and Alternative 1fishery management plans (FMPs).\nThe regulatory changes for Alternative 2.1 that the models attempted to address and that are, therefore,\nreflected in the differences between the model projections for Alternatives 1 and 2.1 are as follows: (1) the\nAleutian Islands pollock fishery was allowed to occur and (2) the BSAI pollock, Pacific cod, and Atka\nmackerel TACs and the GOA pollock and Pacific cod TACs were reduced based on an estimate of the\nproportion of the biomass of each stock in sea lion critical habitat. The changes in the seasonal apportionments\nof TACs, the apportionment of the eastern Bering Sea pollock TAC and the BSAI cod TAC east and west of\n170°W, the daily catch limits, and the changes in seabird bycatch avoidance regulations for hook-and-line gear\nwere not addressed by the models that generated the estimates of catch, bycatch, retained catch, exvessel value,\nand product value.\nFor Alternative 2.1, the estimated exvessel value of all BSAI and GOA groundfish delivered to inshore\nprocessors is $198 million (Table 4.8-1). This is 22 percent lower than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table\n4.8-2). For individual groups of inshore processors, the projected reductions range from less than 3 percent,\nfor southcentral and southeast processors, to almost 40 percent for other Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nprocessors. Exvessel value of deliveries to large BSAI pollock processors is projected to decline by over 25\npercent and deliveries to Kodiak processors by 34 percent. The estimates for the GOA and BSAI catch,\nrespectively, are $92 million and $106 million (Tables 4.8-3 and 4.8-5). This is a 18.7 percent decrease for\nthe GOA (Table 4.8-4) and a 25.1 percent decrease for the BSAI (Table 4.8-6) compared to Alternative 1.\nThe area-wide estimate of exvessel value for hook-and-line gear is $73 million (Table 4.8-7). This is less than\na 1 percent decrease compared to Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-8). The corresponding estimates for pot and trawl\ngear, respectively, are $7.5 million (33.8 percent decrease) and $117 million (30.9 percent decrease) (Tables\n4.8-9 through 4.8-12). The corresponding estimates by gear type for the BSAI and GOA separately are in\nTables 4.8-13 through 4.8-24. The estimates of the effects of Alternative 2.1 in terms of the percentage\ndecrease in exvessel value vary by area and gear type from 0.4 percent for GOA hook-and-line fisheries to 48\npercent for GOA trawl fisheries. The range is greater by processor group.\nThe Alternative 2.1 estimates of the exvessel value by species and processor group for the BSAI and GOA\ncombined and estimates of the percent change compared to Alternative 1 are in Tables 4.8-25 and 4.8-26.\nAlternative 2.1 directly affects the Atka mackerel, Pacific cod, and pollock fisheries. However, because Atka\nmackerel is taken almost exclusively by factory trawlers, reductions in Atka mackerel catch have no significant\neffect on total exvessel value. The $18 million (43 percent) and $40 million (29 percent) decreases in the\nexvessel value of Pacific cod and pollock, respectively, slightly exceed the total decrease in exvessel value for\nall inshore processors. This is because a small part of the decrease in exvessel value for Pacific cod, and\npollock is offset by small increases in the exvessel value of sablefish and Pacific ocean perch. These increases\nare the result of decreases in catch and bycatch in the Atka mackerel, Pacific cod, and pollock fisheries, which\nallow more sablefish and Pacific ocean perch to be caught and retained in other fisheries.\nChapter 4 Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-7","To simplify the discussion above, the analysis focused on the 5-year mean levels of exvessel value from the\nmodel projections. However, it is worthwhile to consider trends in projections as well. Under Alternative 1,\nexvessel value first declines and then rises such that Alaska-wide exvessel value in 2005 is approximately 5\npercent higher than the 5-year mean (Table 4.8-33). Under Alternative 2.1, Alaska-wide exvessel value rises\nsteadily from 2001 to 2005, and the value in 2005 is more than 10 percent higher than the 5-year mean value.\nThus, relative to Alternative 1, Alternative 2.1 results in greater reductions in exvessel value in the early years\nbut smaller reductions in later years. For 2003-2005, Alternative 2.1 projections of exvessel value for the\nBSAI and GOA together average approximately 18 percent below projections for Alternative 1 as compared\nto a 5-year mean value that is 22 percent lower than projections for Alternative 1 (Tables 4.8-33 and 4.8-34).\nQualifications\nThe model projections of exvessel value discussed above may be biased either upward or downward for a\nvariety of reasons. Because Alternative 2.1 results in large reductions in catches of pollock and Pacific cod\nfor both the catcher vessel sector and the catcher/processor sector, prices independent of changes in quality\nmight be expected to increase as a result of a reduction in the quantity of fish and the subsequent product\nsupplied. Increases in prices, and the extent to which they partially or more than offset the decreases in\nquantity, would depend on demand elasticities of which we are uncertain. Also, exvessel prices are determined\nby negotiations between processors on one side and either bargaining associations for catcher vessels or\nindividual fishermen on the other Exvessel prices may not behave as one might expect in a competitive market.\nIt is quite possible that prices might rise to reflect added harvesting costs but this will depend on the relative\nbargaining power of harvesters and processors.\nThere are also factors that might tend to reduce exvessel value relative to the Alternative 2.1 model projections\ndiscussed above. This alternative would result in large shifts in catch both spatially and temporally relative to\nthe status quo. It is reasonable to assume that, subject to regulatory constraints, harvesters target catch in areas\nand time periods that maximize its value either by increasing the value (quality) of the fish or by decreasing\nthe harvesting cost or both. To the extent that the historical fishing locations and time periods maximize fish\nquality and value, the model projections for the alternative understate the actual impact since we use historical\nexvessel prices to calculate exvessel value. This is particularly likely for the pollock fishery. Exvessel value\nprojections are based on 1997 to 1999 average annual exvessel prices under this and other alternatives.\nBonuses for roe in the pollock fishery can be substantial, and a large proportion of catch would be shifted from\nthe roe to non-roe season under Alternative 2.1. This would tend to lower the average exvessel value relative\nto the projections discussed above, which use exvessel prices based on a higher proportion of catch in the roe\nseason. Under Alternative 2.1, only 25 percent of the pollock catch would be taken during roe season as\nopposed to 40 percent in the data used to determine product mix for the projections of exvessel value.\nThe use of historical exvessel prices for pollock may also lead to an underestimate in the decrease in Alternative\n2.1 exvessel value relative to outcomes under Alternative 1. Because exvessel prices for pollock are expected\nto rise as a result of increases in product quality and value made possible by use of cooperatives under AFA,\nthe reduction in exvessel value due to a reduction in catch resulting from Alternative 2.1 would be understated.\nFurthermore, it is possible that catch estimates from the simulations may be overstated. If catch rates are\nreduced substantially due to the spatial and temporal shift of harvests, it may not be possible or cost-effective\nfor the fleet to take the full projected catch. The simulations do not reflect this possibility and therefore might\noverstate exvessel value by overstating the quantity of catch. While it is not possible to say exactly what effect\nspatial displacement of catch might have on the value of fish or the desirability and feasibility of taking a given\nTAC, it is useful to consider the degree to which catch is displaced relative to the reduction in total catch. If\nthe displacements are considerably higher than the percentage reductions in total catch required under this\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-8","alternative, there may be some question as to whether the projected catches will be taken. A large displacement\nof effort also increases the likelihood that the average quality and price would decrease, thereby creating and\nupward bias in the exvessel value projections discussed above.\nIt is possible to use observer data to roughly estimate the percentage of catch that would be displaced under\nAlternative 2.1 (Tables 4.8-45 and 4.8-46). For vessels between 60 and 124 ft in length (which we refer to\nhenceforth as small vessels), approximately 30 percent of trips are observed. Large vessels over 124 ft have\n100 percent observer coverage. Estimates of catch displaced shown in Tables 4.8-45 and 4.8-46 are based on\ncomparisons of the catch taken in a given year and area outside year 2000 closures versus catches taken in\nareas outside the areas closed under Alternative 2.1. The Bering Sea pollock catches for catcher vessels are\nreduced approximately 25 percent under Alternative 2.1, but approximately 60 percent of the 1999 catch had\nbeen taken in areas that would be closed under this alternative. Substantially higher percentages had come from\nthose areas in prior years before the pollock TACs were apportioned inside and outside of sea lion critical\nhabitat. The Bering Sea pollock fishery will have a smaller amount of the TAC available east of 170°W in the\nC and D seasons. The observer data show that catcher vessels had very little catch activity west of 170°W in\nthe years 1997 to 1999. We do not know whether, or to what degree, these vessels would be willing or able to\nharvest pollock west of 170°W in the C and D seasons.\nUnder Alternative 2.1, 25 percent of the catch would take place in each of the four seasons. This results in large\ntemporal shifts of catch relative to historical patterns. During 1997 to 1999, the BSAI pollock fishery harvested\napproximately 92.5 percent of the targeted pollock catch in the timeframes that correspond to the alternative's\nA and D seasons (46.3 percent in the A season timeframe and 46.2 percent in the D season timeframe). Only\n7.1 percent was harvested in what would be the C season, and none was harvested in what would be the B\nseason. Thus a large amount of pollock harvest will be redistributed to the middle seasons from the beginning\nand ending seasons. Assuming that vessels have historically concentrated catches when the fishing is relatively\nmore productive or fish more valuable, this shift will increase costs or decrease value.\nFor the GOA pollock fishery, catches under Alternative 2.1 are reduced by approximately 55 percent, but 91\npercent of observed 1999 catch for small vessels came from areas that will be closed, and 44 percent of pollock\ncatch for larger vessels came from these areas (Table 4.8-45). The GOA pollock fishery would also experience\na reallocation of catch effort across areas relative to the historical averages. From 1997 to 1999, 65.5 percent\nof the catch came from Areas 610 and 620. Under this alternative, that would be reduced to 55.5 percent. The\n1997 to 1999 average catch from Area 650 is 0.03 percent and that would increase under this alternative to\n11.11 percent. Little change would occur in Areas 630 and 640. These changes would affect catcher vessels\nonly since pollock catcher/processors do not currently fish in the GOA.\nDuring 1997-1999, the GOA pollock fishery harvested approximately 77.2 percent of the targeted pollock\ncatch in the time frames that correspond to the alternative's A and D seasons (32.3 percent in the A season time\nframe and 44.9 percent in the D season timeframe 5). Much smaller amounts were harvested in what would\nbe the B and C seasons (10.2 percent and 12.7 percent, respectively). Thus a large amount of pollock harvest\nwill be redistributed to the middle seasons from the beginning and ending seasons.\nAlternative 2.1 will also result in large spatial and temporal displacement of catch in the Pacific cod fishery,\nparticularly for trawlers and smaller pot vessels (Table 4.8-45). For large trawl catcher vessels fishing cod in\nthe Aleutian Islands, 94 percent of the 1999 catch came from areas that will be closed (96 percent for smaller\nvessels); however this is only a small part of the overall BSAI cod catch. In the Bering Sea, where the great\nmajority of BSAI cod catch is taken, catcher vessels took 97 to 100 percent of their catch in areas that will be\nclosed. Also the Bering Sea cod fishery will have a smaller amount of the TAC available east of 170°W in the\nC and D seasons. The observer data show that trawl catcher vessels had very little catch activity west of\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-9","170°W in the years 1997-1999. We do not know whether, or to what degree, these vessels would be willing\nor able to harvest fish west of 170°W in the C and D seasons.\nHistorically there has been relatively little catch of Pacific cod by trawlers in the BSAI in what would be the\nC season under this alternative and little catch in the GOA in the B or C season. Since Pacific cod tend to\naggregate for spawning early in the year, the temporal shift in TACs will likely decrease catch per unit of effort\n(CPUE) and increase harvesting cost. During the period 1997-1999, BSAI Pacific cod catch taken during\nAlternative .1's seasons was 86.3 percent. Thus, 13.7 percent of the total catch was taken during times that\nwould be closed under this alternative. Catch during the alternative's A, B, C, and D seasons were 45.7\npercent, 25.6 percent, 1.7 percent, and 13.3 percent, respectively.\nThe GOA Pacific cod fishery harvest would be distributed across the two harvest areas (610 and 620 to 650)\nin approximately the same proportions as the historical average from 1997 to 1999, and the proportions of\ncatch in areas that would be closed are, for the most part, lower than the reductions in total catch. Therefore,\nchanges in value or costs associated with where the fish may be taken should be less significant. However, the\nGOA Pacific cod fishery would be affected in a manner similar to that of the BSAI fishery in terms of the\ndistribution of catch through time. Catch during the alternative's A, B, C, and D seasons were 81.6 percent,\n2.6 percent, 2.7 percent, and 8 percent, respectively, during the 1997 to 1999 period. It is therefore probable\nthat harvesting costs in the GOA Pacific cod fishery will increase as harvesters have much less fish available\nduring the times they usually fish; when prespawning aggregations occur. Bycatch of halibut could also\nincrease since vessels would have to fish longer for a given level of catch.\nThe Atka mackerel fishery is conducted almost entirely by catcher/processors and thus restrictions on it should\nnot have a significant impact on the catcher vessel sector.\nThe net impact of upward and downward bias in projections of exvessel value is difficult to determine, but we\nexpect that projections are likely to understate the negative impact of Alterative 2.1 on total exvessel value.\nWhether the bias in projections is high or low, we expect that large reductions in exvessel value will occur\nunder Alternative 2.1.\nAlternative 2.1 Impacts on Costs for Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nAverage costs per unit of catch for catcher vessels can be expected to increase substantially under Alternative\n2.1 because of the reduction in the overall level of production resulting from lower catches. Many costs are\nfixed; they are not reduced with the level of production. Fixed costs include costs such as the opportunity cost\nof the investment in the vessel, debt payments, the cost of having the vessel ready to participate in the fisheries,\nsome insurance costs, property taxes, and depreciation. These costs must be allocated to a smaller amount of\nproduct, raising the average cost per unit of product. Set-up costs may also increase with four disjointed\nseasons, thus further increasing average costs. Set-up costs include the cost of preparing a vessel for operation\nand getting it and its crew to the fishing grounds.\nAlternative 2.1 will close critical habitat areas, move portions of the TAC to areas west of 170°W, and change\nthe temporal distribution of the catch. The discussion in the previous section indicated that the spatial\ndisplacement of fishing effort resulting from implementation of Alternative 2.1 would be substantial. These\nchanges can be expected to lead to increased operating costs since vessels will have to travel farther to harvest\nfish and will likely be required to fish in less productive areas in some cases. It is probable that catcher vessels\nwill incur increased costs per unit of catch due to increased travel time and because catch rates are likely to\nfall as vessels are forced to shift effort away from preferred locations. The temporal distribution of the catch\nis also important. Under Alternative 2.1, 25 percent of the catch would be taken in each of the four seasons,\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-10","meaning that vessels would harvest a smaller proportion of their catch in some periods relative to historical\naverages and, likewise, would need to harvest a higher proportion in other periods. This can affect the cost of\nfishing if CPUE is not constant across time periods. CPUE may fall significantly in some cases as a result of\nthis temporal shifting, particularly for trawl cod catch, which relies on targeting spawning aggregations to\nincrease catch rates.\nDaily harvest limits under this alternative are set at the annual average rate in the three fisheries (pollock,\nPacific cod, and Atka mackerel). The daily harvest limits may result in some additional costs to harvesters.\nDaily limits will increase average total cost during periods when production would normally be higher. As a\nresult, some vessels may have to fish an increased number of days for a given level of catch which would also\nincrease average total cost. Organizing catch and deliveries SO as not to exceed daily caps may be costly and\nlogistically difficult. The pollock fleets can more easily regulate daily production and deliveries since they\nalready have cooperatives in place. Managing daily production and deliveries for the Pacific cod and Atka\nmackerel fisheries may be more problematic.\nAlternative 2.1 Seabird Protection Management Action Impacts on Catcher Vessels Delivering to\nInshore Processors\nThe seabird protection measures in Alternative 2.1 are not expected to have an impact on the exvessel value\nof the fisheries unless they result in premature shutting down of fisheries. It is not clear that the likelihood of\nthis happening is increased under this alternative, and projections of exvessel value do not reflect this\npossibility.\nThe major impacts of the seabird protection measures would be increased costs for hook-and-line vessels due\nto a requirement for purchase and use of gear designed to reduce interaction with seabirds and a mandate for\ngear handling and other operational protocols that may increase the amount of time spent deploying gear. An\nestimate of the costs that might result from the operational protocols is not available; however, estimates of\nthe average costs of gear modifications are available. A draft Environmental Assessment/Regulatory Impact\nReview/Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (NMFS 2000b) estimated that the per vessel costs of installing\na lining tube would be about $40,000. Approximately eight catcher vessels over 100 ft in length would be\naffected by the lining tube requirements for this alternative and would likely incur initial costs in excess of\n$40,000 each for a total of $320,000. Bird scaring lines would be required for all hook-and-line vessels and\nwould range from $50 to $250 each. Weights, at $5.65 each, would be required to weight lines for all hook-\nand-line vessels. The average cost of these gear purchases per vessel would depend on the amount of gear, and\nan estimate of the fleetwide costs of these gear purchases is not available.\nAlternative 2.1 Impacts on the Processing Sector\n4.8.2.2\nAlternative 2.1 Impacts on Product Value for Processors\nA summary of the model projections of the product value of BSAI and GOA groundfish through primary\nprocessing under Alternative 2.1 and the differences between the projections for Alternatives 1 and 2.1, is\ndiscussed below, followed by a qualitative assessment of those projections.\nModel Projections\nThe following discussion is of the model projections of the 5-year means (2001-2005) of the product value for\ngroundfish through primary processing. The discussion focuses on estimates for Alternative 2.1 and the\ndifferences between the estimates for Alternative 2.1 and Alternative 1 FMPs. The regulatory changes for\nAlternative 2.1 that the models attempted to address and that are reflected in the differences between the model\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-11","projections for Alternatives 1 and 2.1 were described in the discussion of the model projections of exvessel\nvalue.\nFor Alternative .1, the estimated value of all BSAI and GOA groundfish products is $902 million (Table 4.8-\n27), 25 percent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-28). The absolute and relative impacts vary\nconsiderably for individual groups of processors as shown in Tables 4.8-27 and 4.8-28. The projected\nreductions in product value are smallest for southeast processors and southcentral processors at 8.8 percent\nand 10,7 percent, respectively. The largest percentage reductions are for other Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nIslands processors, whose product revenues decline by 48 percent. BSAI pollock processors (both inshore and\noffshore combined) suffer percentage declines ranging from 23 percent to 26 percent and, as a group, account\nfor about two-thirds of the overall decline in product value. Product value for head-and-gut factory trawlers\ndeclines by $36 million (23 percent). Nearly three-quarters of the reduction is due to the 67 percent reduction\nin the Atka mackerel TAC. Longline catcher/processors product value decreases by 19 percent due almost\nsolely to reductions in Pacific cod catch.\nOver 80 percent of the decline in product revenues comes from the BSAI, with a $746 million (Tables 4.8-31)\nor 25 percent (Table 4.8-32) reduction. The GOA reduction in product value is $156 million (Table 4.8-29)\nor 28 percent (Table 4.8-30).\nTo simplify the discussion above, we focused on the 5-year mean levels of product value from the model\nprojections. However, it is worthwhile to consider trends in projections as well. Under Alternative 1, product\nvalue first declines and then rises such that Alaska-wide product value in 2005 is approximately 4 percent\nhigher than the 5-year mean (Table 4.8-39). Under Alternative 2.1, Alaska-wide product value rises steadily\nfrom 2001-2005, and the value in 2005 is more than 9 percent higher than the 5-year mean value. Thus,\nrelative to Alternative 1, Alternative 2.1 results in greater reductions in product value in the early years but\nsmaller reductions in later years. For 2003 to 2005, Alternative 2.1 projections of product value for the BSAI\nand GOA together average approximately 21 percent below projections for Alternative 1 as compared to a 5-\nyear mean value that is 25 percent lower than projections for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-40).\nQualifications\nAs was the case for projections of exvessel value, projections of product value may be biased for a variety of\nreasons. Product prices and product mix used for projections are average 1996-1998 prices and a 1999 product\nmix. Since Alternative 2.1 results in substantial reductions in the quantity of production of pollock, Pacific\ncod, and Atka mackerel, product prices independent of changes in quality might be expected to increase as a\nresult of a reduction in the quantity supplied. Increases in prices, and the extent to which they partially or more\nthan offset the decreases in quantity, would depend on demand elasticities of which we are uncertain.\nProcessors might also be expected to alter product mix to take advantage of changes in relative product prices,\nwhich might tend to further offset reductions in quantities.\nHowever, the assumptions of constant prices and product mix may also result in bias in the opposite direction\nif lower product quality results and puts downward pressure on average prices, if production of more valuable\nproducts is not possible, or if production is lower than estimated. The most significant bias will be due to a\nreduction in roe production in the pollock fisheries. The Alternative 2.1 projections for the value of roe\nproduction over the years 2001-2005 average approximately $96 million for the BSAI and $2 million for the\nGOA. The product value projections assumed that product mix would not change from the average mix in\n1999; however, since only 25 percent of the pollock catch can be taken during the roe season (compared to 40\npercent in the data used to determine product mix and value), roe production would be expected to fall more\nthan proportionally relative to total catch. This alone would result in an upward bias in projections of product\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-12","value of around $37 million annually, assuming no change in roe prices and no increase in relative production\nof other pollock products. The value of production might also be expected to decline due to decreases in\nproduct quality resulting from lower quality of delivered raw fish. This is likely to be a problem for fish that\nare caught soon after the roe season. Reduced fish quality might also result for shoreside processors if catch\nrates decline and vessels take longer trips to compensate.\nThe use of historical product prices and 1999 product mix may also lead to an underestimate in the decrease\nin Alternative 2.1 product value relative to outcomes under Alternative 1. Since average product value per unit\nof pollock catch is expected to rise as a result of increases in product quality and value made possible by use\nof cooperatives under AFA, the reduction in product value resulting from a reduction in catches resulting from\nAlternative 2.1 would be understated.\nAs discussed in the section on exvessel value, large displacements of Pacific cod and pollock catches for\ncatcher vessels would occur under Alternative 2.1 (Tables 4.8-45 and 4.8-46). This could lead to reductions\nin average quality of fish which could hurt product value. Catcher/processors and motherships will also be\nsubject to spatial and temporal displacement which could both reduce quality and increase the likelihood that\nprojected catches would not be taken. For catcher/processors, around 20 percent of the 1999 Bering Sea\npollock catch was taken in areas that would be closed under Alternative 2.1 (30 percent of catch east of\n170°W). Motherships took nearly 30 percent of their 1999 catch in areas that would be closed (43 percent of\ncatch east of 170°W).\nIn the BSAI Pacific cod fishery, over 50 percent of the catch for small factory trawlers, around 70 percent of\nthe catch for large factory trawlers, and nearly 25 percent of the catch for freezer longliners was taken in areas\nthat would be closed under Alternative 2.1. For both the pollock and Pacific cod fisheries, catches will be\nshifted temporally also. It is likely that this will result in declines in CPUE for Pacific cod. The effect on\npollock CPUE is less clear but a decline in fish quality can be expected, particularly for catch taken soon after\nspawning season.\nOver 50 percent of the 1999 Atka mackerel catch for factory trawlers was taken in areas that would be closed;\nhowever, this is less than the 67 percent reduction in total catch that would be required (Table 4.8-46).\nDaily catch limits might also have a negative effect on product quality and price. If catcher vessels are\nconstrained by these limits, it could increase their length of time at sea and reduce the quality of fish delivered.\nProduct quality might also be reduced if processing operations are interrupted more frequently. This could be\nparticularly important for surimi processing.\nThe net impact of upward and downward bias in projections of product value is difficult to determine; however,\nas with the projections of exvessel value, we expect that model projections of product value for Alternative 2.1\nare likely to understate the negative impact of Alterative 2.1 on total product value. Whether the bias in\nprojections is high or low, we expect large reductions in product value will occur under Alternative 2.1 relative\nto Alternative 1.\nAlternative 2.1 Impacts on Costs for Processors\nAverage costs for processors will increase substantially because of the reduction in the overall level of\nproduction resulting from lower catches. Many costs are fixed, they will not be reduced with the level of\nproduction. These costs must be allocated to a smaller amount of product, thereby raising the average cost per\nunit of product. Set-up costs will also increase with four disjointed seasons, thus further increasing average\ncosts.\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-13","Other factors may lead to an increase in variable costs. The reduction in supply of fish is likely to put upward\npressure on exvessel prices. If temporal and spatial shifting of production raises average costs for catcher\nvessels, shoreside plants and motherships may face increased pressure to pay higher prices for fish. The extent\nto which processors versus catcher vessels would absorb increased harvesting costs, and the extent to which\ncatcher vessels will be able to demand higher prices as total supply declines, will depend on their relative\nbargaining power as well as price elasticities of the products made from the fish. However, increased exvessel\nprices are likely, and this could substantially raise variable costs of production for processors that have to\npurchase fish.\nCatcher/processors variable costs per unit of product may be impacted directly by lower catch rates, but the\nimpacts will vary across fisheries. Alternative 2.1 results in relatively little spatial shifting of catch for pollock\ncatcher/processors. The impact on catcher/processors catch rates is more likely to result from temporal shifting\nof catch, but it is not clear what this impact would be. Since a significant proportion of total catch is shifted\naway from spawning season when fish aggregate and should be easier to target, pollock catch rates might be\nexpected to decline somewhat, thereby raising variable production costs.\nIn the BSAI cod fishery, catcher/processors, particularly trawlers, are likely to suffer significant reductions\nin catch rates as a consequence of shifting of catches into seasons when catch rates are likely to be much\nlower. Similar to trawler catcher vessels, Pacific cod catches for factory trawlers have been heavily\nconcentrated toward the beginning of the year. Freezer longliners will be less affected, but they too are likely\nto suffer reduced catch rates as result of temporal shifting of catches.\nThe BSAI Atka mackerel fishery is also likely to be negatively impacted by temporal shifting of catch. Between\n1997 and 1999, the distribution of catches in what would be the Alternative 2.1 A, B, C, and D seasons was\n59 percent, 17.3 percent, 1.5 percent and 20.8 percent, respectively. It is therefore probable that harvesting\ncosts in the BSAI Atka mackerel fishery will increase, as harvesters have much less fish available during the\ntimes they usually fish. In addition, the critical habitat closures will likely lower CPUE and increase the cost\nof harvesting a given amount of fish.\nThe daily harvest limits under the alternative are set at the annual average rate in the three fisheries (pollock,\nPacific cod and Atka mackerel). The daily harvest limits may results in some additional costs to processors.\nDaily catch limits will tend to increase average harvest costs for catcher/processors if they shut down the\nfishery on days when catch rates were particularly high. They may also result in more costs and more waste\nbecause processing plants (both inshore and offshore) might have to shut down and start up more often. This\ncould be particularly problematic for surimi processing in the pollock fishery where shutting down and starting\nup could result in significant waste of the product left in the pipeline at each shutdown. The pollock fleets may,\nhowever, be in a better position to regulate daily production and deliveries since they already have cooperatives\nin place. Maintaining steady production for the Pacific cod and Atka mackerel fisheries may be more\nproblematic.\nAlternative 2.1 Impacts on Processors of Seabird Protection Management Actions\nThe seabird protection measures in Alternative 2.1 are not expected to impact inshore processors directly but\nwould impact 34 catcher-processors. These measures are not expected to have an impact on the product value\nfor these processors unless they result in premature shutting down of fisheries. It is not clear that the likelihood\nof this happening is increased under this alternative and projections of product value do not reflect this\npossibility.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-14","The major impacts of the seabird protection measures would be to increase costs for hook-and-line\ncatcher/processors by requiring purchase and use of gear designed to reduce interaction with seabirds and by\nmandating gear handling and other operation protocols that may increase the amount of time spent deploying\ngear. An estimate of the costs that might result from the operations protocols is not available; however,\nestimates of the average costs of gear modifications are available (NMFS 2000). Bird scaring lines range from\n$50 to 250 each. The total cost for weights, at $5.65 each, would depend on the amount of gear. Fleetwide\ncost estimates for bird scaring lines and weights are not available at this time. Approximately 34\ncatcher/processor vessels over 100 ft in length would be affected by a requirement to install lining tubes and\nwould likely incur initial costs in excess of $40,000 each for a total of $1,360,000.\n4.8.2.3\nAlternative 2.1 Impacts on Consumers of Groundfish Products\nAlternative 2.1 will result in large reductions in production of several different products. This could result in\nsignificant decreases in supply of pollock and Pacific cod fillets to the domestic market. Supply of surimi for\nthe domestic seafood analog market and other products might also be reduced. Assuming that demand is not\nperfectly elastic, this would result in higher prices and a loss of consumer surplus (i.e., net benefits) to the\nAmerican public. The magnitude of that loss will depend on price elasticities that are not quantifiable at this\ntime and on the degree to which production is shifted toward or away from the export markets.\n4.8.2.4\nAlternative 2.1 Impacts on Nonconsumptive and Nonuse Values\nStudies have shown significant willingness to pay on the part of the general public for existence of species (and\npreservation of endangered species) as well as preservation of wilderness areas which the individuals never\nexpect to see. However, estimates of nonconsumptive and nonuse values for the species and areas these\nmeasures would protect are not available at this time. Neither is it clear to what extent Alternative 2.1 will\nincrease the numbers of animals or reduce risk of extinction of endangered species. Therefore it is not possible\nto quantify the change in the level of nonuse benefits that Alternative 2.1 would provide. However, if the\nprotection measures are effective, we expect a resulting increase in nonuse benefits. An economist at the\nUniversity of Alaska, Fairbanks is undertaking a study of nonuse value for Steller sea lions, SO more\ninformation may be available at a later date.\nAlternative 2.1 Impacts on Prohibited Species Catch and Groundfish Discards\n4.8.2.5\nAlternative 2.1 would not eliminate the source of the problem of excessively high bycatch rates for prohibited\nspecies and discard rates for groundfish. However, by reducing substantially the sizes of the pollock, Pacific\ncod and Atka mackerel fisheries, the model projections indicate that Alternative 2.1 would decrease PSC and\ngroundfish discards. The model projections of PSC and groundfish discards, respectively, are presented in\nSection 4.6.1 and Tables 4.8-50. To the extent the temporal and spatial displacement of these fisheries from\nthe times and areas preferred by fishermen decrease CPUE, the model projections will tend to overstate the\nexpected reductions in PSC and groundfish discards. In addition, bycatch rates for prohibited species,\nparticularly salmon in the pollock fishery and halibut in the Pacific cod fishery may be higher during the\nsummer months in which fishing would be expanded with Alternative 2.1.\nThe cost imposed on the groundfish fleet by having to stay within the PSC limits would be reduced because,\nwith the reduction in the size of those three fisheries, more of the limits could be made available to other\ngroundfish fisheries. The cost imposed on some sectors of the groundfish fleet by other sectors using\ngroundfish as bycatch would be decreased due to the reductions in the size of those three fisheries. Similarly,\nthose reductions would decrease both the cost of PSC imposed on crab, halibut, herring, and salmon fishermen\nand the ecological costs associated with discarding fish at sea. Neither estimates of these costs under the\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-15","current management regime nor estimates of the changes in these costs associated with Alternative 2.1 are\navailable.\nA more complete discussion of the impacts of Alternative 2.1 on prohibited species bycatch is included in\nSection 4.6.\n4.8.2.6\nAlternative 2.1 Impacts on Fishing Vessel Safety\nBoth the closures of sea lion critical habitat and the BSAI TAC apportionments east and west of 170°W would\nresult in vessels fishing farther from port and in more hazardous areas. The adverse effects would be more\nextreme for smaller vessels.\n4.8.2.7\nAlternative 2.1 Impacts on Excess Capacity\nBecause Alternative 2.1 is expected to result in a large decrease in the quantity of catch and products from the\nfishery, it is expected to substantially increase the level of excess capacity in both the harvesting and processing\nsectors. It will not eliminate incentives to maintain excess capacity.\n4.8.2.8\nAlternative 2.2 Impacts on the Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nAlternative 2.2 Impacts on Exvessel Value for Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nA summary of the model projections of the exvessel value of BSAI and GOA groundfish delivered to inshore\nprocessors under Alternative 2.2 and the differences between the projections for Alternatives 1 and 2.2 is\nfollowed by a qualitative assessment of those projections.\nModel Projections\nThe following discussion is of the model projections of the 5-year means (2001-2005) of the exvessel value\nfor groundfish delivered to inshore processors. The discussion focuses on estimates for Alternative 2.2 and\nthe differences between the estimates for Alternative 2.2 and Alternative 1 FMPs. The regulatory changes for\nAlternative 2.2 that the models attempted to address and that are, therefore, reflected in the differences between\nthe model projections for Alternatives 1 and 2.2 are the reductions in the BSAI pollock, Pacific cod, and Atka\nmackerel TACs and the GOA pollock and Pacific cod TACs. The changes in the seasonal apportionments of\nTACs, the daily catch limits, and the changes in seabird bycatch avoidance regulations for hook-and-line gear\nwere not addressed by the models that generated the estimates of catch, bycatch, retained catch, exvessel value,\nand product value.\nThe objective of Alternative 2.2 is to decrease the potential adverse impacts of the pollock, Pacific cod, and\nAtka mackerel fisheries on sea lions and their habitat. The strategy Alternative 2.2 uses to achieve this objective\nis to drastically decrease the TACs for these three species. This affects much more than these three fisheries\nbecause the reductions in the pollock, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel TACs also limit fisheries that take these\nthree species as bycatch.\nFor Alternative 2.2, the estimated exvessel value for all BSAI and GOA groundfish delivered to inshore\nprocessors is $99 million (Table 4.8-1). This is 61 percent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-\n2). The projected reductions in the exvessel value of deliveries to individual groups of inshore processors,\nrange from 9 percent for southeast and southcentral processors to 85.5 percent for large BSAI pollock\nprocessors. About 75 percent of the overall decline in exvessel value is accounted for by reductions in\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-16","deliveries to large BSAI pollock processors. Exvessel value of deliveries to other Alaska Peninsula and\nAleutian Islands processors and Kodiak processors decline by 40 percent and 39 percent respectively.\nMost of the decline in exvessel value comes from reductions in BSAI catch. The estimates for the BSAI and\nGOA catch, respectively are $78 million and $21 million (Tables 4.8-3 and 4.8-5). This is a 30.7 percent\ndecrease for the GOA (Table 4.8-4) and a 85.3 percent decrease for the BSAI (Table 4.8-6).\nThe greatest absolute reductions in exvessel value are for trawlers, but exvessel value for pot gear declines\ndramatically in percentage terms. The estimates of exvessel value under Alternative 2.2 are $2.3 million for\npot gear (an 80 percent decrease from Alternative 1) and $27 million for trawl gear (an 84 percent decrease\nfrom Alternative 1) (Tables 4.8-9 through 4.8-12). The area wide estimate of exvessel value for hook-and-line\ngear is $70 million (Table 4.8-7) which is less than a 5.8 percent decrease compared to Alternative 1 (Table\n4.8-8). The corresponding estimates by gear type for the BSAI and GOA separately are in Tables 4.8-13\nthrough 4.8-24. The estimates of the effects of Alternative 2.2 in terms of the percentage change in exvessel\nvalue vary by area and gear type from a 89 percent decrease for BSAI trawl fisheries to a 0.7 percent increase\nfor BSAI hook-and-line fisheries. The range is greater by processor group.\nThe Alternative 2.2 estimates of the exvessel value by species and processor group for the BSAI and GOA\ncombined, and estimates of the percent change compared to Alterative 1, are in Tables 4.8-25 and 4.8-26.\nAlternative 2.2 directly affects the Atka mackerel, Pacific cod, and pollock fisheries; however, because Atka\nmackerel is taken almost exclusively by factory trawlers, the $37 million (90 percent) and $115 million (85\npercent) decreases in the exvessel value of Pacific cod and pollock, respectively, accounts for most of the total\ndecrease in exvessel value. There are small decreases in the exvessel values of most other species as well.\nTo simplify the discussion above, we focused on the 5-year mean levels of exvessel value from the model\nprojections. However, it is worthwhile to consider trends in projections as well. Under Alternative 1, exvessel\nvalue first declines and then rises such that Alaska-wide exvessel value in 2005 is approximately 5 percent\nhigher than the 5-year mean (Table 4.8-33). Under Alternative 2.2, Alaska-wide exvessel value declines from\n2001 to 2002 and then rises steadily thereafter. The value in 2005 is about 6 percent higher than the 5-year\nmean value. For 2003 to 2005, Alternative 2.2 projections of exvessel value for the BSAI and GOA together\naverage approximately 60 percent below projections for Alternative 1 as compared to a 5-year mean value 61\npercent lower than projections for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-34). Since the trends in exvessel value for\nAlternative 1 and Alternative 2.2 are similar, the comparison of 5-year mean values is quite similar to\ncomparisons of annual values.\nQualifications\nThe projections of exvessel value for Alternative 2.2 are liable to be biased for a variety of reasons.\nAssumptions that prices would remain constant are not likely to hold with such large changes in the quantity\nof fish caught and major shifts in the timing of that catch. Significant price increases could occur, thereby\nincreasing exvessel value over these projections. While it is unlikely that price increases would begin to\ncompensate for the reduction in pollock and Pacific cod catches delivered to inshore plants, the extent to which\nthey partially or more than offset the decreases in quantity depends on the elasticity of demand, of which we\nare uncertain. As was the case for Alternative 2.1, the share of pollock delivered in roe season would decline\nwhich would tend to have a further downward effect on exvessel price. Furthermore, the estimates may\nunderstate the loss in revenue relative to Alternative 1 since the historical prices used to estimate exvessel value\nunder both Alternative 1 and 2.2 do not account for the expected rise in pollock prices resulting from increases\nin product value made possible by the AFA.\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-17","Catch projections may be biased either upward or downward, thereby causing bias in projections of exvessel\nvalue. There is reason to question whether it would be cost effective to catch and process the much smaller\nTACs in the pollock and Pacific cod fisheries under Alterative 2.2, particularly given the eight day length of\neach opening. Fixed costs would be spread out over a much smaller catch, thereby dramatically raising average\nharvest costs per unit of fish. Since average production costs would rise correspondingly, the ability of\nprocessors to compensate harvesters with higher prices would also be limited. Thus, there is a possibility that\nprojected catches would not be taken. The likelihood of this is increased further because Alternative 2.2 also\nmakes pollock and Pacific cod seasons concurrent in all areas. There are catcher vessels and inshore\nprocessors that participate in more than one of these fisheries that may not be able to do SO with concurrent\nseasons which might also increase the possibility the projected catches would not be taken. This would suggest\nthat projections of exvessel value may error on the high side.\nThere are other factors that might have caused some catch and consequently exvessel value estimates to error\non the low side. The model used to make catch projections constrained the fisheries to twice their status quo\nsize in the BSAI and 1.5 times the status quo level in the GOA. However the large declines in the Pacific cod\nand pollock fishery reduced bycatch of other species (including prohibited species) that might have allowed\nmore growth in other fisheries if they were not constrained in the model. However, these would be relatively\nsmall fisheries, many of which have not been utilized by catcher vessels, and they would not be expected to\noffset overall reductions in exvessel value. Also, under the AFA sideboards, most of the catcher vessels\ninvolved in the pollock fishery would have a very limited ability to diversify into other fisheries.\nThe net effect of upward and downward biases on projections of exvessel value is highly uncertain; however,\nthere is little doubt that this measure would result in very large reductions in exvessel value relative to\nAlternative 1.\nAlternative 2.2 Impacts on Costs for Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nAverage costs per unit of catch would be expected to rise dramatically under Alternative 2.2 since fixed costs\nwould be spread out over a much smaller total catch. In some cases catch rates might also decline relative to\nAlternative 1, particularly for the trawl cod fishery in the C and D seasons. This would also increase average\ncosts per unit of catch. However, the major reductions in catches should also result in increasing abundance\nof the affected fish stocks which might eventually tend to increase catch rates. Thus the impact of these\nmeasures on catch rates, particularly in the later years, is indeterminate. Nevertheless, the overriding impact\non costs is expected to result from increasing fixed costs per unit of catch, SO total average costs per unit of\ncatch are expected to rise substantially under Alternative 2.2. The greatest impact will be on trawl and pot\ncatcher vessels, but hook-and-line catcher vessels will also be subject to substantially increased costs per unit\nof catch. Pollock catcher vessels might be particularly hurt since they would suffer the largest reductions in\ncatch and are also restricted from diversifying into other fisheries under AFA sideboard measures.\nLike Alternative 2.1, this alternative would limit daily as well as quarterly catches. Implementing these daily\ncatch limits could add to costs as discussed for Alternative 2.1.\nAlternative 2.2 Seabird Protection Management Action Impacts on Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore\nProcessors\nThe seabird protection measures in Alternative 2.2 are the same as in Alterative 2.1. Therefore, the per vessel\ncost of these measures should be similar. There is a significant potential that some vessels would choose not\nto participate in fisheries that would be impacted by catch reductions and bird protection measures which may\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.8-18","mean that fewer boats would install the bird protection equipment. Thus the total costs of bird protection might\nbe somewhat lower than for Alternative 2.1.\nAlternative 2.2 Impacts on the Processing Sector\n4.8.2.9\nAlternative 2.2 Impacts on Product Value for Processors\nA summary of the model projections of the product value of BSAI and GOA groundfish through primary\nprocessing under Alternative 2.2 and the differences between the projections for Alternatives 1 and 2.2 is\nfollowed by a qualitative assessment of those projections.\nModel Projections\nThe following discussion is of the model projections of the 5-year means (2001-2005) of the product value for\ngroundfish through primary processing. The discussion focuses on estimates for Alternative 2.2 and the\ndifferences between the estimates for Alternative 2.2 and Alternative 1 FMPs. The regulatory changes for\nAlternative 2.2 that the models attempted to address and that are reflected in the differences between the model\nprojections for Alternatives 1 and 2.2 were described in the discussion of the model projections of exvessel\nvalue.\nFor Alternative 2.2, the estimated value of all BSAI and GOA groundfish products is $311 million (Table 4.8-\n27). This is 74 percent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-28). For individual groups of\nprocessors, the projected reductions range from 18 percent for southeast and southcentral processors to 89\npercent for fillet factory trawlers. The projected reductions exceed 75 percent for large BSAI pollock\nprocessors, other Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands processors, motherships, and surimi factory trawlers.\nKodiak processors, H&G factory trawlers and longline catcher/processors suffer reductions in product value\nof 40 percent, 45 percent and 59 percent respectively. The estimates for products from BSAI and GOA catch,\nrespectively are $123 million and $189 million (Tables 4.8-29 and 4.8-31). This is a 44 percent decrease for\nthe GOA (Table 4.8-30) and a 81 percent decrease for the BSAI (Table 4.8-32).\nTo simplify the discussion above, we focus on the 5-year mean levels of product value from the model\nprojections. However, it is worthwhile to consider trends in projections as well. Under Alternative 1, product\nvalue first declines and then rises such that Alaska-wide product value in 2005 is approximately 4 percent\nhigher than the 5-year mean (Table 4.8-39). Under Alternative 2.2, Alaska-wide product value declines from\n2001 to 2002 and then rises steadily thereafter. The value in 2005 is only 2 percent higher than the 5-year mean\nvalue. For 2003-2005, Alternative 2.2 projections of product value for the BSAI and GOA together average\napproximately 74 percent below projections for Alternative 1 as compared to a 5-year mean value, also 74\npercent lower than projections for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-40). Since the trends in product value for\nAlternative 1 and Alternative 2.2 are similar, the comparison of 5-year mean values is quite similar to\ncomparisons of annual values.\nQualifications\nThe projections of product value for Alternative 2.2 are subject to a number of biases. With such large changes\nin the level of production, it is highly likely that significant changes in prices may occur. This is particularly\ntrue for pollock products since the Alaska pollock fishery accounts for a very significant or dominant market\nshare for many of the products produced, and these large reductions in production would have a significant\nimpact on the global market. While it is unlikely that price increases would begin to compensate for the reduced\nlevel of production, the extent to which they partially or more than offset decreases in quantity depends on the\nelasticity of demand of which we are uncertain.\nChapter 4 Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-19","While prices would go up as a result of reductions in supply, directionally opposite biases in projections of\nproduct value are also plausible. As with Alternative 2.1, projections of pollock roe as a percentage of product\nmix are likely to be high since reductions in pollock catch during roe season are greater than overall reductions\nin pollock catch. Furthermore, it may not be cost effective to catch or process some of the seasonal TACs\nunder Alternative 2.2 which would mean that projections might be high. Alternative 2.2 also makes pollock,\nPacific cod and Atka mackerel seasons concurrent in all areas. Processors that participate in more than one\nof these fisheries might not be able to do so, which would increase the possibility the projected catches would\nnot actually be taken.\nAs discussed in the section on exvessel value, there are other factors that might have caused catch and thus\nproduct value estimates to error on the low side. The model used to make catch projections constrained\nfisheries to 2 times their status quo size for the BSAI and 1.5 times for the GOA. However the large declines\nin the Pacific cod and pollock fishery reduced bycatch of other species including prohibited species that might\nhave allowed more growth in other fisheries if they were not constrained in the model. These would be relatively\nsmall fisheries, however, and would not be expected to offset overall reductions in product value. Also, under\nthe AFA sideboards, most of the processors involved in the pollock fishery would have a very limited ability\nto diversify into other fisheries.\nIn sum, the bias in estimates of product value for Alternative 2.2 is indeterminate. What is quite certain,\nhowever, is that processors will suffer dramatic decreases in total product value as compared to Alternative 1.\nAlternative 2.2 Impacts on Costs for Processors\nThe most important impact on costs for processors would an expected very large increase in fixed costs per\nunit of production. Processors also would incur start-up costs for four seasons including travel costs for\nemployees and the cost of getting a processing plant or vessel prepared to operate. If all of the processing\nplants, motherships and catcher/processors that operated in 1999 continue to operate, overall fixed costs for\nprocessors, including semi-fixed costs associated with seasonal start-up, might actually rise. These costs would\nbe spread over much lower total production SO that average total costs per unit of product would increase\ndramatically. BSAI pollock processors may be particularly hurt since they would suffer the largest reductions\nin product value and are also restricted from diversifying into other fisheries under AFA sideboard measures.\nVariable costs for inshore processors and motherships are also likely to increase. Catcher vessels would likely\ndemand higher exvessel prices which would further increase average costs, and CPUE for catcher/processors\nmight decline as a result of temporal reallocation of catches. Other positive or negative impacts on variable\ncosts are also possible. It is quite clear, however, that total average costs per unit of production would rise\nsignificantly and it is quite possible that they would exceed the value of production and lead to a shutdown or\npermanent closing of some processing plants, motherships and catcher/processors.\nAlternative 2.2 Seabird Protection Management Action Impacts on Processors\nThe seabird protection measures in Alternative 2.2 are the same as in Alternative 2.1. Therefore the cost of\nthese measures should be similar on a per boat basis. There is a significant potential that some\ncatcher/processors would choose not to participate in fisheries that would be impacted by catch reductions and\nbird protection measures which may mean that fewer boats would install the bird protection equipment. Thus\nthe total costs of bird protection gear for catcher/processors might be somewhat lower than the $1,360,000\nprojection for Alternative 2.1.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-20","Alternative 2.2 Impacts on Consumers of Groundfish Products\n4.8.2.10\nAlternative 2.2 will result in very large reductions in production of several different products. This could result\nin large decreases in supply of pollock and Pacific cod fillets to the domestic market. Supply of surimi for the\ndomestic seafood analog market and other products probably would also be reduced. Assuming that demand\nis not perfectly elastic, this would result in higher prices and a loss of consumer surplus to the American public.\nThe magnitude of that loss will depend on price elasticities that are not quantifiable at this time and on the\ndegree to which production is shifted toward or away from the export markets.\nAlternative 2.2 Impacts on Nonconsumptive and Nonuse Values\n4.8.2.11\nStudies have shown significant willingness to pay on the part of the general public for existence of species (and\npreservation of endangered species) as well as preservation of wilderness areas which the individuals never\nexpect to see. Estimates of nonconsumptive and nonuse values for the species and areas these measures would\nprotect are not available at this time, however. Neither is it certain whether, or to what extent, the measures\nin Alternative 2.2 will increase the numbers of animals or reduce risk of extinction of endangered species.\nTherefore it is not possible to quantify the change in the level of nonuse benefits that Alternative 2.2 would\nprovide. However, if the protection measures are effective, we expect a resulting increase in nonuse benefits.\nAn economist at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks is undertaking a study of nonuse value for Steller sea\nlions, SO more information may be available at a later date.\nAlternative 2.2 Impacts on Prohibited Species Catch and Groundfish Discards\n4.8.2.12\nAlternative 2.2 would not eliminate the source of the problem of excessively high bycatch rates for prohibited\nspecies and discard rates for groundfish. However, by reducing substantially the sizes of the pollock, Pacific\ncod and Atka mackerel fisheries, the model projections indicate that Alternative 2.2 would decrease PSC and.\ngroundfish discards. The model projections of PSC and groundfish discards, respectively, are presented in\nSection 4.6.1 and Table 4.8-50. To the extent the temporal displacement of these fisheries from the times and\nareas preferred by fishermen decrease CPUE, the model projections will tend to overstate the expected\nreductions in PSC and groundfish discards. By limiting these three fisheries to four specific 8-day periods\nduring the year, Alternative 2.2 would increase substantially the cost to the fleet of searching for areas with\nlower groundfish and prohibited species bycatch rates. In addition, bycatch rates for prohibited species,\nparticularly salmon in the pollock fishery and halibut in the Pacific cod fishery may be higher during the\nsummer months in which fishing would be expanded with Alternative 2.2.\nThe cost imposed on the groundfish fleet by having to stay within the PSC limits would be reduced because,\nwith the reduction in the size of those three fisheries, more of the limits could be made available to other\ngroundfish fisheries. The cost imposed on some sectors of the groundfish fleet by other sectors using\ngroundfish as bycatch would be decreased due to the reductions in the size of those three fisheries. Similarly,\nthose reductions would decrease both the cost of PSC imposed on crab, halibut, herring, and salmon fishermen\nand the ecological costs associated with discarding fish at sea. Neither estimates of these costs under the\ncurrent management regime nor estimates of the changes in these costs associated with Alternative 2.2 are\navailable.\nA more complete discussion of the impacts of Alternative 2.2 on prohibited species bycatch is included in\nSection 4.6.\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-21","4.8.2.13\nAlternative 2.2 Impacts on Fishing Vessel Safety\nThe increased competition among fishermen for the substantially decreased TACs for pollock, Pacific cod, and\nAtka mackerel and the date specific four 8-day seasons are expected to increase the risks fishermen will take\nto harvest fish. For example, the cost of staying in port due to hazardous weather conditions would be\nsubstantially higher during one of the four 8-day openings of Alternative 2.2 than during any period under\nAlternative 1. The adverse effects would be particularly severe in the BSAI pollock fishery because Alternative\n2.2 would eliminate the vessel safety benefits of the AFA pollock cooperatives. The AFA pollock cooperative\nvessel safety benefits result from the elimination of the race for fish and the associated freedom to decide when\nto fish for pollock and at what rate to fish. Alternative 2.2 completely eliminates that freedom. Splitting the\npollock, Pacific cod and Atka mackerel fisheries into four disjoint seasons will increase transit time for\ncatcher/processors and motherships and for some catcher vessels. This will have at least a minimal adverse\neffect on vessel safety which would be offset at least partially by the large decrease in fishing days.\n4.8.2.14\nAlternative 2.2 Impacts on Excess Capacity\nBecause Alternative 2.2 is expected to result in a very large decrease in the quantity of catch and products from\nthe fishery, it is expected to substantially increase the level of excess capacity in both the harvesting and\nprocessing sectors. It will not eliminate incentives to maintain excess capacity.\n4.8.3\nImpacts of Alternative 3 (Comparison Between Alternatives 1 and 3)\nAlternative 3 is intended to provide additional protection for groundfish target species. This section contains\nboth quantitative and qualitative assessments of select economic and social effects of Alternative 3. Other\neconomic and social effects of Alternative 3 are discussed in Section 4.8.7.\n4.8.3.1\nAlternative 3 Impacts on the Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nAlternative 3 Impacts on Exvessel Value for Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nA summary of the model projections of the exvessel value of BSAI and GOA groundfish delivered to inshore\nprocessors under Alternative 3 and the differences between the projections for Alternatives 1 and 3 is followed\nby a qualitative assessment of those projections.\nModel Projection\nThe following discussion is of the model projections of the 5-year means (2001-2005) of the exvessel value\nfor groundfish delivered to inshore processors. The discussion focuses on estimates for Alternative 3 and the\ndifferences between the estimates for Alternative 3 and Alternative 1 (the status quo FMPs). The regulatory\nchanges for Alternative 3 that the models attempted to address and that are, therefore, reflected in the\ndifferences between the model projections for Alternatives 1 and 3 are as follows: 1) the changes in the ABCs\nboth due to changes in the method used to estimate ABCs and due to the assumed changes in gear selectivity\ncoefficients; and 2) setting TACs equal to ABCs and eliminating the optimum yield (OY) limits. The model\nonly partially addresses the elimination of the PSC limits. Specifically, the PSC limits were eliminated as\nconstraints on groundfish catch; however, the effects on the bycatch rates of prohibited species are not\naddressed by the model. The year-round closures of an additional 20 percent of each management area and\nthe effects of the changes in gear selectivity on the bycatch and discards were not addressed by the models that\ngenerated the estimates of catch, bycatch, retained catch, exvessel value, and product value.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-22","For Alternative 3, the estimated exvessel value for all BSAI and GOA groundfish delivered to inshore\nprocessors is $220 million (Table 4.8-1). This is 13.5 percent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table\n4.8-2). For individual groups of inshore processors, the projected reductions range from less than 7 percent\nfor southcentral processors to almost 17 percent for other Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands processors.\nThe estimates for the BSAI and GOA catch, respectively are $100 million and $120 million (Tables 4.8-3 and\n4.8-5). This is a 11.2 percent decrease for the GOA (Table 4.8-4) and a 15.4 percent decrease for the BSAI\n(Table 4.8-6).\nThe area wide estimate of exvessel value for hook-and-line gear is $69 million (Table 4.8-7), this is a 7.1\npercent decrease compared to Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-8). The corresponding estimates for pot and trawl gear,\nrespectively, are $10.2 million (8.9 percent decrease) and $142 million (16.6 percent decrease) (Tables 4.8-9\nthrough 4.8-12). The corresponding estimates by gear type for the BSAI and GOA separately are in Tables\n4.8-13 through 4.8-24. The estimates of the effects of Alternative 3 in terms of the percentage decrease in\nexvessel value vary by area and gear type from 6.3 percent for BSAI pot fisheries to 18.9 percent for GOA\ntrawl fisheries. The range is greater by processor group.\nThe Alternative 3 estimates of the exvessel value by species and processor group for the BSAI and GOA\ncombined and estimates of the percent change compared to Alternative 1 are in Tables 4.8-25 and 4.8-26.\nPacific cod, pollock and sablefish typically have accounted for about 95 percent of the exvessel value of all\nBSAI and GOA groundfish delivered to inshore processors. It is estimated that Alternative 3 would result in\nthe following decreases in exvessel value for those three species: Pacific cod, $6 million (15.6 percent); pollock\n$22 million (16.7 percent); and sablefish, $4 million (6.7 percent). There also are decreases in the exvessel\nvalue of most other species.\nTo simplify the discussion above, we focus on the 5-year mean levels of exvessel value from the model\nprojections. However, it is worthwhile to consider trends in projections as well. Under Alternative 1 exvessel\nvalue first declines and then rises such that Alaska-wide exvessel value in 2005 is approximately 5 percent\nhigher than the 5-year mean (Table 4.8-33). Under Alternative 3, Alaska-wide exvessel value rises steadily\nfrom 2001-2005 and the value in 2005 is more than 8 percent higher than the 5-year mean value. Thus,\nrelative to Alternative 1, Alternative 3 results in greater reductions in exvessel value in the early years but\nsmaller reductions in later years. For 2003-2005, Alternative 3 projections of exvessel value for the BSAI and\nGOA together average approximately 11 percent below projections for Alternative 1 as compared to a 5-year\nmean value nearly 14 percent lower than projections for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-34).\nQualifications\nThe model projections of exvessel value discussed above and presented in Tables 4.8-1-4.8-26 may be biased\neither upward or downward for a variety of reasons. Since Alternative 3 results in reductions in catches of\nmost species for both the catcher vessel sector and the catcher/processor sector, prices independent of changes\nin quality might be expected to increase as a result of a reduction in the quantity of fish and, subsequently,\nproduct supplied. Increases in prices, and the extent to which they partially or more than offset the decreases\nin quantity, would depend on demand elasticities of which we are uncertain. Also, exvessel prices are\ndetermined by negotiations between individual processors on one side and either bargaining associations for\ncatcher vessels or individual fishermen on the other side. Exvessel prices may not behave as one might expect\nin a competitive market. It is quite possible that prices might rise to reflect added harvesting costs but this will\ndepend on the relative bargaining power of harvesters and processors. Similarly, the larger mesh and hook\nsizes required by Alternative 3 may increase the size, quality, and exvessel prices of groundfish.\nThere are also factors that might tend to reduce exvessel value relative to the Alternative 3 model projections\ndiscussed above. The use of historical exvessel prices for pollock may lead to an underestimate in the decrease\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-23","in Alternative 3 exvessel value relative to outcomes under Alternative 1. Because exvessel prices for pollock\nare expected to rise as a result of increases in product quality and value made possible by use of cooperatives\nunder AFA, the reduction in exvessel value resulting from a reduction in catches resulting from Alternative 3\nwould be understated.\nArea closures might put downward bias on total exvessel value not captured in projections for Alternative 3.\nThe additional year-round closures with this alternative spatially shift catch relative to the status quo. It is\nreasonable to assume that, subject to regulatory constraints, harvesters target catch in areas and time periods\nthat maximize its value, either by increasing the value (quality) of the fish, by decreasing the harvesting cost,\nor both. To the extent that the historical fishing locations maximize fish quality and value, the model\nprojections for the alternative understate the actual impact since we use historical exvessel prices to calculate\nthe exvessel value for this alternative.\nFurthermore, it is possible that catch estimates from the simulations may be overstated catch rates are reduced\nsubstantially due to the spatial shift of harvests or due to the decrease in CPUE resulting from the use of the\nlarger mesh and hook sizes required to meet the size selectivity standard of Alternative 3, it may not be possible\nor cost effective for the fleet to catch as much as projected. The simulations do not reflect this possibility and,\ntherefore, might overstate exvessel value by overstating the quantity of catch. While it is not possible to say\nexactly what effect spatial displacement of catch might have on value of fish or desirability and feasibility of\ntaking the projected catch, it is useful to consider the degree to which catch is displaced relative to the reduction\nin total catch. If the displacements are considerably higher than the percentage reductions in total catch\nrequired under this Alternative, there may be some question of whether the projected catches will be taken. A\nlarge displacement of effort also increases the likelihood that the average quality and possibly price would\ndecrease, thereby creating and upward bias in the exvessel value projections presented in Tables 4.8-1-4.8-26.\nThe percent of the annual catch for 1997-1999 that would have been displaced by these additional year-round\nclosures varies substantially by year, target species, gear, area, and catcher vessel size class (Table 4.8-47).\nThe estimates of catch displacement exceed 50 percent in at least one of those years for the following:\nA. GOA bottom trawl pollock, catcher vessels 124 ft or shorter\nB. GOA and Aleutian Islands trawl Pacific cod, catcher vessels longer than 124 ft\nC. BSAI bottom trawl yellowfin sole, catcher vessels longer than 60 ft\nD. BSAI bottom trawl rock sole, catcher vessels longer than 124 ft\nThe discussion of the potential effects of the mesh size regulations on catch and value is based on the\nassumption that the regulations actually result in the size selectivity goals being met. Experience with mesh\nsize regulations has demonstrated the difficulty of establishing and enforcing mesh size regulations that would\ndo that. It certainly is possible that fishermen would have incentives to circumvent the intent of the regulations\nand that size selectivity, CPUE, and catch would not change.\nThe net impact of upward and downward bias in projections of exvessel value is difficult to determine, but we\nexpect that projections are likely to understate the negative impact of Alternative 3 on total exvessel value.\nAlternative 3 Impacts on Costs for Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nAverage costs per unit of catch for catcher vessels can be expected to increase somewhat under Alternative 3\nbecause of the reduction in the overall level of production resulting from lower catches. Many costs are fixed;\nthey are not reduced with the level of production. These costs must be allocated to a smaller amount of product,\nthereby raising the average cost per unit of catch.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-24","The discussion in the previous section indicated that the spatial displacement of fishing effort under Alternative\n3 would be large for some fisheries. These changes can be expected to lead to increased operating costs since\nvessels may have to travel further to harvest fish and will likely be required to fish in less productive areas in\nsome cases. It is probable that catcher vessels will incur increased costs per unit of catch due to increased travel\ntime and because catch rates are likely to fall as vessels are forced to shift effort away from preferred locations.\nThe larger mesh and hook sizes required to meet the size selectivity standards set by Alternative 3 would\nincrease fishing costs in two ways. First, there would be the additional cost of replacing existing gear with gear\nthat met the new specifications. It is not known what mesh and hook sizes would be required for each target\nspecies. Therefore, it is not possible to determine either the amount of gear that would have to be replaced or\nthe amount of additional gear that would be required to meet species-specific size regulations. However gear\nreplacement could be very expensive. For example, codends for trawlers can range from around $5,000 for\nsmall vessels to over $70,000 for the largest pollock nets (Gauvin 2000). Second, the larger mesh and hooks\nwould also tend to decrease CPUE and, therefore, increase cost per unit of catch. In the absence of experiments\nto determine both the mesh and hook size changes to meet the standards and the effects of those changes on\nCPUE and cost per unit of catch, the cost of such changes is indeterminate. However, this cost could be\nsubstantial. For example, in a hook size study conducted by NMFS, it was found that catch per hook was\nabout 50 percent greater with regular sized sablefish hooks than with the larger hooks that were tested.\nAlternative 3 Impacts on the Processing Sector\n4.8.3.2\nAlternative 3 Impacts on Product Value for Processors\nA summary of the model projections of the product value of BSAI and GOA groundfish through primary\nprocessing under Alternative 3 and the differences between the projections for Alternatives 1 and 3 is followed\nby a qualitative assessment of those projections.\nModel Projection\nThe following discussion is of the model projections of the 5-year means (2001-2005) of the product value for\ngroundfish through primary processing. The discussion focuses on estimates for Alternative 3 and the\ndifferences between the estimates for Alternative 3 and Alternative 1 FMPs. The regulatory changes for\nAlternative 3 that the models attempted to address and that are reflected in the differences between the model\nprojections for Alternatives 1 and 3 were described in the discussion of the model projections of exvessel value.\nFor Alternative 3, the estimated value of all BSAI and GOA groundfish products is $1.1 billion (Table 4.8-27).\nThis is 12.5 percent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-28). For individual groups of\nprocessors, the projected changes in product value range from an 18.5 percent decrease for other Alaska\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands processors to a 5.1 percent increase for head and gut factory trawlers. The\nestimates for products from BSAI and GOA catch, respectively are $194 million and $862 million (Tables 4.8-\n29 and 4.8-31). This is a 11.2 percent decrease for the GOA (Table 4.8-30) and a 12.8 percent decrease for\nthe BSAI (Table 4.8-32).\nRelative changes in product value under Alternative 3 differ substantially by species group. The greatest\ndeclines in product value relative to Alternative 1 are for Greenland turbot (61 percent). Product value for\nPacific cod and pollock declines by 10 percent and 16 percent, respectively. For rockfish, product value\ndeclines by 19 percent versus Alternative 1 and by 8 percent for sablefish. Flatfish product value rises by\nnearly 32 percent.\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-25","To simplify the discussion above, we focus on the 5-year mean levels of product value from the model\nprojections. However, it is worthwhile to consider trends in projections as well. Under Alternative 1, product\nvalue first declines and then rises such that Alaska-wide product value in 2005 is approximately 4 percent\nhigher than the 5-year mean (Table 4.8-39). Under Alternative 3, Alaska-wide product value rises fairly\nsteadily from 2001-2005 and the value in 2005 is more than 6 percent higher than the 5-year mean value.\nThus, relative to Alternative 1, Alternative 3 results in greater reductions in product value in the early years\nbut smaller reductions in later years. For 2003-2005, Alternative 3 projections of product value for the BSAI\nand GOA together average approximately 9 percent below projections for Alternative 1 as compared to a 5-\nyear mean value nearly 13 percent lower than projections for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-40).\nQualifications\nAs with exvessel value, projections of product value may be biased for a variety of reasons. Product value\nestimates are based on retention rates, product mixes and product prices from recent years. Since Alternative\n3 results in reductions in the quantity of production of most species except flatfish, product prices independent\nof changes in quality might be expected to increase for most species as a result of a reduction in the quantity\nsupplied. Increases in prices, and the extent to which they partially or more than offset the decreases in\nquantity, would depend on demand elasticities of which we are uncertain. Processors might also be expected\nto alter product mix to take advantage of changes in relative product prices which might tend to further offset\nreduction in quantities. The larger mesh and hook sizes required by Alternative 3 may increase the size, quality\nand value of processed groundfish.\nHowever, the assumptions of constant prices and product mix may also result in bias in the opposite direction\nif lower product quality results and puts downward pressure on average prices or if production is lower than\nestimated. The use of historical product prices and 1999 product mix may also lead to an underestimate in the\ndecrease in Alternative 3 product value relative to outcomes under Alternative 1. Since average product value\nper unit of pollock catch is expected to rise as a result of increases in product quality and value made possible\nby use of cooperatives under AFA, the reduction in product value resulting from a reduction in catches\nresulting from Alternative 3 would be understated.\nAs discussed in the section on exvessel value, spacial displacement of catches for catcher vessels would occur\nunder Alternative 3. This could lead to reductions in average quality of fish which could hurt product value.\nCatcher/processors and motherships will also be subject to spatial displacement and to the larger mesh and\nhook size requirement which could both reduce quality and increase the likelihood that the projected catches\nwould not be taken. The percent of the annual catch for 1997-1999 that would have been displaced by these\nadditional year-round closures varies substantially by year, target species, gear, area, and catcher/processor\nvessel size class (Table 4.8-47). The estimates of catch displacement exceed 50 percent in at least one of those\nyears for the following:\nBSAI trawl flathead sole, catcher/processor vessels longer than 60 ft\nBSAI trawl yellowfin sole, catcher/processor vessels longer than 60 ft\nBSAI longline Pacific cod, catcher/processor vessels 124 ft or shorter\nGOA longline Pacific cod, catcher/processor vessels longer than 124 ft\nGOA longline rockfish, catcher/processor vessels longer than 124 ft\nBSAI pot Pacific cod, catcher/processor vessels longer than 60 ft\nAleutian Islands pot sablefish, catcher/processor vessels longer than 124 ft\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-26","The net impact of upward and downward bias in projections of product value is difficult to determine, but as\nwith the projections of exvessel value we expect that model projections for Alternative 3 are likely to error on\nthe high side, thus understating the negative impact of Alternative 3 on total product value.\nAlternative 3 Impacts on Cost for Processors\nAverage costs will increase because of the reduction in the overall level of production resulting from lower\ncatches. Many costs are fixed; they are not reduced with the level of production. These costs must be allocated\nto a smaller amount of product, thereby raising the average cost per unit of product. If the larger mesh and\nhook sizes required by Alternative 3 further decreases total catch, they also would increase average costs for\ncatcher/processors. In addition, changes in gear requirements would require large investments for\ncatcher/processors increasing both total and average cost. For example, codends for catcher/processors can\nrange from around $10,000 for a smaller head-and-gut factory trawler to over $70,000 for the largest pollock\ncatcher/processors (Gauvin 2000). Average and total costs for gear replacements for other gear sectors might\nalso by high.\nVariable costs may also be increased. The reduction in supply of fish is likely to put upward pressure on\nexvessel prices. If spatial shifting of production or larger mesh and hook sizes raises average costs for catcher\nvessels, shoreside plants may face increased pressure to pay higher prices for fish. The extent to which\nprocessors versus catcher vessels would absorb increased harvesting costs and the extent to which catcher\nvessels will be able to demand higher prices as total supply declines will depend on their relative bargaining\npower as well as price elasticities of the products made from the fish. However, large increases in exvessel\nprices and the associated variable costs of production for processors are not expected due to Alternative 3.\nCatcher/processors variable costs per unit of product may be impacted directly by lower catch rates due both\nto the spatial displacement of catch and to the use of larger mesh and hooks. We expect such impacts to vary\nby fishery.\nAlternative 3 Impacts on Consumers of Groundfish Products\n4.8.3.3\nAlternative 3 will result in reductions in production of most groundfish products. This would result in a\ndecreases in supply of pollock and Pacific cod fillets and a few other products to the domestic market. Supply\nof surimi for the domestic seafood analog market might also be reduced. Assuming demand is not perfectly\nelastic, this would result in higher prices and a loss of consumer surplus to the American public. The\nmagnitude of that loss will depend on price elasticities that are not quantifiable at this time and on the degree\nto which production is shifted toward or away from the export markets.\nAlternative 3 Impacts on Nonconsumptive and Nonuse Values\n4.8.3.4\nA primary reason for this management alternative is to provide increased protection for target species. Meeting\nthis objective is intended to increase the benefits from these species for the fisheries and the BSAI and GOA\necosystems. Studies have shown significant willingness to pay on the part of the general public for existence\nof species (and preservation of endangered species) as well as preservation of wilderness areas which the\nindividuals never expect to see. However, estimates of nonconsumptive and nonuse values for the species and\nareas these measures would protect, and more specifically for the additional protection Alternative 3 would\nprovide are not available at this time. If target species are not at serious risk of collapse under the status quo,\nwe would not expect the nonuse value of these changes to be large unless they led to increases in target species\nthat in turn reduce risk of collapse or extinction of other non-target species. For these reasons, it is not possible\nto quantify the change in the level of nonuse benefits that Alternative 3 would provide.\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-27","4.8.3.5\nAlternative 3 Impacts on Prohibited Species Catch and Groundfish Discards\nAlternative 3 would not eliminate the source of the problem of excessively high bycatch rates for prohibited\nspecies and discard rates for groundfish. However, with an exception for deep water flatfish, Alternative 3 is\nexpected to increase catch in all the trawl flatfish fisheries and decrease catch in basically all other fisheries.\nDue to the higher discard rates in the flatfish fisheries, the net effect is a 10.5 percent increase in the total\ndiscards of TAC species Tables 4.8-50 and 4.8-51). However, the projections of discards assume that bycatch\nrates are not changed by either the spatial shifting of fishing effort or the required changes in mesh and hook\nsizes. Since the former is likely to reduce catch rates of target species, bycatch rates may be expected to\nincrease, in which case the increase in discards would be understated. We do not know the mesh and hook sizes\nthat would be required, but, based on experience with mesh size regulations in other fisheries, we know that\nit is very difficult to set and enforce mesh size regulations that will have the desired effect on selectivity\ncoefficients in a commercial fishery under normal fishing conditions. Therefore, the magnitude and perhaps\nthe direction of change in discards is indeterminate. However, we expect the effects on discards to vary by\nfishery, area, and bycatch species.\nThe potential stock and yield benefits of increased mesh sizes are decreased if the larger mesh sizes increase\nthe contribution of escapement mortality to total fishing mortality. Increases in escapement mortality, which\nis an unobserved component of total fishing mortality, would tend to decrease the quality of our estimates of\nfishing mortality and make it more difficult to model and manage the TAC species.\nThe projections of the effects of Alternative 3 on the bycatch of prohibited species are discussed in Section 4.6.\nThose projections do not account for (1) the spatial redistribution of catch that would result from the additional\nyear-round area closures; (2) the changes in mesh and hook sizes required to meet the size selectivity standards\nof Alternative 3; and (3) the effect on bycatch rates of the elimination of the PSC limits. We do not have the\ninformation required to determine the likely direction and magnitude of the changes in the bycatch of prohibited\nspecies associated with the first two elements of Alternative 3. We expect that the elimination of the PSC limits\nwould decrease the incentive fishermen have to reduce bycatch and bycatch mortality rates. Not being able\nto include these rate changes in the projections tends to introduce a downward bias in the estimates for\nAlternative 3. We do not know the magnitude of this bias but expect it to vary by fishery, area and species.\nBecause actions taken to decrease the bycatch of one species can increase the bycatch of other species, the\ndirection of this bias can differ by species.\nThe cost imposed on the groundfish fleet by having to stay within the PSC limits would be eliminated by\neliminating the PSC limits. Both the cost imposed on some sectors of the groundfish fleet by other sectors\nusing groundfish as bycatch and the ecological costs associated with discarding groundfish at sea would be\nincreased by the increased groundfish discards. Similarly, the increase in prohibited species bycatch would\nincrease the cost of PSC imposed on crab, halibut, herring, and salmon fishermen. Neither estimates of these\ncosts under the current management regime nor estimates of the changes in these costs associated with\nAlternative 3 are available.\nA more complete discussion of the impacts of Alternative 3 on prohibited species bycatch is included in Section\n4.6.\n4.8.3.6\nAlternative 3 Impacts on Fishing Vessel Safety\nAlternative 3 is not expected to results in appreciable changes in fishing vessel safety. The year-round closures\nof an additional 20 percent of each management area will result in a large spatial displacement of catch and\nprobably a decrease in CPUE for some fisheries and vessel classes. Both can decrease fishing vessel safety.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-28","CPUE would be decreased further by the required changes in mesh and hook sizes. This will increase fishing\ntime and safety risk that are related to fishing time. However, the decreased TACs for most species will\ndecrease catch and at least partially offset the CPUE related increase in fishing time.\n4.8.3.7\nAlternative 3 Impacts on Excess Capacity\nBecause Alternative 3 is expected to decrease the quantity of catch and products from the fishery, this\nalternative is expected to increase the level of excess capacity in both harvest and processing sectors. It will\nnot eliminate incentives to maintain excess capacity.\nFurther Consideration of Mesh Size Regulations\n4.8.3.8\nThe AFA pollock cooperatives in the BSAI have increased the benefit and decreased the cost to individual\nfishing operations of avoiding smaller lower-valued pollock and of increasing their catch of larger pollock. The\nextent to which this changed size selectivity and resulted in the size selectivity objective of Alternative 3 being\nmet has not been determined.\nThe AFA cooperatives increase the probability that the fishermen would voluntarily set and enforce a size\nselectivity standard for the BSAI pollock fishery if such a standard were expected to result in an increase in\nthe discounted present value of exvessel value net of harvesting costs. Although each vessel would continue\nto have an incentive to ignore the standard if meeting the standard increased its costs more than its exvessel\nvalue, the standard could be enforced by the cooperatives using observer program and inshore processor size\ncomposition data by vessel. Differences among AFA pollock processors with respect to product mix and,\ntherefore, the desired size selectivity standard could be one of the obstacles to establishing a standard that all\ncooperatives would support.\nThe advantages of a voluntarily established standard include (1) the members of the cooperative have a better\nunderstanding of the cost of a standard and of the most efficient method for meeting it than do fishery managers\nand (2) the cooperatives would be more likely to assist in enforcing a standard that they established voluntarily\nbecause it was in their own interest to do SO.\nIf the principal benefits of a size selectivity standard are not increased yield and revenue, the standard\nvoluntarily set by the cooperatives may not be optimal from society's perspective. However, benefits such as\nthe increased availability of juvenile pollock for marine mammals and seabirds would be considered by the\ncooperatives in setting a standard to the extent that such increases would reduce the need for other protective\nmeasures that would increase fishing costs and decrease exvessel value.\nWhether a size selectivity standard is set voluntarily or established by regulations, there can be advantages to\nsetting a standard as opposed to mandating the method that will be used to meet the standard. Typically there\nare a number of ways a vessel could change its fishing practices to actually meet a size selectivity standard.\nFor example, the time area, and depth fished can be changed, gear (including mesh size) can be modified, or\ntest fishing can be used to find areas and times with lower bycatch rates for smaller, less valuable fish. Setting\na size selectivity standard, as opposed to establishing mesh size regulations, would allow each fishing operation\nto use the lowest cost method of meeting the standard and provide fishermen with an incentive to develop better\nmethods for meeting the standard. By decreasing the cost of meeting a standard, this approach can make a\nmore stringent standard economically viable.\nChapter 4 Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-29","Impacts of Alternative 4 (Comparison Between Alternatives 1 and 4)\n4.8.4\nAlternatives 4.1 and 4.2 are intended to provide additional protection for non-target species. This section\ncontains both quantitative and qualitative assessments of select economic and social effects of Alternatives 4.1\nand 4.2. Other economic and social effects of Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 are discussed in Section 4.8.7.\n4.8.4.1\nAlternative 4.1 Impacts on Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nAlternative 4.1 Impacts on Exvessel Value for Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nA summary of the model projections of the exvessel value of BSAI and GOA groundfish delivered to inshore\nprocessors under Alternative 4.1 and the differences between the projections for Alternatives 1 and 4.1 is\nfollowed by a qualitative assessment of those projections.\nModel Projections\nThe following discussion is of the model projections of the 5-year means (2001-2005) of the exvessel value\nfor groundfish delivered to inshore processors. The discussion focuses on estimates for Alternative 4.1 and\nthe differences between the estimates for Alternative 4.1 and Alternative 1 FMPs. The regulatory changes for\nAlternative 4.1 that the models attempted to address and that are, therefore, reflected in the differences between\nthe model projections for Alternatives 1 and 4.1 are (1) reduced BSAI pollock TAC and (2) imposition of\nTACs for skates in the BSAI and GOA and for grenadier in the GOA. The area closure for the eastern Bering\nSea pollock fishery to decrease squid bycatch was not addressed by the models that generated the estimates of\ncatch, bycatch, retained catch, exvessel value, and product value.\nFor Alternative 4.1, the estimated exvessel value for all BSAI and GOA groundfish delivered to inshore\nprocessors is $233 million (Table 4.8-1). This is 8.4 percent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table\n4.8-2). For individual groups of inshore processors, the projected changes range from a 15.8 percent decrease\nfor large BSAI pollock processors to an increase of 2 percent for southcentral processors. The estimates for\nthe BSAI and GOA catch, respectively are $114 million and $120 million (Tables 4.8-3 and 4.8-5). This is\na 0.9 percent increase for the GOA (Table 4.8-4) and a 15.8 percent decrease for the BSAI (Table 4.8-6).\nThe area wide estimate of exvessel value for hook-and-line gear is $75 million (Table 4.8-7), this is a 1.4\npercent increase compared to Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-8). The corresponding estimates for pot and trawl gear,\nrespectively, are $11.3 million (no change) and $147 million (13.2 percent decrease) (Tables 4.8-9 through\n4.8-12). The corresponding estimates by gear type for the BSAI and GOA separately are in Tables 4.8-13\nthrough 4.8-24. The estimates of the effects of Alternative 4.1 in terms of the percentage change in exvessel\nvalue vary by area and gear type from a decrease of 17.1 percent for BSAI trawl fisheries to an increase of 1.6\npercent for GOA hook-and-line fisheries. The range is greater by processor group.\nThe Alternative 4.1 estimates of the exvessel value by species and processor group for the BSAI and GOA\ncombined and estimates of the percent change compared to Alternative 1 are in Tables 4.8-25 and 4.8-26. The\n$22 million (16.5 percent) decrease in the estimate of the exvessel value of pollock in the BSAI and GOA is\nslightly more than the estimated decrease for all species combined. Small increases in the estimates for Pacific\ncod and sablefish principally explain the small offset to the decrease in the estimate for pollock.\nTo simplify the discussion above, we focus on the 5-year mean levels of exvessel value from the model\nprojections. However, it is worthwhile to consider trends in projections as well. Under Alternative 1 exvessel\nvalue first declines and then rises such that Alaska-wide exvessel value in 2005 is approximately 5 percent\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-30","higher than the 5-year mean (Table 4.8-33). Under Alternative 4.1, Alaska-wide exvessel value rises steadily\nfrom 2001-2005 and the value in 2005 is more than 8 percent higher than the 5-year mean value. Thus,\nrelative to Alternative 1, Alternative 4.1 results in greater reductions in exvessel value in the early years but\nsmaller reductions in later years. For 2003-2005, Alternative 4.1 projections of exvessel value for the BSAI\nand GOA together average approximately 5 percent below projections for Alternative 1 as compared to a 5-\nyear mean value 8 percent lower than projections for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-34).\nQualifications\nThe absolute estimates of exvessel value for Alternative 4.1 are subject to many of the same potential biases\nas with other alternatives. Biases may result from the assumption of constant prices or if catch projections are\ninaccurate. However the relative changes between Alternative 1 and Alternative 4.1 are likely to give a\nreasonably accurate picture of the impacts of this alternative since changes are small for all but the pollock\nfishery, and even changes in pollock catches are moderate. The reduction in pollock catch might be expected\nto have an upward impact on pollock prices, but the magnitude of this effect would depend on price elasticities\nfor products made from pollock as well as the relative bargaining strength of processors and catcher vessels.\nThe increase in prices, and the extent to which they partially or more than offset decreases in quantity, would\ndepend on demand elasticities of which we are uncertain.\nAlternative 4.1 Impacts on Costs for Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nOnly the costs for the catcher vessels in the BSAI pollock fisheries should be substantially impacted by this\nalternative. The most substantial impact on costs for these catcher vessels would be that fixed and semi-fixed\ncosts would be spread out over a somewhat smaller level of exvessel revenues, thereby increasing average per\nunit cost. AFA cooperatives could mitigate this to some degree by idling some vessels. Variable costs may be\nincreased by area closures which may require catcher vessels to fish in less productive areas than they\notherwise would and may cause them to have to travel further to fish in some cases. However, only 8-10\npercent of the catch for catcher vessels would be displaced by the closures (Table 4.8-48), and this should have\nonly a minor impact on variable costs.\nAlternative 4.1 Impacts on Processing Sector\n4.8.4.2\nAlternative 4.1 Impacts on Product Value for Processors\nA summary of the model projections of the product value of BSAI and GOA groundfish through primary\nprocessing under Alternative 4.1 and the differences between the projections for Alternatives 1 and 4.1 is\nfollowed by a qualitative assessment of those projections.\nModel Projections\nThe following discussion is of the model projections of the 5-year means (2001-2005) of the product value for\ngroundfish through primary processing. The discussion focuses on estimates for Alternative 4.1 and the\ndifferences between the estimates for Alternative 4.1 and Alternative 1 (the status quo FMPs). The regulatory\nchanges for Alternative 4.1 that the models attempted to address and that are reflected in the differences\nbetween the model projections for Alternatives 1 and 4.1 were described in the discussion of the model\nprojections of exvessel value.\nFor Alternative 4.1, the estimated value of all BSAI and GOA groundfish products is $1.1 billion (Table 4.8-\n27). This is 11.4 percent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-28). For individual groups of\nprocessors, the projected changes in product value range from a 19.2 percent decrease for motherships to a 1.6\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-31","percent increase for southcentral processors. The estimates for products from BSAI and GOA catch,\nrespectively are $219 million and $851 million (Tables 4.8-29 and 4.8-31). This is a 0.4 percent increase for\nthe GOA (Table 4.8-30) and a 14 percent decrease for the BSAI (Table 4.8-32).\nTo simplify the discussion above, we focus on the 5-year mean levels of exvessel value from the model\nprojections. However, it is worthwhile to consider trends in projections as well. Under Alternative 1, product\nvalue first declines and then rises such that Alaska-wide product value in 2005 is approximately 4 percent\nhigher than the 5-year mean (Table 4.8-39). Under Alternative 4.1, Alaska-wide product value rises steadily\nfrom 2001-2005 and the value in 2005 is more than 7 percent higher than the 5-year mean value. Thus,\nrelative to Alternative 1, Alternative 4.1 results in greater reductions in product value in the early years but\nsmaller reductions in later years. For 2003-2005, Alternative 4.1 projections of product value for the BSAI\nand GOA together average less than 8 percent below projections for Alternative 1 as compared to a 5-year\nmean value more than 11 percent below projections for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-40).\nQualifications\nThe absolute estimates of product value for Alternative 4.1 are subject to many of the same potential biases\nas with other alternatives. Biases may result from the assumption of constant prices and constant product mix\nor if catch projections are inaccurate. However the relative changes between Alternative 1 and Alternative 4.1\nare likely to give a reasonably accurate picture of the impacts of this alternative since changes are small for\nall but the pollock fishery, and even changes in pollock catches are moderate. The reduction in pollock catch\nmight be expected to have an upward impact on prices for pollock products. The increase in prices, and the\nextent to which they partially or more than offset decreases in quantity, would depend on demand elasticities\nof which we are uncertain.\nAlternative 4.1 Impacts on Costs for Processors\nOnly the costs for the processors in the BSAI pollock fisheries should be substantially impacted by this\nalternative. The most substantial impact on costs for these processors would be that fixed and semi-fixed costs\nwould be spread out over a somewhat smaller level of production, thereby increasing average per unit cost.\npollock catcher/processors might be able to offset this by idling some vessels within there cooperative. The\nsame possibility exists for motherships and associated catcher vessels.\nVariable costs may be increased for processors if exvessel prices increase as a result of smaller total pollock\ncatches. However, the magnitude or likelihood of such changes is not certain. Catcher/processors and catcher\nvessels delivering to motherships may incur some increases in variable costs due to displacement of catch from\nmore productive to less productive areas, but these impacts should be relatively minor. The amount of displaced\ncatch is 15 percent for catcher/processors and only 1 percent for motherships (Table 4.8-48).\n4.8.4.3\nAlternative 4.1 Impacts on Consumers of Groundfish Products\nAlternative 4.1 will result in moderate reductions in production of pollock products. This could result in\ndecreases in supply of pollock fillets to the domestic market. Supply of other pollock products such as surimi\nfor the domestic seafood analog market probably would also be reduced. Assuming that demand is not perfectly\nelastic, this would result in higher prices and a loss of consumer surplus to the American public. The magnitude\nof that loss will depend on price elasticities that are not quantifiable at this time and on the degree to which\nproduction is shifted toward or away from the export markets.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-32","Alternative 4.1 Impacts on Nonconsumptive and Nonuse Values\n4.8.4.4\nA primary purpose of this alternative is to reduce or control the catch of nontarget species, specifically squid,\nskate and grenadier. The purpose of doing SO is to protect these species from overexploitation and to maintain\nthe overall ecosystem of which they may be an important part. It is difficult to say whether this would have\nsubstantial value to the public in the form of nonconsumptive or nonuse value since it is unclear the extent to\nwhich these measures would contribute to healthier ecosystems or prevent collapse or extinction of particular\nspecies. Many people are likely to perceive value in this alternative if these contributions are important, but\nthere is no information available to quantify that value at this time.\nAlternative 4.1 Impacts on Prohibited Species Catch and Groundfish Discards\n4.8.4.5\nAlternative 4.1 would not eliminate the source of the problem of excessively high bycatch rates for prohibited\nspecies and discard rates for groundfish. However, groundfish discards are expected to decline marginally as\na result of Alternative 4.1 (Tables 4.8-50 and 4.8-51). The 18 percent decrease in the BSAI pollock TAC and\nthe associated decrease in catch in the pollock fishery are projected to result in roughly comparable reductions\nin the bycatch of salmon and herring, the two prohibited species that are taken almost exclusively in the pollock\nfishery.\nThe cost imposed on the groundfish fleet by having to stay within the PSC limits would not be affected much\nby Alternative 4.1. Both the cost imposed on some sectors of the groundfish fleet by other sectors using\ngroundfish as bycatch and the ecological costs associated with discarding groundfish at sea would be decreased\nminimally by the small decrease in groundfish discards. Similarly, the decreases in prohibited species bycatch\nwould decrease the cost of PSC imposed on herring and salmon fishermen. Neither estimates of these costs\nunder the current management regime nor estimates of the changes in these costs associated with Alternative\n4.1 are available.\nA more complete discussion of the impacts of Alternative 4.1 on prohibited species bycatch is included in\nSection 4.6.\nAlternative 4.1 Impacts on Fishing Vessel Safety\n4.8.4.6\nAlternative 4.1 is not expected to substantially impact fishing vessel safety.\nAlternative 4.1 Impacts on Excess Capacity\n4.8.4.7\nBecause Alternative 4.13 is expected to marginally decrease the quantity of catch and products from the fishery,\nthis alternative is expected to marginally increase the level of excess capacity in both harvest and processing\nsectors. It will not eliminate incentives to maintain excess capacity.\nAlternative 4.2 Impacts on Catcher Vessel Delivering to Inshore Processors\n4.8.4.8\nAlternative 4.2 Impacts on Exvessel Value for Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nA summary of the model projections of the exvessel value of BSAI and GOA groundfish delivered to inshore\nprocessors under Alternative 4.2 and the differences between the projections for Alternatives 1 and 4.2 is\nfollowed by a qualitative assessment of those projections.\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-33","Model Projections\nThe following discussion is of the model projections of the 5-year means (2001 to 2005) of the exvessel value\nfor groundfish delivered to inshore processors. The discussion focuses on estimates for Alternative 4.2 and the\ndifferences between the estimates for Alternative 4.2 and Alternative 1 (the status quo FMPs). The regulatory\nchanges for Alternative 4.2 that the models attempted to address and that are, therefore, reflected in the\ndifferences between the model projections for Alternatives 1 and 4.2 are (1) reduced BSAI pollock TAC and\n(2) imposition of TACs for skates in the BSAI and GOA and for grenadier in the GOA. The TACs for BSAI\nskates and GOA grenadier are lower for Alternative 4.2 than for Alternative 4.1. The area closure for the\neastern Bering Sea pollock fishery to decrease squid bycatch was not addressed by the models that generated\nthe estimates of catch, bycatch, retained catch, exvessel value, and product value.\nFor Alternative 4.2, the estimated exvessel value for all BSAI and GOA groundfish delivered to inshore\nprocessors is $233 million (Table 4.8-1). This is 8.6 percent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-\n2). For individual groups of inshore processors, the projected changes range from a 15.7 percent decrease for\nlarge BSAI pollock processors to an increase of 1.1 percent for southeast processors. The estimates for the\nBSAI and GOA catch, respectively are $113 million and $120 million (Tables 4.8-3 and 4.8-5). This is a 0.5\npercent increase for the GOA (Table 4.8-4) and a 15.8 percent decrease for the BSAI (Table 4.8-6).\nThe area wide estimate of exvessel value for hook-and-line gear is $74 million (Table 4.8-7), this is a 0.5 percent\nincrease compared to Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-8). The corresponding estimates for pot and trawl gear,\nrespectively, are $11.3 million (no change) and $147 million (13.1 percent decrease) (Tables 4.8-9 through\n4.8-12). The estimates by gear type for the BSAI and GOA separately are in Tables 4.8-13 through 4.8-24.\nThe estimates of the effects of Alternative 4.2 in terms of the percentage change in exvessel value vary by area\nand gear type from a decrease of 17 percent for BSAI trawl fisheries to an increase of 0.8 percent for GOA\nhook-and-line fisheries. The range is greater by processor group.\nThe Alternative 4.2 estimates of the exvessel value by species and processor group for the BSAI and GOA\ncombined and estimates of the percent change compared to Alternative 1 are in Tables 4.8-25 and 4.8-26. The\n$22 million (16.4 percent) decrease in the estimate of the exvessel value of pollock in the BSAI and GOA is\nslightly more than the estimated decrease for all species combined. A small increase in the estimate for sablefish\nprincipally explain the small offset to the decrease in the estimate for pollock.\nTo simplify the discussion above, we focus on the 5-year mean levels of exvessel value from the model\nprojections. However, it is worthwhile to consider trends in projections as well. Under Alternative 1, exvessel\nvalue first declines and then rises such that Alaska-wide exvessel value in 2005 is approximately 5 percent\nhigher than the 5-year mean (Table 4.8-33). Under Alternative 4.2, Alaska-wide exvessel value rises steadily\nfrom 2001-2005 and the value in 2005 is more than 8 percent higher than the 5-year mean value. Thus, relative\nto Alternative 1, Alternative 4.2 results in greater reductions in exvessel value in the early years but smaller\nreductions in later years. For 2003-2005, Alternative 4.2 projections of exvessel value for the BSAI and GOA\ntogether average approximately 6 percent below projections for Alternative 1 as compared to a 5-year mean\nvalue nearly 9 percent lower than projections for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-34).\nQualifications\nThe impacts of Alternative 4.2 are very similar to the impacts of 4.1 and the same qualifications are in order.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-34","Alternative 4.2 Impacts on Costs for Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nThe impacts of Alternative 4.2 on costs for catcher vessels are essentially the same as the impacts discussed for\nAlternative 4.1\nAlternative 4.2 Impacts on Processing Sector\n4.8.4.9\nA summary of the model projections of the product value of BSAI and GOA groundfish through primary\nprocessing under Alternative 4.2 and the differences between the projections for Alternatives 1 and 4.2 is\nfollowed by a qualitative assessment of those projections.\nAlternative 4.2 Impacts on Product Value for Processors\nModel Projections\nThe following discussion is of the model projections of the 5-year means (2001 to 2005) of the product value\nfor groundfish through primary processing. The discussion focuses on estimates for Alternative 4.2 and the\ndifferences between the estimates for Alternative 4.2 and Alternative 1 (the status quo FMPs). The regulatory\nchanges for Alternative 4.2 that the models attempted to address and that are reflected in the differences between\nthe model projections for Alternatives 1 and 4.2 were described in the discussion of the model projections of\nexvessel value.\nFor Alternative 4.2, the estimated value of all BSAI and GOA groundfish products is $1.0 billion (Table 4.8-\n27). This is 14.5 percent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-28). For individual groups of\nprocessors, the projected changes in product value range from a 46 percent decrease for longline\ncatcher/processors to a 0.9 percent increase for southeast processors. The estimates for products from BSAI\nand GOA catch, respectively are $219 million and $814 million (Tables 4.8-29 and 4.8-31). This is a 0.2\npercent increase for the GOA (Table 4.8-30) and a 17.7 percent decrease for the BSAI (Table 4.8-32).\nTo simplify the discussion above, we focus on the 5-year mean levels of exvessel value from the model\nprojections. However, it is worthwhile to consider trends in projections as well. Under Alternative 1, product\nvalue first declines and then rises such that Alaska-wide product value in 2005 is approximately 4 percent higher\nthan the 5-year mean (Table 4.8-39). Under Alternative 4.2, Alaska-wide product value rises steadily from\n2001-2005 and the value in 2005 is more than 7 percent higher than the 5-year mean value. Thus, relative to\nAlternative 1, Alternative 4.2 results in greater reductions in product value in the early years but smaller\nreductions in later years. For 2003 to 2005, Alternative 4.2 projections of product value for the BSAI and GOA\ntogether average approximately 11 percent below projections for Alternative 1 as compared to a 5-year mean\nvalue nearly 15 percent below projections for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-40).\nQualifications\nThe impacts of Alternative 4.2 are very similar to the impacts of 4.1 and the same qualifications are in order.\nAlternative 4.2 Impacts on Costs for Processors\nThe impacts of Alternative 4.2 on costs for processors are essentially the same as the impacts discussed for\nAlternative 4.1\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-35","4.8.4.10\nAlternative 4.2 Impacts on Consumers of Groundfish Products\nAlternative 4.2 will result in moderate reductions in production of pollock products. This could result in\ndecreases in supply of pollock fillets to the domestic market. Supply of other pollock products such as surimi\nfor the domestic seafood analog market probably would also be reduced. Assuming that demand is not perfectly\nelastic, this would result in higher prices and a loss of consumer surplus to the American public. The magnitude\nof that loss will depend on price elasticities that are not quantifiable at this time and on the degree to which\nproduction is shifted toward or away from the export markets.\n4.8.4.11\nAlternative 4.2 Impacts on Nonconsumptive and Nonuse Values\nA primary purpose of this alternative is to reduce or control the catch of nontarget species, specifically squid,\nskate and grenadier. The purpose of doing SO is to protect these species from overexploitation and to maintain\nthe overall ecosystem of which they may be an important component. It is difficult to say whether this would\nhave substantial value to the public in the form of nonconsumptive or nonuse value since it is unclear the extent\nto which these measures would contribute to healthier ecosystems or prevent collapse of extinction of particular\nspecies. Many people are likely to perceive value in this alternative if these contributions are important, but\nthere is no information available to quantify that value at this time.\n4.8.4.12\nAlternative 4.2 Impacts on Prohibited Species Catch and Groundfish Discards\nAlternative 4.2 would not eliminate the source of the problem of excessively high bycatch rates for prohibited\nspecies and discard rates for groundfish. However, as with Alternative 4.1, the 18 percent decrease in the BSAI\npollock TAC and the associated decrease in catch in the pollock fishery are projected to result in comparable\nreductions in the bycatch of salmon and herring, the two prohibited species that are taken almost exclusively\nin the pollock fishery. In addition, the BSAI skate TAC for Alternative 4.2 was sufficiently restrictive to\ndecrease the model projection for the longline Pacific cod fishery substantially and, thereby, decrease BSAI\nhalibut bycatch mortality by 10 percent compared to Alternative 1 (Table 4.6-7). A more complete discussion\nof the impacts of Alternative 4.2 on prohibited species bycatch is included in Section 4.6. The model projections\nof groundfish discards are about 6 percent less for Alternative 4.2 than for Alternative 1 (Tables 4.8-50 and 4.8-\n51).\nThe cost imposed on the groundfish fleet by having to stay within the PSC limits would not be affected much\nby alternative 4.2. Both the cost imposed on some sectors of the groundfish fleet by other sectors using\ngroundfish as bycatch and the ecological costs associated with discarding groundfish at sea would be decreased\nminimally by the small decrease in groundfish discards. Similarly, the decreases in prohibited species bycatch\nwould decrease the cost of PSC imposed on halibut, herring and salmon fishermen. Neither estimates of these\ncosts under the current management regime nor estimates of the changes in these costs associated with\nAlternative 4.2 are available.\n4.8.4.13\nAlternative 4.2 Impacts on Fishing Vessel Safety\nAlternative 4.2 is not expected to substantially impact fishing vessel safety.\n4.8.4.14\nAlternative 4.2 Impacts on Excess Capacity\nBecause Alternative 4.2 is expected to decrease the quantity of catch and products from the fishery, this\nalternative is expected to increase the level of excess capacity in both harvest and processing sectors and will\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-36","not eliminate incentives to maintain excess capacity. With the exception of the freezer longline fleet, the effect\nis expected to be small.\n4.8.4.15\nFurther Consideration of Squid Area Closure Regulations\nClosures of areas with historically high squid bycatch may or may not be the most cost effective way to reduce\nbycatch of squid. Typically there are a number of ways a vessel could change its fishing practices to reduce\nbycatch of a particular species. Avoiding areas where bycatch has been high in the past is one, but depth fished\ncan be changed, gear can be modified, or test fishing can be used to find areas and times with lower bycatch\nrates.\nSince the BSAI pollock fishery now has cooperatives in place, it is quite possible that the cooperatives could\ntogether find a solution for reducing squid bycatch that would be less costly than area closures. Although each\nvessel would not have the incentive to reduce squid bycatch if doing SO was costly, incentives to do SO could be\ndeveloped by the cooperatives and monitored using observer program and inshore processor size composition\ndata by vessel. Differences among AFA pollock processors with respect to the costs of avoiding squid bycatch\ncould be one of the obstacles to establishing a bycatch reduction system that all cooperatives would support,\nbut allocations of squid bycatch could be given to each cooperative in that case. Cooperatives could potentially\nallocate bycatch quotas for squid to individual vessels and allow compensated trades that should lead to an\nefficient distribution of bycatch among vessels. Setting allowable catches for squid and perhaps allocating them\nto cooperatives, as opposed to closing a large area to pollock fishing, would allow the fleet to use the lowest cost\nmethod of reducing squid bycatch and would provide fishermen with an incentive to develop better methods for\nreducing bycatch.\nImpacts of Alternative 5 (Comparison Between Alternatives 1 and 5)\n4.8.5\nAlternative 5 is intended to provide additional protection for benthic habitat. This section contains both\nquantitative and qualitative assessments of select economic and social effects of Alternative 5. Other economic\nand social effects of Alternative 5 are discussed in Section 4.8.7.\nAlternative 5 Impacts on the Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\n4.8.5.1\nAlternative 5 Impacts on Exvessel Value for Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nA summary of the model projections of the exvessel value of BSAI and GOA groundfish delivered to inshore\nprocessors under Alternative 5 and the differences between the projections for Alternatives 1 and 5 is followed\nby a qualitative assessment of those projections.\nModel Projection\nThe following discussion is of the model projections of the 5-year means (2001 to 2005) of the exvessel value\nfor groundfish delivered to inshore processors. The discussion focuses on estimates for Alternative 5 and the\ndifferences between the estimates for Alternative 5 and Alternative 1 (the status quo FMPs). The regulatory\nchanges for Alternative 5 that the models attempted to address and that are, therefore, reflected in the differences\nbetween the model projections for Alternatives 1 and 5 are (1) elimination of the bottom trawl Pacific cod,\npollock, rockfish, and sablefish fisheries; (2) replacement of some with pelagic trawl fisheries and others with\nfixed-gear fisheries; (3) decrease the TACs for the target species in the remaining bottom trawl fisheries; and\n(4) reallocate halibut PSC limits between trawl and fixed-gear to allow for the reallocation of groundfish catch\nfrom the trawl to the fixed-gear fisheries. The model did not address fully the replacement of bottom trawl\nrockfish fisheries with pelagic trawl fisheries because 1997 to 1999 data were used to estimate bycatch by target\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-37","fishery and, with the exception of the GOA Pacific ocean perch fishery, there were no pelagic trawl rockfish\nfisheries in 1997-99. The additional year-round area closures were not addressed by the models that generated\nthe estimates of catch, bycatch, retained catch, exvessel value, and product value.\nFor Alternative 5, the estimated exvessel value for all BSAI and GOA groundfish delivered to inshore processors\nis $243 million (Table 4.8-1). This is 4.6 percent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-2). For\nindividual groups of inshore processors, the projected changes range from a 20.8 percent decrease for other\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands processors to an increase of 8.2 percent for southcentral processors. The\nestimates for the BSAI and GOA catch, respectively are $109 million and $134 million (Tables 4.8-3 and 4.8-5).\nThis is a 3.5 percent decrease for the GOA (Table 4.8-4) and a 5.4 percent decrease for the BSAI (Table 4.8-6).\nThe area wide estimate of exvessel value for hook-and-line gear is $79 million (Table 4.8-7), this is a 6.6 percent\nincrease compared to Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-8). The corresponding estimates for pot and trawl gear,\nrespectively, are $21 million (89 percent increase) and $143 million (15.6 percent decrease) (Tables 4.8-9\nthrough 4.8-12). The corresponding estimates by gear type for the BSAI and GOA separately are in Tables 4.8-\n13 through 4.8-24. The estimates of the effects of Alternative 5 in terms of the percentage change in exvessel\nvalue vary by area and gear type from a decrease of 40 percent for GOA trawl fisheries to an increase of 115\npercent for GOA pot fisheries. The range is greater by processor group.\nThe Alternative 5 estimates of the exvessel value by species and processor group for the BSAI and GOA\ncombined and estimates of the percent change compared to Alterative 1 are in Tables 4.8-25 and 4.8-26. Pacific\ncod, pollock and sablefish typically account for 95 percent of the exvessel value of all BSAI and GOA\ngroundfish delivered to inshore processors. It is estimated that Alternative 5 would result in the following\nchanges in exvessel value for those three species: Pacific cod, $11 million (27.5 percent) decrease; pollock $1\nmillion (0.7 percent) increase; and sablefish, $0.4 million (0.6 percent) increase. There were increases in the\nexvessel values of some of the other species and decreases for others.\nTo simplify the discussion above we focus on the 5-year mean levels of exvessel value from the model\nprojections. However, it is worthwhile to consider trends in projections as well. Under Alternative 1 exvessel\nvalue first declines and then rises such that Alaska-wide exvessel value in 2005 is approximately 5 percent\nhigher than the 5-year mean (Table 4.8-33). Under Alternative 5, Alaska-wide exvessel value declines from\n2001 to 2002 and then rises steadily thereafter. The value in 2005 is about 6 percent higher than the 5-year mean\nvalue. For 2003 to 2005, Alternative 5 projections of exvessel value for the BSAI and GOA together average\nless than 96 percent of the projections for Alternative 1 as compared to a 5-year mean value of 95 percent of\nthe projections for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-34). Since the trends in exvessel value for Alternative 1 and\nAlternative 5 are similar, the comparison of 5-year mean values is quite similar to comparisons of annual values.\nQualifications\nThe model projections of exvessel value discussed above and presented in Tables 4.8-1 through 4.8-26 may be\nbiased either upward or downward for a variety of reasons. Alternative 5 results in insignificant changes in the\ntotal catch of many species, a projected increase greater than 5 percent only for rex sole and other groundfish,\nand relatively small decreases for several flatfish and rockfish species, Atka mackerel, and sablefish. Therefore,\nprices independent of changes in quality are not expected to change substantially and the bias introduced by not\nconsidering the price responses to changes in supply are expected to be small for the BSAI and GOA groundfish\nfisheries as a whole, if not for each species.\nThere are factors that might tend to reduce exvessel value relative to the Alternative 5 model projections\ndiscussed above. Additional year-round closures for the bottom trawl fisheries that are not eliminated by\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-38","Alternative 5 (i.e., Atka mackerel and flatfish fisheries except Greenland turbot) and lengthening the season for\nthe fixed-gear Pacific cod fishery will change the spatial distribution of catch in the bottom trawl fisheries and\nboth the spatial and temporal distribution of catch in the fixed-gear Pacific cod fisheries. It is reasonable to\nassume that, subject to regulatory constraints, harvesters target catch in areas and time periods that maximize\nits value either by increasing the quality and value of the fish or by decreasing the harvesting cost or both. To\nthe extent that the historical fishing locations and periods maximize fish quality and value, the model projections\nfor the alternative understate the actual impact since we use historical exvessel prices to calculate the exvessel\nvalue for this alternative.\nFurthermore, it is possible that catch estimates from the simulations may be overstated. If catch rates are\nreduced substantially due to the spatial or temporal shifts of harvests, it may not be possible or cost effective\nfor the fleets to take as much catch as projected. In order to replace the Pacific cod catch in the Pacific cod\ntrawl fisheries in 1999, the Pacific cod catch in the fixed-gear cod fisheries for the BSAI and GOA, respectively,\nwould have had to increase by 108 percent and 50 percent. Therefore, with the elimination of the bottom trawl\nfisheries for Pacific cod and rockfish, it may not be possible or cost effective for the fixed-gear fisheries and the\npelagic trawl fisheries to replace the catch of the bottom trawl fisheries as completely as projected. The\nsimulations do not reflect this possibility and therefore might overstate exvessel value by overstating the quantity\nof catch.\nWhile it is not possible to say exactly what effect spatial and gear displacement of catch might have on the value\nof fish or on the desirability and feasibility of taking the projected catch, it is useful to consider the degree to\nwhich catch is displaced relative to the reduction in total catch. If the displacements are considerably higher\nthan the percentage reductions in total catch required under Alternative 5, there may be some question as to\nwhether the catch projections will be taken. A large displacement of effort also increases the likelihood that the\naverage quality and possibly price would decrease, thereby creating and upward bias in the exvessel value\nprojections presented in Tables 4.8.1 through 4.8-26.\nThe percent of the annual catch for 1997 to 1999 that would have been displaced by these additional year-round\nclosures varies substantially by year, target species, area, and catcher vessel size class (Table 4.8-49). The\nestimates of catch displacement approach or exceed 50 percent in at least one of those years for the following:\n1. GOA bottom trawl rex sole catcher vessels less than 124 ft\n2. GOA bottom trawl deep water flatfish catcher vessels less than 124 ft\nThe net impact of upward and downward bias in projections of exvessel value is difficult to determine, but we\nexpect that projections are likely to understate the negative impact of Alternative 5 on total exvessel value.\nAlternative 5 impacts on costs for catcher vessels delivering to inshore processors\nMany costs are fixed and do not change with the level of production. These costs must be allocated to a smaller\n(larger) amount of product, thereby raising (decreasing) the average cost per unit of product. Average costs per\nunit of catch for trawl catcher vessels would be expected to increase somewhat under Alternative 5 because of\nthe reduction in the overall level of production resulting from lower catches. However, the opposite would be\ntrue for fixed-gear vessels. Average costs per unit of catch for fixed-gear catcher vessels would be expected\nto decrease with Alternative 5 because of the increase in the overall level of production resulting from higher\ncatches.\nThe discussion in the previous section indicated that the spatial displacement of fishing effort that would result\nfrom implementation of Alternative 5 would be large for some bottom trawl fisheries. These changes can be\nexpected to lead to increased operating costs since vessels may have to travel further to harvest fish and will\nChapter 4 Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-39","likely be required to fish in less productive areas in some cases. It is probable that bottom trawl catcher vessels\nwill incur increased costs per unit of catch due to increased travel time and because catch rates are likely to fall\nas vessel are forced to shift effort away from preferred locations.\nIt is reasonable to assume that, subject to regulatory constraints, harvesters target catch with the gear that\nmaximizes its value either by increasing the value (quality) of the fish or by decreasing the harvesting cost or\nboth. To the extent that the historical fishing gear was used because it has the lowest cost per unit of catch, the\nreplacement of select bottom trawl rockfish fisheries with pelagic trawl fisheries would increase cost per unit\nof catch. The pelagic trawl fishery for Pacific ocean perch in the central GOA has been a relatively small part\nof the Pacific ocean perch trawl fishery in that area and there really has not been another pelagic trawl fishery\nfor rockfish in either the GOA or BSAI in recent years. The replacement of the GOA bottom trawl pollock\nfishery with a pelagic trawl fishery is certainly feasible. However, it would tend to shift catch toward larger\nvessels and to the plants to which they deliver fish. The BSAI pollock fishery is limited to pelagic trawls under\nthe status quo.\nBottom trawl gear and fixed-gear are actively used in the BSAI and GOA Pacific cod fisheries. The fixed-gear\ncod fishery is an economically viable fishery; however, the feasibility and cost of having it completely replace\nthe bottom trawl cod fishery is not known. The information required to compare harvesting costs by gear is not\navailable to us.\nThe License Limitations Program (LLP), the physical characteristics of some trawl vessels, and economic\nfeasibility limit the number of trawl gear vessels that would be converted to fish with fixed-gear. For those that\ncan realistically be converted, the conversion cost would be substantial. For vessels that use bottom trawl gear\nexclusively, the conversion necessary to fish with pelagic trawl gear would also be substantial in some cases.\nIn addition to new trawl gear, the conversion could include a more powerful engine, new gear handling\nequipment on deck, and new electronics. Therefore, the conversion cost to pelagic trawl gear could be\nsubstantial. These costs would be difficult to recover, particularly for vessels that had been heavily dependent\non the Pacific cod fishery.\n4.8.5.2\nAlternative 5 Impacts on the Processing Sector\nAlternative 5 Impacts on Product Value for Processors\nA summary of the model projections of the product value of BSAI and GOA groundfish through primary\nprocessing under Alternative 5 and the differences between the projections for Alternatives 1 and 5 is followed\nby a qualitative assessment of those projections.\nModel Projection\nThe following discussion is of the model projections of the 5-year means (2001 to 2005) of the product value\nfor groundfish through primary processing. The discussion focuses on estimates for Alternative 5 and the\ndifferences between the estimates for Alternative 5 and Alternative 1 (the status quo FMPs). The regulatory\nchanges for Alternative 5 that the models attempted to address and that are reflected in the differences between\nthe model projections for Alternatives 1 and 5 were described in the discussion of the model projections of\nexvessel value.\nFor Alternative 5, the estimated value of all BSAI and GOA groundfish products is $1.2 billion (Table 4.8-27).\nThis is 0.9 percent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-28). For individual groups of processors,\nthe projected changes in product value range from a 26.6 percent decrease for other Alaska Peninsula and\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-40","Aleutian Islands processors to a 81 percent increase for pot catcher/processors. The estimates for products from\nBSAI and GOA catch, respectively are $205 million and $991 million (Tables 4.8-29 and 4.8-31). This is a\n6 percent decrease for the GOA (Table 4.8-30) and a 0.2 percent increase for the BSAI (Table 4.8-32).\nTo simplify the discussion above, we focus on the 5-year mean levels of product value from the model\nprojections. However, it is worthwhile to consider trends in projections as well. Under Alternative 1 product\nvalue first declines and then rises such that Alaska-wide product value in 2005 is approximately 4 percent higher\nthan the 5-year mean (Table 4.8-39). Under Alternative 5, Alaska-wide product value decline from 2001 to\n2002 and then rises steadily thereafter. The value in 2005 is also 4 percent higher than the 5-year mean value.\nFor 2000-2005, Alternative 5 projections of product value for the BSAI and GOA together average\napproximately 1 percent below projections for Alternative 1 as compared to a 5-year mean value also 1 percent\nlower than projections for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-40). Since the trends in product value for Alternative 1 and\nAlternative 5 are similar, the comparison of 5-year mean values is quite similar to comparisons of annual values.\nQualifications\nAs with exvessel value, projections of product value may be biased for a variety of reasons. Product value\nestimates are based on retention rates, product mixes and product prices from recent years. Since Alternative\n5 results in small changes in the quantity of production of most species, prices independent of changes in quality\nare not expected to change substantially. Therefore, the bias introduced by not considering the price responses\nto changes in supply are expected to be insignificant for the BSAI and GOA groundfish fisheries as a whole,\nif not for each species. Pacific cod fillets and headed and gutted Pacific cod could be a major exception. The\nreplacement of the bottom trawl cod fishery with a fixed-gear fishery, would tend to decrease the production of\nPacific cod fillets and increase the production of headed and gutted Pacific cod, because historically fillets have\naccounted for a larger percent of the production from the trawl fishery catch. However, the net effect would\nbe expected to be reduced by changes in product mix if the price of Pacific cod fillets relative to headed and\ngutted products increased.\nThe product quality and prices for headed and gutted cod have often been higher for Pacific cod caught with\nfixed-gear. Therefore, the elimination of the trawl cod fishery and the expansion of the fixed-gear fishery might\nbe expected to increase the prices of headed and gutted cod. This means that the use of constant product prices\nthat are not gear-specific to project product value introduces a downward bias in the estimate of total product\nvalue for Alternative 5 that would overstate the reduction in product value due to this alternative. There is not\na similar problem with the exvessel value projections because gear-specific exvessel prices were used.\nHowever, the assumptions of constant prices and product mix may also result in bias in the opposite direction\nif lower product quality results and puts downward pressure on average prices or if production is lower than\nestimated. As discussed in the section on exvessel value, spatial displacement of catches for catcher vessels\nwould occur under Alternative 5. This could lead to reductions in average quality of fish which could hurt\nproduct value. Catcher/processors will also be subject to spatial displacement. The percent of the annual catch\nfor 1997-1999 that would have been displaced by these additional year-round closures varies substantially by\nyear, target species, area, and catcher/processor vessel size class (Table 4.8-49). The estimates of catch\ndisplacement approach or exceed 50 percent in at least one of those years for the following:\nGOA trawl flathead sole, catcher/processor vessels more than 60 ft\nGOA trawl rex sole, catcher/processor vessels 124 ft or less\nGOA trawl deep water flatfish, catcher/processor vessels 124 ft or less\nGOA trawl shallow water flatfish, catcher/processor vessels more than 124 ft\nChapter 4 Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-41","As with catcher vessels, the elimination of the bottom trawl fisheries for rockfish and Pacific cod would prevent\nthe projected catches of these species from being taken if the bottom trawl catch cannot be replaced fully with\nfixed-gear and pelagic trawl catch. The economic viability of pelagic trawl fisheries for rockfish has not been\ndemonstrated. In order to replace the Pacific cod catch in the Pacific cod trawl fisheries in 1999, the Pacific\ncod catch in the fixed-gear cod fisheries for the BSAI and GOA, respectively, would have had to increase by\n108 percent and 50 percent. The longline catcher/processor fleet would receive much of the fixed-gear cod\nallocation in the BSAI. Representatives of that fleet have indicated that they would be able to fully use the\nincreased allocation. It is not clear that the much larger percentage increase in the GOA allocation to fixed-gear\nwould be taken, given the harvesting capacity of that fleet and the lower catch rates that would be expected if\nthe fleet fished more months each year.\nThe net impact of upward and downward bias in projections of product value is sufficiently indeterminate that\nwe do not have an expectation concerning whether the model projections for Alternative 5 are likely to error on\nthe high or low side.\nAlternative 5 Impacts on Cost for Processors\nAverage costs will increase (decrease) because of the reduction (increase) in the overall level of production\nresulting from lower (higher) catches. Many costs are fixed and will not change with the level of production.\nThese costs are allocated to a smaller (larger) amount of product, thereby raising (decreasing) the average cost\nper unit of product. The relatively small decrease in the catch available to most processors would minimally\nincrease their average costs. The increase will be larger for the processors that currently are most dependent\non trawl caught Pacific cod, flatfish, and Atka mackerel. Conversely, there would be large increases in\nproduction and reductions in average costs for processors that are most dependent on cod taken with fixed-gear.\nVariable costs may also be increased. The reduction in supply of fish is likely to put upward pressure on\nexvessel prices. If spatial shifting of production raises average costs for catcher/vessels, shoreside plants may\nface increased pressure to pay higher prices for fish. The extent to which processors versus catcher vessels\nwould absorb increased harvesting costs and the extent to which catcher vessels will be able to demand higher\nprices as total supply declines will depend on their relative bargaining power as well as price elasticities of the\nproducts made from the fish.\nSpatial shifting of harvesting in the remaining bottom trawl fisheries has the potential to increase average costs\nfor bottom trawl catcher/processors if it results in the use of less productive fishing grounds. The expansion\nof the season for the fixed-gear cod fishery would increase average variable cost if CPUE is lower and therefore\nCPUE is higher in the periods the fixed-gear fishery caught little in recent years. As with the catcher vessel\nfleet, we do not have the information necessary to compare fishing costs between the trawl and fixed-gear\ncatcher/processor fleets.\n4.8.5.3\nAlternative 5 Impacts on Consumers of Groundfish Products\nAlternative 5 will result in relatively small reductions in the production of most groundfish products. It is\nexpected to decrease the supply of Pacific cod fillets to the domestic market because historically a larger share\nof the trawl catch has been used to produce fillets. If demand is not perfectly elastic this would result in higher\nprices and a loss of consumer surplus to the American public. The magnitude of that loss will depend on\nprice\nelasticities that are not quantifiable at this time and on the degree to which production from the fixed-gear cod\nfisheries is shifted toward or away from the export markets and fillet production.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-42","4.8.5.4\nAlternative 5 Impacts on Nonconsumptive and Nonuse Values\nA primary reason for this management alternative is to provide increased protection for habitat. Meeting this\nobjective is intended to increase the benefits from the BSAI and GOA ecosystems and fisheries. Studies have\nshown significant willingness to pay on the part of the general public for existence of species (and preservation\nof endangered species) as well as preservation of wilderness areas which the individuals never expect to see.\nHowever, estimates of nonconsumptive and nonuse values for the species and areas these measures would\nprotect are not available at this time. Therefore it is not possible to quantify the change in the level of nonuse\nbenefits that Alternative 5 would provide.\nAlternative 5 Impacts on Prohibited Species Catch and Groundfish Discards\n4.8.5.5\nAlternative 5 would not eliminate the source of the problem of excessively high bycatch rates for prohibited\nspecies and discard rates for groundfish. However, by replacing some bottom trawl fisheries with pelagic trawl\nor fixed-gear fisheries and decreasing the TAC for the target species of the remaining bottom trawl fisheries,\nAlternative 5 is expected to decrease the bycatch of prohibited species.\nThe projections of the effects of Alternative 5 on the bycatch of prohibited species and the discards of groundfish\ndo not account for the following (1) the spatial redistribution of catch that would result from the additional year-\nround area closures for the remaining bottom trawl fisheries; (2) the replacement of select bottom trawl rockfish\nfisheries with pelagic trawl fisheries (other than the GOA Pacific ocean perch fishery); and (3) the expansion\nof the fixed-gear Pacific cod fishery into periods that historically have had higher halibut bycatch rates. In the\nabsence of historical catch and bycatch data for pelagic trawl rockfish fisheries other than for the GOA Pacific\nocean perch fishery, bycatch data from the bottom trawl fisheries was used. We do not have the information\nrequired to determine the likely magnitude of the biases associated with not accounting for these three elements\nof Alternative 5; however, we expect them to vary by fishery, area and bycatch species. The projected increase\nin the bycatch of some species of crab is thought to substantially overstate the expected increase in crab bycatch\nmortality for two reasons. First, the model projections of crab bycatch in rockfish trawl fisheries is overstated\nsubstantially by not having estimates of bycatch rates for rockfish pelagic trawl fisheries. Second, the fixed-gear\nfisheries that would expand under Alternative 5 are thought to have lower crab discard mortality rates than the\nbottom trawl fisheries they would replace.\nThe cost imposed on the groundfish fleet by having to stay within the PSC limits would be reduced by the\ndecreases in halibut bycatch by all gear groups and by the reduction in crab bycatch in the trawl fisheries. Both\nthe cost imposed on some sectors of the groundfish fleet by other sectors using groundfish as bycatch and the\necological costs associated with discarding groundfish at sea would be decreased by the decrease in groundfish\ndiscards. The changes in prohibited species bycatch would increase the cost of PSC imposed the fishermen that\ntarget some of the prohibited species but decrease it for fishermen who target other prohibited species. Neither\nestimates of these costs under the current management regime nor estimates of the changes in these costs\nassociated with Alternative 5 are available.\nThe projections of the effects of Alternative 5 on the bycatch of prohibited species and the discards of groundfish\ndo not account for (1) the spatial redistribution of catch that would result from the additional year-round area\nclosures for the remaining bottom trawl fisheries; (2) the replacement of select bottom trawl rockfish fisheries\nwith pelagic trawl fisheries (other than the GOA Pacific ocean perch fishery); and (3) the expansion of the fixed-\ngear Pacific cod fishery into periods that historically have had higher halibut bycatch rates. In the absence of\nhistorical catch and bycatch data for pelagic trawl rockfish fisheries other than for the GOA Pacific ocean perch\nfishery, bycatch data from the bottom trawl fisheries was used. We do not have the information required to\ndetermine the likely direction and magnitude of the biases associated with not accounting for these three elements\nof Alternative 5; however, we expect them to vary by fishery, area and bycatch species.\nChapter 4 Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-43","4.8.5.6\nAlternative 5 Impacts on Fishing Vessel Safety\nAlternative 5 is not expected to substantially affect fishing vessel safety. The additional area closures may\nincrease stream time and result in vessels fishing farther from a port. This would decrease fishing vessel safety.\nThe closures may at times eliminate safer fishing areas and, therefore, decrease safety.\n4.8.5.7\nAlternative 5 Impacts on Excess Capacity\nThe overall impact of Alternative 5 on the level of excess fishing and processing capacity will vary greatly by\nsector. Fixed gear sectors will see excess capacity decline while the trawl sector will see excess capacity\nincrease substantially. This alternative will not, however, eliminate incentives to maintain excess capacity.\n4.8.5.8\nFurther Consideration of Changing Gear Allocations\nThe objective of the Alternative 5 model regime is to provide additional protection for benthic habitat from the\nBSAI and GOA groundfish fisheries. To meet this objective, Alternative 5 would, among other things, eliminate\nthe bottom trawl fisheries for Pacific cod, pollock, rockfish, and sablefish and replace some of these fisheries\nwith pelagic trawl fisheries and others with fixed-gear fisheries. This reallocation of groundfish from the bottom\ntrawl fisheries to other fisheries will result in the preemption of fishing opportunities for some sectors of the\nfishery. The LLP would limit the ability of trawl vessels to become fixed-gear vessels. Similarly, physical\nlimitations and costs would make it difficult for some trawl vessels to switch from bottom trawl to pelagic trawl\ngear. The adverse effects of preemption for the bottom trawl fleet would be worst for the sectors of the bottom\nfleet that are least able to switch gear and most dependent on the Pacific cod fishery. This could include\na\ndisproportionately large share of the smaller bottom trawlers.\nThe adverse effects of this preemption would be decreased substantially without diminishing the potentially\npositive habitat effects if a rights-based program, such as an individual fishing quota (IFQ) program, were in\nplace before the gear reallocation was implemented. With such a program, the bottom trawl vessel owners could\nreceive some compensation by selling their quota shares. Or by leasing their quota shares, they could cover the\ncost of the transition to pelagic trawl or fixed-gear.\n4.8.6\nImpacts of Alternative 6 (Comparison Between Alternatives 1 and 6)\nThe broad policy objective of Alternative 6.1 is as follows: (1) increase the long-term net economic benefits from\nthe commercial groundfish fisheries to those who harvest and process groundfish, to the associated fishing\ncommunities, and to those who consume groundfish seafood products; (2) prevent preemption of one sector or\nfishing community by another; and (3) maintain or increase levels of protection for protected species, target\nspecies, non-target species, and their habitat. The much narrower policy objective of Alternative 6.2 is to\nincrease the short-term net economic benefits from the commercial groundfish fisheries to those who harvest and\nprocess groundfish, to the associated fishing communities, and to those who consume groundfish seafood\nproducts by allowing a substantially more aggressive harvest strategy. This section contains both quantitative\nand qualitative assessments of select economic and social effects of Alternatives 6.1 and 6.2. Other economic\nand social effects of Alternatives 6.1 and 6.2 are discussed in Section 4.8.7.\nAlternative 6.1 makes only a general recommendation to use rights-based management to improve the economic\nperformance of the groundfish fisheries off Alaska. We agree with the National Research Council (1999a)\ncommittee on Individual Quotas, that the specifics of such a program should be worked out with the\nparticipation of stakeholders in the Council process. Three broad categories of rights-based systems should be\nconsidered: individual fishery quotas, cooperatives and community fishery quotas. Each of these systems can\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-44","take many forms, and any or all of them may prove to be useful tools to achieve the ends of increasing the net\nbenefits derived from the groundfish resources while minimizing preemption of fishing communities. There are\nliterally an infinite number of permutations that an expanded rights-based system could take, and it is probably\nnot productive to try and evaluate one or a small number of specific potential systems. Rather we discuss what\nthe objectives of the overall system should be, alternative structures available, the general costs and benefits\nassociated with these systems, and key design issues of particular relevance to Alaska groundfish fisheries.\nAlternative 6.2 is intended to meet an much narrower objective than Alternative 6.1 and like Alternatives 2.1\nthrough 5 it is defined in terms of very specific changes to the current management regime.\n4.8.6.1\nObjectives of Alternative 6.1\nAlternative 6.1 states a triad of general objectives: (1) to increase the long-term net economic benefits from the\ncommercial groundfish fisheries in Alaska to those who harvest and process groundfish, associated fishing\ncommunities and to those who consume groundfish; (2) to prevent preemption of one sector or fishing\ncommunity by another, while (3) maintaining or increasing levels of protection for protected species (including\nmarine mammals and seabirds), target species and non-target species and their habitat. While a well designed\nrights-based system should be able to achieve all three of these objectives to some degree, the objectives also\nrepresent tradeoffs. The greatest increase in profits for the overall industry is likely to come from a system with\na minimum of constraints on transferability and use of quota shares. Constraints on the types of companies that\ncan hold quotas or process fish or limits on accumulation of quota shares may prevent preemption of\ncommunities or fishery sectors but will likely reduce overall gains in profitability. Similarly constraints on the\ntypes of gears used and the timing and location of harvests may limit the ability of the industry to increase\nefficiency or revenues, though they may contribute to long-run profitability if they are necessary to maintain the\nproductivity of the resource.\nFor the industry as a whole, increases in profitability can be achieved by shifting harvesting and processing from\nless efficient operations to more efficient ones. Further gains may be made by concentrating production in fewer\noperations, particularly if there are firms with excess harvesting or processing capacity as is the case in most\nsectors of the Alaska groundfish fishery. Furthermore it is possible, but by no means certain, that there are\neconomies of scale that would favor larger firms and thus lead to greater concentration of the industry if it were\nallowed. It is this very potential for increasing profits by shifting and concentrating harvest and processing\noperations that poses the threat of preemption of sectors and communities. Regardless of the type of rights-\nbased system implemented, concerns about preemption can be addressed by putting constraints on use, transfer\nand accumulation of quota. However, it must be recognized that these are likely to reduce efficiency gains and\nthe social benefits of doing SO should be balanced with efficiency losses.\nAlternative 6.1 states that increases in economic benefits from expansion of rights-based systems should not\ncome at the expense of increased risk to fish stocks (both target and non-target) and seabirds or marine mammal,\nor increased damage to habitat. To ensure this, a rights-based system will need to incorporate some constraints\non when, where and how individuals and groups harvest their shares of catch. There is, however, no reason to\nexpect that restrictions will need to go beyond current restrictions that allocate total catches temporally, spatially\nand by gear. In fact, experience with cooperatives in the Bering Sea pollock fishery suggests that simply\neliminating the race for fish may reduce bycatch and reduce local and temporal depletions which can be\ndisruptive to ecosystems.\nAlternative 6.1 General Impacts on Economic Performance\n4.8.6.2\nImproved economic performance can be achieved by increasing the value of production, by decreasing costs of\nharvesting and processing, or by some combination of the two. Rights-based systems do not attempt to direct\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-45","fishery participants to produce higher value products or use less costly production methods. Rather they attempt\nto remove perverse incentives that inhibit fishery participants from identifying and implementing the production\nsystem and output that will result in higher profits for the industry as a whole. These perverse incentives can\nbe ascribed primarily to the use of the rule of capture as an allocation system. Elimination of these perverse\nincentives is achieved by explicitly allocating shares of total catch to individuals, firms or groups which can then\nfocus efforts on maximizing the profits they derive from those fixed harvest rights rather than increasing their\nprofits by increasing their share of harvest. Free to harvest and or process their share of fish at their own rate\nand preferred time, individuals, firms or groups will most likely have some ability to increase value and reduce\ncosts. The industry as a whole may also be able to increase total production of some species that were\npreviously constrained by bycatch groundfish species with low TACs or prohibited species. The extent of the\ngains they will make is dependent on the degree to which the race for fish had been leading them to sacrifice\nquality, produce lower value products, use more costly production processes, have higher bycatch of discard\nrates, or maintain excess capital in order to speed harvest and production. Experience with rights-based\nprograms in Alaska and the presence of a rent dissipating race for fish in other fisheries suggest that gains in\nprofitability due both to increased value and reduce costs may be substantial. Depending on the structure of the\nprogram, some of these gains in profitability may be passed on to the public at large or to fishing communities,\nthough, as described below, there is a potential for the opposite to occur.\nWe can expect to see increases in the value of production for a variety of reasons. Some increases in value can\nbe expected as a result of the improved quality that can be achieved by more careful harvesting and handling\npractices that the race for fish had previously made too costly because of the opportunity cost of fishing time\nin a tightly limited season. For example vessels may choose to make shorter tows to reduce the crushing of fish\nin the codend or may spend more time searching for larger, more valuable fish. Quality can be increased and\ncosts reduced by better organization of deliveries of fish to plants to reduce delays in unloading. The value of\nproduction will also be increased because processors will have the time and incentives to make products with\nhigher value added where previously they had focused production on products that could be produced quickly\nor with lower quality fish. For example we might expect to see more fillet production in place of round or headed\nand gutted product. Further increases in the value of production will be achieved by harvesting a greater share\nof catches in target fisheries instead of as bycatch. This will decrease the amount of fish that was previously\ndiscarded, rendered into fish meal or made into products with little value added because the processors were not\nin a position to properly process the non-target catch. For example, Pacific cod that was frozen and marketed\nround when it was caught in a flatfish target fishery with a race for fish might instead be made into a value\nadded product. Total production of some species that were previously limited by constraints on prohibited\nspecies bycatch (particularly several flatfish species) is expected to increase because ending the race for fish\nis expected to improve the ability of harvesters to avoid bycatch of prohibited species. Tables 4.8-32 provide\nsome indication of how exvessel and product revenues for different sectors and fisheries might be expected to\nchange purely as a result of reduced bycatch. These projections are thought to be conservative as they account\nonly for increased catches resulting from projected reductions in bycatch that would have otherwise shut down\nfisheries earlier. Further increases in product value could be expected as a result of reduced discards and more\nvaluable product mix.\nThe costs of harvesting and processing are expected to fall due both to individual fishing or processing\noperations cost savings and cost savings at the industry level. Individual vessels and processors will have\nsignificant opportunities to reduce costs because they can focus on harvesting in the most cost effective way\nwhere before they focused on achieving the highest catch rates possible. At the industry level costs will\nfall\nbecause production is expected to shift over time toward the most cost effective harvesting and processing\noperations. Fixed costs will be reduced by consolidating harvesting and processing operations and retiring or\nselling off vessels and processing equipment. The degree of costs savings will vary greatly depending both on\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-46","the constraints put on transfer and consolidation of catch and or processing rights and on the level of excess\ncapacity prior to implementation.\nThe level and the distribution of benefits and costs will vary by fishery and will be impacted by the structure\nof the rights-based program. While there may be overall gains in industry profitability, the benefits and costs\nmay not be equally shared and there are other important impacts beyond changes in profitability. It is useful to\nconsider the overall and relative impacts of alternative types of rights-based programs on different groups and\non important issues such as safety, excess capacity, employment and competitiveness of markets.\nAs with the other alternatives, we carried out simulations to project catches for Alternative 6.1. From the catch\nprojections we estimated total product value and exvessel value assuming the same product mix as the 1999\nseason and using average retention rates and exvessel prices for the 1997 to 1999 period and product prices\nequal to the average levels over the 1996 to 1998 period. These projections do not reflect changes in exvessel\nand product prices, product mix and retention rates that are likely to occur under rights-based systems and are\ntherefore likely to considerably underestimate product revenues and probably exvessel revenues as well\n(assuming harvesters share in increases to the total product value of the fishery). As Tables 4.8-1 through 4.8-\n26 indicate, we would not expect to see substantial changes in exvessel revenues if exvessel prices do not\nchange, since catches by catcher vessels change little under Alternative 6.1. In a few cases the lower bycatch\nrates that are assumed in Alternative 6.1 allow higher total catches since fisheries that would have been closed\ndue to bycatch in other fisheries or because of caps on prohibited species take were able to take a higher\npercentage of the TAC in the target fishery than they could under the status quo. The only cases where this\nsubstantially changes revenues is for product revenues for the head-and-gut factory trawler fleet. They are able\nto catch a larger percentage of TACs because prohibited species caps are reached at a higher level of target\ncatch than in the status quo simulations (see Table 4.8-27). This allows the head-and-gut factory trawler to\nincrease product revenues by nearly 15 percent under Alternative 6.1. Because the results in the simulations do\nnot reflect either changes in product value and product mix, or the full expansion of fisheries that would be\npermitted by reduced bycatch, likely to occur under rights-based systems, the discussion of the impacts from\nAlternative 6.1 that follows is primarily qualitative in nature and we make very limited reference to the results\nof the simulations.\nAlternative 6.1 Impacts on Vessel Owners Including Owners of Catcher/Processors\n4.8.6.3\nWhile either of the three general categories of rights-based systems may benefit vessel owners, current vessel\nowners as a group are likely to benefit most from an IFQ program that allocates freely transferable and leaseable\nquota shares to vessel owners on the basis of catch histories. The overall increases in profitability and the\nwindfall gains for vessel owners will vary from fishery to fishery, but are expected to be substantial in most\ncases, particularly where excess capacity has led to a race for fish. Not all vessel owners will benefit equally\nand the relative benefits will depend on the formula that relates catch history to allocations. An IFQ program\nwith a minimum of restrictions would give vessel owners the option and incentive to fish, sell or lease their quota\nshares SO as to maximize profits. More efficient operators are likely to purchase quota from less efficient ones,\nbut both should benefit monetarily from the exchange. Catcher vessel owners should also gain bargaining power\nwith processors if they have the ability to choose when and where to deliver catch and consequently can expect\nhigher exvessel prices than they might under the current system. Restrictions on transfer and leasing of quota\nshares, on when, where, and how catch can be taken (i.e., seasonal, area, and gear restrictions associated with\nquota shares) or where or to whom it can be delivered, will tend to lower the value of quota shares and the\npotential monetary gains of vessel owners unless they are necessary to ensure the productivity and the\nsustainability of the fishery. The overall increases in profitability of the industry would be expected to be lower\nas well. Restrictions on where catch can be delivered may also reduce the bargaining power of catcher vessel\nowners and, consequently, exvessel price.\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-47","The Magnuson-Stevens Act allows for cost recovery fees up to 3 percent of exvessel value to be levied on IFQ\nholders and capital gains taxes would apply to permanent transfers of quota shares. Earnings for leasing IFQ\nshares would also be taxable as normal income, but could be expensed by the user. These fees and taxes would\nreduce the benefits accruing to vessel owners that are quota holders, but net gains are still expected.\nIf some or all of the initial quota shares in an IFQ program are allocated to other groups (e.g., crew, processors,\nor community groups) vessel owners could potentially suffer an initial financial loss since they would have to\npurchase quota to undertake their historical level of fishing. Whether or not other gains in cost reduction or\nincreased prices might offset the costs of acquiring quota could only be determined after the structure of the IFQ\nprogram and the allocation formula were determined, and even then would be difficult to assess.\nCooperatives also can be expected to provide net benefits to vessel owners as a group. It appears that the\ncatcher/processor cooperative has delivered benefits similar to those of an IFQ program. However, for catcher\nvessels the rules governing cooperatives will be very important in determining the distribution and the overall\nbenefits between vessels and processors. It has been argued by catcher vessel owners in the BSAI pollock fishery\nthat the rules for inshore pollock cooperatives have actually hurt independent vessel owners financially. A report\nby Halvorson et al. (2000) commissioned by the Council could not rule out this possibility. As this report\nexplains variations on the current rules of cooperatives that would allow smaller groups of catcher vessels to\nform cooperatives and easier movement between plants would tend to shift the balance of market power to\ncatcher vessel owners and increase their share of any net benefits resulting from increased efficiency and product\nvalue that might occur as a result of cooperative-driven rationalization. The overall gains to vessel owners that\nmight be expected in terms of increasing the value of catch and decreasing harvesting costs are likely to be\nsmaller with cooperatives than with IFQs if the ability of vessel owners to form and transfer between\ncooperatives, to sell or lease catch rights and to freely choose their point of delivery is limited. Such limitations\nwould inhibit consolidation and transfer of harvest and processing activities to the most efficient plants.\nIt is not clear whether cost recovery fees could be levied on cooperatives or whether transfers of catch rights\nwould be subject to income or capital gains taxes. The latter question is likely to depend on the legal structure\nof the cooperative contract and the nature of the transfer.\nThe impacts of community quota programs on vessel owners is even less clear. Some vessel owners might gain\nif communities in turn granted them catch rights that enabled them to slow down and choose fishing times;\nhowever, there is the potential that others might be harmed financially if their current ability to harvest resources\nis curtailed and they need to buy or lease catch rights from communities. Even if a community grants catch\nrights at no charge, the profitability of the vessel owners could still be undermined if their freedom to choose\nbuyers is limited by the community.\n4.8.6.4\nAlternative 6.1 Impacts on Owners of Processing Plants Other Than Catcher/Processors\nOwners of processing plants other than catcher/processors have not been granted allocations of IFQ shares in\nprior IFQ programs in the United States, although this possibility might be considered in future IFQ programs.\nArguments have been made (e.g., Matulich 1996) that IFQ programs may lead to expropriation of quasi rents\nfrom processors. This could result if excess processing capacity exists and capital equipment is nonmalleable.\nIt is also possible that plant owners would share in the overall economic gains that could be made through\nfishery rationalization. The degree to which that would be true would depend on the level of excess capacity\nand the degree to which the plant owners engaged in competition with each other to gain market share. If\nprocessors are allocated IFQ shares or are somehow guaranteed a share of processing, they would naturally be\nmore likely to benefit or less likely to suffer harm from implementation of an IFQ program.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-48","Cooperatives offer the potential of similar overall gains in industry profitability to IFQs and the possibility for\nowners of processors to share in those gains. Rules for cooperatives in the inshore BSAI pollock fishery\ncurrently restrict the ability of vessels to transfer between cooperatives and require members of cooperative as\na group to deliver 90 percent of their catch to one processor. Compared with cooperative rules that would allow\nfor free movement of vessel between cooperatives, the present inshore cooperatives shift the balance of power\nin price negotiations toward the processors. Processors can be expected to benefits more from this type of\ncooperative structure though the absolute distribution of rents created by the move to cooperatives is not clear.\nSimilar conclusions can be drawn about additional cooperatives in other fisheries. Cooperatives should, at least\nin the long run, tend to lead toward a more profitable fishery, but the distribution of gains will depend on the\nstructure of the cooperative.\nCommunity fishery quotas might also provide protection to processors in small communities if the communities\nrestricted the landing locations of their quotas. However, this depends on the structure of the program. If the\nprogram worked similarly to the current CDQ program, communities could lease out quota to operations that\nprocessed elsewhere, and local processors might be preempted.\nAlternative 6.1 Impacts on Vessel and Processing Crew and Other Employees\n4.8.6.5\nPrior rights-based systems in the Alaska and elsewhere in the United States have not allocated initial quota\nshares to vessel crews or other employees of fishing or processing companies. Under an IFQ program, if any\nof these individuals were allocated shares they could be expected to make windfall gains just as vessel owners\nwould be under an IFQ program. Whether or not they could expect their earning to rise or fall with an IFQ\nprogram is unclear. In the halibut and sablefish IFQ fisheries, vessel crew members have sometimes been\nexpected to contribute toward the cost of quota shares used, but the value of production has also risen which\nshould have increased crew shares. Whether or not crew members and other seafood industry employees are\nlikely to share in the net gains in profitability that result from an IFQ management system or other rights-based\nsystem will depend on the supply and demand for labor, and this is likely to vary by fishery and area.\nOne impact that is highly likely in any type of rights-based system is a decrease in the number of crew members\nand processing workers employed but an increase in the level of employment of the individuals who remain in\nthe fishery. This is a natural consequence of the consolidation of fishing and processing activities to fewer\nvessels and plants over longer periods that would be expected to result in most fisheries after introduction of a\nrights-based system.\nAlternative 6.1 Impacts on Communities Including Businesses and Employees in Support\n4.8.6.6\nSectors\nThe impacts of Alternative 6.1 on communities are dealt with in detail in another section. In general it is possible\nthat rights-based systems could (not necessarily would) lead to the preemption or reduction of fishing, processing\nand fishing support activities in some traditional fishing communities unless restrictions are implemented to\ninhibit or prohibit a geographic redistribution of landings. This would be a natural consequence of consolidation\nin the industry as excess capital is scrapped or allowed to degenerate without replacement and as a result of\nshifting of production to more efficient operations. Even if reductions in harvesting and processing capacity were\nuniform across communities, one would expect a decrease in economic activities in fishery support sectors due\nto reductions in harvesting and processing capital. IFQ programs and cooperatives programs can be engineered\nto reduce or prevent this. Doing SO would almost certainly entail some sacrifice in overall efficiency gains but\nthis must be weighed against the importance of preserving traditional fishing communities. Granting catch rights\nto community groups would be an alternative and more transparent way to assist traditional fishing communities\nto remain involved in the fisheries or to provide them financial resources to develop new industries.\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-49","Rights-based systems can be expected to have some positive impacts on fishing communities, particularly those\nin Alaska. Ending the race for fish should increase the economic stability of the fishing industry. If fishing is\nspread out more evenly over the year, short term seasonal jobs that were often filled by out-of-state workers are\nlikely to be replaced with more steady, sometimes year-round employment opportunities that can provide a living\nfor individuals and families that wish to live in Alaska year-round.\n4.8.6.7\nAlternative 6.1 Impacts on the Public\nThe public may share in monetary benefits from IFQ programs or other rights-based systems through various\ntaxes or other mechanisms to at least partially recover fishery rents. IFQs are subject to capital gains taxes\nwhen quotas are transferred. If the quotas were received free of charge, the entire sale price of the IFQ shares\nis treated as a capital gain. Transfers of catch rights between members of cooperatives may be subject to capital\ngains taxes but this may depend on the nature of the cooperative and the nature of the transfer. The public also\nbenefits monetarily from increased profitability through increased income tax revenues that would result from\nincreased profitability of fishery participants. Although statutes are not in place to allow it at this time, IFQs\nholders could be charged fees (beyond the 3 percent cost recovery fees) designed to capture a share of resource\nrents. Alternatively, a mechanism might be implemented whereby quota ownership would revert incrementally\nto the public over time and thereafter be resold or leased for public benefit. This would decrease the windfall\nprofit to the initial quota recipients and increase the amount of quota available for sale each year.\nRights-based systems can also be expected to lead to increases in the average quality of a variety of fishery\nproducts originating from the Alaska groundfish fisheries. The total catch of some species and the catch taken\nin target fisheries where discards rates are lower is also likely to increase as a result of decreased bycatch rates.\nThere may be increases in fresh products relative to frozen products in some fisheries, but probably to a much\nsmaller degree than occurred in the halibut fishery. Assuming that demand is not perfectly elastic, increasing\nthe value of production may lead to gains in consumer surplus that will accrue to the public at large, both in and\noutside the United States. This will also depend on the demand for different product forms if there are changes\nin product mixes. However, neither the present levels or future levels of consumer surplus associated with\nAlaska groundfish can be quantified at this time.\nExperience with the IFQ program, the CDQ program and pollock cooperatives suggest that expansion of rights-\nbased systems to other fisheries is likely to result in substantial increases in the costs of monitoring, enforcement\nand administration. Some of these costs will be borne by NMFS and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) but it is\nlikely that the industry could be required to cover much of these added costs. The Magnuson-Stevens Act\nrequires a cost recovery fee of up to 3 percent of exvessel value to be paid by quota holders. These fees will\noffset management costs that would otherwise be publicly funded. Cost recovery fees have been applied in the\nhalibut and sablefish IFQ program and are being developed for the CDQ program. Presumably such a cost\nrecovery fee would be applied to new rights-based systems whether quotas were given to individuals, groups\nor communities though such a fee has not been applied as yet to pollock cooperatives.\nAlternative 6.1 is not expected to affect nonconsumptive or nonuse values.\n4.8.6.8\nAlternative 6.1 Impacts on Fishing Vessel Safety\nRights-based systems of any kind are expected to improve safety. The race for fish created incentives to fish\nduring dangerous conditions and required crew members to work for long stretches with little rest or sleep.\nRights-based systems should slow down the fishing and reduce the financial penalty incurred by opting to stop\nfishing in dangerous weather conditions. The most important benefit of improved safety will be less loss of life\nand a decrease in fishery related injuries. Other benefits include savings from not having to replace lost vessels\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-50","and gear. Finally, significant improvements in safety, if they occur, should result in decreased insurance costs\nfor industry.\nThere is some debate whether IFQs will lead to increased safety, particularly if ownership of vessels tends to\nshift away from owner-operators. The recent sinkings of three vessels in the Atlantic surf clam IFQ fishery have\nbeen suggested as anecdotal evidence to support this claim. However, it has not been determined that the\nprobability of these tragic events would have been lower had an IFQ program not been in place. There is\nevidence of improved safety in the halibut and sablefish IFQ program. USCG search and rescue operations for\nthese fisheries decreased to about one-third the level prior to IFQs.\nAlternative 6.1 Impacts on Harvest and Processing Capacity and Capital\n4.8.6.9\nOne of the primary reasons for implementing rights-based systems is to prevent the build-up of excess harvesting\nand processing capacity or reduce excess capacity that already exists. Excess capacity is both the enabler and\nthe result of the race for fish with its associated negative impacts on profitability, product quality and safety.\nAn IFQ program that ends the race for fish and allows transfer of quota shares would be expected to lead to\nsome consolidation of quota to fewer vessels. The degree of consolidation will vary depending on the level of\nexcess capacity, economies of scale in harvesting, and rules that restrict transfer and accumulation of quota\nshares. Similar consolidation could occur with cooperatives or community quota programs.\nSome excess capacity (in the sense of an ability of vessels and processors to catch and harvest TACs in less time\nthan a maximum season length would allow) can be expected to persist regardless of what type of rights-based\nprogram is put in place. This will generally be the case because it is generally not economically efficient to\noperate at maximum possible production levels but at some more moderate level. Reducing capital to the level\nthat might be held if operators were starting from scratch may not occur for some time if at all. This is true\nbecause there are limited alternative uses for fishing and processing capital. Equipment and vessels might\ninstead by phased out over time as it degenerates. It is notable, however, that many of the vessels involved in\nthe offshore pollock fishery were voluntarily removed from the fishery despite the lack of alternative uses.\nAlternative 6.1 Impacts on the Competitiveness of Markets\n4.8.6.10\nRights-based systems have the potential to reduce the competitiveness of markets and shift the balance of market\npower between harvesters and processors. Care must be taken to minimize threats to competitive markets and\nto avoid or at least be aware of shifts in market power that may result in income transfers between sectors.\nExvessel markets for fish are already quite thin in most Alaska groundfish fisheries. Consolidation of harvest\nand processing sectors will make these markets thinner yet. The number of buyers competing for fish may be\nreduced to a few or a sole buyer in some cases if restrictions were to be put on where fish can be delivered. This\nhas the obvious potential of shifting income from harvesters to processors.\nOn the other hand, without restrictions on where or to what plants fish can be delivered, income transfers may\nmove in the other direction. The temporal spreading of fishing may cause processors to bid up prices in attempt\nto lower average costs by increasing the amount and duration of their processing. As Matulich (1996) points\nout, there is the potential under certain conditions that the quasi rents of processors may be expropriated in this\nprocess.\nThe potential for undue market power on the part of harvesters may also be a concern. The possibility exists\nthat harvesters with sufficient shares of a give TAC might have enough market power to make monopoly profits\nby reducing output below the TAC. This would reduce consumer surplus and could potentially reduce net\nnational benefits. The likelihood of this occurring depends both on the level of consolidation that might occur\nand the elasticity of demand for the particular species.\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-51","Another potential negative consequence of too much consolidation of harvest quota would be development of\nmonopsony power in markets for the factors of production (e.g., labor, gear, bait, etc.). Again, the risk of\nnegative consequence depends on a variety of factors that will vary by fishery. We concur with the\nrecommendations of the National Research Council (NRC) committee on IFQs that limits on accumulation of\nquota shares should be implemented with new IFQ or cooperatives programs. However, appropriate limits on\naccumulation are likely to be much higher than in the halibut or sablefish fisheries in most cases. Accumulation\nlimits should take into account the economies of scale that may exist in some fisheries and the fact that\nconcentration of catch histories is already high in some fisheries.\n4.8.6.11\nAlternative 6.1 Impacts on Prohibited Species Catch and Groundfish Discards\nIn some of the groundfish fisheries, notably several flatfish fisheries, fisheries are closed when caps on bycatch\nof prohibited species are exceeded. For these fisheries, individual quotas or group rights for the target species\nmay change the nature of the fishery little unless rights to take specific amounts of prohibited species are also\nprovided. The structure of these bycatch rights would most probably mirror the structure of target species\nrights. They would be granted to individuals, cooperatives or community groups in proportion to the quota\nshares they held and the expected relative bycatch rates associated with various species. With individual\nbycatch quotas, the costs of bycatch would be internalized and it would be worthwhile to take steps to reduce\nbycatch rates. Consequently we would expect to see an increased proportion of catch taken in the respective\ntarget fishery and correspondingly lower discard rates. Therefore the projections of discards for Alternative 6.1\nshown in Table 4.8-50 are likely to be high and the percentage reductions in discards shown in Table 4.8-51 an\nunderestimate. Discard rates on non-target species are frequently over 50 percent and often reach 100 percent\nin many fisheries (see Tables 10 and 11 in The Economic Status of the Groundfish Fisheries Off Alaska, 1999).\nIf bycatch of prohibited species could be reduced, total catches and consequently revenues would increase for\nsome species where prohibited species take constrained fisheries (e.g., product revenues for head-and-gut factory\ntrawlers shown in Table 4.8-27).\nAs with quotas in a multispecies fishery, there would likely have to be some contingency system for cases where\nquota holders still held target species quota but insufficient bycatch quota to match up with it. Vessels might\nbe prohibited from fishing unless they held sufficient bycatch quota or they might be allowed to purchase it after\nthe fact or pay a fee in relation to the level of bycatch.\nEnforcement of bycatch quotas is likely to be more difficult than target species quotas, especially if they are at\nthe individual level. This is the case because there is no incentive for the catch to be brought to port unless\ndiscarding it is difficult and costly or unless observer coverage is adequate to estimate the total catch. It seems\nlikely that higher observer coverage would be required, and current sampling procedures would have to be\nimproved to provide more accurate and reliable estimates of bycatch. For catcher vessels, it might be possible\nto use dockside monitoring, but only if the cost of discarding the fish at sea is certain to be equal to or higher\nthan the cost of obtaining additional quota or the fee levied for overages.\n4.8.6.12\nTiming and Breadth Of Implementation\nAn extremely important issue in expanding rights-based programs to other fisheries is the timing of\nimplementation; whether to implement rights-based system for all groundfish species and TAC groupings at\nonce or in a stepwise fashion. Huppert and Harding (1992) recommended allocations for all stocks at once to\navoid cascading spillovers of effort and capacity into non-quota fisheries. If this is not done, a complex system\nof sideboards will likely be required as it was for the AFA. If possible, simultaneous implementation in all\nfisheries which might be expected to absorb excess effort should be undertaken.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-52","4.8.6.13\nAllocation of Catch Rights Under Alternative 6.1\nWhether shares of TACs are allocated to individuals, cooperatives, or communities, the basis of determining\nthe allocation will undoubtedly be controversial. The allocative mechanism are likely to vary significantly,\ndepending on the type of rights-based system or systems implemented, and we discuss some key issues for each\nof the three general categories of rights-based systems.\nIf IFQ programs are expanded to additional fisheries, a wide variety of allocation mechanisms and formulas\nshould be considered. Although past IFQ programs in the United States have allocated quota shares to vessel\nowners based on catch histories, other options should also be considered. Granting quota shares to individuals\nfree of charge is likely to result in those individual receiving substantial windfall gains and may be construed\nas a transfer of wealth from the public to those individuals since exclusive access rights to a publicly owned\nresource are being gifted. Whether and to whom this wealth should be gifted is an important question that\nshould be carefully considered.\nIt has been argued that vessel owners have invested their labor and risked their capital and often their lives to\ndevelop these fisheries, and by doing SO have developed natural property rights. However, even if the validity\nof this concept is accepted, vessel owners are only one component of a diverse group of stakeholders that might\nbe viewed as having natural rights to fishery resources. These include skippers who are not vessel owners, other\nvessel crew (potentially processing crew as well as fishing crew), processors, and individuals in communities\nthat support fishing and processing operations. The Council should consider carefully whether and how these\nother stakeholders might be included in initial allocations of IFQ shares.\nThe Council should also consider whether some or all of the IFQ shares should be sold or auctioned to allow\nthe public to capture all or a share of the windfall gains created by the IFQ system. Auctions or sales of initial\nquotas are by no means the only way for the public to share in these windfall gains. As discussed above, there\nare a variety of tax mechanisms that may be used to capture fishery rents for the public.\nIf cooperatives are expanded to other groundfish fisheries, catch rights would likely be granted to the\ncooperatives rather than the individuals. Cooperatives themselves would then be responsible for determining\ncatches of their individual members. However, a method of allocating between cooperatives is still required.\nThe model used with AFA for inshore cooperatives is to allocate catch shares based on the combined catch\nhistory of the cooperative's members. Other allocation formulas might also be considered.\nIf catch rights are granted to communities, allocations might be based on the historic landings made in those\ncommunities and/or the catch histories of the communities' residents. A variety of other formulas might be\nconsidered including allocation designed to meet social and economic objectives. For the CDQ program, relative\nallocations to CDQ groups are not fixed to allow flexibility in directing benefits to achieve community\ndevelopment goals. We concur with the NRC committee on the CDQ program that the process for allocating\ncommunity quotas should be stable and transparent.\nWhether catch rights are allocated to individuals, cooperatives or communities, it may be wise to put in place\nmechanisms that will allow the nature of those rights to be altered. A stable set of rights and responsibilities\nwith a long time horizon is important to promote the efficiency and stability of the fishery, but it is also\nimportant to maintain administrative flexibility for unforeseen eventualities that may oblige changes in the nature\nof catch rights. One such mechanism discussed in the NRC (1999) committee report on IFQs is referred to as\nthe Australian Drop-Through System. In this system, initial entitlements would be defined and fixed for a long\nbut finite period, 30 years in the Australian case. Periodically, perhaps every ten years, a comprehensive review\nof these entitlements would take place and changes could be made to the set of rights and obligations. Rights\nholders could switch to this new set of entitlements (whatever was currently on offer) any time before the term\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-53","of their old entitlements expired at which time they would automatically exchange entitlements for the current\nset on offer. Switching to the new entitlement package would lock in the right to guard those entitlements for\nthe remaining life of that entitlement. Other systems of balancing stability with flexibility are possible, but\nstriking the proper balance is critical to protect the health and prosperity of the fishery and the authority of\nregulators to make appropriate management decisions in the best interest of the public.\n4.8.6.14\nMultispecies Complications with Alternative 6.1\nImplementing rights-based systems, be they IFQs, cooperatives or community quota systems presents special\ndifficulties for fisheries in which multiple species are often caught together. However, it also provides an\nopportunity to address the bycatch problem in those fisheries. If the ability of vessels to determine the species\nmake-up of their catch is limited or costly, it will be necessary to have a flexible system in place that will prevent\ndiscard of fish for which the individual does not have sufficient quota or hold the individual accountable for the\ntotal catch. One option is to allow an individual to fish only when she holds sufficient quota for all of the\nspecies that might possibly be taken on a given trip. This, however, may be needlessly restrictive and might\nmake it impossible for the fleets to take the entire TAC of some jointly caught species unless quota markets are\nsufficiently liquid and efficient. Several alternatives have been used in multispecies fisheries elsewhere with\nvarying success.\nThe primary method used in New Zealand is to allow vessels to land catch for which they do not hold quota and\nforfeit it for a price set high enough to make it worthwhile for them to bring it in to port but low enough that they\nmake no profit on it. This system is referred to as a deemed value system. One of the main objectives of this\nprogram in New Zealand is to assure fuller accounting of catch, but it also prevents waste of potentially valuable\nfish that might otherwise be discarded.\nAn alternative would be for the authorities to set aside or purchase at the beginning of the season some share\nof the overall quotas of various species and allow individuals to lease quota shares at the time of landing for fish\nthey land in excess of their quota landings.\nStill another alternative would be to allow individuals to buy or lease quota on the open market after landing\nfish. If the market is flexible and liquid this should work well. However, trades or leases of quota shares in\nsmall blocks would have to be allowed which would complicate administration of the system.\n4.8.6.15\nOther Elements of Alternative 6.1\nAppropriate Improvements to Catch Monitoring Programs under Alternative 6.1\nWith the exception of the IFQ, CDQ, and cooperative programs, the current management system has been able\nto rely on either fish tickets or a combination of weekly processor reports and observer coverage to monitor\ncatches. For catcher/processors, catches are often back-calculated estimates based on assumed transformation\nrates between raw fish and various products, although observer estimates are used if they are available and if\nthey differ significantly from estimates based on product transformation rates. Rights-based systems will require\nmore precision and reliability on the quantities of target and non target catches of individual vessels.\nFor vessels delivering unprocessed fish to shore plants, monitoring catches poses potentially fewer but different\nproblems than for catcher/processors. The monitoring program for halibut provides a model for how this might\nbe done. Vessel could be required to notify monitoring authorities several hours in advance of landing SO that\nunloading could be observed, quantities measured and quota shares debited appropriately. This would require\nsubstantial increases in monitoring infrastructure and personnel, but it is difficult to quantify the levels without\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-54","first deciding on both the specific structure of the rights-based program itself and also the monitoring scheme.\nIt might also be necessary to increase observer coverage on catcher vessels to monitor or discourage discarding.\nAdditional and more highly trained observers were required for vessels participating in CDQ fisheries (NMFS\n1998b). In addition to the added cost of paying observers (expected to be over $260 per day), some vessel may\nhave difficulty in providing berths for observers.\nVessels that process fish at sea pose additional problems since the product landed does not correlate exactly with\nthe amount of raw fish caught. One way to accurately monitor catches of these vessels would be by increasing\nobserver coverage SO that accurate, officially sanctioned catch levels are recorded for each tow made by each\nentity. This would require having at least two observers aboard each vessel as is done with the CDQ program\nand the offshore pollock cooperatives. Many catcher/processors already have one observer on board at all times,\nbut some smaller vessels have only partial coverage. Smaller vessels might have difficulty in housing two\nobservers at all times. The cost of having two observers on board at all times will probably exceed $500 per\nday for each vessel (NMFS 1998b).\nIn addition to the cost of additional observer coverage, vessels would probably be required to install flow scales\nor hopper scales and observer sampling stations equipped with motion compensated platform scales as was\nrequired of catcher/processors participating in CDQ fisheries and as will be required for offshore pollock\ncooperatives. In 1998 NMFS estimated the costs of hopper scales at $30,000 and flow scales at $50,000 and\nestimated installation costs could range from $5,000 to $250,000 depending on whether the installation would\nrequire substantial reconfiguration of the plant. NMFS (1998b) also noted that the installation of scales might\nreduce plant efficiency, particularly if processing equipment has to be relocated.\nAlternatively, dockside monitoring could be used for catcher/processors as well. For processed products it would\nbe possible to use fixed recovery rates to back calculate catch levels. This would be far less costly, but would\ntend to reduce incentives for firms to maximize recovery rates. Catcher/processors with recovery rates below\nthe assumed rate would have less catch counted against their quota than they actually used while those with high\nrecovery rates would penalized by having more fish counted against their quota than they actually used. It might\nbe possible to document vessel-specific recovery rates that would reduce these perverse incentives. It would also\nbe necessary to guard against undocumented discards and also undocumented landing of product which would\nmost likely require increased observer coverage.\nMandatory reporting of cost, earnings and employment information under Alternative 6.1\nThe need for cost, earnings and employment data originates with the statutory mandates set for NMFS. NMFS\nis required to consider the economic impacts that regulations have on the individuals and communities which\nbenefit from the use of fishery resources. As the legal guardians of these public resources, NMFS and the fishery\nmanagement councils have a statutory obligation to implement management systems that will promote economic\nefficiency while ensuring the conservation of fishery resources. The Magnuson-Stevens Act includes a number\nof national standards for fishery conservation and management that are at least partially concerned with the\neconomic benefits derived from U.S. fisheries. National Standard One instructs fishery managers to implement\nmanagement plans that will achieve the optimum yield from each fishery for the U.S. fishing industry. Optimum\nyield is defined as that which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the nation. Though its language is\nsomewhat ambiguous, the Magnuson-Stevens Act also has some instructions for fisheries managers regarding\nthe objectives of economic efficiency and allocative fairness. National Standard Five instructs managers that\nconservation and management measures shall, where practicable, consider efficiency in the utilization of fishery\nresources; except that no such measure shall have economic allocation as its sole purpose. National Standard\nSeven states that conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, minimize costs and avoid\nunnecessary duplication. Lastly, National Standard Eight states that conservation and management measures\nshall, consistent with the conservation requirements of this act (including the prevention of overfishing and\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-55","rebuilding of overfished stocks), take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities\nin order to (1) provide for the sustained participation of such communities, and (2) to the extent practicable,\nminimize adverse economic impacts on such communities.\nIn addition to the statutory obligations of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, NMFS must also comply with the\nrequirements of Executive Order (EO) 12866, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), The Endangered Species\nAct (ESA) and the National Environmental Police Act (NEPA). NMFS complies with the requirements of EO\n12866 by preparing a regulatory impact review (RIR). This results in an overall review of the economic impacts\nof a proposed action on an entire sector of the fishery and a determination of whether implementation of the\nproposed action would result in net economic benefits to the national economy. In an RIR analysis, the\neconomic impacts are determined by calculating the benefits and costs of each regulatory alternative and the\nresulting net benefits to the nation from the proposed regulatory action. Regulatory flexibility analysis (RFA)\nis necessary to satisfy the requirements of RFA (5U.S.C. 601 et seq.). The RFAA should assess the impacts\non small entities regulated by the proposed and/or final rule and address the actions that have been take to\nminimize the impacts on small entities while still achieving regulatory goals. The ESA requires consideration\nof the economic impacts of designation of critical habitat though it specifically precludes consideration of\neconomic impacts in list a species as endangered. NEPA requires environmental impacts statements for\nregulatory actions that, among other things, require assessment of the impacts of regulations on the human\nenvironment.\nThe types of economic data that would be necessary to perform the economic and social analyses of fishery\nregulations and performance that NMFS if obligated to do include disaggregate revenue, cost and employment\ndata from harvesting and processing firms. Some revenue and production data are currently provided, but they\nare insufficient and incomplete. NMFS collects data on the quantity of fish caught and on production of fishery\nproducts, and the State of Alaska collects information on annual product revenues and prices. However, intra-\nannual prices and prices by product grade are not supplied. This leaves the revenue picture incomplete. No data\non the costs of production and very little data on employment levels are routinely collected. Without information\nabout costs it is not possible to determine whether the industry is making a profit or a loss, much less the\nmagnitude of the profit or how it has been or might be impacted by regulatory changes. The absence of\nemployment data means that it is not possible to state the number of individuals who are employed in the fishery,\ntheir earnings, and how they are impacted by management decisions.\nNMFS has attempted to collect cost, earnings, and employment data from participants in the pollock fishery\nusing a voluntary survey but received virtually no participation. Members of two processing associations have\nsuggested that they might be willing to provide aggregate level information, but this information will be\nincomplete and of limited usefulness. Aggregate data would likely not be adequate for conducting the requisite\nanalyses for RFA, EO 12866 and ESA in most cases. We anticipate that similar problems with lack of\nparticipation may be encountered with voluntary surveys for other sectors. We submit that this information is\nvery useful in meeting the intent of various laws requiring regulatory analysis and that its provision should be\nmandatory.\nMandatory reporting of cost, earnings and employment information is important whether or not additional rights-\nbased systems are implemented, but consideration of expansion of rights-based systems provides added incentive\nfor quick implementation of the necessary regulations mandating data provision. Implementation of rights-based\nprograms is likely to result in substantial changes in the overall profitability of Alaskan fisheries and in the\ndistribution of benefits. Monitoring those changes is very important to judge the success of the programs and\nto monitor and potentially ameliorate undesirable outcomes.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-56","Elimination of improved retention and utilization regulations under Alternative 6.1\nImproved retention and utilization regulations were implemented to counter waste of fishery resources that was\noccurring as a result of the race for fish and to create disincentives for high bycatch and discard rates. The race\nfor fish creates incentives to maximize profits per unit of fishing time rather than per unit of fish. Consequently,\nit may induce wasteful practices or reduce the incentives to increase recovery rates if those increases are costly\neither in out-of-pocket costs or opportunity costs of time. Even when increased or full utilization is profitable\nin terms of the value and costs of product, there may be an implicit cost due to storage space limitations that\nwill force more frequent unloading. For the most part, rights-based systems should end the race for fish and\nshould give individuals and groups the incentive to get the maximum value out of each unit of catch.\nEnding the race for fish may reduce the cost of avoiding bycatch (i.e., the opportunity cost of accepting lower\ntarget catches to avoid bycatch is lower when the vessel's catch is not constrained by time), but may still provide\ninsufficient incentives to reduce bycatch if the costs of that bycatch are external to the party taking it. Requiring\nthe vessel to keep the unwanted bycatch provides an incentive to avoid it since the vessel will incur costs\nhandling and delivering the catch which may be of little or no value. However, this is a very blunt policy\ninstrument and its impact will actually be reduced if the race for fish is ended. We recommend that bycatch\nreduction be achieved instead through rights-based systems as described previously. With a rights-based system,\nthe vessel pays for the fish it uses whether or not they are discarded; therefore, the external cost is reduced or\neliminated.\nUnless full retention is required for catch monitoring purposes, we recommend that improved retention and\nutilization regulations be eliminated.\nElimination of the vessel incentive program under Alternative 6.1\nThe vessel incentive program would be unnecessary and could be eliminated if individual or group vessel\nbycatch quotas are implemented for prohibited species.\nPotential Synergies Between Alternative 6.1 and the Goals of Other Alternatives\n4.8.6.16\nBy ending the race for fish, Alternative 6.1 has the potential to assist in the achievement of some of the\nobjectives of the other alternatives or lessen some of the negative or inequitable economic impacts of some of\nthose alternatives if they too are implemented. Rights-based systems, if they included individual quotas on\nbycatch, provide strong incentives to reduce bycatch because they internalize the cost of that bycatch.\nExperience with the cooperatives in the pollock fishery also shows that reductions in bycatch can be achieved\nmore easily than in a competitive TAC fishery because vessels are more willing to accept the reductions in target\nspecies catch rates that they may incur by moving to areas with lower bycatch rates or by using fishing\ntechniques that reduce bycatch. The penalty for reduced catch rates is lessened in two ways. First, reduced catch\nrates will no longer equate with a smaller share of total catch as they did under the race for fish since the vessel\nis assured of its right to catch a given quantity of fish. Second, as in the pollock fishery, vessels in at least some\nfisheries are likely to fish slower and catch less fish per tow in order to optimize the rate of flow of raw fish for\nthe processing plant and or to improve the quality of the fish. Similarly, impacts of reduced catch rates resulting\nfrom area closures would also be mitigated.\nThe experience with cooperatives in the pollock fishery also shows that fishing may be spread out temporally\nas a result of rights-based systems. This can be expected to reduce the potential for local depletions of fish\nstocks and the associated negative impacts on marine mammals and other species. In addition experience with\nthe pollock cooperatives and the CDQ program have demonstrated the benefits of such programs for preventing\nChapter 4 Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-57","catch from exceeding TACs, particularly when a TAC is subdivided into smaller allowances by time and area.\nTherefore, rights-based management would be expected to decrease the difficulty and cost of implementing the\ndaily catch limits of Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2.\nThe AFA pollock cooperatives would facilitate meeting the gear selectivity objectives of Alternative 3,\nparticularly if doing SO would be expected to increase the discounted present value of exvessel value net of\nharvesting costs. In addition, they would allow the mesh and hook size regulations implicit in this alternative\nto be replaced with more effective and lower cost methods of meeting the size selectivity objectives.\nRight based management would facilitate the use of more cost effective methods of providing the additional\nprotection for squid included in Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2. It would also decrease the adverse effects of\nimplementing the skate and grenadier TACs in those two alternatives by allowing the most productive use of\nthose TACs.\nAlternative 6.1 also offers the potential to reduce or eliminate inequalities that would be caused by the\nreallocation of catch from bottom trawl to fixed-gear in Alternative 5. If quotas were given out for catch rights\nfor these species based on catch histories before the gear restrictions were introduced, the quota holders that had\nfished with bottom trawling gear could receive some compensation by selling their quota shares, or, by leasing\ntheir quota shares, they could be assured an income while they were making the transition to fixed-gear.\nAlternative 6.2 Impacts on the Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\n4.8.6.17\nAlternative 6.2 Impacts on Exvessel Value for Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nA summary of the model projections of the exvessel value of BSAI and GOA groundfish delivered to inshore\nprocessors under Alternative 6.2 and the differences between the projections for Alternatives 1 and 6.2 is\nfollowed by a qualitative assessment of those projections.\nModel Projection\nThe following discussion is of the model projections of the 5-year means (2001 to 2005) of the exvessel value\nfor groundfish delivered to inshore processors. The discussion focuses on estimates for Alternative 6.2 and the\ndifferences between the estimates for Alternative 6.2 and Alternative 1 (the status quo FMPs). The regulatory\nchanges for Alternative 6.2 that the models attempted to address and that are, therefore, reflected in the\ndifferences between the model projections for Alternatives 1 and 6.2 are (1) setting TACs equal to OFLs and\n(2) eliminating the OY limits. The model only partially addresses the elimination of the PSC limits.\nSpecifically, the PSC limits were eliminated as constraints on groundfish catch; however, the effects on the\nbycatch rates of prohibited species are not addressed by the model.\nFor Alternative 6.2, the estimated exvessel value for all BSAI and GOA groundfish delivered to inshore\nprocessors is $298.4 million (Table 4.8-1). This is 17.1 percent more than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table\n4.8-2). For individual groups of inshore processors, the projected increases range from less than just over 12\npercent for other Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Island processors to almost 18.6 percent for Kodiak Island\nprocessors. The increase across all other processor groups is fairly unfirm and ranges from 16.9 to 18.5 percent.\nThe estimates for the BSAI and GOA catch, respectively are $131.6 million and $166.8 million (Tables 4.8-3\nand 4.8-5). This is a 16.8 percent increase for the GOA (Table 4.8-4) and a 17.4 percent increase for the BSAI\n(Table 4.8-6).\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-58","The area wide estimate of exvessel value for hook-and-line gear is $86.2 million (Table 4.8-7), this is a 16.9\npercent increase compared to Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-8). The corresponding estimates for pot and trawl gear,\nrespectively, are $13.4 million (18.1 percent increase) and $198.8 million (17.2 percent increase) (Tables 4.8-9\nthrough 4.8-12). The corresponding estimates by gear type for the BSAI and GOA separately are in Tables 4.8-\n13 through 4.8-24. The estimates of the effects of Alternative 6.2 in terms of the percentage increase in exvessel\nvalue vary by area and gear type from 13.3 percent for BSAI pot fisheries to 23 percent for GOA pot fisheries.\nThe range is greater by processor group.\nThe Alternative 6.2 estimates of the exvessel value by species and processor group for the BSAI and GOA\ncombined and estimates of the percent change compared to Alternative 1 are in Tables 4.8-25 and 4.8-26.\nPacific cod, pollock, and sablefish typically have accounted for about 95 percent of the exvessel value of all\nBSAI and GOA groundfish delivered to inshore processors. It is estimated that Alternative 6.2 would result in\nthe following increases in exvessel value for those three species: Pacific cod, $4 million (9.8 percent); pollock\n$26 million (19.3 percent); and sablefish $11.2 million (16.1 percent). There also are increases in the exvessel\nvalues of all other species.\nTo simplify the discussion above, we focused on the 5-year mean levels of exvessel value from the model\nprojections. However, it is worthwhile to consider trends in projections as well. Under Alternative 1, exvessel\nvalue first declines and then rises such that the Alaska-wide exvessel value in 2005 is approximately 5 percent\nhigher than the 5-year mean (Table 4.8-33). Under Alternative 6.2, Alaska-wide exvessel value follows a\nsimilar pattern of first declining then rising. However, the decline in 2002 from the 2001 level is much more\npronounced, and the 2005 value is well below the 2001 value. Thus, relative to Alternative 1, Alternative 6.2\nresults in greater reductions in exvessel value in the early years. For 2003-2005, Alternative 6.2 projections\nof exvessel value for the BSAI and GOA together average approximately 11.2 percent above projections for\nAlternative 1 as compared to a 5-year mean value nearly 17.1 percent greater than the projections for Alternative\n1 (Table 4.8-34).\nQualifications\nThe model projections of exvessel value discussed above and presented in Tables 4.8-1 through 4.8-26 may be\nbiased either upward or downward for a variety of reasons. Since Alternative 6.2 results in increases in the\ncatches of all species for both the catcher vessel sector and the catcher/processor sector, prices independent of\nchanges in quality might be expected to decrease as a result of an increase in the quantity of fish and\nsubsequently product supplied. Decreases in prices, and the extent to which they partially or more than offset\nthe increases in quantity, would depend on demand elasticities of which we are uncertain. Also, exvessel prices\nare determined by negotiations between individual processors on one side and either bargaining associations for\ncatcher vessels or individual fishermen on the other side. Exvessel prices may not behave as one might expect\nin a competitive market. It is quite possible that prices might decrease to reflect lower average harvesting costs\nbut this will depend on the relative bargaining power of harvesters and processors.\nThere are other factors that might tend to increase exvessel value relative to the Alternative 6.2 model\nprojections discussed above. The use of historical exvessel prices for pollock may lead to an underestimate in\nthe increase in Alternative 6.2 exvessel value relative to outcomes under Alternative 1. Since exvessel prices\nfor pollock are expected to rise as a result of increases in product quality and value made possible by use of\ncooperatives under AFA, the increase in exvessel value resulting from an increase in catches resulting from\nAlternative 6.2 would be understated.\nThe net impact of upward and downward bias in projections of product value is difficult to determine. For the\npollock fishery the biases move in opposite directions, SO we are not able to state the likely net effect. For all\nthe other fisheries, it is likely that the net effect of the biases will overstate the increases in value.\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-59","Alternative 6.2 Impacts on Costs for Catcher Vessels Delivering to Inshore Processors\nAverage costs per unit of catch for catcher vessels can be expected to decrease somewhat under Alternative 6.2\ndue to the increase in the overall level of production resulting from higher catches. Many costs are fixed; they\nare not reduced with the level of production. These costs must be allocated to a larger amount of product,\nthereby lowering the average cost per unit of catch. However, it is possible CPUE will decrease as harvest levels\nincrease. This would mitigate the cost savings discussed above. It is difficult to determine the net effect of these\ninfluences and it will likely vary by fishery and species. Nevertheless, we expect that average costs will decrease.\n4.8.6.18\nAlternative 6.2 Impacts on the Processing Sector\nAlternative 6.2 Impacts on Product Value for Processors\nA summary of the model projections of the product value of BSAI and GOA groundfish through primary\nprocessing under Alternative 6.2 and the differences between the projections for Alternatives 1 and 6.2 is\nfollowed by a qualitative assessment of those projections.\nModel Projection\nThe following discussion is of the model projections of the 5-year means (2001 to 2005) of the product value\nfor groundfish through primary processing. The discussion focuses on estimates for Alternative 6.2 and the\ndifferences between the estimates for Alternative 6.2 and Alternative 1 FMPs. The regulatory changes for\nAlternative 6.2 that the models attempted to address and that are reflected in the differences between the model\nprojections for Alternatives 1 and 6.2 were described in the discussion of the model projections of exvessel\nvalue.\nFor Alternative 6.2, the estimated value of all BSAI and GOA groundfish products is $1.46 billion (Table 4.8-\n27). This is 20.7 percent more than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-28). For individual groups of\nprocessors, the projected changes in product value range from an 11.1 percent increase for other Alaska\nPeninsula and Aleutian Island processors to a 35.3 percent increase for head-and-gut factory trawlers. The\nestimates for products from BSAI and GOA catch, respectively are $267 million and $1.19 billion (Tables 4.8-\n29 and .31). This is a 22.1 percent increase for the GOA (Table 4.8-30) and a 20.4 percent increase for the\nBSAI (Table 4.8-32).\nTo simplify the discussion above, we focus on the 5-year mean levels of product value from the model\nprojections. However, it is worthwhile to consider trends in projections as well. Under Alternative 1, product\nvalue first declines and then rises such that Alaska-wide product value in 2005 is approximately 4 percent higher\nthan the 5-year mean (Table 4.8-39). Under Alternative 6.2, Alaska-wide product value first rises substantially,\nthen falls from 2002-2003, then rises in 2004-2005. However the 2005 level is still substantially below the\n2001 level, and slightly less than the 2002 level. For 2003-2005, Alternative 6.2 projections of product value\nfor the BSAI and GOA together average approximately 13.4 percent above projections for Alternative 1 as\ncompared to a 5-year mean value nearly 21 percent greater than the projections for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-40).\nQualifications\nAs with exvessel value, projections of product value may be biased for a variety of reasons. Product value\nestimates are based on retention rates, product mixes and product prices from recent years. Since Alternative\n6.2 results in increases in the quantity of production of all species, product prices independent of changes in\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-60","quality would be expected to decrease for most species. Decreases in prices, and the extent to which they are\npartially or more than offset the increases in quantity, would depend on demand elasticities of which we are\nuncertain. Processors might also be expected to alter product mix to take advantage of changes in relative\nproduct prices which might tend to offset price reductions.\nThe assumptions of constant prices and product mix may also result in other types of bias. If lower product\nquality results and puts downward pressure on average prices or if production is greater than estimated. The\nuse of historical product prices and 1999 product mix may also lead to an underestimate in the increase in\nAlternative 6.2 product value relative to outcomes under Alternative 1. Since average product value per unit\nof pollock catch is expected to rise as a result of increases in product quality and value made possible by use\nof cooperatives under AFA, the increase in product value resulting from an increase in production under\nAlternative 6.2 would be understated\nThe net impact of upward and downward bias in projections of product value is difficult to determine. For the\npollock fishery the biases move in opposite directions, SO we are not able to state the likely net effect. For all\nthe other fisheries, it is likely that the net effect of the biases will overstate the increases in value.\nAlternative 6.2 Impacts on Cost for Processors\nMany costs are fixed; they are not reduced with the level of production. These costs would be allocated to a\nlarger amount of product, thereby lower the average cost per unit of product. Variable costs may also be\nincreased. The increase in the supply of fish is likely to put downward pressure on exvessel prices. The extent\nto which processors versus catcher vessels would share changes in harvesting costs and the extent to which\ncatcher vessels are willing to accept lower prices as total supply increases will depend on their relative\nbargaining power as well as price elasticities of the products made from the fish. However, large decreases in\nexvessel prices and the associated variable costs of production for processors are not expected under Alternative\n6.2.\nAlternative 6.2 Impacts on Consumers of Groundfish Products\n4.8.6.19\nAlternative 6.2 will result in the increased production of most groundfish products. Assuming that demand is\nnot perfectly elastic, this would result in low prices and a gain of consumer surplus to the American public. The\nmagnitude of that gain will depend on price elasticities that are not quantifiable at this time and on the degree\nto which production is shifted toward or away from the export markets.\n4.8.6.20\nAlternative 6.2 Impacts on Nonconsumptive and Nonuse Values\nA primary outcome of this alternative is a large increase in the harvest levels that occur in most fisheries,\nrelative to the status quo. Nonconsumptive and non-use values would be lower under this alternative to the\nextent that the higher harvest levels affect the overall population sizes or probabilities of survival of endangered\nspecies or other species from which individuals derive such values, or the disturbance of the general marine\nenvironment. Studies have shown significant willingness to pay on the part of the general public for existence\nof species (and preservation of endangered species) as well as preservation of wilderness areas which the\nindividuals never expect to see. Unfortunately, no data is currently available for the GOA or the BSAI that\ndescribes the levels of theses values or how the values respond to changes in population size, species probability\nof survival, or levels of marine environment disturbance. However, it is likely that Alternative 6.2 will have a\nlarge impact on some species and environments, and it is therefore likely that a large reduction in nonuse and\nnonconsumptive values would result.\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-61","4.8.6.21\nAlternative 6.2 Impacts on Prohibited Species Catch and Groundfish Discards\nAlternative 6.2 would not eliminate the source of the problem of excessively high bycatch rates for prohibited\nspecies and discard rates for groundfish. The elimination of the PSC limits and the substantial increases in\nTACs are projected to result in substantial increases in PSC and groundfish discards (see Section 4.6.1 and\nTables 4.8-50). The PSC projections are based on historic bycatch rates and do not reflect the increases in\nbycatch rates that probably would occur with the elimination of the PSC limits. Therefore, the model\nprojections tend to understate the increases in PSC that would occur with Alternative 6.2.\nThe cost imposed on the groundfish fleet by having to stay within the PSC limits would be eliminated by\neliminating the PSC limits. Both the cost imposed on some sectors of the groundfish fleet by other sectors using\ngroundfish as bycatch and the ecological costs associated with discarding groundfish at sea would be increased\nby the increased groundfish discards. Similarly, the increase in prohibited species bycatch would increase the\ncost of PSC imposed on crab, halibut, herring, and salmon fishermen. Neither estimates of these costs under\nthe current management regime nor estimates of the changes in these costs associated with Alternative 6.2 are\navailable.\nA more complete discussion of the impacts of Alternative 6.2 on prohibited species bycatch is included in\nSection 4.6.\n4.8.6.22\nAlternative 6.2 Impacts on Fishing Vessel Safety\nAlternative 6.2 would increase catch and the level of fishing activity. This increases the potential for accidents\non fishing vessels. However, we do not expect a large adverse effect on fishing vessel safety.\n4.8.6.23\nAlternative 6.2 Impacts on Excess Capacity\nAlternative 6.2 is expected to increase the quantity of catch and products from the fishery. Therefore, this\nalternative is expected to decrease the level of excess capacity in both harvest and processing sectors in the\nshort-term. However, it will not eliminate incentives to maintain excess capacity, and we, therefore, expect\neventual increase in capacity in the long-term and a return to the current level of excess capacity.\n4.8.7\nImpacts of the Alternatives on the Human Environment\nThis subsection provides an overview of projected social and economic impacts of the alternative management\nmeasures on the human environment during the period 2001-2005. The overview uses results produced in the\nmodel runs described in an earlier section of Chapter 4 and distributes the outcomes to the various industry\nsectors, communities, and regions based on the profiles developed in Section 3.10. Because the distribution of\nimpacts of alternatives to sectors and communities is based on profiles developed in Section 3.10 and on model\nresults described earlier in Chapter 4, the results contained in this section should be viewed as order of\nmagnitude projections. All of the caveats and data limitations inherent in the profiles and model results apply.\nMore detailed definitions of catcher vessel classes, catcher/processor classes, inshore processors, motherships,\nand regions are in Section 3.10, but it should be noted that vessels and processors that did not catch or process\ngroundfish are not included in any of the information provided.\nTable 4.8-52 summarizes impacts of the alternatives on industry sectors. The table is divided into three sections:\nthe projected outcome under each alternative, the projected change from Alternative 1, the status quo, and\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-62","the\npercentage change from Alternative 1. Additional details summarizing the impacts of each\nalternative separately are in Sections 4.8.7.1 through 4.8.7.6.\nAlternative 2.1. Under Alternative 2.1, total groundfish harvests would decline by 485,000 mt, 25.7 percent\nof the total under Alternative 1. Harvests of pollock would decrease by 26.5 percent to 963,000 mt. Harvests\nof Pacific cod would fall by 32.4 percent, and harvests in the Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish and other\ngroundfish species group (mostly Atka mackerel) would decline by 37.4 percent. Flatfish harvests would\ndecrease by only 4.3 percent. The reduced harvests are projected to result in a decline of exvessel payments of\n$63.5 million, 11.6 percent less than projected in the status quo. The wholesale value of production is projected\nto fall by 25.3 percent to $902 million. Similarly, payments to labor would decrease by $143.5 million to\n$434 million. Employment numbers would fall by 1,559 to 8,750, but this estimate does not include any\nreductions in catcher vessel employment.\nAlternative 2.2. Under Alternative 2.2, total groundfish harvests would decline by more than 1.45 million mt,\n77 percent of the total under Alternative 1. Harvests of pollock and Pacific cod would decrease by 85 percent\n83 percent, respectively. Harvests in the Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish species group\n(mostly Atka mackerel) would decline by 49 percent, and flatfish harvests would decrease by 39 percent. The\nreduced harvests are projected to result in a decline of exvessel payments of $178.8 million, 32.7 percent of the\ntotal of all species (including non-groundfish) projected in the status quo. The wholesale value of production\nis projected to fall by 74.2 percent to $311.1 million. Payments to labor would decrease by 71 percent to\n$162.5 million. Employment would fall by 4,083 to 6,227, but this estimate does not include any reductions\nin catcher vessel employment.\nAlternative 3. Under Alternative 3, total groundfish harvests would decline by more than 224 million mt, to\n1.66 million mt, 12 percent less than the projected total under Alternative 1. Harvests would decrease by\n15 percent for pollock, 8 percent for Pacific cod, and 38 percent for Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and\nother groundfish species (mostly Atka mackerel). Flatfish harvests, unlike harvests for other species, would\ngrow by 35 percent to 234,000 mt, increases in flatfish would result because PSC caps are eliminated and\nflatfish TACs are increased. The reduced overall level of harvests are projected to result in a decline in exvessel\npayments of $38.6 million, 7 percent of the status quo projection. (Increases in flatfish harvests would have\nlittle impact on exvessel revenue because almost all flatfish are harvested by catcher/processors.) Overall, the\nwholesale value of production is projected to fall by 12.5 percent to $1.5 billion. Payments to labor would\ndecrease by 12.7 percent to $504 million. Employment would fall by 703 to 9,607, but this estimate does not\ninclude any reductions in catcher vessel employment.\nAlternative 4.1. Under Alternative 4.1, total groundfish harvests would decline by more than 225,000 mt, nearly\n12 percent of the Alternative 1 total; however, only pollock would be affected. Projected pollock harvests are\n15 percent less than under the status quo projections. The reduced pollock harvests are projected to result in\na decline of exvessel payments of $26.1 million, nearly 5 percent of the total for all species (including non-\ngroundfish) projected in the status quo. The wholesale value of production is projected to fall by 11.3 percent\nto nearly $1.1 billion. Payments to labor would decrease by 10.7 percent to $515 million. Employment would\nfall by 503 to 9,807, but the only changes counted are changes at catcher/processors, inshore processors, and\nmotherships, reductions in catcher vessel employment were not estimated.\nAlternative 4.2. Under Alternative 4.2, total groundfish harvests would decline by more than 282,000 mt, nearly\n15 percent of the total under Alternative 1. As in Alternative 4.1, most of the decline would be in pollock, but\nin Alternative 4.2 constraints on catch of skates would result in declines of 21.8 percent in Pacific cod harvests\nand 4 percent in Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish harvests. These declines are projected\nto reduce exvessel payments by $26.6 million, nearly 5 percent of the projected status quo total for all species\n(including non-groundfish). The wholesale value of production would fall by 14.5 percent to nearly $1.0 billion.\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-63","Payments to labor would drop to $500 million, a decrease of 13.4 percent. Estimated employment would fall\nby 704 to 9,605, the only changes counted are changes on catcher/processors, inshore processors, and\nmotherships.\nAlternative 5. Under Alternative 5, there would be little change in the total groundfish harvest, a 2 percent\noverall reduction relative to the base alternative, with 11,000 fewer tons harvested from the Atka mackerel,\nrockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish species aggregation and 9,000 fewer tons harvested of flatfish. The\nprimary impacts would be felt in industry classes as harvests are reapportioned among gear types to protect\nbenthic habitat. The reductions and reapportionments in harvests are projected to result in a slight decline of\nexvessel payments by $2.2 million, or 2.2 percent of the total for all species (including non-groundfish) projected\nin the status quo. The wholesale value of production is projected to fall by 0.9 percent, and payments to labor\nwould decrease by 1.6 percent. Estimated employment would fall by 175 positions to 134; however, no\nestimates of change in catcher vessel employment were available.\nAlternative 6.1. Under Alternative 6.1, there would be no change in pollock or Pacific cod harvests, but\nincreased flatfish harvests and slightly reduced harvests in the Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other\ngroundfish species aggregation (primarily other groundfish) would combine to increased total harvests of\n21,300 mt, an increase of 1.1 percent from the status quo. Projected changes in exvessel payments would be\nnegligible; however, the wholesale value of production is projected to increase by 2 percent to nearly\n$1.23 billion. Payments to labor would increase by 1.7 percent to 587 million. Changes in estimated\nemployment also would be negligible. While it appears that Alternative 6 would have little impact, the\nalternative is expected to produce reductions in operational costs and gains in efficiency-factors for which the\ninformation necessary to quantify outcomes is unavailable.\nAlternative 6.2. Under Alternative 6.2, there would large increases in harvest of all species. Pollock harvest\nwould increase by 250,000 mt, flatfish would increase by almost 60,000 mt, while harvests of Pacific cod and\nspecies in the Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish complex harvests would increase by\n40,000 mt. A 9 percent in total exvessel payments (groundfish and non-groundfish) is projected. Projections\nof product values and payments to labor would increase by 20 percent to when compared to Alternative 1, and\nprojected employment would increase by 912 positions.\n4.8.7.1\nImpacts of Alternative 1 on Industry Sectors and on Communities and Regions\nAlternative 1, the base alternative, represents the status quo. In this SEIS, the status quo is a vision of the future\nin which the management regime is unchanged. Other factors such as prices for fish and fish products, unit\ncosts of harvesting and processing, catch per unit of effort, and number of vessels and facilities are held\nconstant. Projected changes in target and non-target fish stocks are allowed to occur, as are projected changes\nin marine mammal and seabird counts. In other words, the status quo as depicted in Alternative 1 combines the\nmost recent fishing and processing data and the current management regime with future projections of fish\nstocks.\nTable 4.8-53 summarizes projected impacts of Alternative 1 on fishing and processing sectors. The numbers\nin the table reflect the 5-year average of outcomes projected for 2001 to 2005. Overall, 1.3 million mt of\npollock are projected to be harvested, an increase of more than 20 percent from 1999. Harvests of Pacific cod\nare projected to decline by 5 percent, while harvests of flatfish and species in the Atka mackerel, rockfish,\nsablefish, and other groundfish aggregation are projected to increase by 6 percent from 1999 levels. The total\nwholesale value of output is projected at $1.2 billion, and payments to labor are projected at $577.5 million,\nincreases of more than 20 percent from 1999.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-64","Impacts of Alternative 1 on the Catcher Vessel Sector\nUnder Alternative 1, catcher vessels are assumed to operate much as they have in the past. The analysis uses\nthe conventions that catcher vessel harvests are driven by the demands of processors, and that the relationships\nof catcher vessels with various processors are constant over time. The analysis apportions estimated total\nretained harvests for inshore processors and motherships under Alternative 1 to each of the eight catcher vessel\nclasses at the same proportions that occurred in 1998 and are reflected in tables in Section 3.10.2.3. In other\nwords, if in 1998, AFA-qualified trawl catcher vessels with crab endorsements harvested 39 percent of the\npollock retained by Bering Sea pollock inshore plants, then 39 percent of the pollock retained by Bering Sea\npollock inshore plants under Alternative 1 was apportioned to vessels in the catcher vessels with crab\nendorsements class. Similar apportionments were made for each class for each species. The apportionments\nwere made at an individual species level. Since the model used to estimate impacts tracks individual species\nrather than the aggregated species groups used in Section 3.10, apportionments among catcher vessels from\nprocessing classes do not necessarily correspond to percentages shown in the tables in Section 3.10.2.3.\nTable 4.8-54, which summarizes projections of Alternative 1 impacts on catcher vessels, is similar in\nconstruction to Table 3.10.7 in Section 3.10.2.1, which describes activities of catcher vessels in 1998. The table\ncontains one row for each of the eight catcher vessel classes. The first four columns show projections of total\nretained tons (in thousands) for pollock, Pacific cod, and two species aggregations (1) Atka mackerel, rockfish,\nsablefish, and other groundfish, Atka mackerel, all rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish as defined by the\nFMPs, and (2) flatfish species including Greenland turbot but excluding halibut, which is not a groundfish\nspecies. The fifth and sixth columns show the total exvessel value (in millions of dollars) that is projected to\nbe received by each class under the alternative. The fifth column includes exvessel value projected to be\nreceived from both groundfish and non-groundfish such as salmon, crab, herring, and halibut. The sixth\nincludes only groundfish. Total exvessel value of harvests for each class is provided to show the relative\nimportance of groundfish to each vessel class. The seventh column shows projected payments to labor resulting\nfrom groundfish harvests for each class under the alternative. The final column shows the number of persons\nemployed. For catcher vessels, this number is the number of crew and support staff positions. 2 The number\nof persons employed was estimated as a direct multiple of the number of vessels in the fishery-based on 1998\nvessel counts. Data necessary for reasonable projections of the changes in the number of vessels that might\noccur under the different alternatives are not available, and therefore the analysis does not attempt to project\nsuch changes. Because the employment measure used for catcher vessels was a multiple of the number of\nvessels and the number of vessels was held constant for all alternatives, the projected number of persons\nemployed on groundfish catcher vessels did not change.\nComparing Table 4.8-54 to 1998 catcher vessel conditions in Table 3.10.7 (Section 3.10.2.1) reveals that under\nAlternative 1, overall retained harvests of pollock would increase by more than 115,000 mt, while retained\nharvests of Pacific cod would decrease by nearly 18,000 mt. Retained harvests of Atka mackerel, rockfish,\nsablefish, and other groundfish species would decrease by 4,000 mt, while harvests of flatfish would increase\nby 2,000 mt. The increase in the projected retained harvest of pollock is primarily a function of the shift of\npollock allocations from offshore to inshore that occurred with implementation of the AFA in 1999, and\ntherefore, the increases in pollock would be experienced only by the catcher vessels with crab endorsements and\ncatcher vessels without crab endorsements vessel classes. Pollock harvests by non-AFA trawl catcher vessels\nThe exvessel value of non-groundfish species received in 1998 for each vessel class is used as a constant in the\nprojections of total exvessel value under the each of the alternatives.\n2The estimate of catcher vessel positions is made for each vessel and is constant whether the vessel fishes one\nday or 300 days. The data and time available for the analysis precluded the development of an employment\nmeasure that more closely measure crewmember fishing days.\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-65","are projected to decline relative to 1998 harvests. Harvests by all non-trawl vessels would decline relative to\n1998, with the exception of pot catcher vessels, with overall harvest amounts unchanged from 1998 levels.\nThe column in Table 4.8-54 labeled Total Exvessel Value is the sum of projected groundfish exvessel value and\n1998 exvessel value earned by catcher vessels in salmon, crab, halibut, and herring fisheries that are not part\nof the groundfish FMPs. Non-groundfish earnings are included to indicate the relative importance of groundfish\nfor each vessel class. For example, the two AFA trawl catcher vessel classes generate more than 90 percent of\ntheir annual exvessel revenue from groundfish, while pot catcher vessels generate only 15 percent of their total\nrevenue from groundfish.\nFrom this perspective, impacts of management changes that reduce harvests are likely to be much greater for\nvessels that are more dependent on groundfish than for vessels that are less dependent on groundfish. However,\nvessel classes that are less dependent on groundfish may still be negatively affected by reductions in groundfish\nharvests. A recent study on the importance of salmon to the Aleutians East Borough (Northern Economics\n2000) showed that many fixed-gear catcher vessel 33 foot to 59 foot vessels that use seine gear in salmon\nfisheries and fixed-gear for groundfish are only marginally profitable. Any reduction in revenues for either\ngroundfish or salmon is likely to push many vessels toward bankruptcy.\nExvessel value from groundfish received by catcher vessels is projected to increase by more than $95 million\nunder Alternative 1 relative to 1998. Most of the increase would result from the increase in pollock harvests\nfor catcher vessels without crab endorsements and catcher vessels with crab endorsements vessels, but additional\nincreases would be experienced because of higher prices for Pacific cod and for groundfish overall. For\nexample, even though overall harvests in Alternative 1 for the fixed-gear catcher vessel 33 ft-59 ft class would\nrepresent a decrease of nearly 30 percent from 1998, the exvessel value from groundfish for the class would\nincreased by 25 percent. (In general, exvessel prices used in the analysis of alternatives are about 40 percent\nhigher than the 1998 exvessel prices used in the summary profiles of Section 3.10.2.1.) The price changes\nreflect the fact that prices were relatively low in 1998 compared to 1997 and 1996 and the fact that Alternative 1\nuses estimated prices for 1999 based on the average of prices from 1996-1999.\nGroundfish payments to labor under Alternative 1 are expected to increase $38.5 million from 1998 values to\n$122 million, as shown in Table 4.8-54. As described in the sector profiles in Section 3.10.2, groundfish\npayments to labor were estimated as 40 percent of groundfish exvessel value. Because payments to labor are\na multiple of exvessel value, a 10 percent reduction in exvessel value would create a 10 percent reduction in\nestimated payments to labor. The assumption that payments to labor are 40 percent of exvessel revenue is to\nsome extent based on current conditions in the groundfish fisheries. If variable fishing costs (fuel, for example)\nincrease because of a management action, it is likely that payments to labor as a percentage of exvessel value\nwill decrease. Because comprehensive cost data were not available for the analysis, no projections of cost\nchanges under the alternatives are provided, and therefore payments to labor remain a constant percentage of\nexvessel value.\nThe analysis does not project catcher vessel employment changes that would result from implementation of the\nalternatives. Estimates of employment for catcher vessels were made as a multiple of the number of catcher\nvessels in the fishery, and detailed cost information necessary to estimates changes in vessel numbers was\nunavailable. Under Alternative 1, the average payment for a year per person employed on groundfish catcher\nvessels would be $22,239.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-66","Impacts of Alternative 1 on the Catcher/Processor Sector\nAlternative 1, the status quo, assumes no changes in regulation of groundfish fisheries. For this and the other\nalternatives, tables show projected yearly averages of fisheries activity for the next 5 years. Alternative 1\nprojections are compared to 1999 results in the groundfish fishery. Projections under each of the other\nalternatives are compared to projections under Alternative 1.\nTable 4.8-55 shows projected results for catcher/processors under Alternative 1. The wholesale value of outputs\nof catcher/processor vessels and the total harvest of each groundfish species group by catcher/processors are\nprojected to rise compared to 1999. The increase in value of outputs is due to a projected increase in the harvest\nof pollock by surimi trawl catcher/processors of 92,800 mt (almost 22 percent). Fillet trawl catcher/processors\nare also projected to increase pollock harvests by almost 22 percent, about 22,400 mt. (Harvests were relatively\nlow in 1999 compared to earlier years and projections for Alternative 1.) These two vessel classes are projected\nto have slight increases in harvests of most of the other groundfish classes, none of which would change by more\nthan 3,000 mt.\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors are projected to increase harvests from their present level, with increases\nin harvests of Pacific cod, flatfish, and Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish species of\n5,600, 8,300, and 13,500 mt, respectively. These increases are projected to result in an increase of wholesale\nvalue to head-and-gut trawl catcher/processors of $32.5 million (20.7 percent).\nLongline catcher/processors are projected to experience a decline in harvests, most significantly, Pacific cod,\nwith 16,100 mt (20.3 percent) less than base projections in 1999. These vessels would experience declines of\n3,500 mt of Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish species and 1,200 mt of pollock. These\ndeclines are projected to result approximately $20 million (24 percent) lower total wholesale value of outputs\nfor longline catcher/processors.\nPot catcher/processors are projected to experience declines in harvests under this alternative. The only\nsignificant decline is a 7,400-ton decline in the harvest of Pacific cod. This decline results in a projected\ndecrease of $2.9 million of wholesale value of outputs for this fleet.\nUnder Alternative 1, catcher groundfish processing employment is projected to rise by 208 persons from the\n1999 level to 2,091 persons. This increase is due to projected increases of 152 positions on surimi trawl\ncatcher/processors, 39 on fillet trawl catcher/processors, and 90 on head-and-gut trawl catcher/processors.\nThese increases would offset projected declines of 61 positions on longline catcher/processors and 11 positions\non pot catcher/processors. Payments to labor are projected to increase in this base alternative by approximately\n$59.5 million (26.6 percent). This increase incorporates projected increases in payments to labor by surimi\ntrawl catcher/processors, fillet trawl catcher/processors, and head-and-gut trawl catcher/processors of\n$38.3 million, $8.1 million, and $17.7 million, respectively. These increases contrast with the declines in\npayments to labor by longline catcher/processors of $3.9 million and by pot catcher/processors of $0.8 million.\nImpacts of Alternative 1 on the Inshore Processing and Mothership Sector\nAlternative 1 assumes no changes in regulation of groundfish fisheries. For this and each of the other\nalternatives, numbers reflect the average of activity in the groundfish fisheries projected the years 2001 through\n2005. The projections under Alternative 1 are compared to 1999 results in the groundfish fishery. The\nprojections under other alternatives are compared to projections under this base alternative.\nTable 4.8-56 shows projected results under Alternative 1 for inshore processors and motherships that take\ndeliveries of groundfish. Processors would experience increases of $116.9 million (27.2 percent) in exvessel\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-67","value of inputs and $108.9 million (21.6 percent) in wholesale value of outputs. The principal change would\nbe a result of the increase in pollock inputs of 111,000 mt. Processors in all regions and on motherships would\nexperience increases in exvessel values of inputs; however, groundfish outputs would decline for Kodiak inshore\nplants and southeast Alaska inshore plants, by $13.6 million and $1.6 million, respectively. This shift suggests\nthat processors in those two regions would become less dependent on revenue from groundfish processing,\nalthough in southeast Alaska the change would not be significant in magnitude. Kodiak inshore plants are\nprojected to decrease inputs of pollock, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish\nby 11,800, 7,200, and 2,700 mt, respectively. Bering Sea pollock inshore plants, on the other hand, are\nprojected to increase the value of inputs by approximately $67 million (55 percent) and the value of outputs by\napproximately $93.5 million (34 percent). This projection is primarily due to an increase in pollock of\n78,800 mt, with a minor, 36,000-ton increase in Pacific cod. Motherships, Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nIslands inshore plants, and southcentral Alaska inshore plants each are projected to increase exvessel value of\ninputs and wholesale value of outputs. The only significant groundfish input changes from 1999 levels for these\nprocessors would be pollock increases of 28,100 mt and 14,100 mt by motherships and Alaska Peninsula and\nAleutian Islands inshore plants, respectively.\nPayments to labor, which parallel wholesale value of outputs, would increase by $71 million (41.5 percent) from\n1999 levels. These increases are primarily results of projected increases in payments of $55.8 million by Bering\nSea pollock inshore plants, $6.8 million by Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants, and\n$8.4 million by motherships. Employment would increase by 299 positions (10.4 percent), mostly because of\n291 new positions on Bering Sea pollock inshore plants, more than offsetting a projected decline of 111 positions\non Kodiak inshore plants.\nImpacts of Alternative 1 on Communities and Regions\nTable 4.8-57 shows regional impacts that would be created by processing operations on North Pacific\ngroundfish under Alternative 1. Table 4.8-58 shows regional impacts that would be created by catcher vessels\nthat harvest BSAI and GOA groundfish under Alternative 1. Processors within each region that have not taken\ndeliveries of groundfish are not included in the analysis. Also excluded are impacts on communities outside of\nthe six regions included in the analysis. The excluded impacts result from harvests by catcher vessels and\ncatcher/processors owned by residents of communities throughout the United States. Because owners are widely\ndispersed, the impacts to specific regions are unlikely to be significant.\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island. Pollock alone would account for 88 percent of the volume of groundfish\nprocessed inshore in the region, and groundfish would account for 60 percent of total exvessel value of harvests\nof all species (groundfish plus non-groundfish) delivered to groundfish processors. Regional residents would\nown very little of this processing capacity. Groundfish catcher vessels owned by regional residents would\noperate primarily in the GOA, and about 46 percent of their overall exvessel, value would be from Alaska\ngroundfish.\nKodiak Island. Groundfish would account for about 47 percent of the exvessel value of the fish processed by\nregional inshore groundfish plants, and pollock would account for about 50 percent of groundfish volume.\nKodiak residents would own little regional onshore processing capacity, but would own some offshore non-\npollock processing capacity. Regionally owned groundfish catcher vessels would operate in both the BSAI and\nGOA, harvesting about 3 and 26 percent of those areas' total groundfish harvest. The BSAI harvest would be\nprimarily pollock, while the GOA harvest would be divided between pollock and cod. About 40 percent of the\nexvessel value of the harvest for these catcher vessels would result from Alaska groundfish.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-68","Alaska Southcentral. Only 2 percent of the groundfish processed inshore in Alaska would be processed in the\nAKSC region, but this volume would account for about 36 percent of the exvessel value of all fish processed\nby those plants. Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish would account for 71 percent of\ngroundfish exvessel value. Regional residents would own both onshore and offshore facilities. Catcher vessels\nowned by regional residents would operate in both the BSAI and the GOA, but mainly in the GOA, and about\n31 percent of the exvessel value of fish harvested by these vessels would be associated with Alaska groundfish.\nAlaska Southeast. Groundfish would account for about 32 percent of the exvessel value of the fish processed\nby regional inshore groundfish plants, with Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish making up\n77 percent of groundfish value. Catcher vessels owned by regional residents would operate almost exclusively\nin the GOA and would tend to concentrate on sablefish (94 percent of GOA groundfish exvessel value). About\n48 percent of the exvessel value of fish harvested by these vessels would be associated with Alaska groundfish.\nWashington Inland Waters. Ownership of processing capacity for Alaska groundfish would be heavily\nconcentrated in the Washington inland waters region and focused on pollock (75 percent by weight, 71 percent\nby processed product value). High processing employment would derive mainly from ownership of offshore\nprocessors and management of inshore processors in other regions. Regionally owned groundfish catcher vessels\nwould harvest the bulk of BSAI groundfish delivered to onshore plants (85 percent by weight, 82 percent by\nexvessel value), and a significant amount of the GOA groundfish (29 percent by weight, 28 percent by exvessel\nvalue). These vessels would concentrate on pollock (94 percent of their harvest by weight).\nOregon Coast. No processing of Alaska groundfish would occur in the Oregon coast region, and there would\nbe no regional ownership of processing capability in other regions. Regionally owned groundfish catcher vessels\nwould participate in both the BSAI (7 percent of total harvest by weight) and GOA (16 percent of total harvest\nby weight). These vessels would concentrate on pollock (70 percent of total harvest by weight).\nImpacts of Alternative 2 on Industry Sectors and on Communities and Regions\n4.8.7.2\nThe intent of Alternative 2 is to enhance protection for marine mammals and seabirds. The alternative consists\nof two variations, Alternative 2.1 and Alternative 2.2.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.1 on Industry Sectors and on Communities and Regions\nAlternative 2.1 would close large areas of the BSAI and the GOA to fishing for pollock, Pacific cod, and Atka\nmackerel with the intent to enhance foraging opportunities for marine mammals, and would divide the fishing\nyear into four seasons. In addition, TACs would be reduced by amounts proportional to the biomass that is\nestimated to occur in closed areas.\nTable 4.8-59 summarizes impacts on industry sectors. Closures under this alternative would reduce groundfish\noutput by $305.2 million (25.3 percent) from projections under Alternative 1. The projected decline of harvests\nwould be greatest for pollock at 346,500 mt (26.5 percent of the total base projection). Harvests of Atka\nmackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish species would decline by 37.4 percent (56,600 mt). A\ndecline of approximately 1,560 jobs is projected for catcher/processors and processing plants, and payments\nto labor would decline by $143.5 million (24.8 percent).\nImpacts of Alternative 2.1 on the Catcher Vessel Sector\nTable 4.8-60 summarizes projected impacts of Alternative 2.1 on the eight catcher vessel classes compared to\nthe status quo described in Alternative 1. The tables contains three sections-the first describes the projected\noutcome under Alternative 2.1; the second shows the difference from Alternative 1, calculated as Alt. 2.1-Alt.\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-69","1; and the third shows the percentage change from Alternative 1, calculated as (Alt. 2.1-Alt. 1) - Alt. 1. Catcher\nvessels that harvest substantial quantities of pollock and Pacific cod would be negatively affected by\nAlternative 2.1. Few catcher vessels harvest Atka mackerel, SO the reduction of Atka mackerel would be\ninsignificant to catcher vessels. Overall, groundfish exvessel values and payment to labor would be reduced by\n22.7 percent from the status quo projection, and average payments per position would drop to $17,176.\nTrawl catcher vessels less than 60 ft appears to be the catcher vessel class that would be hardest hit by the\nalternative. These vessels, which because of their size fish almost exclusively in nearshore waters in the GOA,\nare projected to lose 60 percent of their groundfish revenue from the status quo alternative. This loss translates\nto a 35 percent of reduction in all revenue, including non-groundfish species such as salmon, crab, and herring.\nEven though these vessels are relatively diversified between groundfish and non-groundfish, their reliance on\npollock and Pacific cod in the GOA means that they are extremely vulnerable to the types of changes envisioned\nin Alternative 2.1.\nBecause of relatively small vessel size, projected losses to the trawl catcher vessels less than 60 ft class may be\nunderstated. The model used in the analysis assumes that reductions to each class will occur in proportion to\nthe harvests by species and FMP subarea, and does not take into consideration whether the vessels are able fish\nin areas that remain open. Because the open areas are farther from shore than the area typically fished by trawl\ncatchers vessels less than 60 ft vessels, and because these vessels are limited by their size, it is likely that they\nwill not be able to fish at the same relative level they have in the past. Furthermore, the season changes under\nthis alternative would place 36 percent of the quota in FMP Areas 610 and 620, directly in conflict with the\nsalmon seasons in which these vessels participate. It is unlikely that the vessels will be able to participate in\nboth salmon and groundfish fisheries at the same time. Therefore, the area and seasonal changes in this\nalternative are likely to increase the negative impacts of Alternative 2.1 on trawl catcher vessels less than 60\nft vessels to levels greater than the quantitative projections shown in Table 4.8-60.\nThe three other classes of trawl catcher vessels would also be hit hard by the changes. Vessels in the trawl\ncatcher vessels = 60 ft class are projected to lose 34.2 percent of their total groundfish and non-groundfish\nrevenue, while trawl catcher vessels with crab endorsements would lose 25 percent and catcher vessels without\ncrab endorsements would lose 27,6 percent of total exvessel revenues. The AFA trawl catcher vessels would\nbe affected proportionately less than the other trawl catcher vessel classes, primarily because TAC reductions\nwould be proportionately less in the BSAI than in the GOA. Additionally, because impacts on vessels in the\ntrawl catcher vessels less than 60 ft class are expected to be greater than projected, it is likely that larger vessels\nin the trawl catcher vessels = 60 ft class may be affected less than the quantitative projections shown in Table\n4.8-60.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.1 on the Catcher/Processor Sector\nWholesale value of total groundfish outputs of catcher/processors under Alternative 2.1 would be reduced\n23 percent from the base case in Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-61). This reduction, from $594.8 million to\n$460.1 million, would be shared almost evenly by the different classes of catcher/processors, with pot\ncatcher/processors suffering the greatest percentage loss of output value-27 percent, and longline\ncatcher/processors suffering the lowest percentage loss-19 percent. Estimating the impact of these projected\ndeclines on the classes is somewhat deceiving, because pot catcher/processors are responsible for less than\n1 percent of value of groundfish outputs of catcher/processors and are projected to experience a decline of only\n$1.1 million in output value. In contrast, surimi trawl catcher/processors, fillet trawl catcher/processors, and\nhead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors are projected to have declines in value of output of $63.9 million,\n$18.3 million and $35.7 million, respectively.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-70","Surimi trawl catcher/processors and fillet trawl catcher/processors, whose efforts are concentrated on the BSAI\npollock fisheries, are projected to lose 98,000 mt and 25,800 mt of pollock harvests, respectively, under this\nalternative. Since surimi trawl catcher/processors focus on few targets other than pollock, secondary species\nlosses of this fleet would be minimal in quantity. Fillet trawl catcher/processors, however, are projected to\nsuffer significant losses of Pacific cod, losing 3,500 mt, or more than one-third of their harvest. Head-and-gut\ntrawl catcher/processors would reduce their Atka mackerel harvest by 59,700 mt (almost half of their harvests\nunder Alternative 1) because of the two-thirds overall reduction in Atka mackerel harvests under Alternative\n2.1. The reduction in harvests of pot catcher/processors would be distributed evenly across the different species\ngroups, with harvests declining by 25 to 28 percent for each species group. Losses would be greatest in Pacific\ncod, the fishery in which these vessels are most active, but even this decline would be of minor significance\nbecause these vessels are responsible for less than 5 percent of the Pacific cod harvests of catcher/processors.\nLongline catcher/processors, on the other hand, would lose 27 percent of their Pacific cod catch.\nSince estimated payments to labor are a direct product of wholesale value of outputs, declines under this\nalternative would be equal in percent to the declines in output values. The total decrease in payments to labor\nunder this alternative is projected to be slightly more than $50 million, approximately 70 percent of this amount\nin payments from surimi trawl catcher/processors and head-and-gut trawl catcher/processors. Employment\nlosses were estimated based on the reduction of product output. Substantial employment losses would occur\namong surimi trawl catcher/processors and head-and-gut trawl catcher/processors, with employment to these\ntwo vessel classes accounting for more than 70 percent of the 518 jobs lost under this alternative.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.1 on the Inshore Processing and Mothership Sector\nTotal reported tons of groundfish handled by inshore plants and motherships would decrease from about\n887,500 mt under Alternative 1 to 625,800 mt, a decline of about 29 percent. Under Alternative 2.1 the spatial\ndistribution of groundfish species would result in reductions that vary for each species. For example, total\nreported tons of pollock would decrease from about 747,000 to 529,000 mt, or about 29 percent less than under\nAlternative 1 (Table 4.8-62). In comparison, reported tons of Pacific cod would be 42 percent less than\nestimated under Alternative 1. Compared to Alternative 1, reported tons would be approximately 5 percent\nlower for the Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish species group and 14 percent lower for\nflatfish.\nMost facilities in this processing sector also process other types of fish and shellfish resources, such as salmon,\ncrab, halibut, and other finfish. The total exvessel value column provides an indication of the plants'\ndependency on groundfish. For example, under Alternative 2.1, the wholesale value of groundfish produced by\nthe Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plant sector would decline by about 48 percent. However,\nthe decline in total exvessel value paid for all fish and shellfish by this sector would be only about 13 percent.\nMotherships depend more on groundfish than do other processor groups in this sector. Groundfish generally\nrepresents all of MS exvessel value and wholesale production value. Total exvessel value for motherships would\ndecline by 25 percent under Alternative 2.1.\nThe total wholesale production value of groundfish would be reduced by $171 million, about 28 percent of the\nwholesale value in Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-62). Production value for Bering Sea pollock inshore plants would\nbe reduced by $94 million. This amount is more than half of the total reduction for inshore plants and\nmotherships, and is about 26 percent below the amount the Bering Sea pollock inshore plant processors would\nachieve under Alternative 1. The wholesale production estimates for Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\ninshore plants and Kodiak inshore plants are $31 million and $24 million less, respectively, than under\nAlternative 1. Production values under Alternative 2.1 represent reductions of 48 percent and 40 percent,\nrespectively, in groundfish wholesale production value compared to Alternative 1.\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-71","Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants and Kodiak inshore plants would be affected more\nadversely than the other processor sectors. In terms of percentage change in wholesale value of groundfish\nproduction, Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants would lose almost half of the wholesale value\nof groundfish, while Kodiak inshore plant groundfish production value would decline about 40 percent.\nThese percentages reflect the dependence of processors in these communities on groundfish harvested in sea lion\ncritical habitat areas.\nPayments to labor would decrease by about $67.5 million and be 28 percent less than under Alternative 1.\nChanges in distribution of payments to labor would be identical to the distribution of changes in wholesale value\nbecause payments to labor represent an average of about 30 percent of total wholesale value for all inshore\nplants and motherships, based on previous research and discussions with industry representatives.\nTotal sector employment would decline from 3,182 under Alternative 1 to 140 under Alternative 2.1, a loss\nof about 1,040 employees. Bering Sea pollock inshore plants would incur more than half of the loss, but Alaska\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants would incur the largest percentage loss in groundfish-related\nemployment. The number of Alaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant groundfish-related employees\nwould be less than half of the number under Alternative 1. Kodiak inshore plants would lose about 170\nemployees, and southcentral Alaska inshore plants would lose about 50.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.1 on Communities and Regions\nTable 4.8-63 shows regional impacts that would be created by processing operations on North Pacific\ngroundfish under Alternative 2.1. Table 4.8-64 shows regional impacts that would be created by catcher vessels\nthat harvest North Pacific groundfish under Alternative 2.1.\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands. Under Alternative 2.1, total regional groundfish processing\nemployment and payments to labor would be 31 and 29 percent lower, respectively, than under Alternative 1.\nProcessing volumes of cod and pollock, by far the most important species, would decline by 41 and 28 percent,\nrespectively. Total groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value at groundfish processors would decline by\n17 percent. Given the regional plants' dependence on groundfish, consolidation or reorganization of regional\nprocessing could result. The number of processing days would be reduced and divided into four periods.\nMaintaining a residential work force would be difficult, while logistical costs of using a transient work force\nwould increase (due to increased travel costs). Regionally owned groundfish catcher vessel harvest value for\ngroundfish (primarily in the GOA) would decline by 54 percent, and overall exvessel value of fish harvested\n(revenue flow) would decline by 25 percent. Decreases in regional fish tax revenues from groundfish processors\nwould be significant.\nKodiak Island. Total groundfish processing employment and payments to labor would decrease by 41 and\n36 percent, respectively. Inshore processing volumes of cod and pollock would decline by 46 and 55 percent,\nrespectively. Groundfish exvessel value would decrease by 34 percent, and total groundfish and non-groundfish\nexvessel value at groundfish processors would decline by 16 percent. Regionally owned processors would lose\n23 to 24 percent of groundfish volume and value (primarily offshore non-pollock species). For regionally owned\ngroundfish catcher vessels, BSAI and GOA harvest volumes would decline by 26 and 44 percent, respectively;\ntotal groundfish harvest value would decrease by 28 percent; and total groundfish and non-groundfish harvest\nvalue would decrease by 14 percent. Regional impacts from reduced fish tax, processor and harvester changes,\nand population shifts would be pronounced.\nSouthcentral Alaska. Total groundfish processing employment and payments to labor would decline by 33 and\n19 percent, respectively, as would processor volumes of cod and pollock (38 and 59 percent). Given relatively\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-72","low regional dependency on groundfish, the declines would represent 2 percent of total groundfish processor\nexvessel value and only 1 percent of total groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value at groundfish\nprocessors. For regionally owned groundfish catcher vessels, decline of total groundfish and non-groundfish\nexvessel value would be approximately 5 percent. Regional impacts, while not insignificant, would be in the\nrange of variation normally experienced in Alaska fisheries.\nSoutheast Alaska. Total groundfish processing employment and payments to labor would decline by 25 and\n13 percent. Processing volumes for several species also would decline substantially. Total groundfish processor\nexvessel value would decline by about 3 percent, and total groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value at\ngroundfish processors would decline by only 1 percent. For the regionally owned groundfish catcher vessel fleet,\ntotal groundfish exvessel value would decline by 1 percent, and the total groundfish and non-groundfish value\nwould decline by only 0.5 percent.\nWashington Inland Waters. Total regional groundfish processing employment and payments to labor would\ndecrease by 25 and 24 percent, respectively, and volume and value each would decline by 26 percent. For the\nregionally owned groundfish catcher fleet, payments to labor and groundfish exvessel value each would decline\nby 24 percent, and total Alaska groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value would decline by 18 percent.\nWhile impacts to the overall regional economy would be muted by the size of the region, these impacts would\nbe pronounced for enterprises involved. These enterprises comprise a substantial portion of the overall fishery.\nCooperatives could help to mitigate impacts by facilitating structural reorganization of the fishery (essentially\nreducing numbers of active participants and employees).\nOregon Coast. No impacts related to inshore or offshore processors would affect this region. For catcher\nvessels, exvessel value of Alaska groundfish harvest would be 32 percent lower, and overall exvessel value from\nall Alaska fisheries would 25 percent lower. This loss of revenue flow would almost certainly reduce income\nand payments to labor, and would have other, indirect consequences.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.2 on Industry Sectors and on Communities and Regions\nThe intent of Alternative 2.2 is to provide protection to marine mammals by reducing TACs of pollock, Pacific\ncod, and Atka mackerel to levels SO low that the area from which harvests are taken and the timing of harvests\nwould become almost irrelevant.\nTable 4.8-65 summarizes the impacts of Alternative 2.2 on fishing and processing sectors. Total value of\nharvests of groundfish is projected to decline by $311.1 million (74.2 percent). All groundfish species groups\nare projected to experience large declines in harvests, with pollock harvests declining the most: 1,117,800 mt,\nor 85.4 percent. Employment is projected to decline by 70.1 percent on catcher/processors and 82.2 percent\nfor inshore processors and mothership. Payments to labor are projected to decline by 71.8 percent, or\n$414.9 million.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.2 on the Catcher Vessel Sector\nTable 4.8-66 shows projected outcomes for catcher vessels under Alternative 2.2 and compares them to\noutcomes under the status quo depicted in Alternative 1. Overall, pollock harvests by catcher vessels would be\nreduced by 85.1 percent, while Pacific cod harvests by catcher vessels are projected to drop by almost\n91 percent. Relatively few catcher vessels participate in target fisheries for Atka mackerel, and, therefore, TAC\nreductions of Atka mackerel would not be significant. Some reductions in retained harvests of flatfish species\nwould occur because of reductions in flatfish caught as bycatch in the pollock and Pacific cod fisheries. Under\nAlternative 2.2, total groundfish exvessel revenues and payments to labor for catcher vessels are projected to\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-73","fall by 63.9 percent from the status quo, and average payments per person employed are expected to fall to\n$8,022.\nBecause trawl catcher vessels focus almost exclusively on pollock and Pacific cod, they are projected to\nexperience proportionately more negative consequences than fixed-gear vessels would. The AFA trawl catcher\nvessels (catcher vessels with crab endorsements and catcher vessels without crab endorsements) are projected\nto lose more than roughly 80 percent of their total exvessel revenue under Alternative 2.2. Trawl vessels that\noperate primarily in the GOA would also be severely affected. Trawl catcher vessels = 60 ft are projected to\nexperience a 60 percent drop in total groundfish and non-groundfish revenue, while trawl catcher vessels less\nthan 60 ft are projected to see their total exvessel revenue drop nearly 50 percent. Revenue losses of this\nmagnitude are expected to result in bankruptcies for many trawl vessels, and although the analysis cannot\npredict changes in the number of vessels or persons employed, fewer of both are expected.\nCompared to trawl vessels the impacts of Alternative 2.2 on fixed-gear vessels are relatively small. Pot catcher\nvessels are projected to incur the largest negative impact of the fixed-gear vessels. Pot catcher vessels are\nprojected to incur a 69 percent decline in groundfish exvessel revenues compared to the status quo. Since pot\ncatcher vessels rely on crab for most of their overall revenue, Alternative 2.2 is projected to result in a\n10 percent decline in total groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel revenue. The impacts on the other fixed-gear\nclasses would be relatively limited in terms of the percentage change on overall exvessel revenues.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.2 on the Catcher/Processor Sector\nAlternative 2.2 is projected to cause extreme reductions in the harvests of all catcher/processors. The fleet of\ncatcher/processors would suffer a decline from an output value of $280.8 in the base alternative to\n$165.9 million, a drop of more than 70 percent (Table 4.8-17). Although all vessel classes would be greatly\naffected, the brunt of this decline would be borne by surimi trawl catcher/processors and fillet trawl\ncatcher/processors. These vessel types are estimated to incur a decline of almost 90 percent in wholesale output\nvalues. Although these vessel types would lose more than 90 percent of their Pacific cod harvests, a large share\nof their losses would be from a predicted 88 percent decline in harvests of pollock. Since these vessels\nconcentrate on BSAI pollock fisheries and are not permitted to operate outside the BSAI, they are particularly\nvulnerable to the severe restrictions that would be placed on the groundfish fisheries in the BSAI under this\nalternative.\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors would suffer the least loss under Alternative 2.2, with the value of\noutputs $86.4 million. It appears that head-and-gut trawl catcher/processor involvement in flatfish and rockfish\nfisheries, which are not targeted by this alternative, would minimize their losses. Head-and-gut trawl\ncatcher/processors are projected to catch 96,700 mt of flatfish species, a harvest reduction of 36 percent.\nLongline catcher/processors are also estimated to suffer fewer losses than other catcher/processor vessels, with\nwholesale value of outputs of $34.3 million, a drop of 59 percent from the Alternative 1 value. This\ncircumstance would occur because of longline catcher/processors' dependence on species other than pollock that\nwould suffer large, but relatively smaller, declines.\nEmployment losses would parallel the loss of wholesale value under this alternative, with an estimated\n70 percent of jobs on catcher/processor vessels lost. Employment would decrease from 2,091 in the base case\nto 625 under this alternative. The job losses are most severe on the surimi trawl catcher/processors and the fillet\ntrawl catcher/processors, each of which is predicted to suffer job losses in excess of 85 percent. Employment\non surimi trawl catcher/processors is predicted to fall from 677 to 101, while employment on fillet trawl\ncatcher/processors is predicted to fall from 173 to 21. Head-and-gut catcher/processors suffer the smallest\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-74","job losses, but those losses would still exceed 50 percent. Pot catcher/processors and longline\ncatcher/processors are projected to suffer job losses near the fleet average of 71 percent.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.2 on the Inshore Processing and Mothership Sector\nAlternative 2.2 would result in large decreases in groundfish production for Bering Sea pollock inshore plants,\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants and Kodiak inshore plants, and motherships. Total\nreported tons of groundfish would decline by about 735,000 mt, with pollock accounting for about 637,000 mt\nof the reduction (Table 4.8-68). Total reported tons of groundfish under this alternative are estimated at\n152,700 mt, compared to 887,500 mt under Alternative 1. Pollock volumes are reduced to about 15 percent\nof the reported tons under Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-68). The volume of Pacific cod delivered to inshore plants\nand motherships is 90 percent less under Alternative 2.2 than under Alternative 1. Southcentral inshore plants\nand southeast inshore plants would be affected relatively less than the more westward processor groups because\nthey are less dependent on pollock and Pacific cod.\nGroundfish as a percent of total exvessel value can be regarded as an indicator of the dependency of a processor\ngroup on groundfish. If the percentage change in groundfish as a percent of total exvessel value under an\nalternative is much less than the percentage change in groundfish production value, then a processor group\nwould be less dependent on groundfish than another processor group that had similar percentage changes for\nexvessel value and groundfish wholesale value. Total exvessel value for motherships would decline by about\n88 percent under this alternative, which is comparable to the reduction in groundfish wholesale value.\nThe wholesale production value of groundfish under this alternative would be reduced by $315 million for\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants and by $51 million for motherships. These reductions are 87 percent and\n88 percent, respectively, of the wholesale production value under Alternative 1. Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nIslands inshore plants and Kodiak inshore plants would also incur significant losses in groundfish wholesale\nproduction value under this alternative. Wholesale production value for the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nIsland inshore plant sector would be 77 percent less than estimated under Alternative 1, and Kodiak inshore\nplant wholesale production value would be 66 percent less. The total reported tons of pollock and Pacific for\nsouthcentral inshore plants and southeast inshore plants would also decline significantly, but the greater reliance\non sablefish and other members of Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish species complex by\nthese processing groups would reduce the impact of the decline in pollock and Pacific cod TACs.\nThis analysis does not attempt to determine the potential change in the number of facilities associated with any\nof the alternatives. However, those plants that are heavily dependent on groundfish, such as motherships and\nthe Bering Sea pollock inshore plants, may not remain viable businesses under this alternative with the reduction\nin groundfish processed in those facilities.\nDistribution of payments to labor is the same as wholesale production value because payments to labor for\ninshore plants and motherships are set at 30 percent of wholesale production value.\nTotal employment in this sector would decline significantly under this alternative. The reduction in TACs for\npollock, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel would result in lower employment. Groundfish-related employment\nunder Alternative 2.2 would decline by about 2,615 employees. Groundfish-related employment at the Bering\nSea pollock inshore plants and motherships would be only 12 percent of the level estimated for Alternative 1.\nTable 4.8-69 shows regional impacts that would be created by processing operations on North Pacific\ngroundfish under Alternative 2.2. Table 4.8-70 shows regional impacts that would be created by catcher vessels\nthat harvest North Pacific groundfish under Alternative 2.2.\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-75","Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands. Total regional groundfish processing employment and payments to\nlabor would plunge by 87 and 85 percent, respectively. Processing volume of cod and pollock, by far the most\nimportant species, would decline by 93 and 86 percent, respectively. Total groundfish and non-groundfish\nexvessel value at groundfish processors would decline by 49 percent. Regionally owned groundfish catcher\nvessel groundfish harvest value would drop by more than 78 percent (for all fish by 36 percent). Given regional\ndependency on groundfish, impacts of this alternative would be extremely severe.\nImpacts of Alternative 2.2 on Communities and Regions\nKodiak Island. Total groundfish processing employment and payments to labor would decrease by 70 and\n60 percent, respectively. Inshore processing volumes of cod and pollock would decline by 88 and 72 percent,\nrespectively. Groundfish exvessel value would decrease by 58 percent, and total groundfish and non-groundfish\nexvessel value at groundfish processors would decrease by 22 percent. Regionally owned processors would lose\nmore than 50 percent of groundfish volume and value. For regionally owned groundfish catcher vessels, BSAI\nand GOA harvest volumes would decline by 86 and 63 percent, respectively; total groundfish harvest value\nwould decrease by 56 percent; and total groundfish and non-groundfish harvest value (revenue flow) would\ndecrease by 27 percent. These impacts would be profound.\nSouthcentral Alaska. Total groundfish processing employment and payments to labor would decline\nsignificantly, as would processor volumes of cod and pollock. Given lower dependency on groundfish than is\nthe case for Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak Island, these declines represent 9 percent of total\ngroundfish processor exvessel value and only 3 percent of total groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value.\nFor regionally owned groundfish catcher vessels, decline of total groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value\nwould be approximately 11 percent. While this impact would not be insignificant, it would not be nearly as\nprofound as impacts in Kodiak Island and Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands.\nSoutheast Alaska. Groundfish processing employment, payments to labor, and processing volumes for several\nspecies all would decline substantially in relative terms. However, total groundfish processor exvessel value\nwould decline by approximately 9 percent, and total groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value at groundfish\nprocessors would decline by only 3 percent. For the regionally owned groundfish catcher vessel fleet, total\ngroundfish exvessel value would decline by 4 percent, and the total groundfish and non-groundfish value would\ndecline by only 2 percent.\nWashington Inland Waters. Total regional groundfish processing employment and payments to labor would\ndecrease by 75 and 77 percent, respectively. Volume and value would decrease by 80 and 77 percent,\nrespectively. For the regionally owned groundfish catcher fleet, payments to labor and groundfish exvessel value\nwould decline by 75 percent, and total groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value (revenue flow) would\ndecline by 57 percent. While the impacts to the overall regional economy would be muted by the sheer size of\nthe region, these impacts would be extremely profound to the enterprises involved. These enterprises comprise\na substantial portion of the overall fishery.\nOregon Coast. No impacts related to inshore or offshore processors would affect this region. For catcher\nvessels, BSAI harvest volume and values would decrease by 90 percent or more, and total groundfish exvessel\nvalue would decrease by more than 77 percent. Total groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value (revenue\nflow) would decrease by 60 percent. These impacts would be extremely severe to the enterprises involved.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-76","4.8.7.3\nImpacts of Alternative 3 on Industry Sectors and on Communities and Regions\nThe intent of Alternative 3 is to prevent overfishing of groundfish target species, to maintain healthy stock and\nto rebuild depressed stocks by changing the way TACs are established, by implementing time and area closures,\nand by placing restrictions on gears. Estimates of the impacts of the alternative incorporate the changes in the\nway TACs are established, but do not incorporate the time and area closures or gear restrictions.\nTable 4.8-71 summarizes the impacts of Alternative 3 on fishing and processing sectors. Groundfish outputs\nare projected to decline in value by $150.9 million (12.5 percent) under this alternative. The alternative is\nprojected to reduce harvests of species in the Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish complex\nby slightly more than 25 percent (38,800 mt), while pollock harvests are projected to decline by 16.6 percent\n(202,200 mt). Catcher vessels and inshore processors and motherships are projected to bear a disproportionate\nshare of the burden of these declines, with their outputs declining 13.8 percent and 15.3 percent, respectively.\nIn contrast, catcher/processors, are expected to incur a 9.6 percent decline in output. Overall, payments to labor\nare projected to decline by $73.1 million (12.7 percent), while employment on catcher/processors and\nmotherships and shoreline processors are projected to decline by approximately 700 positions.\nImpacts of Alternative 3 on the Catcher Vessel Sector\nTable 4.8-72 summarizes the impacts on catcher vessels of Alternative 3, the primary impact of which is a\nreduction in pollock and Pacific cod TACs of approximately 16 percent for the BSAI and GOA combined.\nCatcher vessel harvests of species, in the Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish aggregation\nare reduced by 10 percent and catcher vessel harvests of flatfish are reduced by 4 percent. Alternative 3 is\nprojected to reduce overall groundfish exvessel values and estimated payments to labor by nearly 14 percent\nfrom the status quo and average payments per person employed are expected to fall to $19,162.\nThe four classes of trawl catcher vessels are projected to lose between 16 and 20 percent of the their exvessel\nrevenue from groundfish under Alternative 3, and 12 to 16 percent of exvessel revenue overall. Fixed-gear\nvessels are projected to be affected to a lesser degree. Losses in groundfish exvessel revenue for the four fixed-\ngear vessel classes range from 7 to 10 percent. Groundfish revenue declines experienced by fixed-gear vessels\ntranslate to overall exvessel revenue losses combining groundfish and non-groundfish ranging from 1 to\n4 percent.\nCatcher vessels without crab endorsements, which rely almost exclusively on pollock and Pacific cod for all of\ntheir revenue, are projected to bear the biggest share of the impacts. The $15.8 million they are expected to lose\nrelative to status quo accounts for 40 percent of the total exvessel revenue impact of the alternative. Catcher\nvessels with crab endorsements, the other AFA trawl catcher vessel class, is projected to bear another 30 percent\nof the overall impact of the alternative.\nWhile the two AFA trawl catcher vessel classes would incur the largest share of the impacts, their ability to\nparticipate in cooperatives may soften some of the negative consequences of the reductions in pollock and\nPacific cod harvests. Cooperatives, for example, make it possible for vessels to leave the fisheries with\ncompensation from the remaining participants. If 16 percent of the least efficient vessels in the catcher vessels\nwithout crab endorsement and catcher vessels with crab endorsements classes can be convinced to leave the\nfishery with compensation from other cooperative members, the remaining vessels could continue to operate at\nthe same individual harvest levels as in Alternative 1. Because the more efficient vessels would be compensating\nthe less efficient vessels that have left the fishery, overall profits for the remaining vessels, while smaller than\nunder Alternative 1, would be higher than if the cooperative system were not in place.\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-77","In the GOA, where there are no cooperatives, all vessels in the trawl catcher vessel = 60 ft and trawl catcher\nvessels less than 60 ft classes would have incentives to remain in the fishery despite TAC reductions because\nthey would not be compensated for leaving. Thus, for these two trawl classes, it is more likely that all vessels\nwould face reduced harvest levels, and even greater competition for the smaller TACs.\nImpacts of Alternative 3 on the Catcher/Processor Sector\nCatcher/processors as a sector are projected to suffer a $57 million (10 percent) decline in wholesale harvest\nvalues under Alternative 3 (see Table 4.8-73). As with the earlier alternatives, the majority of these losses\nwould be suffered by the large surimi trawl catcher/processors and fillet trawl catcher/processors. These vessel\nclasses are projected to experience declines of $43.8 million and $11.2 million of output value, respectively\n(16 percent in each case). Given the dependence of these vessels on pollock, it is not surprising that they are\neach projected to have a 16 percent decline in pollock harvests under this alternative. Projected declines in\nharvests of Pacific cod, flatfish species and species in the Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other\ngroundfish complex are all less than 1,000 mt for these vessels, with the exception of Pacific cod harvests by\nfillet trawl catcher/processors which are projected to decline by almost 2 million mt.\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors are projected to increase their wholesale output revenues\nby\napproximately 5 percent to $164.8 million. Although this class would experience a loss of 31 percent of its\nharvests of Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish subgroup species (primarily Atka\nmackerel), this loss would be more than made up for by projected increases in the harvest of all other species\ngroups-increases of 40,000 mt for flatfish, 5,900 mt for pollock, and 3,300 mt for Pacific cod.\nThe other catcher/processor classes would both experience declines in value of wholesale output. Longline\ncatcher/processors are projected to experience a decline of $9.7 million (7 percent) of output value due to\ndeclines in Pacific cod and flatfish harvests of 7 percent and 53 percent, respectively. Although the projected\ndecline in flatfish harvest appears to be very significant (a decrease of 53 percent), the longline\ncatcher/processors limited activity in that fishery would limit the consequences of the large percentage decrease\nin harvests. Pot catcher/processors are projected to experience slight declines in all of the species groups and\nin wholesale harvest values, but these declines are of insignificant magnitude.\nProjected employment declines across the various catcher/processor vessel types generally parallel the declines\nin harvest values. Surimi trawl catcher/processors and fillet trawl catcher/processors are projected to experience\nlosses of 106 and 29 jobs, respectively, approximately 15 to 16 percent in each case. Longline\ncatcher/processors and pot catcher/processors are projected to experience declines of 30 and 2 jobs, respectively,\napproximately 8 percent in both cases. Although wholesale value of outputs would increase for head-and-gut\ntrawl catcher/processors, employment for these vessels is projected to decline by 2 percent. This projection\nsuggests that Atka mackerel harvesters tend to use more employment per pound of processed product, as\nharvests of only that species would decline for this vessel class.\nImpacts of Alternative 3 on the Inshore Processing and Mothership Sector\nAlternative 3 would result in moderate decreases in groundfish production for Bering Sea pollock inshore plants,\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants, Kodiak inshore plants, and motherships. Impacts would\nbe less for Southcentral Alaska inshore plants and southeast Alaska inshore plants than for plants in other areas.\nTotal reported tons of groundfish would decline by about 133,000 mt, with pollock accounting for about\n81,000 mt of the reduction (Table 4.8.7-24). Total reported tons of groundfish under this alternative are\nestimated at 744,500 n compared to 887,500 mt under Alternative 1. Pollock volumes for Bering Sea pollock\ninshore plants and motherships would decline by about 16 percent from the reported tons under Alternative 1.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-78","Plants in other areas would experience declines of 20 to 22 percent in reported tons of pollock. The volume of\nPacific cod delivered to inshore plants and motherships would be about 15 percent less than under Alternative 1.\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plants and southeast Alaska inshore plants would be relatively unaffected by this\nalternative. They would lose about 9 percent of the wholesale value of their groundfish production, but because\nprocessors from these two areas also process salmon, halibut, and other species, the decrease in groundfish\nrevenues translates into a smaller percentage decrease of total revenues. For example, the exvessel value for\nsouthcentral Alaska inshore plants and southeast Alaska inshore plants would decline by only 2.4 percent. The\nmothership sector is most dependent on groundfish and would lose about 15.8 percent of total revenues from\nAlaska fisheries. Total revenue for motherships does not include revenues from participation in the Pacific\nwhiting fishery off the coasts of Oregon and Washington.\nThe wholesale production value would be reduced by $57 million for Bering Sea pollock inshore plants and by\nabout $12 million for Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants. These reductions are about 15.8\nand 18.5 percent, respectively, of the wholesale production value under Alternative 1. Kodiak inshore plants\nand motherships would experience losses of $9 million to $10 million in wholesale production value.\nDistribution of payments to labor is the same as wholesale production value because payments to labor for\ninshore plants and motherships are set at 30 percent of wholesale production value.\nTotal employment in this sector would decline from 3,182 to about 2,666, a loss of 516 employees. Bering Sea\npollock inshore plants would lose about 315 of these jobs. Groundfish-related employment at Bering Sea\npollock inshore plants would decline by about 15 percent. The percentage loss of employees would be greatest\nat Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants, a reduction of 19 percent in total groundfish processing\nemployment.\nImpacts of Alternative 3 on Communities and Regions\nTable 4.8-75 shows regional impacts that would be created by processing operations on North Pacific\ngroundfish under Alternative 3. Table 4.8-76 shows regional impacts that would be created by catcher vessels\nthat harvest North Pacific groundfish under Alternative 3.\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands. Total regional groundfish processing employment and labor payments\neach would decline by 16 percent. Processing volume for the four groundfish groups would decline by 14 to\n16 percent. Total groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value at groundfish processors would decline by\n9 percent. The number of processing days would be reduced, and use of transient labor may increase.\nRegionally owned groundfish catcher vessel harvest value for groundfish (primarily GOA) would decline by\n19 percent, and overall exvessel value would drop by 9 percent. Regional fish tax revenues from groundfish\nprocessors would decline by approximately 9 percent. Potential adverse impacts are significant and reflect\ncurrent regional dynamics and trends.\nKodiak Island. Total groundfish processing employment and labor payments would decrease by 14 and\n12 percent respectively. Declines would be 15 and 22 percent for inshore processing volumes of cod and\npollock; 15 percent for groundfish exvessel value; and 7 percent for total groundfish and non-groundfish\nprocessor exvessel value. Regionally owned processors would lose 1 percent of groundfish volume and\n6 percent of groundfish value (primarily offshore non-pollock). For regionally owned groundfish catcher\nvessels, BSAI and GOA harvest volumes would decline by 15 and 17 percent; total groundfish harvest value\nwould decrease by 13 percent; and total groundfish and non-groundfish harvest value would decrease by\n7 percent. Regional impacts from reduced fish tax, processor and harvester changes, and population shifts\nwould be significant and may affect participants, but not the fundamental structure, of the regional economy.\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-79","Southcentral Alaska. Total groundfish processing employment and payments to labor would decline by 10 and\n6 percent respectively. Processor volumes of pollock would be reduced by 22 percent, cod and flats by\n14 percent each, and Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish by 6 percent. These declines\nrepresent a 7 percent reduction of total groundfish processor exvessel value and only a 2 percent reduction of\ntotal groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value. For regionally owned groundfish catcher vessels, decline\nof total groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value would be about 4 percent. Regional impacts, while not\ninsignificant, are in the range of variation commonly experienced in Alaska fisheries.\nSoutheast Alaska. Regional groundfish processing employment, payments to labor, and processing volumes\nwould decline from 5 to 13 percent each (pollock 20 percent). Total groundfish processor exvessel value would\ndecline by approximately 8 percent, and total groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value at groundfish\nprocessors would decline by only 2 percent. For the regionally owned groundfish catcher vessel fleet, total\ngroundfish exvessel value would decline by 6 percent, and the total groundfish and non-groundfish value would\ndecline by only by 3 percent. These impacts are in the range of variation expected in Alaska fisheries.\nWashington Inland Waters. Total regional groundfish processing employment and payments to labor would\ndecrease by 5 and 12 percent, respectively, and volume and value would each decline 13 percent. For the\nregionally owned groundfish catcher fleet, payments to labor and groundfish exvessel value would each decline\nby 15 percent, and total Alaska groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value would decline by 11 percent. The\nimpacts to the overall regional economy would be muted by the size of the region, although some economic\nadjustments would be expected. The operation of cooperatives may assist in the rational adjustment to adverse\neconomic impacts, but would not counter them.\nOregon Coast. No inshore or offshore processor related impacts would accrue to this region. For catcher\nvessels, exvessel value of their Alaska groundfish harvest would be reduced by 16 percent, and overall Alaska\nexvessel value by 12 percent. This loss of revenue flow would almost certainly reduce income and payments\nto labor, and would have other indirect consequences.\n4.8.7.4\nImpacts of Alternative 4 on Industry Sectors and on Communities and Regions\nThe overall intent of Alternative 4 is to enhance protections against overfishing non-target groundfish stocks\nsuch as skates, grenadiers, and squid by setting species-specific TACs and closing areas to protect squid\naggregations. Two sub-alternatives are defined, both Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 would close areas in the BSAI\nto protect squid and reduce the BSAI pollock TACs by 18.5 percent (the amount traditionally harvested in the\nnow closed areas). In addition, TACs are imposed on skates and grenadiers in the BSAI and GOA. The\ndifference between Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 is that the latter has lower TACs for skates and grenadiers.\nImpacts of Alternative 4.1 on Industry Sectors and on Communities and Regions\nTable 4.8-77 summarizes projected impacts on fishing and processing sectors of Alternative 4.1. Relative to\nAlternative 1, the value of groundfish outputs would decline by $136.9 million (11.3 percent). This decline\nwould occur primarily in pollock harvests, which would decline by 224,400 mt (17.1 percent). All classes\nwould share in the burden, with value of outputs declining by about 10 percent for each class. Total payments\nto labor would decline by $62.0 million (10.7 percent), while employment would decline by 502 positions for\ncatcher/processors, motherships, and inshore plants.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-80","Impacts of Alternative 4.1 on the Catcher Vessel Sector\nTable 4.8-78 shows projected impacts of Alternative 4.1. Overall, retained harvests of catcher vessels would\nbe reduced by 16.6 percent, and the retained harvest of flatfish would be reduced by nearly 2 percent. The\nalternative is projected to reduce overall exvessel revenues and payments to labor from groundfish activity by\n9.3 percent. The reduced payments to labor would reduce the average payment per person by $2,084 from\nAlternative 1 to $20,154\nBecause Alternative 4.1 affects only the BSAI pollock fishery, the only catcher vessels that would feel\nsignificant impacts are in the catcher vessels with crab endorsements and catcher vessels without crab\nendorsements classes. Vessels in the catcher vessels with crab endorsements class are projected to experience\na 16.3 percent drop in groundfish exvessel revenue and payment to labor. Vessels in the catcher vessels without\ncrab endorsements are expected to face a 15.5 percent decline in groundfish exvessel values and payments to\nlabor.\nMinor changes for other classes may be due to artifacts of the modeling process. While vessels in the trawl\ncatcher vessels = 60 ft class are projected to experience a slight decrease, the decreases are due to the fact that\nin 1998 (the most recent year for which complete catcher vessel data were available) these vessels had some\ncatch of pollock in the BSAI. Under the AFA, which for catcher vessels was not implemented until 2000, trawl\ncatcher vessels = 60 ft vessels will not be allowed to participate in directed pollock fisheries. Therefore, since\nthe alternative does not affect GOA pollock, vessels in the trawl catcher vessels = 60 ft class would not be\naffected by the changes to pollock under the alternative if it were actually implemented.\nThe slight increases of retained catch of Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish species\nprojected for the longline catcher vessel and fixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft classes are actually increases\nin sablefish that result from the model's reassignment of catches from catcher/processors to catcher vessels.\nThese increases are artifacts of the modeling process used in the SEIS and, because sablefish is managed with\nIFQs, are not expected to occur if the alternative is implemented.\nImpacts of Alternative 4.1 on the Catcher/Processor Sector\nUnder this alternative, the wholesale value of the catcher/processor sector would fall by 10 percent relative to\nthe base alternative, from $594.8 million to $530.3 million (Table 4.8.7-29). The decline is almost entirely\nattributable to projected declines in harvests by the surimi trawl catcher/processors and fillet trawl\ncatcher/processors that are most active in the BSAI pollock fishery. These vessel classes are each projected to\nexperience a decline of 19.1 percent of pollock harvests, with surimi trawl catcher/processors losing 81,700 mt\nof pollock and fillet trawl catcher/processors losing 19,500 mt. These vessel classes are also projected to\nexperience slight changes in their harvests of other species groups, but changes in those harvest levels would\nbe inconsequential-in both cases they would be less than 1,000 mt and less than 0.5 percent of total\nharvest tonnage for the vessel type. Very slight changes would occur in harvests by the other catcher/processor\ntypes, because none would have changes in wholesale value of outputs approaching 0.5 percent. Consequently,\nthe loss of output values is almost exclusively attributable to the projected declines of 18.7 percent and\n17.2 percent in output values for surimi trawl catcher/processors and fillet trawl catcher/processors,\nrespectively.\nOverall employment would be largely unchanged, with a 7.6 percent decline projected. The decline is entirely\nattributable to employment losses on surimi trawl catcher/processors and fillet trawl catcher/processors, which\nare projected experience large declines in pollock harvests. These fleets are projected to have employment\ndeclines of 127 and 32 positions, respectively, (approximately an 18 percent decline in each case).\nCorresponding declines in payments to labor of $18.4 million and $4.8 million, respectively, are projected for\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-81","these vessel classes. The other vessels in the catcher/processor fleet are projected to have minor increases in\nemployment and payments to labor. In each case, these changes would be insignificant, as they each would be\nless than 1 percent of the base alternative level.\nImpacts of Alternative 4.1 on the Inshore Processing and Mothership Sector\nAlternative 4.1 would result in modest reductions in reported tons of pollock. The Bering Sea pollock inshore\nplants, motherships, and Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants would be most affected by this\nalternative because they more dependent than the other processing groups on Bering Sea pollock. Kodiak\ninshore plants, southcentral Alaska inshore plants, and southeast Alaska inshore plants would experience\ninsignificant impacts with Alternative 4.1.\nThe reported tons of pollock would decline from 747,600 to 624,700 mt, a reduction of about 122,900 mt.\n(Table 4.8-80). The impact on reported tons for other species groups would be minimal. Bering Sea pollock\ninshore plants and motherships would lose about 19 percent of their total reported tons of pollock under this\nalternative, with the Administrative Procedure Act shore plants losing about 6.5 percent. Motherships and their\ncatcher vessels seldom target Pacific cod or the other species groups, SO the reported tons for these groups\nprimarily represent bycatch while targeting pollock. Assuming constant bycatch rates, the reported tons for\nthese other species would decline concomitantly with the reduction in pollock TACs.\nGroundfish wholesale value would decline by about $72 million, with Bering Sea pollock inshore plants\nincurring $60 million of the reduction. Motherships would account for $11 million of the reduction. These\nreductions are about 16.6 and 19 percent, respectively, of the wholesale production value under Alternative 1.\nTotal exvessel payments by these processors would change by about 19 percent for motherships and 11 percent\nfor Bering Sea pollock inshore plants. The lower percentage for Bering Sea pollock inshore plants reflects the\nlower relative dependence of these plants on groundfish. The percentage for motherships would decline if\nrevenues from the Pacific whiting fishery were included in total revenues for those ships.\nDistribution of payments to labor is the same as wholesale production value because payments to labor for\ninshore plants and motherships are set at 30 percent of wholesale production value.\nTotal employment in this sector would decline from 3,182 to 2,838, a loss of about 340 employees. Bering Sea\npollock inshore plants would lose about 310 of these jobs, or about 90 percent of the total job loss. Groundfish-\nrelated employment at Bering Sea pollock inshore plants would decline by about 15.5 percent. The percentage\nloss of employees would be greatest for motherships, about 19 percent of total employment under this\nalternative.\nImpacts of Alternative 4.1 on Communities and Regions\nTable 4.8-81 shows regional impacts that would be created by processing operations on North Pacific\ngroundfish under Alternative 4.1. Table 4.8-82 shows regional impacts that would be created by catcher vessels\nthat harvest North Pacific groundfish under Alternative 4.1.\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands. Under Alternative 4.1, total regional groundfish processing\nemployment and payments to labor would decline by 13 and 14 percent, respectively. Processing volumes of\nAtka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish would decline by 6 percent and pollock by 17 percent.\nTotal groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value at groundfish processors would decline by 8 percent. The\nnumber of processing days would be reduced, and use of transient labor may increase. Regionally owned\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.8-82","groundfish catcher vessels would be for the most part unaffected (apparent BSAI impacts in Alternative 4.1 are\ndue to small numbers and rounding effects). Decreases in regional fish tax revenues from groundfish processors\nwould be approximately 8 percent. Potential adverse impacts are significant, but reflect current regional\ndynamics and trends.\nKodiak Island. No impacts related to inshore or offshore processors would occur in this region. For catcher\nvessels, exvessel value of Alaska groundfish harvest would be reduced by 3 percent, mainly in the Bering Sea,\nand overall exvessel value would be reduced by 1 percent. While individual operations may be adversely\naffected, overall impacts would be minimal.\nSouthcentral Alaska. No impacts related to inshore or offshore processors would occur in this region. For\ncatcher vessels, exvessel value of Alaska groundfish and overall harvests are projected to be the same (slight\nreductions in the BSAI countered by slight increases in the GOA). Potential impacts would be insignificant.\nSoutheast Alaska. No impacts related to inshore or offshore processors would occur in this region. For catcher\nvessels, exvessel value of Alaska groundfish and overall harvests are projected to increase slightly in the GOA.\nChanges would be small enough that potential impacts would be insignificant.\nWashington Inland Waters. Total regional groundfish processing employment and payments to labor would\ndecrease by 10 and 13 percent, respectively, and volume and value of regionally owned at-sea processors would\neach decline 13 percent. For the regionally owned groundfish catcher fleet, payments to labor and groundfish\nexvessel value would each decline 14 percent, and total groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value would\ndecrease by 11 percent, due to decreases in the BSAI harvest. The impacts to the overall regional economy\nwould be muted by the sheer size of the region itself, although some economic adjustments would be expected.\nThe operation of cooperatives may assist in the rational adjustment to adverse economic impacts, but would not\ncounter them.\nOregon Coast. No impacts related to inshore or offshore processors would occur in this region. For regionally\nowned groundfish catcher vessels, exvessel value of Alaska groundfish harvest would decline by 6 percent and\noverall exvessel value would decline by 5 percent. While such a loss of revenue flow would hinder any business,\nand some operations may be affected more adversely than others, these percentages are similar to the variability\ncommon in Alaska fisheries.\nImpacts of Alternative 4.2 on Industry Sectors and on Communities and Regions\nTable 4.8-83 summarizes impacts on fishing and processing sectors. Groundfish output would decline by\n$175.0 million (15.5 percent). Declines in pollock harvests would be shared by most vessel and processor\nclasses. Outputs would decline more for catcher/processors than for catcher vessels, motherships, or inshore\nprocessors, due primarily to a decline in catcher/processor harvests of Pacific cod of 49,300 mt (36.9 percent).\nPayments to labor would decline by $77.4 million. Employment for catcher/processors, motherships, and\ninshore plants would decline by 704 positions.\nImpacts of Alternative 4.2 on the Catcher Vessel Sector\nTable 4.8-84 shows the projected impacts of Alternative 4.2. Overall, the impacts of Alternative 4.2 are almost\nidentical to the impacts of Alternative 4.1. There do not appear to be any significant impacts on catcher vessels\nfrom the reduced TACs of skates and grenadiers that would be implemented. For catcher vessels, all impacts\nwould result from the closure of the area to protect squid and the consequent reduction in pollock TACs. The\nfact that binding constraints on skates and grenadier do not appear to impact catcher vessels may be an artifact\nof the catch projection model. The model attempts to maximize total groundfish harvests in the constraints of\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-83","TACs and bycatch rates. Observed bycatch rates of skates are highest for longline gears targeting Pacific cod.\nThe catch model implemented for the SEIS reduces the target fisheries that have the highest bycatch rates. The\ncatch model implemented for the SEIS reduces the target fisheries that have the highest bycatch rates and\ntherefore the BSAI longline Pacific cod fishery is reduced. As shown in Table 4.8-84 longline catcher/processor\nvessels would be almost unilaterally affected by the alternative. If the skate TAC had been apportioned by gear\ntype, the projected effects would have been different.\nThe model projection for Alternative 4.2 reduces catcher vessels' retained harvests of pollock by 16.5 percent\nand flatfish by nearly 2 percent. Retained harvests of Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish\nspecies, which include skates grenadiers, and squid, would be reduced by 0.4 percent, a very small impact\nresulting primarily from the fact very few, if any, skates have been retained by catcher vessels in the past.\nAlternative 4.2 is projected to reduce overall exvessel revenues and payments to labor from groundfish by\n9.5 percent. The reduction of payments to labor reduces the average payment per person from Alternative 1\nto $20,115.\nFor catcher vessels, Alternative 4.2 appears to affect only the BSAI pollock fishery. The only catcher vessels\nthat would feel significant impacts are in the catcher vessels with crab endorsements and catcher vessels without\ncrab endorsements classes. Catcher vessels with crab endorsements vessels are projected to experience a\n16.2 percent drop in groundfish exvessel revenue and payment to labor. Catcher vessels without crab\nendorsements vessels are expected to face a 15.4 percent decline in groundfish exvessel values and payments\nto labor.\nImpacts of Alternative 4.2 on the Catcher/Processor Sector\nUnder this alternative, wholesale value of output of the catcher/processor sector would decline by 17.2 percent,\nfrom $594.8 under the base alternative to $492.4 million (Table 4.8-85). The decline is partly attributable to\ndeclines in pollock harvest by surimi trawl catcher/processors and fillet trawl catcher/processors that are almost\nidentical in magnitude to the declines under Alternative 4.1. The additional declines in wholesale value of\noutputs under this alternative would result from a decline in harvests by longline catcher/processors and pop\ncatcher/processors. The small and binding TAC on BSAI skate harvests would limit the total harvest of Pacific\ncod by the fixed-gear catcher/processors. The projected $38.1 million (46 percent) decline in longline\ncatcher/processors output value would be caused primarily by a decline in Pacific cod harvests, from 79,400 mt\nin the status quo to 30,400 mt. Longline catcher/processors are projected to suffer a decline of 6,000 mt\n(44.1 percent) in harvests of Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish species and a decline of\n1,800 mt (67.7 percent) in harvests of pollock. Pot catcher/processors are projected to experience a decline of\n4.9 percent of wholesale value of outputs; however, this decline amounts to a reduction of only $0.2 million in\nwholesale value of outputs.\nTotal payments to labor would decline $38.3 million or 17.2 percent. Although the greatest decline in value of\noutputs would be experienced by surimi trawl catcher/processors, the largest decline in projected employment\nwould be experienced by the more labor-intensive longline catcher/processors, which are projected to lose 203\njobs, or 56.7 percent of their workforce. Surimi trawl catcher/processors are projected to lose 126 jobs, while\nfillet trawl catcher/processors are projected to lose 32, approximately 18 percent of their respective workforces.\nP-CPs are projected to lose only one job. The distribution of projected declines in payments to labor among the\nvarious vessel classes parallels losses in value of output. Surimi trawl catcher/processors and longline\ncatcher/processors are projected to reduce payments to labor by $18.3 million and $15.2 million, respectively,\nwhile total reductions in payments to labor are projected to be $38.3 million.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-84","Impacts of Alternative 4.2 on the Inshore Processing and Mothership Sector\nAlternative 4.2 would result in modest reductions in reported tons of pollock, similar to Alternative 4.1. The\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants, motherships, and Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants would\nbe affected most because they more dependent on Bering Sea pollock than the other processing groups. Kodiak\ninshore plants, southcentral Alaska inshore plants, and southeast Alaska inshore plants would experience\ninsignificant impacts.\nThe reported tons of pollock would decline from 747,600 mt to 625,700 mt, a reduction of about 123,900 mt\n(Table 4.8-86). The impact on reported tons for other species groups would be minimal. Bering Sea pollock\ninshore plants and motherships would lose 18 to 19 percent of their total reported tons of pollock, with Alaska\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants losing about 6.4 percent. Motherships and their catcher vessels\nseldom target Pacific cod or the other species groups, SO reported tons for these groups primarily represent\nbycatch while targeting pollock. Assuming constant bycatch rates, the reported tons for these other species\nwould decline concomitantly with the reduction in pollock TACs. These changes are similar to those projected\nunder Alternative 4.1.\nGroundfish wholesale value would decline by about $73 million, with Bering Sea pollock inshore plants\nincurring $60 million of this reduction. Motherships would account for $11 million of the reduction. These\nreductions are about 16.5 and 18.9 percent, respectively, of the wholesale production value under Alternative 1.\nThese reductions are almost identical to those projected under Alternative 4.1.\nTotal exvessel payments by these processors would change by about 19 percent for motherships and 11 percent\nfor Bering Sea pollock inshore plants under Alternative 4.2. These changes are very close to those projected\nunder Alternative 4.1. The lower percentage for Bering Sea pollock inshore plants reflects the lower relative\ndependence of these plants on groundfish. The percentage for motherships would decline if revenues from the\nPacific whiting fishery were included in total revenues for those ships.\nDistribution of payments to labor is the same as wholesale production value because payments to labor for\ninshore plants and motherships are set at 30 percent of wholesale production value.\nTotal employment in this sector would decline from 182 in the base alternative to about 2,800, a loss of about\n380 employees. Bering Sea pollock inshore plants would lose about 310 jobs, about 90 percent of the total job\nloss. Groundfish-related employment at Bering Sea pollock inshore plants would decline by about 15.4 percent.\nThe percentage loss of employees would be greatest for motherships, which would experience a reduction of\nabout 19 percent in their total employment. There would be a loss of one less job under this alternative than\nunder Alternative 4.1.\nImpacts of Alternative 4.2 on Communities and Regions\nTable 4.8-86 shows regional impacts that would be created by processing operations on North Pacific\ngroundfish under Alternative 4.2. Table 4.8-88 shows regional impacts that would be created by catcher vessels\nthat harvest North Pacific groundfish under Alternative 4.2.\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands. Under Alternative 4.2, total regional groundfish processing\nemployment and payments to labor would decline by 13 and 14 percent, respectively. Processing volumes would\ndecline by 6 percent for Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish and by 17 percent for pollock.\nTotal groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value at groundfish processors would decline by 8 percent. The\nnumber of processing days would be reduced, and use of transient labor may increase. Regionally owned\ngroundfish catcher vessels for the most part would be unaffected (apparent BSAI impacts in Alternative 4.1 are\nChapter 4 Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-85","due to small numbers and rounding effects). Regional fish tax revenues from groundfish processors would\ndecrease by approximately 8 percent. Potential adverse impacts are significant, but reflect current regional\ndynamics and trends.\nKodiak Island. No impacts related to inshore processors would occur in this region. For regionally owned at-\nsea processors, employment would be reduced by 2 percent and payment to labor would be reduced by\n4 percent. Total groundfish volume and processed product value would be reduced by 12 and 16 percent,\nrespectively. For groundfish catcher vessels, exvessel value of Alaska groundfish harvest would decline by\n3 percent (BSAI), and overall exvessel value would decline by 1 percent. Individual operations may be\nadversely affected, but overall regional impacts would be minimal.\nSouthcentral Alaska. No significant impacts related to inshore processors would occur in this region.\nRegionally owned at-sea groundfish processing employment and payments to labor will be reduced 6 percent.\nFor groundfish catcher vessels, exvessel value of their Alaska groundfish and overall harvests are projected to\nbe about the same (slight reductions in the BSAI). Regionally, potential impacts would likely be insignificant.\nSoutheast Alaska. No significant impacts related to inshore processors would occur in this region. For\nregionally owned at-sea processors, employment and payments to labor decline by 15 and 13 percent\nrespectively. Total processing volume is reduced 44 percent and processed product value 17 percent. For\nregional groundfish catcher vessels, projected changes are minimal. Regional impacts will be confined to the\nlongline catcher/processor sector.\nWashington Inland Waters. Total regional groundfish processing employment and payments to labor would\neach decrease by 18 percent, and volume and value of regionally owned at-sea processors would each decline\n16 percent. For the regionally owned groundfish catcher fleet, payments to labor and groundfish exvessel value\nwould each decline 14 percent, and total Alaska groundfish and Alaska non-groundfish exvessel value would\ndecrease by 11 percent, due to decreases in the BSAI harvest. The impacts to the overall regional economy\nwould be muted by the sheer size of the region itself, although some economic adjustments would be expected.\nCooperatives may aid the rational adjustment to adverse economic impacts, but would not counter them.\nOregon Coast. No significant inshore or offshore processor related impacts would accrue to this region. For\nregionally owned groundfish catcher vessels, exvessel value of their Alaska groundfish harvest would decline\n6 percent and their overall Alaska exvessel value by 5 percent. While such a loss of revenue flow would hinder\nany business, and some individual operations may be more adversely affected than others, these changes are\nsimilar to the variability commonly experienced in Alaska fisheries.\n4.8.7.5\nImpacts of Alternative 5 on Industry Sectors and on Communities and Regions\nThe intent of Alternative 5 is to enhance the protection of benthic habitat while maintaining commercial fisheries\nat levels approaching the status quo. To accomplish this objective, Alternative 5 proposes replacing the bottom\ntrawl fisheries with pelagic trawl and fixed-gear fisheries, decreasing the TACs for target species in the\nremaining bottom trawl fisheries, and reallocating halibut vessel limits between trawl and fixed-gear to allow\nfor reallocation of groundfish catch from trawl to fixed-gear fisheries. The impacts of replacing bottom trawl\nrockfish fisheries and additional year-round area closures were not addressed in the model.\nTable 4.8-89 summarizes impacts on fishing and processing sectors. Total value of groundfish outputs would\nchange by less than 1 percent. Catcher/processors, however, would increase their Pacific cod harvest by\napproximately 34,000 mt, offsetting a decline of similar magnitude in catcher vessel harvests. Atka mackerel,\nrockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish and flatfish harvests are both projected to decline by approximately\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-86","10,000 mt, with catcher/processors incurring the majority of Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other\ngroundfish decline and inshore processors incurring the majority of the flatfish decline. Payments to labor would\ndecline by less than 2 percent ($10 million). Employment on catcher/processors would increase by 7 percent,\nwhich would be more than offset by a 10 percent decline on motherships and inshore processors.\nImpacts of Alternative 5 on the Catcher Vessel Sector\nTable 4.8-90 summarizes projected impacts of Alternative 5 on catcher vessels. The biggest impact on retained\nharvests for catcher vessels would occur in the Pacific cod fishery, in which overall retained harvests would be\nreduced by nearly 37 percent. Total retained harvests of flatfish and species in the Atka mackerel, rockfish,\nsablefish, and other groundfish aggregation would also be reduced. In general, retained harvests by trawl\ncatcher vessels would be reduced and retained harvests of fixed-gear catcher vessels would increase. Overall,\nexvessel revenue from groundfish and payments to labor from groundfish would be reduced by 4.3 percent. The\naverage payment per person on catcher vessels is estimated to drop by nearly $1,000, to $21,267.\nAll four classes of trawl catcher vessels are projected to experience negative consequences from Alternative 5.\nVessels in the trawl catcher vessels = 60 ft and trawl catcher vessels less than 60 ft classes have a greater\nreliance on Pacific cod than vessels in the catcher vessels with crab endorsements and catcher vessels without\ncrab endorsements classes, and therefore the negative consequences of the alternative would be felt more by\ntrawl catcher vessels = 60 ft and trawl catcher vessels less than 60 ft than by catcher vessels with crab\nendorsements and catcher vessels without crab endorsements. Trawl catcher vessels = 60 ft are projected to lose\n41 percent of their groundfish revenues and 35 percent of their overall revenues under the alternative. Trawl\ncatcher vessels less than 60 ft are projected to experience a 61 percent drop in groundfish revenues. The\nreductions in groundfish revenues for trawl catcher vessel less than 60 ft would result in a 35.5 percent reduction\nin overall exvessel value, including non-groundfish revenues from salmon, crab, halibut, and herring. Projected\nrevenue declines for AFA trawl catcher vessels are between 8 and 9 percent.\nFixed-gear catcher vessels are projected to increase their retained harvests of Pacific cod. However, because\nmost harvests of Pacific cod by catcher vessels with crab endorsements and catcher vessels without crab\nendorsements of Pacific cod occur in the BSAI, and because the fixed-gear apportionment of Pacific cod in the\nBSAI FMP allocates 80 percent to longline catcher/processors, fixed-gear catcher vessels would not gain as\nmuch as trawl catcher vessels would lose. Vessels and fixed-gear catcher vessel 33 ft, 59 ft are the biggest\nbeneficiaries of the reapportionment of Pacific cod from bottom trawling to fixed-gear. Retained harvests of\nPacific cod by vessels are projected to increase by more than 10,000 mt, mostly from the BSAI. Groundfish\nexvessel value for vessels would increase by 56 percent, but because vessels rely SO heavily on crab, the\nincreases in groundfish would increase total exvessel revenue by only 9 percent. 3 Retained harvests of Pacific\ncod by fixed-gear catcher vessel 33 ft, 59 ft vessels would jump by more than 12,000 mt and would result in\nan increase in groundfish exvessel revenues of 17 percent compared to the status quo. Pot catcher vessels in\nfixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft classes are projected to experience a 43 percent gain in groundfish exvessel\nvalue resulting from an increase of only 700 mt of Pacific cod.\nImpacts of Alternative 5 on the Catcher/Processor Sector\nWholesale value of outputs of the catcher/processor sector is projected to rise 4.0 percent ($23.9 million) under\nthis alternative (Table 4.8-91). This rise is mostly attributable to projected increases in harvests by longline\ncatcher/processors, which would harvest an additional 55,700 mt (70.2 percent) of Pacific cod. This fleet would\n3Future crab harvests in the BSAI are expected to be smaller than amounts harvested in 1998 and 1999, and\ntherefore the increase in total exvessel value for Pacific cod by vessel would likely exceed this projection.\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-87","increase its harvests of all of the other classes of groundfish species, and the most significant increase would\noccur in harvest of the Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish species complex-an increase\nof 5,600 mt (68.4 percent). This fleet's harvests are projected to result in an increase of $42.2 million\n(51.0 percent) of added output value. Pot catcher/processors also are projected to increase their harvest of all\ngroundfish species groups, with the only significant increase in Pacific cod harvests: 4,100 mt (80.6 percent).\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors are projected to have a slight increase in wholesale value of harvests. This rise\nwould occur because of an increase of 4,400 mt (1 percent) in pollock harvests and despite minor projected\ndeclines in harvests of all other groundfish species classes. Fillet trawl catcher/processors are projected to\nexperience a decline of 10,100 mt of Pacific cod and declines of approximately 500 mt of species in the Atka\nmackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish complex and flatfish. These declines would result in a\nprojected decline of wholesale value of output of $5.8 million (8.3 percent) for this fleet. Head-and-gut trawl\ncatcher/processors are projected to experience a decline of $17.5 million (11.2 percent) in wholesale value of\noutputs, the greatest decline of any vessel class. This decline incorporates projected declines in harvests of\npollock, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel of 5,800 mt, 13,600 mt, and 13,600 mt, respectively.\nThe number of persons employed on catcher/processors is projected to rise by 7.1 percent to 2,240 under this\nalternative. The rise is attributable to projected rises in employment on longline catcher/processors of 227\npersons and on pot catchers/processors of 20 persons. These increases more than offset the loss of 91 jobs on\nhead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors and 11 jobs on Fillet trawl catcher/processors. Payments to employment,\nwhich parallel wholesale value, would increase by 4.0 percent or $9.1 million. This increase incorporates a\nprojected increase in payments to labor on longline catcher/processors of $16.9 million, which more than\ncompensates for declines in payments to labor projected to occur on head-and-gut trawl catcher/processors and\nfillet trawl catcher/processors.\nImpacts of Alternative 5 on the Inshore Processing and Mothership Sector\nAlternative 5 proposes eliminating the bottom trawl Pacific cod, pollock, rockfish, and sablefish fisheries and\nreplacing these fisheries with pelagic trawl and fixed-gear fisheries; decreasing TACs for target species in the\nremaining bottom trawl fisheries; and reallocating halibut vessel limits between trawl and fixed-gear to allow\nfor the reallocation of groundfish catch from the trawl to the fixed-gear fisheries. Replacement of bottom trawl\nrockfish fisheries with pelagic trawl fisheries and additional year-round area closures was not addressed in the\nmodel.\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants and Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants would experience\nthe greatest adverse impacts from this alternative. In contrast, reported tons would increase for southcentral\nAlaska inshore plants.\nAlternative 5 would not reduce pollock TACs. As a result, there would be minimal change in pollock harvests\nand reported tons. The reported tons of pollock would decline from 747,600 mt to 746,200 mt, a reduction of\nabout 1,400 mt (Table 4.8-92). The impact on reported tons would be greater for other species groups. Bering\nSea pollock inshore plants and Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants would lose about 56 and\n61 percent, respectively, of their total reported tons of Pacific cod. Reported tons of Pacific cod would decrease\nby about 35,000 mt for those two processor groups. In contrast, reported tons of Pacific cod for southcentral\nAlaska inshore plants would increase by 2,900 mt, a gain of about 79 percent. The gain for southcentral Alaska\ninshore plants can be attributed primarily to reallocation of groundfish harvests to fixed-gear vessels from trawl\nvessels, and to the dominant role of fixed-gear catcher vessels in the volume of groundfish delivered to this\nprocessor group. For processor groups other than southcentral Alaska inshore plants, the reductions in trawl\ndeliveries would not be offset by increased fixed-gear harvests.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-88","Groundfish wholesale value would decline by about $35 million, with Bering Sea pollock inshore plants losing\n$18 million and Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants losing $17.1 million. These reductions\nare about 5 and 26.6 percent, respectively, of the groundfish wholesale value under Alternative 1. Kodiak\ninshore plants would experience reductions of about 8.1 percent. Wholesale values would increase by\n17 percent for southcentral Alaska inshore plants, but would decrease slightly for southeast Alaska inshore\nplants (less than 1 percent).\nTotal exvessel payments would decline about 2 percent, with Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore\nplants incurring a reduction of about 7 percent. Bering Sea pollock inshore plants and Kodiak inshore plants\nwould experience reductions in exvessel value of 4.3 and 1.4 percent, respectively. Total exvessel payments\nby southcentral Alaska inshore plants would increase by 3 percent, even though total groundfish production\nvalue would increase by about 17 percent. This smaller percentage increase reflects the lower dependence on\ngroundfish by southcentral Alaska inshore plants.\nDistribution of payments to labor is the same as wholesale production value because payments to labor for\ninshore plants and motherships are set at 30 percent of wholesale production value.\nTotal sector employment would decline from 3,182 under Alternative 1 to 2,858, a loss of 324 employees, or\n10 percent. Bering Sea pollock inshore plants would lose about 190 of these jobs, and Alaska Peninsula and\nAleutian Islands inshore plants would lose about 150. The increase in groundfish-related employment for\nsouthcentral Alaska inshore plants offsets part of the employment reduction for westward processors.\nImpacts of Alternative 5 on Communities and Regions\nTable 4.8-93 shows regional impacts that would be created by processing operations on North Pacific\ngroundfish under Alternative 5. Table 4.8-94 shows regional impacts that would be created by catcher vessels\nthat harvest North Pacific groundfish under Alternative 5.\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands. Total regional groundfish processing employment and payments to\nlabor would decline by 14 and 8 percent, respectively. Processing volume of pollock would remain about the\nsame, while cod would decline by 58 percent, flats by 56 percent, and Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and\nother groundfish by 16 percent. Total groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value at groundfish processors\nwould decline by 5 percent. Regionally owned groundfish catcher vessel harvest value for groundfish (primarily\nGOA bottom trawl) would decline by 38 percent, and overall exvessel value of fish harvested (revenue flow)\nwould decline by 17 percent. Regional fish tax revenues from groundfish processors would decline by about\n7 percent. Potential adverse impacts are significant and reflect regional dynamics and trends. Regionally owned\ngroundfish catcher vessels would be especially affected.\nKodiak Island. Total groundfish processing employment and payments to labor would decrease by 5 and\n4 percent, respectively. Inshore processing volumes would decline most for Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish,\nand other groundfish and flatfish, at 27 and 26 percent, respectively. Cod would decline by 6 percent and\npollock would decline by 1 percent. Groundfish exvessel value would decrease by 3 percent, and total\ngroundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value at groundfish processors would decline by 1 percent. Regionally\nowned processors would gain 8 percent of groundfish volume and 12 percent of groundfish product value\n(primarily at-sea non-pollock). For regionally owned groundfish catcher vessels, BSAI and GOA harvest\nvolumes would increase, and total groundfish harvest value would increase by 9 percent. Total groundfish\nand\nnon-groundfish harvest value would increase by 5 percent. Regional impacts would be a more depressed\nprocessing sector, reduced fish tax receipts, and some shifting fisheries for local groundfish catcher vessels.\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-89","Southcentral Alaska. Total groundfish processing employment and payments to labor would increase\nsignificantly (17 and 6 percent, respectively), as would processor volumes of cod, Atka mackerel, rockfish,\nsablefish, and other groundfish, and pollock (78, 6, and 5 percent). Total inshore groundfish processor exvessel\nvalue would increase by 8 percent and total inshore groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value would\nincrease by 3 percent, reflecting increased non-trawl deliveries to local shore plants. For regionally owned\nprocessors, total groundfish exvessel value would decline by 5 percent. For regionally owned groundfish catcher\nvessels, total groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value would increase by approximately 9 percent.\nRegional impacts would be positive, reflecting the current non-trawl nature of the groundfish fishery in the\nregion.\nSoutheast Alaska. Groundfish regional processing employment and payments to labor, and processing volumes\nand exvessel values for regionally owned processors, would increase significantly. This change reflects at-sea\nprocessors using non-trawl gear, as regional inshore processors would process fewer groundfish (especially\nflats) although their overall loss of exvessel value processed would be less than 1 percent. Numbers are\nrelatively small. For regionally owned groundfish catcher vessels, groundfish exvessel value would increase by\n2 percent, and the total groundfish and non-groundfish value would increase by 1 percent.\nWashington Inland Waters. Total regional groundfish processing employment and payments to labor would\nincrease by 5 and 3 percent, respectively. Volume and value would each decline by 1 percent. These impacts\nwould result from redistribution in the at-sea sector. For the regionally owned groundfish catcher fleet,\npayments to labor and groundfish exvessel value would each decline by 4 percent, and total groundfish and non-\ngroundfish exvessel value would decrease by 3 percent. Impacts to the regional economy would be muted by\nthe size of the region. Impacts would be pronounced for some enterprises, some industrial sectors would grow\nand others would contract.\nOregon Coast. No impacts related to inshore or offshore processors would occur in this region. For catcher\nvessels, payments to labor and exvessel value of Alaska groundfish harvest would be reduced by 28 percent,\nand overall exvessel value would drop by 22 percent. This loss of revenue would almost certainly reduce income\nand have other, indirect consequences. Regional impacts would be significant.\n4.8.7.6\nImpacts of Alternative 6 on Industry Sectors and on Communities and Regions\nAlternative 6 is subdivided into two distinct alternative regimes to increase socioeconomic benefits. The broad\npolicy objectives of the Alternative 6.1 model regime are (1) increase the long-term net economic benefits from\nthe commercial groundfish fisheries to those who harvest and process groundfish, to the associated fishing\ncommunities, and to those who consume groundfish seafood products; (2) prevent preemption of one sector or\nfishing community by another; and (3) maintain or increase levels of protection for protected species, target\nspecies, non-target species, and their habitat. The much narrower policy objective of the Alternative 6.2 model\nregime is to increase the short-term net economic benefits from the commercial groundfish fisheries to those who\nharvest and process groundfish, to the associated fishing communities, and to those who consume groundfish\nseafood products by allowing a substantially more aggressive harvest strategy. We recognize that actions taken\nto meet the narrower policy objective may be counterproductive with respect to meeting the broader policy\nobjective.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.1 on Industry Sectors and on Communities and Regions\nThe intent of Alternative 6.1 is to enhance the ability of fishing and processing operations to optimize costs and\nrevenues while maintaining protections for marine fishery resources, marine mammals, and the marine\nenvironment. Alternative 6.1 proposes a rights-based management program for Alaska groundfish fisheries and\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-90","could involve IFQs, cooperatives, and community fishery quotas. The experience with halibut and sablefish\nIFQs and the pollock cooperatives suggests that reduced bycatch would enable greater catches of target species.\nThe model anticipates that bycatch would be reduced by 20 percent with a rights-based program. Because\nmodel constraints limit the expansion of target species harvests that might occur with reduced bycatch,\nprojections are likely to understate potential benefits of moving further toward right-based management.\nFurthermore, the model does not attempt to capture the potential benefits of increased retention, product\nrecovery rates, cost savings, or improved product quality, all of which would lead to increased exvessel values,\nproduct values and payments to labor.\nTable 4.8-95 summarizes projected impacts on fishing and processing sectors of indicators that were included\nin the model. The additional 25,500 mt of flatfish harvest by catcher/processors is the only significant change\nin groundfish harvests. This change accounts for increases of almost 12 percent in flatfish harvests and\n$23.7 million (2 percent) in wholesale value of groundfish outputs. Payments to labor would increase by\n$9.6 million (less than 2 percent), with a slight overall increase in employment.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.1 on the Catcher Vessel Sector\nTable 4.8-96 summarizes impacts of Alternative 6.1 on catcher vessels. In general, the outcomes appear nearly\nidentical to those projected under Alternative 1. No significant changes for catcher vessels are projected, at least\nin the variables for which changes are captured by the projection model. Most of the impacts for catcher vessels\nwould occur in variables such as operating costs that have not been tracked in the analysis and in changes in\nexvessel prices, which are not included in the model.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.1 on the Catcher/Processor Sector\nTable 4.8-97 shows projected impacts of Alternative 6.1 on the catcher/processor sector. It is important to note\nthat only those indicators included in the projection model are estimated. Expected changes in costs, product\nprices, utilization rates, product forms, and other indicators were not quantifiable.\nThe value of wholesale outputs for the catcher/processor sector would increase by 3.9 percent, from\n$594.0 million under Alternative 1 to $617.7 million under Alternative 6.1. This increase is wholly a result of\nincreases in output value of head-and-gut trawl catcher/processors, projected to rise by $9.3 million\n(14.9 percent). This rise is primarily a result of an increase of flatfish harvests of 26,900 mt (17.8 percent).\nAn increase of 1,700 mt (5.1 percent) of Pacific cod is also projected for this vessel class. Surimi trawl\ncatcher/processors would increase pollock harvests by less than 1,000 mt. This increase does not increase\nwholesale value of output, as slight declines (all less than 1,000 mt) in other groundfish species are projected\nfor these vessels. Fillet trawl catcher/processors would experience a similar rise in pollock harvests, slightly\nmore than offset by declines in harvests of other groundfish species. The result is an insignificant decline in\nwholesale output value of approximately $0.2 million. Longline catcher/processors would reduce pollock, Atka\nmackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish, and flatfish harvests by 500, 2,000, and 500 mt,\nrespectively, and increase Pacific cod harvests by 100 mt. The changes result in a decrease in wholesale value\nof harvests of $0.3 million (0.4 percent). Pot catcher/processors would reduce harvests of all groundfish\nspecies slightly, with no measurable change in output values.\nEmployment on catcher/processors participating in groundfish fisheries would increase by 2.7 percent compared\nto the status quo. This increase is entirely accounted for by an increase in employment on head-and-gut trawl\ncatcher/processors of 62 persons. Decreases of two positions on surimi trawl catcher/processors and three\npositions on longline catcher/processors would offset some of those gains. Payments to labor on head-and-gut\ntrawl catcher/processors are projected to increase by $9.3 million (14 percent). This change, together with\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-91","projected decreases in payments to labor of $0.1 million on Fillet trawl catcher/processors and on longline\ncatcher/processors, results in an overall increase in payments to labor of $9.2 million (4 percent).\nImpacts of Alternative 6.1 on the Inshore Processing and Mothership Sector\nFor inshore processors and motherships, Alternative 6.1 is predicted to have only minor impacts on the\nindicators that were included in the projection model. Expected changes in costs, product prices, utilization rates,\nproduct forms, and other indicators were not quantifiable. As shown in Table 4.8-98, the projected total\nexvessel value of all groundfish inputs to these processors is $546.7 million, $0.3 million greater than projected\nunder Alternative 1. Similarly, the groundfish wholesale value of outputs of processors is projected to rise by\n$0.8 million, an increase of less than 1 percent of the Alternative 1 projected level. Bering Sea pollock inshore\nplants are projected to experience decreases of pollock, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and\nother groundfish species of less than 1,000 mt each. Flatfish processed by these plants are projected to decline\nby 1,300 mt. The minimal impact of these changes is apparent, as exvessel value of inputs is projected to\ndecrease by only $0.4 million and wholesale value of outputs is projected to decline by $0.2 million.\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants are projected to experience changes of even smaller\nmagnitude, with each groundfish species group projected to decline by less than 500 mt. Kodiak inshore plants,\nsouthcentral Alaska inshore plants, and southeast Alaska inshore plants are all projected to experience declines\nin pollock, Pacific cod, and flatfish of 0.3 mt or less for each species group. Kodiak inshore plants are projected\nto increase species in the Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish complex by approximately\n500 mt, while levels of these species processed by southcentral Alaska inshore plants and southeast Alaska\ninshore plants are projected to remain constant. These changes in inputs are projected to increase the exvessel\nvalue of inputs to southcentral Alaska inshore plants and southeast Alaska inshore plants by $0.6 million and\n$0.4 million, respectively, and to increase wholesale values of output by $0.5 million and $0.3 million,\nrespectively. Motherships are projected to increase inputs of pollock by approximately 300 mt, while Pacific\ncod, Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish species, and flatfish are projected to decline by\nless than 200 mt each. These changes are projected to change the exvessel value of inputs and wholesale value\nof outputs by less than $0.2 million. In all cases, the differences between this alternative and the base alternative\nare too small to be regarded as significant.\nEmployment under this alternative is projected to decline by 10 positions in comparison to the base alternative.\nThe decline is attributable to projected losses of seven positions at Bering Sea pollock inshore plants, two\npositions at Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants, and one position at southeast Alaska inshore\nplants. Payments to labor, on the other hand, are projected to rise by less than $0.8 million, mostly as a result\nof a rise in payments to labor of $0.5 million at southcentral Alaska inshore plants. As with other projections\nunder this alternative, these changes are too small to be regarded as significant.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.1 on Communities and Regions\nTable 4.8-99 shows regional impacts that would be created by processing operations on North Pacific\ngroundfish under Alternative 6.1. Table 4.8-100 shows regional impacts that would be created by catcher\nvessels that harvest North Pacific groundfish under Alternative 6.1. It is important to reiterate that the model\nused to estimate impacts of this alternative did not capture many of the expected changes, primarily in the areas\nof cost savings, changes in output prices, or productivity gains. These potential changes were not quantifiable.\nThe net impact of these expected changes on communities and regions is uncertain.\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands. No significant impacts related to inshore or offshore processors would\noccur in this region. Some costs would be imposed by the need to adjust operations to meet new management\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-92","requirements, but impacts should be minimal. For regionally owned groundfish catcher vessels, exvessel value\nof Alaska groundfish harvest would decline by 1 percent and overall exvessel value would decline by less than\n1 percent. Impacts should be minimal and would be related to the reorganization of the fishery.\nKodiak Island. No significant impacts related to inshore processors would occur in this region. Slightly\npositive impacts are indicated by increased processing volume and output value of about 7 percent for regionally\nowned at-sea facilities. Employment and payments to labor may be increased slightly. Overall, impacts would\nbe neutral. The primary source of socioeconomic impacts would arise from decisions made on how to\nimplement the alternative.\nSouthcentral Alaska. No significant impacts related to inshore processors would occur in this region. Some\nslight positive impacts for regionally owned at-sea facilities are indicated by increased processing volume and\nexvessel value of about 5 and 7 percent, respectively. Employment and payments to labor may be somewhat\nincreased. Overall, impacts would be neutral. Impacts on regionally owned groundfish catcher vessels would\nbe relatively neutral. The primary source of socioeconomic impacts would arise from decisions on how to\nimplement the alternative.\nSoutheast Alaska. No significant impacts related to inshore or offshore processors, or to catcher vessels, would\noccur in this region. Such possible changes as are indicated are of such small magnitude that the alternative is\nneutral concerning the regional fishing industry. The primary source of socioeconomic impacts would arise from\ndecisions about how to implement the alternative.\nWashington Inland Water. Employment and payments to labor, and processing volume and exvessel value,\nwould all increase slightly for regionally owned processing facilities (at-sea sector). The alternative is neutral\nis relation to regionally owned groundfish catcher vessels. The primary source of socioeconomic impacts would\narise from decisions made on how to implement the alternative.\nOregon Coast. No significant impacts related to inshore or offshore processors would occur in this region.\nFor catcher vessels, the alternative is essentially neutral. Such changes as indicated are of such small magnitude\nas to be speculative. The primary source of socioeconomic impacts would arise from decisions made on how\nto implement the alternative.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.2 on Industry Sectors and on Communities and Regions\nAlternative 6.2 demonstrates the level of fishing and processing impacts that could occur by setting TACs for\nall species at levels that represent overfishing, and eliminating PSC constraints.\nTable 4.8-101 summarizes the impacts of Alternative 6.2 on fishing and processing sectors. Groundfish outputs\nare projected to increase in value by $250 million (20.7 percent) under this alternative. The alternative is\nprojected to increases harvests in all species, with increases ranging from 17,7 percent for Pacific cod to\n29.7 percent for flatfish. The pollock harvests are projected to increase by 19.1 percent (250,400 mt). All three\nsectors are projected to see improved conditions, at least in the short-run from 2001 to 2005, under the\nalternative. The output value of catcher vessels and inshore processors and motherships would increase by\n17.5 percent, while catcher/processor output value would increase by 24.1 percent. Projected increases for\ncatcher/processors are greater than for other sectors because they traditionally have processed a greater share\nof flatfish and species in the Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish complex. Overall,\npayments to labor are projected to increase by $116.4 million (20.2 percent), while employment on\ncatcher/processors and motherships and inshore processors are projected to increase by approximately 912\npositions.\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-93","Impacts of Alternative 6.2 on the Catcher Vessel Sector\nUnder Alternative 6.2, exvessel value of groundfish harvests by catcher vessels is predicted to increase by\napproximately $48 million (or 17 percent) over the base case (Table 4.8-102). Large catcher vessels are\npredicted to obtain most of the benefit of this increase, with the two categories of AFA-qualified trawler catcher\nvessels predicted to obtain almost two-thirds of the increase (or approximately $31 million combined) through\nmore than 125,000 tons increased harvests of pollock. With the exception of trawl catcher vessel less than 60\nft, all classes of catcher vessels are predicted to increase exvessel value of harvests by more than 10 percent.\nTrawl catcher vessel less than 60 ft are expected to experience a 1,200-ton decline in Pacific cod harvests. The\ndecline is a result of much higher overall catches of flatfish in the GOA, which have relatively high levels of\nPacific cod bycatch, thereby decreasing the amount of Pacific cod available for the trawl target fishery. Other\ntrawl vessels in the GOA are more likely to target flatfish, and therefore make up for lower targeted harvests\nwith bycatch.\nFixed-gear catcher vessel less than or equal to 32 ft are predicted to have the highest percentage increase in\nexvessel value of harvests, but because this vessel class has limited involvement in groundfish fisheries, its\nincrease would be less than $1 million (or less than 10 percent of that fleet's total exvessel value of harvests).\nHarvests of all species by catcher vessels are projected to increase under this alternative, but pollock harvest\nincreases would be the largest by far. Pollock harvests are predicted to increase by 141,000 mt, and harvests\nof all other species groups are predicted to increase by less than 10,000 mt each.\nPayments to labor are predicted to increase by almost $20 million under this alternative. The majority of this\nincrease is predicted to come through payments made by the two fleets of AFA-qualified vessels, which each\nwould increase payments to labor by more than $5 million. Other classes of large vessels (including trawl\ncatcher vessel 60 ft, longline catcher vessel, and fixed-gear catcher vessel 33 ft to 59 ft) are predicted to\nincrease payments to labor by more than $1 million.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.2 on the Catcher/Processor Sector\nUnder Alternative 6.2, the value of groundfish harvests by catcher/processors, as shown in Table 4.8-103, is\npredicted to increase by $143.4 million (approximately 24 percent) over the base case. The projected increase\nin output values is a result of predicted increases in harvest tonnage of all groundfish species. Harvests of\npollock are predicted to rise by more than 100,000 tons (19 percent), and approximately three-quarters of this\nincrease is predicted to be harvested by surimi trawl catcher/processors. Flatfish harvests are predicted to\nincrease by approximately 50,000 tons (31 percent), with about 48,000 tons (almost 90 percent) of this increase\nharvested by head-and-gut trawl catcher/processors. Harvests of Pacific cod and species in the Atka mackerel,\nrockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish group are predicted to rise by approximately 30,000 tons (23 percent)\nand 35,000 tons (28 percent), respectively. A large majority of increase in harvest tonnage of Pacific cod is\npredicted to be shared by head-and-gut trawl catcher/processors and longline catcher/processors, while the\nincrease in harvests of species in the Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish group is predicted\nto be taken mostly by head-and-gut trawl catcher/processors.\nAll catcher/processor vessel types are predicted to increase revenues between 18 and 35 percent under this\nalternative. Surimi trawl catcher/processors and head-and-gut trawl catcher/processors account for more than\ntwo-thirds of the increase in output value, each increasing its output value by more than $50 million. Pot\ncatcher/processors are predicted to increase output value by only $1 million, a 23 percent increase for this fleet.\nPayments to labor under Alternative 6.2 are predicted to increase by approximately $55 million (24 percent).\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors are predicted to have the greatest increase in payments to labor,\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-94","$22.2 million (35 percent), while Surimi trawl catcher/processors are predicted to increase payments to labor\nby $17.8 million (or 18 percent). Almost 500 new positions are predicted to be created by this alternative.\nAlmost half of these jobs would be on head-and-gut trawl catcher/processors. Surimi trawl catcher/processors\nand longline catcher/processors would add 118 positions and 86 positions, respectively.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.2 on Inshore Processors and Motherships\nAlternative 6.2 would result in significant increases in groundfish production for the inshore processing and\nmothership sector. Total projected tons of groundfish would increase by about 143,800 mt, with pollock\naccounting for about 93,800 mt of the increase (Table 4.8-104). Total reported tons of groundfish under this\nalternative are estimated at 1,050,000 mt, compared to 887,500 mt under Alternative 1. Pollock volumes would\nincrease by about 18 percent for the Bering Sea pollock inshore plants and motherships, ranging as high as\n26 percent for Kodiak inshore plants.\nThe volume of Pacific cod would increase for all processors, with the exception of Pacific cod delivered to\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants. The increases in Pacific cod deliveries would range from\nabout 100 mt for motherships to 4,400 mt for Bering Sea pollock inshore plants. The 400 mt decrease in Pacific\ncod delivered to Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants is a primarily result of higher bycatch\namounts of Pacific cod in GOA flatfish fisheries. Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants would\nhave the lowest percentage of increase among the inshore and mothership processors for flatfish and Atka\nmackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish volumes, with gains of about 3 percent and 14 percent\nrespectively. In contrast, Kodiak inshore plants would have increases of about 22 percent for species in the Atka\nmackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish group, and southeast Alaska inshore plants would have\nincreases in flatfish volumes of about 42 percent.\nThe wholesale production value would increase for inshore plants and motherships. The increased wholesale\nproduction value for Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands inshore plants would be about 11 percent, but other\nareas and motherships would experience increases in the range of 17 to 20 percent. Distribution of payments\nto labor is the same as wholesale production value because payments to labor for inshore plants and motherships\nare set at 30 percent of wholesale production value.\nTotal employment in this sector would increase from 182 to about 3,720, a gain of 538 employees. Bering Sea\npollock inshore plants would gain about 345 of these jobs and Kodiak inshore plants would gain about 81.\nThe percentage gain of employees would be greatest for southcentral Alaska inshore plants, an increase of about\n23 percent in total employment.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.2 on Communities and Regions\nTable 4.8-105 shows regional impacts that would be created by processing operations on North Pacific\ngroundfish under Alternative 6.2. Table 4.8-106 shows regional impacts that would be created by catcher\nvessels that harvest BSAI and GOA groundfish under Alternative 6.2. Processors within each region that have\nnot taken deliveries of groundfish are not included in the analysis.\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands. Positive impacts related to inshore and offshore processors would\naccrue to this region. Employment and payments to labor would increase by about 15 to 17 percent, and\nregional processing value for groundfish would increase by about the same amount. Local fish tax revenues\nwould increase. For regionally owned groundfish catcher vessels, the exvessel value of the Alaskan groundfish\nharvest would increase by about 4 percent and overall exvessel value would increase by less than 2 percent.\nPresent regional capacity (which was built up during race-for-fish conditions) could handle these increases, SO\nJanuary 2001\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\n4.8-95","little or no associated socioeconomic effects (such as increased population or demand for infrastructure) would\nbe expected.\nKodiak Island. Positive impacts related to groundfish processors would accrue to this region, with increases\nin employment and payments to labor increasing by more than 20 percent. The exvessel value of groundfish\nlanded would increase by about 17 percent, while the increase for total groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel\nvalue would be about half of that. Gains by regionally owned processors would be in the 30 percent range for\nboth volume and product value of groundfish Local fish tax revenues would increase. For regionally owned\ngroundfish catcher vessels, harvest volumes would increase by 17 to 21 percent. Groundfish exvessel value\nwould also fall within this range, while overall increase in exvessel value for groundfish and non-groundfish\ncombined would be about half that amount. Present regional capacity could absorb all anticipated increases.\nSouthcentral Alaska. Positive impacts would accrue to regional groundfish processing operations, with\nincreases in employment and payments to labor increasing by about 25 percent. Total groundfish exvessel value\nwould increase by 20 percent, while overall exvessel value of groundfish and non-groundfish combined would\nincrease by 7 percent. For regionally owned groundfish catcher vessels, positive impacts would also occur\nacross the board. Groundfish harvest volumes and values would increase in the range of 14 to 19 percent,\ndepending on the area, and overall groundfish and non-groundfish exvessel value combined would increase by\n6 percent. Present regional capacity could absorb all anticipated increases.\nSoutheast Alaska. Positive impacts would occur across the board for regional groundfish processing\noperations. Employment and payments to labor would increase by 20 percent or slightly more, while groundfish\nlandings value would increase by 17 percent. Total groundfish and non-groundfish landings exvessel value\nwould increase by about 5 percent. For regionally owned groundfish catcher vessels, harvest volume increases\nwould be concentrated in the GOA, the total value of groundfish harvested would increase by about 18 percent,\nand total exvessel value of the harvest of groundfish and non-groundfish would increase by about 8 percent.\nWashington Inland Water. Employment and payments to labor for processing operations would increase by\napproximately 22 percent, but few additional employees would be required. Similarly, volume and value of\ngroundfish processed by regionally owned entities would increase by about 20 percent, but could be absorbed\nby the present industry capacity. These are large increases in an already large industry segment, SO the positive\neconomic impacts would be substantial. Similarly, for regionally owned groundfish catcher vessels, payments\nto labor and harvest volumes in Alaska would increase in the 18 to 20 percent range. The exvessel value of\nAlaska groundfish landings would increase by 18 percent, while the total for groundfish and non-groundfish\nwould increase by about 14 percent.\nOregon Coast. No impacts related to inshore or offshore processor would accrue to this region. For groundfish\ncatcher vessels, potential impacts are uniformly positive, with Alaska groundfish harvest volume and exvessel\nvalue increasing by 14 to 23 percent, depending on the region. Overall exvessel value for groundfish and non-\ngroundfish combined would increase by 12 percent.\nImpacts of Alternative 6.2 on the Catcher/Processor Sector\nUnder Alternative 6.2, the value of groundfish harvests by catcher/processors, as shown in Table 4.8-103, is\npredicted to increase by $143.4 million (approximately 24 percent) over the base case. The projected increase\nin output values is a result of predicted increases in harvest tonnage of all groundfish species. Harvests of\npollock are predicted to rise by more than 100,000 mt (19 percent), and approximately three-quarters of this\nincrease is predicted to be harvested by surimi trawl catcher/processors. Flatfish harvests are predicted to\nincrease by approximately 50,000 mt (31 percent), with about 48,000 mt (almost 90 percent) of this increase\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-96","harvested by Head-and-gut trawl catcher/processors. Harvests of Pacific cod and species in the Atka mackerel,\nrockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish group are predicted to rise by approximately 30,000 mt (23 percent)\nand 35,000 mt (28 percent), respectively. A large majority of increase in harvest tonnage of Pacific cod is\npredicted to be shared by Head-and-gut trawl catcher/processors and longline catcher/processors, while the\nincrease in harvests of species in the Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish group is predicted\nto be taken mostly by head-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nEffects of the Proposed Alternatives on Subsistence Use of Marine Resources\n4.8.8\nThis section addresses the potential effects of the proposed alternatives on subsistence use of marine resources.\nFor purposes of this analysis, relevant resources fall into three categories of species that may be affected by\nmanagement of the groundfish fishery. These categories are groundfish, salmon, and Steller sea lions.\nConclusions about effects on these three species categories are summarized briefly below. As the summary\nindicates, detailed analysis of effects on groundfish subsistence was deemed unnecessary. For salmon and Steller\nsea lions, subsequent sections describe documented historical subsistence use of the resource and summarize\nthe potential effects of the proposed alternatives on such use.\nPotential effects on groundfish subsistence use. There is a relatively low level of subsistence activity\nassociated with groundfish species targeted for commercial harvest. There are no indications that\ncommercial harvest activity is adversely affecting groundfish-specific subsistence activities that do occur.\nGiven this current pattern, and the relationship of harvest levels proposed under the various alternatives to\nthose allowed under the status quo, the potential direct and indirect (bycatch) effects of any of the proposed\nalternatives on subsistence use of groundfish resources will be insignificant.\nPotential effects on subsistence salmon fisheries due to salmon bycatch in the commercial groundfish\nfisheries. Present levels of salmon bycatch in groundfish fisheries have had negligible effects on subsistence\nsalmon fisheries. None of the proposed alternatives will result in salmon bycatch levels that will have\nsignificant positive or negative effects on subsistence salmon fisheries. More details on the effects of the\ngroundfish management alternatives on subsistence salmon fisheries are found in Section 4.8.8.1\nPotential effects of commercial groundfish fisheries on subsistence use of Steller sea lions. Impacts to\nSteller sea lion subsistence use are less straightforward. The subsistence harvest of Steller sea lions has\ndeclined steadily and significantly since 1992, at the same time that the overall population of Steller sea\nlions was also declining. However, the relationship between the two is not clear. Furthermore, the\nconnection between commercial groundfish fisheries and the decline in Steller sea lion population is also\nnot clear. Both of these relationships are important for assessing the potential effects of the proposed\nalternatives on the subsistence use of Steller sea lions. If current levels of groundfish fishing are causing\na significant decline in Steller sea lion population, the fisheries could be contributing indirectly to, if not\ncausing, the declining trend in subsistence harvest and use of Steller sea lion that has occurred in recent\nyears. The magnitude of this contribution would then depend on the relationship between the population\nof Steller sea lions and the subsistence harvest of that population. Thus, to the extent that a proposed action\npotentially increases the Steller sea lion population, it will have neutral to positive effects on the subsistence\nuse of that resource. The magnitude of the effect would depend on the increase in the Steller sea lion\npopulation and the strength of the relationship between the overall Steller sea lion population and the\nsubsistence harvest from that population. Similarly, if Alternative 6.2, which would increase groundfish\nfishing levels, has potential negative effects on the Steller sea lion population, it would have neutral to\nnegative effects on the subsistence use of Steller sea lions. More precise judgments are not possible, given\nthe quality and quantity of information available, although qualitatively it is probable that subsistence\nharvest levels will not be significantly changed by the projected potential changes in the Steller sea lion\nChapter 4 - Draft Programmatic SEIS\nJanuary 2001\n4.8-97","population resulting from the proposed alternatives. This rather complex argument is presented in\nsomewhat more detail in Section 4.8.8.2.\n4.8.8.1\nPotential Salmon Bycatch Effects\nThis section, discusses the bycatch estimates and projections developed earlier in this document, presents the\nrecent historical commercial and subsistence harvest of salmon in Alaska by region, and assesses the potential\neffects of the proposed alternatives on Alaskan subsistence salmon fisheries. The overall conclusion is that\nsignificant impacts on subsistence salmon harvests are unlikely, due to the small size of salmon bycatch relative\nto the total documented consumptive harvest for each salmon stock, and the priority given to subsistence\nconsumptive use over commercial harvest.\nSalmon bycatch estimates in terms of historical commercial catch for Alaska salmon fisheries by region are\ndiscussed in detail in Section 4.6.1.4. Those bycatch estimates and projections are not repeated here, but are\nincorporated by reference. The analysis in Section 4.6.1.4 is also largely applicable to the current analysis\nbecause the addition of subsistence catch to commercial catch decreases the potential adverse effects of salmon\nbycatch. That analysis indicated that the two main fisheries of concern are the western Alaska4 chinook-and-\nchum salmon fisheries and this analysis focuses on those two fisheries. Most of the salmon caught as bycatch\nin the groundfish fisheries are chinook or chum, and Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim Region chinook-and-chum are\nthe most depressed stocks at present.\nTable 4.8-107 presents the estimated commercial and subsistence catch for Alaska salmon fisheries by region\nfor 1997 and 1998. 5 Both commercial and subsistence data are presented rather than subsistence data only,\nbecause any reductions due to groundfish bycatch will affect commercial users before subsistence uses, both\nstate and federal regulation give subsistence use a priority in times of shortage. In Section 4.6.1.4, it was\nestimated that the BSAI chinook bycatch of western Alaskan origin would range from 23,000 to 32,000 fish for\nAlternative 1 (the status quo) in each of the next 5 years, without the proposed reduction in chinook salmon\nprohibited species caps. This estimate represents 10 to 25 percent of western Alaska commercial chinook\nsalmon landings for 1997-1999, but only about 5 to 8 percent of the combined commercial and subsistence\nlandings for 1997-1998 (1999 subsistence estimates are not yet available).\nHowever, given that the bycatch estimates are, at best, very rough and dependent on a number of assumptions,\nand that the subsistence harvest estimates are also uncertain, the use of data in Table 4.8-107 for comparative\npurposes should be considered general rather than a precise indicator. The bycatch assumptions especially tend\nto overestimate the contribution of depressed chinook (and chum and salmon) stocks to bycatch, since the only\nbycatch stock composition information is from periods of relatively high population levels of those stocks.\nWhile bycatch of about 5 to 8 percent of the consumptive harvest of the western Alaska chinook salmon fishery\nis not insignificant, it is not likely to affect the subsistence use of this resource.\nAlternatives that would reduce total groundfish harvests in general would reduce chinook salmon bycatch by\nsome amount. While such bycatch reduction may be a worthwhile goal and could have a positive effect on\nsubsistence use, even complete elimination of salmon bycatch in the groundfish fishery may have little or no\neffect on subsistence uses. Not all fish saved from bycatch would survive to enter the river system, and not all\nthat survive would be caught. The numbers saved relative to the number usually harvested, within the context\n4Western Alaska is defined as the Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim region plus Bristol Bay.\nSTTE documented historical catch does not represent current use-the Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim commercial\nand subsistence chinook-and-chum salmon fisheries have been closed for the year 2000, and harvest was zero.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.8-98","of large variations in run size and unknown ocean survival rates, make any positive effects of these alternatives\non subsistence highly speculative. Similarly, while Alternative 6.2 would increase groundfish harvests and\ntherefore potentially increase chinook salmon bycatch to some degree, it would probably have few if any effects\non subsistence, unless such bycatch had implications for the biological viability of the fish population.\nFor the western Alaska chum salmon fishery, estimates in Section 4.6.4.1 show that for Alternative 1, chum\nsalmon bycatch in BSAI fisheries originating from western Alaska stocks would range from 11,000 to 13,000\nfish in the next 5 years. That amount is less than 2 percent of the historical western Alaska commercial chum\nsalmon harvest, and more than 1 percent of the combined historical commercial and subsistence harvest. Such\na level of bycatch is unlikely to affect the subsistence fishery significantly. None of the other alternatives would\ndecrease or increase chum salmon bycatch enough to have a significant impact on salmon subsistence fisheries.\nPotential Steller Sea Lion Subsistence Use Effects\n4.8.8.2\nThis section first presents general descriptive information on the current methods subsistence hunters use to take\nSteller sea lions. This is followed by a discussion of recent historical subsistence harvest of Steller sea lions\nin Alaska by region. The section concludes with an assessment of the potential effects of the proposed\ngroundfish management alternatives on subsistence harvest and use of Steller sea lions. Such as assessment is\ncomplicated because of two uncertainties. First, the relationship between commercial groundfish harvests and\nthe decline in the Steller sea lion population is not known. Second, the relationship between the level of Steller\nsea lion subsistence take and the total Steller sea lion population is also not known. Thus, in a strict sense,\nnothing definitive can be said about the probable effects of the alternatives on the subsistence use of Steller sea\nlions (Table 4.8-108 and the associated text box, which discuss a matrix of potential relationships and impacts\nof groundfish and sea lion subsistence.)\nEven if one assume that the proposed alternatives do have potential effects on the population of Steller sea lions,\nit is probable that in the short-term any effects on subsistence would be small in magnitude. Even relatively\nlarge changes (20 percent) in Steller sea lion populations may not be accompanied by changes in the rate of\nsubsistence use, for the reasons discussed below. Although subsistence harvest is to some degree related to the\ntotal population (and density) of animals to be taken, other factors also affect the rate of harvest, especially at\nlow population levels. Unfortunately, little is known about these relationships, SO the threshold at which at\npopulation is no longer perceived as low is not clear, and no information exists on changes in cultural\npreferences for, and uses of, traditional foods. Thus, the possibility remains that subsistence use of sea lions\nwill increase in direct proportion to any increase in Steller sea lion population, although that does not appear\nto be the most likely case from the information available.\nSteller sea lions are taken by a number of methods throughout the year. Hunting for sea lions is a relatively\nspecialized subsistence activity, and a relatively small core of highly productive hunters from a limited number\nof households account for most of the harvest. Once harvested, sea lion is widely distributed among a much\nwider range of households (ADF&G 1999). For Kodiak Island communities, the sea lion harvest used to take\nplace at their haulouts, and 20 or 30 were transported at a time aboard purse seiners. Thus, one or two hunters\ncould supply an entire village. Currently, hunting sea lions involves two or three individuals using skiffs to hunt\nswimming sea lions in open water. The hauling capacity of such skiffs is one or two animals, and hunters\nKodiak hunters prefer to take young adults of medium size rather than large bulls or young pups. Some sea lions\nare taken from shore locations where sea lions are known to swim close to the shoreline. The animal is then\nretrieved using a skiff. Peak months for harvest are October through December (ADF&G 1991).\nMethods in the Aleutians and Pribilof Islands are documented in ADF&G 1995. Pribilof Island residents hunt\nsea lions almost exclusively from the shore and target swimming juvenile (mid-size) males. On Saint Paul Island\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.8-99","sea lion hunting is most commonly done from shore at Northeast Point, accessible by truck. Saint Paul hunters\ntake advantage of known sea lion swimways. Once shot, the hunter waits for the wind and sea to bring the\ncarcass to shore, as heavy seas generally preclude the use of a skiff. A sea dog (a retrieval device consisting\nof a piece of wood with hooks attached to a 30 to 40 ft rope) assists in this process. Not all animals are\nrecovered, but hunters try to shoot only those animals for which there is a high probability of eventual recovery.\nHunters will at times hunt from skiffs in calm weather. Sea lion hunting on Saint Paul occurs mainly from\nSeptember through May. Sea lion hunting on Saint George is similar to that of Saint Paul, being predominately\nshore-based. Harvest occurs mainly from January through May. Sea lion harvest in the Aleutian Chain (Atka,\nUnalaska, Akutan, and Nikolski) occurs mostly from skiffs in open water, and hunters target both sexes. When\nskiff travel is risky or for a change of pace, sea lion hunting is also done from concealed shore stations. Aleutian\nChain hunters will concentrate effort near haulout locations, and take more adult and female animals than do\nPribilof Island hunters. Seasonality of sea lion harvest is quite variable, and appears to be dependent on sea lion\nabundance and distribution.\nHistorical, documented subsistence harvests of Steller sea lions are shown in Tables 4.8-109 through 4.8-111,\nTable 4.8-109 identifies documented harvests for Alaska coastal communities in the most typical year for which\ninformation is available. While this information for the most part is relatively old and no longer represents\ncurrent subsistence use of the resource, it does provide the only information available on the historical and\npotential future contribution of Steller sea lion to the total subsistence pattern of use for Alaskan communities.\nTable 4.8-110 displays subsistence harvest by region for 1992 to 1998, while Table 4.8-111 provides sea lion\nharvest information for the Aleutian and Pribilof Islands and other communities for the same period. Most of\nthis information is for years when Steller sea lions were classified as threatened, before the western stock of\nSteller sea lions was reclassified as endangered in 1997. The information is drawn from several data sources.\nThe information in Table 4.8-109 is not fully consistent with data in Table 4.8-110 and 4.8-111 because of a\ngeneral lack of precision in the data. The 1992-1998 data is part of a systematic survey effort, while earlier\ninformation is derived more from specific community-based studies. More recent information on subsistence\ntake of Steller sea lions is not available, in part because NMFS did not renew its contract with ADF&G for data\ncollection after 1998. Co-management agreements among federal marine mammal regulators and subsistence\nuser groups are still in development or awaiting final approval (Loughlin 2000).\nIn a general manner, the tables illustrate the following points:\nSubsistence use of Steller sea lions is heaviest in southwest Alaska and is concentrated among relatively few\ncommunities. Any subsistence impacts to Steller sea lions would be concentrated among Alaska Native\nresidents of these communities. While subsistence use of resources other than marine mammals is generally\nopen to a broader spectrum of residents, the take of marine mammals is restricted to the Alaska Natives\nunder the terms of the MMPA.\nIn the past some communities have relied on Steller sea lions for a very significant percentage of their\noverall subsistence harvest (Atka 23 percent, Saint Paul 21 percent, Akutan 16 percent, Nikolski 14\npercent). This information is dated and current subsistence use of sea lions is almost certainly not at this\nlevel.\nTables 4.8-110 and 4.8-111 show a sharp decline in subsistence harvest for 1992-1998, years in which\nthere was also a continuing overall decline in the Steller sea lion population. Despite the lack of current data,\nit may be reasonable to assume that the trend of harvest decline has continued in recent years, in parallel\nwith the overall decline in sea lion population, but other factors may also be relevant.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-100","ADF&G has tried to address the possible linkage between the sharp decline in the overall Steller sea lion harvest\nand the steep decrease in the sea lion subsistence harvest between 1992 and 1998 (ADF&C 1997a, 1998, 1999).\nThey note that while the total number of sea lions harvested has decreased, this can be accounted for by an\nequivalent decrease in the number of people hunting sea lions. The apparent rate of hunter success has not\ndeclined in any measurable way (although ADF&G has not rigorously investigated this). ADF&G states:\nthere are probably a variety of local factors related to the year-to-year changes in the\nnumber of households hunting sea lions in particular communities, including seasonal\nhunting conditions, local food needs, and personal circumstances of hunters. It is likely that\nthe declines in the numbers of sea lion hunters in many communities are because sea lions\nare increasingly harder to find and consequently more difficult and expensive to hunt. As\nsea lions become scarcer in a community's hunting area, an increasing number of hunters\nin the community probably choose to stop hunting them. While the hunters that continue\nto hunt appear to maintain annual harvest rates similar to past years, hunters probably are\ninvesting more time and money in pursuit of the sea lions harvest. In addition to these\nfactors, it is quite likely that some sea lion hunters have chosen to reduce their hunting\nactivity because of perceived problems with sea lion populations (ADF&G 1999).\nIn earlier documents, ADF&G had also suggested that another factor may be the increased availability of\nseasonal wage employment in local communities (including work the groundfish fisheries). Some hunters may\nbe choosing to work rather than to hunt, as a conscious economic choice of time allocation (ADF&G 1997,\n1998). This explanation is not stressed as much in their 1999 report, being included in the phrase personal\ncircumstances of hunters (ADF&G 1999). It should be noted that hunting Steller sea lions does require a\nconsiderable amount of effort, and in most cases the cooperation of several people, SO that time management\nand allocation could be a significant factor. An additional possible contribution to a decrease in sea lion\nsubsistence harvest would be a cultural change in taste, SO that the consumptive demand for sea lion may have\ndecreased. No information exists on this possible factor.\nThis information provides some support for a direct relationship between the overall Steller sea lion population\nand the level of subsistence harvest. Such support is not definitive, however, and other factors cannot be\nexcluded. The weighting of factors is also not possible from the evidence available. It does appear that present\nSteller sea lion harvest methods are likely to be more successful, and certainly more efficient, when resource\npopulations (and density) are higher. In general, the more abundant a subsistence resource is, the more heavily\nit is used. Thus, the analysis does assume some relationship between the Steller sea lion population level and\nsubsistence harvest from that population. The strength of that relationship cannot be determined given other\nfactors in play.\nThis lack of precise information, both in terms of precise measurement as well as in terms of causal linkages,\nis not uncommon when examining human behavior. Human behavior is often over-determined in the sense that\nthe same behavior can have several causes, and sometime the same causes can have different results. Given this\nlack of precise information, it is not possible to distinguish degrees of positive subsistence impact among the\nalternatives, either to order them or to determine whether or not such theoretically positive impacts would be\nsignificant. The alternatives that would reduce commercial groundfish harvest most would have the greatest\npotential benefit for subsistence use of Steller sea lions, but operationally such differences are likely to be slight.\nIn general, somewhat positive effects could result if reductions in groundfish harvest would lead to increased\nsea lion populations, and if higher sea lion populations would result in benefits to subsistence users of sea lions.\nSuch benefits could include higher harvest levels and lower harvest costs for sea lions.\nAlternative 6.2, increasing commercial groundfish harvest, is the only alternative that could have negative effects\n(the effects would be either neutral or somewhat negative.) The reasons for this conclusion are similar to the\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.8-101","reasons that neutral or somewhat positive types of positive subsistence impacts that would occur with decreases\nin fishing under the other alternatives. Negative impacts could occur if higher groundfish harvests reduce sea\nlion populations and if lower populations result in lower sea lion harvests or higher costs to harvest sea lions.\nIt is possible that these potential negative effects would be magnified due to the current depressed status of the\nSteller sea lion population and relatively low level of subsistence use. An additional decrease in sea lion\npopulation may result in a relatively larger decrease in subsistence harvest, or a relatively larger increase of\ncosts in terms of time and other resources.\nThe degree to which subsistence reliance on Steller sea lions could be affected by the proposed alternatives\ncannot be quantified given the lack of precise data. This analysis assumes that it is not likely to be great, but\nthat the possibility of significant effects cannot be precluded. There is the additional complication that\nsubsistence harvest levels normally vary considerably from year-to-year, due to the natural variability of\nweather, animal abundance and distribution, and other factors. The long-term direction of change (trend) is\nmore important than short-term measures of magnitudes of change. If there is a causal relationship between the\ncommercial groundfish fishery and declining Steller sea lion populations, a reduction in commercial groundfish\nharvest is probably a prerequisite for the increased subsistence harvest of Steller sea lions. It is simply not\npossible to determine how much of a change in one would result in how much of a change in the other.\nMatrix of Relationships and Impacts Between the Groundfish Fishery and Sea Lion Subsistence\nThe relationship between the existing groundfish fishery and Steller sea lion population dynamics is far from\nclear. There are two major areas of uncertainty concerning the impacts of the groundfish management\nalternatives on subsistence use of sea lions: (1) the relationship between the groundfish fishery and sea lion\npopulations, and (2) the relationship between sea lion population and subsistence harvest from that population.\nThe uncertainty of these relationships limits the strength of our conclusions. The following table is a matrix of\npotential impacts, given the potential relationships between the groundfish fishery and sea lions and between sea\nlion population and sea lion subsistence. The table shows four levels of relationship: no relationship, a weak\nrelationship, and a strong relationship. Four levels of impacts are indicated: no impact, slight impacts, some\nimpacts, and strong impacts.\nThe conclusions in earlier sections of this SEIS indicate that there is a potential but essentially unknown\nrelationship between the groundfish fishery and the sea lion population. Similarly, there is a potential but\nessentially unknown the relationship between sea lion population and the level of sea lion subsistence harvest\n(ADF&G 1997a, 1998, 1999). While it is clear that if sea lions approach extinction, then subsistence harvest\nwould likely decline, it is much less clear that if sea lion population increases, then subsistence harvest will also\nincrease. It is likely subsistence harvest changes would lag behind, and be smaller in magnitude than, potential\nchanges in overall Steller sea lion population. A number of other variables, such as negotiated agreements or\nother cultural or social variables that may influence long-term subsistence trends may be at work. Thus, the\npotential subsistence effects of most of the alternatives are either neutral or somewhat positive (or negative, for\nAlternative 6.2).\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-102","4.8.9 Summary of Economic and Social Effects of the Alternatives\nA summary of the significance of the economic and social effects of Alternative 1 is followed by a summary of\nhow the expected economic and social impacts of Alternative 1 would be expected to be affected by each of the\nother alternatives.\n4.8.9.1 Summary of Social and Economic Impacts of Alternative 1\nThe significance of the economic and social impacts of Alternative 1 are summarized in this section. For the\nimpacts that are commonly measured in dollars, an impact is identified as significant if the annual impact is\nexpected to exceed $100 million. The determination of the significance of other impacts is more subjective.\nFor Alternative 1, the estimated 5-year mean exvessel value for all BSAI and GOA groundfish deliveries by\ncatcher vessels is $280 million (Table 4.8-54) and the 5-year mean of groundfish product revenues is predicted\nto be $1.2 billion (Table 4.8-53). Therefore, the groundfish fishery is expected to have significant beneficial\nimpacts with respect to the exvessel value of groundfish, total exvessel value, and seafood product value.\nHowever, the use of the race for fish to allocate TACs and PSC limits among competing fishermen has resulted\nin unnecessarily low exvessel and product values. It is expected to continue to do SO by decreasing (1) retention\nrates, (2) product recovery rates, (3) product quality, and (4) the ability of fishermen and processors to take\nfuller advantage of seasonal demand for some seafood products, to prevent seasonal market gluts or to take\nadvantage of seasonal differences in product quality.\nAlthough harvesting and processing cost data generally are not available for the BSAI and GOA groundfish\nfisheries, the continued use of the race for fish to allocate TACs and PSC limits among competing fishermen\nhas resulted in excess harvesting and processing capacity which have increased both fixed and variable\nharvesting and processing costs substantially.\nThe current FMPs and market conditions are expected to limit preemption of one processing sector or one vessel\nclass by another. However, regulatory changes could result in either preemption or additional barriers to\npreemption.\nThe BSAI and GOA groundfish fisheries are expected to continue to provide high and relatively stable levels\nof seafood products to domestic and foreign markets. Estimates of the final market value of BSAI and GOA\nseafood products are not available; however, it would be substantially greater than $1.2 billion, the projected\n5-year mean of the product value of BSAI and GOA groundfish after primary processing. However, the\nelements of the current management regime that decrease the quantity and quality of groundfish products\navailable to consumers from a given level of catch will prevent some potential consumer benefits from being\nattained.\nStudies have shown significant willingness to pay on the part of the general public for the existence of species\n(and the preservation of endangered species) as well as the preservation of wilderness areas which the\nindividuals never expect to see. Estimates of nonconsumptive and nonuse values for various levels of the many\ncomponents of the BSAI and GOA ecosystems are not available at this time, and there is uncertainty concerning\nthe adverse and beneficial effects of the groundfish fishery on various components of the ecosystem. Therefore,\nit is not possible to quantify the impact of the groundfish fisheries on the level of nonconsumptive and nonuse\nbenefits under the current management regime. However, because the fishery may have an adverse effect on\nsome components and because nonuse value depends on the perception of adverse effects, the groundfish\nfisheries may decrease nonuse value by more than $100 million annually.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.8-103","From an economic perspectives, the costs of PSC and groundfish discards will continue to include (1) the cost\nimposed on the groundfish fleet by having both to stay within the PSC limits and to meet the retention\nrequirements for pollock and Pacific cod; (2) the cost imposed on some sectors of the groundfish fleet by other\nsectors using groundfish as discards; (3) the cost of PSC imposed on crab, halibut, herring, and salmon\nfishermen (including commercial, recreational and subsistence fishermen) in terms of reduced catch and value;\n(4) the cost of any net adverse ecological effects associated with discarding fish at sea; and (5) the management\nand enforcement costs associated with controlling these two types of bycatch. The second and third types of\ncosts, respectively, are the opportunity costs of using groundfish and prohibited species as discards. In the case\nof a TAC that is not utilized fully, the opportunity cost of using that species as discard may be very low. All\nbut the first type of cost are external costs from the perspective of groundfish fishermen. These external costs\nare the reason why, from the nation's perspective, fishermen tend to use too much fish as discards.\nAn extensive at-sea observer program was developed for the foreign fleets and then extended to the domestic\nfishery once it had all but replaced participation by foreign fishing and processing vessels. The observer\nprogram resulted in fundamental changes in the nature of the bycatch problem. First, by providing good\nestimates of total groundfish catch and non-groundfish bycatch by species, it eliminated much of the concern\nthat total fishing mortality was being underestimated due to fish that were discarded at sea. Second, it made\nit possible to establish, monitor and enforce the groundfish quotas in terms of total catch as opposed to only\nretained catch. Third, it made it possible to implement and enforce bycatch quotas for the non-groundfish\nspecies that by regulation had to be discarded at sea. Finally, it provided extensive information which managers\nand the industry could use to assess methods to reduce bycatch and bycatch mortality. In summary, the observer\nprogram provided fishery managers with the information and tools necessary to prevent bycatch from adversely\naffecting the stocks of the bycatch species. Therefore, the bycatch in the groundfish fishery is principally not\na conservation problem but it can be an allocation problem. Although this does not make it less controversial,\nit does help identify the types of information and management measures that are required to reduce bycatch to\nthe extent practicable, as is required by the Magnuson-Stevens Act.\nThe attempts of the Council and NMFS to address bycatch in the groundfish fisheries have demonstrated the\nneed for a better understanding of (1) the levels of bycatch (2) the fishing practices and techniques that can\ndecrease bycatch mortality and (3) the population, ecosystem, social, and economic effects of bycatch and of\nbycatch management measures. In addition, improved decisions require increased efforts to ensure fishermen,\nfishery managers, and the public more fully consider the impacts of their bycatch decisions. The use of the race\nfor fish to allocate fish among competing fishermen has been identified as a major impediment to fishermen fully\nconsidering the impacts of their bycatch decisions.\nWith the current management regime, prohibited species bycatch and groundfish discards are expected to remain\nprincipally an allocation issue, not a conservation issue. Fishermen will not have adequate incentives to control\nbycatch. Relatively high cost methods will continue to be used to control bycatch and the benefits of decreasing\nbycatch will continue to be unnecessarily low; therefore, smaller reductions in bycatch will be practicable than\nwould otherwise be the case.\nConcerns about vessel safety have been raised by many including fishermen, fishery managers, the public,\nCongress, and Alaska Governor Tony Knowles. The high risks faced by fishermen at sea and the effects of\nfishery regulations on those risks are recognized broadly. The Magnuson-Stevens Act national standard 10\nhighlights the issue of fishing vessel safety, it states that Conservation and management measures shall, to the\nextent practicable, promote the safety of human life at sea. In a recent press release, Governor Knowles\ndiscussed the issue of fishing vessel safety and stated that according to the National Institute of Occupational\nSafety and Health, Alaska fishermen face a workplace mortality rate 20 times the national average, and that rate\nis highest-more than 50 times the national average-among those who fish farthest from shore. The risk to\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-104","fishermen is expected to remain high under the current management regime. This is in part due to the continued\nuse of (1) the race for fish to allocate TACs and PSC limits among competing fishermen and (2) regulations that\nrequire fishermen to operate farther from shore or in areas and seasons with more hazardous weather conditions.\nThe current management regime includes a variety of measures that were intended, at least in part, to limit\nexcess harvesting and processing capacity. As indicated by recent problem statements prepared by the Council,\nthe measures have not been successful in eliminating excess capacity as one of the major management problems\nfor the BSAI and GOA groundfish fisheries. High levels of excess harvesting and processing capacity are\nexpected to continue to exist and to decrease the net benefits from the groundfish fisheries by more than $100\nmillion annually.\nFor Alternative 1, the estimated 5-year mean total payments to harvesting and processing labor in BSAI and\nGOA groundfish fisheries is $578 million (Table 4.8-53). Therefore, the groundfish fisheries are expected to\ncontinue to have a significant beneficial impact with respect to employment and payments to labor.\nThe BSAI and GOA groundfish fisheries are expected to continue to have significant beneficial impacts on\nregional exvessel value product value and payment to labor either because the impacts by region exceed $100\nmillion annually or because these fisheries are a critical component of the economic base of a region.\nDue to the uncertainty concerning the effects of the BSAI and GOA groundfish fisheries on the subsistence use\nof salmon and sea lions, we consider these impacts to be conditionally significant adverse. However, the\npotential for significant adverse impacts is reduced to the extent that income from the groundfish fisheries is\nused to pay part of the cash costs of subsistence fishing and hunting.\n4.8.9.2 Summary of Social and Economic Impacts of Alternatives 2.1 Through 6.2\nThe summary tables presented in this section contain an ordinal index for each of several types of potential\neffects of each alternative relative to Alternative 1 (status quo). The index is represented by the values {-2, -1,\n+0, +1, +2}. An index value of +0 indicates that there is no expected change relative to Alternative 1. A\nnegative index value indicates that the alternative is expected to have an adverse effect compared to Alternative\n1. A positive index value indicates that the alternative is expected to have a beneficial effect compared to\nAlternative 1. Since the index values only contains ordinal information, they can only be used to make ordinal\ncomparisons. For example, an index value of +2 is better than a value of +1, but it is not true, in general, that\na +2 is twice as good or twice as large as a +1. In short, the index values are simply place holders that\nrepresent an ordering. A completely equivalent ordering could be represented by {a, b, c, d, e}. Therefore, it\nis not possible to obtain meaningful summary information by performing numerical operations using the index\nvalues (e.g., add or subtract index values or calculate their ratios).\nBecause this assessment is based either on quantitative estimates that are subject to a number of qualifications\nor on a qualitative analysis, the index values assigned are inherently inexact. If they are used by themselves,\nwithout the necessary qualifications, they may be quite misleading. We encourage the reader to refer to the\nrelevant parts of sections for context to these summary scores and for discussions of the limitations of the\nquantitative estimates.\nIn general we give an index value of -2 if the alternative has a very large adverse effect and a score of -1 if the\nalternative has a large adverse effect. An index of +0 indicates no expected effect or only a marginal effect, a\n+1 indicates a large beneficial effect, and a +2 indicates a very large beneficial effect. For exvessel and product\nvalues and payments to harvesting and processing labor, for which quantitative projections are possible, a -2\nindicates an estimated decrease of more than 20 percent, a -1 indicates an estimated decrease of 5-20 percent,\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-105","a +0 indicates the change is estimated to be less than 5 percent, a +1 indicates an estimated increase of 5-20\npercent, and a +2 indicates an estimated increase of more than 20 percent. The same definitions are used for\nthe regional estimates of those variable; but if the index values differ by region the range of the values is given.\nFor example, if the projected change in groundfish product value varies by region from a decrease of 30 percent\nto an increase of 10 percent, the score would show a range of -2 to +1. The preemption index values are based\non the projected percentage decreases in groundfish product value by processor group and in exvessel value by\ncatcher vessel class. If the percentage decrease is projected to exceed 20 percent for one or more processor\ngroups or catcher vessel classes, a -2 is given. A - indicates that the largest projected decrease is 5-20 percent\nand a score of 0 indicates that the largest projected decrease is less than 5 percent.\nThe category Benefits To Domestic Seafood Consumers represents the impact on the consumer surplus\nassociated with the consumption of Alaska groundfish products by domestic consumers. We would like to point\nout that although the absolute dollar amount of the consumer surplus associated with the domestic consumption\nof Alaska groundfish may be large, it is very likely to represent a small part of the total net benefits that such\nconsumers receive from all seafood products or from all goods and services they purchase. In other words, it\nis unlikely that any of the alternatives would affect the total net benefits that domestic consumers receive from\ntheir consumption of all products by as much as 5 percent.\nAlternatives 2.1 and 2.2\nAlternatives 2.1 and 2.2 are intended to provide increased protection to marine mammals and seabirds. To\nprovide this protection Alternative 2.1 would, among other things, close all sea lion critical habitat and reduce\nTACs for BSAI pollock, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel and GOA pollock and Pacific cod in proportion to the\nbiomass of each stock in sea lion critical habitat. Alternative 2.2 requires much greater reductions in pollock,\nPacific cod, and Atka mackerel TACs and allows fishing over only four quarterly 8-day seasons. Both\nAlternatives 2.1 and 2.2 also include changes in seabird bycatch avoidance regulations for hook-and-line gear\nwhich would required changes in operations and purchases of new equipment and gear.\nFor Alternative 2.1, the estimated 5-year mean exvessel value for all BSAI and GOA groundfish deliveries is\n22.7 percent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-60) and the 5-year mean of groundfish product\nrevenues is predicted to be 25.3 percent below status quo (Table 4.8-59). The reductions under Alternative 2.2\nwere much greater with 5-year mean groundfish exvessel revenues declining by 63.9 percent (Table 4.8-66)\nand groundfish product revenues by 74.2 percent (Table 4.8-65). The expected changes vary for individual\ngroups of harvesters and processors. As discussed in Section 4.8.2, these revenue estimates may be biased either\nupward or downward for a variety of reasons The net impact of the upward and downward biases in\nprojections is difficult to determine, but we expect that the projections are likely to understate the negative\nimpacts on total exvessel and product value for both alternatives.\nAverage harvesting and processing costs are expected to increase substantially under both alternatives because\nfixed costs (e.g., general office and accounting costs, vessel maintenance, and insurance) must be allocated to\na smaller amount of catch, set-up costs (e.g., preparing the vessel or plant for operation and fine-tuning\nproduction) are likely to increase with four disjointed seasons, and a variety of factors are likely to increase\nvariable costs. Because revenues are expected to fall while costs rise, the percentage reduction in profits can\nbe expected to be greater than the reduction in revenues, but we are unable to provide quantitative estimates of\nthat change due to a lack of cost information. However, it is clear that Alternative 2.2 will result in much\ngreater reductions in total profits than Alternative 2.1.\nSome processing sectors and vessel class categories will likely be preempted by these two alternatives. The\neffects of both alternatives vary substantially between individual groups of harvesters and processors. Under\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-106","Alternative 2.1, the estimated reduction in product value is 48 percent for the other Alaska Peninsula and\nAleutian Islands processors compared to a 25 percent reduction for all processors. Under Alternative 2.2, the\nestimated decrease in product value exceeds 85 percent for four processor groups compared to a 74 percent\nreduction for all processors. Closures of critical habitat under Alternative 2.1 are expected to cause substantial\npreemption of catcher vessels delivering to inshore plants, particularly small vessels. The large reductions in\ncatches under both alternatives are expected to make it impossible for some fishery participants to continue\ntaking part in these fisheries.\nAlternatives 2.1 and 2.2 are expected to have a variety of other impacts. Reductions in production of several\ndifferent products could result in higher consumer prices and a loss of consumer surplus (i.e., the net benefits\nto consumers derive from their consumption or use of a product) to the American public under both alternatives,\nbut particularly under Alternative 2.2. If Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 increase the population sizes of endangered\nspecies or decrease the risk of their extinction, then there would likely be an increase non-use values to the public\nat large.\nAlternatives 2.1 and 2.2 would not eliminate the source of the problem of excessively high bycatch rates for\nprohibited species and discard rates for groundfish. However, by reducing substantially the sizes of the pollock,\nPacific cod, and Atka mackerel fisheries, the model projections indicate that both alternatives would decrease\nPSC and groundfish discards. The latter would decrease both the cost imposed on some sectors of the\ngroundfish fleet by other sectors using groundfish as discards and the ecological costs associated with discarding\nfish at sea. The former would decrease the cost of PSC imposed on crab, halibut, herring, and salmon\nfishermen. Therefore, from an economic perspective, there would be large improvements with respect to\ngroundfish discards and PSC.\nBoth alternatives are expected to decrease the safety of vessels and crew. This would be particularly true under\nAlternative 2.1 where relatively more areas are closed and small vessels would be forced to fish further from\nshore. Because both alternatives substantially decrease the quantity of catch and products from the fishery, they\nare expected to substantially increase the level of excess capacity in both harvest and processing sectors and will\nnot eliminate incentives to maintain excess capacity. This is particularly true of Alternative 2.2. Both\nalternatives would result in very large reductions in employment of vessel crew and processing employees as\nwell as substantial reductions in employment and income in support sectors in fishing communities.\nUnder Alternative 2.1, the economic health of traditional fishing communities are negatively impacted when\ncompared to status quo conditions in all six regions discussed. Similarly consistent negative impacts are seen\nfor Alternative 2.2 across all regions. For both Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2, particularly acute negative impacts\nto regions within Alaska are concentrated in the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands region and the Kodiak\nIsland region. Engaged industry segments in Washington and Oregon would be similarly hard hit.\nGroundfish exvessel value by region of landing is expected to decrease by a very large amount in the Alaska\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak Island regions under both alternatives. The expected decrease ranges\nfrom 28-34 percent under Alternative 2.1 and 58-82 percent under Alternative 2.2. The southeast and\nsouthcentral regions are only expected to receive small, negative deductions in exvessel value (Tables 4.8-62\nand 4.8-69). Both alternatives would cause very large reductions in inshore processing value and the payments\nto labor in the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands, and Kodiak Island regions. The southeast and southcentral\nregions would be impacted as much, but their expected reductions are still large (Table 4.8-62 and 4.8-68). The\nimpact on exvessel value by region of owner under Alternative 2.2 is estimated to be very large for all regions\nexcept the southeast where a small negative impact is expected. The reductions in the other regions range from\n27 to over 80 percent (Table 4.8-70). The impacts under Alternative 2.1 are similar, but not as severe (Table\n4.8-64).\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-107","The decreases in salmon bycatch and the increased protection for sea lions with Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 would\ntend to benefit the subsistence use of salmon and sea lions. However, because the changes in these benefits are\nexpected to be minimal, we gave both alternatives a score of +0 with respect to their effect on the subsistence\nuse of living marine resources.\nAlternative 3\nAlternative 3 is intended to provide increased protection for target species. The regulatory changes for\nAlternative 3 include: changes in the ABCs both due to changes in the method used to estimate ABCs and due\nto the assumed changes in gear selectivity coefficients; setting TACs equal to ABCs and eliminating the OY\nlimits; and eliminating the PSC limits. Other changes include year-round closures of an additional 20 percent\nof each management area and requirements for minimum mesh and hook sizes to improve size selectivity.\nFor Alternative 3, the estimated 5-year mean exvessel value for all BSAI and GOA groundfish deliveries is 13.8\npercent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-72). The 5-year mean estimated value of all BSAI\nand GOA groundfish products is 12.5 percent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-71). The\nexpected changes vary for individual groups of harvesters and processors. As discussed in Section 4.8.3, these\nrevenue estimates may be biased either upward or downward for a variety of reasons. The net impact of upward\nand downward bias in projections value is difficult to determinate, but we expect that projections are likely to\nunderstate the negative impacts of Alterative 3 on total exvessel and product value.\nAverage costs per unit of catch for catcher vessels can be expected to increase somewhat under Alternative 3\nbecause of the reduction in the overall level of production resulting from lower catches. Spatial displacement\nof fishing effort under Alternative 3 could lead to increased operating costs for vessels. The larger mesh and\nhook sizes required to meet the size selectivity standards set by Alternative 3 would increase fishing costs\nthrough the additional cost of replacing existing gear and because larger mesh and hooks would also tend to\ndecrease CPUE. Because revenues are expected to fall while costs rise, the percentage reduction in profits can\nbe expected to be greater than the reduction in revenues, but we are unable to provide quantitative estimates of\nthat change due to a lack of cost information.\nSome processing sectors and vessel class categories will likely be preempted by the alternative. Most of the\nprocessing sectors have an estimated decrease of product value between 10-16 percent compared to Alternative\n1. The trawl catcher vessel categories have an estimated decrease in vessel value of 12-16 percent compared\nto Alternative 1. The other catch vessel categories have smaller project decreases (1.3-4.4 percent).\nAlternative 3 is expected to have a variety of other substantial impacts. Reductions in production of several\ndifferent products could result in higher consumer prices and a loss of consumer surplus to the American public.\nAlternative 3 is not expected to result in large changes in nonuse values.\nAlternative 3 would not eliminate the source of the problem of excessively high bycatch rates for prohibited\nspecies and discard rates for groundfish. Increases in groundfish discards and PSC are projected for Alternative\n3. Both the cost imposed on some sectors of the groundfish fleet by other sectors using groundfish as discards\nand the ecological costs associated with discarding groundfish at sea would be increased by the increased\ngroundfish discards. Similarly, the increase in prohibited species bycatch would increase the cost of PSC\nimposed on crab, halibut, herring, and salmon fishermen. However, the cost imposed on the groundfish fleet\nby having to stay within the PSC limits would be eliminated by eliminating the PSC limits. Therefore, from an\neconomic perspective, there would be large adverse effects with respect to groundfish discards and a mix of\nbeneficial and adverse effects with respect to PSC\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-108","Alternative 3 is not expected to results in appreciable changes in safety. Because it will decrease the quantity\nof catch and products from the fishery, this alternative is expected to increase the level of excess capacity in both\nharvest and processing sectors and will not eliminate incentives to maintain excess capacity. Alternative 3 would\nresult in large reductions in employment of vessel crew and processing employees, as well as reductions in\nemployment and income in support sectors in fishing communities.\nUnder Alternative 3, all of the regions are negatively impacted relative to the status quo. Groundfish exvessel\nvalue by region of landing is expected to decrease by a large amount in the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nIslands and Kodiak Island (15-16 percent), while the southcentral and southeast regions would be negatively\nimpacted to a lesser degree (7-8 percent) (Table 4.8-75). The regional impact on inshore groundfish product\nvalue and labor payments follows a similar pattern (Table 4.8-74). The impact on exvessel groundfish value\nby region of owner is estimated to be large for all regions with a range of -6,4 percent to - -19 percent (Table 4.8-\n76).\nThe decreases in salmon bycatch with Alternative 3 would tend to benefit the subsistence use of salmon.\nHowever, because the change in this benefit is expected to be minimal, we have the alternative a score of +0 with\nrespect to its effect on the subsistence use of living marine resources.\nAlternatives 4.1 and 4.2\nAlternatives 4.1 and 4.2 are intended to provide increased protection to non-target species. The regulatory\nchanges for Alternative 4.1 and 4.2 include a reduced BSAI pollock TAC and imposition of binding TACs for\nskates in the BSAI and GOA and for grenadier in the GOA. Both Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 also create an area\nclosure for the eastern Bering Sea pollock fishery to decrease squid bycatch. The TACs for BSAI skates and\nGOA grenadier are lower for Alternative 4.2 than for Alternative 4.1 thus tending to more tightly constrain\nfisheries where they are taken as bycatch.\nFor Alternative 4.1, the estimated 5-year mean exvessel value for all BSAI and GOA groundfish deliveries is\n9.3 percent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-78). For Alternative 4.2, the 5-year mean exvessel\nvalue for all BSAI and GOA groundfish deliveries 9.5 percent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table\n4.8-84). For Alternative 4.1, the 5-year mean estimated value of all BSAI and GOA groundfish products is 11.3\npercent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-77). For Alternative 4.2, the estimated value of all\nBSAI and GOA groundfish products is 14.5 percent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-83).\nExpected changes vary substantially for individual groups of harvesters and processors for Alternative 4.2 but\nnot for Alternative 4.1. With Alternative 4.2, the estimated reduction in product value is 45 percent for the\nlongline catcher/processors compared to 14.5 percent for all processors. As discussed in Section 4.8.4, these\nrevenue estimates may be biased either upward or downward for a variety of reasons. The net impact of upward\nand downward bias in projections of value is difficult to determine.\nOnly the costs for the participants in the BSAI pollock fishery (and the BSAI Pacific cod longline fishery with\nAlternative 4.2) should be substantially impacted by these alternatives. The most substantial impact on costs\nfor this sector would be that fixed and semi-fixed costs would be spread out over a somewhat smaller level of\nproduction thereby increasing average per unit cost. Because revenues are expected to fall while costs rise, the\npercentage reduction in profits can be expected to be greater than the reduction in revenues, but we are unable\nto provide quantitative estimates of that change due to a lack of cost information.\nSome processing sectors and vessel class categories will likely be preempted by the alternatives. The most\nseverely impacted sector would likely be the longline catcher/processors with an estimated 46 percent reduction\nin product revenue under Alterative 4.2. Under both alternatives, the pollock processors will have a large\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.8-109","negative impact ranging from 16-19 percent reduction in revenue. A large negative impact (12.1-16.7 percent)\nis forecasted for the AFA catcher vessels' revenue under both Alternatives.\nAlternatives 4.1 and 4.2 are expected to have some impacts on the other categories. Reductions in production\nof several different products could result in higher prices and a loss of consumer surplus to the American public\nunder both alternatives. It is unclear whether this alternative will increase non-use values.\nNeither of the alternatives would eliminate the source of the problem of excessively high bycatch rates for\nprohibited species and discard rates for groundfish. However, groundfish discards, and salmon and herring\nbycatches are expected to decline under both alternatives. In addition, a decrease in halibut bycatch is projected\nunder Alternative 4.2. Both the cost imposed on some sectors of the groundfish fleet by other sectors using\ngroundfish as discards and the ecological costs associated with discarding groundfish at sea would be decreased\nminimally by the small decrease in groundfish discards. The cost imposed on the groundfish fleet by having\nto stay within the PSC limits would not be affected much by either alternative. The decreases in prohibited\nspecies bycatch would decrease the cost of PSC imposed on herring and salmon fishermen under both\nalternatives, and on halibut under Alternative 4.2. Overall, from an economic perspective, there would be small\nimprovements with respect to groundfish discards and PSC for Alternative 4.1 and a large improvement under\nAlternative 4.2.\nNeither alternative is expected to substantially impact safety. Because they will decrease the quantity of catch\nand products from the fishery, these alternative are expected to increase the level of excess capacity in both\nharvest and processing sectors and will not eliminate incentives to maintain excess capacity. Both Alternatives\nare expected to results in large reductions in employment of vessel crew and processing employees, as well as\nreductions in employment and income in support sectors in fishing communities.\nFor Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2, groundfish and total exvessel value by region of landing is neutral for all regions\nexcept Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands where they are expected to decrease by 8-14 percent (Tables 4.8-\n81 and 4.8-87). The regional impact on inshore groundfish product value and labor payments follows a similar\npattern (Tables 4.8-80 and 4.8-86). The impact on exvessel value by region of owner is estimated to be large\nfor Washington with a decrease of 10.6-13.9 percent (Table 4.8-81) and Oregon with a decrease of 4.7-6\npercent (Tables 4.8-82 and 4.8-88). Other regions of vessel owners are only expected to be slightly impacted.\nThe decreases in salmon bycatch with Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 would tend to benefit the subsistence use of\nsalmon and sea lions. However, because the change in these benefits is expected to be minimal, we gave both\nalternatives a score of +0 with respect to their effect on the subsistence use of living marine resources.\nAlternative 5\nAlternative 5 is intended to provide increased protection for the marine habitat. The regulatory changes for\nAlternative 5 include: eliminating the bottom trawl Pacific cod, pollock, rockfish, and sablefish fisheries and\nreplacing some with pelagic trawl fisheries and others with fixed-gear fisheries; decreasing the TACs for the\ntarget species in the remaining bottom trawl fisheries; and reallocating halibut PSC limits between trawl and\nfixed-gear to allow for the reallocation of groundfish catch from the trawl to the fixed-gear fisheries. This\nalternative also requires some additional year-round area closures.\nFor Alternative 5, the estimated 5-year mean exvessel value for all BSAI and GOA groundfish deliveries is 4.3\npercent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-90). The estimated value of all BSAI and GOA\ngroundfish products is only 0.9 percent less than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-89). However,\nexpected changes vary substantially for individual groups of harvesters and processors. As discussed in Section\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-110","4.8.5, these revenue estimates may be biased either upward or downward for a variety of reasons The net\nimpact of upward and downward bias in projections of value is difficult to determine, but we expect that\nprojections are likely to understate the negative impacts of Alterative 5 on total exvessel and product value.\nAverage costs per unit of catch for catcher vessels can be expected to increase somewhat under Alternative 5\nbecause of the reduction in the overall level of production resulting from lower catches. Spatial displacement\nof fishing effort under Alternative 5 could lead to increased operating costs for vessels. Because revenues are\nexpected to fall while costs rise, the percentage reduction in profits can be expected to be greater than the\nreduction in revenues, but we are unable to provide quantitative estimates of that change due to a lack of\ninformation about costs.\nThe replacement of several bottom trawl fisheries with pelagic trawl and fixed-gear fisheries will result in some\nvery large levels of preemption. The area closures may cause additional preemption of some fishery sectors.\nAlternative 5 is expected to have a variety of substantial impacts beyond reducing profits in the harvest and\nprocessing sectors. Reductions in production of several different products could result in higher prices and a loss\nof consumer surplus to the American public, but it is possible that these will be mitigated or canceled by\nincreased production of other products. By providing protection to habitat, Alternative 5 may protect\nbiodiversity and may provide some increases in nonuse values but it is unclear whether these benefits will be\nsignificant.\nAlternative 5 would not eliminate the source of the problem of excessively high bycatch rates for prohibited\nspecies and discard rates for groundfish. However, it is expected to decrease groundfish discards marginally\nand decrease the bycatch mortality of prohibited species substantially. Both the cost imposed on some sectors\nof the groundfish fleet by other sectors using groundfish as discards and the ecological costs associated with\ndiscarding groundfish at sea would be decreased minimally. The cost imposed on the groundfish fleet by having\nto stay within the PSC limits is expected to decrease. The same is true for the cost of PSC imposed on the\nfishermen that target those species. Therefore, from an economic perspective, there would be large\nimprovements with respect to groundfish discards and PSC.\nAlternative 5 is not expected to substantially affect safety. The overall impact of Alternative 5 on the level of\nexcess fishing and processing capacity will vary greatly by sector. Fixed-gear sectors will see excess capacity\ndecline while the trawl sector will see excess capacity increase substantially. This alternative will not, however,\neliminate incentives to maintain excess capacity. We expect Alternative 5 would have a small negative effect\non employment of vessel crew and processing employees and employment and income in support sectors in\nfishing communities.\nUnder Alternative 5, some regions experience positive economic impacts and some experience negative economic\nimpacts in comparison to status quo conditions. Groundfish exvessel value by region of landing is neutral for\nthe Kodiak Island and southeast regions. The Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands region is expected to be\nnegatively impacted (9 percent), while the southcentral region is expect to receive a positive impact of 8 percent\n(Table 4.8-93). The regional impact on inshore groundfish product value and labor payments is even more\nvaried. The Bering Sea pollock shore plants, the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands shore plants, and the\nKodiak shore plants are expected to receives reductions of 5 percent, 26.6 percent and 8.1 percent, respectively\n(Table 4.8-92). The southcentral shore plants are expected to receive an increase of 16.8 percent in both\ngroundfish product value and payments to labor. The impact on exvessel value by region of owner is estimated\nto be very large for the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Oregon with a decreases of around 40 percent\nand 28 percent, respectively (Table 4.8-94). Kodiak Island and the southcentral owner regions are expected to\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-111","benefit by 9.1 percent and 24.8 percent, respectively, in term for groundfish exvessel value. Other regions of\nvessel owners are only expected to be slightly impacted.\nAlternative 5 is not expected to provide additional protection for salmon and sea lions. Therefore, we gave this\nalternative a score of +0 with respect to its effect on the subsistence use of living marine resources.\nAlternative 6\nAlternatives 6.1 and 6.2 are intended to provide increased socio-economic benefits or a subset of those benefits.\nAlternative 6.1 has a broad policy objective that can be summarized as (1) increase the long-term net economic\nbenefits from the commercial groundfish fisheries to those who harvest and process groundfish, to the associated\nfishing communities, and to those who consume groundfish seafood products; (2) prevent preemption of one\nsector or fishing community by another; and (3) maintain or increase levels of protection for protected species,\ntarget species, non-target species, and their habitat. Alternative 6.2 has the more narrower policy objective of\nincreasing the short-term net economic benefits from the commercial groundfish fisheries to those who harvest\nand process groundfish, to the associated fishing communities, and to those who consume groundfish seafood\nproducts. This is accomplished by allowing a substantially more aggressive harvest strategy. We recognize that\nactions taken to meet the narrower policy objective of Alternative 6.2 may be counterproductive with respect\nto meeting the broader policy objective of Alternative 6.1.\nAlternative 6.1\nAlternative 6.1 makes a general recommendation to use rights-based management to improve the economic\nperformance of the groundfish fisheries off Alaska. Three broad categories of rights-based systems are\nconsidered: individual fishing quotas, cooperatives, and community fishery quotas. Each of these systems can\nin turn be structured in a variety of ways to achieve different combinations of biological, ecological, economic,\nand social objectives.\nRegardless of the types of rights-based systems implemented, Alternative 6.1 is expected to result in increases\nin the value of production resulting from improved product quality and product mix. Further increases in the\nvalue of production will be achieved by harvesting a greater share of catches in target fisheries instead of as\nbycatch and by allowing a higher level of exploitation of some fisheries that were previously closed by limits\non protected species bycatch. Projections of exvessel and product revenues from simulations indicate only\nmarginal gains as a result of lower bycatch reducing constraints on fisheries but do not capture gains from\nincreased quality or a more valuable product mix. We consider them to be very conservative and not indicative\nof the true gains in value from the fishery. We therefore have given the exvessel and product value categories\na value of +1 or +2, rather than +0.\nThe costs of harvesting and processing are expected to fall due both to cost savings by individual fishing or\nprocessing operations and cost savings at the industry level. Individual vessels and processors will have\nsignificant opportunities to reduce costs because they can focus on harvesting in the most cost effective way\nwhere before they focused on achieving the highest catch rates possible. At the industry level, costs will fall\nbecause production is expected to shift over time toward the most cost effective harvesting and processing\noperations. Fixed costs will be reduced by consolidating harvesting and processing operations and retiring or\nselling off excess vessels and processing equipment. The degree of costs savings will vary greatly depending\non the constraints put on the transfer and consolidation of catch and or processing rights.\nIt is possible that rights-based systems could lead to the preemption of some fishing and processing firms or\nsectors. However, it is expected that regulations limiting the transferability and consolidation of quota would\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-112","be used to protect sectors and communities against preemption. These regulations would tend to decrease the\nefficiency gains, and thus the profit levels.\nAlternative 6.1 is expected to have a variety of substantial impacts beyond increasing profits in the harvest and\nprocessing sectors. Since Alternative 6.1 is expected to increase the average quality and value of a variety of\nfishery products, we expect it to lead to gains in consumer surplus that will accrue to the public at large.\nAlternative 6.1 is not expected to substantially impact nonuse values.\nAlternative 6.1 would eliminate the source of the problem of excessively high bycatch rates for prohibited\nspecies and discard rates for groundfish. Therefore, it is expected to allow the groundfish TACs to be used as\nfully as allowed by market conditions, and to do SO without increasing the bycatch of prohibited species. The\nexternal cost imposed on some sectors of the groundfish fleet by other sectors using groundfish as bycatch would\nbe internalized. However, the same is not true for the external ecological costs associated with discarding\ngroundfish at sea. Therefore, from an economic perspective, there would be very large improvements with\nrespect to groundfish discards and PSC.\nAlternative 6.1 is expected to improve safety as a consequence of ending the race for fish. One of the primary\nreasons for implementing rights-based systems is to prevent the build-up of excess harvesting and processing\ncapacity or reduce excess capacity that already exists. Rights-based systems should eliminate incentives to build\nor maintain excess capacity.\nAverage employee compensation is expected to increase under Alternative 6.1. However, it highly likely that\na rights-based system will lead to a decrease in the number of crew members and processing workers employed.\nWe believe that the increase in average employee compensation will be larger than reductions in employment.\nAs a result, we expect that total payments to vessel crews and processing labor would increase.\nIn general it is possible that rights-based systems could (not necessarily would) lead to the preemption or\nreduction of fishing, processing and fishing support activities in some traditional fishing communities unless\nrestrictions are implemented to inhibit or prohibit a geographic redistribution of landings. Rights-based systems\ncan also be expected to have some positive impacts on fishing communities. Ending the race for fish should\nincrease the economic stability of the fishing industry.\nUnder Alternative 6.1, all categories of regional impacts are expected to improve. We expect that all measures\nof regional exvessel and product value will increase by more than 20 percent for all regions and sectors, and\ninshore groundfish processing labor payments to increase by more than 5 percent for all regions.\nThe decreases in salmon bycatch and the increased protection for sea lions via the temporal and spatial\ndispersion of the fisheries with Alternative 6.1 would tend to benefit the subsistence use of salmon and sea lions.\nHowever, because the changes in these benefits are expected to be minimal, we gave this alternative a score of\n+0 with respect to its effect on the subsistence use of living marine resources.\nAlternative 6.2\nAlternative 6.2 is intended to increase the level of harvest in all fisheries, and therefore increase the short-term\nbenefits for fishery participants. The regulatory changes for Alternative 6.2 include setting TACs equal to OFLs,\nand eliminating the OY and PSC limits.\nFor Alternative 6.2, the estimated 5-year mean exvessel value for all BSAI and GOA groundfish deliveries is\n17.5 percent greater than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-108). The 5-year mean estimated value of\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.8-113","all BSAI and GOA groundfish products is 20,7 percent greater than the estimate for Alternative 1 (Table 4.8-\n107). The expected changes vary for individual groups of harvesters and processors. As discussed in Section\n4.8.6, these revenue estimates may be biased either upward or downward for a variety of reasons. The net\nimpact of upward and downward bias in projections of product value is difficult to determine. For the pollock\nfishery the biases move in opposite directions, SO we are not able to state the likely net effect. For all the other\nfisheries, it is likely that the net effect of the biases will overstate the increases in value.\nAverage costs per unit of catch for catcher vessels can be expected to decrease somewhat under Alternative 6.2\nbecause of the increase in the overall level of production resulting from higher catches. Because revenues are\nexpected to increase while costs decrease, the percentage increase in profits can be expected to be greater than\nthe increase in revenues, but we are unable to provide quantitative estimates of that change due to a lack of cost\ninformation.\nAlternative 6.2 is expected to have a variety of other substantial impacts. None of the processing sectors and\nvessel class categories will likely be preempted by the alternative. Increases in production of several different\nproducts could result in lower consumer prices and an increase in consumer surplus to the American public. It\nis likely that Alternative 6.2 will have a large impact on some species and environments, and it is therefore likely\nthat a large reduction in nonuse and nonconsumptive values would result.\nAlternative 6.2 would not eliminate the source of the problem of excessively high bycatch rates for prohibited\nspecies and discard rates for groundfish. The elimination of the PSC limits and the substantial increases in\nTACs are projected to result in substantial increases in PSC and groundfish discards. The elimination of the\nPSC limits would eliminate the cost imposed on the groundfish fleet of having to stay within the PSC limits.\nTherefore, from an economic perspective, there would be very large adverse effects with respect to groundfish\ndiscards and large adverse effects with respect to PSC.\nAlternative 6.2 is not expected to result in appreciable changes in safety. Because it will increase the quantity\nof catch and products from the fishery, this alternative is expected to decrease the level of excess capacity in\nboth harvest and processing sectors in the short-term. However it will not eliminate incentives to maintain excess\ncapacity, and we therefore, expect eventual increase in capacity in the long-term and a return to the current\nlevel of excess capacity. Alternative 6.2 would result in large increases in employment of vessel crew and\nprocessing employees, as well as increases in employment and income in support sectors in fishing communities.\nUnder Alternative 6.2, all of the regions are positively impacted relative to the status quo. Groundfish exvessel\nvalue by region of landing is expected to increase by a large amount in all regions, with a range of 17 to 19.6\npercent (Table 4.8-111). The regional impact on inshore groundfish product value and labor payments is\nexpected to have a similar increase with a range from 11.2 percent to 20.1 percent (Table 4.8-110). The impact\non exvessel groundfish value by region of owner is estimated to be large for all regions except the Alaska\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands region where there is a small positive impact (Table 4.8-112).\nThe increases in salmon bycatch and the decreased protection for sea lions with Alternative 6.2 would tend to\nbe detrimental to the subsistence use of salmon and sea lions. However, because those adverse effects are\nexpected to be minimal, we have this alternative a score of +0 with respect to its effect on the subsistence use\nof living marine resources.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-114","Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based\nTable 4.8-2 Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative 1, by\nJANUARY 2001\n220.2\n233,3\n232.8\n298.4\nTotal\n254.7\n198.1\n243.1\n255.1\nTotal\n98.9\n-22.2\n-61.2\n-13.5\n-8,4\n-8.6\n-4,6\n0.1\n17.1\nProcessors\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nSoutheast\nAlaska\nAlaska\n35.8\n34.7\n32.5\n36.2\n36.2\n36.2\n41.8\n-2.9\n-7,6\n1.3\n0.9\n16.9\n33.1\n-9.1\n1.1\n1.1\n36.1\nSouthcentral\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nProcessors\nAlaska\nAlaska\n27.9\n27.4\n25.3\n28.4\n30.2\n28.5\n33.0\n-1,8\n-9.2\n-6.5\n2.0\n0.9\n8.2\n2.2\n18,5\nInshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\n26.1\n28.1\n4.8-115\nProcessors\nProcessors\nKodiak\nKodiak\nIsland\nIsland\n27.8\n18.4\n11.9\n23,6\n27.8\n27.8\n27.0\n27.7\n33.0\n-34.0\n-15.3\n0.0\n-0.2\n-3.0\n-0,3\n18,6\n-57.1\non 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nOther Aleutian\nOther Aleutian\nProcessors\nProcessors\nPen. and\nPen. and\n-20.8\n26.8\n22.3\n26.0\n25.8\n21.2\n26.6\n-39,9\n-65,2\n-16,9\n-3,6\n-0.7\n12.3\n-3.1\n16.1\n30.1\n9.3\nLarge Bering\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\nProcessors\n136.4\n101.5\n19.8\n115.2\n114.8\n115.0\n128.6\n136.0\n160.4\n-25.6\n-85.5\n-15.5\n-15.8\n-15.7\n-5,7\n-0,3\n17.6\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nAlternative\nAlternative\nTable 4.8-1\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n5\n1","Table 4.8-3 Gulf of Alaska Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions\nTable 4.8-4 Gulf of Alaska Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative 1, by Inshore Processor Group and\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTotal\nTotal\n-18,7\n-30.7\n-11.2\n0.9\n0.5\n-3.5\n0.8\n16.8\n112.7\n91.7\n78.0\n100.0\n113.7\n113.2\n108.7\n113.5\n131,6\nProcessors\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nSoutheast\nAlaska\nAlaska\n35.8\n34.7\n32.5\n36.2\n36.2\n36.2\n41.8\n-2.9\n-7.6\n1.3\n0.9\n16.9\n33.1\n36.1\n-9.1\n1.1\n1.1\nSouthcentral\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nProcessors\nAlaska\nAlaska\n27.8\n27.3\n25.2\n26.0\n28.4\n28.0\n28.4\n32.9\n-1.8\n-9.2\n-6.5\n2.0\n0.9\n8.3\n2.2\n18.5\n30.1\n4.8-116\nProcessors\nProcessors\nKodiak\nKodiak\nIsland\nIsland\n27.6\n11.7\n23.4\n27.6\n27.5\n26.8\n27.5\n32.7\n-34.3\n-57.7\n-15.3\n0.0\n-0.2\n-2.9\n-0.3\n18.6\n18.1\nAlternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nOther Aleutian\nOther Aleutian\nProcessors\nProcessors\nPen. and\nPen. and\n18.5\n9.6\n7.0\n18.5\n18.5\n13.0\n18.4\n20.4\n-47.9\n-18.4\n0.0\n-29.6\n-0.3\n10.7\n15.1\n-62.1\n-0.1\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\n1.9\n1.6\n2.5\n3.0\n2.7\n-48.4\n-16.9\n0.0\n-0.3\n-10.2\n-0.2\n19.6\n3.1\n3.1\n3.1\n3.7\n-38.1\nof Dollars\nAlternative\nAlternative\nJANUARY 2001\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n5\n1","Table 4.8-6 Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative 1, by Inshore Processor\nJANUARY 2001\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005\n142.0\n106.4\n120.2\n119.6\n119.6\n134.4\n141.5\n166.8\nTotal\n-85,3\n-15.4\n-15.8\n-15.8\nTotal\n-25.1\n17.4\n20.9\n-5.4\n-0.4\nProcessors\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nSoutheast\nAlaska\nAlaska\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nSouthcentral\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nProcessors\nAlaska\nAlaska\n0,0\n0.0\n-8.6\n0.0\n0,0\n-8.6\n-1.0\n15.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n4.8-117\nProcessors\nProcessors\nKodiak\nKodiak\nIsland\nIsland\n0.0\n0.0\n-9.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-9.0\n-2.5\n21,7\n0.3\n0.3\n0.3\n0.2\n0.3\n0.3\n0.2\n0.3\n0.3\nGroup and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nOther Aleutian\nOther Aleutian\nProcessors\nProcessors\nPen. and\nPen. and\n-13,6\n-22.4\n-72.0\n-10.0\n-11.4\n-1.4\n-1.5\n15.8\n8.3\n6.5\n2.3\n7.2\n7.5\n7.4\n8.2\n8.2\n9.7\nAverage, in Millions of Dollars\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\nProcessors\n-25.3\n-86.4\n-15.5\n-16.2\n-5,6\n-0,3\n17.5\n-16.1\n133.3\n99.6\n18.2\n112.7\n111.8\n111.9\n125.9\n133.0\n156.7\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nNotes: NA - data not available\nAlternative\nAlternative\nTable 4.8-5\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n5\n1","Table 4.8-7 Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Hook-and-Line Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and\nTable 4.8-8 Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Hook-and-Line Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTotal\nTotal\n73.7\n73.4\n69.5\n68.5\n74.8\n74.1\n78,6\n74.6\n86.2\n16,9\n-0.5\n-5.8\n-7.1\n1.4\n0.5\n6.6\n1.2\nProcessors\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nSoutheast\nAlaska\nAlaska\n32.0\n32.4\n29.9\n32.4\n32.3\n31.1\n32,6\n32.4\n37.2\n1.5\n-2.6\n-6.6\n1.5\n1.2\n2.0\n1.4\n16.3\nAlternative 1, by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nSouthcentral\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nProcessors\nAlaska\nAlaska\n26.3\n24.2\n24.5\n26.6\n26.3\n28.0\n26.1\n26.7\n30.7\n0.8\n-7.0\n-5.9\n2.2\n1.0\n7.5\n2.5\n17.9\nAlternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\n4.8-118\nProcessors\nProcessors\nKodiak\nKodiak\nIsland\nIsland\n6.2\n5.3\n4.6\n5.6\n6.2\n6.2\n8.8\n6.2\n7.2\n-15.3\n-26.9\n-10.6\n0.2\n-0.9\n40.7\n-0,5\n14.8\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nOther Aleutian\nOther Aleutian\nProcessors\nProcessors\nPen. and\nPen. and\n5.5\n5.4\n5.4\n5.0\n5.5\n5.3\n5.4\n5.4\n6.3\n-0.5\n-0.3\n-8.8\n0.3\n-2.5\n-0,5\n-1.2\n14.9\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\nProcessors\n4.0\n4.0\n3.6\n4.0\n4.0\n3.8\n3.9\n4.9\n4.1\n-0.5\n1.4\n-11.9\n0.0\n-1.4\n-2.4\n21.0\n-5.1\nAlternative\nAlternative\nJANUARY 2001\n2.2\n4.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.2\n6.1\n3\n1\n5\n3\n5","Table 4.8-9 Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Pot Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative,\nTable 4.8-10 Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Pot Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative 1,\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal\nTotal\n-33.8\n-79.5\n11.3\n10.2\n11.3\n11.3\n21.3\n11.3\n13.4\n88.8\n-9.9\n-0.5\n18.1\n7.5\n0.0\n0.0\n2.3\nProcessors\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nSoutheast\nAlaska\nAlaska\n0.7\n0.3\n0.0\n0.6\n0.7\n0.7\n1.6\n0.7\n0.8\n-51.7\n-100.0\n-17.7\n0.0\n126.9\n-1.0\n10.7\n0.1\nSouthcentral\nSouthcentral\nby Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nProcessors\nProcessors\nAlaska\nAlaska\n0.6\n0.4\n0.3\n0.5\n0.6\n0.6\n0.6\n0.8\n-32.7\n-51.3\n-11.2\n0.0\n0.0\n84.3\n-0.6\n31.3\n1.1\n4.8-119\nProcessors\nProcessors\nKodiak\nKodiak\nIsland\nIsland\n-51.6\n-99.7\n-17.7\n0.0\n126.6\n-1.2\n10.8\n3.0\n1.5\n0.0\n2.5\n3.0\n3.0\n6.9\n3.0\n3.4\n0.1\nBased on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nOther Aleutian\nOther Aleutian\nProcessors\nProcessors\nPen. and\nPen. and\n-17.7\n-48.3\n-4.2\n0.0\n0.0\n75.5\n-0.3\n34.4\n2.2\n1.8\n1.2\n2.2\n2.2\n3.9\n2.2\n3.0\n2.1\nLarge Bering\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\nProcessors\n-27.4\n-81.8\n-6.2\n0.0\n0.0\n65.5\n0.0\n14.4\n4.7\n3.4\n0.9\n4.4\n4.7\n4.7\n7.8\n4.7\n5.4\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nAlternative\nAlternative\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n5\n1","Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Trawl Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Trawl Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessell Value Relative to Alternative\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTotal\n169,7\n117.2\n141.5\n147.2\n147,4\n169.2\n198.8\n143.1\nTotal\n-30,9\n-84.0\n-16.6\n-13.2\n-15.6\n27.1\n-13.1\n17.2\n-0,3\nProcessors\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nSoutheast\nAlaska\nAlaska\n2.0\n1.4\n2.6\n1.9\n3.0\n3.9\n3.1\n3.1\n3.1\n-36.9\n-54,6\n-15.9\n-0.2\n-38,9\n-0.1\n-1.4\n24.9\n1, by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nSouthcentral\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nProcessors\nAlaska\nAlaska\n1.2\n0.7\n0.8\n1.0\n1.2\n1.2\n1.0\n1.2\n1.5\n-41.8\n-35.2\n-18.9\n0.0\n0.0\n-1.2\n25,5\n-15.1\nAlternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\n4.8-120\nProcessors\nProcessors\nKodiak\nKodiak\nIsland\nIsland\n18.6\n11.6\n7.4\n15.5\n18.6\n18.6\n11.4\n18.5\n22.5\n-37.4\n-60.3\n-16.4\n0.0\n-38,8\n-0.2\n21.2\n-0.1\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nOther Aleutian\nOther Aleutian\nProcessors\nProcessors\nPen. and\nPen. and\n8.8\n2.7\n15.2\n18.3\n18.3\n11.9\n19.0\n20.8\n-53.8\n-85.7\n-20.7\n-4.4\n-4.4\n-37,9\n-0.6\n8.9\n19.1\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\nProcessors\n127,7\n94.0\n14.8\n107,3\n106.3\n117.0\n127,4\n-26.3\n-88.4\n-16.0\n-16.9\n-16.8\n-8.4\n-0.2\n17.6\n106.1\n150.1\nTable 4.8-11\nTable 4.8-12\nAlternative\nAlternative\nJANUARY 2001\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n1\n3\n5","Gulf of Alaska Hook-and-Line Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005\nGulf of Alaska Hook-and-Line Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative 1, by Inshore Processor\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal\nTotal\n16.7\n68.7\n68.4\n64.4\n64.0\n69.8\n69.2\n73.8\n69,7\n-0.4\n-6.3\n-6.8\n80.1\n1.6\n0.8\n7.5\n1.5\nProcessors\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nSoutheast\nAlaska\nAlaska\n32.0\n32.4\n29.9\n32.4\n32.3\n32.6\n32.4\n37.2\n1.5\n-2.6\n-6.6\n1.5\n1.2\n2.0\n1.4\n16.3\n31.1\nSouthcentral\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nProcessors\nAlaska\nAlaska\n26.0\n26.2\n24.4\n26.5\n26.2\n27.9\n26.6\n30.6\n0.8\n-7.0\n-5.8\n2.2\n1.0\n7.5\n2.5\n17.9\n24.1\n4.8-121\nProcessors\nProcessors\nGroup and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nKodiak\nKodiak\nIsland\nIsland\n6.0\n5.0\n4.3\n5.3\n6.0\n5.9\n8.5\n5.9\n6.8\n-16.0\n-28.0\n-10.7\n0.2\n-0.9\n42.9\n-0.4\n14.5\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nOther Aleutian\nOther Aleutian\nProcessors\nProcessors\nPen. and\nPen. and\n3.9\n3.9\n3.9\n3.6\n3.9\n3.9\n3.8\n3.9\n4.5\n0.5\n0.3\n-7.9\n0.4\n-0.5\n-0.6\n0.1\n15.1\nAverage, in Millions of Dollars\nLarge Bering\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\nProcessors\n0.9\n0.9\n0.9\n0.8\n0.9\n0.9\n0.9\n0.9\n-0.5\n-0.4\n-8.5\n-1.0\n1.8\n-0.5\n14.5\n1.1\n-0.1\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTable 4.8-14\nTable 4.8-13\nAlternative\nAlternative\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n5\n1","Table 4.8-15 Gulf of Alaska Pot Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average, in\nGulf of Alaska Pot Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative 1, by Inshore Processor Group and\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTotal\nTotal\n114.7\n-40.3\n-75.4\n-13.8\n11.6\n23.0\n5.4\n3.2\n-0.9\n1.3\n4.7\n5.4\n5.4\n5.4\n6.6\n0.0\n0.1\nProcessors\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nSoutheast\nAlaska\nAlaska\n0.7\n0.3\n0.0\n0.6\n0.7\n0.7\n1.6\n0.7\n0.8\n-51.7\n-100.0\n-17.7\n0.0\n126.9\n-1.0\n10.7\n0.1\nSouthcentral\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nProcessors\nAlaska\nAlaska\n0.6\n0.4\n0.3\n0.5\n0.6\n0.6\n0.6\n1.1\n0.8\n-32.7\n-51.3\n-11.2\n0.0\n0.0\n84.3\n-0.6\n31.3\n4.8-122\nProcessors\nProcessors\nKodiak\nKodiak\nIsland\nIsland\n3.0\n1.5\n0.0\n2.5\n3.0\n3.0\n6.9\n3.0\n3.4\n-51.6\n-99.7\n-17.7\n0.0\n126.6\n-1.2\n0.1\n10.8\nAlternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nOther Aleutian\nOther Aleutian\nProcessors\nProcessors\nPen. and\nPen. and\n0.9\n0.9\n0.9\n0.9\n0.9\n0.9\n1.8\n0.9\n1.5\n-3.9\n-1.6\n-1.3\n0.0\n0.0\n89.3\n62.4\n-0.1\nMillions of Dollars\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\nProcessors\n0.2\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n-4.4\n-2.6\n-1.5\n0.0\n0.0\n89.7\n-0.5\n61.9\nTable 4.8-16\nAlternative\nAlternative\nJANUARY 2001\n2.2\n4.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.2\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n1\n5","Gulf of Alaska Trawl Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative 1, by Inshore Processor Group and\nJANUARY 2001\nGulf of Alaska Trawl Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average,\nTotal\n-48.2\n-18.9\n-39.6\n-68.1\nTotal\n-0.4\n16.1\n38.6\n20.0\n12.3\n31.3\n38.5\n38.6\n23.3\n38.4\n44.8\n-0.1\n-0.1\nProcessors\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nSoutheast\nAlaska\nAlaska\n-36.9\n-54.6\n-15.9\n-0.2\n-38.9\n-1.4\n24.9\n2.0\n1.4\n2.6\n1.9\n3.0\n3.9\n-0.1\n3.1\n3.1\n3.1\nSouthcentral\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nProcessors\nAlaska\nAlaska\n-41.8\n-35.2\n-18.9\n0.0\n0.0\n-1.2\n25.5\n1.2\n-15.1\n0.7\n0.8\n1.0\n1.2\n1.2\n1.0\n1.2\n1.5\n4.8-123\nProcessors\nProcessors\nKodiak\nKodiak\nIsland\nIsland\n-37.4\n-60.3\n-16.4\n0.0\n-38.8\n-0.2\n21.2\n-0.1\n18.6\n11.6\n7.4\n15.5\n18.6\n18.6\n11.4\n18.5\n22.5\nAlternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nOther Aleutian\nOther Aleutian\nProcessors\nProcessors\nPen. and\nPen. and\n-64.6\n-84.0\n-22.5\n-0.4\n5.8\n-0.1\n-0.1\n-46.1\n13.7\n4.8\n2.2\n10.6\n13.6\n13.6\n7.4\n13.6\n14.4\nin Millions of Dollars\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\nProcessors\n-56.6\n-72.2\n-21.3\n0.0\n0.0\n-20.0\n-0.1\n20.1\n2.0\n0.9\n0.6\n1.6\n2.0\n2.0\n1.6\n2.0\n2.5\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTable 4.8-18\nTable 4.8-17\nAlternative\nAlternative\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n5\n1","Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Hook-and-Line Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based\nTable 4.8-20 Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Hook-and-Line Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative 1, by\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTotal\nTotal\n-12.0\n5.0\n4.4\n-1.3\n-3.3\n-3.3\n20.1\n5.1\n4.9\n5.1\n5.1\n4.8\n4.9\n6.1\n0.7\n0.0\n-5.1\nProcessors\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nSoutheast\nAlaska\nAlaska\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nSouthcentral\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nProcessors\nInshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nAlaska\nAlaska\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n-8.6\n0.0\n0.0\n-8.6\n-1.0\n15.1\n4.8-124\nProcessors\nProcessors\nKodiak\nKodiak\nIsland\nIsland\n0.3\n0.3\n0.3\n0.2\n0.3\n0.3\n0.2\n0.3\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n-9.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-9.0\n-2.5\n21.7\non 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nOther Aleutian\nOther Aleutian\nProcessors\nProcessors\nPen. and\nPen. and\n1.6\n1.5\n1.6\n1.4\n1.6\n1.5\n1.6\n1.5\n1.8\n-1.7\n-10.9\n0.0\n-7.6\n-0.2\n-4.2\n14.4\n-3.1\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\nProcessors\n3.2\n2.7\n2.9\n3.0\n3.8\n3.1\n3.1\n3.1\n3.1\n-0.5\n2.0\n-12.9\n0.0\n-1.5\n-7.2\n-2.9\n23.0\nNotes: NA - data not available\nTable 4.8-19\nAlternative\nAlternative\nJANUARY 2001\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n1\n3\n5\n3\n5","Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Pot Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Pot Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative 1, by Inshore\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal\nTotal\n-27.9\n-83.3\n13.5\n-6.3\n65.1\n5.9\n4.3\n1.0\n5.5\n5.9\n5.9\n9.7\n5.9\n6.7\n0.0\n0.0\n-0.1\nProcessors\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nSoutheast\nAlaska\nAlaska\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nSouthcentral\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nProcessors\nAlaska\nAlaska\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nProcessor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\n4.8-125\nProcessors\nProcessors\nKodiak\nKodiak\nIsland\nIsland\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\n2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nOther Aleutian\nOther Aleutian\nProcessors\nProcessors\nPen. and\nPen. and\n1.3\n0.9\n0.2\n1.2\n1.3\n1.3\n1.3\n1.5\n-27.9\n-83.0\n-6.3\n0.0\n0.0\n65.3\n-0.4\n13.6\n2.1\nLarge Bering\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\nProcessors\n4.6\n3.3\n0.8\n4.3\n4.6\n4.6\n7.6\n4.6\n5.2\n-27.8\n-83.4\n-6.3\n0.0\n0.0\n65.0\n0.0\n13.5\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nNotes: NA - data not available\nTable 4.8-22\nTable 4.8-21\nAlternative\nAlternative\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n1\n3\n5","Table 4.8-23 Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Trawl Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group and Alternative, Based on\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Trawl Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative 1, by Inshore\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n110.2\nTotal\n108.7\n108.9\n119.9\n130.7\n154.0\n131.1\nTotal\n-25.9\n-88.7\n-15.9\n-17.0\n97.2\n14.8\n-17.1\n17.5\n-8.6\n-0.3\nProcessors\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nSoutheast\nAlaska\nAlaska\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nSouthcentral\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nProcessors\nAlaska\nAlaska\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\n4.8-126\nProcessors\nProcessors\nKodiak\nKodiak\nIsland\nIsland\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nProcessor Group, Based on 2001-2005 Average\n2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nOther Aleutian\nOther Aleutian\nProcessors\nProcessors\nPen. and\nPen. and\n-16.0\n-15.2\n5.5\n4.0\n0.6\n4.6\n4.6\n4.6\n4.5\n5.4\n6.4\n-26.7\n-89.9\n-15.3\n-17.4\n-1.0\n16.8\nLarge Bering\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\nProcessors\n125.6\n14.3\n-25.8\n-88.7\n-15.9\n-17.2\n-17.0\n-8.2\n-0.2\n17.5\n93.1\n105.7\n104.0\n104.2\n115.3\n125.3\n147.7\nNotes: NA - data not available\nTable 4.8-24\nAlternative\nAlternative\nJANUARY 2001\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n5\n1","JANUARY 2001\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group, Alternative and\nTotal\n0.02\n0.00\n0.02\n0.02\n0.02\n4.02\n3.83\n2.83\n3.80\n3.96\n3.96\n3.13\n3.93\n5.43\n1.39\n1.04\n0.37\n1.20\n1.23\n1.20\n1.43\n1.13\n1.65\n0.01\n0.01\n0.01\n0.01\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nAlaska\n0.46\n0.44\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.44\n0.43\n0.32\n0.44\n0.46\n0.69\n0.04\n0.04\n0.04\n0.04\n0.04\n0.04\n0.04\n0.04\n0.06\n0.31\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nAlaska\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.15\n0.15\n0.15\n0.14\n0.15\n0.15\n0.14\n0.13\n0.20\n0.06\n0.05\n0.04\n0.05\n0.06\n0.06\n0.07\n0.05\n0.07\nProcessors\nKodiak\nIsland\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n0.00\n2.15\n2.13\n1.67\n2.16\n2.15\n2.15\n1.65\n2.22\n3.00\n0.13\n0.09\n0.05\n0.12\n0.13\n0.13\n0.22\n0.18\n0.11\nSpecies Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\n4.8-127\nPen. and Aleutian\nOther Aleutian\nProcessors\nIslands\n0.00\n0.00\n0.34\n0.27\n0.19\n0.28\n0.35\n0.34\n0.17\n0.28\n0.38\n0.23\n0.15\n0.08\n0.19\n0.23\n0.20\n0.15\n0.18\n0.24\n0.01\n0.01\n0.01\n0.01\n0.01\n0.01\n0.01\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\n0.00\n0.92\n0.85\n0.50\n0.77\n0.87\n0.88\n0.87\n0.83\n1.16\n0.93\n0.16\n0.79\n0.77\n0.76\n0.95\n0.75\n1.10\n0.71\n0.01\n0.01\n0.01\n0.01\n0.01\n0.01\n0.01\n0.01\nAlternative\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n5\n3\n5\n3\n5\n3\n1\n1\n1\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nOther species\nOther species\nOther species\nOther species\nOther species\nOther species\nOther species\nOther species\nOther species\nTable 4.8-25\nSpecies\nFlatfish\nFlatfish\nFlatfish\nFlatfish\nFlatfish\nFlatfish\nFlatfish\nFlatfish\nFlatfish","Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group, Alternative\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n134.95\n112.46\n112.67\n112.85\n135.92\n161.05\n135.11\n41.42\n23.66\n34.94\n41.50\n41.39\nTotal\n30.04\n40.99\n45.47\n95.34\n20.30\n4.27\n3.45\n3.44\n3.60\n3.13\n3.45\n3.45\n3.04\n3.26\n4.08\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nAlaska\n1.85\n1.02\n1.56\n1.85\n1.85\n0.31\n1.97\n2.15\n1.81\n1.35\n0.65\n0.59\n1.07\n1.35\n1.35\n1.26\n1.35\n1.73\n1.27\n1.27\n1.28\n1.27\n1.24\n1.19\n1.52\n1.21\n1.27\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nAlaska\n2.02\n1.24\n0.84\n1.75\n2.02\n2.02\n3.72\n2.00\n0.78\n0.33\n0.44\n0.60\n0.78\n2.51\n0.78\n0.78\n0.97\n0.44\n0.42\n0.43\n0.44\n0.44\n0.47\n0.38\n0,57\n0.81\n0.41\nand Species Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nProcessors\nKodiak\nIsland\n10.93\n5.64\n0.97\n10.94\n10.94\n11.44\n10.80\n12.38\n9.11\n7.56\n3.37\n2.16\n7.56\n7.56\n7.54\n7.56\n9.50\n1.24\n1.28\n1.02\n1.20\n1.20\n0.85\n1.23\n1.34\n5.91\n1.21\n4.8-128\nPen. and Aleutian\nOther Aleutian\nProcessors\nIslands\n9.48\n4.12\n1.20\n7.78\n9.47\n9.42\n4.17\n9.44\n11.58\n6.44\n2.70\n9.30\n10.73\n10.74\n11.73\n11.58\n14.14\n0.26\n0.24\n0.30\n0.24\n0.26\n0.26\n0.23\n0.23\n0.32\n9.41\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\n17.14\n11.64\n0.94\n14.73\n17.22\n17.17\n8.74\n16.94\n19.02\n113.68\n84.55\n95.58\n92.25\n92.42\n114.58\n113.84\n134.72\n0.28\n0.27\n0.32\n0.26\n0.28\n0.28\n0.26\n0.23\n0.32\n14.41\nAlternative\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n1\n5\n3\n5\n1\n1\nTable 4.8-25 (Cont.)\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nJANUARY 2001\nSpecies\nRockfish\nRockfish\nRockfish\nRockfish\nRockfish\nRockfish\nRockfish\nRockfish\nRockfish\nPollock\nPollock\nPollock\nPollock\nPollock\nPollock\nPollock\nPollock\nPollock","Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Groundfish Exvessel Value by Inshore Processor Group, Alternative\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal\n69.47\n70.73\n67.54\n64.66\n70.52\n69.98\n69.54\n70.63\n80.68\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nAlaska\n30.83\n31.32\n29.99\n28.70\n31.30\n31.20\n31.29\n35.68\n31.31\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nAlaska\n24.43\n25.18\n23.10\n24.99\n24.68\n24.96\n25.15\n28.72\n23.41\nand Species Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nProcessors\nKodiak\nIsland\n5.85\n5.90\n5.82\n5.26\n5.86\n5.79\n5.82\n6.62\n5.31\n4.8-129\nPen. and Aleutian\nOther Aleutian\nProcessors\nIslands\n4.92\n4.89\n4.87\n4.49\n4,94\n4.88\n4.77\n4.92\n5,60\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\n3.44\n3.44\n3.44\n3.10\n3.44\n3.43\n3.43\n4.05\n3.21\nAlternative\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n1\nTable 4.8-25 (Cont.)\nSablefish\nSablefish\nSablefish\nSablefish\nSablefish\nSablefish\nSablefish\nSablefish\nSablefish\nSpecies","Table 4.8-26 Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative 1, by\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTotal\n-46.9\n-82.6\n-19.0\n-21.8\n-20.0\n-29.6\n-25.3\n-73.2\n-13.8\n-11.9\n-13.7\n-19.2\n-7.0\n-22.1\n-7.0\n13.3\n-4.6\n18.2\n-5.2\n-1.4\n35.3\n-1.4\n-2.2\n2.6\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nAlaska\n-70.0\n-100.0\n-22.0\n-0.2\n-100.0\n-20.3\n-13.3\n-0.1\n-10.7\n-2.2\n4.2\n-1.0\n-27.1\n-0.6\n-30.8\n3.5\n56.0\n-8.5\n-19.5\n-3.0\n-0.4\n-0.2\n-11.6\n43.6\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nAlaska\n-51.7\n-100.0\n-17.7\n0.0\n-100.0\n0.1\n-20.7\n10.7\n-1.8\n1.4\n-8.7\n0.0\n-0.6\n-8.3\n-10.6\n30.3\n-14.0\n-26.0\n-10.5\n1.3\n0.7\n22.8\n-18.7\n15.5\nInshore Processor Group ,Alternative and Species Based on 2001-2005 Average\nProcessors\nKodiak\nIsland\n-59.2\n-100.0\n-19.5\n0.0\n0.0\n-100.0\n-20.5\n1.9\n-1.0\n-22.4\n0.4\n-23.3\n-0.1\n-0.1\n3.2\n39.2\n-28.5\n-62.1\n-7.7\n0.0\n-16.9\n34.8\n-0.1\n66.1\n4.8-130\nPen. and Aleutian\nOther Aleutian\nProcessors\nIslands\n-59.5\n-75.8\n-21.2\n0.0\n-23.6\n-19.9\n-0.1\n12.4\n-46.2\n-19.0\n0.7\n-1.4\n-51.6\n-17.6\n11.6\n-35.6\n-64.3\n-14.3\n-21.7\n0.1\n-10.1\n-33.7\n-20.0\n4.6\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\n-25.2\n-87.6\n-15.7\n-18.8\n-18.7\n2.1\n-19.8\n18.3\n-8.0\n-46.3\n-17.1\n-5.4\n-5.0\n-6.4\n-10.6\n25.8\n-23.9\n-82.4\n-15.2\n-17.9\n-18.0\n1.7\n-19.6\n18.2\nAlternative\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n2.1\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n4.1\n6.2\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n5\n3\n5\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nAtka mackerel\nOther species\nOther species\nOther species\nOther species\nOther species\nOther species\nOther species\nOther species\nJANUARY 2001\nSpecies\nFlatfish\nFlatfish\nFlatfish\nFlatfish\nFlatfish\nFlatfish\nFlatfish\nFlatfish","Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal\n-42.9\n-89.7\n-15.6\n-27.5\n-29.3\n-85.0\n-16.7\n-16.5\n-16.4\n-11.9\n19.3\n18.3\n-1.0\n-0.4\n-9.3\n-0.2\n-5.6\n0.2\n-0.1\n9.8\n0.7\n4.3\n0.0\n0.1\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nAlaska\n-44.7\n-82.9\n-15.4\n0.0\n0.0\n6.5\n-2.0\n16.2\n-52.0\n-56.2\n-20.5\n0.0\n0.0\n-6.5\n0.3\n1.3\n-4.4\n0.3\n0.3\n-1.8\n-5.9\n20.3\n-0.1\n28.1\n1, by Inshore Processor Group ,Alternative and Species Based on 2001-2005 Average\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nAlaska\n-38.7\n-58.4\n-13.4\n0.0\n0.0\n84.0\n-0.9\n-57.7\n-43.4\n-22.7\n0.0\n0.0\n3.7\n0.2\n24.2\n-2.8\n-2.2\n-6.7\n1.2\n0.6\n6.7\n-12.9\n31.2\n24.1\nProcessors\nKodiak\nIsland\n-48.4\n-91.2\n-16.6\n0.0\n0.0\n4.7\n-1.3\n13.2\n-55.4\n-71.5\n-21.9\n0.0\n0.0\n-0.3\n0.0\n25.6\n2.6\n5.8\n-15.6\n-0.2\n-0.3\n-29.9\n2.2\n11.2\n4.8-131\nPen. and Aleutian\nOther Aleutian\nProcessors\nIslands\n-56.6\n-87.3\n-7.3\n-7.3\n1.4\n0.0\n22.2\n-8.3\n14.2\n-7.7\n-1.2\n-11.0\n-12.5\n-17.9\n0.0\n-0.7\n-56.0\n-0.4\n-0.7\n-44.4\n-76.7\n-19.7\n-0.1\n24.1\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\n-94.5\n-14.0\n0.5\n0.2\n-49.0\n11.0\n-25.6\n-87.3\n-15.9\n-18.9\n-18.7\n0.8\n18.5\n-4.9\n12.7\n-9.8\n-1.7\n-2.0\n-9.6\n-19.4\n13.7\n-32.1\n-1.1\n0.1\nAlternative\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n5\n3\n5\nTable 4.8-26 (Cont.)\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nRockfish\nRockfish\nRockfish\nRockfish\nRockfish\nRockfish\nRockfish\nRockfish\nSpecies\nPollock\nPollock\nPollock\nPollock\nPollock\nPollock\nPollock\nPollock","Table 4.8-26 (Cont.) Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Percent Change in Groundfish Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTotal\n-2.8\n-6.9\n16.1\n1.8\n1.5\n0.7\n0.1\n1.7\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nAlaska\n1.6\n-2.7\n-6.9\n1.5\n1.2\n1.5\n1.6\n15.8\n1, by Inshore Processor Group ,Alternative and Species Based on 2001-2005 Average\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nAlaska\n-4.2\n-5.4\n2.3\n1.0\n2.2\n3.0\n3.1\n17.6\nProcessors\nKodiak\nIsland\n0.9\n-0.5\n-10.0\n-1.0\n-0.5\n13.2\n0.1\n-9.1\n4.8-132\nPen. and Aleutian\nOther Aleutian\nProcessors\nIslands\n-0.5\n-1.0\n-8.7\n0.3\n-0.8\n-3.0\n-0.1\n13.8\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\n-10.0\n-0.4\n-6.9\n-0.3\n17.6\n-0.1\n-0.1\n-0.1\nAlternative\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\nJANUARY 2001\nSablefish\nSablefish\nSablefish\nSablefish\nSablefish\nSablefish\nSablefish\nSablefish\nSpecies","JANUARY 2001\nTable 4.8-27 Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Total Product Value by Processor Group and Alternative, Based on\nMotherships\nTOTAL\n1,207.4\n1,056.4\n1,070.2\n1,032.4\n1,196.5\n1,230.9\n1,457.3\n902.2\n311.1\n58.3\n43.6\n47.2\n47.3\n59.0\n58.5\n49.1\n69.1\n7.2\nPot Catcher/\nProcessors\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nAlaska\n36.4\n33.2\n30.0\n33.2\n36.8\n36.7\n36.7\n43.0\n3.0\n1.2\n3.8\n3.9\n7.5\n36.1\n4.1\n4.1\n4.1\n5.1\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nProcessors\nCatcher/\nLongline\nAlaska\n31.0\n27.7\n25.5\n28.3\n31.5\n31.2\n36.2\n31.5\n37.2\n82.8\n34.3\n83.0\n44.7\n125.0\n82.5\n106.6\n67.1\n73.1\n4.8-133\nFactory Trawlers\nHead-and-Gut\nProcessors\nKodiak\nIsland\n156.8\n86.4\n164.8\n156.8\n156.9\n139.3\n180.1\n212.2\n60.4\n36.4\n20.5\n50.5\n60.4\n60.3\n55.5\n60.6\n72.0\n121.1\n2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nAleutian Islands\nOther Aleutian\nFillet Factory\nProcessors\nTrawlers\nPen. and\n64.4\n33.4\n52.5\n62.4\n62.2\n47.3\n64.2\n71.6\n70.3\n52.0\n7.9\n58.2\n58.3\n64.5\n82.7\n59.1\n70.1\n15.1\nSurimi Factory\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\nTrawlers\n280.8\n216.9\n237.0\n228.2\n228.6\n282.4\n280.9\n331.7\n361.9\n267.6\n46.9\n304.9\n301.7\n343.8\n361.7\n302.1\n426.1\n36.1\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nAlternative\nAlternative\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n5\n1\n1","Table 4.8-28 Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Percent Change In Total Product Value Relative to Alternative 1, by\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nMotherships\nTOTAL\n-25.2\n-87.6\n-15.8\n-19.2\n-19.0\n-25.3\n-74.2\n-12.5\n-11.4\n-14.5\n18.4\n-0.9\n20.7\n1.1\n0.2\n1.9\nPot Catcher/\nProcessors\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nAlaska\n-8.8\n-17.7\n-8.8\n0.9\n-1.0\n1.1\n0.7\n18.0\n-27.9\n-7,5\n0.0\n-4.5\n-72.1\n80.6\n-0.3\n22.3\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nProcessors\nCatcher/\nLongline\nAlaska\n-10.7\n-17.8\n-8.6\n1.6\n0.7\n16.8\n1.6\n20.0\n-19.0\n-58.5\n-11.7\n0.2\n-46.0\n50.9\n-0.4\n28.7\nProcessor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\n4.8-134\nFactory Trawlers\nHead-and-Gut\nProcessors\nKodiak\nIsland\n-39.7\n-66.0\n-16.5\n0.0\n-0.1\n0.3\n19.3\n-8.1\n-22.7\n-44.9\n0.0\n-11.2\n14.8\n5.1\n35.3\n0.1\nAleutian Islands\nOther Aleutian\nFillet Factory\nProcessors\nPen. and\nTrawlers\n-76.6\n-18.5\n-3.2\n-3.4\n-26,6\n-48.1\n-0.3\n11.1\n-26.0\n-88.7\n-16.0\n-17.2\n-8.3\n-0.2\n17.6\n-17.1\nSurimi Factory\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\nTrawlers\n-26.0\n-87.0\n-15.7\n-16.6\n-16.5\n-5.0\n0.0\n17.8\n-22.8\n-15.6\n-18.7\n-18.6\n0.6\n0.0\n-87.1\n18.1\nAlternative\nAlternative\nJANUARY 2001\n2.2\n4.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.2\n6.1\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n5","JANUARY 2001\nTable 4.8-29 Gulf of Alaska Total Product Value by Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Millions of Dollars\nMotherships\nTOTAL\n218.5\n156.3\n122.5\n194.0\n219.3\n218.8\n205,4\n225.7\n266.8\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.1\nPot Catcher/\nProcessors\nProcessors\nSoutheast\n1.5\n0.7\n1.3\n1.5\n1.5\n1.5\n2.0\n36.4\n33.2\n30.0\n33.2\n36.8\n36.7\n36.7\n43.0\n36.1\n1.1\n3.1\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nProcessors\nCatcher/\nLongline\n16.2\n13.8\n15.3\n16.2\n16.0\n24.9\n16.2\n30.9\n27.6\n25.4\n28.3\n31.4\n31.2\n31.4\n36.1\n37.1\n16.1\n21.1\n4.8-135\nFactory Trawlers\nHead-and-Gut\nProcessors\nKodiak\n60.2\n36.2\n20.3\n50.3\n60.2\n55.3\n60.4\n71.8\n19.7\n18.4\n17.3\n22.9\n19.6\n19.7\n13.8\n32.3\n26.1\n60.1\nAleutian Islands\nOther Aleutian\nFillet Factory\nProcessors\nTrawlers\nPen. and\n0.0\n0.0\n46.0\n19.7\n11.9\n36.6\n46.0\n46.0\n45.9\n50.2\n29.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\nSurimi Factory\nLarge BSAI\nProcessors\nTrawlers\nPollock\n0.2\n7.3\n3.8\n3.0\n5.9\n7.3\n7.3\n6.7\n7.3\n9.0\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nAlternative\nAlternative\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n5\n1\n1","Table 4.8-30 Gulf of Alaska Percent Change In Total Product Value Relative to Alternative 1, by Processor Group and Alternative, Based on\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nMotherships\nTOTAL\n-55.8\n-65.0\n-43.9\n-21.7\n-28.4\n-11.2\n24.6\n-1.3\n-6.0\n22.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.2\n0.4\n0.2\n3.3\nPot Catcher/\nProcessors\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nAlaska\n-8.8\n-17.7\n-8.8\n0.9\n-1.0\n18.0\n1.1\n0.7\n-27.5\n-50.3\n-9.4\n0.0\n0.0\n107.9\n-0.5\n36.8\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nProcessors\nCatcher/\nLongline\nAlaska\n-10.8\n-17.9\n-8.6\n1.6\n0.7\n16.8\n1.6\n20.0\n0.4\n-14.2\n-4.9\n0.5\n-0.3\n54.8\n0.5\n31.0\n4.8-136\nFactory Trawlers\nHead-and-Gut\nProcessors\nKodiak\nIsland\n-39.9\n-66.3\n-16.5\n0.0\n0.3\n19.3\n-6.6\n-12.0\n15.9\n-0.4\n-0.2\n-29.9\n32.2\n63.8\n-0.1\n-8.1\nAleutian Islands\nOther Aleutian\nFillet Factory\nProcessors\nPen. and\nTrawlers\n-57.2\n-20.4\n-36.7\n-0.2\n9.2\n-55.3\n-64.3\n-21.6\n0.0\n0.0\n0.9\n0.2\n25.6\n-74.1\n-0.1\n-0.1\nSurimi Factory\n2001-2005 Average\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\nTrawlers\n-48.2\n-59.6\n-19.4\n0.0\n-49.4\n-0.1\n-8.9\n21.9\n-57.6\n-19.4\n0.8\n-0.2\n-3.5\n3.2\n38.6\n-0.1\nAlternative\nAlternative\nJANUARY 2001\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n5","Table 4.8-31 Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Total Product Value by Processor Group and Alternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average, in\nJANUARY 2001\nMotherships\nTOTAL\n1,005.2\n1,190.4\n988.9\n745.9\n188.6\n862,5\n850.9\n813.6\n991.0\n58.3\n43.6\n47.2\n58.9\n58.4\n69.0\n49.1\n47.1\n7.2\nPot Catcher/\nProcessors\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nAlaska\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n2.6\n1.9\n0.4\n2.5\n2.6\n2.5\n4.4\n2.6\n3.0\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nProcessors\nLongline\nCatcher/\nAlaska\n66.7\n50.9\n20.5\n57.8\n66.8\n28.7\n66.4\n85.5\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n100.1\n4.8-137\nFactory Trawlers\nHead-and-Gut\nProcessors\nKodiak\nIsland\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\n0.3\n102.7\n142.0\n137.3\n125.5\n154.0\n179.9\n137.1\n69.1\n137.1\nAleutian Islands\nOther Aleutian\nFillet Factory\nProcessors\nPen. and\nTrawlers\n70.2\n52.0\n7.9\n59.0\n58.2\n64.4\n82.6\n18.4\n13.8\n3.2\n15.9\n16.4\n16.3\n18.3\n21.4\n18.1\n58.1\n70.1\nSurimi Factory\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\nMillions of Dollars\nTrawlers\n354.5\n263.8\n43.9\n299.0\n294.3\n294.8\n354.3\n280.7\n216.9\n236.9\n228.0\n228.5\n282.3\n280.8\n331.5\n337.1\n417.1\n36.1\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nAlternative\nAlternative\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n5\n1\n1","Table 4.8-32 Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Percent Change In Total Product Value Relative to Alternative 1, by Processor Group and\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nMotherships\nTOTAL\n-25.2\n-87.6\n-15.8\n-19.2\n-19.0\n-24.6\n-80.9\n-12.8\n-14.0\n-17.7\n18.4\n20.4\n0.2\n1.1\n0.2\n1.6\nPot Catcher/\nProcessors\nProcessors\nSoutheast\nAlaska\n-28.2\n-84.3\n-6.4\n0.0\n65.3\n-0.2\n-7.1\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\n14.1\nSouthcentral\nProcessors\nProcessors\nLongline\nCatcher/\nAlaska\n0.0\n0.0\n-8.6\n0.0\n0.0\n-8.6\n-0.2\n15.2\n-23.7\n-69.2\n-13.3\n-57.0\n50.0\n-0.6\n0.1\n28.1\n4.8-138\nH&G Factory\nProcessors\nTrawlers\nKodiak\nIsland\n0.0\n0.0\n-9.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-9.0\n-1.6\n21.7\n-49.6\n3.6\n0.0\n-8.5\n12.3\n31.2\n-25.1\n0.1\nAlternative, Based on 2001-2005 Average\nAleutian Islands\nOther Aleutian\nFillet Factory\nProcessors\nPen. and\nTrawlers\n-25.4\n-82.8\n-13.9\n-11.8\n-25.9\n-88.8\n-15.9\n-17.2\n-17.1\n-8.3\n-0.2\n17.6\n-11.1\n-1.6\n-0.5\n15.9\nSurimi Factory\nLarge Bering\nSea Pollock\nProcessors\nTrawlers\n-25.6\n-87.6\n-15.7\n-17.0\n-16.8\n-4.9\n0.0\n17.7\n-22.7\n-87.2\n-15.6\n-18.8\n-18.6\n0.6\n0.0\n18.1\nNotes: NA - data not available\nProcessing\nAlternative\nGroup/\nAlternative\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n5\nJANUARY 2001","Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Island Percentage in Change in Annual Total Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative\nJANUARY 2001\nTable 4.8-33 Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Total Exvessel Value by Year and Alternative in Millions of Dollars\n(2001-2005)\n(2001-2005)\nAverage\nAverage\n-22.2\n-61.2\n-13.5\n-8.4\n-8.6\n-4.6\n255\n198\n220\n233\n233\n243\n255\n298\n0.1\n17.1\n99\n2005\n2005\n-60.8\n-11.3\n-5.9\n-6.6\n-3.7\n0.7\n13.9\n268\n219\n105\n238\n252\n258\n270\n306\n251\n-18.\n2004\n2004\n-17.2\n-60.0\n-10.9\n-4.4\n-3.6\n0.9\n11.8\n-4.1\n247\n205\n220\n237\n236\n238\n249\n276\n99\nYear\nYear\n4.8-139\n2003\n2003\n-18.6\n-60.3\n-11.0\n-5.8\n-5.8\n-4.8\n7.8\n-0.1\n246\n200\n219\n232\n232\n234\n246\n266\n98\n2002\n2002\n-24.3\n-62.7\n-13.8\n-10.2\n-10.2\n-4.9\n-0.4\n15.6\n253\n218\n227\n227\n240\n252\n292\n191\n94\n1 by Year and Alternative\n2001\n2001\n-32.4\n-62.0\n-20.6\n-15.7\n-15.7\n-5.7\n-0.4\n36.0\n259\n175\n206\n219\n219\n245\n258\n353\n98\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTable 4.8-34\nAlternative\nAlternative\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n5\n1","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTable 4.8-36 Gulf of Alaska Percent Change in Annual Total Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative 1, by Year and Alternative\n(2001-2005)\n(2001-2005)\nAverage\nAverage\n-18.7\n-11.2\n-30.7\n0.9\n0.5\n-3.5\n0.8\n16.8\n113\n92\n78\n100\n114\n113\n109\n114\n132\nTable 4.8-35 Gulf of Alaska Total Exvessel Value by Year and Alternative in Millions of Dollars\n2005\n2005\n-16.7\n-31.4\n-9.6\n1.5\n0.0\n-1.7\n2.0\n15.0\n123\n102\n84\n124\n123\n120\n125\n111\n141\n2004\n2004\n-16.3\n-32.3\n-10.4\n3.0\n2.3\n-1.4\n2.5\n14.7\n115\n96\n78\n103\n118\n118\n113\n118\n132\nYear\nYear\n4.8-140\n2003\n2003\n-18.8\n-29.9\n-13.5\n-4.5\n-0.4\n12.7\n-0.1\n-0.1\n110\n89\n77\n95\n110\n110\n105\n109\n124\n2002\n2002\n-19.7\n-29.6\n-10.8\n0.0\n0.0\n-4.9\n-0.3\n17.7\n105\n84\n74\n93\n105\n105\n100\n104\n123\n2001\n2001\n-30.3\n0.0\n0.0\n-5.4\n-0.4\n-22.1\n-12.1\n24.1\n105\n111\n87\n78\n98\n111\n111\n111\n138\nAlternative\nAlternative\nJANUARY 2001\n2.2\n4.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n1\n3\n5","JANUARY 2001\n(2001-2005)\n(2001-2005)\nTable 4.8-37 Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Total Exvessel Value by Year and Alternative in Millions of Dollars\nAverage\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Percent Change in Annual Total Exvessel Value Relative to Alternative 1, by\nAverage\n-85.3\n-15.4\n-15.8\n-15.8\n-5.4\n-0.4\n17.4\n-25.1\n142\n106\n120\n120\n120\n134\n142\n167\n21\n2005\n2005\n-20.0\n-85.4\n-12.7\n-12.2\n-12.2\n-5.4\n-0.5\n13.0\n146\n117\n21\n127\n128\n128\n138\n145\n165\n2004\n2004\n-17.9\n-11.3\n-10.3\n-10.3\n-5.6\n-0.5\n9.2\n-84.1\n132\n108\n119\n119\n125\n144\n21\n117\n131\nYear\nYear\n4.8-141\n2003\n2003\n-18.4\n-84.8\n-9.0\n-10.4\n-10.4\n4.0\n-5.1\n0.1\n136\n124\n122\n122\n130\n137\n142\n111\n21\n2002\n2002\n-17.4\n-27.5\n-15.9\n-17.4\n-5.0\n-0.5\n-86.1\n14.1\n148\n107\n124\n122\n122\n147\n169\n21\n141\nYear and Alternative.\n2001\n2001\n-40.2\n-85.9\n-27.0\n-27.6\n-27.6\n-5.9\n-0.5\n44.9\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n148\n88\n108\n107\n107\n139\n147\n214\n21\nTable 4.8-38\nAlternative\nAlternative\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n5\n1","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nGulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Percent Change in Annual total Product Value Relative to Alternative\nTable 4.8-39 Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Total Product Value by Year and Alternative in Millions of Dollars\n(2001-2005)\n(2001-2005)\nAverage\nAverage\n1207\n1056\n1070\n1032\n1196\n1457\n-25.3\n-74.2\n-12.5\n-11.4\n-14.5\n1231\n20.7\n902\n-0.9\n311\n1.9\n2005\n1256\n1122\n1149\n1107\n1248\n1284\n2005\n-21.5\n-74.7\n-10.7\n-11.8\n1461\n16.3\n-8.5\n-0.6\n985\n317\n2.2\n-20.0\n-73.2\n2004\n2004\n1156\n1049\n1075\n1039\n1146\n1183\n1311\n-10.1\n13.5\n-9.2\n-7.0\n-0.8\n924\n310\n2.4\nYear\nYear\n4.8-142\n-73.4\n2003\n-20.3\n-10.3\n2003\n1167\n1070\n1079\n1047\n1153\n1290\n1181\n10.5\n-8.3\n-7.5\n-1.2\n930\n310\n1.2\n-15.9\n2002\n-26.9\n-75.0\n-12.9\n-13.0\n2002\n1223\n1066\n1065\n1029\n1247\n1452\n1211\n18.7\n-1.0\n894\n306\n1.9\n1, by Year and Alternative\n-37.0\n-74.8\n-21.0\n-20.3\n-23.9\n1236\n1224\n1260\n1773\n2001\n43.5\n2001\n-1.0\n778\n312\n976\n984\n940\n2.0\nTable 4.8-40\nAlternative\nAlternative\nJANUARY 2001\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n3\n5\n1","JANUARY 2001\nTable 4.8-42 Gulf of Alaska Percent Change in Annual Total Product Value Relative to Alternative 1, by Year and Alternative\n(2001-2005)\n(2001-2005)\nAverage\nAverage\n-28.4\n-43.9\n-11.2\n218\n156\n123\n194\n219\n219\n205\n226\n267\n-6.0\n22.1\n0.4\n0.2\n3.3\nTable 4.8-41 Gulf of Alaska Total Product Value by Year and Alternative in Millions of Dollars\n2005\n2005\n-26.5\n-45.8\n-10.9\n19.2\n239\n176\n130\n213\n242\n239\n228\n249\n285\n-4.7\n0.9\n0.0\n4.1\n2004\n2004\n-26.7\n-45.6\n-10.3\n17.9\n225\n165\n122\n202\n228\n227\n213\n234\n265\n-5.3\n1.2\n1.0\n4.1\nYear\nYear\n4.8-143\n2003\n2003\n-27.8\n-42.5\n-13.3\n-6.6\n212\n18.1\n153\n122\n184\n198\n217\n250\n-0.1\n211\n211\n-0.1\n2.6\n2002\n2002\n-41.8\n-29.1\n-11.1\n23.8\n-0.2\n-0.2\n-6.6\n202\n143\n118\n180\n202\n202\n189\n208\n250\n2.7\n-32.5\n-43.3\n-10.5\n2001\n2001\n32.4\n214\n144\n-6.9\n122\n192\n214\n214\n199\n283\n221\n0.0\n0.0\n2.9\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nAlternative\nAlternative\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n5\n1","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n(2001-2005)\nTable 4.8-43 Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Total Product Value by Year and Alternative in Millions of Dollars\n(2001-2005)\nAverage\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands Percent Change in Annual Total Product Value Relative to Alternative 1, by\nAverage\n1005\n1190\n989\n746\n189\n862\n814\n-24.6\n-80.9\n-12.8\n-14.0\n851\n991\n-17.7\n0.2\n1.6\n20.4\n2005\n1016\n1020\n1035\n1176\n2005\n809\n188\n908\n907\n868\n-20.4\n-81.5\n-10.7\n-10.8\n-14.6\n0.3\n1.8\n15.7\n2004\n1046\n2004\n759\n188\n-18.4\n-79.8\n-8.9\n-9.0\n-12.8\n0.3\n1.9\n12.4\n931\n848\n847\n812\n933\n949\nYear\nYear\n4.8-144\n2003\n1039\n2003\n955\n-18.6\n-80.3\n-7.2\n-9.2\n777\n188\n886\n867\n836\n955\n964\n-12.5\n0.0\n0.9\n8.8\n2002\n1023\n1039\n2002\n1021\n1201\n-13.2\n886\n863\n-26.5\n-81.5\n-15.5\n-19.0\n1.8\n751\n189\n827\n0.1\n17.6\nYear and Alternative\n1024\n1040\n1489\n2001\n1021\n2001\n633\n190\n784\n770\n726\n-38.0\n-81.4\n-23.3\n-24.6\n-28.9\n0.3\n1.8\n45.8\nTable 4.8-44\nAlternative\nAlternative\nJANUARY 2001\n2.2\n4.2\n2.2\n4.2\n6.2\n2.1\n4.1\n6.2\n6.1\n2.1\n4.1\n6.1\n3\n3\n5\n1\n5","Table 4.8-45 Percent of Groundfish Catch on Observed Vessels off Alaska That Would Have Been\nDisplaced By Alternative 2.1 by Area (Only East of 170°W for the Bering Sea and\nAleutian Islands), Target and Vessel Class, 1997-1999\nGulf of Alaska\nFishery - Gear\nAleutian Islands\nBering Sea\n1999\n1997\n1998\n1999\nVessel Class\n1997\n1998\n1999\n1997\n1998\nPollock - Bottom Trawl\n0\n20\n6\n35\nCP < = 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n-\n37\n12\n76\nCP > 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n98\n33\n100\n97\n95\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n-\n90\n75\nCatcher > 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nPollock - Pelagic Trawl\n60\n52\n30\nCP > 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n76\n91\n99\n86\n62\n80\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n97\n83\n57\n38\n68\n44\nCatcher > 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n86\n63\n43\nMothership\n-\n-\n-\nPacific cod -Trawl\n71\n69\n53\n60\n2\n22\nCP < = 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n74\n72\n85\n20\n27\n5\nCP > 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n100\n100\n100\n63\n59\n36\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n100\n97\n96\n82\n52\nCatcher > 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n-\nPacific cod - Hook-and-line\n80\n46\n21\n63\n94\n56\nCP < = 124 ft\n-\n-\n47\n50\n37\n70\n15\n51\nCP > 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n87\n35\n49\n95\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCatcher > 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nPacific cod -Pot\n79\nCP < = 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n33\n42\n47\n26\nCP > 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n71\n70\n59\n100\n100\n100\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n98\n100\n98\n96\nCatcher > 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nNotes: Only fisheries with significant displacement are shown.\nCP - catcher/processor\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4-DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-145","4.8-46 Percent of Groundfish catch on observed Vessels Off Alaska That Would Have Been\nTable\nDisplaced by Alternative 2.1 by area (only west of 170°W for the Bering Sea and\nAleutian Islands), Target and Vessel Class, 1997-1999\nFishery - Gear\nAleutian Islands\nBering Sea\nGulf of Alaska\nVessel Class\n1997\n1998\n1999\n1997\n1998\n1999\n1997\n1998\n1999\nPacific cod -Trawl\n96\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCP < = 124 ft\n85\n81\n94\n1\n0\n0\n-\n-\n-\nCP > 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n89\n0\n100\n0\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCatcher > 124 ft\nPacific cod - Hook-and-line\n98\n98\n97\n4\n9\n1\n-\n-\n-\nCP < = 124 ft\n76\n82\n91\n9\n11\n10\n-\n-\n-\nCP > 124 ft\n98\n41\n12\n54\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n89\n0\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCatcher > 124 ft\nPacific cod -Pot\n28\n38\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCP < = 124 ft\n97\n18\n66\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCP > 124 ft\n99\n100\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n96\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCatcher > 124 ft\nAtka mackerel -Trawl\nCP < = 124 ft\n73\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCP > 124 ft\n80\n83\n51\n0\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nNotes: Only fisheries with significant displacement are shown.\nCP - catcher/processor\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-146","Table 4.8-47 Percent of Groundfish Catch on Observed Vessels Off Alaska That Would Have Been\nDisplaced By Alternative 3 by Area, Target, and Vessel Class, 1997-1999\nFishery - Gear\nAleutian Islands\nBering Sea\nGulf of Alaska\nVessel Class\n1997\n1998\n1999\n1997\n1998\n1999\n1997\n1998\n1999\nPollock - Bottom Trawl\n0\n53\n80\n0\nCP < = 124 ft\n-\n-\n26\n24\n19\nCP > 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n0\n0\n55\n43\n67\n0\n-\n-\n25\nCatcher > 124 ft\n0\n5\n-\n-\nPollock - Pelagic Trawl\nCP > 124 ft\n6\n20\n27\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n0\n8\n12\n16\n17\n27\n-\n0\n7\n17\n0\n1\n33\nCatcher > 124 ft\n-\n-\nMothership\n2\n20\n22\n-\n-\nPacific cod -Trawl\n0\n17\n26\n39\n26\n0\n0\nCP < = 124 ft\n7\n20\n24\n12\n14\n11\n0\n6\n0\nCP > 124 ft\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n0\n0\n0\n19\n9\n3\n-\n-\n5\nCatcher > 124 ft\n50\n0\n64\n1\n1\n5\n48\n82\nPacific cod - Hook-and-line\n61\n35\n14\n17\n16\n0\n0\n1\nCP < = 124 ft\n28\n34\n41\n0\n50\n18\nCP > 124 ft\n3\n23\n27\n32\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n0\n4\n41\n11\n18\n33\n7\n12\n-\n0\n0\n29\nCatcher > 124 ft\n-\n-\nPacific cod -Pot\nCP < = 124 ft\n91\n63\n11\n60\n100\n0\n0\n0\n6\n2\n3\n48\n73\nCP > 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n29\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n29\n13\n1\n0\n0\n7\n29\n-\n0\n0\n2\n0\n0\nCatcher > 124 ft\n0\n0\nSablefish - Hook-and-line\n24\n24\n33\nCP < = 124 ft\n30\n6\n19\n0\n20\n8\n26\n0\n0\n18\n12\nCP > 124 ft\n47\n25\n35\n8\n32\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n26\n10\n4\n0\n2\n41\n35\n34\nSablefish -Pot\n59\n0\nCP > 124 ft\n-\nRockfish -Trawl\n12\n0\n29\n27\n25\nCP > 124 ft\n9\n15\n8\n-\n3\n3\n1\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n-\n-\nRockfish - Hook-and-line\n43\n0\n0\n62\nCP > 124 ft\n0\n0\n-\n-\n-\n0\n0\n35\n0\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4-DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-147","Table 4.8-47 (Cont.) Percent of Groundfish Catch on Observed Vessels Off Alaska That Would Have\nBeen Displaced By Alternative 3 by Area, Target, and Vessel Class, 1997-1999\nFishery - Gear\nAleutian Islands\nBering Sea\nGulf of Alaska\nVessel Class\n1997\n1998\n1999\n1997\n1998\n1999\n1997\n1998\n1999\nTurbot -Trawl\nCP < = 124 ft\n0\n10\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCP > 124 ft\n68\n16\n5\n8\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nTurbot - Hook&line\nCP < = 124 ft\n2\n5\n6\n3\n3\n-\n-\nCP > 124 ft\n7\n16\n0\n3\n0\n-\n-\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n38\n0\n0\n0\n-\n-\n-\nAtka mackerel -Trawl\nCP > 124 ft\n30\n31\n9\n0\n0\nArrowroot -Trawl\nCP < = 124 ft\n0\n4\n0\n15\n3\n-\n-\n-\nCP > 124 ft\n47\n5\n3\n2\n23\n0\n-\n-\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n21\n0\n0\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nFlathead sole -Trawl\nCP < = 124 ft\n75\n55\n68\n29\n3\n0\n-\n-\nCP > 124 ft\n65\n38\n51\n4\n6\n-\n-\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n37\n24\n0\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nRock sole -Trawl\nCP < = 124 ft\n33\n10\n32\n-\n-\nCP > 124 ft\n17\n18\n31\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCatcher > 124 ft\n54\n-\n-\n-\n-\nYellowfin -Trawl\nCP < = 124 ft\n44\n59\n60\n-\n-\nCP > 124 ft\n52\n41\n42\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n50\n60\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCatcher > 124 ft\n62\n83\n93\n-\nRex sole -Trawl\nCP < = 124 ft\n33\n1\n0\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCP > 124 ft\n3\n2\n3\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nFlat deep -Trawl\nCP < = 124 ft\n11\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n29\n18\n15\n-\n-\n-\n-\nFlat shallow -Trawl\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n37\n40\n0\n-\n-\n-\nNotes: CP - catcher/processor\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-148","Table 4.8-48 Percent of Groundfish Catch on Observed Vessels Off Alaska That Would Have Been\nDisplaced By Alternative 4 By Area, Target and Vessel Class, 1997-1999\nGulf of Alaska\nFishery - Gear\nAleutian Islands\nBering Sea\nVessel Class\n1997\n1998\n1999\n1997\n1998\n1999\n1997\n1998\n1999\nPollock - Pelagic Trawl\n10\n12\n15\nCP > 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n24\n15\n8\n0\n0\n0\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n-\n-\n40\n20\n10\n0\n0\n0\nCatcher > 124 ft\n-\n-\n2\n4\n1\nMothership\n-\n-\n-\nNotes: Only fisheries with significant displacement are shown\nCP - catcher/processor\nTable 4.8-49 Percent of Groundfish Catch on Observed Vessels off Alaska That Would Have Been\nDisplaced by Alternative 5 by Area, Target and Vessel Class, 1997-99.\nBering Sea\nGulf of Alaska\nFishery - Gear\nAleutian Islands\nVessel Class\n1997\n1998\n1999\n1997\n1998\n1999\n1997\n1998\n1999\nAtka mackerel -Trawl\n15\n27\n21\n0\n0\nCP > 124 ft\nFlathead sole -Trawl\n13\n20\n11\n51\n68\n84\nCP < = 124 ft\n-\n-\n18\n23\n24\n77\n88\nCP > 124 ft\n-\n-\n4\n35\n1\nCatcher < = 124 ft\nRock sole -Trawl\n15\n3\n36\nCP < = 124 ft\n-\n-\n22\n2\n26\nCP > 124 ft\n-\n-\n0\n0\nCatcher > 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\nYellowfin -Trawl\n16\n1\n10\nCP < = 124 ft\n-\n17\n8\n21\nCP > 124 ft\n19\n0\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n-\n-\n13\n10\n0\nCatcher > 124 ft\nRex sole -Trawl\n73\n53\n35\nCP < = 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n40\n29\n17\nCP > 124 ft\n-\n-\n0\n68\n14\nCatcher < = 124 ft\nFlat deep -Trawl\n78\nCP < = 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n-\n48\n35\n37\nCatcher < = 124 ft\nFlat shallow -Trawl\n2\n15\n14\nCP < = 124 ft\n-\n75\nCP > 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n-\n13\n9\nCatcher < = 124 ft\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nNotes: Only fisheries with significant displacement are shown\nCP - catcher/processor\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4-DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-149","Table 4.8-50 Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Total Discards by Alternative and\nSpecies Based on 2001-2005 Average, in Metric Tons\nAlternative\nSpecies\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nAtka Mackerel\n6.60\n2.53\n1.59\n5.14\n6.59\n6.58\n5.70\n6.47\n8.48\nFlatfish\n76.66\n70.60\n46.44\n94.28\n76.23\n75.40\n69.46\n84.51\n103.64\nOther Species\n19.49\n15.63\n7.33\n20.11\n19.37\n14.25\n23.74\n17.44\n24.91\nPacific Cod\n6.11\n5.37\n3.03\n6.40\n6.06\n5.25\n6.42\n6.07\n8.47\nPollock\n31.25\n24.40\n9.08\n32.51\n30.12\n29.88\n19.93\n30.23\n38.91\nRockfish\n10.40\n6.28\n5.55\n8.09\n10.37\n10.27\n8.88\n9.16\n13.26\nSablefish\n1.01\n0.99\n0.98\n0.90\n1.02\n1.01\n0.86\n0.98\n1.17\nTotal Discards\n151.52\n125.80\n74.02\n167.42\n149.76\n142.64\n135.00\n154.86\n198.85\nTable 4.8-51 Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Total Discards Percent Change\nRelative to Alternative 1, by Alternative and Species Based on 2001-2005 Average, in\nMetric Tons\nAlternative\nSpecies\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nAtka Mackerel\n-61.6\n-75.9\n-22.1\n0.0\n-0.3\n-13,5\n-1.9\n28.6\nFlatfish\n-7.9\n-39.4\n23.0\n-0,6\n-1.6\n-9.4\n10.2\n35.2\nOther Species\n-19.8\n-62.4\n3.2\n-0,6\n-26.9\n21.8\n-10.5\n27.8\nPacific Cod\n-12.1\n-50.3\n4.8\n-0.8\n-14.0\n5.1\n-0.6\n38.7\nPollock\n-21.9\n-70.9\n4.0\n-3.6\n-4.4\n-36.2\n-3.3\n24.5\nRockfish\n-39.6\n-46.6\n-22.2\n-0.3\n-1.2\n-14.6\n-11,9\n27.6\nSablefish\n-2.1\n-2.9\n-10.9\n0.4\n-0.6\n-15.1\n-3.1\n16.0\nTotal Discards\n-17.0\n-51,1\n10.5\n-1.2\n-5.9\n-10.9\n2.2\n31.2\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-150","Table 4.8-52 Summary of Impacts of Alternatives on Fishing and Processing Sectors\nTotal\nGroundfish\nVolume (Thousands of mt)\nPayments\nExvessel\nOutput\nGroundfish\nto Labor\nAlternative\nValue\nValue\nEmployment\nPacific\n($Millions)\nPollock\nARSO\nFlatfish\n($Millions)\n(Millionsb)\nCod\nOutcome Under Alternative\n1\n1,309.4\n226.9\n151.2\n199.2\n546.3\n1,207.2\n577.5\n10,309\n2.1\n962.9\n153.3\n94.7\n190.6\n482,8\n902.0\n434,0\n8,750\n6,227\n2.2\n191.6\n39.4\n77.1\n121.3\n367,5\n311.1\n162.6\n504,4\n9,607\n3\n1,107.2\n208,2\n113.0\n234.2\n507.7\n1,056.3\n515,4\n9,807\n4.1\n1,085.0\n226.9\n151.0\n198,5\n520.2\n1,070.3\n1,032.2\n500.0\n9,605\n4.2\n1,085.0\n177.5\n145.0\n197,6\n519.8\n5\n1,309.0\n227.2\n140.5\n190.2\n534.3\n1,196.6\n568.0\n10,134\n10,356\n6.1\n1,309.4\n226.9\n149.1\n222.6\n546.7\n1,230.9\n587.1\n693,9\n11,221\n6.2\n1,559.8\n267.0\n190.9\n258,4\n595.3\n1,457.3\nChange from Alternative 1\n2.1\n-346.5\n-73,6\n-56,6\n-8.6\n-63,5\n-305,2\n-143,5\n-1,559\n-4,083\n2.2\n-1,117.8\n-187.5\n-74.2\n-77.8\n-178.8\n-896.1\n-414.9\n-703\n3\n-202.2\n-18.7\n-38.3\n35.0\n-38.6\n-150,9\n-73.1\n-62.0\n-503\n4.1\n-224.4\n0.0\n-0.2\n-0,6\n-26.1\n-136.9\n-175.0\n-77.4\n-704\n4.2\n-224,4\n-49.4\n-6.2\n-1.6\n-26,6\n5\n-0.4\n0.4\n-10.7\n-9.0\n-2.2\n-10.6\n-9.5\n-175\n47\n6.1\n0.0\n0.0\n-2.1\n23.4\n0.1\n23.7\n9.6\n6.2\n250.4\n40.1\n39.7\n59.2\n49,0\n250.1\n116.4\n912\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\n2.1\n-26.5\n-32,4\n-37.4\n-4.3\n-11.6\n-25.3\n-24.8\n-15.1\n2.2\n-85,4\n-82,6\n-49.0\n-39.1\n-32,7\n-74.2\n-71,8\n-39,6\n-6.8\n17.6\n-7.1\n-12.5\n-12,7\n3\n-15.4\n-8.2\n-25.3\n-10.7\n-4.9\n4.1\n-17.1\n0.0\n-0.2\n-0.3\n-4.8\n-11.3\n-14.5\n-13.4\n-6.8\n4.2\n-17.1\n-21.8\n-4.1\n-0.8\n-4.9\n-2.2\n-0.9\n-1,6\n-1.7\n5\n0.0\n0.2\n-7.1\n-4.5\n0.5\n6.1\n0.0\n0.0\n-1.4\n11.8\n0.1\n2.0\n1.7\n20.2\n8.8\n6.2\n19.1\n17.7\n26.2\n29,7\n9,0\n20.7\naincludes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species from inshore processors\nNotes:\nand motherships and is included as an indicator of dependence on groundfish relative to other major\nAlaska fisheries.\nThe numbers are summed wholesale values for catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships.\n'The numbers are sums of estimated position counts for catcher vessels and full-time equivalent\nemployment for catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships.\nARSO - Atka mackerel, rockfish, sablefish, and other groundfish\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4-DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-151","Employment\nincludes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species paid to groundfish catcher vessels or paid by inshore groundfish processors\nand motherships to all catcher vessels. Numbers were neither applicable nor available for catcher/processors. The all sector totals show the value for\nFor catcher vessels, the output value is the exvessel value of groundfish. For catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships, output values are\nthe wholesale value of production. For all sectors, the numbers shown are the summed wholesale values for catcher/processors, inshore processors, and\n'For catcher vessels, employment is the number of positions on vessels. For catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships, employment\nnumbers are full-time equivalents. For all sectors, the numbers shown are the sums of all three sectors and are neither counts of positions nor full-time\nGroundfish\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n10,309\n5,036\n3,182\n2,091\n(No. of\n2,836\n5,036\n194\n270\n194\n228\n396\n561\n357\nPayments to\n($Millions)\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n112.0\n223.5\n242.0\n577.5\nLabor\n112.0\n28.6\n39.0\n11.4\n18.1\n6.3\n4.2\n3.9\n0.4\ninshore processors and motherships. Adding the exvessel value of catcher vessels and processors would be double counting.\nGroundfish\n($Millionsb)\nOutput\n1,207.2\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nValue\n279,9\n594.8\n612.4\nExvessel\nValue\n279.9\n71.5\n97,5\n15.8\n10.5\n28.6\n45.3\n9.7\n1.0\nTable 4.8-53 Impacts of Alternative 1 on Fishing and Processing Sectors\nTable 4.8-54 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 1 on Catcher Vessels\nNotes: includes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species of groundfish catcher vessels.\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n436,5\n546.3\n546.3\n($Millions)\nTotal\nExvessel\nNA\nValue\n113.6\n436.5\nTotal\n78.0\n18.3\n17.9\n46,5\n98.1\n60.1\n4.0\nOutcome Under Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 1\n176.3\n199.2\n12.2\n22,9\n12.2\n1.6\n4.6\n1.0\n0.3\n4.1\n0.1\n0.5\n0.1\n(Thousands of mt)\nARSO\nRetained Tons\n18.1\n1.0\n2.7\n2.2\n0.4\n0.4\n4.4\n6.8\n0.2\n4.8-152\nVolume (Thousands of mt)\nARSO\n127.5\n151.2\n23.7\n18.1\nPacific\nCod\n15.5\n21.6\n13.2\n13.4\n13.6\n10.7\n91.1\n2.4\n0.6\nARSO - Atka makerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\nPacific Cod\nequivalents-the numbers are provided as indicators only.\n735.3\n292.1\n387,9\n36.3\n18.9\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n133,6\n226.9\n93.3\n91.1\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nPollock\n1,309.4\n735.3\n561.8\n747.6\nCatcher vessels with crab endorsements\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 ft to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nInshore and Motherships\nLongline catcher vessel\nmotherships.\nCatcher/processors\nPot catcher vessels\nCatcher vessels\nVessel Class\nVessel Class\nAll Sectors\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal\nNotes:","JANUARY 2001\nEmployment\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nPositions)\nPositions)\n(No. of\n(No. of\n2,004\n3,182\n2,091\n182\n816\n440\n392\n128\n102\n116\n711\n358\n25\nPayments to\nPayments to\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\n($Millions)\nLabor\nLabor\n223.5\n144.8\n242.0\n98.3\n25.8\n24.2\n12.4\n14.6\n20.4\n28.1\n62.7\n33.1\n1.2\nNotes: aincludes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species of processors that took deliveries of groundfish\nTable 4.8-56 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 1 on Inshore Plants and Motherships\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nWholesale\n($Millions)\nWholesale\n($Millions)\nValue\nValue\n280.8\n156.8\n594.8\n361.9\n612.4\n70.3\n82.8\nNotes: Exvessel value is not applicable to catcher/processors, but the column is included to be consistent with other tables.\n64.4\n60.4\n36.4\n58.3\n4.1\nTable 4.8-55 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 1 on Catcher/Processors\n31\n($Millions)\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nExvessel\nValue\nValue\nTotal\nTotal\n188.4\n112.5\n546.3\n83.4\n59.0\n70.7\n26.1\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nOutcome Under Alternative 1\nOutcome Under Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nFlatfish\n151.5\n176.3\n17.5\n22.9\n10.1\n1.2\n0.0\n1.5\n0.7\n1.9\n0.7\n6.1\n8.1\n4.8-153\n(Thousands of mt)\nARSO\n(Thousands of mt)\nARSO\n111.9\n127.5\n13.5\n23.7\n1.9\n0.2\n3.2\n1.7\n4.8\n6.8\n0.0\n7.1\nReported Tons\n0.1\nReported Tons\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPacific Cod\nPacific\n133.6\nCod\n10.8\n33.7\n79.4\n40.3\n20.9\n23.5\n93.3\n4.6\n3.7\n0.8\n5.1\n4.1\nPollock\nPollock\n426.6\n102.2\n561.8\n509.6\n128.6\n747.6\n30.3\n57.7\n40.3\n7.2\n2.7\n0.0\n4.1\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nNA - not available\nPot catcher/processors\nKodiak inshore plants\nVessel Class\nVessel Class\nMotherships\nTotal\nTotal\nplant","CHAPTER 4- DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n($Millions)\n'The two \"Processors Owned by Regional Residents\" columns show total volume and total output value by the processor owner's region. Output values\n1,090.8\nValue\nTotal\nNotes: The two \"Total Regional Processor\" columns show the employment and payments to labor of all inshore groundfish processing facilities in the region\n19.7\n53.6\n14.6\n0.4\n0\nThe six \"Regional Inshore Processing\" columns include totals for inshore processing in the region-inshore processors provide fish taxes based on\nProcessor\n(Regional Inshore) as well as all employment and payments to labor of catcher/processors and motherships owned by residents of the region.\n(Thousands\nVolume\n1,723.7\nof mt)\nTotal\n37.0\n78.3\n0.3\n8.9\n0\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\nfrom which operating cost and profits are taken are associated with the owners' regions rather than the processing location.\n271.8\n112.5\n59.0\n77.0\nExvessel Value\n0\n0\nGroundfish\nRegional Inshore Processing\n162.6\n28.0\n27.6\n35.6\nTable 4.8-57 Impacts of Alternative 1 on Regional Processing\n0\n0\nPollock\n567.4\n40.3\n7.2\n4.1\n0\n0\nPacific\nOutcomes Under Alternative 1\nCod\n23.5\n61.1\n3.7\n4.1\n0\n0\nVolume\nFlatfish\n10.1\n9.6\n0.7\n1.9\n4.8-154\n0\n0\nARSO\n5.0\n4.8\n6.8\n7.1\n0\n0\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\n($Millions)\nTotal Region Processor\nPayments\nto Labor\nOwnership of CP and\n(Regional Inshore +\n128\n200\n25\n16\n15\n0\nMotherships)\nexvessel value to the region in which they operate.\nEmployment\n(Est. FTEs)\n2,332\n1,920\n469\n259\n137\n0\nFTE - full-time equivalent\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nCP - catcher/processor\nWashington inland water\nMS - mothership\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nJANUARY 2001\nRegion\nIslands","JANUARY 2001\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n222.0\nTotal\n17.3\n53.7\n30.7\n61.8\n27.6\nGroundfish\n168.7\nTotal\n26.3\n10.5\n29.5\n21.6\n7.9\nHarvest Value\n($ Millions)\nGroundfish\nGOA\n19.8\n29.3\n32.0\n7.3\n8.4\n8.2\nTable 4.8-58 Impacts of Alternative 1 on Regional Catcher Vessels\nGroundfish\n136.7\nBSAI\n13.4\n0.6\n6.6\n2.2\n0.2\n(Thousands of\nOutcomes Under Alternative 1\nGOA\n21.3\n43.7\n47.9\n26,7\n7.3\n6.0\nHarvest\nVolume\nmt)\nNotes: All information in the table is associated with regions through the owner's address.\n583.4\nBSAI\n22.0\n47.5\n0.5\n4.2\n0.1\n4.8-155\nEmployment and Payments\nPayments to\n($Millions)\nLabor\n10.5\n11.8\n67.5\n4.2\n8,6\n3.1\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nto Labor\nEmployment\nPositions)\n(No. of\n1,380\n349\n767\n944\n147\n171\nBSAI - Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nGOA - Gulf of Alaska\nWashington inland water\nmt - metric tons\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nRegion","Notes anIncludes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species. Numbers were not applicable for catcher/processors. The all sector totals\nFor catcher vessels the output value is the exvessel value of groundfish. For catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships output values are\nand\n'For catcher vessels, employment is the number of positions on vessels. For catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships, employment numbers\nare full-time equivalents. For all sectors, the numbers shown are the sums of all three sectors and are neither counts of positions nor full-time\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\n-1,041.6\n-1,559.2\nthe wholesale value of production. For all sectors, the numbers shown are the summed wholesale values for catcher/processors, inshore processors,\n-517.6\n5,036\n1,574\n2,140\n8,750\n-24.8\n-32.7\n-15.1\n0.0\n0.0\nshow the value for inshore processors and motherships. Adding the exvessel value of catcher vessels and processors would be double counting.\nPayments to\n($Millions)\nLabor\n-143.5\n172.9\n174.6\n434.0\n-25.4\n-50.6\n-67.5\n86.5\n-22.7\n-22.6\n-27.9\n-24.8\nOutput Value\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\n-134.7\n-170,5\n-305.2\n216.4\n441.9\n902.0\n460.1\n-63.5\n-22.7\n-22.6\n-27.8\n-25.3\nTable 4.8-59 Impacts of Alternative 2.1 on Fishing and Processing Sectors\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1 Under Alternative 2.1\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n372.9\n482.8\n482.8\n-63.5\n-63.5\n-63.5\nTotal\n-14.6\n-11.6\n-11.6\nNA\nNA\nNA\nChange from Alternative 1 Under Alternative 2.1\nOutcome Under Alternative 2.1\nFlatfish\n170.8\n190.6\n-13.7\n11.5\n19.8\n-0.8\n-5.4\n-8.6\n-6.2\n-4.3\n-3.1\n-3.1\nVolume (Thousands of mt)\n4.8-156\nARSO\n-55.5\n-56.6\n-43.5\n-37.4\n17.9\n22.6\n72.1\n94.7\n-0.2\n-1.0\n-4.6\n-1.1\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPacific\n153.3\n-38.9\n-34.6\n-39.0\n-73.6\n-42.7\n-25.9\n-41.8\n-32.4\nCod\n52.2\n99.0\n54.3\nequivalents-the numbers are provided as indicators only.\nPollock\n-214.6\n-128.0\n-218.5\n-346.5\n520.7\n433.8\n962.9\n529.1\n-29.2\n-22.8\n-29.2\n-26.5\nNA - not applicable\nInshore and motherships\nInshore and motherships\nInshore and motherships\nmt - metric tons\nCatcher/processors\nCatcher/processors\nCatcher/processors\nmotherships.\nCatcher vessels\nCatcher vessels\nCatcher vessels\nAll Sectors\nAll Sectors\nAll Sectors\nJANUARY 2001\nSector","JANUARY 2001\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n2,836.0\n5,036.0\n194.0\n270.0\n194.0\n228.0\n396.0\n561.0\n357.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n-10.8\n-25.4\n20.8\n28.2\n11.4\n17.4\n86.5\n-7.8\n-2.5\n-2.6\n-0.9\n-0.7\n3.8\n1.6\n3.0\n0.3\n0.0\n-0.1\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n216.4\n-19.5\n-63.5\n-27.1\n52.0\n70.4\n28.5\n43.5\n-6.3\n-6.4\n-2.2\n-1.8\n-0.2\n-0.1\n9.6\n7.5\n0.8\n4.1\nTable 4.8-60 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 2.1 on Catcher Vessels\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n111.8\n372.9\nTotal\n-19.5\n-63.5\n-27.1\n58.5\n71.0\n11.5\n57.9\n46.4\n12.1\n-6.3\n-6.4\n-2.2\n-1.8\n-0.2\n-0.1\n3.8\nOutcome Under Alternative 2.1\nFlatfish\n11.5\nChange from Alternative 1\n-0.2\n-0.4\n-0.8\n-0.1\n1.4\n4.2\n1.0\n0.3\n0.4\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-0.1\n0.0\n4.1\n0.1\nARSO\nRetained Tons\n17.9\n-0.2\n-0.2\n4.8-157\n-0.1\n-0.1\n0.0\n(Thousands)\n0.9\n2.5\n2.3\n0.2\n0.4\n4.5\n6.8\n0.2\n0.0\n0.0\n0.1\n0.1\nPacific\n-38,9\n52.2\nCod\n10.0\n13.4\n-5.5\n-8.2\n-6.3\n-4.2\n-1.0\n-4.3\n-0.3\n-9.1\n6.9\n4.3\n9.4\n1.4\n6.4\n0.4\nPollock\n-107.9\n-214.6\n213.6\n280.0\n520.7\n-78.5\n-17.7\n-10.4\n18.6\n8.5\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nLongline catcher vessel\nLongline catcher vessel\nPot catcher vessels\nPot catcher vessels\nVessel Class\nTotal\nTotal","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0,0\n0.0\n0.0\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n-27.3\n-27.8\n-39,6\n-60,9\n-22.7\n-16,9\n-22,7\n-0,3\n-4.1\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nTable 4.8-60 (Cont.) Summary of Impacts of Alternative 2.1 on Catcher Vessels\nValue\n-16.9\n-27.3\n-27.8\n-39,6\n-60,9\n-22.7\n-22.7\n-0.3\n-4.1\nNotes: includes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species of groundfish catcher vessels.\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\n-25.0\n-27.6\n-34.2\n-35.7\n-14.6\n-3.7\n-0.2\n-1.6\n-4.3\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\n-14.2\n-11.1\n-7.6\n-1.9\n-4.3\n-1.2\n-3,7\n-6.0\n-6.2\nARSO\nRetained Tons\n-46.8\n-8.4\n-5.2\n-1.2\n-1,0\n4.8-158\n(Thousands)\n1.9\n0.3\n1.7\n1.4\nPacific\n-35.3\n-37.8\n-47,4\n-68.0\n-30.9\n-43.2\n-40.5\n-43,0\n-42,7\nCod\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n-26.9\n-27.8\n-48,9\n-55,0\n-31.7\n-51.0\n-50.6\n-48.6\n-29.2\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nLongline catcher vessel\nPot catcher vessels\nVessel Class\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal","JANUARY 2001\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n-24.8\n1,574\n-22.0\n-25.8\n-27.3\n-23.7\n-27.9\n-156\n-223\n-518\n555\n135\n593\n273\n-47\n-85\n18\n-7\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n-22.6\n172.9\n-22.4\n-14.3\n-50.6\n-22.8\n-26.0\n-22.8\n-19.0\n-26,8\n75.9\n20.8\n48.4\n26.8\n-7.3\n-6.3\n-0.3\n0.9\nGroundfish\nWholesale\n($Millions)\n-134.7\nNotes: value is not applicable to catcher/processors, but the column is included to be consistent with other tables.\nValue\n216.9\n121.1\n460.1\n-63.9\n-18.3\n-35.7\n-15.7\n-22.8\n-26.0\n-22.8\n-19.0\n-26.8\n-22.6\n52.0\nTable 4.8-61 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 2.1 on Catcher/Processors\n67.1\n-1.1\n3.0\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nOutcome Under Alternative 2.1\nFlatfish\nChange from Alternative 1\n147.4\n170.8\n-28.0\n-28.0\n16.9\n-0.7\n-0.3\n-0,3\n-5.4\n-3.7\n-2.7\n-5.5\n-3.1\n-4.1\n0.0\n0.9\n5.7\n0.0\n4.8-159\n(Thousands of mt)\nARSO\n-52.2\n-55.5\n-40.7\n-31.5\n-46,7\n-17.9\n-43.5\n-25.1\n59.7\n11.1\n72.1\n-0.8\n-2.4\n-0.1\n0.0\n1.1\n0.1\n0.1\nReported Tons\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPacific\n-20.6\n-34.6\n-28.0\n-32.9\n-22.8\n-26.0\n-27.9\n-25.9\nCod\n58.8\n99.0\n26.1\n-1.3\n-3.5\n-7.7\n-1.4\n3.3\n7.2\n3.6\nPollock\n-128.0\n328.6\n433.8\n-98.0\n-25.8\n-23.0\n-25.2\n-11.2\n-27.5\n-22.8\n-28.1\n76.4\n26.9\n-3.4\n-0.8\n2.0\n0.0\n0.0\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nNA - not applicable\nPot catcher/processors\nPot catcher/processors\nPot catcher/processors\nmt - metric tons\nVessel Class\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n-1,041.6\n(No. of\n-536.4\n-228.2\n-172.2\n1,468\n2,140\n-50.2\n-25.5\n-29.2\n-26.8\n-51.8\n-44.0\n-39.2\n-25.0\n-25.2\n-32.7\n212\n219\n78\n76\n87\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n107.0\n174.6\n-37,7\n-12.4\n-67.5\n13.4\n-10.6\n-25.2\n-27.9\n14.6\n13.3\n15.3\n-26.1\n-48.1\n-39,7\n11.1\n-9.6\n-1.3\n-1.3\n-5.1\n-8.8\nNotes: aincludes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species of processors that took deliveries of groundfish.\nTable 4.8-62 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 2.1 on Inshore Plants and Motherships\nGroundfish\nWholesale\n($Millions)\nValue\n-170.5\n267.6\n441.9\n-94.3\n-31.0\n-24.0\n-14.7\n33.4\n36.4\n27.7\n33.2\n43.6\n-26.1\n-39,7\n-10.6\n-25.2\n-27.8\n-48.1\n-3.3\n-3.2\n-8.8\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\n153.6\n111.4\n482.8\n-34,8\n-11.0\n-63.5\n-18.5\n-25.2\n72.4\n49.4\n76.5\n19.5\n-13,1\n-16.3\n-11.6\n-9.6\n-0.5\n-1.1\n-6.6\n-0.7\n-0.9\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 2.1\n-23.2\n-43,2\n-25.2\n-13.7\n19.8\n-1.9\n-0,6\n-0.4\n-0.2\n-3,5\n-5.6\n6.3\n0.8\n9.7\n0.7\n1.8\n0.5\nChange from Alternative 1\n0.0\n-0.1\n-3.1\n-3.1\n(Thousands of mt)\nARSO\n-21.6\n-20.3\n-25.2\n22.6\n-0,7\n-0.4\nReported Tons\n2.5\n1.4\n6.9\n4.8\n6.9\n0.0\n-0.1\n-1,9\n-4.6\n0.0\n0.0\n-1.1\n0.0\n1.3\n0.1\n4.8-160\nPacific\n-13.0\n-12.0\n-10.7\n-39.0\n-32.3\n-57.7\n-45.5\n-38.0\n-40.4\n-26.0\n-41.8\nCod\n27.3\n12.8\n54.3\n-1.4\n-1.7\n-0.2\n8.8\n2.3\n2.4\n0.6\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n-131,5\n-218.5\n378.1\n529.1\n-26.4\n-22.2\n-32.4\n-25.8\n-45.7\n-57.7\n-51.3\n-25.2\n-29.2\n31.4\n96.2\n-55.1\n18.1\n-2.4\n-3.7\n1.7\n3.5\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nmt - metric tons\nKodiak inshore plants\nKodiak inshore plants\nKodiak inshore plants\nVessel Class\nMotherships\nMotherships\nMotherships\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal","JANUARY 2001\n($Millions)\nProcessors Owned by\nRegional Residents\n-279,3\nValue\n811.5\nTotal\n-14.9\n14.9\n38.7\n13.7\n-4.8\n-0.9\n0.3\n-0.1\n0\n0\n(Thousands\nVolume\n1277.7\nof mt)\n-446,0\nTotal\n-22.3\n28.4\n56.0\n-0.1\n-8.6\n-1.6\n0.2\n7.3\n0\n0\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n226.0\n111.4\n-45.8\n49.4\n76.5\n-9.6\n-0,5\n0.0\n0.0\n-1.1\n0.0\n0.0\nExvessel Value\n($Millions)\nGroundfish\nTable 4.8-63 Impacts of Alternative 2.1 on Regional Processing\n116.9\n-45.8\n18.4\n34.5\n27.1\n-9.6\n-0.5\n0.0\n0.0\n-1.1\n0.0\n0.0\nRegional Inshore Processingb\nPollock\n-157.9\n409.5\n-22.2\n-2.4\n-3.7\n18.1\n1.7\n3.5\n0\n0\n0\n0\nOutcomes Under Alternative 2.1\n(Thousands of mt)\nPacific\nChange from Alternative 1\n-25.0\n-10.7\nCod\n12.8\n-1.4\n-1.7\n36.1\n2.3\n2.4\n0\n0\n0\n0\nVolume\n4.8-161\nFlatfish\n-2.5\n-0.4\n-0.1\n7.1\n9.7\n0.7\n1.8\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nARSO\n-0.2\n-1.1\n3.9\n6.9\n4.8\n6.9\n0.1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n($Millions)\nPayments\nTotal Regional Processor\nto Labor\n153\n-37\n-47\n16\n13\n13\n-9\n-3\n-2\n(Regional Inshore +\n91\nOwnership of CP &\n0\n0\nMotherships)\nEmployment\n(Est. FTEs)\n1,602\n1,598\n-730\n-322\n-191\n278\n173\n103\n-86\n-34\n0\n0\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nAlaska Peninsula and\nAlaska Peninsula and\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nRegion","Notes: aThe two \"Total Regional Processor\" columns show the employment and payments to labor of all inshore groundfish processing facilities in the region\n\"The six \"Regional Inshore Processing\" columns include totals for inshore processing in the region-inshore processors provide fish taxes based on exvessel\n'The two \"Processors Owned by Regional Residents\" columns show total volume and total output value by the processor owner's region. Output values from\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n($Millions)\nProcessors Owned by\nRegional Residents\nValue\nTotal\n-25.0\n-24.4\n-27.8\n-25.6\n-6.2\n0\n(Regional Inshore) as well as all employment and payments to labor of catcher/processors and motherships owned by residents of the region.\n(Thousands\nVolume\nof mt)\nTotal\n-33.3\n-23.2\n-28.5\n-18.0\n-25.9\n0\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n-16.8\n-16.3\n-0.7\n-0.9\nExvessel Value\n0.0\n0.0\n($Millions)\nwhich operating cost and profits are taken are associated with the owners' regions rather than the processing location.\nTable 4.8-63 (Cont.) Impacts of Alternative 2.1 on Regional Processing\nGroundfish\n-34.3\n-28.1\n-1.9\n-3.0\n0.0\n0.0\nRegional Inshore Processing\nPollock\n-27.8\n-58.5\n-55.1\n-51.4\n0\n0\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nPacific\n-40.9\n-45.5\n-37.8\n-41.5\nCod\n0\n0\nVolume\nFlatfish\n4.8-162\n-26.0\n-4.0\n-5.3\n0\n0\n0\nARSO\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\n-22.0\n-2.8\n1.5\n0\n0\n0\n($Millions)\nPayments\nTotal Regional Processor\nto Labor\n-28.9\n-36.0\n-18.8\n-13.3\n-23.5\n(Regional Inshore +\nOwnership of CP &\n0\nMotherships)\nvalue to the region in which they operate.\nEmployment\n(Est. FTEs)\n-31.3\n-40.7\n-33.2\n-24.8\n-16.8\n0\nFTE - full-time equivalent\nWashington inland water\nmt - metric tons\nAlaska Peninsula and\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nAleutian Islands\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nJANUARY 2001\nRegion","JANUARY 2001\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n-17.9\nTotal\n182.2\n-39.8\n-24.9\n-13.8\n-25.0\n13.0\n46.3\n20.7\n29.1\n62.1\n-4.3\n-7.4\n-1.6\n-6.9\n-5.2\n0.3\n0.5\nGroundfish\n128.9\nTotal\n-39.8\n-54.4\n-15.2\n-23.6\n-31.9\n18.9\n-28.1\n29.8\n14.7\n-4.3\n-7.4\n-1.6\n-6.9\n3.6\n8.9\n0.3\n1.0\nHarvest Value\n($Millions)\nGroundfish\nGOA\n-57.5\n-29.8\n-15.5\n-17.2\n-37.8\n13.9\n29.6\n26.5\n-4.2\n-5.9\n-1.3\n-5.5\n0.3\n-3.1\n1.0\n3.1\n7.1\n5.1\nTable 4.8-64 Impacts of Alternative 2.1 on Regional Catcher Vessels\nGroundfish\n102.4\nBSAI\n-34.3\n-16.7\n-24.2\n-18.2\n-27.6\n-25.1\n-1.6\n-0.4\n-3.7\n0.5\n5.0\n1.8\n0.2\n-0.1\n9.7\n0\n0\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\n-49.4\nGOA\n-12.4\n-19.0\n-24.2\n-13.2\n-58.2\n-43.5\n-39.7\n-50.5\n(Thousands of mt)\n24.7\n23.7\n13.5\n-2.9\n-0.4\nOutcomes Under Alternative 2.1\n-6.7\n8.9\n4.4\n5.6\nHarvest Volume\nChange from Alternative 1\nNotes: All information in the table is associated with regions through the owner's address.\n4.8-163\n-147.9\n435.5\n-12.9\n-20.0\n-25.9\n-26.2\n-25.4\n-27.2\nBSAI\n16.3\n34.6\n-5.7\n0.4\n-0.1\n-1.1\n3.1\n0.1\n0\n0\nPayments to\n($Millions)\nLabor\n-27.6\n-16.0\n-54.8\n-16.7\n-23.7\n-31.4\nPayments to Labor\n11.9\n51.5\n-1.7\n-2.9\n-0.7\n-2.7\n1.4\n7.6\n3.5\n5.9\n0.8\n0.1\nEmployment and\nEmployment\nPositions)\n(No. of\n1380\n349\n767\n944\n147\n171\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nBSAI - Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nGOA - Gulf of Alaska\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nmt - metric tons\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nRegion","Notes: includes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species. Numbers were not applicable for catcher/processors. The all sector totals\nFor catcher vessels the output value is the exvessel value of groundfish. For catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships output values are\nthe wholesale value of production. For all sectors, the numbers shown are the summed wholesale values for catcher/processors, inshore processors, and\n'For catcher vessels, employment is the number of positions on vessels. For catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships, employment numbers\nare full-time equivalents. For all sectors, the numbers shown are the sums of all three sectors and are neither counts of positions nor full-time\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\n-1,466.3\n-2,615.6\n-4,081.9\n5,036\n6,227\n-82.2\n-70.1\n-39.6\n625\n566\n0.0\n0.0\nshow the value for inshore processors and motherships. Adding the exvessel value of catcher vessels and processors would be double counting.\n($Millions)\nPayments\nto Labor\n-184.3\n-159.0\n-414.9\n162.6\n-71.5\n-63.9\n-71.2\n-76.2\n-71.8\n40.4\n64.4\n57.7\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nOutput\nValue\n-178.8\n-428.9\n-467.2\n165.9\n145.2\n-896.1\n101.1\n311.1\n-63.9\n-76.3\n-74.2\n-72.1\nTable 4.8-65 Impacts of Alternative 2.2 on Fishing and Processing Sectors\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n-178.8\n-178.8\n-178.8\nTotal\n257.7\n367.5\n367.5\n-41.0\n-32.7\n-32.7\nNA\nNA\nNA\nFlatfish\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\n109.3\n121.3\n-66.9\n-10.9\n-77.8\n-34.5\n-38.0\n-47.5\n-39.1\n12.0\n-4.2\n8.0\nOutcome Under Alternative 2.2\nChange from Alternative 1\nVolume (Thousands of mt)\nARSO\n-70.6\n-74.2\n-55.4\n-15.0\n-49.0\n17.0\n56.9\n20.1\n77.1\n-1.1\n-3.6\n-5.8\n4.8-164\nPacific Cod\n-103.9\n-187.5\n-82.7\n-83.5\n-90.8\n-77.8\n-89.6\n-82.6\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\n29.7\n39.4\n8.4\n9.7\nequivalents-the numbers are provided as indicators only.\nPollock\n-1,117.8\n-625.4\n-636.7\n109.9\n110.9\n191.6\n-481.1\n-85.6\n-85.2\n-85.4\n-85.1\n80.7\nNA - not applicable\nInshore and motherships\nInshore and motherships\nInshore and motherships\nmt - metric tons\nCatcher/processors\nCatcher/processors\nCatcher/processors\nmotherships.\nCatcher vessels\nCatcher vessels\nCatcher vessels\nVessel Class\nAll Sectors\nAll Sectors\nAll Sectors\nJANUARY 2001","JANUARY 2001\nEmployment\nPersons)\n2,836.0\n5,036.0\n(No. of\n194.0\n270.0\n194.0\n228.0\n396.0\n561.0\n357.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n-24.9\n-71.5\n-33.3\n10.7\n15.9\n40.4\n-4.3\n-3.6\n-2.4\n-0.7\n-2.2\n3.7\n5.7\n2.0\n0.6\n1.4\n0.3\n-0.1\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nExvessel\n-178.8\nValue\n101.1\n-62.3\n-83.3\n-10.8\n14.2\n26.8\n39.8\n-8.9\n-6.0\n-1.8\n-5.5\n-0.2\n9.2\n5.0\n1.6\n3.6\n0.8\nTable 4.8-66 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 2.2 on Catcher Vessels\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n-178.8\n257.7\nTotal\n108.1\n-62.3\n-83.3\n-10.8\n15.7\n14.8\n54.0\n44.7\n-8.9\n-6.0\n-1.8\n-5.5\n-0.2\n7.5\n3.7\n9.1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 2.2\n-1.0\n-0.8\n-0.3\n-4.2\n0.6\n2.5\n3.3\n0.8\n0.3\n0.4\n8.0\n-2.1\n0.0\n0.0\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.1\n0.1\nChange from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nRetained Tons\nARSO\n17.0\n-0.3\n-0.5\n-0.2\n-1.1\n0.7\n2.2\n2.3\n0.4\n4.3\n6.6\n0.3\n0.0\n-0.1\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.1\n0.1\n4.8-165\nPacific\n-15.3\n-21.0\n-13.0\n-11.4\n-82.7\n-12.1\nCod\n-2.0\n-7.5\n-0.5\n0.2\n0.6\n0.4\n2.2\n0.4\n3.2\n0.2\n8.4\n1.1\nPollock\n-625.4\n-252.7\n-333.5\n109.9\n-26.0\n-13.1\n39.4\n54.4\n10.3\n5.7\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nLongline catcher vessel\nLongline catcher vessel\nPot catcher vessels\nPot catcher vessels\nVessel Class\nTotal\nTotal","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nPersons)\n(No. of\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0,0\n0.0\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n-85.4\n-68,4\n-84,6\n-62,5\n-87.1\n-12.1\n-24.4\n-63.9\n-6.2\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nTable 4.8-66 (Cont.) Summary of Impacts of Alternative 2.2 on Catcher Vessels\nExvessel\nValue\n-68.4\n-84.6\n-62,5\n-87.1\n-85.4\n-24.4\n-63.9\n-12.1\n-6.2\nNotes: includes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species of groundfish catcher vessels.\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\n-79.9\n-84.9\n-49.5\n-41.0\n-59,1\n-10.1\n-3.8\n-4.8\n-6.2\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\n-63.2\n-46,3\n-19.7\n-24.6\n-13.3\n-34.5\n13,3\n-0.8\n6.5\n(Thousands of mt)\nRetained Tons\nARSO\n-25,3\n-17.8\n-62.3\n14.6\n-2,5\n-2.0\n-5.8\n4.7\n-2.1\n4.8-166\nPacific\n-98.5\n-91.3\n-97.0\n-84.0\n-82.6\n-70.2\n-70,9\n-90.8\n-97.1\nCod\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n-86.5\n-86.0\n-71.7\n-69.7\n-84.6\n-88.7\n-83,6\n-79,4\n-85.1\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nLongline catcher vessel\nmt - metric tons\nPot catcher vessels\nVessel Class\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal","JANUARY 2001\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n-1,466\n-85.8\n-88.4\n-50.9\n-73.4\n-610\n-415\n-263\n-72.1\n-70.1\n625\n-161\n101\n401\n-18\n95\n21\n7\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\n-159.0\nLabor\n-85.6\n-25.0\n-28.2\n-19.4\n-88.8\n-44.9\n-58.6\n-70.7\n-71.2\n-87.1\n12.6\n34.6\n13.7\n64.4\n-0.9\n3.2\n0.4\nGroundfish\nWholesale\n($Millions)\n-244.7\nValue\n-428.9\nNotes: Exvessel value is not applicable to catcher/processors, but the column is included to be consistent with other tables.\n165.9\n-62.4\n-70.4\n-48.5\n-88.8\n-44.9\n-58.6\n-70.7\n-87.1\n-72.1\nTable 4.8-67 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 2.2 on Catcher/Processors\n86.4\n34.3\n-2.9\n36.1\n7.9\n1.2\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 2.2\n109.3\n-10.6\n-54.8\n-66.9\n-60.3\n-91.8\n-36.2\n-83.3\n-38.0\n96.7\n-0.5\n-8.2\n-1.1\n6.9\n5.6\n0.0\n0.0\n0.1\nChange from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nReported Tons\nARSO\n-61.8\n-70.6\n-74.5\n-97.2\n-55.3\n-53.0\n-73.4\n-55.4\n56.9\n50.1\n-1.4\n-0.2\n-7.2\n-0.1\n0.5\n0.0\n6.4\n0.0\n4.8-167\nPacific\n-103.9\n-21.0\n-10.7\n-64.3\n-91.3\n-99.2\n-62.2\n-81.0\n-77.8\n-72.1\nCod\n12.7\n29.7\n-4.2\n-3.6\n15.1\n0.4\n1.4\n0.1\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n-373.5\n-481.1\n-89.6\n-15.7\n-87.6\n-87.6\n-51.8\n-84.2\n-85.6\n-82.1\n12.6\n14.6\n80.7\n-2.3\n53.1\n0.4\n0.0\n0.0\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nNA - not applicable\nPot catcher/processors\nPot catcher/processors\nPot catcher/processors\nmt - metric tons\nVessel Class\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n-1,773.2\n(No. of\n-2,615.6\n-361.9\n-284.3\n-101.5\n-87.6\n-88.5\n-82.2\n-53.1\n-41.6\n-72.6\n-41.4\n-40.8\n-82.2\n107\n231\n566\n78\n75\n60\n14\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n-126.0\n-184.3\n-19.7\n-16.0\n18.8\n10.2\n12.0\n-17.9\n-76.6\n-87.0\n57.7\n-17.7\n-17.6\n-87.7\n-76.2\n-66.1\n6.0\n8.2\n2.5\n-2.2\n-2.6\nNotes: includes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species of processors that took deliveries of groundfish.\nTable 4.8-68 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 2.2 on Inshore Plants and Motherships\nGroundfish\nWholesale\n($Millions)\nValue\n-315.0\n-467.2\n145.2\n-49.3\n-39.9\n46.9\n20.5\n-87.0\n25.5\n30.0\n-51.1\n-76.6\n-17.7\n-17,6\n-87.7\n-76.3\n15.1\n-66.1\n-5.5\n-6.4\n7.2\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n-178.8\nTotal\n109.2\n367.5\n-116.1\n-17.8\n-16.2\n-22.8\n-61.6\n72.3\n-21.4\n65.6\n42.9\n74.4\n-27.4\n-87.6\n-32.7\n-2.6\n-3.3\n3.2\n-3.3\n-2.9\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 2.2\n-10.9\n-81.9\n-70.9\n-22.5\n-87.6\n-47.5\n12.0\n-21.1\n-6.7\n-1.0\n-0.4\n1.5\n0.4\n7.9\n0.6\n1.4\n-2.1\n-0.6\n0.1\n0.0\n-6.7\nChange from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nReported Tons\nARSO\n-67.9\n-87.6\n-15.0\n20.1\n-31.1\n-2.2\n-0.5\n-0.4\n-0.3\n-0.2\n1.0\n1.2\n-3.6\n6.7\n4.5\n-5.0\n-2.4\n6.7\n0.0\n0.0\n-6.1\n4.8-168\nPacific\n-38.3\n-18.5\n-20.6\n-83.5\n-95.2\n-88.8\n-87.7\n-57.6\n-77.6\n-87.8\n-89.6\nCod\n-3.2\n1.9\n2.3\n2.9\n1.6\n0.9\n9.7\n-2.1\n-0.7\n0.1\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n-445.6\n-112.7\n-636.7\n110.9\n-43.9\n-28.7\n-87.4\n13.8\n11.5\n15.9\n-76.1\n-71.3\n-43.6\n-55.7\n-87.6\n-85.2\n64.1\n-1.8\n-4.0\n2.3\n3.2\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nmt - metric tons\nKodiak inshore plants\nKodiak inshore plants\nKodiak inshore plants\nVessel Class\nMotherships\nMotherships\nMotherships\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal","JANUARY 2001\nTotal Value\n($Millions)\nProcessors Owned by\nRegional Residents\n-844.6\n246.2\n-10.2\n-25.2\n28.4\n11.1\n-0.2\n-3.5\n0.2\n9.5\n0\n0\n(Thousands\nVolume\n-1372,8\nof mt)\n350.9\nTotal\n-19.8\n-40.8\n17.2\n37.5\n-0.2\n-5.1\n3.8\n0.1\n0\n0\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n-134.0\n137.8\n109.2\n-16.2\n42.9\n74.4\n-2.6\n-3.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nExvessel Value\n($Millions)\nRegional Inshore Processingb\nTable 4.8-69 Impacts of Alternative 2.2 on Regional Processing\nGroundfish\n-134.0\n-16.2\n28.7\n11.8\n32.3\n25.1\n-2.6\n-3.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nPollock\n-489.5\n-28.8\n77.9\n11.5\n-1.8\n-4.0\n2.3\n3.2\n0\n0\n0\n0\nOutcomes Under Alternative 2.2\n(Thousands of mt)\nChange from Alternative 1\nPacific\n-56.8\n-20.6\nCod\n-3.2\n-2.1\n4.3\n2.9\n1.6\n0.9\n0\n0\n0\n0\nVolume\nFlatfish\n4.8-169\n-7.7\n-2.2\n-0,5\n-0.1\n1.9\n7.9\n0.6\n1.4\n0\n0\n0\n0\nARSO\n-2.8\n-0.4\n-0.3\n-0,1\n2.2\n6.7\n4.5\n6.7\n0\n0\n0\n0\n($Millions)\nPayments\nto Labor\n(Regional Inshore +\nOwnership of CP &\n-109\n-153\n-15\n19\n10\n10\n47\n11\n-6\n-4\n0\n0\nTotal Regional\nMotherships)\nProcessor\nEmployment\n(Est. FTEs)\n-2,037\n1088\n-326\n-127\n-832\n295\n143\n132\n-68\n69\n0\n0\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nRegion","The two \"Total Regional Processor\" columns show the employment and payments to labor of all inshore groundfish processing facilities in the region\nThe six \"Regional Inshore Processing\" columns include totals for inshore processing in the region-inshore processors provide fish taxes based on exvessel\nfrom\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTotal Value\n($Millions)\nProcessors Owned by\nRegional Residents\n-50.0\n-51.8\n-47.0\n-24.0\n-77.4\n'The two \"Processors Owned by Regional Residents\" columns show total volume and total output value by the processor owner's region. Output values\n0\n(Regional Inshore) as well as all employment and payments to labor of catcher/processors and motherships owned by residents of the region.\n(Thousands\nVolume\nof mt)\nTotal\n-66.7\n-53.5\n-52.1\n-57.3\n-79.6\n0\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n-49.3\n-27.4\n-3.3\n-2.9\n0.0\n0.0\nExvessel Value\nwhich operating cost and profits are taken are associated with the owners' regions rather than the processing location.\n($Millions)\nTable 4.8-69 (Cont.) Impacts of Alternative 2.2 on Regional Processing\nRegional Inshore Processingb\nGroundfish\n-82.4\n-57.8\n-9.3\n-9.2\n0.0\n0.0\nPollock\n-86.3\n-71.5\n-43.9\n-55.6\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\n0\n0\n(Thousands of mt)\nPacific\nCod\n-93.0\n-87,7\n-56.8\n-78.0\n0\n0\nVolume\nFlatfish\n4.8-170\n-80.2\n-21.8\n-14.3\n-26.3\n0\n0\nARSO\n-56.0\n-5.6\n-6.3\n-1.5\n0\n0\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\n($Millions)\nPayments\nto Labor\n(Regional Inshore +\nOwnership of CP &\n-85.2\n-60.0\n-37.5\n-26.7\n-76.5\n0\nTotal Regional\nMotherships)\nProcessor\nEmployment\n(Est. FTEs)\n-87.3\n-69.5\n-49.0\n-49,6\n-43.3\n0\nvalue to the region in which they operate.\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nFTE -- full-time equivalent\nCP - catcher/processor\nWashington inland water\nmt - metric tons\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nJANUARY 2001\nRegion\nNotes:","JANUARY 2001\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n-126.7\n-16.7\nTotal\n-14.7\n-35.8\n-27.4\n-11.4\n-60.5\n-57.1\n39.0\n27.2\n60.6\n95.3\n10.9\n11.1\n-6.2\n-3.5\n-1.2\n-1.9\nGroundfish\n-126.7\nTotal\n-14.7\n-16.7\n-78.5\n-55.9\n-33.3\n-77.3\n11.6\n28.3\n42.0\n-75.1\n-6.2\n-3.5\n-1.2\n-4.1\nHarvest Value\n1.7\n7.0\n4.9\n($Millions)\nGroundfish\nGOA\n-82.2\n-48.0\n-29.8\n-26.9\n-56.1\n10.3\n28.0\n23.4\n-6.0\n-9.5\n-2.5\n-1.3\n-8.6\n-4.6\n-4.4\n1.3\n5.9\n3.6\nTable 4.8-70 Impacts of Alternative 2.2 on Regional Catcher Vessels\nGroundfish\n-118.1\n-12.2\nBSAI\n-50.0\n-80.3\n-50.0\n-86.4\n-91.0\n18.6\n50.0\n-0.3\n-5.3\n-1.1\n0.3\n1.3\n0.3\n1.2\n1.1\n0.1\nHarvest Volume\nGOA\n-17.0\n-27.5\n-31.3\n-17.2\n-79.8\n-62.9\n-63.0\n-13.3\n-65.3\n-64.4\n16.2\n16.6\n-4.6\n-0.8\n4.3\n2.7\n5.2\n9.5\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\n(Thousands\nof mt)\nOutcomes Under Alternative 2.2\nChange from Alternative 1\n-512.2\n-19.0\n-42.8\n-60.0\n-86.4\n-83.3\n-87.8\nBSAI\n71.2\n-90.1\n-0.3\n-3.5\n0.2\n3.0\n0.7\n0.1\n4.7\n0\n0\nNotes: All information in the table is associated with regions through the owner's address.\n4.8-171\n($Millions)\nPayments\nto Labor\nPayments to Labor\n-50.7\n-77.4\n-56.2\n-33.3\n-77.9\n11.3\n16.8\n-75.1\n-2.4\n-5.9\n-1.4\n-0.5\n-6.7\n-4.2\n0.7\n4.6\n2.8\n1.9\nEmployment and\nEmployment\nPositions)\n(No. of\n1,380\n349\n767\n944\n147\n171\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nBSAI - Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nGOA - Gulf of Alaska\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nmt - metric tons\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nOregon coast\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nRegion","Notes: includes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species. Numbers were not applicable for catcher/processors. The all sector totals\nFor catcher vessels the output value is the exvessel value of groundfish. For catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships output values are\nthe wholesale value of production. For all sectors, the numbers shown are the summed wholesale values for catcher/processors, inshore processors, and\nFor catcher vessels, employment is the number of positions on vessels. For catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships, employment numbers\nare full-time equivalents. For all sectors, the numbers shown are the sums of all three sectors and are neither counts of positions nor full-time\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\n-187.0\n-515.7\n-702.7\n5,036\n1,904\n2,666\n9,607\n-16.2\n-8.9\n0.0\n-6.8\n0.0\nshow the value for inshore processors and motherships. Adding the exvessel value of catcher vessels and processors would be double counting.\nPayments to\n($Millions)\nLabor\n202.9\n204.9\n504.4\n-15.4\n-20.6\n-13.8\n-15.3\n-12.7\n96.5\n-37.1\n-73.1\n-9.2\nOutput Value\nGroundfish\n($Millionsb)\n1,056.3\n-150.9\n241.3\n537.8\n518.5\n-38.6\n-57.0\n-93.9\n-13.8\n-15.3\n-12.5\n-9.6\nTable 4.8-71 Impacts of Alternative 3 on Fishing and Processing Sectors\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1 Under Alternative 3\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n397.9\n507.7\n507.7\n-38.6\n-38.6\n-38.6\nTotal\n-8.8\nNA\nNA\nNA\n-7.1\n-7.1\nChange from Alternative 1 Under Alternative 3\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 3\n213.3\n234.2\n11.7\n20.9\n37.0\n35.0\n21.0\n-0.6\n-2.0\n17.6\n-4.7\n-8.7\nVolume (Thousands of mt)\nARSO\n113.0\n-36.0\n-38.3\n-10.2\n-28.2\n-25.3\n16.2\n91.6\n21.4\n-1.8\n-2.3\n-9.8\n4.8-172\nPacific\n129.3\n208.2\n-15.9\n-14.5\n-14.4\n-18.7\n-15.4\nCod\n76.6\n78.9\n-4.3\n-3.2\n-8.2\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n1,107.2\n-122.3\n-202.2\n-124.3\n613.0\n483.9\n623.3\n-15.4\n-77.9\n-16.6\n-13.9\n-16.6\nequivalents-the numbers are provided as indicators only.\nNA - not applicable\nInshore and motherships\nInshore and motherships\nInshore and motherships\nmt - metric tons\nCatcher/processors\nCatcher/processors\nCatcher/processors\nmotherships.\nCatcher vessels\nCatcher vessels\nCatcher vessels\nVessel Class\nAll Sectors\nAll Sectors\nAll Sectors\nJANUARY 2001","JANUARY 2001\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n2,836.0\n5,036.0\n194.0\n270.0\n194.0\n228.0\n396.0\n561.0\n357.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0,0\n0.0\n0,0\n0.0\n0.0\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n-15.4\n24.0\n32.7\n10.6\n16.8\n96.5\n-4,6\n-6.3\n-0,9\n-0.3\n-0.8\n-1.4\n-1.1\n0.0\n5.3\n3.3\n3.6\n0.4\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nExvessel\n241.3\nValue\n-11.6\n-15.8\n-38,6\n59.9\n81.7\n26.5\n41.9\n-2.7\n-2.2\n-0.8\n-3,4\n13.1\n-2.1\n-0.1\n8.3\n8.9\n0.9\nTable 4.8-72 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 3 on Catcher Vessels\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n110.2\n397.9\n-11.6\n-15.8\n-38.6\nTotal\n66.4\n82.3\n15.6\n15.8\n59.3\n44.4\n-2.7\n-2.2\n-0.8\n-3.4\n-2.1\n-0.1\n3.9\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 3\n11.7\n-0.2\n-0.6\n-0.1\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n-0.1\n-0.1\n0.0\n1.5\n4.4\n1.0\n0.2\n0.4\n0.0\n4.1\n0.1\nChange from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nRetained Tons\nARSO\n16.2\n-0.2\n-0.5\n-0.4\n-0.3\n-0.4\n-1.8\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.8\n2.2\n1.8\n0.3\n0.4\n6.3\n0.2\n4.1\n4.8-173\nPacific\n-14.5\n10.6\n12.5\n76.6\nCod\n12.9\n17.9\n11.0\n-2.7\n-3.7\n-2.2\n-2.9\n-0.4\n-1.5\n-1.1\n-0.1\n9.2\n0.6\n2.1\nPollock\n-122.3\n613.0\n244.9\n324.5\n-47.3\n-63,5\n28.8\n14.7\n-7.5\n-4.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nLongline catcher vessel\nLongline catcher vessel\nPot catcher vessels\nPot catcher vessels\nVessel Class\nTotal\nTotal","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n-16.2\n-16.2\n-17.0\n-20.8\n-10.9\n-13.8\n-7.9\n-7.2\n-7.6\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nTable 4.8-72 (Cont.) Summary of Impacts of Alternative 3 on Catcher Vessels\nValue\n-16.2\n-16.2\n-17.0\n-20.8\n-10.9\n-13.8\n-7.9\n-7.2\n-7.6\nNotes: includes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species of groundfish catcher vessels.\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\n-14.8\n-14.7\n-12.2\n-16.1\n-1.3\n-4.4\n-3.0\n-2.8\n-8.8\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\n-20.3\n-20.7\n-17,0\n-26,5\n-7.9\n-4.3\n-1.8\n-1.4\n-4.7\n(Thousands of mt)\nRetained Tons\nARSO\n-17.6\n-17.7\n-17.0\n-20,9\n-10.2\n-7.3\n-6.6\n-4.2\n-6.1\n4.8-174\nPacific\n-16,9\n-21.5\n-14.5\n-13.9\n-14.7\n-15.9\n-17.1\n-17.1\nCod\n-7.9\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n-16.2\n-16.4\n-20.5\n-21.8\n-17,5\n-17.4\n-17.0\n-16.6\n-8.1\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nLongline catcher vessel\nmt - metric tons\nPot catcher vessels\nVessel Class\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal","JANUARY 2001\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n1,904\n-15.0\n-15.9\n-106\n-187\n-2.4\n-8.4\n-7.5\n-8.9\n604\n153\n796\n328\n-29\n-20\n-30\n23\n-2\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n202.9\n-15.3\n-20.6\n-15.6\n-15.9\n-11.7\n83.0\n23.6\n65.9\n29.2\n-4.5\n-3.9\n-7.3\n-9.2\n3.2\n-0.1\n1.1\n5.1\nGroundfish\nWholesale\n($Millions)\nNotes: Exvessel value is not applicable to catcher/processors, but the column is included to be consistent with other tables.\nValue\n164.8\n537.8\n-43.8\n-11.2\n-57.0\n-15.6\n-15.9\n-11.7\n-9.7\n-0.3\n-7.3\n-9.6\n237\n59.1\n73.1\n3.8\n8.0\n5.1\nTable 4.8-73 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 3 on Catcher/Processors\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 3\n192.3\n213.3\n-16.2\n-52.6\n40.8\n26.9\n21.0\n17.1\n-0.4\n-0.2\n-3.2\n37.0\n-2.3\n-6.4\n1.0\n2.9\n0.0\n0.0\nChange from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nReported Tons\nARSO\n-34.2\n-36.0\n-18.5\n-16.7\n-30.6\n-28.2\n77.7\n12.2\n91.6\n-0.3\n-1.3\n-9.9\n-5.8\n1.5\n0.0\n0.0\n0.1\n0.1\n4.8-175\nPacific\n129.3\n-15.7\n-16.9\nCod\n37.0\n74.8\n-0.7\n-1.8\n-4.6\n-0.4\n-4.3\n-5.8\n-7.5\n-3.2\n3.9\n8.9\n4.7\n3.3\n9.6\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n359.2\n483.9\n-67.5\n-16.2\n-77.9\n-15.8\n-15.8\n-13.9\n19.6\n86.0\n36.2\n-0.2\n-6.4\n-6.2\n2.5\n0.0\n5.9\n0.0\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nNA - not applicable\nPot catcher/processors\nPot catcher/processors\nPot catcher/processors\nmt - metric tons\nVessel Class\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n-314.8\n-515.7\n1,690\n2,666\n-83.5\n-65.9\n-20.6\n-12.6\n-18.4\n-15.7\n-19.0\n-16.8\n-16.1\n-12.3\n-15.8\n-16.2\n357\n326\n108\n89\n98\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n122.0\n204.9\n-22.8\n-15.8\n-18.5\n21.0\n20.2\n11.3\n13.3\n17.2\n-37.1\n-16.4\n-15.8\n-15.3\n-4.8\n-4.0\n-1.3\n-3.2\n-1.1\n-8.7\n-8.8\nNotes: includes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species of processors that took deliveries of groundfish.\nTable 4.8-74 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 3 on Inshore Plants and Motherships\nGroundfish\nWholesale\n($Millions)\nValue\n304.9\n518.5\n-57.0\n-11.9\n-93.9\n-15.8\n-18.5\n-16.4\n-15.8\n-15.3\n52.5\n50.5\n28.3\n33.2\n49.1\n-9.9\n-2.7\n-3.2\n-9.2\n-8.7\n-8.8\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\n167.3\n109.8\n507.7\n-38.6\n-11.2\n-15.8\n78.8\n54.7\n75.2\n21.9\n-21.1\n-4.6\n-4.3\n-1.8\n-2.7\n-5.5\n-7.3\n-2.4\n-2.4\n-4.1\n-7.1\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\n-14.5\n-19.5\n-15.8\n20.9\n-1.2\n-0.3\n-0.3\n-3.3\n7.0\n1.2\n9.7\n0.6\n1.8\n0.6\n-0.1\n-2.0\n-9.7\n-1.5\n-8.7\n0.0\n-0.1\nChange from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nReported Tons\nARSO\n-13.7\n-11.9\n-11.9\n-15.8\n21.4\n-0.4\n-0.2\n-0.8\n-0.3\n-0.5\n-2.3\n-6.4\n-7.5\n-9.8\n2.8\n1.5\n6.2\n4.5\n6.3\n0.0\n0.0\n4.8-176\nPacific\n-14.4\n-14.5\n-18.4\n-15.2\n-13.3\n-13.4\n-16.0\n-15.4\nCod\n34.4\n17.0\n19.9\n78.9\n-5.8\n-3.8\n-3.6\n-0.5\n-0.5\n3.2\n3.6\n0.7\n-0.1\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n-124.3\n428.4\n108.2\n623.3\n-81.3\n-11.5\n-20.4\n-16.0\n-20.0\n-21.7\n-22.6\n46.2\n-20.1\n-15.8\n-16.6\n31.5\n-8.7\n-0.9\n-1.4\n3.2\n5.8\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nOutcome Under Alternative 3\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nmt - metric tons\nKodiak inshore plants\nKodiak inshore plants\nKodiak inshore plants\nVessel Class\nMotherships\nMotherships\nMotherships\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal","JANUARY 2001\n($Millions)\nProcessors Owned by\nRegional Residents\n-146.5\nValue\nTotal\n944.3\n18.6\n49.6\n13.4\n-4.0\n-1.2\n0.3\n-0.1\n-1.1\n0\n0\n(Thousands\nVolume\n1500.2\nof mt)\n-223.5\nTotal\n37.5\n73.7\n-4.6\n-0.8\n0.3\n0.5\n8.1\n0\n0\n0\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n109.8\n246.1\n-25.7\n54.7\n75.2\n-4.3\n-1.8\n-2.7\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nExvessel Value\n($Millions)\nGroundfish\nRegional Inshore Processingb\nTable 4.8-75 Impacts of Alternative 3 on Regional Processing\n137.0\n-25.7\n23.7\n25.8\n32.9\n-4.3\n-1.8\n-2.7\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nPollock\n474.6\n-92.8\n31.5\n-8.8\n-0.9\n-1.4\n3.2\n5.8\n0\n0\n0\n0\n(Thousands of mt)\nOutcome Under Alternative 3\nPacific\nChange from Alternative 1\nCod\n51.5\n19.9\n-9.6\n-3.6\n-0.5\n-0.5\n3.2\n3.6\n0\n0\n0\n0\nVolume\nFlatfish\n4.8-177\n-1.5\n-0.4\n-0.1\n-0.1\n8.1\n9.7\n0.6\n1.8\n0\n0\n0\n0\nARSO\n-0.7\n-0.9\n-0.3\n-0.5\n4.3\n6.2\n4.5\n6.3\n0\n0\n0\n0\n($Millions)\nPayments\nto Labor\n(Regional Inshore +\nOwnership of CP &\n108\n177\n-20\n-23\n22\n15\n13\n-3\n-2\n0\n-1\n0\nTotal Regional\nMotherships)\nProcessor\nEmployment\n(Est. FTEs)\n1952\n1816\n-380\n-104\n402\n233\n121\n-67\n-26\n-16\n0\n0\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nRegion","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n($Millions)\nProcessors Owned by\n'The two \"Processors Owned by Regional Residents\" columns show total volume and total output value by the processor owner's region. Output values\nRegional Residents\nValue\nTotal\nNotes: aThe two \"Total Regional Processor\" columns show the employment and payments to labor of all inshore groundfish processing facilities in the region\n-25.0\n-13.4\n-5.6\n-7.5\n-8.2\n0\nThe six \"Regional Inshore Processing\" columns include totals for inshore processing in the region-inshore processors provide fish taxes based on\n(Regional Inshore) as well as all employment and payments to labor of catcher/processors and motherships owned by residents of the region.\n(Thousands\nVolume\nof mt)\nTotal\n-13.0\n-5.9\n-9.0\n1.4\n0\n0\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\nfrom which operating cost and profits are taken are associated with the owners' regions rather than the processing location.\n-9.4\n-7.3\n-2.4\n-2.4\n0.0\n0.0\nExvessel Value\n($Millions)\nTable 4.8-75 (Cont.) Impacts of Alternative 3 on Regional Processing\nGroundfish\nRegional Inshore Processingb\n-15.8\n-15.3\n-6.6\n-7.6\n0.0\n0.0\nPollock\n-16.4\n-21.8\n-22.0\n-19.4\n0\n0\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nPacific\n-13.5\nCod\n-15.7\n-15.3\n-12.2\n0\n0\nVolume\nFlatfish\n4.8-178\n-15.6\n-14.3\n-4.0\n-5.3\n0\n0\nARSO\n-14.0\n-12.7\n-6.3\n-7.4\n0\n0\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\n($Millions)\nPayments\nto Labor\n(Regional Inshore +\nOwnership of CP &\n-15.6\n-12.0\n-13.3\n-11.5\n-6.3\n0\nTotal Regional\nMotherships)\nProcessor\nexvessel value to the region in which they operate.\nEmployment\n(Est. FTEs)\n-16.3\n-14.3\n-10.0\n-11.7\n-5.4\n0\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nFTE -- full-time equivalent\nCP -- catcher/processor\nWashington inland water\nMS - mothership\nmt - metric tons\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nJANUARY 2001\nRegion","JANUARY 2001\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n197.0\nTotal\n-25.0\n-11.3\n-12,3\n15.8\n50.2\n29.6\n59.9\n24.2\n-1.5\n-3.5\n-1.9\n-3.4\n-1.1\n-8.7\n-6.5\n-3.6\n-3.1\nGroundfish\n143.7\n-25.0\nTotal\n-19.0\n-13.3\n-10.5\n-14.8\n-15.7\n22.8\n27.6\n18.2\n-1.5\n-3.5\n-1.9\n-3.4\n-1.1\n-6.4\nHarvest Value\n6.4\n9.4\n($Millions)\nGroundfish\nGOA\n-19.2\n-13.6\n-11.3\n-17.1\n27.4\n28.4\n17.1\n-1.4\n-2.7\n-0.8\n-1.9\n-3.6\n-1.4\n-9.5\n-6,5\n5.9\n7.6\n6.8\nTable 4.8-76 Impacts of Alternative 3 on Regional Catcher Vessels\nGroundfish\n115.3\n-21.4\nBSAI\n-16.7\n-13.6\n-13.6\n-15.7\n-14.9\n11.4\n-0.9\n-0.3\n-2.0\n-0.1\n0.5\n5.7\n1.9\n0.2\n0\n0\nHarvest Volume\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nGOA\n-20.7\n-17.4\n-20.0\n-19.5\n16.9\n38.3\n21.5\n-15.1\n-4.4\n-7.6\n-0.4\n-9.6\n-5.2\n36.1\n-1.1\n-6.7\n6.2\n5.6\n(Thousands\nOutcomes Under Alternative 3\nof mt)\nChange from Alternative 1\nNotes: All information in the table is associated with regions through the owner's address.\n-100.0\n491.4\n-92.0\nBSAI\n-14.5\n-14.3\n-15.8\n-15.6\n18.8\n40.1\n-3.2\n-0.6\n-7.4\n-0.1\n0.5\n3.6\n0\n0\n0\n4.8-179\nPayments to\n($Millions)\nLabor\n-10.0\n-19.4\n-13.3\n-14.8\nPayments to Labor\n11.0\n57.5\n-15.1\n-0.6\n-1.4\n-0.4\n-0.8\n-1.3\n-9.5\n-6.8\n2.5\n3.8\n7.3\n9.1\nEmployment and\nEmployment\nPositions)\n(No. of\n1380\n349\n767\n944\n147\n171\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nBSAI - Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nGOA - Gulf of Alaska\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nmt - metric tons\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nRegion","Notes: includes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species. Numbers were not applicable for catcher/processors. The all sector totals\nFor catcher vessels, the output value is the exvessel value of groundfish. For catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships, output values are\nthe wholesale value of production. For all sectors, the numbers shown are the summed wholesale values for catcher/processors, inshore processors, and\n'For catcher vessels, employment is the number of positions on vessels. For catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships, employment numbers\nare full-time equivalents. For all sectors the numbers shown are the sums of all three sectors and are neither counts of positions nor full-time equivalents-the\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\n-158,5\n-502.5\n5,036\n1,933\n2,838\n9,807\n-344.1\n-10.8\n0.0\n-7,6\n-4.9\n0.0\nshow the value for inshore processors and motherships. Adding the exvessel value for catcher vessels and processors would be double counting.\nPayments to\n($Millions)\nLabor\n101.5\n200.3\n213.6\n515.4\n-10,5\n-23,2\n-28.4\n-62.0\n-10.4\n-11.7\n-10.7\n-9.3\nOutput Value\nGroundfish\n($Millionsb)\n1,070.3\n-136,9\n253.8\n530.3\n540.0\n-64.5\n-26.1\n-72.4\n-10.8\n-11.8\n-11.3\n-9.3\nTable 4.8-77 Impacts of Alternative 4.1 on Fishing and Processing Sectors\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\n410.3\n520.2\n520.2\n-26.1\n-26.1\n-26.1\n-6.0\n-4.8\n-4.8\nNA\nNA\nNA\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 4.1\n175,9\n198.5\n12.0\n22.6\n-0.2\n-0.4\n-0.3\n-0.6\n-1.8\n-0.2\n-1.2\n-0.3\nChange from Alternative 1\nVolume (Thousands of mt)\nARSO\n127.4\n151.0\n23.6\n18.1\n-0.2\n-0,5\n-0.2\n0.0\n-0.1\n-0.1\n0.0\n-0.1\n4.8-180\nPacific\n133.6\n226.9\nCod\n91.2\n93.3\n0,0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n1,085.0\n-122.2\n-101.5\n-122.9\n-224.4\n613.0\n460.3\n624.7\n-16.6\n-16.4\n-18.1\n-17.1\nnumbers are provided as indicators only.\nNA - not applicable\nInshore and motherships\nInshore and motherships\nInshore and motherships\nmt - metric tons\nCatcher/processors\nCatcher/processors\nCatcher/processors\nmotherships.\nCatcher vessels\nCatcher vessels\nCatcher vessels\nVessel Class\nAll Sectors\nAll Sectors\nAll Sectors\nJANUARY 2001","JANUARY 2001\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n2,836.0\n5,036.0\n194.0\n270.0\n194.0\n228.0\n396.0\n561.0\n357.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n101.5\n-10.5\n23.9\n32.9\n11.6\n18.4\n-4.7\n6.2\n4.2\n3.9\n0.4\n-6.1\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.2\n0.2\n0.0\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n253.8\n-11.7\n-15.2\n-26.1\n59.8\n82.3\n15.5\n10.5\n29.0\n46.0\n-0,3\n9.7\n1.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.4\n0.6\n0.0\nTable 4.8-78 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 4.1 on Catcher Vessels\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n114.2\n410.3\nTotal\n-11.7\n-15.2\n-26.1\n66.3\n82.9\n18.0\n17.9\n46.9\n60.1\n-0.3\n4.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.4\n0.6\n0.0\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 4.1\n12.0\n-0.2\n-0.2\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n1.5\n4.4\n4.2\n1.0\n0.3\n0.5\n0.1\n0.1\nChange from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nRetained Tons\nARSO\n18.1\n0.0\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.9\n2.6\n2.2\n0.4\n0.4\n4.5\n6.9\n0.2\n0.1\n0.1\n4.8-181\nPacific\n91.2\nCod\n15.5\n21.6\n13.2\n13.4\n13.6\n10.7\n2.4\n0.6\n0.0\n0.0\n0,0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nPollock\n-122.2\n239.3\n613.0\n320.1\n-52.8\n-67.8\n34.8\n18.7\n-1.5\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nLongline catcher vessel\nLongline catcher vessel\nPot catcher vessels\nPot catcher vessels\nVessel Class\nTotal\nTotal","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n0.0\n0,0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0,0\n0,0\n0,0\n0,0\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n-16.3\n-15,5\n-2.0\n-0.4\n-9.3\n0.2\n1.4\n1.4\n0.4\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nTable 4.8-78 (Cont.) Summary of Impacts of Alternative 4.1 on Catcher Vessels\nExvessel\nValue\n-16.3\n-15,5\n-2.0\n-0,4\n-9.3\n0.2\n1.4\n1.4\n0,4\nNotes: includes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species of groundfish catcher vessels.\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\n-15,0\n-15,5\n-1,7\n-0,3\n-6.0\n0,0\n0.9\n0.5\n0.1\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\n-3.7\n-3.5\n-0,2\n-0.1\n-1.8\n0,0\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n(Thousands of mt)\nRetained Tons\nARSO\n-4.6\n-4.2\n-0.4\n-0,3\n0.8\n1.5\n1.5\n0.4\n0.0\n4.8-182\nPacific\nCod\n-0.2\n0.2\n0.0\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n-17,5\n-16.6\n-18.1\n-0.8\n-4.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.1\n0.1\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nLongline catcher vessel\nmt - metric tons\nPot catcher vessels\nVessel Class\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal","JANUARY 2001\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n1,933\n-17.9\n-17.7\n-127\n-158\n-7.6\n584\n149\n817\n358\n-32\n0.0\n0.1\n0.1\n25\n0\n0\n1\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n200.3\n-10.4\n-18.4\n-23.2\n-18.7\n-17.2\n79.9\n23.3\n62.7\n33.2\n-4.8\n1.2\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n0.1\nGroundfish\nWholesale\n($Millions)\nNotes: value is not applicable to catcher/processors, but the column is included to be consistent with other tables.\nValue\n-17.2\n228.2\n156.8\n530.3\n-52.6\n-64.5\n-18.7\n-10.8\nTable 4.8-79 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 4.1 on Catcher/Processors\n-12.1\n58.2\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n83\n4.1\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 4.1\n151.6\n175.9\n-11.9\n-0.4\n-2.4\n-0.2\n17.1\n-0.4\n-0.1\n1.0\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n0.0\n0.5\n0.0\n6.1\nChange from Alternative 1\n0.1\n(Thousands of mt)\nReported Tons\nARSO\n111.9\n127.4\n13.6\n-0.2\n-9.5\n-2.6\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n-0.1\n1.7\n0.2\n0.1\n4.8-183\nPacific\n133.6\nCod\n10.9\n34.0\n79.4\n-0.4\n-9.3\n4.2\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.8\n0.9\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n5.1\n0.1\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n-101.5\n345.0\n460.3\n-81.7\n-19.5\n-19.1\n-19.1\n-18.1\n82.7\n29.9\n-1.0\n-0.3\n2.7\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nNA - not applicable\nPot catcher/processors\nPot catcher/processors\nPot catcher/processors\nmt - metric tons\nVessel Class\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n1,694\n2,838\n-344.1\n-12.7\n-22.2\n-15.5\n-310\n-19.2\n-10.8\n427\n129\n102\n391\n-2.9\n0.0\n0.4\n0.4\n0.0\n94\n0.3\n0.4\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n120.7\n213.6\n-28.4\n25.0\n24.2\n-16.6\n-19.0\n-11.7\n12.6\n14.7\n16.5\n-24.1\n-0.8\n-3.9\n0.0\n0.2\n0.2\n-3.1\n0.0\n1.6\n1.1\nNotes: aIncludes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species of processors that took deliveries of groundfish.\nTable 4.8-80 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 4.1 on Inshore Plants and Motherships\nGroundfish\nWholesale\n($Millions)\nValue\n301.7\n-60.2\n-72.4\n-16.6\n-19.0\n-11.8\n62.4\n60.4\n31.5\n36.8\n47.2\n-11.1\n540\n-2.0\n0.0\n0.5\n0.4\n-3.1\n0.0\n1.6\n1.1\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\n112.9\n520.2\n167.1\n-21.3\n-11.3\n-19.2\n82.6\n59.0\n77.6\n-26.1\n21.1\n-0.8\n-5.0\n-1.0\n-4.8\n0.0\n0.6\n0.5\n0.0\n0.7\n0.4\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 4.1\n-19.2\n22.6\n-0.2\n-0.3\n-2.2\n-0.4\n-1.2\n8.0\n10.1\n1.5\n0.7\n1.9\n0.5\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.4\n0.3\nChange from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nReported Tons\nARSO\n-19.2\n23.6\n-0.3\n-7.7\n-0.3\n-0.5\n3.0\n1.7\n7.0\n4.9\n6.9\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-0.1\n-0.3\n1.8\n1.2\n0.1\n0.1\n4.8-184\nPacific\n-18.9\nCod\n40.5\n20.8\n23.5\n93.3\n-0.2\n3.7\n0.2\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.5\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-0.1\n0.0\n4.1\n0.7\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n415.2\n104.0\n624.7\n-122.9\n-94.5\n-24.7\n-18.5\n-19.2\n-16.4\n54.0\n40.3\n-3.7\n-6.5\n7.2\n0.0\n4.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nmt - metric tons\nKodiak inshore plants\nKodiak inshore plants\nKodiak inshore plants\nVessel Class\nMotherships\nMotherships\nMotherships\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal","JANUARY 2001\nTotal Value\n($Millions)\nProcessors Owned by\n-137.5\nRegional Residents\n953.3\n19.7\n53.7\n14.8\n0.4\n0.2\n0.1\n0\n0\n0\n0\nTotal Volume\n(Thousands\n1498.4\nof mt)\n-225.3\n37.0\n78.3\n0.3\n8.9\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nExvessel Value ($Millions)\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n249.6\n112.9\n-22.2\n59.0\n77.6\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0,6\n0.5\n0.0\n0.0\nTable 4.8-81 Impacts of Alternative 4.1 on Regional Processing\nGroundfish\nRegional Inshore Processingb\n140.5\n-22.2\n28.0\n28.2\n36.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.6\n0.5\n0.0\n0.0\nPollock\n469.2\n-98.2\nOutcomes Under Alternative 4.1\n40.3\n7.2\n4.1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nChange from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nPacific\nCod\n61.3\n23.5\n3.7\n0.2\n4.1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nVolume\n4.8-185\nFlatfish\n-0.2\n10.1\n9.4\n0.7\n1.9\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nARSO\n-0.3\n-0.1\n4.7\n7.0\n4.9\n6.9\n0.1\n0.1\n0\n0\n0\n0\nTotal Regional Processor\n($Millions)\nPayments\nto Labor\n(Regional Inshore +\nOwnership of CP &\n110\n175\n-18\n-25\n25\n16\n15\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMotherships)\nEmployment\n(Est. FTEs)\n2025\n1851\n-307\n469\n259\n137\n-69\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nAlaska Peninsula and\nAlaska Peninsula and\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nAleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nRegion","Notes: The two \"Total Regional Processor\" columns show the employment and payments to labor of all inshore groundfish processing facilities in the region\nThe six \"Regional Inshore Processing\" columns include totals for inshore processing in the region-inshore processors provide fish taxes based on exvessel\n'The two \"Processors Owned by Regional Residents\" columns show total volume and total output value by the processor owner's region. Output values from\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTotal Value\n($Millions)\nProcessors Owned by\nRegional Residents\n-12.6\n0.2\n1.4\n0\n0\n0\n(Regional Inshore) as well as all employment and payments to labor of catcher/processors and motherships owned by residents of the region.\nTotal Volume\n(Thousands\nof mt)\n-13.1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nExvessel Value ($Millions)\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\nwhich operating cost and profits are taken are associated with the owners' regions rather than the processing location\n-8.2\n0.0\n0.7\n0.4\n0.0\n0.0\nTable 4.8-81 (Cont.) Impacts of Alternative 4.1 on Regional Processing\nGroundfish\nRegional Inshore Processingb\n-13.6\n0.0\n2.0\n1.3\n0.0\n0.0\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nPollock\n-17.3\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n(Thousands of mt)\nPacific\nCod\n0.3\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nVolume\n4.8-186\nFlatfish\n-2.1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nARSO\n-6.0\n-1.4\n1.5\n2.1\n0\n0\nTotal Regional Processor\n($Millions)\nPayments\nto Labor\n(Regional Inshore +\nOwnership of CP &\n-12.5\n-14.1\n0\n0\n0\n0\nMotherships)\nvalue to the region in which they operate.\nEmployment\n(Est. FTEs)\n-13.2\n-3.6\n0\n0\n0\n0\nFTE - full-time equivalent\nWashington inland water\nmt - metric tons\nAlaska Peninsula and\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nAleutian Islands\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nJANUARY 2001\nRegion","JANUARY 2001\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\nTotal\n198.5\n-23.5\n17.3\n53.0\n30.7\n62.3\n26.3\n-10.6\n-0.7\n-1.3\n0.5\n-1.3\n-4.7\n0.8\n0\n0\n0\n0\nGroundfish\n145.2\nTotal\n-23.5\n25.6\n10.5\n30.0\n-13.9\n20.3\n-0.7\n-1.3\n7.9\n0.5\n-2.7\n-6.0\n1.7\n0\n0\n0\n0\nHarvest Value\n($Millions)\nGroundfish\nGOA\n19.9\n29.7\n32.3\n7.3\n8.5\n8.2\n0.4\n0.3\n0.1\n0.1\n0.5\n1.2\n1.4\n0.9\n0\n0\n0\n0\nTable 4.8-82 Impacts of Alternative 4.1 on Regional Catcher Vessels\nGroundfish\n112.9\nBSAI\n-23.8\n-16.7\n-17.4\n12.1\n-0.8\n-1.3\n-12.1\n0.5\n5.8\n0.2\n-0.1\n-0.1\n-4.5\n-9.7\n2.1\n0\n0\nHarvest Volume\nGOA\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\n21.3\n43.7\n47.9\n26.7\n(Thousands\n7.4\n6.1\n0.1\n0.1\n1.4\n1.7\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nOutcomes Under Alternative 4.1\nof mt)\nChange from Alternative 1\n-107,0\n476.4\nBSAI\n18.6\n-15.5\n-18.3\n-13.5\n41.1\n-3.4\n-0.4\n-6.4\n0.5\n3.8\n-9.5\n0.1\nNotes: All information in the table is associated with regions through the owner's address.\n0\n0\n0\n0\n4.8-187\nPayments to\n($Millions)\nLabor\nPayments to Labor\n10.3\n12.0\n-13.9\n58.1\n-0.2\n-9.4\n-0.5\n4.2\n0.2\n-1.9\n-5.8\n3.1\n8.1\n1.7\nEmployment and\n0\n0\n0\n0\nEmployment\n(Persons)\n1380\n349\n767\n944\n147\n171\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nBSAI - Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nGOA - Gulf of Alaska\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nmt - metric tons\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nRegion","Notes: anIncludes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species. Numbers were not applicable for catcher/processors. The all sector totals\nFor catcher vessels the output value is the exvessel value of groundfish. For catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships output values are\nthe wholesale value of production. For all sectors, the numbers shown are the summed wholesale values for catcher/processors, inshore processors, and\n'For catcher vessels, employment is the number of positions on vessels. For catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships, employment numbers\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nare full-time equivalents. For all sectors the numbers shown are the sums of all three sectors and are counts of neither positions nor full-time equivalents-the\nEmployment\nGroundfish\n-343.2\n-704.2\n5,036\n1,730\n2,839\n9,605\n-361.1\n-17.3\n-10.8\n-6.8\n0.0\n0.0\nshow the value for inshore processors and motherships. Adding the exvessel value of catcher vessels and processors would be double counting.\nPayments to\n($Millions)\nLabor\n101.3\n213.6\n185.1\n500.0\n-10.6\n-38.3\n-28.5\n-77.4\n-17.2\n-11.8\n-13.4\n-9.5\nOutput Value\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\n1,032.2\n-102.4\n-175.0\n253.3\n492.4\n539.8\n-26.6\n-72.6\n-17.2\n-11.9\n-14.5\n-9.5\nTable 4.8-83 Impacts of Alternative 4.2 on Fishing and Processing Sectors\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\n409.9\n519.8\n519.8\n-26.6\n-26.6\n-26.6\n-4.9\n-4.9\nNA\nNA\n-6.1\nNA\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 4.2\n175.0\n197.6\n12.0\n22.6\n-0.2\n-1.3\n-0.3\n-1.6\n-1.9\n-0.7\n-1.3\n-0.8\nVolume (Thousands of mt)\nChange from Alternative 1\nARSO\n121.5\n145.0\n18.0\n23.5\n-6.0\n-0.2\n-6.2\n-0.1\n-0.4\n-4.7\n-0.9\n-4.1\n4.8-188\nPacific\n177.5\n-49.3\n-49.4\n-36.9\n-21.8\nCod\n91.0\n84.3\n93.2\n-0.1\n-0.1\n-0.1\n-0.1\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n1,085.0\n-121.3\n-102.5\n-121.9\n-224.4\n614.0\n459.3\n625.7\n-16.5\n-18.2\n-16.3\n-17.1\nnumbers are provided as indicators only.\nInshore and Motherships\nInshore and Motherships\nInshore and Motherships\nNA - not applicable\nCatcher/processors\nCatcher/processors\nCatcher/processors\nmotherships.\nCatcher vessels\nCatcher vessels\nCatcher vessels\nVessel Class\nAll Sectors\nAll Sectors\nAll Sectors\nJANUARY 2001","JANUARY 2001\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n2,836.0\n5,036.0\n194.0\n270.0\n194.0\n228.0\n396.0\n561.0\n357.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n101.3\n-10.6\n24.0\n33.0\n11.5\n18.3\n-4.6\n-6.0\n6.2\n4.2\n3.9\n0.4\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.1\n0.1\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n253.3\n-26.6\n-11.6\n-15.0\n59.9\n82.5\n15.5\n10.5\n28.7\n45.6\n-0.3\n9.6\n1.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.3\n0.0\n0.1\nTable 4.8-84 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 4.2 on Catcher Vessels\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n113.9\n409.9\nTotal\n-11.6\n-15.0\n-26.6\n66.4\n18.0\n17.9\n46.6\n-0.3\n83.1\n60.1\n4.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.3\n0.0\n0.1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 4.2\n12.0\n-0.2\n-0.2\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n1.5\n4.4\n1.0\n0.3\n0.4\n4.1\n0.1\n0.1\nChange from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nRetained Tons\nARSO\n18.0\n-0.1\n0.0\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n1.0\n2.6\n2.2\n0.4\n0.4\n4.4\n6.8\n0.2\n0.1\n4.8-189\nPacific\n91.0\nCod\n15.5\n21.6\n13.2\n13.4\n13.6\n10.6\n2.4\n0.6\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-0.1\n0.0\n-0.1\nPollock\n-121.3\n614.0\n239.8\n320.7\n-52.4\n-67.2\n34.8\n18.7\n-1.5\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nLongline catcher vessel\nLongline catcher vessel\nPot catcher vessels\nPot catcher vessels\nVessel Class\nTotal\nTotal","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n-16.2\n-15.4\n-2.0\n-0.4\n-0.1\n-3.2\n-9.5\n0.5\n0.7\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nTable 4.8-84 (Cont.) Summary of Impacts of Alternative 4.2 on Catcher Vessels\nExvessel\nValue\n-16.2\n-15.4\n-2.0\n-0.4\n-0.1\n-3.2\n-9.5\n0.5\n0.7\nNotes: includes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species of groundfish catcher vessels.\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\n-14.8\n-15.3\n-1.7\n-0.2\n-0.8\n0.0\n0.3\n0.3\n-6.1\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\n-3,7\n-3.5\n-3.0\n-2.4\n0.0\n-0.1\n-0,4\n-1.9\n-1.1\n(Thousands of mt)\nRetained Tons\nARSO\n-4.4\n-4.0\n-0.3\n-0.1\n-0.1\n-0.3\n-0.4\n0.5\n0.9\n4.8-190\nPacific\nCod\n-0.4\n-0.9\n-6,4\n0.2\n-0.1\n0.0\n-0.1\n0.1\n0.1\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n-17.9\n-17.3\n-16.5\n-4.1\n-0.7\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-0.1\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nLongline catcher vessel\nmt - metric tons\nPot catcher vessels\nVessel Class\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal","JANUARY 2001\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n1,730\n-17.8\n-17.6\n-56.7\n-17.3\n-126\n-203\n-361\n-4.4\n585\n150\n817\n155\n-32\n0.1\n23\n-1\n1\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n185.1\n-18.3\n-15.2\n-38.3\n-18.6\n-46.0\n-17.2\n-17.1\n80.0\n23.3\n62.8\n17.9\n-4.8\n-4.9\n1.2\n0.0\n-0.1\n0.1\nGroundfish\nWholesale\n($Millions)\n-102.4\nNotes: value is not applicable to catcher/processors, but the column is included to be consistent with other tables.\nValue\n228.6\n156.9\n492.4\n-52.2\n-12.0\n-18.6\n-46.0\n-17.2\n-38.1\n-17.1\n58.3\n44.7\n-0.2\n-4.9\n3.9\n0.1\n0.1\nTable 4.8-85 Summary of Alternative 4.2 Impacts on Catcher/Processors\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 4.2\n151.8\n175.0\n-11.8\n-16.6\n-1.0\n-1.3\n-2.4\n-8.9\n-0.7\n17.1\n-0.4\n-0.1\n1.0\n0.3\n0.0\n0.2\n5.1\n0.0\nChange from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nReported Tons\nARSO\n112.0\n121.5\n-14.0\n-44.1\n-0.2\n-6.0\n-6.0\n-2.6\n-4.7\n0.0\n-8.1\n1.7\n0.2\n7.6\n0.0\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n4.8-191\nPacific\n-49.0\n-49.3\n-61.7\n-36.9\nCod\n10.9\n34.0\n30.4\n84.3\n-0.4\n-0.2\n-9.2\n-4.4\n4.2\n4.8\n0.1\n0.3\n0.8\n0.8\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n-102.5\n345.6\n459.3\n-81.0\n-19.4\n-19.0\n-18.9\n-67.7\n-18.2\n82.9\n30.0\n-0.3\n-1.8\n-1.0\n-4.0\n0.9\n0.0\n0.0\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nNA - not applicable\nPot catcher/processors\nPot catcher/processors\nPot catcher/processors\nmt - metric tons\nVessel Class\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n-307,9\n1,696\n-343.2\n2,839\n-13,6\n-22,0\n-15,4\n-19,0\n-10,8\n427\n128\n102\n391\n-0.1\n94\n0.4\n-3.1\n0.0\n0,4\n0.1\n0.1\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n120.8\n213.6\n-23,9\n-28.5\n-16.5\n-18,9\n-11.8\n24,9\n12,5\n24.1\n14.7\n16.6\n-0.9\n-3,9\n-3,4\n-0.2\n0,0\n0,6\n0.8\n0,1\n0.1\nNotes: includes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species of processors that took deliveries of groundfish.\nGroundfish\nWholesale\n($Millions)\nTable 4.8-86 Summary of Alternative 4.2 on Inshore Plants and Motherships\nValue\n539.8\n302.1\n-59,8\n-11,0\n-72.6\n-16.5\n-18,9\n-11,9\n62.2\n60.3\n31.2\n36.7\n47.3\n-2.2\n-3,4\n-0,2\n-0.1\n0.2\n0,3\n0,6\n0.8\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\n167.2\n112,8\n519.8\n-21,2\n-26.6\n-11.3\n-19,0\n82,4\n58,9\n77.3\n21.1\n-0.9\n-5,0\n-0,1\n0.2\n0.4\n-1.1\n-4,9\n-0.1\n0,3\n0.3\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 4.2\n-19,0\n22.6\n10.1\n-0.2\n-2.2\n-0,7\n-0,2\n8.0\n1.5\n0.7\n1.9\n0.5\n0,0\n0.0\n0,0\n0,0\n-0,1\n-0.3\n-0.1\n-1,3\nChange from Alternative 1\n0.1\n(Thousands of mt)\nReported Tons\nARSO\n-19.0\n23.5\n-0,3\n-0.2\n-8.0\n-2.2\n-0,3\n-0,9\n3.0\n1.7\n4.8\n6.9\n0.0\n0.0\n7.1\n0,0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.7\n1.0\n0.1\n4.8-192\nPacific\n-18.7\nCod\n40.4\n20.8\n23.5\n93.2\n-0.2\n-0,4\n3.7\n0.7\n-0,1\n0.0\n0,0\n-0.1\n0.0\n4.1\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-0.1\n0.1\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n-121.9\n416.0\n104.2\n625.7\n-93,7\n-24,5\n-18,4\n-19.0\n-16.3\n54.0\n40.3\n-3,7\n-6,4\n7.2\n0.0\n0,0\n0,0\n0.0\n0,0\n0.0\n4.1\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nmt - metric tons\nKodiak inshore plants\nKodiak inshore plants\nKodiak inshore plants\nVessel Class\nMotherships\nMotherships\nMotherships\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal","JANUARY 2001\nTotal Value\n($Millions)\nProcessors Owned by\n-168,9\nRegional Residents\n921.9\n16.6\n53.5\n-2.5\n12.1\n-3.1\n-0.1\n0.4\n0\n0\n0\nTotal Volume\n(Thousands\n1451.0\n-272.7\nof mt)\n32.5\n-4.5\n-0.2\n-3.9\n78.1\n0.3\n5.0\n0\n0\n0\nExvessel Value ($Millions)\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n249.6\n112.8\n-22.2\n58.9\n77.3\n0.0\n0.0\n-0.1\n0.2\n0.4\n0.0\n0.0\nTable 4.8-87 Impacts of Alternative 4.2 on Regional Processing\nRegional Inshore Processingb\nGroundfish\n140.5\n-22.2\n27.9\n27.9\n36.0\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.2\n0.4\n0.0\n0.0\nPollock\n-97.4\n40.3\n470\n7.2\n4.1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nOutcomes Under Alternative 4.2\nChange from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nPacific\nCod\n61.2\n23,5\n3.7\n4.1\n0.1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nVolume\n4.8-193\nFlatfish\n10.1\n-0.2\n9.4\n0.7\n1.9\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nARSO\n-0.3\n4.7\n4.8\n6.9\n7.1\n0.1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nTotal Regional Processor\n($Millions)\nPayments\nto Labor\n(Regional Inshore +\nOwnership of CP &\n110\n165\n-18\n-35\n24\n15\n13\n-2\n-1\n-1\n0\n0\nMotherships)\nEmployment\n(Est. FTEs)\n2026\n1703\n-306\n-217\n459\n244\n117\n-10\n-15\n-20\n0\n0\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nRegion\nIslands\nIslands","Notes: aThe two \"Total Regional Processor\" columns show the employment and payments to labor of all inshore groundfish processing facilities in the region\nThe six \"Regional Inshore Processing\" columns include totals for inshore processing in the region-inshore processors provide fish taxes based on exvessel\n'The two \"Processors Owned by Regional Residents\" columns show total volume and total output value by the processor owner's region. Output values from\nTotal Value\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n($Millions)\nProcessors Owned by\nRegional Residents\n-15.7\n-15.5\n-17.1\n-0.2\n0\n0\n(Regional Inshore) as well as all employment and payments to labor of catcher/processors and motherships owned by residents of the region.\nTotal Volume\n(Thousands\nof mt)\n-12.2\n-43.8\n-15.8\n-0.3\n0\n0\nExvessel Value ($Millions)\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n-8.2\n-0.1\nwhich operating cost and profits are taken are associated with the owners' regions rather than the processing location.\n0.3\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\nTable 4.8-87 (Cont.) Impacts of Alternative 4.2 on Regional Processing\nGroundfish\nRegional Inshore Processing'\n-13.6\n-0.2\n0.9\n0.0\n0.0\n1.1\nPollock\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\n-17.2\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n(Thousands of mt)\nPacific\nCod\n0.2\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nVolume\nFlatfish\n4.8-194\n-2.1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nARSO\n-6.0\n1.5\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\n0\n0\n0\n0\nTotal Regional Processor\n($Millions)\nPayments\nto Labor\n(Regional Inshore +\nOwnership of CP &\n-13.3\n-14.1\n-17.5\n-4.0\n-6.3\n0\nMotherships)\nEmployment\n(Est. FTEs)\nvalue to the region in which they operate.\n-14.6\n-13.1\n-11.3\n-5.8\n-2.1\n0\nFTE - full-time equivalent\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nCP - catcher/processor\nWashington inland water\nMS - mothership\nmt - metric tons\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nJANUARY 2001\nRegion\nIslands","JANUARY 2001\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\nTotal\n198.5\n-23.5\n17.2\n53.0\n30.7\n26.3\n-10.6\n62.1\n-0.7\n-1.3\n-0.1\n0.3\n-0.6\n-1.3\n-4.7\n0.5\n0\n0\nGroundfish\nTotal\n145.2\n-23,5\n25.6\n10.5\n29.8\n20.3\n-13.9\n-1,3\nHarvest Value\n7.8\n-0.1\n-0.7\n0.3\n-1.3\n-2.7\n-6.0\n1.0\n0\n0\n($Millions)\nGroundfish\nGOA\n19.8\n29.5\n32.1\n7.3\n8.4\n8.2\n0.2\n0.1\n0.7\n0.3\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nTable 4.8-88 Impacts of Alternative 4.2 on Regional Catcher Vessels\nGroundfish\nBSAI\n113.1\n-23.6\n-16.7\n-17.3\n12.1\n-0.8\n-12.1\n0.5\n5.8\n0.2\n-0.1\n-0.1\n-1.3\n-4.5\n-9,7\n2.1\n0\n0\nHarvest Volume\nGOA\n21.3\n43.7\n47.9\n26.7\n(Thousands\n7.3\n6.1\n0.1\n1.7\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nof mt)\nOutcomes Under Alternative 4.2\nChange from Alternative 1\n477.3\n-106.1\nBSAI\n18.6\n41.2\n-20.0\n-15.5\n-18.2\n-13.3\n-3.4\n-0.4\n-6.3\n0.4\n3.8\n-0.1\n-9.5\n0.1\n0\n0\nNotes: All information in the table is associated with regions through the owner's address.\nPayments to\n($Millions)\n4.8-195\nLabor\nPayments to Labor\n10.2\n11.9\n-13.9\n58.1\n-0.3\n-9.4\n-0,5\n4.2\n-2.9\n-5.8\n3.1\n8.1\n0.1\n0.8\nEmployment and\n0\n0\n0\n0\nEmployment\n(Persons)\n1380\n349\n767\n944\n147\n171\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nBSAI - Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nGOA - Gulf of Alaska\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nmt - metric tons\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nRegion","includes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species. Numbers were not applicable for catcher/processors. The all sector totals\nFor catcher vessels the output value is the exvessel value of groundfish. For catcher/processors, inshore processors, and Motherships output values are\nthe wholesale value of production. For all sectors, the numbers shown are the summed wholesale values for catcher/processors, inshore processors, and\n'For catcher vessels, employment is the number of positions on vessels. For catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships, employment numbers\nare full-time equivalents. For all sectors, the numbers shown are the sums of all three sectors and are neither counts of positions nor full-time equivalents-the\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\n10,134\n-323.6\n5,036\n2,240\n2,858\n148.5\n-175.1\n-10.2\n0.0\n-1.7\n0.0\n7.1\nshow the value for inshore processors and motherships. Adding the exvessel value of catcher vessels and processors would be double counting.\nPayments to\n($Millions)\nLabor\n232.6\n228.2\n568.0\n-13.8\n107.1\n-4.8\n-9.5\n-4.3\n-5.7\n-1.6\n9.1\n4.1\nOutput Value\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\n1,196.6\n267.8\n618.7\n577.9\n-34.5\n-10.6\n-12.1\n23.9\n-4.3\n-5,6\n-0.9\n4.0\nTable 4.8-89 Impacts of Alternative 5 on Fishing and Processing Sectors\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\n424.4\n534.3\n534.3\n-12.1\n-12.1\n-12.1\n-2.8\n-2.2\n-2.2\nNA\nNA\nNA\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\n175.8\n190.2\n-19.3\n-37.2\n14.4\nOutcome Under Alternative 5\n-2.4\n-0.5\n-8.5\n-9.0\n-0.3\n-4.5\n9.9\nChange from Alternative 1\nVolume (Thousands of mt)\nARSO\n119.4\n140.5\n-10.7\n-12.5\n-10.8\n15.8\n21.2\n-2.3\n-8.2\n-2.5\n-6.4\n-7.1\n4.8-196\nPacific\n167.8\n227.2\n-33.7\n-33.9\n-36.9\n-36.3\nCod\n57.5\n59.4\n34.2\n25.6\n0.4\n0.2\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n1,309.0\n741.0\n562.8\n746.2\n-1.4\n-0.4\n-0.2\n5.7\n1.0\n0.8\n0.2\n0.0\nnumbers are provided as indicators only.\nNA - not applicable\nInshore and Motherships\nInshore and Motherships\nInshore and Motherships\nmt - metric tons\nCatcher/processors\nCatcher/processors\nCatcher/processors\nmotherships.\nCatcher vessels\nCatcher vessels\nCatcher vessels\nVessel Class\nAll Sectors\nAll Sectors\nAll Sectors\nJANUARY 2001\nNotes:","JANUARY 2001\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n2,836.0\n5,036.0\n194.0\n270.0\n194.0\n228.0\n396.0\n561.0\n357.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n107.1\n26.3\n35.5\n21.2\n12.1\n-2.3\n-3.5\n-2.6\n-2.5\n-4.8\n3.7\n1.7\n6.0\n0.6\n2.2\n0.7\n0.2\n3.1\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n267.8\n-12.1\n65.7\n88.8\n30.2\n15.1\n53.1\n-5.8\n-8.7\n-6.4\n-6.4\n9.4\n4.1\n1.5\n5.4\n1.7\n7.7\n0.4\nTable 4.8-90 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 5 on Catcher Vessels\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n424.4\nTotal\n121.3\n-12.1\n72.2\n89.4\n11.9\n11.6\n65.5\n48.1\n-5.8\n-8.7\n-6.4\n-6.4\n4.4\n5.4\n1.7\n7.7\n0.4\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 5\n-0.5\n-0.8\n-1.0\n-0.3\n-2.4\n3.2\n0.8\n9.9\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n1.1\n3.8\n0.1\n0.3\n0.6\n0.1\nChange from Alternative 1\n0.1\n(Thousands of mt)\nRetained Tons\nARSO\n15.8\n-0.4\n-0.9\n-1.0\n-0.3\n-2.3\n0.6\n1.8\n1.3\n0.4\n4.5\n6.9\n0.2\n0.0\n0.0\n0.2\n0.0\n0.1\n4.8-197\nPacific\n-19.8\n-12.3\n-33.7\n-13.1\nCod\n23.8\n22.8\n57.5\n-14.1\n10.2\n12.1\n1.4\n1.8\n0.9\n0.4\n5.0\n1.3\n2.6\n0.7\nPollock\n294.6\n390.9\n741.0\n36.2\n19.2\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n2.4\n3.0\n-0.1\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n5.7\n0.1\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nLongline catcher vessel\nLongline catcher vessel\nPot catcher vessels\nPot catcher vessels\nVessel Class\nTotal\nTotal","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n0.0\n0,0\n0.0\n0,0\n0,0\n0.0\n0.0\n0,0\n0.0\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n-40,7\n-60,6\n56.0\n17.0\n43.2\n-8.9\n-8.1\n-4.3\n5.8\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nTable 4.8-90 (Cont.) Summary of Impacts of Alternative 5 on Catcher Vessels\nValue\n-40.7\n-60.6\n56.0\n17.0\n43.2\n-8.9\n-4.3\n-8.1\n5.8\nNotes: aIncludes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species of groundfish catcher vessels.\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\n-35.2\n-35,5\n-7.5\n-8.8\n11.1\n-2.8\n9.0\n3.6\n6.8\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\n-28.7\n-17.2\n-23,4\n-26.2\n-19.3\n26,0\n10.4\n-4.0\n3.7\n(Thousands of mt)\nRetained Tons\nARSO\n-36,4\n-34.2\n-43,3\n-72.5\n-12.5\n2.4\n1.0\n2.5\n5.4\n4.8-198\nPacific\n107.7\n112.8\n107.5\n-90.8\n-91.6\n-92.9\n-97,4\n-36,9\nCod\n74,9\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n126,0\n125.3\n121.3\n75.2\n-0.2\n0.8\n0.8\n1.8\n0.8\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nLongline catcher vessel\nmt - metric tons\nPot catcher vessels\nVessel Class\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal","JANUARY 2001\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n2,240\n-11.1\n63.4\n80.6\n-5.8\n714\n725\n585\n227\n149\n171\n0.4\n7.1\n-11\n-91\n44\n20\n3\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n232.6\n-11.2\n51.0\n82.9\n98.8\n25.8\n55.7\n50.0\n-2.3\n-7.0\n16.9\n-8.3\n2.3\n0.6\n1.0\n0.6\n4.1\n9.1\nGroundfish\nWholesale\n($Millions)\nNotes: Exvessel value is not applicable to catcher/processors, but the column is included to be consistent with other tables.\nValue\n282.4\n139.3\n125.0\n618.7\n-17.5\n-11.2\n64.5\n42.2\n23.9\n51.0\n82.9\n-5.8\n-8.3\n4.0\n7.5\n1.6\n3.4\n0.6\nTable 4.8-91 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 5 on Catcher/Processors\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 5\n151.2\n175.8\n-33.4\n65.9\n17.3\n-0.2\n-0.4\n-0.3\n-0.5\n-1.3\n-0.2\n-0.3\n0.4\n0.0\n6.7\n0.8\n6.5\n0.1\nChange from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nReported Tons\nARSO\n119.4\n-13.6\n-77.3\n-12.2\n41.7\n68.4\n-6.4\n98.3\n19.2\n-8.2\n-6.2\n-0.1\n-0.1\n5.6\n0.0\n1.8\n0.0\n0.1\n4.8-199\nPacific\n167.8\n135.1\n-13.6\n-41.0\n-93.6\n-40.2\n-10.1\n70.2\n80.6\n25.6\n55.7\n34.2\nCod\n20.2\n-1.9\n2.7\n0.7\n4.1\n9.1\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n103.0\n562.8\n-19.3\n431.1\n61.2\n66.0\n24.4\n-5.8\n0.2\n4.4\n0.0\n4.4\n0.7\n1.7\n0.0\n1.0\n1.0\n0.7\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nNA - not applicable\nPot catcher/processors\nPot catcher/processors\nPot catcher/processors\nmt - metric tons\nVessel Class\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n-187.3\n-145.8\n1,817\n-323.6\n2,858\n-27.8\n-10.2\n294\n364\n169\n117\n40.6\n-33.1\n-4.6\n-9.3\n31.7\n97\n1.2\n-7.1\n-4.5\n1.1\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n137.5\n228.2\n18.9\n22.2\n-13.8\n-26.6\n14.5\n14.4\n20.7\n-7.2\n-6.8\n-2.0\n16.8\n-5.0\n-0.1\n-0.8\n-5.7\n0.2\n-8.1\n1.2\n2.1\nNotes: aincludes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species of processors that took deliveries of groundfish.\nTable 4.8-92 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 5 on Inshore Plants and Motherships\nGroundfish\nWholesale\n($Millions)\nValue\n343.8\n577.9\n-34.5\n-26.6\n47.3\n55.5\n36.2\n-18.1\n-17.1\n36.1\n-4.9\n-0.3\n-5.0\n16.8\n-0.8\n-5.6\n5.2\n59\n0.7\n-8.1\n1.2\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\n180.2\n112.8\n534.3\n77.4\n58.2\n79.3\n26.3\n-12.1\n-8.2\n-6.0\n-0.8\n-4.3\n-7.2\n-1.4\n-2.2\n2.3\n0.3\n0.3\n3.0\n0.3\n1.1\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 5\n-55.2\n-63.3\n-25,7\n14.4\n-27.9\n-37.2\n-4.5\n-0.9\n-2.6\n-0.5\n-8.5\n3.6\n0.5\n7.5\n0.7\n1.3\n0.7\n0.0\n0.0\nChange from Alternative 1\n0.7\n1.0\n(Thousands of mt)\nReported Tons\nARSO\n-17.7\n-12.4\n-10.8\n21.2\n-27.1\n-0.6\n-0.2\n-1.9\n-2.5\n-1.8\n2.7\n1.5\n5.2\n6.7\n0.0\n5.1\n0.3\n-0.1\n0.0\n5.7\n1.1\n4.8-200\nPacific\n-22.5\n-12.7\n-33.9\n-55.8\n-36.3\nCod\n17.8\n22.0\n59.4\n-61.1\n-1.5\n-6,3\n6.6\n4.0\n0.8\n79.1\n-2.5\n-0.6\n8.1\n2.9\n-0.1\n0.0\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n130.0\n746.2\n507.1\n58.2\n40.0\n-2.6\n-0.3\n-0.5\n-1.4\n-0.5\n-0.7\n-0.2\n4.3\n6.7\n0.5\n0.2\n1.4\n0.8\n4.0\n-7.1\n1.1\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nmt - metric tons\nKodiak inshore plants\nKodiak inshore plants\nKodiak inshore plants\nVessel Class\nMotherships\nMotherships\nMotherships\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal","JANUARY 2001\nTotal Value\n($Millions)\nProcessors Owned by\n1077.8\nRegional Residents\n-13.0\n22.1\n51.1\n17.6\n-0.2\n-2.4\n-2.5\n0.2\n3.0\n0\n0\nTotal Volume\n(Thousands\n1705.2\nof mt)\n-18.5\n39.9\n72.3\n13.1\n-6.0\n-0.1\n0.2\n2.9\n4.2\n0\n0\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n257.6\n112.8\n-14.2\n58.2\n79.3\n-0.8\nExvessel Value\n0.0\n0.0\n2.3\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n($Millions)\nTable 4.8-93 Impacts of Alternative 5 on Regional Processing\nGroundfish\nRegional Inshore Processingb\n148.4\n-14.2\n27.2\n30.0\n35.9\n-0.8\n0.0\n0.0\n2.3\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\nPollock\n565.3\n40.0\n-0.3\n-0.5\n4.3\n6.7\n-2.1\n0.2\n0\n0\n0\n0\nOutcomes Under Alternative 5\nChange from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nPacific\n-35.2\nCod\n25.9\n22.0\n-1.5\n6.6\n4.0\n2.9\n-0.1\n0\n0\n0\n0\nVolume\n4.8-201\nFlatfish\n-5.4\n-2.6\n-0.6\n4.2\n7.5\n0.7\n1.3\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nARSO\n-0.8\n-1.9\n4.2\n5.2\n0.3\n-0.1\n5.1\n6.7\n0\n0\n0\n0\nTotal Regional Processor\n($Millions)\nPayments\nto Labor\n(Regional Inshore +\nOwnership of CP &\n118\n205\n-10\n24\n17\n16\n-1\n0\n5\n0\n1\n1\nMotherships)\nEmployment\n(Est. FTEs)\n2014\n2020\n-318\n100\n448\n303\n155\n-21\n44\n18\n0\n0\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nRegion\nIslands\nIslands","Notes: The two \"Total Regional Processor\" columns show the employment and payments to labor of all inshore groundfish processing facilities in the region\nThe six \"Regional Inshore Processing\" columns include totals for inshore processing in the region-inshore processors provide fish taxes based on exvessel\n'The two \"Processors Owned by Regional Residents\" columns show total volume and total output value by the processor owner's region. Output values from\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTotal Value\n($Millions)\nProcessors Owned by\nRegional Residents\n-50.0\n12.2\n20.5\n-4.7\n-1.2\n0\n(Regional Inshore) as well as all employment and payments to labor of catcher/processors and motherships owned by residents of the region.\nTotal Volume\n(Thousands\nof mt)\n-33.3\n47.2\n-7.7\n7.8\n-1.1\n0\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\nwhich operating cost and profits are taken are associated with the owners' regions rather than the processing location.\n-5.2\n-1.4\nExvessel Value\n3.0\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n($Millions)\nTable 4.8-93 (Cont.) Impacts of Alternative 5 on Regional Processing\nGroundfish\nRegional Inshore Processingb\n-8.7\n-2.9\n8.4\n0.9\n0.0\n0.0\nPollock\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\n-0.4\n-0.7\n-6.9\n4.9\n0\n0\n(Thousands of mt)\nPacific\nCod\n-57.6\n78.4\n-6.4\n-2.4\n0\n0\nVolume\n4.8-202\nFlatfish\n-56.3\n-25.7\n-31.6\n0\n0\n0\nARSO\n-16.0\n-26.8\n-1.5\n6.3\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\n0\n0\nTotal Regional Processor\n($Millions)\nPayments\nto Labor\n(Regional Inshore +\nOwnership of CP &\n-7.8\n-4.0\n6.3\n6.7\n2.5\n0\nMotherships)\nEmployment\n(Est. FTEs)\nvalue to the region in which they operate.\n-13.6\n-4.5\n17.0\n13.1\n5.2\n0\nFTE - full-time equivalent\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nCP - catcher/processor\nWashington inland water\nMS - mothership\nmt - metric tons\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nJANUARY 2001\nRegion\nIslands","JANUARY 2001\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n214.7\nTotal\n-17.3\n-22.1\n14.3\n33.3\n62.5\n21.5\n-3.0\n-7.3\n-3.3\n56.1\n2.4\n2.6\n0.7\n-6.1\n4.5\n8.5\n1.1\nGroundfish\n161.4\nTotal\n-38.0\n-28.2\n28.7\n30.2\n15.5\n13.1\n-3.0\n-7.3\n24.8\n-6.1\n-4.3\n2.4\n2.6\n0.7\n2.4\nHarvest Value\n4.9\n9.1\n($Millions)\nGroundfish\nGOA\n-42.5\n-28.0\n20.9\n30.0\n29.4\n-2.6\n11.1\n-2.3\n32.1\n4.2\n5.9\n-3.1\n2.7\n0.7\n-8.1\n1.1\n5.6\n2.4\nTable 4.8-94 Impacts of Alternative 5 on Regional Catcher Vessels\nGroundfish\n132.0\n-28.4\nBSAI\n-0.2\n-4.7\n-3,8\n16.7\n18.2\n-3.4\n-9.1\n0.7\n7.8\n2.0\n0.2\n9.6\n1.2\n0.1\n0\n0\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nGOA\n-31.5\n-13.2\n-18.0\n14.6\n11.3\n41.6\n21.9\n-6.7\n-6.3\n-4.8\n54.8\nHarvest Volume\n44.1\n6.3\n0.4\n4.0\n0.3\n0.9\n5.0\nOutcomes Under Alternative 5\nChange from Alternative 1\nNotes: All information in the table is associated with regions through the owner's address.\n573.7\n-18,5\nBSAI\n24.5\n38.7\n-0.3\n-9.7\n-8.8\n60.0\n11.4\n-1.7\n0.3\n2.5\n-7.1\n0.8\n3.9\n0.1\n0\n0\n4.8-203\nPayments to\n($Millions)\nLabor\n-35,5\n-27.9\nPayments to Labor\n11.5\n64.6\n-2.9\n-2.4\n23.8\n-4.3\n12.1\n6.2\n-1.1\n1.0\n1.0\n0.3\n2.0\n5.2\n9.5\n2.5\nEmployment and\nEmployment\nPositions)\n(No. of\n1380\n349\n767\n944\n147\n171\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nBSAI - Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nGOA - Gulf of Alaska\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nmt - metric tons\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nOregon coast\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nRegion","Employment\nincludes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species. Numbers were not applicable for catcher/processors. The all sector totals\nFor catcher vessels the output value is the exvessel value of groundfish. For catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships output values\nare the wholesale value of production. For all sectors, the numbers shown are the summed wholesale values for catcher/processors, inshore processors,\nFor catcher vessels, employment is the number of positions on vessels. For catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships, employment\nfull-time\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nGroundfish\n10,356\n5,036\n2,148\n3,172\n-10.2\nshow the value for inshore processors and motherships. Adding the exvessel value of catcher vessels and processors would be double counting.\n57.3\n47.0\n0.0\n-0.3\n0.0\n2.7\n0.5\nnumbers are full-time equivalents. For all sectors the numbers shown are the sums of all three sectors and are neither counts of positions nor\nPayments to\n($Millions)\nLabor\n232,6\n242.4\n112.1\n587.1\n0.1\n9.2\n0.3\n9.6\n0.1\n4.1\n1.7\n0.1\nOutput Value\nGroundfish\n($Millionsb)\n1,230.9\n280.2\n617.7\n613.2\n22.9\n23.7\nTable 4.8-95 Impacts of Alternative 6.1 on Fishing and Processing Sectors\n0.3\n0.8\n3.9\n2.0\n0.1\n0.1\n($Millions\nExvessel\nValue)a\nTotal\n436.8\n546.7\n546.7\nNA\n0.3\nNA\n0.3\n0.3\nNA\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nOutcome Under Alternative 6.1\nChange from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\n201.7\n222.6\n11.9\n20,9\n-0.4\n25.5\n23.4\n-2.0\n-3,0\n14,4\n11.8\n-8,9\n4.8-204\nARSO\n125,6\n149.1\n(Thousands of mt)\n18.6\n23,6\n-2.0\n-1,5\n0.5\n-0.1\n-2.1\n-0.6\n-1.4\n2.8\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nVolume\nequivalents-the numbers are provided as indicators only.\nPacific Cod\n134.7\n226.9\n90.0\n92.1\n-1.1\n-1.2\n-1.2\n-1.1\n1.1\n0.0\n0.9\n0.0\nPollock\n1,309.4\n736.2\n562,3\n747.1\n-0.5\n1.0\n0,5\n0.0\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.1\n0.1\nNA - not applicable\nand motherships.\nmt - metric tons\nInshore and motherships\nInshore and motherships\nInshore and motherships\nCatcher/processors\nCatcher/processors\nCatcher/processors\nCatcher vessels\nCatcher vessels\nCatcher vessels\nVessel Class\nAll Sectors\nAll Sectors\nAll Sectors\nJANUARY 2001\nNotes:","JANUARY 2001\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n5,036.0\n(No. of\n2,836.0\n194.0\n270.0\n194.0\n228.0\n396.0\n561.0\n357.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n112.1\n28.5\n38.9\n11.6\n18.3\n-0.1\n-0.1\n6.3\n4.2\n3.9\n0.4\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.2\n0.2\n0.0\n0.1\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n280.2\n71.3\n97.3\n15.7\n10.4\n29.0\n45.8\n-0.2\n-0.1\n-0.1\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.4\n0.5\n0.0\n0.3\n9.7\n1.0\nTable 4.8-96 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 6.1 on Catcher Vessels\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n436.8\nTotal\n114.1\n77.8\n97.8\n18.2\n17.9\n46.9\n-0.2\n60.1\n3.9\n-0.1\n-0.1\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.4\n0.5\n0.0\n0.3\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 6.1\n11.9\n-0.4\n-0.2\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-0.1\n0.0\n1.4\n4.4\n4.2\n0.2\n0.4\n0.0\n1.1\n0.1\nChange from Alternative 1\n0.1\n(Thousands of mt)\nRetained Tons\nARSO\n18.6\n0.0\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.5\n1.0\n2.8\n2.5\n0.3\n0.4\n4.5\n6.8\n0.2\n0.1\n0.1\n4.8-205\nPacific\nCod\n15.2\n21.2\n13.0\n13.3\n13.6\n10.6\n90.0\n-0.3\n-0.4\n-0.2\n-0.1\n-1.1\n0.0\n0.0\n-0.1\n0.0\n2.4\n0.6\nPollock\n292.6\n388.5\n736.2\n36.3\n18.9\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.4\n0.5\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n1.0\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nLongline catcher vessel\nLongline catcher vessel\nPot catcher vessels\nPot catcher vessels\nVessel Class\nTotal\nTotal","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0,0\n0,0\n0.0\n0.0\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n-0.2\n-0.2\n-0.5\n-0,6\n-3.9\n0.0\n1.4\n1.1\n0.1\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nTable 4.8-96 (Cont.) Summary of Impacts of Alternative 6.1 on Catcher Vessels\nExvessel\nValue\n-0.2\n-0.2\n-0,5\n-0,6\n-3,9\n0.0\n1.4\n1.1\n0.1\nNotes: exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species of groundfish catcher vessels.\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\n-0.2\n-0.2\n-0,4\n-0,4\n-1.0\n0,0\n0.9\n0.4\n0.1\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\n-16,9\n-16.9\n-18.2\n-15,3\n-8,9\n-3.7\n-3,0\n1.8\n1.5\n(Thousands of mt)\nRetained Tons\nARSO\n13.6\n-9.8\n-6.3\n4.9\n0.2\n3.1\n1.2\n0.5\n2.8\n4.8-206\nPacific\nCod\n-2.0\n-1.8\n-1.4\n-0.7\n-0,8\n-0.9\n-1.4\n-1.2\n-0.1\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n-20,6\n-20.1\n-20,7\n-20,7\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nLongline catcher vessel\nmt - metric tons\nPot catcher vessels\nVessel Class\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal","JANUARY 2001\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n2,148\n709\n182\n878\n355\n-0.2\n-0.8\n-0.2\n0.0\n7.6\n2.7\n24\n62\n-2\n-3\n57\n0\n0\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n232.6\n98.3\n28.0\n72.0\n33.0\n14.9\n-0.3\n-0.4\n1.2\n0.0\n-0.1\n9.3\n-0.1\n0.0\n9.2\n0.0\n0.0\n4.1\nGroundfish\nWholesale\n($Millions)\nValue\n280.9\n617.7\n180.1\nTable 4.8-97 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 6.1 on Catcher/Processors\n82.5\n23.3\n22.9\n14.9\n70.1\n-0.2\n-0.3\n-0.3\n-0.4\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n3.9\n4.1\n0.1\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\nNotes: Exvessel value is not applicable to catcher/processors, but the column is included for consistency.\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 6.1\n178.4\n201.7\n-19.9\n-20.0\n16.8\n26.9\n25.5\n17.8\n14.4\n-0.7\n-0.2\n-0.5\n-8.2\n0.9\n5.6\n0.0\n0.0\n-4.1\nChange from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nReported Tons\nARSO\n112.2\n125.6\n-10.7\n-15.0\n-20.0\n11.5\n-20.1\n-0.2\n-2.0\n-2.0\n-1.5\n1.7\n0.0\n0.3\n0.0\n0.3\n0.1\n0.1\n4.8-207\nPacific\n134.7\n-11.7\nCod\n10.6\n35.5\n79.5\n-0.5\n-0.2\n-1.4\n-0.2\n1.7\n0.0\n0.9\n4.1\n5.1\n0.1\n1.1\n5.1\n0.1\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n427.3\n102.4\n562.3\n-19.9\n-20.0\n30.4\n-0.5\n2.2\n0.0\n0.7\n0.2\n0.0\n0.5\n0.2\n0.6\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nHead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nNA - not applicable\nmt - metric tons\nPot catcher/processors\nPot catcher/processors\nPot catcher/processors\nVessel Class\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal","CHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n1,997\n3,172\n-10.2\n439\n128\n-7.6\n-0.4\n-0.4\n-0.2\n-0.7\n-0.3\n391\n101\n116\n-1.7\n-0.1\n-0.3\n-0.7\n0.0\n0.1\n0.1\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n144.7\n242.4\n25.7\n24.2\n12.6\n14.7\n20.5\n-0.3\n-0.1\n-0.1\n0.2\n-0.1\n0.3\n1.6\n0.8\n0.3\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.3\n0.1\nNotes: aincludes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species of processors that took deliveries of groundfish.\nTable 4.8-98 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 6.1 on Inshore Plants and Motherships\nGroundfish\nWholesale\n($Millions)\nValue\n361.7\n613.2\n64.2\n60.6\n31.5\n36.7\n58.5\n-0.2\n-0.2\n-0.3\n0.2\n0.5\n0.3\n0.2\n0.8\n-0.1\n0.3\n1.6\n0.8\n0.3\n0.1\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n112.9\nTotal\n188.0\n546.7\n83.2\n58.9\n77.6\n26.0\n-0.4\n-0.2\n-0.2\n-0.2\n-0.2\n-0.1\n0.6\n0.4\n0.0\n0.3\n0.8\n0.3\n0.0\n0.1\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 6.1\n-19.5\n-19.8\n20.9\n-16.1\n-12.1\n-1.3\n-0.3\n-0.2\n-1.6\n-3.8\n-8.9\n-0.1\n-2.0\n6.8\n1.2\n9.9\n0.6\n1.8\n0.5\n-0.1\n-0.1\nChange from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nReported Tons\nARSO\n-16.4\n-19.8\n23.6\n-0.5\n-0.2\n-9.6\n-0.3\n-0.6\n2.7\n1.6\n7.6\n4.8\n6.8\n0.0\n0.5\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n7.7\n0.5\n4.8-208\nPacific\n-19.5\nCod\n39.8\n20.8\n23.3\n92.1\n-0.5\n-0.3\n-0.2\n-1.2\n-0.5\n-1.2\n-1.2\n-1.1\n-2.1\n3.7\n4.0\n0.7\n-0.1\n0.0\n-0.1\n-1.1\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n509.0\n128.9\n747.1\n57.7\n40.2\n-0.6\n-0.5\n-0.1\n7.2\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n-0.1\n-0.1\n4.1\n0.3\n0.2\n-0.1\n0.2\n-0.1\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nAlaska Peninsula Aleutian Island inshore plant\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nmt - metric tons\nKodiak inshore plants\nKodiak inshore plants\nKodiak inshore plants\nVessel Class\nMotherships\nMotherships\nMotherships\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal","JANUARY 2001\nTotal Value\n($Millions)\nProcessors Owned by\n1,106.1\nRegional Residents\n21.0\n57.3\n14.7\n15.3\n0.4\n1.3\n3.7\n0.1\n0\n0\n0\nTotal Volume\n(Thousands\n1735.6\nof mt)\n39.5\n82.3\n11.9\n-0.2\n0.3\n8.7\n2.5\n4.0\n0\n0\n0\nExvessel Value ($Millions)\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n271.3\n112.9\n58.9\n77.6\n-0.5\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.6\n0.4\n0.0\n0.0\nTable 4.8-99 Impacts of Alternative 6.1 on Regional Processing\nRegional Inshore Processingb\nGroundfish\n162.1\n27.9\n28.3\n36.0\n-0.5\n-0.1\n0.0\n0.0\n0.6\n0.4\n0.0\n0.0\nPollock\n566.7\n40.2\n-0.7\n-0.1\n7.2\n4.1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nOutcomes under Alternative 6.1\nChange from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nPacific\nCod\n60.5\n23.3\n-0.6\n-0.2\n-0.1\n3.7\n4.0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nVolume\n4.8-209\nFlatfish\n-1.6\n-0.2\n-0.1\n-0.1\n8.0\n9.9\n0.6\n1.8\n0\n0\n0\n0\nARSO\n-0.7\n0.5\n4.3\n7.6\n4.8\n6.8\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nTotal Regional Processor\n($Millions)\nPayments\nto Labor\n(Regional Inshore +\nOwnership of CP &\n128\n205\n26\n17\n15\n0\n0\n0\n5\n0\n1\n1\nMotherships)\nEmployment\n(Est. FTEs)\n2324\n1956\n474\n266\n136\n36\n-8\n-1\n0\n5\n7\n0\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nRegion\nIslands\nIslands","The two \"Total Regional Processor\" columns show the employment and payments to labor of all inshore groundfish processing facilities in the region\nThe six \"Regional Inshore Processing\" columns include totals for inshore processing in the region-inshore processors provide fish taxes based on exvessel\n'The two \"Processors Owned by Regional Residents\" columns show total volume and total output value by the processor owner's region. Output values\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTotal Value\n($Millions)\nProcessors Owned by\nRegional Residents\n6.6\n6.9\n0.7\n1.4\n0\n0\n(Regional Inshore) as well as all employment and payments to labor of catcher/processors and motherships owned by residents of the region.\nTotal Volume\n(Thousands\nof mt)\n-2.2\n6.8\n5.1\n0.7\n0\n0\nfrom which operating cost and profits are taken are associated with the owners' regions rather than the processing location.\nExvessel Value ($Millions)\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n-0.2\n-0.2\n0.8\n0.3\n0.0\n0.0\nTable 4.8-99 (Cont.) Impacts of Alternative 6.1 on Regional Processing\nRegional Inshore Processing\nGroundfish\n-0.3\n-0,3\n2.2\n1.1\n0.0\n0.0\nPollock\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\n-0.2\n-0.1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n(Thousands of mt)\nPacific\nCod\n-1.0\n-0.9\n-2.4\n0\n0\n0\nVolume\n4.8-210\nFlatfish\n-16.7\n-14.3\n-2.0\n-5.3\n0\n0\nARSO\n-14.0\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\n7.0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nTotal Regional Processor\n($Millions)\nPayments\nto Labor\n(Regional Inshore +\nOwnership of CP &\n4.0\n6.3\n2.5\n0\n0\n0\nMotherships)\nEmployment\n(Est. FTEs)\nvalue to the region in which they operate.\n-0.3\n-0.7\n2.7\n1.9\n1.1\n0\nFTE -- full-time equivalent\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nWashington inland water\nmt - metric tons\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nJANUARY 2001\nRegion\nIslands\nNotes:","JANUARY 2001\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n222.0\nTotal\n17.2\n55.7\n30.7\n62.3\n27.5\n-0.1\n-0.4\n2.0\n0.5\n-0.1\n-0.6\n3.7\n0.8\n0\n0\n0\n0\nGroundfish\n168.7\nTotal\n28.3\n10.5\n30.0\n21.5\n-0.1\n-0,5\n2.0\n0.5\n-0.1\n-1.3\nHarvest Value\n7.8\n7.6\n1.7\n0\n0\n0\n0\n($Millions)\nGroundfish\nGOA\n19.8\n29.7\n32.3\n7.2\n8.4\n8.2\n-0.1\n0.4\n0.3\n-1.4\n1.4\n0.9\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nTable 4.8-100 Impacts of Alternative 6.1 on Regional Catcher Vessels\nGroundfish\n136.4\nBSAI\n-16.7\n13.3\n-0.3\n-1.1\n-0.1\n-0.1\n-4.5\n-0.2\n-0.7\n0.6\n5.5\n0.2\n2.1\n0\n0\n0\n0\nHarvest Volume\nGOA\n21.2\n43.9\n47.9\n26.9\n-0.1\n-0.1\n7.2\n6.0\n0.2\n0.2\n-0.5\n-1.4\n(Thousands\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\n0.5\n0.7\n0\n0\n0\n0\nof mt)\nOutcomes Under Alternative 6.1\nChange from Alternative 1\n583.3\nBSAI\n22.0\n47.3\n-0.2\n-0.1\n-0.4\nNotes: All information in the table is associated with regions through the owner's address.\n0.5\n4.2\n0.1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n4.8-211\nPayments to\n($Millions)\nLabor\n10.5\n12.0\n67.5\n4.2\n8.6\n0.2\n3.1\n1.7\nPayments to Labor\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nEmployment and\nEmployment\nPositions)\n(No. of\n1380\n349\n767\n944\n147\n171\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nBSAI - Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nGOA - Gulf of Alaska\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nmt - metric tons\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nRegion","Notes: includes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species. Numbers were not applicable for catcher/processors. The all sector totals\nFor catcher vessels the output value is the exvessel value of groundfish. For catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships output values are\nEmployment\nthe wholesale value of production. For all sectors, the numbers shown are the summed wholesale values for catcher/processors, inshore processors, and\n'For catcher vessels, employment is the number of positions on vessels. For catcher/processors, inshore processors, and motherships, employment\nfull-time\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nGroundfish\n11,221\n5,036\n2,465\n3,720\n374\n538\n912\n18\n17\n0\n0\n9\nshow the value for inshore processors and motherships. Adding the exvessel value of catcher vessels and processors would be double counting.\nnumbers are full-time equivalents. For all sectors, the numbers shown are the sums of all three sectors and are neither counts of positions nor\nPayments to\n($Millions)\nLabor\n131.5\n278.2\n284.2\n693.9\n116.4\n19.6\n54.7\n42.1\n17.5\n24.5\n17.4\n20.2\nOutput Value\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\n1,457.3\n328.9\n738.2\n719.0\n143.4\n106.6\n250.1\nTable 4.8-101 Impacts of Alternative 6.2 on Fishing and Processing Sectors\n49.0\n17,5\n20.7\n24.1\n17,4\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\n485.4\n595.3\n595.3\n49.0\n49.0\n49.0\n11.2\nNA\nNA\nNA\n9.0\n9.0\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 6.2\n230.4\n258.4\n15.5\n28.0\n54.1\n59.2\n26.5\n30.7\n22.2\n29.7\nVolume (Thousands of mt)\n3.2\n5.1\nChange from Alternative 1\nARSO\n162.8\n190.9\n21.1\n35.2\n28.1\n39.7\n16.8\n27.6\n18.8\n26.2\n3.0\n4.4\n4.8-212\nPacific\n164.0\n103.0\n267.0\nCod\n99.6\n30.4\n40.1\n22.8\n10.4\n17.7\n8.5\n9.7\n9.4\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n1,559.8\n877.3\n668.5\n891.4\n142.0\n106.6\n143.8\n250.4\n19.3\n19.0\n19.2\n19.1\nequivalents-the numbers are provided as indicators only.\nNA - not applicable\nInshore and motherships\nInshore and motherships\nInshore and motherships\nmt - metric tons\nCatcher/processors\nmotherships.\nCatcher/processors\nCatcher/processors\nCatcher vessels\nCatcher vessels\nCatcher vessels\nVessel Class\nAll Sectors\nAll Sectors\nAll Sectors\nJANUARY 2001","JANUARY 2001\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n2,836\n5,036\n194\n270\n194\n228\n396\n561\n357\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n131.5\n33.8\n46.3\n13.5\n21.4\n19.6\n7.5\n4.3\n4.4\n0.5\n5.2\n7.3\n1.2\n0.5\n2.0\n3.2\n0.1\n0.1\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n115.6\n328.9\n84.6\n18.7\n10.7\n10.9\n33.7\n53.4\n49.0\n13.1\n18.1\n1.2\n2.9\n0.2\n1.3\n0.2\n5.1\n8.1\nTable 4.8-102 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 6.2 on Catcher Vessels\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n485.4\nTotal\n116.2\n121.7\n21.2\n18.2\n61.3\n51.5\n49.0\n91.1\n13.1\n18.1\n4.2\n2.9\n0.2\n1.3\n0.2\n5.1\n8.1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 6.2\n15.5\n1.9\n5.6\n5.5\n1.4\n0.4\n0.6\n0.3\n1.0\n1.3\n0.4\n0.0\n0.0\n3.2\n0.1\n0.1\nChange from Alternative 1\n0.1\n0.1\nRetained Tons\nARSO\n(Thousands)\n21.1\n3.0\n2.6\n0.4\n0.5\n5.2\n8.0\n0.3\n0.4\n0.4\n0.0\n0.8\n1.2\n3.0\n1.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n4.8-213\nPacific\nCod\n17.0\n23.6\n14.6\n12.3\n15.6\n99.6\n-1.2\n13.1\n2.8\n0.8\n1.4\n2.0\n1.4\n2.0\n0.4\n2.3\n8.5\n0.1\nPollock\n347.0\n461.7\n877.3\n142.0\n45.0\n23.5\n54.9\n73.8\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n8.8\n4.6\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nLongline catcher vessel\nLongline catcher vessel\nPot catcher vessels\nPot catcher vessels\nVessel Class\nTotal\nTotal","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n0,0\n0.0\n0.0\n0,0\n0.0\n0,0\n0,0\n0,0\n0.0\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n18,3\n18,6\n18.4\n13.0\n17.8\n17,8\n20,4\n17.5\n2.1\nGroundfish\nTable 4.8-102 (Cont.) Summary of Impacts of Alternative 6.2 on Catcher Vessels\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n18,3\n18,6\n18.4\n13,0\n17,8\n17.8\n20,4\n17.5\n2.1\nNotes: includes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species of groundfish catcher vessels.\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\n16.8\n18,5\n15,9\n10,9\n11.2\n1.2\n5.2\n2.1\n7.1\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\n17,9\n22.5\n31,9\n35,7\n21,7\n25,6\n26,4\n26.5\n43.1\nRetained Tons\nARSO\n(Thousands)\n14.3\n14.3\n16.0\n16.9\n17.4\n18.2\n36.0\n16.8\n-0,6\n4.8-214\nPacific\nCod\n10.5\n14.6\n17.0\n21.8\n16,4\n-8.6\n9.3\n9.4\n9.4\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n18.8\n19.0\n24.6\n24.1\n13.3\n11.5\n11.1\n19.3\n12.1\nTrawl catcher vessel without crab endorsements\nTrawl catcher vessel with crab endorsements\nFixed-gear catcher vessel 33 to 59 ft\nFixed-gear catcher vessel = 32 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel < 60 ft\nTrawl catcher vessel = 60 ft\nLongline catcher vessel\nmt - metric tons\nPot catcher vessels\nVessel Class\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal","JANUARY 2001\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n1,010\n2,595\n795\n204\n427\n118\n233\n493\n29\n86\n17\n18\n30\n25\n22\n23\n31\n5\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n278.2\n116.1\n84.9\n42.6\n17.8\n22.2\n54.7\n33.1\n1.5\n4.9\n9.5\n0.3\n18\n18\n35\n29\n23\n24\nGroundfish\nWholesale\n($Millions)\n331.7\n82.7\n212.2\n106.6\n738.2\n5.1\nExvessel value is not applicable to catcher/processors, but the column is included to be consistent with other tables\n143.4\nTable 4.8-103 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 6.2 on Catcher/Processors\nValue\n50.9\n12.4\n55.4\n23.8\n1.0\n18\n18\n35\n29\n23\n24\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\nTotal\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nNA\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 6.2\n199.49\n230.37\n17.96\n11.51\n48.0\n1.37\n0.04\n54.1\n0.4\n0.2\n5.4\n0.0\nChange from Alternative 1\n15\n32\n89\n15\n31\n3\n(Thousands of mt)\nReported Tons\n143.70\n162.75\nARSO\n16.50\n31.8\n35.2\n2.28\n0.18\n0.09\n0.4\n0.0\n3.0\n0.0\n28\n22\n28\n21\n11\n21\n4.8-215\nPacific\n164.02\n11.84\n43.76\n96.95\n6.19\n10.0\n17.6\n30.4\nCod\n5.29\n0.7\n1.1\n1.1\n14\n10\n30\n22\n22\n23\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n505.17\n121.04\n668.45\n106.6\n39.00\n3.22\n0.02\n78.5\n18.8\n8.7\n0.5\n0.0\n18\n18\n29\n19\n15\n19\nhead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nhead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nhead-and-gut trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nSurimi trawl catcher/processors\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nFillet trawl catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nLongline catcher/processors\nNA - not applicable\nmt - metric tons\nPot catcher/processors\nPot catcher/processors\nPot catcher/processors\nVessel Class\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal\nNotes:","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nEmployment\nGroundfish\nPositions)\n(No. of\n2,349\n3,720\n480\n473\n158\n124\n137\n345\n17.2\n20.7\n23.3\n538\n21.1\n18.4\n16.9\n9.0\n40\n30\n81\n22\n21\nPayments to\nGroundfish\n($Millions)\nLabor\n170.4\n284.2\n28.6\n28.8\n14.9\n17.2\n24.2\n25.7\n42.1\n17.7\n11.2\n19.3\n18.0\n18.5\n17.4\n2.9\n20.1\n4.7\n2.5\n2.6\n3.8\nTable 4.8-104 Summary of Impacts of Alternative 6.2 on Inshore Plants and Motherships\nGroundfish\nWholesale\n($Millions)\nValue\n426.1\n719.0\n106.6\n71.6\n72.0\n37.2\n43.0\n69.1\n64.2\n11.6\n10.8\n17.7\n11.2\n19.3\n18.0\n18.5\n17.4\n7.2\n20.1\n6.2\n6.6\n($Millions)\nExvessel\nValue\n213.0\nTotal\n118.7\n595.3\n86.3\n64.0\n82.4\n30.8\n24.6\n49.0\n13.1\n18.4\n3.0\n5.0\n5.4\n6.2\n4.8\n3.6\n8.5\n7.0\n5.5\n9.0\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nFlatfish\nOutcome Under Alternative 6.2\n13.0\n28.0\n12.4\n29.2\n27.6\n42.0\n18.4\n22.2\n9.2\n1.5\n0.9\n2.7\n0.8\n1.0\n0.0\n2.9\n0.2\n0.8\nChange from Alternative 1\n0.1\n5.1\n2.8\nNotes: anIncludes exvessel value of groundfish, salmon, crab, halibut, and other species.\nReported Tons\nARSO\n(Thousands)\n28.1\n15.8\n14.3\n22.4\n19.2\n17.2\n18.4\n18.8\n3.7\n2.0\n8.7\n5.7\n8.0\n0.0\n0.5\n0.2\n1.6\n0.9\n1.2\n0.0\n4.4\n4.8-216\nPacific\n103.0\nCod\n44.6\n20.4\n27.4\n-0.4\n10.8\n16.4\n24.0\n20.2\n-2.0\n17.8\n10.4\n4.6\n4.9\n1.0\n4.4\n3.9\n0.9\n0.8\n9.7\n0.1\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nPollock\n603,4\n152.3\n891.4\n143.8\n70.6\n50.7\n93.8\n12.9\n10.4\n23.7\n18.4\n22.3\n25.8\n28.7\n18.4\n19.2\n24.1\n9.3\n5.1\n1.0\n2.1\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nSouthcentral Alaska inshore plant\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nSoutheast Alaska inshore plant\nmt - metric tons\nKodiak inshore plants\nKodiak inshore plants\nKodiak inshore plants\nAPA-SPECIES\nAPA-SPECIES\nAPA-SPECIES\nVessel Class\nMotherships\nMotherships\nMotherships\nJANUARY 2001\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal","JANUARY 2001\nTotal Value\n($Millions)\nProcessors Owned by\n1,309.5\nRegional Residents\n218.7\n25.7\n68.4\n17.6\n14.8\n0.4\n0.0\n0.0\n6.0\n3.0\n0.0\n(Thousands\nVolume\n2,062.3\nof mt)\n100.0\n338.6\nTotal\n47.7\n10.9\n10.7\n21.7\n0.0\n2.0\n0.0\n0.1\n.4\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n299.4\n118.7\n63.9\n82.4\n27.6\n0.0\n0.0\n4.9\n5.4\n6.2\n0.0\n0.0\nExvessel Value\n($Millions)\nTable 4.8-105 Impacts of Alternative 6.2 on Regional Processing\nGroundfish\nRegional Inshore Processingb\n190.2\n32.9\n33.0\n41.8\n27.6\n0.0\n0.0\n4.9\n5.4\n6.2\n0.0\n0.0\nPollock\n647.0\n106.6\n50.7\n10.4\n9.3\n0.0\n0.0\n1.0\n0.0\n0.0\n5.1\n2.1\nOutcome Under Alternative 6.2\nChange from Alternative 1\n(Thousands of mt)\nPacific\nCod\n27.4\n65.1\n4.6\n4.9\n0.0\n0.0\n4.0\n3.9\n0.9\n0.8\n0.0\n0.0\nVolume\n4.8-217\nFlatfish\n10.7\n13.0\n2.7\n0.0\n0.0\n2.9\n0.2\n0.8\n0.0\n0.0\n1.1\n.9\nARSO\n5.7\n8.7\n5.7\n8.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.7\n1.6\n0.9\n1.2\n0.0\n0.0\n($Millions)\nPayments\nto Labor\n(Regional Inshore +\nOwnership of CP &\n150\n245\n20\n18\n22\n45\n31\n0\n6\n4\n3\n0\nTotal Regional\nMotherships)\nProcessor\nEmployment\n(Est. FTEs)\n2,669\n2,340\n573\n326\n167\n337\n104\n420\n67\n30\n0\n0\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nRegion\nIslands\nIslands","aThe two \"Total Regional Processor\" columns show the employment and payments to labor of all inshore groundfish processing facilities in the region\nThe six \"Regional Inshore Processing\" columns include totals for inshore processing in the region-inshore processors provide fish taxes based on exvessel\n'The two \"Processors Owned by Regional Residents\" columns show total volume and total output value by the processor owner's region. Output values\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nTotal Value\n($Millions)\nProcessors Owned by\nRegional Residents\n30.5\n27.6\n20.5\n20.0\n0.0\n0\n(Regional Inshore) as well as all employment and payments to labor of catcher/processors and motherships owned by residents of the region.\n(Thousands\nVolume\nof mt)\nTotal\n33.3\n28.9\n27.7\n22.5\n19.6\n0\nfrom which operating cost and profits are taken are associated with the owners' regions rather than the processing location.\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n10.2\n8.3\n7.0\n5.5\nExvessel Value\n0\n0\n($Millions)\nTable 4.8-105 (Cont.) Impacts of Alternative 6.2 on Regional Processing\nGroundfish\nRegional Inshore Processingb\n17.0\n17.5\n19.6\n17.4\n0\n0\nPollock\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\n18.8\n25.7\n24.7\n28,6\n0\n0\n(Thousands of mt)\nPacific\nCod\n16.5\n24.2\n20.2\n6.5\n0\n0\nVolume\nFlatfish\n4.8-218\n11.1\n28.7\n25.9\n39.7\n0\n0\nARSO\n14.3\n21.9\n19.5\n18.0\nARSO - Atka mackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\n0\n0\n($Millions)\nPayments\nto Labor\n(Regional Inshore +\nOwnership of CP &\n17.2\n24.0\n25.0\n20.0\n22.5\n0\nTotal Regional\nMotherships)\nProcessor\nEmployment\n(Est. FTEs)\nvalue to the region in which they operate.\n14.5\n22.2\n25.9\n21.9\n21.9\n0\nFTE - full-time equivalent\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nCP - catcher/processor\nWashington inland water\nMS - mothership\nmt - metric tons\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nJANUARY 2001\nRegion\nIslands\nNotes:","JANUARY 2001\nGroundfish\nGroundfish\nand Non-\n252.8\nTotal\n13.9\n12.3\n17.6\n58.4\n32.5\n67.0\n31.0\n30.8\n0.3\n4.7\n1.8\n5.2\n3.4\n1.7\n8.8\n5.9\n8.4\nGroundfish\n199.5\nTotal\n31.0\n12.3\n34.7\n25.0\n30.8\n17.9\n17.6\n18.3\n15.7\n17.1\n8.2\n0.3\n4.7\n1.8\n5.2\n3.4\n3.8\nHarvest Value\n($Millions)\nGroundfish\nGOA\n18.2\n16.7\n17.4\n16.9\n18.3\n23.4\n34.4\n37.4\n7.5\n9.8\n9.7\n0.2\n3.6\n1.4\n5.4\n1.5\n2.7\n5.1\nTable 4.8-106 Impacts of Alternative 6.2 on Regional Catcher Vessels\nGroundfish\nBSAI\n162.1\n15.3\n25.4\n16.7\n16.7\n13.6\n50.0\n18.6\n14.2\n0.7\n7.7\n2.5\n0.3\n0.3\n1.9\n0.1\n1.1\n0.1\nPercentage Change from Alternative 1\nOutcome Under Alternative 6.2\nHarvest Volume\nGOA\n11.7\n21.5\n19.2\n18.3\n20.5\n22.8\n23.8\n57.7\n32.8\n53.1\nChange from Alternative 1\n8.7\n2.5\n9.4\n1.4\n9.8\n7.1\n1.1\n6.1\n(Thousands\nNotes: All information in the table is associated with regions through the owner's address.\nof mt)\n689.0\n105.6\nBSAI\n20.0\n17.3\n16.7\n16.0\n25.8\n18.1\n4.8-219\n55.1\n0.0\n0.6\n4.9\n3.8\n0.7\n0.0\n7.6\n0.1\n0.1\nPayments to\n($Millions)\nLabor\nPayments to Labor\n12.4\n13.9\n79.8\n10.0\n12.3\n16.7\n17.8\n18.2\n16.3\n18.1\n3.3\n4.9\n0.2\n1.9\n0.7\n1.4\n6.5\n2.1\nEmployment and\nEmployment\nPositions)\n(No. of\n1,380\n349\n767\n944\n147\n171\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nBSAI - Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nGOA - Gulf of Alaska\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nWashington inland water\nmt - metric tons\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nSoutheast Alaska\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nOregon coast\nKodiak Island\nRegion","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n653,000\n182,089\n835,089\n16,260,000\n317,423\n16,577,423\n3,180,000\n96,457\n3,276,457\n71,554,000\n36,376\n71,590,376\n24,142,000\n514,709\n24,656,709\nAlaska\nAll\n40,000\n1,410,000\n3,959\n1,413,959\n831\n40,831\n680,000\n14,250,000\n6,439\n14,256,439\n13,611\n693,611\n772,000\n61,732\n833,732\nTable 4.8-107 Estimated Catch (Number of Fish) in Alaskan Region Salmon Fisheries, 1997 and 1998\nWestward (4)\nEstimated Catch (Number of Fish) in Alaskan Salmon Fisheries by Alaska Region, 1997\nAlaska Department of Fish and Game Region Name\n170,000\n151,415\n400,000\n306,723\n240,000\n71,360\n311,360\n0\n25,330\n25,330\n120,000\n45,450\n165,450\nKuskokwim (3)\nArctic Yukon\n1,029,774\n421,350\n80,000\n19,935\n320,000\n3,051\n50,000\n6,642\n56,642\n0\n707\n707\n12,160,000\n123,630\n12,283,630\nBay (2)\nBristol\n4.8-220\n63,000\n9,169\n72,169\n2,340,000\n169\n2,340,169\n240,000\n2,530\n242,530\n28,324,000\n537\n28,324,537\n8,610,000\n235,047\n8,845,047\nCentral (2)\n300,000\n739\n300,739\n11,790,000\n2,314\n1,972,314\n28,980,000\n3,521\n11,793,521\n1,970,000\n3,363\n28,983,363\n2,480,000\n48,850\n2,528,850\nSoutheast (1)\nCategory\nCommercial\nSubsistence\nCommercial\nSubsistence\nCommercial\nSubsistence\nCommercial\nSubsistence\nCommercial\nSubsistence\nCatch\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal\nJANUARY 2001\nSpecies\nChinook\nSockeye\nChum\nCoho\nPink","JANUARY 2001\n580,000\n177,462\n757,462\n19,090,000\n275,719\n19,365,719\n4,680,000\n92,510\n4,772,510\n104,770,000\n64,549\n104,834,549\n22,720,000\n459,382\n23,179,382\nAlaska\nAll\nTable 4.8-107 (Cont.) Estimated Catch (Number of Fish) in Alaskan Region Salmon Fisheries, 1997 and 1998\n30,000\n848\n30,848\n1,240,000\n1,768\n1,241,768\n850,000\n12,675\n862,675\n30,920,000\n4,705\n30,924,705\n7,940,000\n41,798\n7,981,798\nWestward (4)\nAlaska Department of Fish and Game Region Name\nEstimated Catch (Number of Fish) in Alaska Salmon Fisheries by Region, 1998\n90,000\n148,455\n380,000\n264,716\n340,000\n64,479\n404,479\n590,000\n53,450\n643,450\n130,000\n40,418\n170,418\nKuskokwim (3)\nArctic Yukon\n1,048,717\n395,380\n140,000\n16,925\n400,000\n130,000\n8,734\n138,734\n30,000\n2,550\n32,550\n10,040,000\n119,150\n10,159,150\n4,001\nBay (2)\nBristol\n4.8-221\n80,000\n10,183\n90,183\n1,370,000\n262\n1,370,262\n370,000\n3,784\n373,784\n30,700,000\n485\n30,700,485\n3,230,000\n204,603\n3,434,603\nCentral (2)\nNotes: aCombined total for Bristol Bay and Arctic Yukon Kuskokwim\n240,000\n15,700,000\n4,972\n15,704,972\n2,990,000\n2,838\n2,992,838\n42,530,000\n3,359\n42,533,359\n1,380,000\n53,413\n1,433,413\n1,051\n241,051\nSoutheast (1)\nSource: Alaska Department of Fish and Game, 2000b.\nCategory\nSubsistence\nCommercial\nSubsistence\nCommercial\nSubsistence\nCommercial\nSubsistence\nCommercial\nSubsistence\nCommercial\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nCatch\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal\nSockeye\nSpecies\nChinook\nChum\nCoho\nPink","Table 4.8-108\nMatrix of Relationships and Impacts Between the Groundfish Fishery and Sea Lion\nSubsistence\nand the relationship\nIf the relationship between the groundfish fishery and sea lion populations is:\nbetween sea lion\nUnknown relationship\nNo relationship\nWeak relationship\nStrong relationship\npopulations and\nsubsistence is:\nThen the impact of the alternative on sea lion subsistence harvest is:\nUnknown relationship\nUnknown impact\nNo impact\nUnknown impact\nUnknown impact\nNo relationship\nNo impact\nNo impact\nNo impact\nNo impact\nWeak relationship\nUnknown impact\nNo impact\nSlight impact\nSlight impact\nStrong relationship\nUnknown impact\nNo impact\nSlight impact\nSlight impact\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4- - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-222","Documented Subsistence Harvest of Steller Sea Lions, Alaska Coastal Communities,\nTable 4.8-109\nSelected Years\nSubsistence Harvest\nSteller Sea Lion\nAll Species\nNumber\nPercent of\nTotal\nPercent of\n(Edible\nCommunity\n(Edible\nCommunity\nHarvest\nPounds)\nHarvest\nPounds)\nCommunity\nRegion\nYear\nWestern\n1980\n431,904\n9\n1,200\n0.3\nAlaskanuk\n0.4\nWestern\n1982\n536,584\n16\n2,286\nQuinhagek\n400\n0.0\nSoutheast\n1996\n1,749,772\n2\nSitka\n3.6\n12\n997\nChenega Bay\nSouthcentral\n1993\n27,809\n1,048\n2.5\n1997\n42,593\n5\nNanwalek\nSouthcentral\n19\n3,712\n1.1\nSouthcentral\n1997\n322,915\nTatitluk\n2.3\n25,735\n3\n600\nSouthwest\n1992\nAkhiok\n38\n7,688\n16.2\nSouthwest\n1990\n47,397\nAkutan\n0.4\n54,079\n2\n221\nAleknagik\nSouthwest\n1989\n8,700\n23.3\nSouthwest\n1994\n37,307\n44\nAtka\n0.8\n28,586\n1\n220\nFalse Pass\nSouthwest\n1988\n130\n0.2\nSouthwest\n1991\n82,915\n1\nlliamna\n150\n1.0\n1\nIvanof Bay\nSouthwest\n1989\n15,677\n1,639\n1.4\n118,337\n16\nManokotak\nSouthwest\n1985\n26\n5,143\n13.9\nNikolski\nSouthwest\n1990\n36,945\n7,442\n8.4\n88,851\n37\nOld Harbor\nSouthwest\n1997\n264\n0.5\n1997\n55,015\n1\nOuzinkie\nSouthwest\n4.5\n45,729\n11\n2,067\nPerryville\nSouthwest\n1989\n356\n0.5\n1993\n78,371\n2\nPort Lions\nSouthwest\n3\n556\n4.9\nSaint George\nSouthwest\n1994\n11,330\n28,214\n21.4\n1994\n131,814\n141\nSaint Paul\nSouthwest\n72\n14,423\n4.1\nUnalaska\nSouthwest\n1994\n355,081\nNotes: Numbers are for the \"most typical\" year for which information is applicable. Alaska Department of Fish and\nGame does only limited surveys, and subsistence use can vary greatly from year-to-year.\nCommunities with documented use but no harvest are not included.\nNumbers differ from and are not included in Table 4.8.11 Numbers in both tables are estimates based on\nsampling.\nSource: ADF&G 2000a.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-223","Table 4.8-110 Estimated Subsistence Harvest of Steller Sea Lions by Alaska Region, 1992-1998\nNumber of Sea Lions Taken by Year\nCommunity\n1992\n1993\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\n1998\nSoutheast Alaska\n6\n1\n5\n0\n0\n0\n8\nNorth Pacific Rim\n32\n35\n26\n31\n14\n6\n29\nUpper Kenai-Cook\n10\n11\n1\n0\n3\n0\n0\nInlet\nKodiak Island\n58\n58\n61\n137\n60\n38\n18\nSouth Alaska\n2\n6\n6\n8\n5\n8\n9\nPeninsula\nAleutian Islands\n135\n124\n122\n96\n58\n52\n37\nPribilof Islands\n297\n245\n193\n68\n46\n56\n78\nSouth Bristol Bay\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nNorth Bristol Bay\n8\n7\n1\n0\n0\n4\n0\nTotal\n548\n487\n415\n340\n186\n164\n179\nSource: ADF&G 1999\nTable 4.8-111 Estimated Subsistence Harvest of Steller Sea Lions for Selected Communities,\n1992-1998\nNumber of Sea Lions Taken by Year\nCommunity\n1992\n1993\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\n1998\nAleutian and Pribilof Communities\nAtka\n39\n25\n54\n40\n17\n12\n17\nAkutan\n30\n23\n16\n6\n16\n6\n6\nIvanof Bay\n0\n4\n0\n0\n2\n2\n2\nKing Cove\n1\n1\n4\n5\n0\n4\n4\nNikolski\n8\n6\n0\n0\n3\n3\n1\nPerryville\n1\n0\n1\n3\n3\n2\n1\nSaint George\n70\n19\n20\n8\n8\n28\n20\nSaint Paul\n227\n227\n173\n60\n38\n28\n58\nUnalaska\n59\n43\n42\n47\n22\n30\n13\nTotal\n79\n59\n75\n54\n109\n115\n122\nSelected Other Alaska Communities\nTatitlek\n13\n5\n16\n3\n5\n4\n22\nAkhiok\n4\n0\n3\n2\n7\n8\n3\nOld Harbor\n46\n33\n48\n113\n50\n26\n13\nNotes:\nNumbers differ from and are not included in Table 4.8-109. Numbers in both tables are estimates based on\nsampling.\nSource:\nADF&G 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998, and 1999.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-224","Table 4.8-112 Summary of the Significance of Economic and Social Impacts of Alternative 1\nAlternative 1 Score\nCategory\nSignificantly Beneficial\nGroundfish exvessel value\nSignificantly Beneficial\nTotal exvessel value\nNot Applicable\nAverage harvesting cost\nSignificantly Beneficial\nGroundfish product value\nNot Applicable\nAverage processing cost\nNot Significant\nPreemption of processing sectors\nNot Significant\nPreemption of vessel classes\nConditionally Significantly\nNet benefits to domestic seafood consumers\nBeneficial\nConditionally Significantly Adverse\nNonconsumptive and non-use value\nNot Significant\nGroundfish discards\nNot Significant\nProhibited species catch\nSignificantly Adverse\nSafety\nSignificantly Adverse\nExcess capacity\nSignificantly Beneficial\nLabor payments by catcher vessels\nSignificantly Beneficial\nLabor payments by catcher/processors\nLabor payments by other groundfish processors\nSignificantly Beneficial\nSignificantly Beneficial\nTotal labor employment\nGroundfish exvessel value by region of landing\nSignificantly Beneficial\nTotal exvessel value by region of landing\nSignificantly Beneficial\nInshore groundfish product value by region of operation\nSignificantly Beneficial\nInshore groundfish processing labor payments by\nSignificantly Beneficial\nregion of operation\nGroundfish exvessel value by region of owner\nSignificantly Beneficial\nSignificantly Beneficial\nTotal exvessel value by region of owner\nConditionally Significantly Adverse\nSubsistence use of living marine resources\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.8-225","The index values contained in this table only contain ordinal information and can only be used to make ordinal comparisons. For example, an index value\nof 2 is better than a value of 1, but it is not true, in general, that a +2 is twice as good or twice as large as a +1. Therefore, it is not possible to obtain\n\"The index values for Alternative 6.1 are based on a qualitative assessment since the model used to make the quantitative assessments does not\nmeaningful summary information by performing numerical operations (e.g., add or subtract index values or calculate their ratios) using the index values.\nincorporate most of the major attributes of the alternative. These attributes include increases in catch and product quality, changes in product prices and\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n6.2\n1/2\n1/2\n-2\n-2\n2\n0\n0\n-1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n0\n2\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n0\n6.1\nGroundfish and total exvessel value by region of landing does not include the Washington inland waters or the Oregon coast regions.\n2\n2\n2\n0\n0\n1\n0\n2\n1\n1\n1\n2\n2\n-1\n2\n2\n2\n2\n2\n1\n1\n1\n1\n0\nTable 4.8-113 Summary of the Economic and Social Rankings of Alternatives 2.1 Through 6.2\n-1/0\n-2/2\n-1/1\n-2/1\n-2/1\n-2/1\n-2\n-2\n5\n0\n0\n-1\n0\n-1\n0\n0\n-1\n1\n1\n1\n0\n0\n-1\n0\n0\n-1/0\n-1/0\n-1/0\n-1/0\n-1/0\n-1/0\n4.2\n-2\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n0\n0\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n1\n1\n0\n-1/0\n-1/0\n-1/0\n-1/0\n-1/0\n-1/0\n4.1\n-1\n0\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n0\nproduct mix, and the harvesting a greater proportion of the target catch in the target fishery.\n-1/0\n-1/0\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n3\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n0\n-1\n0\n0\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n-1\n0\n4.8-226\n-2/-1\n-2/0\n-2/-1\n-2/-1\n-2/0\n-2/0\n2.2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n2\n2\n-1\n1\n0\n-2/0\n-1/0\n-2/-1\n-2/-1\n-2/0\n-2/0\n2.1\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-1\n-1\n-1\n2\n2\n-1\n1\n0\nInshore groundfish product value by region of operation\nInshore groundfish processing labor payments by region\nLabor payments by other groundfish processors\nGroundfish exvessel value by region of landing\nGroundfish exvessel value by region of owner\nNet benefits to domestic seafood consumers\nSubsistence use of living marine resources\nTotal exvessel value by region of landing\nTotal exvessel value by region of owner\nLabor payments by catcher/processors\nNonconsumptive and non-use value\nLabor payments by catcher vessels\nPreemption of processing sectors\nPreemption of vessel classes\nGroundfish exvessel value\nGroundfish product value\nAverage processing cost\nProhibited species catch\nAverage harvesting cost\nTotal labor employment\nAlternative/Category\nTotal exvessel value\nGroundfish discards\nExcess capacity\nof operation C\nJANUARY 2001\nSafety\nNotes:","Effects of the Alternatives on the Ecosystem\n4.9\nIn this section the principles and policies of ecosystem-based management are outlined and how present\ngroundfish fishery management meets the objectives of ecosystem-based management is summarized. It will\nbe clear from this evaluation that ecosystem-based management encompasses a variety of objectives that\noverlap all alternatives, particularly the consideration of other ecosystem components-marine mammals and\nsea birds or non-target species in-fishery management decisions (Alternatives 2.1, 2.2, 4.1, and 4.2),\nconservative single-species management (Alternative 3), fish habitat protection (Alternative 5), and fishing\ncapacity and fishing rights issues (Alternatives 6.1 and 6.2). Because of this overlap, those issues and impacts\nare not analyzed when evaluating how well each alternative meets the objectives of ecosystem-based\nmanagement. Instead, how the various alternatives perform with respect to various ecosystem-level measures\nthat might indicate the impacts of the alternatives from a broader ecological viewpoint are presented in Section\n4.9.2. In Section 4.9.3 the ecosystem-level ecological impacts are summarized and how each alternative\nperforms with respect to ecosystem-based management is discussed.\nPrinciples and Policies of Ecosystem-Based Management\n4.9.1\nFish are only one component of a complex marine ecosystem. Removing fish for human consumption can\npotentially have broad impacts to the marine ecosystem unless safeguards are incorporated into fishery\nmanagement plans. Fisheries can impact ecosystems in numerous ways. Populations of fish and other\necosystem components can be affected by the selectivity, magnitude, timing, location, and methods of fish\nremovals. Fisheries can also impact ecosystems by vessel disturbance, nutrient cycling, introduction of exotic\nspecies, pollution, unobserved mortality, and habitat alteration.\nEcosystem-based management strategies for fisheries are being developed around the world to address the\nlarger impacts due to fishing. Ecosystem-based fishery management aims at conserving the structure and\nfunction of marine ecosystems, in addition to conserving fishery resources. An ecosystem-based management\nstrategy for marine fisheries is one that minimizes potential impacts while at the same time allowing the\nextraction of fish resources at levels sustainable for both the fish stock and the ecosystem.\nThe Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA) of 1996 strengthened the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and\nManagement Act (the Magnuson-Stevens Act) by mandating new conservation measures. One provision of\nthe SFA was the appointment of a NMFS Ecosystem Principles Advisory Panel (the Panel). The panel was\ntasked to report to Congress on the extent to which ecosystem principles are applied in fishery conservation\nand management, including research, and propose actions that should be undertaken to expand the application\nof ecosystem principles in fishery conservation and management. The panel's report was recently published,\nand thus provides updated information on ecosystem-based management of fisheries (Ecosystem Principles\nAdvisory Panel 1999). The panel described ecosystem-based management for marine fisheries:\nEcosystem-based management can be an important complement to existing fisheries\nmanagement approaches. When fishery managers understand the complex ecological and\nsocioeconomic environments in which fish and fisheries exist, they may be able to\nanticipate the effects that fishery management will have on the ecosystem and the effects\nthat ecosystem change will have on fisheries. However ecosystem-based management\ncannot resolve all of the underlying problems of the existing fisheries management regimes.\nAbsent the political will to stop overfishing, protect habitat, and support expanded research\nand monitoring programs, an ecosystem-based approach cannot be effective.\nA comprehensive ecosystem-based fisheries management approach would require managers\nto consider all interactions that a target fish stock has with predators, competitors, and prey\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-1","species; the effects of weather and climate on fisheries biology and ecology; the complex\ninteractions between fishes and their habitat; and the effects of fishing on fish stocks and\ntheir habitat. However, the approach need not be endlessly complicated. An initial step\nmay require only that managers consider how the harvesting of one species might impact\nother species in the ecosystem. Fishery management decisions made at this level of\nunderstanding can prevent significant and potentially irreversible changes in marine\necosystems caused by fishing.\nThe panel developed a list of basic ecosystem principles and policies, and recommended that fisheries\necosystem plans (FEP) be developed as a first step toward a full ecosystem approach. Components of the plan\ninclude food web models, habitat needs, estimates of total removals, an assessment of uncertainty and buffers,\nindices of ecosystem health and use, long-term monitoring plans, and an assessment of other elements. The\nprinciples the panel developed are as follows:\nThe ability to predict ecosystem behavior is limited.\nEcosystems have real thresholds and limits which, when exceeded, can effect major system\nrestructuring.\nOnce thresholds and limits have been exceeded, changes can be irreversible.\nDiversity is important to ecosystem functioning.\nMultiple scales interact within and among ecosystems.\nComponents of ecosystems are linked.\nEcosystem boundaries are linked\nEcosystems change with time.\nBasically, these basic principles outline the complex and dynamic nature of marine systems that are composed\nof interconnected groups of living organisms and their habitats. These basic principles form the foundation of\necosystem based management strategies.\nBuilding on these principles, the panel developed several general ecosystem-based management policies to guide\nfishery managers. These policies reflect the overriding aspects of the principles associated with the limitations\non extraction, uncertainty, and the role of humans within ecosystems. These six policies provided by the panel\nare as follows:\n1. Change the burden of proof. We live in a world where humans are an important component of almost\nall ecosystems. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that human activities will impact ecosystems. The\nmodus operandi for fisheries management should change from traditional mode of restricting fishing\nactivity only after it has demonstrated an unacceptable impact, to a future mode of only allowing fishing\nactivity that can be reasonably expected to operate without unacceptable impacts.\n2.\nApply the precautionary approach. The precautionary approach is a key element of the United Nations\nAgreement for Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Species (United Nations 1997) and the Food and\nAgriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Code of Conduct for the Responsible Fisheries\n(FAO 1995). The U.S. is a signatory of both.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-2","Purchase \"insurance\" against unforseen, adverse ecosystem impacts. Even under the precautionary\n3.\napproach, there is a risk of unforseen, adverse impacts on ecosystems. Insurance can be used to mitigate\nthese impacts if and when they occur.\nLearn from management experiences. Management actions and policies can be considered as\n4.\nexperiments and should be based upon hypotheses about the ecosystem response. This requires close\nmonitoring of results to determine to what extent the hypotheses are supported.\nMake local incentives compatible with global goals. Changing human behavior is most easily\n5.\naccomplished by changing the local incentives to be consistent with broader social goals. The lack of\nconsistency between local incentives and global goals is the root cause of many \"social traps,\" including\nthose in fisheries management (Constanza 1987). Changing incentives is complex and must be\naccomplished in culturally appropriate ways.\nPromote participation, fairness, and equity in policy and management. Ecosystem approaches to\n6.\nmanagement rely on the participation, understanding and support of multiple constituencies. Policies\nthat are developed and implemented with the full participation and consideration of all stakeholders,\nincluding the interests of future generations, are more likely to be fair and equitable, and to be perceived\nas such.\nThe panel's overall recommendation was to expand the application of ecosystem principles, goals, and policies\nto fishery management and research. The mechanism to accomplish this is developing an FEP for each major\necosystem. The objectives of an FEP would be to provide the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council (the\nCouncil) and public with a description and understanding of the fundamental physical, biological, and\nhuman/institutional context of ecosystems, as well as to provide some direction on how this information can\nbe used to set policies for ecosystem-based management options. Actions required to develop an FEP include\ncharacterization of the ecosystem, food web modeling, habitat needs, total removal calculations, assessment\nof uncertainty, indices of ecosystem health, long-term monitoring data, and an assessment of ecological, human\nand institutional elements of the ecosystem that are affected by fisheries.\nA requirement for regional councils to develop FEPs is being considered for the next round of Magnuson-\nStevens Act amendments. The annual ecosystem considerations chapter to the Stock Assessment and Fishery\nEvaluation Report (SAFE), together with what is provided in this draft programmatic SEIS, already assembles\nmost of the information required for a FEP, SO the job for the Council may not be as daunting a task as for\nother regional councils.\n4.9.1.1 Evaluation of Alternative 1 Relative to Ecosystem-Based Management Standards\nIn 1999, the National Research Council (NRC), an agency organized by the National Academy of Sciences,\nset out new performance standards for fishery management in Sustaining Marine Fisheries (National Research\nCouncil 1999c). The publication reviews the status of global fisheries, the problems facing fishery managers,\nand provides recommendations on how to improve management to achieve sustainable marine fisheries. The\nNRC's overall recommendation was adoption of an ecosystem-based approach for fishery management with\nthe goal \"to rebuild and sustain populations, species, biological communities, and marine ecosystems at high\nlevels of productivity and biological diversity, SO as not to jeopardize a wide range of goods and services from\nmarine ecosystems, while providing food, revenue, and recreation for humans\" (National Research Council\n1999c). To achieve an ecosystem-based approach, the NRC made eight specific recommendations:\n1. Adopt conservative harvest levels for single species fisheries.\n2. Incorporate ecosystem considerations into fishery management decisions.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-3","3. Adopt a precautionary approach to deal with uncertainty.\n4. Reduce excess fishing capacity and define and assign fishing rights.\n5. Establish marine protected areas as a buffer for uncertainty.\n6. Include bycatch mortality in TAC accounting.\n7. Develop institutions to achieve goals.\n8. Conduct more research on structure and function of marine ecosystems.\nAlthough the NMFS is still evaluating the recommendations from the various ecosystem-based management\nreview panels to determine how best to integrate them into the fishery management regime, the NRC\nrecommendations provide one set of standards from which to evaluate the current management program for\ngroundfish fisheries. For each recommendation, the NRC's summary recommendation is provided verbatum.\nA description of how current measures address these recommendations, and a brief evaluation of their\neffectiveness, is also provided.\nConservative Single Species Management. Managing single-species fisheries with an explicitly\nconservative, risk-averse approach should be a first step toward achieving sustainable marine fisheries. The\nprecautionary approach should apply. A moderate level of exploitation might be a better goal for fisheries\nthan full exploitation, because fishing at levels believed to provide the maximum long-term yield tends to lead\nto overexploitation. Many species are overfished and their productive potential is impaired, even without\nconsidering the ecosystem effects of fishing for them. Expanding fisheries to include previously unfished or\nlightly fished species, such as deep-sea species, is unlikely to lead to large, sustainable increases in marine\ncapture fisheries. Therefore, the committee recommends that management agencies adopt regulations and\npolices that strongly favor conservative and precautionary management and that penalize overfishing, as\ncalled for in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 and the 1996\namendments to that Act, often referred to as the Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996 (National Research Council\n1999c).\nThe management of fisheries in the North Pacific is conservative, by comparison with other fisheries\nworldwide. Low harvest rates, combined with other management elements, provide for the following elements\nto achieve sustainable groundfish fisheries in the North Pacific:\npeer-reviewed scientific advice\ndefined overfishing levels\nconservative harvest rates\ncomprehensive observer coverage\ncomplete catch reporting\nAll groundfish stocks are considered relatively healthy after 20 years of sustained annual harvests of about 2\nmillion mt. No fish stocks have been deemed overfished, approaching an overfished condition, or subject to\noverfishing in a recent evaluation of the status of U.S. fisheries (NMFS 19980). The components of\nconservative single species management for the North Pacific groundfish fisheries are described below:\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-4","The intended catch is well below the absolute catch limit. Total removals of groundfish are controlled\nby annual catch limits established for each stock. For each target stock, three harvest levels are set,\ncorresponding to the overfishing level (OFL), the acceptable biological catch (ABC), and total\nallowable catch (TAC). TACs are annual catch limits for the fishery, and are established at or below\nthe ABC. ABCs define acceptable harvest levels from a biological perspective, and the defines the\nunacceptable harvest level. To further minimize the possibility of catches jeopardizing a stock's long-\nterm productivity, there is a buffer established between ABC and OFL.\nHarvest rate specifications are more conservative when less information is available. A\nprecautionary approach is used to address uncertainty around parameters used in stock assessments.\nThe maximum allowable rates are prescribed in descending order of preference, corresponding to\ndescending order of information availability (Thompson 1996). Additionally, maximum sustainable\nyield (MSY) is treated as a limit, rather than a target. For most stocks, ABC is based on a rate less\nthan or equal to F40%> which is the fishing mortality rate associated with an equilibrium level of\nspawning per recruit equal to 40 percent of the equilibrium level of spawning per recruit in the absence\nof any fishing. In other cases where less information is available about the stock, ABC is generally\nbased on the three-fourths of the natural mortality rate (M). Both the F40%, and 0.75M rates are\nconsidered to be conservative harvest rates for most groundfish stocks (Clark 1993; Rosenberg and\nRestrepo 1996). For most stocks OFL is defined based on F35% The conservative nature of our tier\nsystem is fully discussed in Section 2.7 and referenced throughout Section 4.4.\nHarvest rates are reduced at lower than average stock size levels, thereby allowing rebuilding. If\nthe biomass of any stock falls below BMSY or B40% (the long-term average biomass that would be\nexpected under average recruitment and = F40%), the fishing mortality rate is adjusted relative to\nstock status. This serves as an implicit rebuilding plan should a stock fall below a reasonable\nabundance level. The conservative nature of the tier system is fully discussed in Section 2.7 and\nreferenced throughout Section 4.4.\nThe optimum yield limit adds additional precaution. Since 1981, the total annual allowable catch\nof Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI) groundfish must be less than the optimum yield (OY) upper\nlimit of 2 million mt. This has limited the sum of TACs for all species to 2 million mt per year,\nconsiderably less than the sum of all ABCs. In some years, ABCs have totaled more than 2.8 million\nmt. As a result, many groundfish stocks, particularly flatfish stocks, have been exploited well below\nsustainable levels (Witherell 1995). The conservative nature of the tier system is fully discussed in\nSection 2.7 and referenced throughout Section 4.4.\nMonitoring allows catches to stay within specified levels. All fish caught in any fishery (including\nbycatch), whether landed or discarded, are counted toward the TAC for that stock. Based on\ncomprehensive onboard observer data and reports provided by the fleet, directed fisheries for each\nspecies or complex are closed before the TAC is reached, SO that catches are maintained within\nbiologically acceptable levels. Observer data provides for accurate and precise estimation of Alaska\ngroundfish catch (Volstad et al. 1997).\nEvaluation\nExisting single-species management of North Pacific groundfish meet the conservative and risk averse approach\nstandard recommended by the NRC. None of the groundish stocks are subject to overfishing as defined under\nthe Magnuson-Stevens Act. However, we have insufficient information on some stocks to determine if they\nare being overfished. Improvements can be made in our single-species management and these have been\noutlined in our target and non-target species alternatives (Section 4.1.2 and 4.1.3).\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.9-5","Incorporating Ecosystem Considerations into Fishery Management. Fishery management should\ntake account of known and probable goods and services of marine ecosystems that are potentially jeopardized\nby fishing. The aim is to sustain the capacity of ecosystems to produce goods and services at local to global\nscales and to provide equitable consideration of the rights and needs of all beneficiaries and users of ecosystem\ngoods and services (National Research Council 1999c).\nThe Council has been actively developing an ecosystem-based approach to managing fisheries (Table 4.9-1).\nThe Council's approach involves public participation, reliance on scientific research and advice, conservative\ncatch quotas, comprehensive monitoring and enforcement, bycatch controls, gear restrictions, temporal and\nspatial distribution of fisheries, habitat conservation areas, and other biological and socioeconomic\nconsiderations. Management measures are also taken to minimize potential impacts of fishing on seafloor\nhabitat and other ecosystem components such as marine mammals and seabirds.\nTable 4.9-1 North Pacific Fishery Management Council Goals and Objectives for Ecosystem-Based\nManagement\nDefinition: Ecosystem-based management, as defined by the NPFMC, is a strategy to regulate human activity\ntoward maintaining long-term system sustainability (within the range of natural variability as we understand it)\nof the North Pacific, covering the Gulf of Alaska, the Eastern and Western Bering Sea, and the Aleutian Islands\nregion.\nObjective: Provide future generations the opportunities and resources we enjoy today.\nGoals:\nMaintain biodiversity consistent with natural evolutionary and ecological processes, including dynamic change\n1.\nand variability.\n2.\nMaintain and restore habitats essential for fish and their prey.\nMaintain system sustainability and sustainable yields of resources for human consumption and non-extractive\n3.\nuses.\nMaintain the concept that humans are components of the ecosystem.\n4.\nGuidelines:\n1. Integrate ecosystem-based management through interactive partnerships with other agencies, stakeholders,\nand public.\n2. Utilize sound ecological models as an aid in understanding the structure, function, and dynamics of the\necosystem.\n3. Utilize research and monitoring to test ecosystem approaches.\n4. Use precaution when faced with uncertainties to minimize risk; management decisions should err on the side\nof resource conservation.\nUnderstanding:\n1. Uncontrolled human population growth and consequent demand for resources are inconsistent with resource\nsustainability.\n2. Ecosystem-based management requires time scales that transcend human lifetimes.\n3. Ecosystems are open, interconnected, complex, and dynamic; they transcend management boundaries.\nThe public, scientists, and policy makers have all contributed to development of an ecosystem-based\nmanagement strategy. Since 1995, the groundfish plan teams have added an \"Ecosystem Considerations\"\nsection to their SAFE document (e.g., NPFMC 1998f) that provides an annual assessment of the ecosystem,\nreview of recent ecosystem-based management literature, updates of ongoing ecosystem research, local\nobservations from coastal residents and fishermen, and any new information on the status of seabirds, marine\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-6","mammals, habitat and other components of the North Pacific ecosystem. The Council also has an Ecosystem\nCommittee, which was established to discuss and recommend possible approaches to incorporating ecosystem\nconcerns into the fishery management process. A major role of this committee has been to provide the Council\nand stakeholders with information on ecosystem-based fishery management in the North Pacific Ocean. While\na full understanding of North Pacific ecosystem dynamics remains beyond our grasp, the Council and NMFS\nare striving to achieve a better understanding of this system and, in the interim, are attempting to incorporate\nwhat we do know in the fisheries management process.\nEvaluation\nThe NRC advocates ecosystem-based fishery management to achieve sustainability of fish resources.\nNevertheless, because ecosystem-based management is difficult to define, and as yet, there are no real world\nexamples where it has been specifically applied, the NRC tried instead to lay out elements of an ecosystem\napproach. These elements include ecosystem monitoring, monitoring of human systems, application of\necosystem principles, cross-sectoral institutional arrangements, large marine ecosystem approach, and a\nprecautionary approach. All these elements are applied to management and research of North Pacific fisheries.\nHowever, improvements can be made in all these areas. We are still challenged to move towards a system that\nexplicitly acknowledges ecosystem-based management goals in our quantitative assessment procedures.\nA Precautionary Approach to Deal with Uncertainty. Fisheries are managed in an arena of uncertainty\nthat includes an incomplete understanding of and ability to predict fish population dynamics, interactions\namong species, effects of environmental factors on fish population, and effects of human actions. Therefore,\nsuccessful fishery management must incorporate and deal with uncertainties and errors. The committee\nrecommends the adoption of a precautionary approach in case of uncertainty. Management should be risk-\nadverse. Although research and better information can reduce uncertainty to a degree, they can never\neliminate it (NRC 1999c).\nThe primary sources of scientific uncertainty in fishery management are the uncertainty about fishing effects\non ecosystems and the uncertainty associated with stock assessments. For stock assessments, uncertainty can\nbe associated with catch statistics (e.g., observer estimation error, misreporting), biological parameters (e.g.,\nmaturity, mortality, growth), resource assessment survey measurement error, and natural variability in\ndynamics, such as recruitment.\nIn the North Pacific fishery management arena, uncertainty is dealt with in several ways. In the case of\nestablishing acceptable harvest rates of fish, the ABCs are based on a system of tiers, corresponding to\ninformation availability on population dynamics parameters. The Pacific cod stock assessment went an\nadditional step of evaluating uncertainty regarding specific model parameters. The ABC for the 2000 fisheries\nwas based on a risk-averse optimization procedure that adjusts for uncertainty in the selectivity coefficients\nand natural mortality rate. This type of analysis will likely be expanded to other assessments in coming years.\nUncertainty regarding species interactions, environmental factors, and human actions are addressed with other\nmanagement measures. Regulatory changes that have to some degree addressed these sources of uncertainty\ninclude establishment of marine protected areas, the OY limit, the forage fish prohibition, making corals and\nsponges prohibited species, spatial and temporal restrictions to reduce potential competition with marine\nmammals and seabirds.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.9-7","Evaluation\nThe Ecosystem Principles Advisory Panel, in its report to Congress, noted that the Council has generally acted\nconservatively in the face of uncertainty (i.e., applying the precautionary approach) compared with the\ndecisions of other regional fishery management councils (Ecosystem Principles Advisory Panel 1999).\nReducing Excess Fishing Capacity and Assignment of Fishing Rights. Excess fishing capacity\n(fishing capacity is the ability to catch fish or fishing power) and overcapitalization (capitalization, related\nto capacity, is the amount of capital invested in fishing vessels and gear) reduce the economic efficiency of\nfisheries and usually are associated with overfishing. Sustainable global reductions in fishing capacity are\nof the highest priority to help reduce overfishing and to deal with uncertainty and unexpected events in\nfisheries. Overcapacity is difficult to manage directly, and usually evolves in management regimes that\nencourage unrestricted competition for limited fishery resources. Consequently, managers and policy makers\nshould focus on developing or encouraging socio-economic and other management incentives that discourage\novercapacity and that reward conservative and efficient use of marine resources and their ecosystems.\nAt the core of today's overcapacity problem is the lack of, or ineffective, definition and assignment of rights\nin most fisheries. In addition, subsidies that circumvent market forces have contributed significantly to the\novercapacity problem in many fisheries. Therefore, the committee recommends for many fisheries a\nmanagement approach that includes the development and use of methods of allocation of exclusive shares\nof the fish resource or privileges and responsibilities (as opposed to open competition) and the elimination\nof subsidies that encourage overcapacity. A flexible and adaptive approach is essential, and careful attention\nmust be given to equity issues associated with such approaches. The committee recommends experimental\napproaches to community-based fishery management, including the development of virtual communities. This\nwould include research into the establishment of management groups in which participation is based on\nshared interests in a fishery and its associated ecosystem, with diminished emphasis on where participants\nlive or their direct financial interests (NRC 1999c).\nThere is no doubt that the groundfish and crab fishing industries in the North Pacific are overcapitalized due\nto limited quotas and the race for fish. The NRC report (1999c) tends to link overcapacity with overfishing,\nbecause some fisheries (e.g., New England groundfish and scallops) have been traditionally managed with\neffort controls, rather than quotas. Because catch is limited by TACs and crab guideline harvest levels in the\nNorth Pacific, overcapacity does not necessarily increase the potential for overfishing. However, participants\nin overcapitalized fisheries can exert strong pressure for liberal catch quotas and other risk prone management\nmeasures, though there has been little evidence of that in fisheries under the Council's jurisdiction. Also, in\nextreme cases, excess harvesting capacity may shorten seasons to a point at which fishing quotas cannot be\naccurately monitored. The GOA pollock and BSAI crab fisheries are examples of fisheries in which quota\noverages have occurred in the North Pacific.\nOvercapacity can also make it more difficult for managers to deal with unexpected events. This situation may\nbe exacerbated when fishermen are limited to specific fisheries by licenses or endorsements. Fishermen have\nno place to use their vessels (and other not-so-liquid asset) when the stock is in lower abundance, the market\ndrops, or unexpected events occur (e.g., Bristol Bay sockeye salmon fishery in 1997 to 1998). Often, the\npolitical response to these situations is subsidies, which further exacerbates the overcapacity situation. For\nfisheries to be sustainable and economically stable, capacity must be balanced with resource availability.\nThe Council has developed several programs to address overcapacity in the fisheries. Groundfish and crab\nmanagement programs generally limit the number of vessels that are allowed to fish off Alaska. In addition,\nhalibut and fixed-gear sablefish are managed under an individual fishing quota (IFQ) program, which does not\nlimit the number of vessels, but instead grants permission to individuals to harvest a specified percentage of\nthe TAC each year. Specific programs are reviewed below.\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.9-8","1,800\n1,600\n1,400\nTotal\n1,200\n1,000\nHook and\n800\nTrawl\nPot\n600\n400\n200\n0\n1993\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\nYear\nFigure 4.9-1 Trends in number of groundfish fishing vessels, that caught groundfish off Alaska 1993\nto 1997.\nA moratorium on new vessel entry into the federally managed groundfish and crab fisheries was implemented\nin 1996. The program is considered a placeholder, while more comprehensive management measures are\ndeveloped. Currently the owners of 1,853 groundfish and 664 crab vessels hold moratorium fishing rights.\nIn addition to limiting the number of vessels the moratorium also restricted each vessel's length.\nVessels that were less than 125 ft. length overall (LOA) may only be increased to 120 percent of their length\non June 24, 1992, or up to 125 ft. LOA, whichever is less; vessels that are 125 ft. LOA or longer may not\nincrease their length. Increasing a vessel's length could add harvesting capacity without increasing the number\nof vessels.\nThe License Limitation Program (LLP) for groundfish and crab vessels was implemented on January 1, 2000,\nand replaces the vessel moratorium. The original LLP, approved in 1995, was intended as the second step in\nfulfilling the Council's commitment to develop a comprehensive and rational management program for fisheries\noff Alaska. Amendments to that program approved in 1998 tighten the LLP and include additional restrictions\non vessel numbers and fishery crossovers. Additional restrictions under development include an industry-funded\nlicense buyback program for the crab fisheries and further gear and species endorsement restrictions for the\ngroundfish fisheries. Based on preliminary estimates of qualified vessels, the LLP should further reduce the\nnumber of vessels eligible to participate in the BSAI crab fisheries by more than 60 percent compared to the\ncurrent vessel moratorium. The number of vessels predicted to be eligible for groundfish licenses (2,435) is\ngreater than the number currently holding moratorium permits (Figure 4.9-1). However, the LLP carries stricter\nqualification standards, and many moratorium permits were never claimed). The LLP will be more restrictive\nin terms of areas a vessel can fish and types of gear it can deploy. It is also important to note that the vast\nmajority of the vessels qualifying for the LLP are longline vessels less than 60 ft. LOA, and they are only\neligible to participate in Gulf of Alaska, (GOA) fisheries. These vessels have typically had relatively small\ncatch histories in past years.\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.9-9","The sablefish and halibut IFQ programs provide good examples of how the Council is working to control\novercapacity in fisheries off Alaska. From 1975 to 1994 the central GOA halibut fishing seasons decreased\nfrom approximately 125 days to single day openings, while catches increased. Faced with very short seasons\nand increasing fishing effort, the Council passed an IFQ program for both the halibut and fixed-gear sablefish\nfisheries. These programs were initiated in 1995. After implementation, the fisheries changed from a short-\npulse fishery to one that extends over several months. IFQs have allowed participants to better match fishing\ncapacity with the amount of fish they are allowed to harvest during a year. In recent years the numbers of\nvessels and persons have declined, even as the TACs have been increasing.\nThe American Fisheries Act (AFA), passed in late 1998, among other things limited the number of harvesting\nand processing vessels that would be allowed to participate in the BSAI pollock fishery. Only harvesting and\nprocessing vessels that met specific requirements, based on their participation in the 1995-1997 fisheries will\nbe eligible to harvest BSAI pollock. Preliminary estimates indicate that 21 catcher/processors and 120 catcher\nvessels qualify under the AFA. Nine large capacity catcher/processors were retired from the fishery by the\nAFA. Under the fishery cooperative structure now in place, not all 21 eligible catcher/processors fished during\nthe 1999 late winter and early spring pollock seasons. The AFA also restricts eligible vessels from shifting\ntheir effort into other fisheries. Sideboard measures, as they have become known, prevent AFA eligible vessels\nfrom increasing their catch in other fisheries beyond their average 1995-1997 levels. Sideboard restrictions\nreduce the likelihood that the fishing capacity of AFA eligible vessels would be increased to better compete in\nthose fisheries.\nEvaluation\nThe NRC encourages the assignment of rights in most fisheries to address overcapacity. It recommends\nallocation of exclusive shares of the fish resource or privileges and responsibilities (as opposed to open\ncompetition) and the elimination of subsidies that encourage overcapacity. The IFQ program for halibut and\nsablefish fisheries, together with the multi-species community development quota (CDQ) program have proven\nsuccessful at eliminating the race for fish, reducing capacity, and decreasing costs. Fishery co-ops, allowed\nfor the BSAI pollock fleet under the AFA, appear to have done much the same for that fishery.\nAlternatives to eliminate incentives for overcapacity should continue to be examined. The primary alternative\nto a competitive allocation process is share-based or rights-based allocation. These management systems\nprovide incentives for members of industry to reduce overcapitalization voluntarily. Traditionally, regulations\nhave been implemented to limit the growth of specific elements of fishing capacity (i.e., vessel length or\nhorsepower). However, without the proper economic incentives, these types of restrictions have been\ncircumvented and often proved to be ineffective in reducing fishing capacity.\nMarine Protected Areas. Where they have been used, marine protected areas, where fishing is prohibited,\nhave often been effective in protecting and rebuilding ecosystems and populations of many (but not all) marine\nspecies. They often also lead to increases in the numbers of fish and other species in nearby waters.\nImportantly, they can provide a buffer against uncertainty, including management errors. Permanent marine\nprotected areas should be established in appropriate locations adjacent to all the U.S. coasts. It will be\nimportant to include highly productive areas-that is, areas in which fishing is good or once was-if this\nmanagement approach is to produce the greatest benefits.\nProtected areas will make the most effective contribution to the management of species and ecosystem when\nthey are integrated into management plans that cover the full life cycles and geographic ranges of the species\ninvolved. Smaller, fixed protected areas will be most effective for species with life stages that are spent in\nclose association with fixed topography in various stages of their lives. Wholly or largely pelagic species move\naccording to ocean currents or other factors that are not necessarily related to fixed topographic structures and\nare thus likely to benefit less from small protected areas.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.9-10","The design and implementation of marine protected areas should involve fishermen to ensure that they believe\nthe resulting systems will protect their long-term interests and to improve operational integrity. Because\nattempts to develop marine protected areas in the United States have been strongly opposed by some\nfishermen, the broad involvement of users is a key strategy. Current theory and experiences make clear that\nmarine protected areas must be established over a significant portion of the fishing grounds to have significant\nbenefits. Recent calls for protecting 20 percent of potential fishing areas provide a worthwhile reference point\nfor future consideration, and emphasize the importance of greatly expanding the areas currently protected.\nMarine protected areas are not alternative to other techniques of fishery management and to the other\nrecommendations in this report. They should be considered as only one of a suite of important ecosystem\napproaches to achieve sustainable fisheries and protect marine ecosystems. For marine protected areas to be\nmost successful as fishery-management tools, their intended purposes must be clearly defined (NRC 1999c).\nIt has been long recognized that seafloor habitat is essential for maintaining productivity of fishery resources.\nHabitat that provides structural relief on an otherwise featureless bottom can be particularly important to fish\nfor food, reproduction, and shelter from predators. Structural habitat includes boulders, corals, anemones,\nkelp, and other living organisms attached to the ocean bottom.\nBecause fishing gear can disturb structural habitat, areas where this habitat type are known to occur have been\nprotected by regulations. Vast areas of the North Pacific have been permanently closed to groundfish trawling\nand scallop dredging to reduce potential adverse impacts on vulnerable and essential habitat and to protect\njuvenile crab. Other closures occur on a seasonal basis, and additional closures to mobile fishing gear are\nunder consideration. A unique pair of nearshore pinnacles off Cape Edgecumbe in southeast Alaska has been\ndesignated as the Sitka Pinnacles Marine Reserve and closed to groundfish and halibut fishing with all gear\ntypes.\nThese marine protected areas comprise a relatively large portion of the continental shelf, and in many respects,\nserve as marine reserves (Figure 4.9-2). In the Bering Sea, habitat area closures encompass about 30,000 nm2.\nTo put this in perspective, this area is larger than Indiana or Maine and more than twice the size of Georges\nBank off the east coast of the United States. The GOA closures encompass about 47,000 nm2, but a vast\nmajority (about 80 percent) of this closure area is off the continental shelf (greater than 200 nm). Some\nenvironmental advocates and scientists have suggested that marine reserves should be at least 20 percent of\navailable habitat in order to be effective. The Bering Sea marine protection areas exceed this threshold by\nencompassing about 25 percent of the Bering Sea shelf areas where commercial quantities of groundfish could\nbe taken with bottom trawl gear. Existing GOA closure areas encompass less than 10 percent of the trawlable\nshelf area (NMFS 1999e).\nEvaluation\nThe NRC (1999c) considers permanent marine protected areas to be an important and useful tool for fisheries\nmanagers. Marine protected areas would provide a hedge against uncertainty, provide habitat protection, and\nallow for species and ecosystem protection.\nThe NRC defines marine protected areas as those where all fishing is prohibited. Furthermore, the NRC\nsuggests that 20 percent of the potential fishing area be considered for marine protected areas. NRC states that\nthese areas can lead to increases in the numbers of fish and other species in nearby waters. However, it remains\nto be seen whether these benefits would be realized in open access fisheries, which can increase effort adjacent\nto protected areas and potentially negate the gains.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-11","RUSSIA\nALASKA\nCANADA\n(U.S.)\nBERING\n(Proposed)\nIt\nPinnacle\nClosure\nALEUTIAN ISLANDS\nGULF OF ALASKA\nFigure 4.9-2 Year-round trawl closure areas established to protect fish and crab\nhabitat. Source: NMFS\nExisting no-trawl zones comprise a relatively large portion of the continental shelf. The three Bering Sea area\nclosures (Pribilof Islands, Bristol Bay and Red King Crab Savings Area) total about 30,000 nm2, which\nencompass about 25 percent of the Bering Sea shelf where commercial quantities of groundfish can be taken\nwith bottom trawl gear. The GOA closures encompass about 47,000 nm2, but a vast majority (about 80\npercent) of this area is off the continental shelf (greater than 200 nm). Additional no trawl zones include the\nSteller sea lion rookeries and haulouts. The 2.5 nm2 Sitka Pinnacles Marine Reserves, established in 2000,\nprohibits all groundfish and halibut fishing but allows recreational and commercial fishing for salmon.\nClosing some productive areas to all gear types could be considered as an additional form of insurance.\nHabitat areas of particular concern (HAPCs), such as deep water coral reefs, could be evaluated for potential\nmarine protected areas. The Council is reviewing an amendment that would set up a comprehensive, iterative\napproach for future HAPC identification and habitat protection. The approach would involve researchers,\nstakeholders, and management agencies. Meetings are planned in Sitka, Yakutat, and a location representing\nthe western Aleutian Islands, in the fall of 2000 to discuss gorgonian coral protection measures.\nBycatch and Discards. Bycatch and discards add to fishing mortality and should be considered as part of\nfishing activities rather than only as side effects. Estimates of bycatch should be incorporated into fishery-\nmanagement plans and should be taken into account in setting fishing quotas and in understanding and\nmanaging fishing to protect ecosystem and nonfished ecosystem components. Reducing fishing intensity on\ntarget species can reduce bycatch, often with no long-term reduction in sustainable yield. In some cases,\ntechnological developments and careful selection of fishing gear (e.g., bycatch-reduction devices) can be\neffective in reducing bycatch, and those options should encouraged, developed, and required where appropriate.\nMore information is needed on discards and on bycatch and their fate (i.e., whether bycatch is retained or\ndiscarded and whether discards survive or die) (NRC 1999c).\nThe issues of bycatch and discards of fish resources stem from social, economic, and conservation concerns.\nFrom an ecosystem perspective, mortality of unwanted and prohibited species may reduce spawning potential,\nreduce biodiversity, alter regular paths of energy flow and balance, enhance the growth of scavenger\npopulations, and add uncertainty to estimates of total removals.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-12","The NRC raises conservation concerns for world fisheries where bycatch and discards are treated as side\neffects of fishing. Fortunately, however, in the North Pacific, this is not a problem. All bycatch and discarded\ngroundfish are counted toward the TAC established for individual stocks that are presently managed.\nAdditionally, because observers sample the entire catch, not just the retained portion, the information on\nbycatch and discards is available and is directly incorporated into the annual stock assessments of managed\nspecies.\nFish are discarded for two reasons: either because regulations require that they be thrown back (prohibited\nspecies), or they are unwanted for market reasons. Prohibited species are economically important non-\ngroundfish species. Bycatch management measures implemented for groundfish fisheries of the eastern Bering\nSea have aimed at reducing the incidental capture and injury of these economically important species\ntraditionally harvested by other fisheries. These species include crab, herring, halibut, and salmon.\nCollectively, these species are called prohibited species, because they cannot be retained as bycatch in\ngroundfish fisheries and must be discarded with a minimum of injury.\nBycatch controls on prohibited species were instituted on foreign groundfish fisheries prior to passage of the\nMagnuson-Stevens Act in 1976 and have become more restrictive in recent years (Witherell and Pautzke 1997).\nBycatch limits are apportioned to specific groundfish target fisheries, and attainment of any apportionment\ncloses that groundfish target fishery for the remainder of the season. Bycatch limits for 2000 BSAI groundfish\ntrawl fisheries included 3,675 mt of halibut mortality, 1,853 mt of herring, 97,000 red king crabs, 3,350,000\nbairdi Tanner crab, 4,350,000 opilio Tanner crab, 48,000 chinook salmon, and 42,000 other salmon. These\nlimits equated to about 0.1 percent of the red king crab and opilio Tanner crab populations, 1 percent of the\nbairdi Tanner crab population, 1 percent of the herring biomass, and 1.5 percent of the halibut biomass. The\nimpact of salmon bycatch on Alaska salmon populations remains unknown, but is thought to be less than 1\npercent of the chum salmon population, and on the order of 2 percent to 4 percent of the adult chinook salmon\npopulation. To reduce the impact of bycatch on chinook salmon population, bycatch limits will be\nincrementally reduced to 29,000 chinook salmon by the year 2003.\nIn the North Pacific, discards of unwanted groundfish (so-called economic discards) result when fishermen\ndo not have markets, sufficient equipment, time or the economic incentive to retain and process the catch.\nSection 313 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act require that the Council develop management measures to reduce\nthe level of economic discards in the groundfish fisheries off Alaska. The Council adopted an improved\nretention and utilization (IR/IU) program for all groundfish target fisheries in order to reduce groundfish\neconomic discards. It was implemented in 1998 under Amendments 49/49 to the FMPs. All discards of\npollock and Pacific cod were prohibited under the program; only fish not fit for human consumption can be\nlegally discarded. This measure has dramatically reduced overall discards of groundfish (Figure 4.9-3). For\nexample, in 1997, about 22,100 mt of cod (8.6 percent of the cod catch) and 94,800 mt of pollock (8.2 percent\nof the pollock catch) were discarded. In 1998, discards amounted to only 4,300 mt of cod (2.2 percent) and\n16,200 mt of pollock (1.6 percent). A regulation requiring full retention of all demersal shelf rockfish species\n(e.g., yellow-eye rockfish) was adopted in 1999.\nThe cod and pollock retention requirements of the IR/IU program are the first step. In 1999, with IR/IU in\nplace, 125,500 mt of groundfish was discarded in the BSAI, or about 6.9 percent of the total groundfish there.\nIn the GOA, the discard was 25,000 mt of groundfish, or 11 percent of the total GOA groundfish catch.\nAlthough these discard rates are much lower than most of the world's groundfish fisheries, which average about\n19.9 percent discards, and although the discards are deducted from the TAC, the sheer volume of discards is\nstill troublesome to many people who consider economic discards as waste of food and as having an\nunnecessary impact to the ecosystem. BSAI rock sole and yellowfin sole and GOA shallow water flatfish\nretention will be required beginning in 2003. The delay allows for development of new markets and\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-13","20\n15\nFull retention of\ncod & pollock\nFull retention\n10\nof flatfish\n5\n0\n1993\n95\n97\n99\n2001\n2003\nYear\nFigure 4.9-3 Total discard rates of Alaska groundfish, all areas and species combined,\n1993-1998, with projections through 2003.\ntechnological developments in gear by vessels engaged in these fisheries. These retention requirements are\nexpected to reduce overall discard rates to about 5 percent.\nIn addition to bycatch limits, gear restrictions and other regulatory changes have also been implemented to\nreduce bycatch and waste. Biodegradable panels are required for pot gear to minimize waste associated with\nso-called ghost fishing of lost gear. Tunnel openings for pot gear are limited in size to reduce incidental catch\nof halibut and crabs. Giblets for groundfish have been prohibited to prevent ghost fishing and reduce bycatch\nof non-target species. With the implementation of an IFQ system for halibut and sablefish longline fisheries\nin 1995, bycatch and waste were reduced because the race for fish was eliminated, allowing for more selective\nfishing practices and significant reductions in actual gear deployment and loss. The emergence\nof\nfisherycooperatives in the BSAI pollock fishery in 1999 has also led to a reduction in bycatch through\neliminating the economically wasteful race for fish. The discard rate of pollock in the offshore component of\nthe fishery declined from about 2.4 percent to 0.5 percent in 1999 when pollock cooperatives were initiated in\nthe BSAI. Under fishery cooperatives, vessels have an increased economic incentive to increase the utilization\nof their catch because they are no longer constrained by time. BSAI Amendment 57, finalized in 2000,\nprohibited the use of nonpelagic trawl gear for vessels targeting pollock in the Bering Sea, and concomitantly\nreduces allowable prohibited species bycatch of halibut and crabs.\nWaste of salmon and halibut has been reduced by allowing bycatch of dead fish to be donated to food banks.\nThe food banks in turn distribute the fish to needy people in the northwestern United States. Many fishing\ncompanies voluntarily participate in the donation program. Through 1998, over 3 million pounds of donated\nfish produced an estimated 12 million meals for needy persons.\nA variety of other bycatch and discard reduction programs are currently under analysis or development,\nincluding proposals including gear research and bycatch reduction incentives, and a proposal for a nonpelagic\ntrawl prohibition in Cook Inlet.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-14","Evaluation\nNumerous regulations have been implemented to reduce bycatch and discards of groundfish and crabs. It is\nunlikely that discarding can be significantly reduced below the 5 percent rate projected under current\nregulations, without requiring full retention of fish species unwanted for human consumption. In other words,\na full retention requirement for sculpins and other species would likely result in less discards, but more fishmeal\nproduction. Bycatch and discard of crabs, halibut, and herring is a function of regulations. If full retention of\nall species was required, there would be virtually no bycatch or discard.\nInstitutions\nEffective fishery management requires structures that incorporate diverse views without being compromised\nby endless negotiations or conflicts of interest. The committee recommends developing institutional structures\nthat promote\neffective and equitable reduction of excess capacity,\nsustainable catches of targeted species,\nexpansion of the focus of fishery management to include all sources of environmental degradation that\naffect fisheries,\nconsideration of the effects of fishing on ecosystem,\ndevelopment and implementation of effective monitoring and enforcement, and\nthe collection and exchange of vital data.\nTo achieve these goals, the spatial and temporal scales at which the institutional structures operate should\nbetter match those of important processes that affect fisheries. Participation in management should be extended\nto all parties with significant interests in marine ecosystems that contain exploited marine organisms.\nInstitutions should allocate shares in or rights to fisheries, rather than allowing openly competitive allocations.\nThe clear explication of management goals and objectives is a prerequisite to achieving effective and equitable\nmanagement.\nThe Council is one of eight regional councils established by the Magnuson-Stevens Act to manage fisheries in\nthe 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Council primarily manages groundfish in the GOA and\nBSAI, including cod, pollock, flatfish, mackerel, sablefish, and rockfish species harvested mainly by trawlers,\nhook-and-line longliners, and pot fishermen. The Council also makes limited entry decisions for halibut,\nalthough the U.S.-Canada International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) biologically manages the resource.\nOther large Alaska fisheries such as salmon, crab, and herring are managed primarily by the Alaska\nDepartment of Fish & Game (ADF&G). For a more detailed description of the Magnuson-Stevens Act and\nthe regulatory process, refer to Section 2.7.8.\nThe Council has eleven voting members, six from Alaska, three from Washington State, one from Oregon, and\na federal representative, the Alaska Regional Administrator of the NMFS. Voting members represent state\nfisheries agencies, industry, fishing communities, and academia. The Council's four nonvoting members\nrepresent the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and Department of State,\nand the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission. The Council's staff of twelve resides in Anchorage,\nAlaska. The Council receives advice each meeting from a 23-member Advisory Panel (AP) representing user\ngroups, environmentalists, recreational fishermen, and consumer groups, and from a 13-member Scientific and\nStatistical Committee (SSC) of highly respected scientists who review all information brought to the Council.\nFor a more detailed description of the regulatory process, refer to Section 2.7.8.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-15","Each Council decision is made by recorded vote in public forum after public comment. Final decisions then\ngo to NMFS for a second review, public comment, and final approval. Decisions must conform with the\nMagnuson-Stevens Act, the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), Endangered Species Act (ESA),\nMarine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), and other applicable laws including several executive orders.\nRegulatory changes may take up to a year or longer to implement, particularly if complex or contentious.\nEvaluation\nThe Council has worked successfully to achieve the goal of sustainable fisheries. The structure of the Council's\nnumerous committees (e.g., AP, SSC, Plan Teams, Ecosystem Committee) allows for incorporation of diverse\nviews from interested parties. The Council coordinates activities with other institutions including the NMFS,\nIPHC, ADF&G, USFWS, USCG, and others. Individual stock assessment advice provided to the Council\ngroups may also require broader participation from the scientific communities involved in protected species\nand essential fish habitat research, for example. This broader participation would lead to a comprehensive\nassessment process that explicitly takes ecosystem-based factors into account.\nInformation Needs - Better understanding is needed for the structure and functioning of marine\necosystems, including the role of habitat and the factors affecting stability and resilience. This includes\nattempting to understand mechanisms at lower levels of organization (i.e., populations and communities),\nlong-term research and monitoring programs, development of models that incorporate unobserved fishing\nmortality and environmental variability (e.g., El Niño events) into fishery models, multispecies models, and\ntrophic models. More research is also needed on the biological effects of fishing, such as the alteration of\ngene pools and population structures as a consequence of fishing. More research is needed on the\nconditions under which marine protected areas are most effective, and marine protected areas themselves\nshould be used as research tools as well as for conservation.\nMore information is needed on the effects and effectiveness of various forms of rights-based management\napproaches and other management regimes, on the way people behave in response to different economic\nand social incentives, and on barriers to cooperation and sharing of information. The committee\nrecommends research into the roles of communities in fisheries management, including the use of\ncommunity-based quotas and other assignments of rights to communities, and explorations into the\nfeasibility of granting management responsibilities to those engaged in a particular fishery, regardless of\ntheir geographic community (\"virtual communities\") (NRC 1999c).\nWhile the fisheries in the North Pacific are managed with the best available science, there is an ongoing need\nto increase current understanding of the biological and socioeconomic factors in the fisheries. There is also\na mandate to achieve some level of understanding of overall ecosystem dynamics and incorporate that\nunderstanding in our management approach. Each year, with input from its Groundfish and Crab Plan Teams\nand its SSC, the Council compiles and forwards to NMFS a list of research priorities in six specific areas of\nstudy:\n1. Stock Assessments\n2. Stock Surveys\n3. Ecosystem Studies\n4. Socioeconomic Research\n5. Bycatch Reduction and\n6. Fishery Monitoring\nEach general study area contains numerous specific research recommendations aimed either at strengthening\nbasic biological understanding of specific fish species; embracing the concept of ecosystem management and\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-16","responding accordingly; gaining better knowledge of the impacts of allocation decisions; or improving the\nsystem of monitoring fishery removals and associated impacts.\nSpecific examples of current high priority research needs include the following:\nContinuing research on pollock stock structure, including impacts to the overall resource from\nremovals in the transboundary area between the U.S. and Russia.\nIdentification of the origin of chum and chinook salmon bycatch in the groundfish fisheries.\nMethodologies for incorporating uncertainty in stock assessments.\nStudies of the effects of fishing on benthic habitat and overall ecosystem, utilizing closed areas as\nexperimental controls.\nStudies on trophic dynamics and species interactions among fisheries, marine mammals, seabirds, and\nforage fish populations.\nTime-series data on economic parameters in the fisheries, including fixed and variable costs associated\nwith fishing and processing, prices, inventories and exports, ownership patterns, employment patterns,\nand location of expenditures for goods and services.\nComprehensive research to identify and quantify the linkages between fisheries and the economic and\nsocial life in coastal communities.\nResearch on gear modification and other methods to reduce bycatch or minimize mortality.\nOngoing analysis of the accuracy and precision of catch estimates in the fisheries.\nDevelopment of catch and bycatch sampling procedures to support programs of\nindividual\naccountability for bycatch.\nResearch on the linkages between fisheries and Steller sea lion recovery, including evaluation of\nimpacts of no-trawl zones.\nEvaluation\nThe NMFS Alaska Fisheries Science Center, along with other institutions such as the University of Alaska,\nADF&G, the Prince William Sound Science Center, and others have all been doing ecosystem level research.\nThis research is expected to continue at about the current level.\nEcosystem Impacts of the Alternatives\n4.9.2\nFishing has the potential to influence ecosystems in several ways. Fishing may alter the amount and flow of\nenergy in an ecosystem by removing energy and altering energetic pathways though the return of discards and\nfish processing offal back into the sea. The recipients, locations, and forms of this returned biomass may differ\nfrom those in an unfished system. Selective removal of species and sizes of organisms has the potential to\nchange predator-prey relationships and community structure. Introduction of nonnative species may occur\nthrough emptying of ballast water in ships from other regions (Carlton 1996). These species introductions have\nthe potential to cause large changes in community dynamics. Fishing can alter different measures of diversity.\nSpecies level diversity, or the number of species, can be altered if fishing essentially removes a species from\nthe system. Fishing can alter functional or trophic diversity if it selectively removes a trophic guild member\nand changes the evenness with which biomass is distributed among a trophic guild. Certain species, such as\npollock, are at a central position in the food web and their abundance is an indicator of prey availability for\nmany species. Fishing can alter genetic level diversity by selectively removing faster growing fish or removing\nspawning aggregrations that might have different genetic characteristics than other spawning aggregations.\nFishing gear may alter bottom habitat and damage benthic organisms and communities (a topic covered in\nSection 4.7).\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-17","Much has been written about possible indicators of ecosystem status in response to perturbations (e.g., Odum\n1985, Pauly et al. 1998, Rice and Gislason 1996, Murawski 2000). These indices can show changes in energy\ncycling and community structure that might occur due to some external stress such as climate or fishing. For\nexample, fisheries might selectively remove older, more predatory individuals. Therefore, one would expect\nto see changes in the size diversity spectrum (the proportion of animals of various size groups in the system),\nmean age, or proportion of r-strategists (faster growing, more fecund species such as pollock) in the system.\nThese changes can increase nutrient turnover rates because of the shift toward younger, smaller organisms with\nhigher turnover rates. Total fishing removals and discards also provide a measure of the loss and redirection\nof energy in the system due to human influences. Total fishing removals relative to total ecosystem energy\ncould indicate the importance of fishing removals as a source of energy removal in an ecosystem. Changes in\nscavenger populations that show the same direction of change as discards could be an indicator of the degree\nof influence discards have on the system. Discards as a proportion of total natural detritus would also\nbe\na\nmeasure that could indicate how large discards are relative to other natural fluxes of dead organic material.\nLevels of total fishing removal or fishing effort could also indicate the potential for introduction of nonnative\nspecies through ballast water in fishing vessels. Fishing practices can selectively remove predators or prey.\nTracking the change in trophic level of the catch may provide information about the extent to which this is\noccurring (e.g., Pauly et al. 1998). Thus, measures of total catch, total discard, and information about the\nchanging mean size of organisms will be used to indicate the potential of each alternative to impact ecosystem\nenergy flow and turnover.\nTotal catch and trophic level of the catch will also provide information about the potential to disrupt predator-\nprey relationships through introduction of nonnative species or fishing down the food web through selective\nremoval of predators. Angermeier and Karr (1994) also recognized that an important factor affecting the\ntrophic base is spatial distribution of the food. These factors will be evaluated to determine the potential of\neach alternative to disrupt predator-prey relationships.\nThe scientific literature on diversity is somewhat mixed about what changes might be expected due to a\nstressor. Odum (1985) asserts that species diversity (number of species) would decrease and dominance (the\ndegree to which a particular species dominated in terms of numbers or biomass in the system) would increase\nif original diversity was high, while the reverse might occur if original diversity was low. Genetic diversity can\nalso be altered by humans through selective fishing (removal of faster growing individuals or certain spawning\naggregations). Accidental releases of cultured fish and ocean ranching tends to reduce genetic diversity\n(Boehlert 1996). More recently, there is growing agreement that functional (trophic) diversity might be the key\nattribute that lends ecosystem stability (see review by Hanski 1997). This type of diversity ensures there are\nsufficient number of species that perform the same function SO that if one species declines for any reason\n(human or climate-induced), then other species can maintain that particular ecosystem function and less\nvariability would occur in ecosystem processes. However, measures of diversity are subject to bias and how\nmuch change in diversity is acceptable is not really known (Murawski 2000). Furthermore, diversity may not\nbe a sensitive indicator of fishing effects (Livingston et al. 1999, Jennings and Reynolds 2000). Nonetheless,\nthe possible impacts the alternatives may have on various diversity measures will be assessed.\nQuantitative measures of some of the indicators mentioned above have been summarized for each of the\nalternatives. These include total catch, trophic level of the catch, total discards, total groundfish biomass,\ndiversity (Simpson's richness index), trophic level of groundfish biomass, and amount of pollock or other\nforage for the BSAI and GOA (Table 4.9-2). For each alternative, the possible impacts are addressed for on\n(1) predator-prey relationships, including introduction of nonnative species; (2) energy flow and redirection\n(through fishing removals and return of discards to the sea); and (3) diversity, using a system of ranking the\nchanges seen in the indicators for each alternative, with positive ranks given to beneficial directions of change,\nnegative ranks given to directions of change that would provide less protection, and zeros given to neutral\nchanges (Tables 4.9-3 and 4.9-4). The summary tables contain an ordinal index for each of several types of\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-18","potential effects of each alternative relative to Alternative 1. The index is represented by the values {-2, -1,\n+0, +1, or +2}. An index value of +0 indicates that there is no expected change relative to Alternative 1. A\nnegative index value indicates that the impact of the alternative is expected to be worse than Alternative 1. A\npositive index value indicates that the impact of the alternative is expected to be better than Alternative 1.\nSince the index values only contain ordinal information, they can only be used to make ordinal comparisons.\nFor example, an index value of +2 is better than a value of +1, but it is not true, in general, that a +2 is twice\nas good or twice as large as a +1. In short, the index values are simply place holders that represent an ordering.\nA completely equivalent ordering could be represented by a, b, C, d, or e. Therefore, it is not possible to obtain\nmeaningful summary information by performing numerical operations (e.g., add or subtract index values or\ncalculate their ratios) using two or more of the index values.\nEffects on Predator-Prey Relationships, Including Introduction of Nonindigenous Species\n4.9.2.1\nAlternative 1\nAs noted earlier, fisheries can remove predators, prey, or competitors and thus alter predator-prey relationships\nrelative to an unfished system. Studies from other ecosystems have been conducted to determine whether\npredators were controlling prey populations and whether fishing down predators produced a corresponding\nincrease in prey. Similarly, the examination of fishing effects on prey populations has been conducted to\nevaluate impacts on predators. Finally, fishing down of competitors has the potential to produce species\nreplacements in trophic guilds (see reviews of all these effects in Hall 1999b). Evidence from other ecosystems\npresents mixed results about the possible importance of fishing in causing population changes of the fished\nspecies' prey, predators, or competitors. Some studies showed a relationship, while others showed that the\nchanges were more likely due to direct environmental influences on the prey, predator or competitor species\nrather than a food web effect. Thus, fishing does have the potential to impact food webs but each ecosystem\nmust be examined to determine how important it is for that ecosystem.\nMost of the work on predator-prey relationships in the BSAI and GOA regions has been done in the eastern\nBering Sea. Evidence from modeling studies and examination of trophic guild changes (see Section 3.9)\nsuggest that under Alternative 1, there is no clear evidence of fishing as the cause of species fluctuations\nthrough food web effects. Multispecies models have shown that although cannibalism can explain a large part\nof the density-dependent part of the stock recruitment relationship for pollock (that is, the decline in recruitment\nobserved at high spawner biomasses), most of the overall variability in stock and recruitment is not explained\nby predation (Livingston and Methot 1998). Pollock is a key prey species of many target and nontarget species\nin the Bering Sea and GOA (Livingston 1989a, 1994) and has a central position in the food webs of those\necosystems. Modeling of predation on pollock in the eastern Bering Sea and GOA (Livingston and Methot\n1998, Livingston and Jurado-Molina 1999, and Hollowed et al. 2000) shows that different predators may be\nthe most important source of predation mortality during different time periods. For example, Steller sea lion\npredation on pollock in the GOA was more important in earlier years but the most important current source\nof predation mortality on pollock is now from arrowtooth flounder. Population levels of some of these\npredators such as arrowtooth flounder appear unrelated to fishing removals but are more linked to\nenvironmental forces that favor the production of these species (Hollowed et al. 1998). Similarly, the\nfluctuations observed in species composition of trophic guilds (Livingston et al. 1999) do not appear to be\nrelated to fishing removals of competitors or prey, when analyzed at the aggregated level for the whole eastern\nBering Sea. Measures of pelagic forage abundance in the status quo indicate in the short term that from 2001\nto 2005, the fraction of pollock in total groundfish biomass is predicted to increase 6 percent in the BSAI and\n29 percent in the GOA. These are substantial increases for pollock abundance, particularly in the GOA, and\nwould be considered a significant positive effect of the status quo on the environment in the short term.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-19","However, the above analyses did not consider space and time removals of prey by fisheries. Concentrated\nfishing removals of key prey species in space and time has been of concern in the status quo regime and time\nand area closures have recently been implemented to attempt to remedy the possible effects of these removals\non predator species, particularly Steller sea lions. There has not been sufficient observation time to evaluate\nthe effectiveness of these closures in protecting prey availability to predators, though presumably they have\na beneficial effect in the short term if predators are prey limited, particularly for predators seeking commercial-\nsized prey in the closed areas. Until the effectiveness of the present closures is seen, the impact of the present\nregime in concentrating removals of prey in space and time is considered to have a conditionally significant\nadverse effect.\nFishing can selectively remove fish eating predators then move down the food web and begin removing the next\ntrophic level down such as plankton feeding fish. This process is known as fishing down the food web.\nTrophic level of the fish and invertebrate catch from the BSAI, and GOA was estimated from the 1960s to the\npresent (Queirolo et al. 1995, Livingston et al. 1999) to determine whether such fishing down effects were\noccurring. Trophic level of the catch in all three areas has been relatively high and stable over the last 30 or\nmore years. There is no evidence from the present fishery management regime that this fishing down the food\nweb process has occurred. Trophic level of the catch under Alternative 1 is not expected to change appreciably\n(Table 4.9-2), with changes of 1 percent or less predicted between 2001 and 2005.\nSpecies composition of the catch indicates that some predatory populations such as arrowtooth flounder have\nbeen lightly exploited and the focus over time has been on mixed fish and invertebrate feeders such as pollock\nand cod. Protection of forage species from directed fisheries was implemented in recent years and this has also\nreduced the possibility of fishing down the food web under the status quo regime. The biomass of pollock, a\nkey prey species, in the groundfish biomass is predicted to increase in the short-term under Alternative 1, with\na 12 percent and 47 percent increase in the BSAI and GOA, respectively over 2001 to 2005. Changes in\nfunctional species composition might be indicated by changes in diversity of the groundfish community. No\nappreciable changes in the trophic level of the groundfish biomass are seen in the Alternative 1 from 2001 to\n2005 (Table 4.9-2). Thus, with regard to removal of top predators, the present regime is considered to have\nan insignificant effect on the environment.\nFishing vessels and vessels supporting fishing operations have the potential to disrupt predator-prey\nrelationships through the introduction of nonindigenous species. These introductions occur when ship ballast\nwater containing live organisms is obtained outside a region and is released into fishery management areas.\nVessels also have organisms fouling their hulls that can be transported between regions. These organisms have\nthe potential to cause large alterations in species composition and dominance in ecosystems (Carlton 1996).\nRecent work done primarily in Port Valdez and Prince William Sound shows that biological introductions of\nnonindigenous species has occurred, although these introductions cannot be ascribed to a particular vessel type,\nsuch as oil tankers or fishing vessels (Hines and Ruiz 2000). There have been 24 species of nonindigenous\nspecies of plants and animals documented primarily in shallow water marine and estuarine ecosystems of\nAlaska, with 15 species recorded in Prince William Sound. One example of a likely introduction is the\npredatory seastar Asterias amurensis, which is found in other areas of Alaska but has not previously been\nfound in Cook Inlet. These predators have the potential to have a major impact on benthic communities.\nImpacts from these introductions have not yet been observed in Alaskan waters, but because they could\npotentially produce large-scale changes in predator-prey interactions and species composition they are judged\nto have a conditionally significant effect on the environment.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-20","Notes: aTotal catch biomass (in metric tons) includes target and non-target species, including prohibited species. Prohibited species catches that are typically\nreported in numbers were converted into weight using 1999 observer data on total weight and numbers of each prohibited species category to derive\nDiscards include managed species dis cards, prohibited species, and other species. Alternative 1 assumes discards of yellowfin sole and rock sole\nin the BSAI and shallowwater flatfish in the GOA would not occur beginning in 2003, when the improved retention requirements for those species would\nJANUARY 2001\nIndicators of Amounts of Energy Removal and Redirection and Trophic Position of Removals for the Eastern Bering Sea and\nThis index is estimated from the biomasses of the groundfish species that are analyzed using age structured models using the following formula:\nAleutian Islands and the Gulf of Alaska for the Alternative 1 and Percent Change Between Other Alternatives for 2005\n<1\n6.2\n<1\n16\n<1\n26\n24\n36\n-4\n-5\n-4\n-1\n-7\n1\n1\n<1\n6.1\n<1\n40\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n-3\n1\n1\nPercent change from Alternative 1 in 2005\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n-3\n-4\n5\n1\n1\n4.2\n-14\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n-6\n-4\n-1\n5\n7\nmt - metric tons\n-10\n4.1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n-5\n3\n4\n7\n1\n°1/2 where p = proportion of each groundfish species biomass relative to total groundfish biomass.\na mean individual weight which was then applied to estimated catch from the catch projection model.\n-10\n-14\n<1\n<1\n<1\n<1\n-3\n-2\n3\n6\n3\n3\n3\n6\n1\n-54\n-16\n2.2\n-80\n-57\n-13\n<1\n22\n34\n<1\n17\n-2\n-1\n9\n3\ncIncludes only species that are analyzed using single species age-structured models.\n-20\n-15\n-33\n<1\n2.1\n<1\n10\n<1\n14\n<1\nGOA - Gulf of Alaska\n-4\n-7\n7\n2\n7\nPercent\nchange\n-28\n<1\n<1\n12\n<1\n25\n15\n47\n<1\n4.9-21\n-8\n-1\n6\n3\n3\n18,736,59\n3,811,909\nAlternative 1\n1,739,018\n9,532,480\n1,146,170\n286,154\n117,069\n47,338\n2005\n4.15\n3.97\n3.73\n3.68\n3.3\n3.1\n7\n1,743,728\n17,696,828\n3,326,535\n8,493,650\n777,449\n159,708\n46,123\n228,048\n4.17\n2001\n3.68\n3.73\n4.01\n3.0\n3.6\nBSAI - Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nTrophic level total groundfish biomass\nTrophic level total groundfish biomass\nTotal groundfish biomass (mt)c\nTotal groundfish biomass (mt)c\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nSimpson's richness index\nSimpson's richness index\nTotal catch biomass (mt)\nTotal catch biomass(mt) a\nIndicator\nTrophic level catch\nTrophic level catch\nDiscards (mt)b\nDiscards (mt)b\nbiomass (mt)\nbiomass (mt)\nTotal pollock\nTotal pollock\nbegin.\nTable 4.9-2\nGOA\nBSAI","CHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\ncatch (greater than 10\ntotal pollock or other\nMuch lower discards\nspatial compression\nabundance (greater\nLess temporal and\ntotal catch (greater\nTable 4.9-3 Scoring System for Effects of the Alternatives on Predator-Prey Relationships, Energy Flow and Balance and Diversity\nLarge decrease in\nLarge increase in\nthan 10 percent)\nMuch lower total\nthan 10 percent\n(greater than 10\n+2\nkey forage\ndecrease)\npercent)\npercen)\nTrophic level of catch\nspatial compression\npollock or other key\nlevel of biomass is\nforage abundance\nrelative to trophic\nLess temporal or\nLower total catch\n(5 to 10 percent)\nDecrease in total\n(5 to 10 percent)\n(5 to 10 percent)\nIncrease in total\nLower discards\ncatch (5 to 10\n+1\npercent)\nlower\nScore\nlevel of catch relative\nforage (pollock, Atka\nNo change in trophic\npollock or other key\n(less than 5 percent\nSame temporal and\ndistributions on key\nNo change in catch\nNo change in total\nforage abundance\nNo change in total\nto trophic level of\nspatial fishery\nNo change in\n+0\nmackerel)\nremovals\nbiomass\ndiscards\nchange)\ncatch\npollock or other key\nGreater temporal or\nspatial compression\nforage abundance\nbiomass is higher\nHigher total catch\nDecrease in total\n(5 to 10 percent)\ncatch relative to\n(5 to 10 percent)\n(5 to 10 percent)\nIncrease in total\nTrophic level of\nHigher discards\n4.9-22\ntrophic level of\ncatch (5 to 10\n-1\npercent)\nkey forage abundance\ncatch (greater than 10\nLarge increase in total\nGreater temporal and\nMuch higher discards\ncatch (greater than 10\ntotal pollock or other\nspatial compression\nLarge decrease in\nMuch higher total\n(greater than 10\n(greater than 10\n-2\npercent)\npercent)\npercent)\npercent)\nEnergy removal\nRemoval of top\nPelagic forage\nIntroduction of\nconcentration\nSpatial and\navailability\nEnergy re-\nof fishery\nimpact on\nnonnative\n(discards)\npredators\nEffects\ntemporal\ndirection\nspecies\n(catch)\nforage\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n1.\n2.\nPredator-prey\nrelationships\nand balance\nEnergy flow\nIssue\nJANUARY 2001","Scoring System for Effects of the Alternatives on Predator-Prey Relationships, Energy Flow and Balance and Diversity\nJANUARY 2001\npolicies for protection\nof many ecosystem\nMore stringent\n+2\ncomponents\npolicies for protection\nchanges in functional\nDecreased fishing on\nof a few ecosystem\nReduced levels of\naggregations or\nfishing-induced\nMore stringent\ncomponents\n+1\nlarger fish\nspawning\ndiversity\nScore\nchanges in functional\nfishing on spawning\nstatus quo policies\naggregations and\nfishing-induced\nSame levels of\nSame levels of\ncomponents\n+0\nthat protect\necosystem\nlarger fish\ndiversity\nIncreased levels of\nfunctional diversity\nprotection of a few\nIncreased fishing\naggregations or\n4.9-23\nfishing-induced\nLess stringent\non spawning\ncomponents\n-1\npolicies for\necosystem\nchanges in\nlarger fish\nLess stringent policies\nfor the protection of\nmany ecosystem\n-2\ncomponents\n1. Species diversity\nFunctional\nEffects\ndiversity\n(trophic)\ndiversity\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT - PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n3. Genetic\nTable 4.9-3 (Cont.)\n2.\nIssue\nDiversity","Assessment of the Impact of the Alternative 1 on the Environment and Summary of Scores for Each Alternative,\nNotes: aScoring of status quo impacts: Not Significant - Nonsignificant impact; S (+ or -) = Significant beneficial or adverse impact; CS(+or-) = Conditionally\nof\n\"The index values contain ordinal information and can only be used to make ordinal comparisons. For example, an index value of 2 is better than a value\nof 1, but a 2 is not necessarily twice as good or twice as large as 1. Therefore, it is not possible to obtain meaningful summary information by performing\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nsignificant beneficial or adverse impact (some information suggests that significant effects could occur, but the intensity of effect and probability\nReflecting Relative Levels of Protection for Predator-prey Relationships, Energy Flow and Balance, and Diversity\n6.2\n-2\n-1\n-2\n-2\n-2\n-2\n0\n0\n-1\n6.1\n-2\n0\n2\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n1\n0\n2\n0\nnumerical operations (e.g., add or subtract index values or calculate their ratios) using two or more index values.\n5\n1\n1\n1\n1\n4.2\n2\n2\n2\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\nAlternatives\n4.1\n0\n2\n2\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n4.9-24\n-1\n0\n2\n0\n2\n2\n0\n1\n1\n3\n2.2\n2\n2\n0\n2\n2\n2\n0\n1\n1\n2\n2.1\n2\n0\n2\n2\n2\n0\n1\n1\n1\nCS(-)\nCS(-)\nCS(-)\nS(+)\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\n1ª\nSpecies, Species Groups, and\nIntroduction of nonnative species\noccurrence are unknown).\nPredator-prey relationships\nEnergy redirection (discards)\nFunctional (trophic) diversity\nEnergy flow and balance\nPelagic forage availability\nRemoval of top predators\nEnergy removal (catch)\nEffects\nSpatial and temporal\nof fishery on forage\nSpecies diversity\nGenetic diversity\nTable 4.9-4\nconcentration\nDiversity\nJANUARY 2001","Alternative 2.1\nAlternative 2.1 has the potential to make fishery-sized cod, pollock, and Atka mackerel more available to\npredators in time and space through a combination of TAC reduction and spreading the prey removal over time\nand space. Thus, in the short-term, Alternative 2.1 would tend to better protect the trophic base of predators,\nparticularly marine mammals, that rely on these prey relative to Alternative 1. Benefits to these predators\nwould result if they encounter some prey limitation in the present regime. In the short term, non-mammal\npredators that might benefit through increased adult pollock and Atka mackerel include Pacific cod, Pacific\nhalibut, sablefish, and Greenland turbot. Indirect impacts of Alternative 2.1 could occur by reducing the prey\nbase of other species that compete for food with the Pacific cod, pollock, and Atka mackerel that are not taken.\nHowever, there are no indications that food is limiting to these other groundfish species SO this indirect effect\nis likely to be minimal. No large changes are expected in species composition in the ecosystem due to\nAlternative 2.1 because variability in the main species affected (pollock) appears to be more driven by\nrecruitment variability than changes in TAC.\nIn the long-term, multispecies age-structured predator-prey modeling indicates that when there is decreased\nfishing on pollock, predators of the smallest sizes of pollock, such as adult pollock and northern fur seal, tend\nto get more prey (Jurado-Molina and Livingston 2000), but predators of adult pollock may not see this benefit.\nIncreased predation on rock sole, yellowfin sole, and Pacific herring would be predicted by this multispecies\nforecasting model if Pacific cod were fished at lower rates. Also, when no-fishing scenarios are tested in this\nmultispecies model, the model predicts much lower stock biomasses in the long term than what single-species\nmodels predict, particularly for species that are prey in the modeled system, such as pollock, rock sole, and\nyellowfin sole. Thus, the single-species predictions of increases in pollock biomass when fishing is lowered\nunder Alternative 2.1 might not be as large in the long term if multispecies considerations are taken into\naccount.\nAggregated (non-age structured) ecosystem model simulations for the Bering Sea, using the ECOSIM model,\npredict long-term decreases in juvenile pollock and populations of piscivorous birds, which rely on juvenile\npollock as prey, but no changes in marine mammal populations when there is no fishing on pollock (Trites et\nal. 1999). As mentioned in Section 3.9, when the newer version of the ECOMSIM model is run, which has\na different way of considering pollock recruitment, an increase in juvenile pollock and piscivorous birds is seen\nbut there is still no change in marine mammal populations (Kerim Aydin, University of Washington School of\nfisheries and Aquatic Sciences personal communication). Assumptions about recruitment influence the results\nof these models, and these assumptions can change the direction of the predicted changes, particularly for\npollock. These models also lack spatial definition, which is most critical in evaluation of this alternative.\nGiven the importance of availability of prey in space and time, spatial foraging models need to be developed\nto better understand the possible impacts of Alternative 2.1 on predators of adult pollock, such as marine\nmammals.\nAlternative 2.1 would increase key forage species biomass at least in the short term. Although the alternative\nis intended to benefit marine mammals, two key prey species considered (pollock and Atka mackerel) are\ncentral prey species in either the pelagic food webs of the BSAI or the GOA. Thus, Alternative 2.1 ranks +1\nin influencing the ecosystem issue of pelagic forage availability (Table 4.9-4).\nThe explicit consideration of spreading out fishery removals of these key prey species in space and time under\nthis Alternative 2.1 gives it a rank of +2 for potential benefits to the ecosystem for decreasing the spatial and\ntemporal concentration of fisheries on forage species.\nTrophic level of the catch shows little change from Alternative 1 (Table 4.9-2). No additional tendency to fish\ndown the food web occurs under Alternative 2.1. As an indicator of forage availability, some additional\nincreases over Alternative 1 are seen in the proportion of pollock in the groundfish biomass when single-species\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-25","models are used to evaluate changes in groundfish biomass, 3 percent and 7 percent increases over the\nAlternative 1 2005 for the Bering Sea and GOA, respectively. Trophic level of the total groundfish biomass\n(Table 4.9-2) would not change relative to Alternative 1, indicating little change in the functional species\ncomposition of the groundfish community. Thus, trophic level of the catch relative to trophic level of\ngroundfish biomass is about the same, giving Alternative 2.1 a neutral rank with respect to influencing the\necosystem effect of removal of top predators.\nPresumably, the seasonal TAC reductions of Alternative 2.1 would translate into fewer fishing vessels or\nfishing effort for these species. Thus, there are lower probabilities for the introduction of nonindigenous\nspecies under Alternative 2.1 relative to Alternative 1. The total catch reductions of greater than 10 percent\nwould indicate less fishing effort, which would be related to the possibility for introduction of nonindigenous\nspecies. Thus this alternative ranks a +2 for potential reduction in possibility of introduction of nonnative\nspecies.\nAlternative 2.2\nAlternative 2.2 has the potential to make fishery-sized pollock, cod, and Atka mackerel more available to\npredators in time and space by using large TAC reductions. Thus, Alternative 2.2 would tend to better protect\nthe trophic base of predators, particularly marine mammals, that rely on these prey relative to Alternative 1.\nBenefits to these predators would result if they are encountering some prey limitation in the present regime.\nIn the short term, non-mammal predators that might benefit through increased adult pollock and Atka mackerel\ninclude cod, Pacific halibut, sablefish, and Greenland turbot. Indirect impacts of Alternative 2.2 could occur\nby reducing the prey base of other species that compete for food with the cod, pollock, and Atka mackerel that\nare not taken. However, there are no indications that food is limiting to these other groundfish species SO this\nindirect effect would likely be minimal. Large changes in species composition in the ecosystem would not be\nexpected under Alternative 2.2 because variability in the main species affected (pollock) appears to be more\ndriven by recruitment variability than changes in TAC.\nIn the long term, multispecies age-structured predator-prey modeling indicates that when there is decreased\nfishing on pollock, predators of the smallest sizes of pollock, such as adult pollock and northern fur seal, tend\nto get more prey (Jurado-Molina and Livingston 2000), but predators of adult pollock may not see this benefit.\nIncreased predation on rock sole, yellowfin sole, and Pacific herring would be expected if Pacific cod were\nfished at lower rates. Also, when no-fishing scenarios are tested in this multispecies model, much lower stock\nbiomasses are predicted for the long term than by single-species models, particularly for species that are prey\nin the modeled system, such as pollock, rock sole, and yellowfin sole. Thus, the single-species predictions of\nincreases in pollock biomass when fishing is lowered under Alternative 2.2 might not be as large in the long-\nterm if multispecies considerations are taken into account.\nAggregated (non-age structured) ecosystem model simulations for the Bering Sea using ECOSIM predict long-\nterm decreases in populations of piscivorous birds and and juvenile pollock but no changes in marine mammal\npopulations when there is no fishing on pollock (Trites, et al. 1999). Adult pollock populations would increase\nonly about 5 percent in the long term if fishing were stopped. As mentioned in Section 3.9, running the newer\nversion of this model, which has a different way of considering pollock recruitment, results in an increase in\njuvenile pollock and piscivorous birds but still no change in marine mammal populations (Kerim Aydin,\npersonal communication). Assumptions about recruitment influence the results of these models, and these\nassumptions can alter the direction of the predicted changes, particularly for pollock. These models also lack\nspatial definition, which is critical in evaluating Alternative 2.2. Given the importance of availability of prey\nin space and time, spatial foraging models need to be developed to better understand the possible impacts of\nthis alternative on predators of adult pollock, such as marine mammals.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-26","Alternative 2.2 would increase key forage species biomass, at least in the short term. Although Alternative 2.2\nobjectives were intended to benefit marine mammals, two key prey species considered (pollock and Atka\nmackerel) are central prey species in either the pelagic food webs of the BSAI or the GOA. Thus, Alternative\n2.2 ranks +2 in influencing the ecosystem issue of pelagic forage availability (Table 4.9-4).\nAlthough Alternative 2.2 would not explicitly reducet fishery catch in space, the TAC levels proposed and the\ntiming of catches indicate that there would likely be a reduction of both spatial and temporal catches of key\necosystem forage species, Atka mackerel and pollock. Thus, Alternative 2.2 ranks +2 in terms of providing\nincreased protection against temporal and spatial concentrations of fisheries on forage.\nTrophic level of the catch would decline by less than 2 percent relative to Alternative 1 for the BSAI.\nAlternative 2.2 does not show any increased tendency to fish down the food web relative to the Alternative 1.\nTrophic level declines would be purely due to change in fishery targets, not a sequential fishing down effect.\nAs an indicator of forage availability, some additional increases over the Alternative 1 would be seen in the\nproportion of pollock in the groundfish biomass when single species models are used to evaluate changes in\ngroundfish biomass, 10 percent and 3 percent increases over Alternative 1 in 2005 for the Bering Sea and\nGOA, respectively. Trophic level of the total groundfish biomass (Table 4.9-2) would not change relative to\nAlternative 1, indicating little change in the functional species composition of the groundfish community. Thus,\nAlternative 2.2 would be neutral (e.g., +0) with respect to providing additional protection to fishing down the\nfood web through removal of top predators.\nThe large TAC reductions under Alternative 2.2 would translate into fewer fishing vessels or less fishing effort\nfor these species. Thus, there would be fewer possibilities for the introduction of nonindigenous species\nthrough groundfish fishing vessels under Alternative 2.2 relative to Alternative 1, and scores +2.\nAlternative 3\nAlternative 3 has the potential to protect predator-prey interactions by protecting stock levels through minimum\nstock size thresholds (MSST) and incorporating uncertainty (which would lower TACs of some species). No\nlarge changes in species composition in the ecosystem would be expected due to this alternative because\nvariability in the groundfish species affected appears to be more driven by recruitment variability than changes\nin TAC. Pelagic forage availability, as measured by the fraction of pollock in the groundfish biomass would\nincrease slightly, but not more than 5 percent above Alternative 1. However, Alternative 3 would make large\nreductions (almost 40 percent) in the TACs of Atka mackerel, thus is given a score of +1. Although 20 percent\ntime and area closures would provide a consistent fraction of undisturbed area in each management zone for\npredators to find prey, the TAC displacement into other areas has the potential to increase local prey depletion\nin those areas, giving Alternative 3 a -1 with respect to spatial and temporal concentrations of fisheries on the\nkey forage species Atka mackerel and pollock.\nIn the short term, the shift in fishery selectivity toward older fish might tend to remove more older, predatory\nindividuals relative to Alternative 1, which could potentially reduce any possible competition for prey with\nother predators. However, because of the decline in fishing mortality due to the uncertainty corrections, the\nlong-term equilibrium age composition of these populations might actually show an increase in older more\npredatory individuals relative to Alternative 1. More research needs to be done that looks at the changes in\necosystem-level size frequency distributions that might be expected if the size frequencies of groundfish\nremovals are altered.\nTrophic level of the catch would not decline under Alternative 3 relative to Alternative 1. However, the trophic\nlevels of each species were not explicitly modeled by size. Potentially, Alternative 3 could show an increase\nin trophic level of the catch if this feature of increasing predatory behavior with increasing size of fish were\nmodeled. Alternative 3 could show a slight reduction in the fishing down effect through the increase in the\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-27","lifespan of target fish induced by the decreased fishing mortalities in the long term. Although Alternative 3\nhas the potential to show an increase in trophic level of the catch relative to Alternative 1, it is likely not a very\nlarge change. Similarly, trophic level of the total groundfish biomass does not show any change relative to\nAlternative 1, although there is some potential for increased trophic level if trophic level changes with respect\nto changing size distributions were modeled. Thus, Alternative 3 would not differ from Alternative 1 with\nrespect to its potential for fishing down large predators (e.g., +0).\nTotal catch reductions under Alternative 3 would likely mean smaller fishing effort or fewer fishing vessels in\nthe region. Thus, there would be lower probabilities for the introduction of nonindigenous species under\nAlternative 3 relative to Alternative 1, therefore Alternative 3 scores a +2.\nAlternatives 4.1 and 4.2\nAlternatives 4.1 and 4.2 could alter predator-prey relationships primarily by the closure of areas to protect\nsquid aggregations and the resulting TAC reduction of pollock. Squid is a prey species of marine mammals\nand some slope-dwelling groundfish. Closed areas to protect squid would provide more squid as prey to these\nanimals relative to Alternative 1, and would provide some benefits to predators over Alternative 1 if these prey\nare presently limiting. There is presently no evidence that prey are limiting to slope dwelling groundfish. TAC\nreduction of pollock would also tend to provide more fishery-sized pollock to animals such as some marine\nmammals, cod, Greenland turbot, and sablefish, which consume these larger sized pollock. Benefits to these\npredators would occur if pollock prey are a limiting factor to these groups. There is presently no evidence that\npollock is limiting groundfish species. Eastern Bering Sea pollock biomass would increase about 7 percent\nrelative to Altertnative 1 under Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2, SO they give increased protection relative to Alternative\n1 with respect to providing greater availability of pelagic forage as measured by pollock abundance. Also,\nthese are the only alternatives that explicitly attempt to provide additional protection to another important\npelagic forage species, squid. Although there is no explicit measure of the potential increase in squid\nabundance, Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 would provide increased availability of this pelagic forage SO they receive\na +1 score with respect to this measure.\nThe closed area to protect squid would also provide some reduction in spatial concentration of pollock fishing\nSO there is some additional protection to spatial and temporal concentration of fisheries on forage relative to\nAlternative 1. Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 were both given a +1 score for this metric.\nNo change in trophic level of the catch would be seen under Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 relative to trophic level\nof the total groundfish biomass. Thus, they appear to provide no further protection to fishing down the food\nweb relative to Alternative 1. However, if Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 were implemented to species beyond the\nexample species of skates, squids, and grenadiers, they would provide increased protection to fishing down top\npredators such as sharks, and thus they receive a +1 relative to Alternative 1 on this issue.\nSome decreases in the amount of fishing vessels or effort might occur due to the TAC reduction of pollock.\nThus, Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 might provide some additional increase in protection from the introduction of\nnonindigenous species relative to Alternative 1. Alternative 4.1 was given a score of +1 and Alternative 4.2,\nwhich would have more catch reduction than Alternative 4.1, scores +2 on this metric relative to Alternative\n1.\nAlternative 5\nAlternative 5 could change predator-prey relationships relative to Alternative 1 by providing some areas that\nwould be totally closed to fishing (HAPC areas) and reducing the TAC of flatfish and Atka mackerel, which\ncould provide additional prey to species that consume them. Some reductions in the abundance of older, more\npredatory fish might occur by changing the fisheries for Greenland turbot, some rockfish, sablefish, and cod\nto fixed-gear only, which has greater selectivity for older fish. The HAPC area closures would provide areas\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-28","where prey populations were not disturbed and could be more beneficial to predators relative to Alternative 1.\nTAC reductions of flatfish and Atka mackerel could potentially benefit Pacific cod, Pacific halibut, arrowtooth\nflounder, and Greenland turbot by providing additional prey for them in short term. However, in the long term,\nmultispecies modeling indicates that if there are species that consume younger ages of these species relative\nto these predators, then the species that consume the smallest sizes tend to benefit the most. Pollock biomass\nincreases slightly relative to Alternative 1 but Alternative 5 would reduce TAC of Atka mackerel by 8 percent\nin the Aleutian Islands, and thus it deserves a +1 score for providing increased pelagic forage availability\nrelative to Alternative 1.\nReducing the disturbance of benthic prey through bottom trawling would provide a less disturbed prey base\nfor benthic feeding animals. Scavenging animals that presently benefit to some degree by trawls that expose\nbenthic prey to predation would experience a decline in this benefit under Alternative 5 relative to Alternative\n1. The actual magnitude of the positive benefits to non-scavenging predators is not known, but would be\ngreater under this alternative compared to Alternative 1. Changing the selectivity toward gear that removes\nolder fish would reduce energy flow at higher trophic levels, which would shorten the food chain and decrease\nthe lifespan of organisms (both of which would occur to some extent through the change in fishery selectivity\ntoward older fish). These would be indicators of a more stressed, less mature ecosystem according to Odum\n(1985). No quantitative measures are available of the extent to which these processes would be affected.\nHowever, the magnitude of the change proposed in removal of higher level predators relative to changes\nobserved due to environmentally driven changes in recruitment suggest that there would not likely be a large\necosystem impact in this regard from Alternative 5.\nAlternative 5 would close additional areas to fishing and reduce TAC outside these areas for flatfish and Atka\nmackerel. It thus would provide additional protection to spatial compression of fisheries on forage species\nrelative to the Alternative 1, and receives a score of +1.\nThere would be little change in trophic level of the catch relative to trophic level of the groundfish biomass\nunder Alternative 5. Thus it would provide similar protection as Alternative 1 to fishing down effects on top\npredators in the food web (+0).\nTAC reductions of flatfish and Atka mackerel could presumably decrease the number of vessels or amount of\neffort in the management areas. Thus, this alternative might provide some additional increase (e.g., +1) in\nprotection from the introduction of nonindigenous species relative to Alternative 1.\nAlternative 6.1\nThe main predator-prey-related effects of Alternative 5 would be to spread out the removal of either predators\nor prey over space and time due to the elimination of the race for fish. Fishing practices, such as the use of\nlarger mesh sizes, might also be used to decrease the catch of less desirable sizes of fish and thus would tend\nto increase the removal of larger, more predatory fish from the system. Pelagic forage availability as measured\nby pollock biomass would not change relative to Alternative 1, giving this alternative a +0 score in this respect.\nAlternative 5 would reduce the race for fish and spread fisheries over time. Because of this extra time to catch\nfish, fishermen would also increase their exploratory fishing and would spread out fishing in space. Thus\nAlternative 5 would reduce spatial and temporal concentrations of fisheries on forage relative to Alternative\n1, giving Alternative 5 a rank of +2.\nPresumably, species that rely heavily on adult groundfish for prey in space and time would have less population\nvariability SO more stability would be likely in ecosystem biomass. The shift in fishery selectivity toward older\nfish would tend to remove more older, predatory individuals relative to Alternative 1, potentially reducing any\npossible competition for prey with other predators. Large changes in species composition would not be\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-29","expected in the ecosystem due to Alternative 5, because variability in affected groundfish species appear to be\nmore driven by recruitment variability. Reduced energy flow at higher trophic levels, which would shorten the\nfood chain and decrease the lifespan of organisms (both of which would occur to some extent through the\nchange in fishery selectivity toward older fish), would be indicators of a more stressed, less mature ecosystem\naccording to Odum (1985). No quantitative measures are available of the extent to which these processes\nwould be affected. However, the magnitude of the change relative to changes observed due to environmentally\ndriven recruitment changes suggest that there would not likely be a large ecosystem impact in this regard from\nAlternative 5.\nThere would be little change in trophic level of the catch under Alternative 5 relative to trophic level of\nbiomass. Thus it provides similar protection as Alternative 1 to fishing down effects on the food web (e.g., +0).\nAlternative 5 might reduce the number of vessels participating in groundfish fisheries, but could also increase\nthe effort (spread it over space and time). Thus, Alternative 5 might provide no additional increase in\nprotection from the introduction of nonindigenous species relative to Alternative 1.\nAlternative 6.2\nThe main predator-prey-related effects of Alternative 6.2 would be to increase short-term harvests of some\neconomically desirable species such as pollock (a key prey) and cod (an important predator). Pollock biomass\nwould decrease 5 percent and 7 percent in the BSAI and GOA, respectively, relative Alternative 1. Thus,\nAlternative 6.1 would provide less protection to pelagic forage availability and is given a -1 score.\nIncreased catches of pollock could also result insignificant increases in spatial or temporal concentrations of\nprey removals relative to Alternative 1. Therefore this metric was given a score of -2.\nThere would be little change in trophic level of the catch under Alternative 6.2 relative to trophic level of\nbiomass. Thus it would provide similar protection as Alternative 1 to fishing down effects on the food web\n(e.g., +0).\nGiven the large catch increases predicted for Alternative 6.1, there might be an increase in the effort or number\nof vessels participating in groundfish fisheries. Thus, there would be a much larger potential for introduction\nof nonnative species through groundfish fishing vessels (e.g., -2).\nEffects on Energy Flow and Balance, Including Fish Removals and Fish Processing Waste\n4.9.2.2\nAlternative 1\nFishing may alter the amount and flow of energy in an ecosystem by removing energy and altering energetic\npathways through the return of discards and fish processing offal back into the sea. The recipients, locations,\nand forms of this returned biomass may differ from those in an unfished system. A mass-balance model of the\neastern Bering Sea (Trites et al. 1999) provides some information on fishing removals relative to total system\nproduction and the distribution of biomass and energy flow throughout the system in recent times. The trophic\npyramids (distribution of biomass at various trophic levels) indicate that biomass and energy flow are\ndistributed fairly well throughout the system (Trites et al. 1999, p. 28 of). These show that the Bering Sea is\na more mature system compared to other shelf systems. A more mature system is one that is less disturbed\n(Odum 1985). Total catch biomass (including non-groundfish removals) as a percentage of total system\nbiomass (excluding dead organic material, known as detritus) was estimated to be 1 percent, a small proportion\nof total system biomass. Fishery removal rates are based in the most basic sense on the amount of surplus\nproduction (the excess of reproduction and growth over natural mortality) (Hilborn and Walters 1992) for fish\nstocks. Because there is great variability among stocks with regard to the amount of this excess production,\nit is likely more important that removals stay within the bounds of each individual stock's excess production\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.9-30","(a topic that is considered in the individual stock impacts sections). From an ecosystem point of view, total\nfishing removals are a small proportion of the total system energy budget and are small relative to internal\nsources of interannual variability in production. Thus, they have an insignificant effect on the environment.\nFisheries can redirect energy in the system by discarding and returning fish processing wastes to the system.\nThese practices take energy and potentially provide them to different parts of the ecosystem relative to the\nnatural state. For example, discards of dead flatfish or small benthic invertebrates might be consumed at the\nsurface by scavenging birds, which would normally not have access to those energy sources. An analysis of\nthe importance of these fisheries practices on the BSAI and GOA ecosystems was conducted by Queirolo et\nal. (1995), before the improved retention requirements for pollock and cod were mandated. Total offal and\ndiscard production at that time was estimated at only 1 percent of the unused detritus already going to the\nbottom. No scavenger population increases were noted that related to changes in discard or offal production\namounts. The annual consumptive capacity of scavenging birds, groundfish, and crab in the eastern Bering\nSea was determined to be over ten times larger than the total amount of offal and discards in the BSAI and\nGOA. Finally, it appeared that the main scavengers of fish processing offal, which primarily consisted of\npollock, were also natural pollock predators. Thus, energy flow paths did not seem to be redirected in a large\nway and have an insignificant impact on the environment.\nDiscard rates dropped even further after the implementation of retention requirements for all pollock and cod\nin groundfish fisheries. Managed groundfish species discards dropped below 10 percent of the total catch\n(down from about 15 percent in the eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands and 20 percent in the GOA,\nrespectively) in 1998. The mandated retention of managed flatfish species (yellowfin sole and rock sole in the\nBSAI and shallow water flatfish in the GOA) in 2003, which make up the bulk of the remaining discards of\nmanaged species, may cause the total discard amounts to decrease 28 percent in the BSAI under Alternative\n1 from the year 2001 to 2005 (Table 4.9-2, Figure 4.9-4). Total discards in the GOA are estimated to increase\n3 percent under Alternative 1 from 2001 to 2005 because shallow water flatfish are not a dominant source of\ndiscards in the GOA (arrowtooth flounder, grenadiers, pollock, and cod are the dominant species in the\ndiscards) (Figure 4.9-2). Alternative 1 has removed the largest potential source of energy redirection through\ndiscards with the improved retention requirements in the eastern Bering Sea. Discards are estimated to decline\nto 7 percent of the total catch in the BSAI but would remain constant at about 17 percent of the total catch in\nthe GOA, a reflection of the discard level observed in 1999. Combined evidence regarding the level of discards\nrelative to natural sources of detritus and no evidence of changes in scavenger populations that are related to\ndiscard trends suggest that Alternative 1 would have insignificant ecosystem impacts through energy removal\nand redirection.\nDiscards and offal production can cause local enrichment and change in species composition if discards or offal\nreturns are concentrated. Some evidence of those effects have previously been cited (Thomas 1994) in areas\nwith inadequate tidal flushing (Orcas Inlet in Prince William Sound and in Dutch Harbor) but not in the deep\nwater disposal site in Chiniak Bay off Kodiak Island (Stevens and Haaga 1994). Local ocean properties (water\nflow and depth) and amount of water discharged per year could be important factors determining the effect of\nnearshore disposal on local marine habitat and communities. Changes to the processing plant at Dutch Harbor\ndramatically reduced the amount of offal and ground discards discharged. Improved retention could be causing\nsome increases in the amount of local enrichment due to disposal of increased offal from shoreside processing\nof newly retained fish. However, increase in offal production for the Bering Sea, if all pollock, cod, rock sole\nand yellowfin sole were to be retained, would amount to an increase of about 6 percent (NMFS 1996e) and\nwould not likely cause a change in water quality.\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.9-31","Alternative 2.1\nThe main impact of Alternative 2.1 with regard to amount and flow of energy flow in the ecosystem would be\nto reduce total level of catch biomass removals from groundfish fisheries by about 33 percent in the GOA and\n20 percent in the BSAI from Alternative 1. This retained energy would consist primarily of catch reductions\nin pollock, Atka mackerel, and cod. This would provide further ecosystem protection for energy flows that\ninvolve these species. Catch was determined to be a small proportion of total ecosystem energy under\nAlternative 1 and Alternative 2.1 would ensure that it is even smaller, thus providing further protection to\nnatural ecosystem energy flow paths and amounts. For this reason, Alternative 2.1 was given a score of +2\nrelative to Alternative 1.\nDiscards would be reduced 15 percent in the BSAI and 7 percent in the GOA under Alternative 2.1 relative\nto Alternative 1, primarily through reductions in the discards of pollock and Atka mackerel (Table 4.9-2).\nAlthough negative impacts of the present discarding practices have not been demonstrated, this alternative\nwould provide further restoration of natural energy flow paths over those in Alternative 1, and was given a\nscore of +2.\nAlternative 2.2\nThe main impact of Alternative 2.2 with regard to amount and flow of energy flow in the ecosystem would be\nto reduce total level of catch biomass removals from groundfish fisheries by about 54 percent in the GOA and\n80 percent in the BSAI from Alternative 1. This retained energy would consist primarily of catch reductions\nin pollock, Atka mackerel, and cod. This would provide further ecosystem protection for energy flows that\ninvolve these species. Catch was determined to be a small proportion of total ecosystem energy in Alternative\n1 and Alternative 2.2 would ensure that it is even smaller, thus providing further protection to natural\necosystem energy flow paths and amounts. For this reason, Alternative 2.2 was given a score of +2 relative\nto Alternative 1.\nDiscards would decrease 57 percent in the BSAI and 16 percent in the GOA relative to Alternative 1 (Table\n4.9-2). Although negative impacts of the present discarding practices have not been demonstrated, Alternative\n2.2 would provide further restoration of natural energy flow paths over those in Alternative 1, and was given\na score of +2.\nAlternative 3\nThe main impact of Alternative 3 with regard to energy flow in the ecosystem would be to reduce total level\nof catch biomass removals from groundfish fisheries by about 14 percent in the GOA and 10 percent in the\nBSAI from the Alternative 1. Catch was determined to be a small proportion of total ecosystem energy in\nAlternative 1, and Alternative 3 would ensure that it is even smaller, thus providing further protection to natural\necosystem energy flow paths and amounts. Thus, Alternative 3 scores +2 with respect to its degree of\nprotection of ecosystem energy flow and balance.\nDiscards under Alternative 3 would increase by 3 percent in the BSAI and decrease by 2 percent in the GOA\nrelative to the status quo alternative level in 2005. Previous analysis of higher discard levels seen before\nimplementation of improved retention requirements for pollock and cod indicated minimal ecosystem impacts\nat levels higher than those estimated under this alternative (Queirolo et al. 1995). The small increases in\nestimated discards under this alternative relative to status quo will likely not have negative impacts in the form\nof increased scavenger populations or anaerobic bottom conditions. Therefore, it received a neutral (e.g., +0)\nscore with respect to energy redirection relative to Alternative 1.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.9-32","BSAI Discards\nOther Species\n200,000\nProhibited Species\nTarget Species\n150,000\n100,000\n50,000\nGOA Discards\n70,000\n60,000\n50,000\n40,000\n30,000\n20,000\n10,000\nEstimated levels of total discards (target species, prohibited species, and non-target\nFigure 4.9-4\nspecies) under Alternative 1 2001-2005 and under Alternatives 2.1 through 6.2 in 2005.\nThe estimates assume that improved retention requirements for yellowfin sole and rock\nsole in the Bering Sea and shallow water flatfish in the Gulf of Alaska would begin in\n2003 and would cause zero discards for those species, beginning in 2003, over all\nalternatives except 6.1, which removes improved retention requirements.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.9-33","Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2\nThe main impact of Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 with regard to energy flow in the ecosystem would be to reduce\ntotal level of catch biomass removals from groundfish fisheries by less than 1 percent in the GOA and 10\npercent and 14 percent in the BSAI, respectively from Alternative 1. Catch would be a small proportion of total\necosystem energy under Alternative 1 and Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 would ensure that it is even smaller, thus\nproviding further protection to natural ecosystem energy flow paths and amounts. For these reasons,\nAlternatives 4.1 and 4.2 both received a score of +2 relative to Alternative 1.\nDiscards under Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 would increase by 3 percent in the BSAI and 1 percent in the GOA\nin 2005 relative to Alternative 1. Analysis of higher discard levels before implementation of improved retention\nrequirements for pollock and cod indicate that minimal ecosystem impacts would occur at levels higher than\nthose estimated under Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 (Queirolo et al. 1995). The small increases in estimated\ndiscards under Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 relative to Alternative 1 would likely not have negative impacts in the\nform of increased scavenger populations or anaerobic bottom conditions. Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 receive a\nneutral score of +0 relative to Alternative 1 with respect to providing decreases in the amount of discards.\nAlternative 5\nAlternative 5 would not change total observed catch amounts appreciably from Alternative 1, and thus would\nnot provide any further protection to natural ecosystem energy flow paths and amounts relative to Alternative\n1 in that regard. Alternative 5 would reduce the amount of bottom trawling that occurs, and thus would cause\nsome decline in the amount of prey exposed by trawls and eaten by scavenging benthic organisms. No negative\nimpacts attributable to the exposure of prey have been observed under Alternative 1, as evidenced by the lack\nof increase in benthic scavenger populations. Alternative 5 would provide further protection from this\noccurring.\nDiscards under Alternative 5 would decline by about 3 percent in the BSAI and 4 percent in the GOA in 2005\nrelative to Alternative 1. These are very small changes relative to Alternative 1 and minimal changes in energy\nredirection, scavengers, or water quality would be anticipated from directed catch and discard observations.\nHowever, the unmeasured energy redirection from trawls exposing prey that are then eaten by scavenging\nbenthic organisms would be reduced relative to Alternative 1, thus Alternative 5 receives a +1 because it\nreduces this energy redirection relative to Alternative 1.\nAlternative 6.1\nAlternative 6.1 would not change total observed catch amounts appreciably from Alternative 1 and thus does\nnot provide any further protection to natural ecosystem energy flow paths and amounts relative to Alternative\n1 in that regard. For this reason Alternative 6.1 was given a score of +0 for this metric.\nDiscards under Alternative 6.1 would increase by a large amount (40 percent) in the BSAI and decrease by 3\npercent in the GOA in 2005 relative to Alternative 1. The large change in the BSAI is due to removing the\nregulations on improved retention and utilization. However, Alternative 6.1 proposes that fishermen optimize\ncatch of directed target species and minimize discards without the benefit of the improved retention regulations.\nThe actual level of discards that would be realized under Alternative 6.1 cannot be predicted quantitatively:\nif effective, then presumably discards would be lower than projected, but if ineffective, up to a 40 percent\nincrease in discards would be seen relative to Alternative 1. Although the absolute level of this 40 percent\nincrease in discards is likely to be less than the levels seen before improved retention would be put into place\n(in which negative impacts would not be observed), it would be a step backwards in achieving the ecosystem\npolicy objective of minimizing waste and discards and is given a -2 score in that regard.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-34","Alternative 6.2\nAlternative 6.2 would increase total catch biomass by 16 percent relative to Alternative 1. Catch would be a\nvery small proportion of total ecosystem biomass under Alternative 1, and Alternative 6.2 would likely not\nchange that proportion. However, the change is a rather large negative change relative to Alternative 6.2,\nwhich is given a score of -2.\nTotal discards would increase under Alternative 6.2 by 26 percent, mainly due to increased catch levels.\nImproved retention regulations would still be in place SO the estimated discard level would not be as high as\nAlternative 6.1. Although the discard levels are possibly of the same magnitude as those observed before the\nimproved retention regulations would be put in place (in which negative impacts would not be observed), it\nwould be a step backward in achieving the ecosystem policy objective of minimizing waste and discards, thus\nit is given a -2 score in that regard.\n4.9.2.3\nEffects on Biological Diversity\nFishing can alter different measures of diversity. Species level diversity, or the number of species, can be\naltered if fishing removes a species from the system. Fishing can alter functional or trophic diversity if it\nselectively removes a trophic guild member and changes the way biomass is distributed within a trophic guild.\nFishing can alter genetic level diversity by selectively removing faster growing fish or removing spawning\naggregrations that might have different genetic characteristics than other spawning aggregations. Large, old\nfishes may be more heterozygous (i.e., have more genetic differences or diversity) and some stock structures\nmay have a genetic component (see review in Jennings and Kaiser 1998), thus one would expect a decline in\ngenetic diversity due to heavy exploitation.\nAlternative 1\nLocalized extinctions due to fishing are rare but some evidence exists that this may have occurred to some skate\nspecies in areas of the North Atlantic (see review in Greenstreet and Rogers 2000). These extinctions could\nbe thought of as a decrease in species level diversity or the actual number of species in an area. Elasmobranchs\nsuch as shark, skate, and ray species are vulnerable to fishing removals and direct impacts to those species are\ncovered in Section 4.5. Species level diversity changes have not been assessed in a quantitative fashion under\nthe current regime. No fishing induced extinctions have been documented in the last 30 years or SO.\nTaxonomic work on some fish species (e.g., skates is ongoing and minimal survey and systematic work is\nbeing done on other ecosystem components, such as benthic invertebrates, that could be impacted by fishing\nactivities. Until some of these survey and taxonomic problems are resolved, it is not possible to fully assess\nthe impacts of Alternative 1 on species level diversity. However, given the sensitive nature of some species\nconsidered (i.e., long-lived or low-reproductive potential species, such as skates, sharks, and grenadiers), and\nthe evidence of extinction of related species in the Atlantic, suggests that this could be a conditionally\nsignificant adverse impact on the environment under Alternative 1.\nStudies of other more heavily fished systems, such as the North Sea, Georges Bank, or Gulf of Thailand have\nshown declines in diversity (Hall 1999a, Jennings and Reynolds 2000) related to fishing, and the diversity\ndeclines were due to direct mortality of target species. Biomass diversity and evenness for trophic guilds was\ninvestigated by Livingston et al. (1999) in the eastern Bering Sea in the current regime (Section 3.9). There\nappeared to be no evidence that groundfish fisheries caused declines in trophic guild diversity for the groups.\nFor example, the biomass of diversity in the pelagic fish consumer guild was close to 1 from 1979 to 1993, a\nreflection of the dominance of pollock in the biomass of that group. Diversity tended to decline when pollock\nbiomass increased due to large year-class production. Other groups, such as the benthic infauna consumer\nguild and the crab and fish consumer guild, had higher species biomass diversity than the pelagic fish consumer\nguild. Guild diversity changes were again seen when a dominant member changed in abundance. The\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.9-35","abundance changes of those species were mostly related to recruitment changes and not to fishing. There\nappeared to be no fishing-induced changes in functional (trophic) diversity under Alternative 1. Functional\n(trophic) diversity indicators using forecasts of groundfish biomass under Alternative 1 from 2001 to 2005\nindicate an 8 percent decline would occur in the diversity of groundfish biomass in the BSAI and a 3 percent\nincrease would occur in groundfish biomass diversity in the GOA. The projected decrease in the BSAI is\nprimarily due to the increased dominance in pollock biomass in that region while the GOA diversity change is\nsmaller and not linked to a particular species. Thus, there appears to be no fishing-induced changes in\nfunctional diversity. This was considered to be an nonsignificant effect on the status quo environment.\nEvidence SO far in highly fished areas such as the North Sea suggests that there is little evidence of genetically\ninduced change in selection for body length in cod after 40 years of exploitation (Law and Rowell 1993 cited\nin Jennings and Kaiser 1998). Genetic diversity has not been assessed under Alternative 1, but heavy\nexploitation of certain spawning aggregations can be inferred and heavier exploitation on older, more\nheterozygous individuals would have the tendency to reduce genetic diversity in fished versus unfished systems\nThus, some change in genetic diversity has possibly occurred in the BSAI and GOA, but the magnitude of the\nimpacts are not known. The North Sea work indicates the impacts might be minimal. Genetic assessment of\npollock populations and subpopulations in the North Pacific shows some genetic differences among stocks but\nhas not demonstrated any genetic variability across time within stocks that might indicate fishing influences\n(Bailey et al. 1999). This is judged to have an nonsignificant impact on the Alternative 1 environment.\nAlternative 2.1\nAlternative 2.1 would likely have little change in species level diversity relative to Alternative 1, except that\nit could potentially help reverse the trend in species decline of Steller sea lion (an assessment of that possibility\nis contained in Section 4.2). It is given a score of +1 for that reason.\nTrophic guild diversity of the guilds that pollock, cod, and Atka mackerel belong to would decline as these\nspecies increase their dominance in those guilds. Overall biomass diversity of the groundfish complex indicates\na 4 percent decline would occur compared to Alternative 1 in the BSAI and a 2 percent increase for the GOA.\nThese are small changes relative to Alternative 1 and likely would not change functional relationships among\nspecies (e.g., +0).\nGenetic diversity could increase under Alternative 2.1 if older, more heterozygous individuals were left in the\npopulations of cod, pollock, and Atka mackerel. Also, protection of spawning aggregations of these species\nunder Alternative 2.1 would tend to provide increased protection of genetic diversity over Alternative 1, which\nmight be due to differences among spawning subgroups. For this reason, Alternative 2.2 scores a +1 for this\nmetric.\nAlternative 2.2\nAlternative 2.2 would likely have little change in species level diversity relative to Alternative 1, except that\nit could potentially reverse the trend in species decline of Steller sea lion. It is thus given a score of +1 for\nproviding additional protection to species level diversity relative to Alternative 1.\nTrophic guild diversity of the guilds that pollock, cod, and Atka mackerel belong to would decline as these\nspecies would increase their dominance in those guilds. Overall biomass diversity of the groundfish complex\nwould decline 13 percent from Alternative 1 in the BSAI and increase 3 percent for the GOA. The change in\nthe GOA is small relative to Alternative 1 and likely would not change functional relationships among species.\nThe decline in biomass diversity in the BSAI is mainly due to the increase in pollock and is of the same order\nas changes seen when large pollock year-classes move through the system and the same as under Alternative\n1. Understanding of how this dominance might affect trophic guild members that might compete for prey with\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.9-36","pollock is still not completely understood. Alternative 2.2 would be neutral (e.g., +0) with respect to\ninfluencing trophic diversity above levels observed in natural systems.\nGenetic diversity could increase under Alternative 2.2 if older, more heterozygous individuals were left in the\npopulations of cod, pollock, and Atka mackerel. Also, protection of spawning aggregations of these species\nunder Alternative 2.2 would also tend to increase protection over Alternative 1 of genetic diversity that might\nbe due to differences among spawning subgroups. Thus, Alternative 2.2 is given a rank of +1 with regard to\nprotecting genetic diversity relative to status quo.\nAlternative 3\nAlternative 3 would provide increased protection to target species with regard to potential for overfishing.\nTherefore, at the species level, it ranks higher than Alternative 1 with regard to protection of species diversity.\nBecause these policies are applied to many target species, Alternative 3 is given a rank of +2 relative to\nAlternative 1.\nTrophic level of the total groundfish biomass shows virtually no change from Alternative 1 level in 2005. This\nis an indication that functional (trophic) species composition of the groundfish community would not change\nappreciably from Alternative 1. Increased energy flow at higher trophic levels that would increase the food\nchain length and increase the life span of organisms (both of which would occur to some extent through the\nshift in long-term equilibrium age structure toward older fish) would be indicators of a less stressed, more\nmature ecosystem (Odum 1985). However, the 3 percent increase in pollock (an r-selected species) under\nAlternative 3 relative to Alternative 1 would indicate a slight shift toward a faster-growing, less mature system.\nThe magnitude of change relative to changes observed due to environmentally driven changes in recruitment\nwould suggest that there would not likely be a large ecosystem impact in this regard from Alternative 3. It thus\nscores a +0 relative to Alternative 1 with respect to protection of functional diversity.\nGenetic diversity would be further protected under Alternative 3 relative to Alternative 1 through its policy of\nclosing a certain proportion of spawning areas to fishing, which would tend to protect spawning subgroups and\npartly protect larger, more heterozygous individuals. For this reason, we gave Alternative 3 a +1 for this metric.\nAlternatives 4.1 and 4.2\nAlternatives 4.1 and 4.2 would potentially provide increased protection of species diversity over Alternative\n1 by protecting many non-target species, such as skates, that could be vulnerable to unmeasured but high\nexploitation rates. Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 rank +2 relative to Alternative 1 with respect to providing extra\nprotection for species diversity.\nTrophic guild diversity would decline somewhat relative to Alternative 1 for the pollock trophic guild due to\nthe increase in pollock biomass in Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 in the BSAI. However, these alternatives have the\npotential to protect trophic guild diversity for many groups that are not measured in the indices of Table 4.9-2.\nSuch species as skates, grenadiers, sculpins, and sharks fill many different trophic roles and belong to several\ntrophic guilds. Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 would provide additional protection to many of these groups, thus they\nreceived a +1 score with respect to providing additional protection to trophic guild diversity relative to\nAlternative 1.\nSquid closures might provide some additional protection to genetic diversity for larger, more heterozygous or\nspawning subgroups of squid relative to Alternative 1 (e.g., +1).\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-37","Alternative 5\nAlternative 5 could potentially provide some unknown increase in species level diversity over Alternative 1\nthrough protection of many benthic invertebrate species that could be vulnerable to high, unmeasured levels\nof mortality through gear impacts (e.g., gorgonian corals). It thus ranks +2 relative to Alternative 1 with\nrespect to protection of species diversity.\nNo changes in trophic guild diversity that contain dominant groundfish species would be anticipated under\nAlternative 5. However, Alternative 5 would provide additional protection to benthic trophic guilds that supply\nprey to many groundfish species. It thus would provide some additional protection relative to Alternative 1\nin this regard, SO it receives a score of +1.\nNo additional protection for genetic diversity of groundfish would be expected under Alternative 5 (e.g., +0).\nAlternative 6.1\nAlternative 6.1 would provide no expected changes in species level, trophic guild, or genetic diversity over\nAlternative 1, therefore, Alternative 6.1 receives a neutral score (e.g., +0) for all three of these metrics.\nAlternative 6.2\nAlternative 6.2 could induce some unknown level of decline in species diversity over Alternative 1 through\nincreased catch levels of target species. These increased catch levels could reduce protection of endangered\nspecies that rely on those species for prey. Increased bycatch of sensitive species such as skates, grenadiers,\nand sharks would occur along with increased mortality of benthic invertebrates such as corals, sponges,\nanemones, sea pens, and sea whips. Alternative 6.2 is given a score of -2 because it would reduce protection\nto many species.\nLittle change is seen in functional diversity under Alternative 6.2 relative to Alternative 1 (e.g., +0).\nAlternative 6.2 would provide less protection to genetic diversity because it would possibly increase fishing\nintensity on spawning aggregations and on larger, more heterozygous fish. Thus, it is given a score of-1.\n4.9.3\nSummary of Effects\n4.9.3.1\nEcosystem-level Ecological Impacts\nThree main factors were evaluated from an ecological perspective at the ecosystem level to examine the\necosystem effects of the alternatives. Indexes or measures that relate to possible changes in predator-prey\nrelationships, energy flow and balance, and various types of diversity were used in the evaluation (Table 4.9-3).\nEvaluation of Alternative 1 impacts with respect to these measures does not show any large negative impacts\nalthough a few were conditionally significant adverse (spatial and temporal prey removals, introduction of\nnonnative species, and species diversity) due to more complete knowledge of these effects (Table 4.9-4). Each\nalternative is ranked with respect to whether it would provide more or less protection relative to Alternative\n1 using these measures (Table 4.9-4).\nFour main issues are examined under the effects on predator-prey relationship: pelagic forage availability,\nspatial and temporal concentration of fishery on forage, removal of top predators (fishing down the food web),\nand introduction of nonnative species. The biomass of pollock (a key pelagic forage species) in the groundfish\nbiomass is expected to increase 12 percent and 47 percent in the BSAI and GOA, respectively in the short term.\nThus, significant positive impacts were observed in pelagic forage availability due to the increases in pollock\nabundance predicted to occur from 2001 to 2005 under Alternative 1. However, the spatial and temporal\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-38","concentration of fisheries had a conditionally significant adverse impact on prey availability because there was\nnot sufficient time to evaluate the effectiveness of the present mitigation scheme for reducing fishery impacts\nin this regard. Fisheries in these areas have not traditionally focused on top level predators but have been more\nfocused on mixed fish and invertebrate feeders such as pollock and cod. Thus, there has not been evidence of\nfishing down the food web that has been seen in some highly exploited systems. Removal of top predators was\nthus determined to be insignificant. Although a recent report on species introductions in Port Valdez and Prince\nWilliam Sound relative to oil tankers has shown that some nonnative species introductions have occurred,\npossibly through introduction on vessel hulls or from vessel ballast water, no particular vessel type has been\nimplicated. Most introductions have been in shallow water and estuarine areas. So far impacts from these\nintroductions have not been observed in Alaskan waters, but they could potentially produce large-scale changes\nin predator-prey interactions and species composition and are thus judged to be a conditionally significant\nadverse impact.\nAlternatives 2.1 and 2.2 provide some of the highest measures of increased protection with respect to predator-\nprey relationships because of their focus on pollock and Atka mackerel. These species are important prey, not\nonly for Steller sea lions but to many other species as well. That is the main reason Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2\nwould perform well at an ecosystem level. Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 were next in providing increased protection.\nThese alternative would perform well because of their focus on providing increased protection to squid as an\nimportant forage. Alternatives 4.1 4.2 and 5 also reduce spatial and temporal concentrations on forage relative\nto Alternative 1, would provide policies to increase management of top level predators such as sharks, and\nwould likely reduce fishing effort SO that the possibility of introducing nonnative species from fishing vessel\nhulls and ballast waters would be reduced.\nAlternative 5 would increase Atka mackerel prey availability in the Aleutian Islands, provide increased spatial\nrefuges from fishing without increasing fishing effort outside refuges, and provide some possible decrease in\nfishing effort to reduce nonnative species introductions.\nAlternative 6.1 would perform well in terms of reducing spatial and temporal concentrations of fishery on\nforage. Alternative 6.1 reduces the race for fish, which tends to concentrate fisheries in time. Fishermen also\nhave the opportunity to increase their search for fish outside their normal fishing areas as the race for fish is\neliminated. Alternative 6.1 would not provide any additional protection to pelagic forage availability, removal\nof top predators, or introduction of nonnative species.\nAlternative 3 would increase forage availability relative to Alternative 1. Alternative 3 reductions in total catch\nbiomass of 10 percent or greater would reduce the possibility of nonnative species introductions. However,\nit received a negative score on temporal and spatial reduction of forage because it did not reduce total catch\nwhen closed areas were specified. This practice might tend to increase spatial and temporal concentrations of\nfisheries on forage in open areas.\nAlternative 6.2 would decrease forage abundance by increasing catch of forage species, which would also tend\nto produce increases in spatial and temporal reduction in forage availability. Alternative 6.2 is neutral with\nrespect to removal of top predators, but the increased effort likely to occur with increased catches would\nincrease probabilities of introduction of nonnative species.\nThe main measures relating ecosystem level impacts on energy flow and balance related to the total catch level\n(a measure of energy removal) and total discard level (a measure of energy redirection because discards may\nbe consumed by different species in the ecosystem than if they had not been discarded). Alternative 1 levels\nof energy removals in the form of catch would be only about 1 percent of the estimated total ecosystem biomass\nand would produce an insignificant impact on this basis. Discards are projected to decrease by about 28\npercent over the next five years under Alternative 1. Discards also would be about 1 percent of the natural\nlevels of dead organic material already going to the bottom and no scavenger population would increase related\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-39","to changes in discards levels in the BSAI or GOA under Alternative 1. Thus, discards would produce no\nsignificant impact on the ecosystem under Alternative 1.\nAlternatives 2.1 and 2.2 would provide additional protection over Alternative 1 with respect to energy removal\nand discards. Measures primarily because of their reduction in pollock and Atka mackerel catch. Pollock\ncatch tends to dominate the total catch biomass, particularly in the eastern Bering Sea. Even though discard\nrates in the pollock fishery tend to be low as a proportion of catch, the discards are still a large proportion of\nthe total discards. Policies that tend to reduce catch of pollock will also tend to reduce total discards.\nAlternative 3 would provide extra protection to energy removals in the system by reducing total catch biomass\nby 10 percent or greater. Discards would not decrease as much under Alternative 3 compared to Alternatives\n2.1 and 2.2 because catch reductions would be spread over a broader spectrum of species. Both target species\nand nontarget species would be neutral with respect to energy redirection (discard) amounts. Although the\nmain measure of energy redirection, total discards, would not change much under Alternative 4, it still received\na positive score with respect to improvement in energy redirection over Alternative 1. The positive score is\nbecause it would reduce an unmeasured source of energy redirection: bottom prey exposed by trawls and eaten\nby scavenging benthic organisms. Alternative 6.1 would be neutral with respect to energy removal in the form\nof total catch, but it received a negative score, -2, because it would remove the improved retention and\nutilization requirements of groundfish that are part of Alternative 1. Alternative 6.2 received the largest\nnegative scores, -2, on both energy removal and redirection because it would increase both catch and discards\nto levels 10 percent greater than those observed under Alternative\n1.\nThree main aspects of diversity are considered in this evaluation: species diversity (number of species),\nfunctional or trophic diversity (the diversity of biomass in a trophic grouping of species), and genetic diversity\n(genetic diversity within species). Although no fishing-induced extinctions have been documented in the last\n30 years or so, taxonomic work on some fish species (e.g., skates) is still ongoing and little survey and\nsystematic work is being done on other ecosystem components such as benthic invertebrates that could be\nimpacted by fishing activities. Until some of these survey and taxonomic problems are resolved, it is not\npossible to fully assess the impacts of Alternative 1 on species level diversity. However, given the sensitive\nnature of some species considered (i.e, long-lived or low reproductive potential species such as skates, shark,\nand grenadiers), and the evidence of extinction of related species in the Atlantic Ocean, this could be a\nconditionally significant adverse impact on the environment under Alternative 1. Trophic guild diversity\nchanges observed under Alternative 1 mostly would be related to recruitment changes of a dominant guild\nmember and not fishing. There would appear to be no fishing-induced changes in functional diversity.\nTherefore, this is considered to be an insignificant impact on the environment under Alternative 1. Genetic\ndiversity changes were not assessed for Alternative 1. Heavy exploitation of certain spawning aggregations\nand heavier exploitation on older, more heterozygous individuals would have the tendency to reduce genetic\ndiversity in fished versus unfished systems. Thus, some change in genetic diversity has possibly occurred in\nthe BSAI and GOA but the magnitude of the impacts are not known. Research on genetic diversity changes\nin more heavily exploited areas suggests the impacts might be minimal. Thus, this was considered an\ninsignificant impact on the status quo environment.\nTarget species, non-target species, and habitat alternatives (e.g., Alternatives 3, 4.1, 4.2, and 5) would all\nprovide much more protection by species-level diversity relative to Alternative 1 by providing additional\nprotection to harvesting many different species. Marine mammal and seabird alternatives (2.1 and 2.2) would\nprovide additional protection primarily to two endangered species, Steller sea lions and short-tailed albatross.\nAlternative 6.1 would provide no additional protection relative to Alternative 1 with respect to species diversity.\nAdditional protection to functional diversity would be provided mainly under the non-target species and habitat\nalternatives (4 and 5). These alternatives protect trophic guild diversity for many members of trophic guilds\npresently not measured quantitatively, such as skates and sculpins (members of the benthic fish and invertebrate\nfeeding group), sharks (member of the pelagic fish feeding guild), and sessile benthic filter-feeding invertebrate.\nGenetic diversity would be further protected by alternatives that reduce fishing on spawning aggregations or\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-40","fishing on larger, faster growing fish. Alternatives 2 (2.1 and 2.2) and 4 (4.1 and 4.2) all rank positively in\nthis regard. Alternative 6.2 received negative scores on both species diversity and genetic diversity.\nOverall, most alternatives scored either neutral (socioeconomic Alternative 6.1) or positive with respect to\nproviding additional protection to the ecosystem based on these ecosystem-level ecological measures.\nAlternatives 2.1, 2.2 and 4.2 had many high positive ranks, but Alternative 4.1 also had many positive scores.\nThese latter alternatives performed better than Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 with respect to diversity. Alternative\n6.2 was the only alternative to receive mostly negative scores. Each other alternative targeted a certain group\nof species in diversity protection. Best protection of diversity would likely result from using a mixture of\nalternatives. No alternative obtained a dominance of the highest possible score of two. Achieving the highest\necosystem-level protection may involve combining policy objectives of a variety of alternatives.\nEcosystem-Based Management Objectives\n4.9.3.2\nAnalysis of the alternatives with respect to how well they would meet the objectives of ecosystem-based\nmanagement provides another means of evaluating ecosystem-level performance. The NRC report, Sustaining\nMarine Fisheries (NRC 1999), recommended improvements in eight categories of ecosystem-based\nmanagement in order to achieve sustainable fisheries. These recommendations are to (1) adopt conservative\nharvest levels for single-species fisheries, (2) incorporate ecosystem considerations into fishery management\ndecisions, (3) adopt a precautionary approach to deal with uncertainty, (4) reduce excess fishing capacity and\nassign fishing rights, (5) establish marine protected areas as a buffer for uncertainty, (6) include bycatch\nmortality in TAC accounting, (7) develop institutions to achieve goals, and (8) conduct more research on\nstructure and function of marine ecosystems. The status quo ecosystem-based fishery management regime is\nreviewed and each alternative is evaluated and compared to Alternative 1 (Tables 4.9-5 and 4.9-6). Detailed\ninformation on each alternative is found in the individual alternative impacts sections. However, this section\nsummarizes in a broad sense how each alternative performs with respect to these ecosystem-based management\ngoals.\nAlternative 1 would make many improvements in meeting each ecosystem-based management objective.\nConservative single-species management is the cornerstone of ecosystem-based management in the BSAI and\nGOA. No fish stocks have been deemed overfished, the intended catch is well below the absolute catch limit,\nharvest rate specifications are more conservative for some management tiers when less information is available,\nharvest rates are reduced at lower than average stock size levels to allow rebuilding, OY limits add additional\nprecaution, and observer catch monitoring allows catches to stay within specified levels. However, additional\ninformation on target and non-target species could provide substantial improvements to conservative single-\nspecies management. Better knowledge of spatial/temporal distribution of stocks could help prevent localized\nstock depletion. More information on species-specific fish stock abundance and life history characteristics\nwould help define overfishing levels for stocks for which those levels have not yet been defined. Incorporating\nuncertainty into assessment procedures would also lead to more conservative harvest levels. Some alternatives\noffer improvements to conservative single-species harvest levels. Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 offer increased\nconservatism in the harvest of a few species (pollock, cod, and Atka mackerel). Alternative 5 also offers more\nconservatism to the harvest of some species (flatfish and Atka mackerel). Alternatives 3, 4.1 and 4.2 add\nadditional conservatism to broad groups of species, while Alternative 6.1 would maintain the status quo in this\nregard. Alternative 6.2 offers a less conservative single-species management.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-41","Table 4.9-5\nScoring System for Ranking How Well Each Alternative Achieves Ecosystem-Based\nManagement Goals\nScore\nGoal\n-2\n-1\n+0\n+1\n+2\nConservative\nLess conservative\nLess conservative\nContinue\nAdds more\nAdds more\nsingle species\nharvest levels for\nharvest levels\npresent policy\nconservatism\nconservatism to\nharvest levels\nmany species\nfor some species\nto harvest\nharvest levels\nlevels of some\nof many\nspecies\nspecies\nIncorporate\nConsideration of\nConsideration of\nPresent\nConsideration\nConsideration\necosystem\necosystem\necosystem\nconsideration\nof ecosystem\nof ecosystem\nconsiderations\nfactors in much\nfactors in fewer\nof ecosystem\nfactors in\nfactors in many\ninto fishery\nfewer\nmanagement\nfactors\nmore decisions\nmore\nmanagement\nmanagement\ndecisions\ndecisions\ndecisions\ndecisions\nPrecautionary\nLess precaution\nLess precaution\nPresent level\nAdds more\nAdds more\napproach to\nto many more\nto some more\nof precaution\nprecaution to\nprecaution to\ndeal with\nspecies/decisions\nspecies/decisions\nsome more\nmany more\nuncertainty\nspecies/decisi\nspecies/decisio\nons\nns\nReduce excess\nCreates large\nCreates some\nPresent level\nMore control\nMore control of\nfishing capacity\nexcess capacity\nexcess capacity\nof fishing\nof fishing\nfishing capacity\nand assign\nor loss of fishing\nor loss of fishing\ncapacity\ncapacity and\nand rights\nfishing rights\nrights in many\nrights in some\ncontrol and\ngreater rights\nassignment to\nfisheries\nfisheries\nassignment of\nassignment to\nmany fisheries\nfishing rights\nsome fisheries\nEstablish\nMuch less area\nSome less area\nPresent level\nSome more\nMany more\nmarine\nprotected\nprotected\nof marine\nmarine\nmarine\nprotected areas\nprotected\nprotected\nprotected areas\nareas\nareas\nInclude bycatch\nIgnore bycatch\nIgnore bycatch\nPresent level\nIncreased\nIncreased level\nmortality into\nmortality in TAC\nmortality in TAC\nof inclusion of\nlevel of of\nof bycatch\nTAC\naccounting for\naccounting in\nbycatch\nbycatch\nmortality in\naccounting\nmany species\nsome species\nmortality in\nmortality in\nTAC\nTAC\nTAC\naccounting for\naccounting\naccounting for\nmany species\nsome species\nDevelop\nRemoval of\nRemoval of\nPresent\nCreation of\nCreation of\ninstitutions to\ninstitutions to\ninstitutions to\ninstitutional\nnew/revised\nnew/revised\nachieve goals\nachieve many\nachieve some\nstructure\ninstitutions to\ninstitutions to\ngoals\ngoals\nachieve goals\nachieve many\ngoals\nConduct more\nLess research on\nLess research on\nExisting level\nMore research\nMore research\nresearch on\nand direction\nmany\nsome\non some\non many\nstructure and\ncomponents\ncomponents\nof research\ncomponents\ncomponents\nfunction of\nmarine\necosystems\nNotes: TAC - total allowable catch\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-42","aThe index values contained in this table only contain ordinal information and can only be used to make ordinal comparisons. For example, an index value\nof +2 is better than a value of +1, but a +2 is not necessarily twice as good or twice as large as a +1. Therefore, it is not possible to obtain meaningful\nJANUARY 2001\nsummary information by performing numerical operations (e.g., add or subtract index values or calculate their ratios) using two or more of the index values.\n6.2\n-2\n-2\n-1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n1\nTable 4.9-6 Scores for Each Alternatives Relative Level of Achieving Ecosystem-Based Management Goals\n6.1\n0\n0\n2\n0\n2\n2\n1\n1\n2\n0\n2\n0\n0\n2\n1\n1\n5\n4.1 and\n4.2\n2\n0\n2\n2\n0\n2\n-1\n1\nAlternative\n-1\n2\n0\n2\n2\n0\n0\n1\n3\n2.2\n-2\n0\n0\n0\n0\n1\n1\n1\n2\n4.9-43\n2.1\n-1\n2\n0\n0\n1\n1\n1\n1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n1\nConduct more research on structure and function of\nReduce excess fishing capacity and assign fishing\nIncorporate ecosystem considerations into fishery\nPrecautionary approach to deal with uncertainty\nInclude bycatch mortality into TAC accounting\nConservative single-species harvest levels\nEcosystem-Based Management Goal\nDevelop institutions to achieve goals\nTAC - total allowable catch\nEstablish marine protected areas\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nmarine ecosystems\nmanagement\nrights\nNotes:","Incorporating ecosystem considerations into fishery management means taking account of known and probable\ngoods and services of marine ecosystems that are potentially jeopardized by fishing. These considerations\ninclude provision of prey and other habitat aspects to ecosystem components and protecting energy flow and\nredirection. The status quo regime has taken into account marine mammal critical habitat by reducing mammal\nprey harvest levels inside these areas. Forage fish species have been protected by provisions that prevent new\nfisheries starting on those species. Habitat protection of various ecosystem components such as sea lions,\nherring, and crab has been provided by time and area closures. Fishery discards have been reduced\nsubstantially by the improved retention and utilization requirements and prevent energy redirection in these\necosystems. However, better understanding prey requirements of protected species and habitat requirements\nof fish could lead to improved ecosystem-based management. Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 would provide\nadditional protection to sea lion prey. Alternative 5 would further protect benthic fish habitat and particularly\ngorgonian coral areas. Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 would provide extra protection to squid as prey and many other\necosystem components. In rights-based management proposed under Alternative 6.1, users would be held\naccountable for resources they use and the costs, including environmental costs, they impose. Thus, Alternative\n6.1 would internalize ecosystem considerations rather than considering them as an externality as Alternative\n1 does. Alternative 6.2 would provide less protection to prey and energy removal and redirection.\nThe precautionary approach to deal with uncertainty means providing a way to take into account the incomplete\nunderstanding of and ability to predict fish population dynamics, interactions among species, effects of\nenvironmental factors on fish population, and effects of human actions. A variety of steps would be taken in\nthe BSAI and GOA Groundfish FMPs (Alternative 1) to provide additional precaution in the face of\nuncertainty. The most visible means is the tier system of setting ABCs of fish based on information availability\nof population dynamics parameters. As mentioned above in ecosystem considerations, forage fish protection\nand protection of sea lion critical habitat are other examples of precaution in the face of uncertainty. Virtually\nall the alternatives provide additional ways to deal with uncertainty to provide improvements over the status\nquo regime. Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 would provide further precaution in dealing with uncertainty about effects\nof fishing removals of Steller sea lion prey. Alternative 3 would provide additional precaution by explicit\nconsideration of uncertainty in survey estimates of many groundfish species. Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 would\nprovide additional precaution by imposing management rules on a large group of non-target fish species for\nwhich complete information about abundance or species-specific catch rates is lacking. Alternative 5 would\nprovide additional precaution about the uncertainty of effects of fishing on benthic habitat and corals by setting\nareas aside for protection and switching to alternative gear types. Additional precaution under Alternative 6.1\nwould impose rights-based management. Alternative 6.1 not only would provide additional precaution by its\nsystem of holding users accountable and imposing monitoring to ensure that accountability, it would also\nprovide a system with more rapid response to observed changes than the present system, which relies on the\ntime-consuming process of regulatory amendments. Alternative 6.2 would remove precaution by advocating\nfishing rates for some species up to the overfishing level.\nReducing excess fishing capacity and assignment of fishing rights is recognized as a primary means of reducing\npressure to overfished stocks. The status quo regime has imposed a moratorium on new vessel entry into the\nfederally managed groundfish and crab fisheries. A license limitation program for these vessels was\nimplemented on January 1, 2000, which replaces this moratorium. Sablefish and halibut IFQ programs have\nreduced overcapacity in those fisheries, as has the recently implemented American Fisheries Act, which reduces\nharvesting capacity in the BSAI pollock fishery. These programs could be more broadly applied than in the\npresent fishery management regime. The only alternative that would provide additional control of excess\ncapacity and assignment of fishing rights is Alternative 6, which explicitly proposes to extend assignment of\nfishing rights to all target groundfish and prohibited species category fisheries. The other alternatives, which\npropose to reduce TAC in fisheries, would result in an increase in excess fishery capacity, at least in the short\nterm. Alternative 6.2 might reduce excess fishery capacity in the short term through its policy of TAC\nincreases.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-44","Establishment of marine protected areas, where fishing is prohibited, is one means of protecting and rebuilding\necosystems and populations of marine species. As such, it should be considered as one of the tools of\necosystem-based management and not the sole tool. Areas of the Bering Sea that are closed to year-round\ntrawling encompass 25 percent of the Bering Sea shelf areas where most fishing presently occurs and GOA\nclosed areas now encompass about 10 percent of the trawlable shelf area. Evaluation of the areas now\nprotected and development of strategic goals for habitat protection by area need to be performed to make\nimprovements beyond the status quo regime. The alternatives offer some suggestions for more optimal habitat\nprotection beyond the status quo regime. Alternative 2.1 proposes much extended marine protected areas,\nwhere fishing for pollock, cod, and Atka mackerel would be prohibited, while Alternative 2.2 proposes no new\nprotected areas. Alternative 3 would close 20 percent of all management areas year-round fishing, thus\nproviding, a much greater amount of protected area relative to Alternative 1. Alternative 5 would also close\nlarge areas to bottom trawling in order to provide additional protection to benthic habitat and close some areas\nto all fishing in order to protect gorgonian corals. Alternatives 4.1 and 4.2 would establish additional areas for\nprotection in the form of squid protection areas along the outer shelf of the BSAI. Alternatives 6.1 and 6.2\nwould provide no additional marine protected areas.\nExplicit accounting of bycatch and discards in the assessment of fishing mortality on species is an important\necosystem-based management action. Methods and gears to reduce bycatch should also be encouraged. The\nstatus quo management regime has instituted many controls and accounting systems for bycatch and discards.\nBycatch limits have been developed for prohibited species categories and groundfish fisheries are stopped when\nthese limits have been reached. Target species discards are explicitly counted and added into landed catches\nin assessment of fishing mortality for groundfish. Improved retention and utilization regulations have also\nreduced the amount of pollock and cod that are discarded, and flatfish retention will be mandated in 2003.\nOnly two alternatives have the potential to provide additional inclusion of bycatch mortality in TAC\naccounting. Alternative 4.1 and 4.2 would add TAC setting and associated inclusion of bycatch into TAC\nsetting for species that are presently not targets of groundfish fisheries. Alternative 6.1, by virtue of its rights-\nbased management that holds users accountable for the resources they use and mandates a monitoring system\nto account for that use, would also provide additional accounting of bycatch mortality in TAC setting.\nDeveloping institutions to achieve ecosystem-based management goals is also important. Institutions should\nincorporate diverse views and institutional structures should be developed that promote reduction of excess\ncapacity, sustainable catches of target species, expansion of fishery management to include all sources of\nenvironmental degradation, consideration of ecosystem effects of fishing, effective monitoring and enforcement,\nand collection of important data. The status quo regime is characterized by the Council's structure and\nassociated groups. The Council has diverse representation and numerous committees that represent natural\nresource agencies, industry, fishing communities, environmental organizations, recreational fishermen, and\nacademia. Alternative 6.1 is the only alternative that would add organizational structure through its\nimplementation of rights-based management.\nExplicit accounting of bycatch and discards in the assessment of fishing mortality on species is an important\necosystem-based management action. Methods and gears to reduce bycatch should also be encouraged. The\nstatus quo management regime has instituted many controls and accounting systems for bycatch and discards.\nBycatch limits have been developed for prohibited species categories and groundfish fisheries are stopped when\nthese limits have been reached. Target species discards are explicitly counted and added into landed catches\nin assessment of fishing mortality for groundfish. Improved retention and utilization regulations have also\nreduced the amount of pollock and cod that are discarded, and flatfish retention will be mandated in 2003.\nOnly two alternatives have the potential to provide additional inclusion of bycatch mortality in TAC\naccounting. Alternative 4.1 and 4.2 would add TAC setting and associated inclusion of bycatch into TAC\nsetting for species that are presently not targets of groundfish fisheries. Alternative 6.1, by virtue of its rights-\nbased management that holds users accountable for the resources they use and mandates a monitoring system\nto account for that use, would also provide additional accounting of bycatch mortality in TAC setting.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-45","Developing institutions to achieve ecosystem-based management goals is also important. Institutions should\nincorporate diverse views and institutional structures should be developed that promote reduction of excess\ncapacity, sustainable catches of target species, expansion of fishery management to include all sources of\nenvironmental degradation, consideration of ecosystem effects of fishing, effective monitoring and enforcement,\nand collection of important data. The status quo regime is characterized by the Council's structure and\nassociated groups. The Council has diverse representation and numerous committees that represent natural\nresource agencies, industry, fishing communities, environmental organizations, recreational fishermen, and\nacademia. Alternative 6.1 is the only alternative that would add organizational structure through its\nimplementation of rights-based management.\nResearch on the structure and function of ecosystems, long-term research and monitoring, a variety of modeling\nefforts, biological effects of fishing, effectiveness of MPAs, and effectiveness of various forms of rights-based\nmanagement would all be required to effectively implement ecosystem-based management. Although research\nis ongoing with respect to all of these categories, implementing the additional protection proposed in many of\nthe alternatives would require much more additional research. Setting appropriate boundaries for Steller sea\nlion conservation would require additional research on Steller sea lion foraging needs and target species\nseasonal movements. Target species require more accurate determination of critical life history parameters and\nsurvey estimates. Non-target species need much more work on taxonomy and life history characteristics and\ndistribution. Implementation of optimal areas for fish habitat protection would require long-term research on\nthe effectiveness of MPAs. Finally, implementing rights-based management would require additional\ninformation on the effects and effectiveness of various forms of rights-based management.\nOverall, the alternatives would perform positively with respect to providing additional ways to move toward\necosystem-based management. Alternative 6.1 had many high scores and non-target species and habitat also\nseveral high positive scores. Alternative 2.1 and Alternative 3 follow. Alternative 2.2 would not perform much\nabove the status quo because it does not explicitly establish marine protected areas and would cause the largest\nshort-term increases in excess capacity. As mentioned earlier, some alternatives have competing objectives\n(e.g, TAC reduction and excess capacity reductions), and some alternatives perform better on particular\nobjective than others. Alternative 6.2 receives several negative scores. Ultimately, achieving an ecosystem-\nbased management regime that best meets all eight goals examined here will be met through a combination of\nfeatures of each individual alternative, which were designed to delineate and sharply define specific issues.\nEcosystem-based management is a regime that involves a combination of a broad set of issues from single-\nspecies management, to ecosystem considerations, and finally to economic concerns and the role of humans in\nthese ecosystems.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.9-46","Effects of the Alternatives on Management and Enforcement\n4.10\n4.10.1\nAlternative 1\nThis section provides information about the effects of the alternatives on management and enforcement for the\ngroundfish fisheries off Alaska. For this discussion, management and enforcement responsibilities under the\nstatus quo include the following:\nData collection, research, and analysis to prepare annual stock assessments;\nThe annual groundfish specifications process through which total allowable catch limits and prohibited\nspecies catch limits are established;\nThe ongoing process of amending the fishery management plans (FMPs) and regulations to implement\nfishery management measures recommended by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (the\nCouncil) or National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS);\nMonitoring of commercial fishing activities to estimate the total catch of each species and to ensure\ncompliance with fishery laws and regulations;\nActions to close commercial fisheries once catch limits have been reached; and\nActions taken by NMFS Enforcement, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and National Oceanic and\nAtmospheric Administration (NOAA) General Counsel to identify, educate, and, in some cases,\npenalize people who violate the laws and regulations governing the groundfish fisheries.\nManagement of the groundfish fisheries in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) and Gulf of Alaska\n(GOA) and enforcement of management measures governing those fisheries comprise a complex system for\noverseeing fisheries that range geographically over an extensive area of the North Pacific Ocean and Bering\nSea. Management of these fisheries is more fully described in Section 2.7.8.4.\nNMFS manages the fisheries off Alaska based on total allowable catch (TAC) amounts for target species and\nprohibited species catch (PSC) amounts for species that may not be retained. The TAC and PSC amounts are\nfurther subdivided by gear type, area, and season. As the complexity of the management regime has grown,\nthe number of TAC and PSC subdivisions has grown as well. For example, in 1995 for the BSAI there were\n40 TAC allocations, 38 PSC allocations and 2 community development quota (CDQ) allocations. In 1999 for\nthe BSAI, there were 79 TAC allocations, 54 PSC allocations, and 29 CDQ allocations. Each allocation\nrepresents a possible need for NMFS to take management actions, such as closing fisheries, reallocating\nbycatch amounts, or investigating overages. When a directed fishery in one area is closed, the boats that\nparticipated in the fishery often move to another area or change to another target. This, in turn, often leads to\nthe need for additional management actions. Though the number of allocations has increased, the quantity of\nfish available for these allocations has not, and NMFS is required to manage increasingly small blocks of fish.\nTo do this adequately requires the use of increasingly sophisticated catch-monitoring tools, such as observer\ncoverage, electronic reporting, vessel monitoring systems (VMS), and the use of at-sea scales. Though these\ntools increase the quantity, quality, and timeliness of the data available to NMFS management, they also\nincrease the demands on staff to effectively make use of a larger and more complex data system.\nStatus quo fishery management recognizes that a meaningful enforcement program must accompany\nmanagement measures for them to be effective. As management becomes more complex, the difficulty of\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.10-1","adequately enforcing the regulations grows. As the size and complexity of the regulatory environment\nincreases, the burden on enforcement personnel to fully understand the nuances and implications of regulations\nincreases as well. NMFS/Alaska Region enforcement maintains approximately 20 agents and officers stationed\nin nine Alaskan ports for monitoring groundfish landings: Juneau, Anchorage, Dutch Harbor, Homer,\nKetchikan, Kodiak, Petersburg, Seward, and Sitka. In addition, enforcement personnel regularly travel to other\nAlaskan ports to monitor landings and conduct investigations. Enforcement personnel associated with NMFS\nNorthwest Region assist in the monitoring of Alaska Region groundfish harvest, primarily individual fishing\nquota (IFQ) sablefish, landed at ports in the Northwest Region. USCG personnel also conduct enforcement\nactivities, monitor vessel activity, conduct at-sea boardings, and aircraft overflights and assist NMFS\nEnforcement personnel in monitoring dockside landings.\nA key component of management and enforcement is education and outreach. Complex management programs\nare accompanied by a regulatory structure that can be difficult for the fishing industry to understand and\ncomply with. This is exacerbated when regulations change rapidly. When fishermen believe that regulations\nare unduly burdensome or unnecessary, they are less likely to comply voluntarily. Thus, successful\nimplementation of the regulations is dependent on outreach programs that explain the goal of regulations and\nwhy they are necessary. NMFS Management, NMFS Enforcement, and the USCG all conduct extensive\noutreach and education programs that seek not only to explain the regulations, but to help the fishing industry\nunderstand the rationale for those regulations.\nThe status quo management regime provides a buffer between TAC and overfishing level (OFL) for the target\nspecies. Fishery managers limit the catch of a particular species or group of species in directed fisheries and\nas bycatch to less than the TAC for that species or group of species. If, however, TAC is exceeded by small\namounts, the OFL is generally not reached for that particular species or group of species. Given the above as\na criteria for evaluating the impact of status quo management and enforcement programs, the current\nmanagement regime results in an insignificant impact on the human environment. This insignificant impact\nconclusion is not meant to imply that all harvest quotas are monitored precisely, or that all violations are\ndetected and prosecuted, but that the volume of quota overages that may be occurring under status quo\nmanagement is within the buffer between TAC and OFL built into the harvest management scenario.\n4.10.2\nBasis for Comparing the Effects of the Alternative\nSection 4.1 provides a detailed description of the management measures developed by agency analysts to\nillustrate methods for implementing the alternative. Most of these management measures are already used in\nsome form under the status quo regime, including (1) catch limits to control the amount of a species harvested\nin the commercial fisheries; (2) prohibiting of commercial fisheries in certain areas or during certain times of\nthe year (time and area closures); (3) regulations that limit or define the type of fishing gear that may be used\nor the manner in which the fishing gear may be used (gear restrictions or gear modifications); and (4) rights-\nbased fishing systems.\nTable 4.10-1 lists the major categories of recommended management measures and the alternatives under which\nthey are recommended. Further discussion of the specific management measures developed for each alternative,\nand an overview of effect on management and enforcement follow the table in Section 4.10.3.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.10-2","Primary Management Measures Suggested by National Marine Fisheries Service to\nTable 4.10-1\nImplement the Alternatives\nSuggested Management Measures\nAlternatives\nControl the harvest level by setting TACs, including measures to\n2, 3, 4, 5, 6.2\n- reduce TACs\n- specify TACs for different areas or seasons than currently specified\n- establish TACs for new species groups\n- establish daily catch limits under Alternative 2.1\n- establish catch limits in critical habitat under Alternatives 2.1 and\n2.2\n- set all TACs equal to OFLs under Alternative 6.2\nTime or area closures to protect marine mammals, groundfish target\n2, 3, 4, 5\nspecies, non-target species, or habitat\nGear restrictions or gear modifications\n2, 3, 4, 5\nGear allocations\n5\nLimit the development of new target fisheries; establish bycatch-only\n4\nfisheries; implement bycatch restrictions\nChanges to the North Pacific Groundfish Observer Program\n3,4,5,6\n- revise observer coverage levels\n- collect new data\nImprove recordkeeping, reporting, and data collection from industry\n3,4,6\n- collect new data\n- improve access to existing data\nUse experimental fishing permits to collect additional data\n4\nIncreased use of rights-based fishing systems\n6.1\nRemove all PSC limits\n6.2\nEach alternative is rated in terms of the complexity of enforcement and management effects relative to status\nquo using the following categories.\nSignificant Adverse (S-) The alternative is significantly more complex than the status quo because it\nwould implement new types of management measures or would significantly expand the use of existing\nmanagement measures. Additional analysis is needed to develop a specific implementation plan, however,\nit is likely that additional staff and budget would be necessary to manage and enforce the alternative.\nImplementation could not be accomplished by reassigning existing staff.\nConditionally Significant Negative (CS-) The alternative is somewhat more complex than status quo\nbecause it expands the use of existing management measures. Additional staff or budget may be desirable\nto successfully implement the alternative, but implementation also could be accomplished by reassigning\nor changing the priority of existing agency resources.\nInsignificant Impact (I) The alternative is not a significant change from the status quo. Additional staff\nand budget could improve management and enforcement capabilities, but current staff and budget levels\nprovide an acceptable level of management and enforcement.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.10-3","Conditionally Significant Positive (CS+) The alternative is less complex than status quo and could be\naccomplished with no increase in budget or staff. The alternative would reduce management and\nenforcement complexity and allow some budget and staff to be redirected to other management and\nenforcement priorities\nSignificant Positive (S+) The alternative is significantly less complex to implement than status quo.\nImplementation of the alternative would allow NMFS to reduce the staff and budget needed for\nmanagement and enforcement.\nUnknown (U) The effects of the alternative on the complexity of management and enforcement are\nunknown.\n4.10.3\nComparing Alternatives to the Status Quo\n4.10.3.1\nAlternative 2\nAlternative 2 would increase protection to marine mammals through one of two management approaches\ntermed \"low and slow\" (Alternative 2.1) or \"short bursts\" (Alternative 2.2). Alternative 2 also would increase\nprotection to seabirds using the same management measures under Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2. Alternative 2.1\nwould implement management measures to slow the pace of groundfish fisheries and spread the harvest over\na longer time period to prevent localized depletion of groundfish species important as prey for marine\nmammals. The following specific management measures are recommended in Section 4.1.1.8 under this\nalternative: (1) closure of critical habitat areas to directed fishing for certain groundfish species; (2) seasonal\nallocation of catch limits; (3) area allocation of catch limits based on species distribution in each season; (4)\nreduction of catch limits based on the distribution of the groundfish species closed areas; and (5) daily catch\nlimits for some species to ensure that the harvest is spread out evenly over the season.\nEstablishing TAC levels to control the total catch of a species or the time of year, length of season, or area that\nthe harvest may occur is one of the most important management measures currently used in the groundfish\nfisheries off Alaska. For most fisheries, once catch limits are established, NMFS is responsible for monitoring\ncommercial fishing activity by all vessel types, to estimate the amount of each species caught, and to know the\ndate and location of the catch. NMFS uses this information to limit or prohibit commercial fishing SO that the\ncatch limits are not exceeded. The ability of NMFS staff to select the appropriate date to close a fishery\ndepends on accurate, complete, and timely catch data. Much of these data are collected by NMFS-certified\nobservers or through industry reports.\nAlternative 2.1, and most of the other alternatives, would increase the number of individual catch limits NMFS\nmust manage, thereby increasing the need for accurate, complete, and timely catch data from fishermen in order\nto manage the commercial fisheries within catch limits. Obtaining the data necessary to manage current catch\nlimits, as well as additional catch limits recommended under all of the alternatives is particularly difficult for\nunobserved vessels or for vessels that do not have the capability to transmit observer data to NMFS.\nReassessment of agency priorities or additional staff resources may be necessary for data collection, research,\nand analysis to establish catch limits based on new criteria.\nClosures of areas or times to all fishing, or to vessels using fishing gear that can be easily identified can be\neffectively enforced using aerial or at-sea surveillance by the USCG or information supplied by observers on\nthe vessels. In addition, NMFS is working to incorporate vessel monitoring systems (VMS) into the catch\nmonitoring and enforcement programs for the groundfish fisheries.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.10-4","Closure of Steller sea lion critical habitat areas to directed fishing for certain species, such as pollock, Atka\nmackerel, or Pacific cod is more difficult to monitor and enforce than closure of areas to all vessels of a\nparticular gear type. Effective monitoring and enforcement requires assessment of the catch onboard the vessel\nto determine whether the vessel is complying with catch composition requirements associated with particular\ndirected fisheries.\nThe most challenging element of the recommended management measures under Alternative 2.1 for NMFS to\nimplement would be daily catch limits. The current procedure of issuing notices in the Federal Register to\nprohibit fishing once a catch limit is reached probably would not be effective because NMFS would not have\nenough time to evaluate catch data and issue Federal Register notices on a daily basis. NMFS would have\nto examine other methods to manage daily catch limits that probably would involve a combination of a limited\naccess system to identify eligible fishery participants, the ability to hold individual vessels or groups of vessels\nresponsible for maintaining catch below the daily limit, and the ability to penalize individuals if catch data later\nshowed that they exceeded the daily catch limits. Alternative 2.1 is rated as \"significant adverse\" primarily\non the basis of the complexity of implementing daily catch limits.\nAlternative 2.2 would implement management measures to limit the interaction of marine mammals with the\ncommercial fisheries by establishing a series of short, periodic fishery openings. The recommended\nmanagement measures in Section 4.1.1.9 for this alternative are (1) reduced catch limits for some groundfish\nspecies; (2) a series of short openings followed by long periods of no fishing; and (3) reduction in the closure\nareas outside of critical habitat relative to Alternative 1.\nThe primary management issue under Alternative 2.2 would be providing the staff resources necessary to\nprepare the analysis supporting revised catch limits and to manage the commercial fishery within established\ncatch limits. The short, periodic openings recommended under Alternative 2.2 probably would be less complex\nto manage and enforce than the daily catch limits recommended under Alternative 2.1.\nUnder Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2, the following management measures are recommended in Section 4.1.1.8 to\nincrease the protection of seabirds: (1) mandatory use of seabird scaring devices and gear handling protocols;\n(2) restrictions on offal discharge from the vessel; (3) reductions of incidental take limits for the endangered\nshort-tailed albatross; and (4) seabird bycatch limits for other seabird species, combined with a bycatch\nmonitoring program and a vessel incentive program to determine which vessels could continue to fish and which\nwould cease operations. The primary management and enforcement issues associated with the seabird\nprotection measures are providing the staff resources necessary to conduct the research to identify and evaluate\nappropriate gear modifications and the difficulty of enforcing restrictions on gear and fishing operations on\nunobserved vessels. In addition, the recommendation to develop bycatch limits, a bycatch monitoring program,\nand a vessel incentive program would require increases in observer coverage levels, possible changes in\nobserver duties, and increases in management and observer program staff involvement in the seabird protection\nprogram. Therefore, the seabird protection measures under Alternative 2.1 and Alternative 2.2 are rated\n\"significant adverse\" due to the increased complexity of management and enforcement.\nAlthough the marine mammal protection measures recommended under Alternative 2.2 are only somewhat more\ncomplex than Alternative 1, Alternative 2.2 also is rated as \"significant adverse\" due to the potential\nimplementation impacts of some of the seabird protection measures.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.10-5","4.10.3.2 Alternative 3\nAlternative 3 would implement management measures to increase protection of groundfish target species while\nproviding sustainable commercial fisheries. Specific management measures recommended in Section 4.1.2 to\nimplement this alternative include (1) setting of TACs at levels designed to protect the target species; (2) time\nand area closures to protect biologically critical life history stages or critical habitat, (3) gear restrictions to\nincrease the age at capture of the target species or to reduce bycatch of the species in other fisheries; (4)\nchanges to the distribution of observer coverage levels; and (5) improvements in reporting and availability to\nanalysts of catch location data provided by the fishing industry.\nAlternative 3 would require additional staff resources for the data collection, research, and analysis necessary\nto establish catch limits on a different basis than Alternative 1. In addition, as is the case for several of the\nother alternatives, enforcement of time and area closures that apply only to certain directed fisheries is more\ncomplex than closures to all fishing by certain gear types. Gear restrictions and modifications increase the need\nfor data collection, research, and analysis to identify and evaluate appropriate modifications and may require\nadditional resources to monitor and enforce. Changes to the data collected by the observer program require\nassessment of the impact of adding more duties for the observer. Finally, recommendations to use VMS,\ntogether with observer data or vessel logbook data, to increase the precision of catch location data would\nrequire management and enforcement staff resources for program development and maintenance. Alternative\n3 is rated as \"conditionally significant\" because it would somewhat increase the complexity of management\nand enforcement by expanding the use of existing management measures.\n4.10.3.3 Alternative 4\nAlternative 4 would implement management measures to increase protection of non-target species including\nnon-target groundfish species, prohibited species, and nonallocated species. Specific management measures\nrecommended in Section 4.1.3 to implement this alternative include (1) establishing catch limits and controlling\nthe level of harvest for individual non-target species; (2) limiting the development of directed fisheries for non-\ntarget species; (3) using time, area, and gear restrictions to protect certain habitat; and (4) using experimental\nfishing permits to collect additional data about non-target species. Placing a priority on catch limits for non-\ntarget species likely would result in directed fisheries for target species closing due to bycatch of non-target\nspecies before the target species catch limit was fully harvested.\nAlternative 4 is rated \"significant adverse\" because is would significantly increase the number of catch limits\nthat would have to be monitored and managed by NMFS, thereby increasing both management and enforcement\ncomplexity. In addition, because most non-target species currently are discarded at sea, this alternative would\nrely more heavily on data collected by observers for estimating catch and would increase the need to extrapolate\ndata from observed vessels to estimate at-sea discards by unobserved vessels. Additional agency resources also\nmay be needed for stock assessment (data collection, research, and analysis) to establish catch limits for species\nthat currently are not assessed and do not have catch limits.\n4.10.3.4 Alternative 5\nAlternative 5 would implement management measures to increase protection of fish habitat and marine\necosystems. Specific management measures recommended in Section 4.1.4 to implement this policy include\n(1) annual and seasonal catch limits; (2) increased allocations to fixed-gear; (3) gear restrictions and\nmodifications; (4) area closures or marine reserves to protect habitat; and (5) additions to the data collected\nby observers.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.10-6","All management and enforcement issues associated with Alternative 5 are similar to those already discussed\nfor the previous alternatives. Increases in the number of individual catch limits that must be managed by\nNMFS increases the need for accurate and timely data from fishing vessels and increases the complexity of\nmanagement and enforcement. Alternative 5 is rated \"significant adverse\" primarily because of the additional\nagency resources that will be needed for data collection, research, and analysis to identify critical or essential\nhabitat. Increasing the data collection requirements for observers requires assessment of the priority of these\ndata relative to other demands on the observers' time. Gear restrictions and modifications increase the need\nfor data collection, research, and analysis to identify and evaluate appropriate modifications and require\nadditional resources to monitor and enforce. Time and area closures to specific directed fisheries are more\ndifficult to manage and enforce than are closures to fishing by certain gear types or by all vessels.\n4.10.3.6 Alternative 6\nAlternative 6 would implement management measures to increase long-term socioeconomic benefits from the\ngroundfish fisheries. Alternative 6.1 would expand rights-based management measures, such as individual or\ngroup fishing quotas, to increase long-term net economic benefits. Alternative 6.2 would implement a\nsubstantially more aggressive harvest strategy for target species by setting all TACs equal to the OFL and\neliminating the optimum yield (OY) cap in the BSAI and all PSC limits.\nUnder Alternative 6.1, the primary management measures would be (1) individual or group quotas; (2)\nimproving existing catch monitoring programs; (3) collecting more socioeconomic data from the industry; and\n(4) eliminating retention and utilization requirements and the vessel incentive program. Section 4.1.5 contains\na lengthy discussion about many of the management issues related to the rights-based fishing systems currently\nin existence in the Alaska Region, including the IFQ and CDQ programs and fishing cooperatives established\nunder the American Act Fisheries (AFA). Each program was implemented together with existing traditional\nmanagement measures, such as overall catch limits, limits on seasons or areas, gear restrictions, and observer\nprograms. However, they also required implementation of additional administrative and catch monitoring\nregulations to manage and enforce programs based on the assignment of fishing rights to individuals or groups.\nIn some cases, such as the IFQ and CDQ programs, NMFS no longer manages the catch limits through\nclosures of directed fishing by a group of vessels once a catch limit is reached. Instead, catch limits are\nassigned to individuals or groups, who are required to provide accurate and timely reports of catch and to stop\nfishing once a catch limit is reached.\nRights-based systems present some potential difficulties and some advantages for fisheries managers. Because\nthey are likely to change the practices of harvesters (e.g., less emphasis on maximizing catch rates) they are\nlikely to lead to discontinuities in fishery-dependent data. Commercial catch per unit of effort (CPUE) is likely\nto change independent of stock sizes, and the relative catch rates of different species or cohorts may also\nchange. Any stock assessment models that rely on fishery-dependent data may require recalibration. However,\nrights-based systems also have the potential to provide new useful information to managers. The prices of quota\nshares or use rights, if transferable, should indicate the net value of the fishery and changes in prices can be\nuseful indicators of the economic impact of regulatory changes. Prices of transferable individual quotas on\ncatch and bycatch (including prohibited species) also provide information on the relative value of allocations\nto different fisheries and sectors.\nExperience with the IFQ and CDQ programs and pollock cooperatives suggests that expansion of rights-based\nsystems to other fisheries is likely to result in substantial increases in the costs of monitoring, enforcement, and\nadministration. Therefore, Alternative 6.2 is rated as \"significant adverse\" in its effect on management and\nenforcement complexity. Cost recovery fees will at least partly offset management costs that would otherwise\nbe publicly funded. To implement rights-based fishing systems, additional agency resources would be required\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.10-7","to develop the process through which fishing rights are assigned; to adjudicate appeals about the assignment\nof fishing rights to individuals or groups; to administer the annual assignment of catch amounts and transfers\nof fishing rights; to monitor catch of individual or group quotas; and to penalize people violating regulations.\nEliminating current retention and utilization requirements and the vessel incentive program would reduce\noperational regulations on the fishing industry, reduce recordkeeping and reporting requirements, and reduce\nthe staff resources needed to analyze and revise regulations and to monitor compliance.\nAlternative 6.2 would (1) set all TACs equal to OFL; (2) eliminate the OY caps; and (3) eliminate the PSC\nlimits. Elimination of all PSC limits would decrease management complexity and costs because it would\nremove an entire category of catch limits that currently need to be monitored by NMFS. However, setting all\nTACs equal to the OFLs would increase management complexity because it would eliminate the quota\nmanagement buffer that currently exists between the TACS and OFLs. If the catch of any species reaches its\nOFL, NMFS is required to take management action to prevent further catch of that species, even if it means\nclosing other directed fisheries in which that species might be taken as bycatch. The status quo provides a\nbuffer between TAC and OFL for many species. Fishery managers try to limit the catch of a particular species\nin directed fisheries and as bycatch to less than the TAC. However, if TAC is exceeded by small amounts, the\nOFL generally is not reached. Under Alternative 6.1, the consequences of reaching the catch limit are the same\nas the consequences of reaching OFL. Therefore, NMFS managers would need to be more conservative in their\nmanagement of the directed fisheries and bycatch to ensure that a TAC was not exceeded. Alternative 6.2\nlikely would lead to earlier fishery closures to protect certain species from reaching OFL. It also is likely that\nmore directed fisheries would be curtailed because a bycatch species had reached OFL than are under the status\nquo. For these reasons, Alternative 6.2 also is rated as \"significant adverse.\"\nThe rating of each alternative relative to Alternative 1 in terms of effect on the complexity of management and\nenforcement in terms of budget, staff, data, and analysis needs. The ratings are as follows:\nAlternative 1 - I\nAlternative 2.1 - S-\nAlternative 2.2 - S-\nAlternative 3 - CS-\nAlternative 4.1 - S-\nAlternative 4.2 - S-\nAlternative 5 - S-\nAlternative 6.1 - S-\nAlternative 6.2 - S-\nThe rankings are defined as follows:\nS- - Significant, adverse\nCS- - Conditionally significant, adverse\nI - Insignificant\nCS+ - Conditionally significant, positive\nS+ - Significant, positive\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.10-8","Other Environmental Consequences Associated with the Groundfish Fishery\n4.11\nThis section discusses several issues that are consequences of fishing activities (discharge of marine debris,\ndischarge of fish processing waste, and accidents at sea) or results of the fishing industry support facilities\n(impacts to nearshore marine habitat associated with harbor development). Introduction of nonindigenous\nspecies is a possible consequence of vessels traveling between North Pacific ocean waters and distant waters\nto participate in these fisheries. Descriptions of fishing gears and the impacts associated with their use on\nmarine habitat are discussed in Sections 3.2 and 4.7 and are not repeated here. The direct, indirect, and\ncumulative impacts of these consequences on seabirds, marine mammals, and ecosystems, therefore, are\nanalyzed in those sections. Cross-references are provided at the end of each subsection to guide the reader to\nthose impact analyses.\nMarine Debris\n4.11.1\nLost and discarded fishing gear or fishing vessel parts are generally discussed in the context of marine debris,\nwhich includes all man-made material adrift in the marine environment (Coe and Rogers 1997). Marine debris\npollutes all of the world's oceans, but the majority of it does not originate at sea. Based on survey observations\nthat the highest densities of marine debris are found in coastal waters, the majority of marine debris seems to\noriginate from land discharge (i.e., it is washed, blown, or dumped from shore) (Matsumura and Nasu 1997).\nThe debris has a wide range of impacts on marine and littoral animals and plants, perhaps extending to entire\necosystems. Waterborne debris may entangle wildlife, masquerade as a food source, smother beaches and\nbottom-growing plants, or provide a surface for colonizing small organisms that travel on marine debris to\ndistant shores, perhaps with adverse ecological consequences.\nEntanglement in debris is the most obvious of all debris-related impacts on living marine resources. Northern\nfur seals entangled in debris were spotted as early as the 1930s. Trawl web is a predominant item that\nentangles northern fur seals on the Pribilof Islands (Fowler et al. 1985). Fleeting glimpses of entangled animals\nare also seen from planes and ships. The fate of entangled animals is often unknown. Many die and sink or\nare eaten without record or intervention.\nIngestion of marine debris can be a serious threat to wildlife. Some seabirds mistake plastic pellets for fish\neggs, choice prey items. Plastic may be accidentally eaten in association with natural food. Ingested debris\nmay damage the digestive tract; block the digestive tract, causing starvation; be toxic, and depending on\nprevalence, be a serious source of mortality. Surveys of marine debris on select Alaska shorelines, indicated\nthat derelict fishing gear usually made up most of the plastic debris; fishing gear constituted 53 percent and\npackaging items 42 percent of the total number of plastic debris pieces at all locations sampled from 1989 to\n1993 (Ribic et al. 1997). Though not necessarily artifacts of the groundfish fisheries, two of the five most\nabundant debris items directly associated with commercial fishing are gillnet floats and rope (Ribic et al. 1997).\nThe capture of marine lost and abandoned fishing gear is termed \"ghost fishing.\" Because the gear is not being\ntended anymore, the trapped species usually die, either of starvation or drowning, and subsequently decompose\nor become prey for scavenger species. All types of fishing gear (e.g., pots, traps, and mesh netgear) in use in\nthe groundfish fisheries are capable of ghost fishing to some degree (Table 3-1).\nThough studies specific to Alaska's groundfish fisheries have not been conducted, it is hypothesized that gear\nuse and losses in pot fisheries increased concurrently with a shift to more durable gear and designs (Carr and\nHarris 1997). Current regulations require some form of biodegradable escape mechanism in all pot gear\n(679.24(b)(1)(i)). The mechanism basically consists of an escape slit cut horizontally into the side of the trap\nand sewn up with untreated (biodegradable) cotton twine. In some gear a galvanic time-release device may be\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.11-1","used. The biodegradable panel or time-release mechanisms are intended to minimize ghost fishing in the event\nthe pot is lost.\nThe degree of ghost fishing by trawl gear depends on which of the several components of trawl gear (lines,\ndoors, mesh, or foot ropes) are lost. The traditional twine used in trawl gear has a large diameter, is more\nvisible, and is more readily sensed by fish than monofilament line (Carr and Harris 1997); therefore, it is\npresumed to have low ghost-fishing potential. Once lost, the trawl mesh settles to the bottom or washes up in\nthe intertidal area where it may smother invertebrate species attached to the substrate or provide a different\nsubstrate for different species to associate with. A lost steel trawl door, for instance, could be deposited on top\nof the substrate, which may have been unconsolidated sediments, and provide stable substrate on which\norganisms would settle. Probably the trawl door would settle into the unconsolidated sediments in time. Based\non data collected by observers in 1983, 668 nets, or large portions of nets, were lost in the trawl fisheries off\nAlaska between 1954 and 1982 (Low et al. 1985). Surveys of beach habitat have indicated that substantial\namounts of trawl web lost at sea end up on beaches (Berger and Armistead 1987, Johnson 1989).\nLongline gear is also believed to have little ghost-fishing potential. During fishing the gear has one main line\nstretched between two anchored buoys. Typically, the gear is set out for only a few hours with the attending\nvessels remaining nearby; thus, gear loss is minimal. The longline gear design and operations are\nstraightforward, and the potential for losses from mechanical failure, accidents, or mistakes are limited. When\nlost or abandoned, a longline loses its fishing power rapidly as baits are lost and hooks settle onto the seafloor\n(Carr and Harris 1997).\nManagement measures in effect to combat marine debris pollution from sea sources are the two global\nconventions MARPOL and LDC. The first global convention was Annex V of the Regulations for the\nPrevention of Pollution by Garbage from Ships of the 1973 International Convention of the Prevention of\nPollution from Ships as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (called MARPOL 73/78 for short.) It provides the\nframework for the control of wastes generated aboard ships of all types and sizes, and includes recreational\nvessels as well as fixed and floating platforms. Annex V prohibits the discharge of plastics from ships of\nnations party to the Annex and from all ships operating in waters under the jurisdiction of nations party to the\nAnnex. It also sets restrictions on the discharge of other ship-generated wastes. Offal generated at sea are not\nregulated under MARPOL 73/78.\nThe London Dumping Convention of 1972 (LDC) resulted from the Convention for the Prevention of Marine\nPollution by the Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter. This international law addresses waste materials\ncarried to sea for the purposes of disposal, as distinguished from those generated during ship operations. The\nLDC became effective in 1975 and established permit requirements for the disposal of wastes at sea. These\nrequirements cover all manner of wastes including dangerous substances, radioactive wastes, sewage, and\ngarbage. As of July 21, 1995, 74 nations representing about 70 percent of the world's registered shipping\ntonnage had ratified the LDC.\nVessels participating in the federal groundfish fisheries generally would not be operating as carriers of\ndangerous substances, therefore, are unlikely candidates for LDC permits. The wastes, sewage, and garbage\ngenerated aboard the vessels participating in the groundfish fisheries are regulated under the U.S. Act to\nPrevent Pollution from Ships, which implements MARPOL 73/78.\nImpacts from marine debris accruing to marine mammals are described in Section 4.2. Impacts accruing to\nseabirds are described in Section 4.3.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.11-2","Fish Processing Waste\n4.11.2\nOrganic waste has been discharged into marine waters from land-based fish processing facilities as well as\nprocessing vessels operating at sea as long as fishing has occurred in Alaskan waters. Impacts of the discharge\nare best evaluated in terms of (1) location and rate of nutrient return to the marine environments and (2) effects\non or changes in the ambient water quality parameters in the locations where they are returned.\nAll fish waste is biodegradable. The size of the particles discharged (whether it is ground into fine particles\nbefore discharge or discharged whole) is the primary determinant of the path it takes back into the marine food\nchain. Other determinants are a function of the location, depth, and circulation patterns of receiving waters,\nand the species of opportunistic feeders present near the discharge. Many observations have documented large\nchunks of waste being consumed by opportunistic predators soon after discharge. The opportunistic predators\ninclude species of invertebreates, fish, birds, and marine mammals.\nScavenging seabird species such as northern fulmars and large gulls are well-known consumers of fish\nprocessing waste. Though the food source may appear to benefit populations of some species, such as gulls,\nit can be detrimental to species displaced or preyed upon by the increased population of gulls (Furness 1984).\nIn order to control discharge and prevent occurrences of over-enrichment in localized areas, discharge is\nregulated under the Clean Water Act (Section 402). Under this act, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination\nSystem (NPDES) permits are issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Most at-sea\nfloating processors apply for and receive NPDES permits authorizing them to discharge fish waste with the\nstipulation that the waste be ground into particles finer than 0.5 inches and discharged below the surface. The\nintent of the stipulation is to avoid quantities of organic materials accumulating in a confined water body to\nthe degree that during decomposition it consumes SO much of the available dissolved oxygen that oxygen\ndepletion of the surrounding waters occurs. If depletion of oxygen were to occur in the short term, it could\nresult in mortality of invertebrates, such as crab. If it were to occur in the long term, it could result in changes\nin species composition of the area, as the species with lower tolerances for anoxic waters move out.\nUnauthorized organic discharge is generally understood to mean accumulations of dead fish, crab shells, and/or\nfish waste material that either smother the bottom or impair the surrounding water quality to a such a degree\nthat it compromised the viability of marine species. This is casually termed fouling of the grounds.\nObservations of ground fouling in Alaska are undocumented, though anecdotal accounts abound.\nThe point source discharges from established onshore processing operations in ports (e.g., Kodiak, Dutch\nHarbor, St. Paul, and Akutan) are also subject to Clean Water Act permitting requirements. Each permit\napplication is evaluated in an open public forum when it is being considered for issuance by the EPA, and it\nremains subject to EPA's oversight. Some facilities in locations such as Captains Bay near Dutch Harbor are\nrequired to collect waste streams and to barge the discharge several miles offshore prior to discharge.\nUsing the Clean Water Act, the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation established total maximum\ndaily load limits for Udagak Bay (Beaver Inlet on Unalaska Island in the Aleutian Islands) and King Cove\nlagoon in King Cove (on the Alaska Peninsula in the Aleutians East Borough) because of the effects of seafood\nwastes on water quality in those water bodies (EPA 1998a, 1998b). In Udagak Bay, the Northern Victor\nPartnership facility P/V Northern Victor produced seafood processing wastes (from processing Pacific cod,\nPacific halibut, herring, pollock, salmon, and a variety of other fish) that created a waste pile deposit of\nsettleable solid residues measuring at least 2.4 acres in area and 7 feet thick on the seafloor. The waste pile\nexceeded State of Alaska water quality standards for residues. The waste pile at King Cove created by the\nPeter Pan Seafoods facility covered 11 acres of seafloor to an average depth of 3 feet (EPA 1998a, 1998b).\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.11-3","The State of Alaska list of impaired waters in 1998 included six water bodies from locations in Cold Bay,\nDutch Harbor, and Kodiak that had been impaired by seafood processing, logging operations, military material,\nor fuel storage.\nThe impacts of fish processing waste on seabirds are described in Section 4.3. The impacts of fish processing\nwaste on to the ecosystem are described in Section 4.9.\n4.11.3\nAccidents at Sea\nThe biological impact of vessels involved in accidents at sea is measured in terms of the fish and wildlife\nexposed to the toxins from spilled petroleum compounds and their resulting mortality (Johnston 1992).\nIntertidal communities are the most immediately affected when oil strands in the intertidal zones on sheltered\nrocky shores. In these areas, seaweeds, barnacles, limpets, periwinkles, clams, mussels, amphipods, isopods,\nand marine worms may be killed. Oil that sinks into the subtidal bottom may affect eelgrass beds, small\ncrustaceans, worms, and clams. Species of birds that spend most of their time on the water surface, such as\ncommon murres and marbled murrelets, are vulnerable during an oil spill. Also, scavenging species, such as\nbald eagles, are affected secondarily by preying on fish and oil-contaminated carcasses. Marine mammals,\nsuch as sea otters, are vulnerable because their fur becomes fouled with oil, which interferes with its function\nas an insulator from the cold water. The most vulnerable sites and periods for harbor seals and Steller sea lions\nare when they are during their haulouts and in rookery areas during pupping seasons.\nThough not directly related to the U.S. groundfish fisheries, the oil spill generated when the supertanker Exxon\nValdez ran aground on a reef in Prince William Sound (Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation\n1993) is the most well-known event affecting the GOA marine habitat. In the weeks and months after the oil\nspill, 10.8 million gallons of Alaska North Slope crude oil leaked and spread over the shorelines. Storm winds\nand ocean currents broadcast the oil out of the sound, oiling 1,500 miles of beaches from the site of the wreck\nwestward to the Alaska Peninsula. The accident heightened awareness of marine resource vulnerability to the\noil industry's use of the fishery management areas.\nAccidents by fishing vessels are not thought to have resulted in measurable impacts to any marine resources\nevaluated in the action area. Safety issues (as they apply to fishing vessels) are evaluated in Section 4.8.\n4.11.4\nNonindigenous Species\nExotic, or nonindigenous species, may be introduced into new habitats by vessels that travel long distances and\ncross diverse ecosystems. All types of vessels have the potential to transport exotic species via attachment of\nbiota to the vessel's hull, within the water carried in the vessel's storage tanks, or simply aboard the vessel (i.e.,\nlive animals). Depending on the species transported and its tolerance to the new environment, it may or may\nnot be viable in the new location. If the introduced species is not viable, the resulting impacts are fairly limited\nand short term. Those introduced species that are viable can dramatically alter aquatic ecosystems. It has been\nsuggested that nonindigenous species contributed to the declines of 70 percent of the endangered U.S.\nfreshwater fish species for which causes of declines are adequately known (Aquatic Nuisance Species Task\nForce 1994). Introduction of the nonindigenous species Atlantic salmon has recently been recorded in waters\noff southeastern Alaska (McKinnell et al. 1997). The origin of these introduced fish is assumed to be pen-\nrearing aquaculture projects in British Columbia.\nNonindigenous organisms can be difficult or impossible to eradicate once they become established. The effects\nof introductions are impossible to predict. A frequently voiced concern regarding vessels participating in the\nAlaska groundfish fishery is the potential threat of their introducing rats to the Pribilof Islands or Aleutian\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.11-4","Islands (Loy 1993). If rats were introduced and remained viable, they could displace bird species from nesting\nhabitat and dramatically change the balance of predator-prey relationships in both bird and marine mammal\npopulations.\nImpacts associated with the introduction of nonindigenous species are evaluated in Section 4.9.\nFishing Industry Logistical Support Facilities\n4.11.5\nThe primary support activities for the fishing industry include construction, expansion, and maintenance of boat\nharbors. The activities utilizing fill or dredge in navigable waters require both Tidelands Permits, which are\nissued by the State of Alaska, and Clean Water Act Section 404 Permits, which are issued by the Department\nof Army. To qualify for these permits, the activities must be consistent with coastal zone management policies,\nand Clean Water Act regulations and they must be in the best public interest as determined by the U.S. Army\nCorps of Engineers.\nHarbor construction and expansion projects on St. Paul Island and near the town of Kodiak on Kodiak Island\nare the most recent and most directly related projects attributable to success of the Alaska groundfish fisheries.\nLocation of floating breakwaters used in construction of these facilities minimized the direct habitat impact to\nsome degree.\nSection 4.13 incorporates the impacts of harbors and logistical support facilities constructed along the shoreline\n(outside the action area) into the cumulative impact analyses.\n4.11.6\nEnvironmental Justice\nExecutive Order (EO) 12898 requires that federal agencies make achieving environmental justice part of their\nmission by identifying and addressing disproportionately high adverse human health or environmental effects\nof their programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations in the United\nStates. Environmental affects include economic and subsistence impacts. Aleut, Ingalik, Central Yupik,\nAlutiiq, Ahtna, Eyak, Tlingit, Haida, and Tsimshian, which are minority populations covered by the EO, reside\nadjacent to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), where federally managed groundfish fisheries occur. Members\nof these minority populations participate in groundfish harvesting and processing activities, are represented by\none of the six Community Development Quota (CDQ) groups, or reside in communities that benefit from state\nand municipal fishery generated tax revenues. In addition, there are representatives of other minority\npopulations, primarily Asian and Hispanic groups that are employed by inshore processors in Alaskan regions.\nPreparation of the Alaska groundfish fisheries programmatic supplemental environment impact statement\n(SEIS) has proceeded according to the following steps to comply with EO 12898 in addressing environmental\njustice and enhancing participation by affected communities:\nPreparation of this SEIS has provided many opportunities for community input. SEIS\n1.\nmeetings were held in three Alaska communities (Anchorage, Kodiak, and Juneau) as well as\nin Seattle, Washington. The North Pacific Fishery Management Council (the Council), its\nAdvisory Panel, and its Scientific and Statistical Committee have held numerous public\nmeetings in Anchorage as well as Seattle where the public have been encouraged to provide\ncomments on any fishery issue, including the programmatic SEIS and its alternatives.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.11-5","2. Traditional knowledge has been used in the preparation of this programmatic SEIS.\nTraditional knowledge was obtained from comments made during scoping meetings and\ninformal telephone conversations with native representatives.\n3. Topics specified in EO 12898 have been addressed in the chapters on affected environment\nand environmental consequences. Section 3.10 describes the socioeconomic characteristics\nof affected communities, by summarizing the ethnic composition and employment and income\nlevels. Detailed regional and industry sector profiles are provided in Appendix I. A\ndescription of specific subsistence resources (game and fish utilized by local residents),\nactivities, and harvest and consumption levels of the affected communities has been provided.\nSection 4.8 describes the potential socioeconomic effects of Alternatives 1 through 6 on\nAlaska coastal communities and subsistence activity. Section 4.13.4.7 describes the potential\ncumulative effects of the groundfish fisheries on the human environment. While these same\nalternatives would affect non-minority sectors of the fisheries, the lack of economic\nalternatives would heighten the impact on certain native regions and communities.\nThe conclusion of this programmatic SEIS is that the potential effects of the groundfish fisheries on minority\npopulations of certain alternatives would be disproportionately high for specific regions of Alaska. While these\nsame alternatives would affect non-minority sectors of the fisheries, the lack of economic alternatives would\nheighten the impact on certain Native regions and communities. Currently, minority populations in Alaska\nhave some direct and indirect involvement with four aspects of the high-seas groundfish fisheries that occur\nin the EEZ.\nCatcher Vessel Ownership and Employment\nIn the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands Region, and to a lesser extent in other regions, Native Alaskans\neither have ownership or are employed as crew in catcher vessels participating in the groundfish fisheries.\nAdverse direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 on harvest and exvessel values\nwould be disproportionately high on Native Alaskan vessel owners and crew members in these regions.\nAlternative employment and economic activities in these regions are limited.\nInshore Processing Employment\nAsian and Hispanic populations constitute a high percentage of inshore processing employees in the Alaska\nPeninsula/Aleutian Islands and Kodiak Regions; adverse direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of Alternatives\n2.1 and 2.2. would be disproportionately high on these populations due to reductions in fish harvest and inshore\nplant processing levels. Minority populations working for inshore processors in the southcentral and southeast\nAlaska Regions would be affected to a lesser degree.\nCDQ Employment and Investments\nSix CDQ groups representing 65 predominantly Native Alaska communities benefits from vessel ownership,\nharvesting and processing employment, and community infrastructure improvements funded by CDQ revenues.\nAdverse direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 on harvest and exvessel values\nwould be disproportionately high on Native Alaskan vessel owner, crew members, and processing employees\nparticipating in CDQ fishing ventures. The same reductions in exvessel and groundfish product value would\nadversely effect the ability to fund community infrastructure improvements, disproportionately affecting Native\nAlaskans. This disproportionate effect is amplified by the trend of decreasing state revenue sharing to these\ncommunities.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.11-6","Subsistence Harvests\nResidents of rural Alaska communities harvest chinook salmon, and Steller sea lion for subsistence use. With\nregard to the areas affected by the groundfish fisheries, subsistence harvest of salmon has been traditionally\nhigh in the Alaska Peninsula/Aleutian Islands, Kodiak Island, and western Alaska communities. Salmon\nbycatch by the groundfish fishery is relatively insignificant, although any level of catch may be of concern to\nWestern Alaskan communities, where Yukon and Kuskokwim River salmon runs have significantly decreased.\nSubsistence use of Steller sea lions is heaviest in the Aleutian Islands and southwest Alaska, and is\nconcentrated among relatively few communities. The Biological Opinion (NMFS 2000c) has determined that\nthe groundfish fisheries are a contributing factor to the decline of Steller sea lions. Alternatives 1, 6.1, and 6.2,\nwhich maintain or increase current groundfish harvest levels, could disproportionately affect Native Alaskan\npopulations that harvest salmon and Steller sea lions, although there is some uncertainty regarding cause and\neffect. However, the potential for significant adverse impacts is reduced to the extent that income from the\ngroundfish fisheries is used to pay part of the cash costs of subsistence fishing and hunting.\nWhereas adverse socioeconomic effects do result from fishery actions, the Council has sought to mitigate those\neffects for all participants to the extent possible. In addition, the Council has traditionally sought\nrepresentatives from western Alaska and coastal communities to sit on its Advisory Panel. Such representation\nin the past has been shown to be an effective way for minority groups to voice their concerns and assist the\nCouncil in developing its management recommendations to the Secretary. Finally, NMFS has recognized its\nresponsibility under EO 13084 to engage in consultation with potentially affected federally recognized tribal\ngovernments and has taken steps through the development of the programmatic SEIS to ensure that Alaska\ntribal governments adjacent to the BSAI and GOA have been kept informed regarding the process and provided\nthe opportunity to participate.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.11-7","This page intentionally left blank.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.11-8","Energy Requirements and Conservation Potential of Various Alternative Regimes\n4.12\nFor each fishery target, there are energy costs associated with traveling to, finding, catching, processing, and\ndelivering the available quota. This, cost can be expressed as an energy use per ton of processed product and\nis a measure of the energy efficiency of the fishery. The energy efficiency varies extensively between target\nspecies, gear types, and areas and is primarily a function of the following factors:\ntravel distance\ncatch per unit of effort\nvessel capacity\ngear type\nvessel displacement and available horsepower.\nThe total energy cost for a given fishery is the energy efficiency multiplied by the tonnage harvested, and\nfisheries management decisions that affect the amount of quota available for harvest will directly affect the total\namount of energy required to harvest that quota. Thus, management regimes that result in lower TACs would\nresult in lowered energy usage for the fishery. However, the energy savings that result from TAC reductions\nare somewhat illusory because, to the extent that the demand for fish products is inelastic, reducing harvest in\none fishery simply serves to increase production in another fishery that may or may not be more energy\nefficient. On the other hand, fisheries management decisions that affect the dynamics of how a fishery is\nconducted would directly affect the energy cost per ton for the fishery. Management actions such as area\nclosures and gear restrictions generally decrease energy efficiency for the managed fishery. Conversely, energy\nefficiency can be increased by closing distant fishing grounds or restricting fishing to areas with large\nconcentrations of target species.\nUnder Alternative 2, management decisions would be made primarily to conserve marine mammal and seabird\npopulations. Under the model regimes described in Section 4.1.1, TAC amounts for several species would be\nexpected to decline significantly, which would reduce overall fuel consumption. This alternative would also\nincrease the use of exclusion areas and change the temporal distribution of fishing effort, both of which would\nbe expected to decrease energy efficiency, especially for the pollock, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel targets.\nUnder Alternative 3, management decisions would be focused on increased protection for target species. Under\nthe model regime described in Section 4.1.2, the TAC setting procedure would be changed to formally\nincorporate minimum stock size thresholds, model uncertainty, and multispecies considerations. Outputs from\nthe model regime indicate that overall catch would decline by approximately 15 percent, resulting in overall\nfuel use reductions. This model also recommends the increased use of time and area closures and gear\nrestrictions. These measures would be expected to increase energy cost per ton for some targets.\nUnder Alternative 4, management decisions would be focused on increased protection for non-target species.\nUnder the model regimes described in Section 4.1.3, new TACs would be established for some non-target\nspecies, and closed areas to protect squid aggregations would be established in the Bering Sea. Model outputs\nindicate that overall total catch would decline slightly, which could marginally reduce fuel consumption.\nThe objective of Alternative 5 is to increase protection to habitat. Under the model regime described in Section\n4.1.4, TAC amounts for several bottom trawl fisheries would be reallocated to pot and longline fisheries, and\nremaining bottom trawl fisheries would be spatially restricted. Energy costs per ton of product were not\ncompared between trawl and non-trawl gear types, thus whether total fuel consumption would be increased or\ndecreased under this option cannot be predicted.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.12-1","The objective of Alternative 6 is to increase the long-term socioeconomic benefits of the fisheries off Alaska.\nUnder this alternative, NMFS would expand the use of rights-based fisheries management through increased\nreliance on individual quota type programs. Because total harvest under Alternative 6 would not be expected\nto change significantly for most species, total fuel consumption would be expected to be similar to Alternative\n1. In a rights-based fishery, fishermen are generally unable to increase their profit by increasing harvest and\nmust focus on decreasing costs and increasing product value. To some extent, efforts to decrease costs would\nreduce fuel consumption. However efforts to increase product value could increase fuel consumption as\nfishermen seek to optimize product quality.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.12-2","4.13\nCumulative Effects\nThe analysis of potential cumulative effects is a crucial part of this programmatic supplemental environmental\nimpact statement (SEIS). Cumulative effects are linked to incremental policy changes that individually may\nhave small outcomes, but that in the aggregate and in combination with other factors can result in major\nresource trends in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) and Gulf of Alaska (GOA) ecosystems. An\nimportant goal of this SEIS is to provide an integrative view of groundfish fishery management policy in a\nbroad context; the cumulative effects analysis provides a means to accomplish this goal. Consequently, this\nsection focuses on the synergy of fisheries management policies with other factors that affect physical,\nbiological, and socioeconomic resource components of the BSAI and GOA environment.\n4.13.1\nObjectives and Approach\nThe concept behind cumulative effects analysis is to capture the total effects of many actions over time that\nwould be missed by evaluating each action individually. A cumulative effects assessment describes the\nadditive result of the many actions proposed in this SEIS. To avoid the piecemeal assessment of\nenvironmental impacts, cumulative effects were included in the 1978 Council on Environmental Quality\n(CEQ) regulations, which led to the development of the CEQs cumulative effects handbook (CEQ 1997) and\nfederal agency guidelines based on that handbook (e.g., EPA 1999). Although predictions of direct effects\nof individual proposed actions tend to be more certain, cumulative effects may have more important\nconsequences over the long term. The possibility of these \"hidden\" consequences presents a risk to decision\nmakers, because the ultimate ramifications of an individual decision might not be obvious. The goal of\nidentifying potential cumulative effects is to provide for informed decisions that consider the total effects\n(direct, indirect, and cumulative) of alternative management actions. In this section we characterize the\nincremental cumulative effects that potentially arise from external factors in combination with the direct and\nindirect effects.\nThe objectives and approach of the cumulative effects analysis conducted for this SEIS are described below.\n4.13.1.1\nObjectives\nAt the highest level, the goal of the cumulative effects component of this SEIS is to ensure that the potential\ncumulative effects of groundfish fisheries management on the physical, biological, and socioeconomic\ncomponents of the BSAI and GOA environments are analyzed thoroughly, comprehensively, accurately\n(including the Alternative 1 status quo and Alternative policies 2-6), and in compliance with federal\nregulations and guidelines. More specifically, the cumulative effects analysis has three objectives:\n1. Prepare a historical analysis of the effects of incremental decisionmaking related to the BSAI and\nGOA groundfish fisheries management plans (FMPs) and their amendments. Group potential\nenvironmental effects of the FMPs and their amendments into physical, biological, and social\ncategories. Supplement the analysis with a literature review to evaluate changes to the ecosystem\nthat have been observed over the past 20 years of managed fisheries in the region. Develop a\nchecklist or table of past direct and indirect effects of the status quo (the structure of management\ndecisions and policies now in effect as represented by Alternative 1).\n2. Assess the potential of synergism (the combined effect of two or more agents) over time among the\npredicted direct and indirect effects for each of six programmatic management alternatives, using as\na basis for this assessment the information provided in Sections 4.2 through 4.12. Provide a tabulated\nlist of predicted direct and indirect effects on the ecosystem as a whole that are associated with each\nalternative. External actions or forces are not considered at this stage of the analysis.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-1","3. Assess the potential cumulative effects of each alternative in conjunction with other actions or\nexternal forces related to other fisheries, other human activities, and natural phenomena. Consolidate\nand screen information tabulated to fulfill objectives 1 and 2 (above) to determine the potential\ncumulative effects of each alternative \"when added to other past, present, or reasonably foreseeable\nfuture actions\" (CEQ 1997). Evaluate the magnitude and likelihood of each potential cumulative\neffect to assess its significance, and the relative importance of fishing practices and management\npolicies in relation to external factors, in a descriptive checklist or matrix (CEQ 1997). Sections\n4.13.4 through 4.13.8 summarize the potential cumulative effects associated with each alternative.\n4.13.1.2\nApproach\nCumulative effects are defined by federal regulation as \"the impact on the environment which results from\nthe incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future\nactions regardless of what agency (federal or nonfederal) or person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative\neffects can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of\ntime\" (40 CFR 1508.7). In this case, changes in management of the Alaskan groundfish fisheries represent\nsequential actions that may, or may not, overlap in time. Each policy change contributes an increment to the\ntotal cumulative effect, while working in combination with the effects of other fisheries, other human\nactivities, and natural phenomena.\nTo be reliable, any cumulative effects analysis must use a procedure that is (1) logical and methodical, and\n(2) transparent and reproducible. The analysis must combine three components (1) a scope that sets\nboundaries in location and time; (2) past, present, and predicted actions; and (3) past, present, and predicted\nenvironmental effects (impacts) of the actions. The CEQ (1997) has established eight principles, shown in\nTable 4.13-1, that elaborate on these elements. The CEQ principles were used to guide the analysis of\npotential effects associated with Alternative 1 and each additional alternative.\nTable 4.13-1 Principles of Cumulative Effects Analysis\n1.\nCumulative effects are caused by the aggregate of past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions.\n2.\nCumulative effects are the total effect, including both direct and indirect effects, on a given resource,\necosystem, and human community of all actions taken, no matter who (federal, nonfederal, or private) has\ntaken the actions.\n3. Cumulative effects need to be analyzed in terms of the specific resource, ecosystem, and human community\nbeing affected.\n4.\nIt is not practical to analyze the cumulative effects of an action on the universe; the list of environmental\neffects must focus on those that are truly meaningful.\n5.\nCumulative effects on a given resource, ecosystem, and human community are rarely aligned with political or\nadministrative boundaries.\n6.\nCumulative effects may result from the accumulation of similar effects or the synergistic interaction of different\neffects.\n7. Cumulative effects may last for many years beyond the life of the action that caused the effects.\n8.\nEach affected resource, ecosystem, and human community must be analyzed in terms of its capacity to\naccommodate additional effects, based on its own time and space parameters.\nSource: CEQ 1997\nCumulative effects take into account the accumulation and/or combination of all identified direct and indirect\neffects generated by multiple (two or more) actions affecting a given resource, ecosystem, or human\ncommunity. The key to identifying a potential cumulative effect lies in linking a direct or indirect effect from\none action (in this case, for the status quo and each of five policy management alternatives) to an additive or\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-2","interactive effect from another or several other actions or external factors (in this case, actions associated with\nother fisheries, other types of human activity, and/or natural phenomena). This process is illustrated in Figure\n4.13-1.\nBuilding on the analytic framework shown above and the general principles summarized in Table 4.13-1, an\norderly procedure is required to ensure that the assessment is conducted in a systematic, reproducible way\nthat can be independently examined and evaluated. The CEQ (1997) has established step-by-step guidelines\nCumulative Effects Analysis Framework\nOther fisheries, other human\nEach of Six Management\nactivities, and/or natural\nAlternatives\nphenomena.\nImpacts\nPast, present, predicted for Status Quo\nImpacts\nPredicted for Alt. 2 through 6\nEnvironmental Consequences\nEnvironmental Consequences\nDirect and/or Indirect Effects\nExternal Effects\nStatus Quo: S+, CS+, NS, U\n+, \", 0, or U\nAlts.: -2 to +2 compared to Status Quo\nCUMULATIVE EFFECTS\nNot Significant (NS)\nSignificant (S) + or -\nConditionally Significant (CS) + or -\nUnknown (U)\nFigure 4.13-1 Framework for cumulative effects analysis.\nfor conducting a cumulative effects analysis. The guidelines set forth 11 steps that can be classified into four\nbasic stages: scoping, organizing, screening, and evaluating. The CEQ emphasizes that the guidelines are\nintended to \"assist practitioners in developing their own study-specific approaches\" (CEQ 1997). Table\n4.13-2 shows how the cumulative effects assessment for groundfish fisheries management was adapted to\nfollow the CEQ guidelines closely and also to accomplish the objectives described in Section 4.13.1.1.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-3","Table 4.13-2 Stepwise Procedure for Cumulative Effects Analysis\nRecommendations from CEQ (1997)\nApproach Used in This Analysis\nA. Scoping: Identify Issues, Actions, and Boundaries\n1. Identify the significant cumulative effects\n1.\nConduct a historical review of the status quo and summarize\nissues associated with the proposed action\npredicted direct and indirect effects of the alternatives as discussed\n[and alternatives], and define the assessment\nin Sections 4.2 through 4.12 of the SEIS.\ngoals.\n2. Establish the geographic scope for the\n2. Geographic scope is defined as the GOA and BSAI groundfish\nanalysis.\nfisheries.\n3.\nEstablish the time frame for the analysis.\n3. The time frame is established as 1980 (incorporating the past 20\nyears of incremental fisheries management) through 2005.\n4.\nIdentify other actions affecting the\n4.\nSystematically review FMP amendments and information\nresources, ecosystems, and human\nprovided in Sections 3.0 and 4.0 of the SEIS. Review environmental\ncommunities of concern.\nimpact statements, reports, resource studies, and the peer-reviewed\nliterature, and confer with expert contributors to the SEIS to identify\nother actions and issues of concern.\nB. Organizing: Characterize and Consolidate Issues\n5. Characterize the resources, ecosystems,\n5.\nIdentify and characterize potentially affected resources,\nand human communities identified during\norganizing them into eight resource categories: target groundfish\nscoping in terms of their response to change\nspecies, non-target species, marine mammals, seabirds, prohibited\nand capacity to withstand stresses.\ncatch species, habitat, socioeconomics, and ecosystem. Delineate\nthe component parts of each resource category so that they are\nconsistent with the \"Effects of the Alternatives\" sections in Chapter\n4. For example, marine mammals includes Steller sea lion, fur seals,\nharbor seals, other pinnipeds, baleen whales, toothed whales, and\nsea otter.\n6. Characterize the stresses affecting these\n6. From SEIS Chapters 3 and 4, identify and evaluate all of the\nresources, ecosystems, and human\npotential direct and indirect effects of the alternatives on the specified\ncommunities and their relation to regulatory\nresource category components (Tier 1). Then prepare one matrix per\nthresholds.\nresource category component per alternative that compares each\ndirect or indirect effect (rows) with each type of external influence\n(columns) (Tier 2).\n7. Define a baseline condition for the\n7. The baseline condition is defined as the existing Y2000 fisheries\nresources, ecosystems, and human\nmanagement regime (Alternative 1).\ncommunities.\nC. Screening: Identify Potential Cumulative Effects\n8. Identify the important cause-and-effect\n8.\nIn each Tier 2 matrix cell, enter a +, -, or 0 to indicate the\nrelationships between human activities and\ncumulative cause-and-effect relationship (if any) between each type\nresources, ecosystems, and human\nof direct or indirect effect and each type of external influence, e.g.,\ncommunities.\nother fisheries, subsistence, commercial shipping, climate.\nD. Evaluating: Rank by Magnitude and Probability\n9. Determine the magnitude and\n9. In the Tier 2 matrix for each alternative, include the significance\nsignificance of cumulative effects.\nscoring for each direct or indirect effect and show how it would be\ninfluenced by the corresponding cumulative effect (if any). In the final\ncolumn, state whether the identified cumulative effect is conditionally\nsignificant (Y or N). Explain the rationale for each conditionally\nsignificant evaluation in the text.\n10. Modify or add alternatives to avoid,\n10. Any of the six policy alternatives would be in compliance with\nminimize, or mitigate significant cumulative\napplicable laws, regulations, and permits and would incorporate\neffects.\nappropriate mitigation measures, as described in the discussion of\neach alternative. The alternatives are programmatic in nature but do\naddress important effects (Chapter 2).\n11. Monitor the cumulative effects of the\n11. Monitoring and adaptive management would be conducted in\nselected alternative and adapt management.\nconjunction with any alternative (Chapter 2).\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-4","Scoping\nThe first step in the cumulative effects analysis is to summarize the historical consequences of Alternative\n1 by reviewing one-page summaries of each FMP amendment and SEIS Section 2.7, the federal action:\nAlaska groundfish fisheries and their management. This review is supplemented by an examination of\npeer-reviewed literature to look specifically for historical ecosystem trends. Overall, this first step provides\na documented summary of the known direct and indirect effects of Alternative 1 that have occurred in the past\nand that are presently occurring.\nInformation regarding potential direct and indirect effects of all six alternatives is then summarized from\npreceding sections of this SEIS: Chapter 2, Alternatives Including the Proposed Action; Chapter 3, Affected\nEnvironment; and Chapter 4, Environmental Consequences. This review focuses on tables in Sections 4.2\nthrough 4.9 of the Environmental Consequences chapter. These tables identify past, present, and predicted\ndirect and indirect effects of Alternative 1 and potential future direct and indirect effects of Alternatives 2.1\nthrough 6.2 on eight resource categories: target groundfish species, non-target species, marine mammals,\nseabirds, prohibited catch species, habitat, socioeconomics, and ecosystem. This part of the scoping\nprocess-to tabulate direct and indirect effects of the alternatives-is the basis for Tier 1 of the cumulative\neffects analysis: scoring the potential direct and indirect effects of each alternative on each resource category.\nIt is also necessary to identify external factors (including human activities and natural events, such as, other\nfisheries, subsistence harvests, commercial shipping, oil and gas leasing, and climatic shifts) that could act\nin combination with the direct and indirect effects of the alternatives. To identify the external factors,\npertinent sections of Chapter 3, Affected Environment, were consulted along with the peer-reviewed\nliterature. The SEIS Scoping Report (NMFS 2000) and public comments on the Scoping Report were also\nreviewed. The identified external factors were discussed in meetings with staff of the National Marine\nFisheries Service (NMFS) Alaska Fisheries Science Center (AFSC) to confirm accuracy, identify any effects\nthat might have been missed, and explore pathways through which the external influences might act in an\nadditive or interactive fashion with the alternatives to produce cumulative effects. This identification of\nexternal influences is the basis for Tier 2 of the cumulative effects analysis: the subsequent screening of direct\nand indirect effects against external influences to identify and evaluate potential cumulative effects.\nOrganizing\nThe organizational structure used to support the cumulative effects analysis employs two tiers of matrix-style\nchecklists (Figure 4.13-2). The advantage of using tiered tables or matrices to organize the information used\nin the cumulative effects analysis is that they provide a visual representation of the analytic process itself and\nhelp to assure that the analysis is orderly and systematic. This approach is recommended by the CEQ as\na\nuseful means \"to evaluate the cumulative effects of multiple actions on individual resources, ecosystems, and\nhuman communities\" and to \"facilitate tracing effects through the environment\" (CEQ 1997).\nTier 1 matrices were prepared as part of the discussion of direct and indirect effects of the alternatives in\nSections 4.2 through 4.9 (Figure 4.13-3). For example, for the marine mammals resource category (Section\n4.2), separate matrices were prepared for Steller sea lion, northern fur seal, harbor seal, and the other species\nor groups in this category. In each Tier 1 matrix, the six alternatives are arrayed vertically as columns against\nhorizontal rows listing the categories of potential direct and indirect effects that the alternatives might produce\non the particular resource component under discussion (e.g., Steller sea lion).\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-5","Analytical Framework to Determine Environmental\nSuite of Management\nand Economic Consequences\nToois from Chapter 2\nInput Alternatives\nSpecies and Issues\nTier 1 (Table 1)\nfrom Chapter 2\nfrom Chapter 3\nissue Effects to Marine Mammals\nHarbor Senis\nFisheries\nIssue: Effects to Marine Mammals\nNorthern Fur Seak\nfrom Chapter 3\n1) Develop analytical approach\nissuer Effects to Marine Mammals\nSea Lions\nfor alternatives\ns\n4.1x\nAlternatives\n2) \"Implement\" alternatives and\n0\nDirect Effects\n0\n1\n2a 2b\n3\n4\n+2\ncharacterize environmental inputs\n-1\nDirect Take\n0\n2\n+2\n0\n+1\nD\n0\n+1\n+2\n+2\n0\n1\n0\n-1\n2\n0\nEnvironmental inputs\nInstruct Effects\n1\n0\nby alternative\n0\nCompetition for food\n0\nD\n1\n0\n2\n*2\n0\n-1\n+2\n1) Establish \"baseline\" by comparing\n4.2\ninputs of alternatives to input from status quo\nthrough\n2) Evaluate performance of alternatives on\n4.10\nissues relative to performance of status quo\nIssue Cumulative Effects to Marine Mammata\nSea Lions\nHuman Induced and Controlled Activities ON & Gas Development\nDirect and indirect effects of alternatives\nissue Cumulative Effects to Marine Mammals\nSea Lions\nHuman Induced and Controlled Activities Of Spills\n.\non issues relative to status quo\n1.1\nAlternatives\nDirect Effects\n1\n2a\n3\nDirect Take\n-1\n0\n+21+2\n+11-1\n0\n+1\nInputs\n-1\nEvaluate direct and indirect effects of alternatives\n0\n+1-2\n+1\n1\n0\n+1-1\n0\nfrom 2 cumulative effects perspectives\n4.13\n0\n0\n+1+10\n0\n1) human induced and controlled activities\nIndirect Effects\nD\n2) natural events\nCompetition for food\n0\n+1\n0\n+1.1\n+1\n+2\n+\n2\n+2\n+2 -1 :\nTier 2 (Table 1)\nCumulative effects analysis\nissue Cumulative Effects to Marine Maramals\nSca Lions\nAnalyze significance\n4,15\nNatural Events Short Term Climate Changes\nof each alternative\nIssue: Cumulative Effects to Marine Mammels\nSea Lions\nNatural Events Long Term Climate Changes\n.\nAlternatives\n1.1\nDirect Effects\n+1\nFully analyze alternatives\n1\n2a\n2b\n3\n4\nInputs\nDirect Take\n-1\n0\n42\n-1\n-1\n+1\n+1\n0\n0\n01+2\n0\n4.16\nindirect Effects\nCompare alternatives\nCompetition for food\n+1-1\n+1\n+1\n+2\n0\n+2-1\nTier 2 (Table 2)\nFigure 4.13-2 Analytical framework for cumulative effects analysis.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-6","Each Tier 1 matrix scores the alternatives with respect to the impacts they could produce on the subject\nresource component. Alternative 1, the status quo fisheries management regime, is scored with respect to the\nsignificance of its direct and indirect effects on the resource component. The range of scores includes not\nsignificant, significant, conditionally significant, and unknown. A + or - is added to the significant or\nconditionally significant score to indicate a beneficial or adverse effect. A score of Conditionally Significant\nsuggests that some information exists that indicates a significant effect could occur, but the intensity of the\neffect and its probability of occurrence are unknown. A score of Unknown indicates that insufficient data are\navailable to allow any determination of significance.\nIn the Tier 1 matrices, Alternatives 2.1 through 6.2 are scored in a different manner from Alternative 1.\nWhereas Alternative 1 represents existing conditions for which data may be available, Alternatives 2.1\nthrough 6.2 are hypothetical (Figure 4.13-3). Therefore, Alternatives 2.1 through 6.2 are scored using a five-\npoint ordinal scale that represents the probable level of protection that each alternative would provide relative\nto the status quo. The ordinal index is represented by the values {-2, -1, +0, +1, +2}. An index value of +0\nindicates that there is no expected change relative to Alternative 1. A negative index value indicates that the\neffect of the alternative is expected to be more adverse than that of Alternative 1. A positive index value\nindicates that the effect of the alternative is expected to be more beneficial relative to Alternative 1. Because\nthe index values contain only ordinal information, they can be used only for ordinal comparisons. For\nexample, an index value of +2 is more beneficial than a value of +1, but it is not true, in general, that a +2\nis twice as beneficial, or twice as large, as a +1. The index values are simply place holders that represent an\nordering, and a fully equivalent ordering could be represented by {a, b, c, d, e}. Therefore, it is not possible\nto obtain meaningful summary information by performing numerical operations (e.g., adding or subtracting\nindex values or calculating their ratios) using two or more of the index values.\nA second series of checklists (Tier 2) was prepared for each resource component under each alternative. The\nTier 2 matrices tabulate the external factors identified in the scoping process (columns) against the direct and\nindirect effects that had been captured in Tier 1 (rows). Under a single resource category (e.g., marine\nmammals), a separate Tier 2 matrix was prepared for each resource component (e.g., Steller sea lion, northern\nfur seal, harbor seal, etc.). The checklists include both beneficial and adverse environmental effects associated\nwith past, present, and potential future management decisions related to the status quo (Alternative 1) and,\nfor the other five policy alternatives, potential effects of future management decisions.\nExternal effects that could function additively or interactively with the direct and indirect effects of the\nalternatives are organized into two major categories (1) human controlled and (2) natural events. Human\ncontrolled effects include other fisheries (salmon and herring fisheries managed by the State of Alaska and\nthe halibut fishery managed by the International Halibut Commission), subsistence harvests, and commercial\nshipping. Oil and gas leasing activities on the outer continental shelf of the GOA and BSAI were considered\nbut are not incorporated into the analysis because such leasing is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future.\nNatural events considered include short-term climate changes, long-term (e.g., decadal scale or longer)\nclimate trends, and environmental regime shifts (Section 3.1.7).\nScreening\nAs explained above, a Tier 2 matrix was prepared for each resource component under each alternative. This\nmatrix was used as a tool to correlate direct and indirect effects of the alternative with the past and present\ninfluence of external factors (for Alternative 1 only) and with the potential future influence of external factors\nfor all six alternatives. As illustrated by the example in Figure 4.13-4, each Tier 2 matrix incorporates five\ncomponents in an additive fashion, from left to right:\n1. The significance rating for Alternative 1;\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-7","Evaluation of Impacts to Prohibited Species under Alternative 1 Groundfish Fishery Management\nEffect\nHalibut\nChinook\nChinook\nOther salmon\nOther salmon\n(BSAI and\nsalmon\nsalmon\n(BSAI)\n(GOA)\nGOA)\n(BSAI)\n(GOA)\nBycatch\nNS\nCS(-)\nU\nCS(-)\nNS\nSpatial and temporal\nNS\nU\nU\nU\nNS\nconcentrations\nof bycatch\nSpawning habitat\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\ndisruption\nPrey competition\nNS\nU\nU\nU\nNS\nSummary of the Direct and Indirect Effects of Each Alternative Regime Relative to Alternative 1\nManagement on Prohibited Species\nSpecies/Species group,\nRankings by Alternative\nFMP area, Effects\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nPacific halibut, all areas\nCatch relative to status quo\n0\n1\n2\n0\n0\n0\n1\n0\n-2\nSpatial and temporal concentration\n0\n1\n1\n-2\n0\n0\n0\n1\n-1\nSpawning habitat disruption\n0\n-1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n1\n0\n0\nPrey competition\n0\n2\n2\n1\n0\n1\n0\n0\n-2\nChinook salmon, BSAI\nCatch relative to status quo\n0\n2\n2\n1\n1\n1\n0\n1\n-1\nSpatial and temporal concentration\n0\n2\n2\n-1\n1\n1\n0\n1\n-1\nSpawning habitat disruption\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrey competition\n0\n1\n2\n0\n1\n1\n0\n1\n-1\nChinook salmon, GOA\nCatch relative to status quo\n0\n2\n2\n1\n0\n0\n0\n1\n-2\nSpatial and temporal concentration\n0\n2\n2\n-1\n0\n0\n0\n1\n-1\nSpawning habitat disruption\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrey competition\n0\n2\n2\n1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n-1\nOther salmon (chum), BSAI\nCatch relative to status quo\n0\n1\n2\n1\n1\n1\n0\n1\n-1\nSpatial and temporal concentration\n0\n2\n2\n-1\n0\n0\n0\n1\n-1\nSpawning habitat disruption\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrey competition\n0\n1\n2\n0\n1\n1\n0\n1\n-1\nOther salmon, GOA\nCatch relative to status quo\n0\n2\n2\n1\n0\n0\n0\n1\n-2\nSpatial and temporal concentration\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nSpawning habitat disruption\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nPrey competition\n0\n1\n2\n0\n1\n1\n0\n1\n-1\nExample of a Tier 1 matrix.\nFigure 4.13-3\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.13-8","STATUS QUO - PAST INFLUENCE - CHINOOK (Bering Sea)\nDirect/Indirect Effects\nExternal Effects\nof Groundfish Fishery\nPast\nHuman Controlled\nNatural\nInfluence?\nEvents\nCategory\nY/N\nForeign\nState\nResource\nClimate &\nFisheries\nFisheries\nDevelopment\nRegime\nDirect &\nDirect &\nShifts\nBycatch\nBycatch\n0\n0\nY\nBycatch\n-\n-\nY\nSpatial and temporal\nU\nU\n0\n0\n0\nY\nSpawning Habitat\n0\n0\n-\nCompetition for prey\nU\nU\n0\n+/-\nY\nSTATUS QUO - PRESENT/PREDICTED EFFECTS - CHINOOK (Bering Sea)\nDirect/Indirect Effects of\nExternal Effects\nGroundfish Fishery\nPast\nCumulative\nConditionally\nInfluence\nEffect\nSignificant\nRating\nHuman\nNatural\nY/N\nY/N\nY/N\nCategory\nControlled\nEvents\nStatus\nState\nClimate\nFisheries\n&\nquo\nCatch &\nRegime\nBycatch\nShifts\nY-\nY\nY\nBycatch\nCS-\n0**\n0\nSpatial and temporal\nU\nU\n0\nY\nY\nU\nN\nSpawning Habitat\nNS*\n0\n0\nY\nY\nY\nPrey\nU\nU\n+/-\nNotes: *No effect due to lack of groundfish fisheries interaction with freshwater spawning habitat\n**Protection of effects uncertain\nALTERNATIVE 2.1- PREDICTED EFFECTS - CHINOOK (Bering Sea)\nDirect/Indirect Effects of\nExternal Effects\nCumulative\nConditionally\nGroundfish Fishery\nEffect\nSignificant\nRating\nHuman\nNatural\nY/N\nY/N\nControlled\nEvents\nCategory\nStatus\n2.2\nState Fisheries\nClimate &\nScore\nCatch &\nRegime\nquo\nBycatch\nShifts\nY\nU\nBycatch\nCS-\n2\n0**\n0\nSpatial and temporal\nU\n2\nU\n0\nY\nU\nSpawning Habitat\nNS*\n0\n0\n0\nN\nY\nU\nPrey\nU\n2\nU\n+/-\nFigure 4.13-4 Example of a Tier 2 matrix.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-9","2. The impact score for the alternative under discussion, showing, for each resource component, how the\nalternative would push existing conditions in the direction of greater or lesser significance;\n3. Cells for identifying potential effects of external factors;\n4. A column for stating whether or not there is a potential cumulative effect; and\n5. A final column for evaluating whether or not the identified cumulative effect is significant, conditionally\nsignificant, or if the significance is unknown.\nFor screening, attention is focused on the cells denoting the influence of external factors on each direct or\nindirect effect listed in the left-hand column. If an additive or synergistic relationship is identified that could\npush the existing effect in a beneficial or adverse direction, this information is entered in the appropriate cell\nas + or -, respectively. If no relationship is identified, a +0 is entered; if there is insufficient information to\ndetermine a relationship, U is entered. When all of the external effects have been addressed, the possibility\nof a cumulative effect is indicated by rows that contain at least one + or - In such cases, a Y+ or Y- is entered\nin the cumulative effect column, indicating that a potential cumulative effect has been identified and that the\neffect would be either beneficial or adverse, respectively.\nEvaluating\nThe screening process yields potential cumulative effects but does not address their significance. The final\nstage of determining the significance of each potential cumulative effect is then completed in the evaluation\nprocess.\nEvaluating begins at the left side of the Tier 2 table and proceeds toward the right. For each category of direct\nor indirect effect, the significance rating of the status quo management regime is reviewed first. Second, the\ndirection in which the alternative would influence the significance rating (more adverse, more beneficial, or\nno change) is considered. Third, the external factors contributing to the potential cumulative effect and to its\ndirection (beneficial or adverse) are reviewed. If a status quo rating is determined to be significant or\nconditionally significant in a beneficial or adverse direction, and if the score for the alternative in conjunction\nwith the + or - rating for each external factor exerts a combined influence consistently in the same direction\nas the status quo rating, then the potential cumulative effect is evaluated as conditionally significant.\nThe term conditionally significant, as applied to cumulative effects, indicates that a firm prediction cannot\nbe made with respect to either (1) the actual occurrence of the effect in the future or (2) its level of\nsignificance. The term is used because of the low level of certainty regarding future direct and indirect effects\nof the six alternatives, future human activities not under the control of fisheries managers, and the\noverwhelming and unpredictable influence of climatic factors.\n4.13.1.3\nSummary of Cumulative Effects Assessment Procedure\nIn the sequential approach described in Section 4.13.1.2, the analysis followed CEQ (1997) guidance\nand\nprogressed through the four basic stages of scoping, organizing, screening, and evaluating potential\ncumulative effects. The basic sequence was to:\nDescribe the potential direct and indirect effects of each of the six alternatives (Tier 1);\nIdentify external factors such as other fisheries, other types of human activities, and natural\nphenomena that could have additive or synergistic effects (Tier 2);\nUse the Tier 2 matrix to screen all of the issues to capture those effects that are potentially cumulative\nin nature;\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-10","Evaluate the significance of the potential cumulative effects using criteria appropriate to the resource\ncategory in question; and\nDiscuss the reasoning that led to the evaluation, citing evidence from the peer-reviewed literature.\nThe advantages of this approach are that it (1) closely follows CEQ guidance, (2) employs an orderly and\nexplicit procedure, and (3) provides the reader with the information necessary to make an informed and\nindependent judgment concerning the validity of the conclusions.\nHistorical Review of Effects Resulting From Incremental Decision-making\n4.13.2\nWith passage of the Magnuson-Stevens Act in 1976, management of the North Pacific groundfish fisheries\noperating in the federal waters off the coast of Alaska was vested in the NMFS and the Secretary of\nCommerce in conjunction with the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (the Council). Subsequently,\nFMPs were developed for the GOA and the BSAI. A detailed history of the North Pacific groundfish fishery\nis presented in Section 2 of this document. This additional review now summarizes incremental\ndecisionmaking based on amendments to the GOA and BSAI FMPs for the North Pacific groundfish fisheries\nsince 1978.\nThe management of the North Pacific groundfish fishery has evolved into a complex process responsible for\nmaintaining the ecological integrity of the marine environment while at the same time maximizing economic\nopportunities derived from a healthy and stable fishing industry. Over the years, various aspects of the GOA\nand BSAI FMPs have been reevaluated and modified when necessary to improve the management process.\nSince the implementation of the GOA and BSAIFMPs (1978 and 1982, respectively), numerous amendments\nto the FMPs have been proposed and implemented. To date, 65 amendments to the GOA FMP and 67\namendments to the BSAI FMP have been proposed and/or implemented. The GOA and BSAI FMP\namendments are summarized in Appendices A and B. FMP amendments have been approved and\nimplemented in response to a wide variety of issues, including but not limited to correcting management\ninefficiencies, protecting target groundfish stocks, reducing bycatch of non-target species, conserving marine\nmammals and seabirds, conserving marine habitat, reducing post-harvest waste, providing better data for\nenforcement and management, and improving safety within the fishery.\nThis continuing process of weighing issues, measuring environmental and socioeconomic effects, and other\nmodifications to the GOA and BSAI FMPs has, over time, via the FMP amendments and other regulatory and\nin-season emergency actions, culminated in the current management system. While still largely reactive, the\nmanagement process attempts to be proactive in order to avoid looming problems before they surface or\nbecome unwieldy.\n4.13.2.1\nHistorical Review Methodology\nFor this SEIS, an historical review of GOA and BSAI FMP amendment decisions was conducted through a\nmatrix categorization process. It should be noted that only the original GOA and BSAI FMPs and approved\nand implemented amendments to the FMPs were included in these analyses. Proposed amendments, proposed\nregulatory amendments, and emergency in-season actions were not included in the analyses.\nThe first step screens the original GOA and BSAI FMPs and their associated approved and implemented\namendments for the specific management objectives each amendment sought to implement. These objectives\nare assigned to descriptive categories by their specific management intent(s). The descriptive categories and\ntheir definitions are:\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.13-11","Administrative\nTo establish a structured process for administering groundfish fisheries\n-\n- To correct inefficiency in administration of the fishery management process\n- To make the management process more understandable to users\n- To help facilitate enforcement of fishery regulations\n- To enhance data collection and record keeping\n- To improve reporting\n- To clarify the intent of past regulations\nAllocative\n- To make prosecution of groundfish fisheries more fair to user groups\n- To control the rate of groundfish harvest\n- To manage effort in groundfish fisheries\nBycatch\nTo minimize the incidental take of non-target groundfish species, undersized target groundfish,\n-\nand prohibited species\n- To avoid waste of marine resources\nTo facilitate full utilization of catches taken in groundfish fisheries\n-\nGear\n- To avoid gear conflicts, gear entanglement, or gear damage\nTo reduce fishing gear effects on the marine environment\n-\n- To avoid gear loss and subsequent \"ghost fishing\" of lost gear\nGroundfish Yield\n- To protect target groundfish stocks\nTo ensure productivity of groundfish stocks\n-\n- To maintain long term yield from groundfish stocks\n- To improve the quality of groundfish products\n- To protect groundfish habitat\nMarine Mammal and Seabird Conservation\n- To avoid fishing effects on marine mammals, birds, or habitat areas of critical concern\n- To avoid disturbance, injury, or mortality to marine mammals or seabirds\n- To protect marine mammal and seabird food sources\nSafety\nTo enhance safety at sea\n-\nManagement objectives are next entered into descriptive category spreadsheets and referenced by either a\nBSAI/GOA FMP page number or FMP amendment number. A brief description of the management objective\nand its intended effect is composed for each entry and the potential influences on resources are assessed. The\nresource categories are:\nMarine mammals\nSeabirds\nTarget groundfish\nNon-target groundfish\nProhibited species\nHabitat\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-12","The third step sorts information in the descriptive category spreadsheets by its potential influence(s) on\nresource categories. The resulting spreadsheets list FMP management objectives chronologically for each\nresource category (e.g., all management objectives regarding marine mammals are on one spreadsheet,\nobjectives relating to target groundfish species are on a separate spreadsheet, and SO on).\nThe final step considers management objectives and their intended effects over time within a given resource\ncategory. Succinct statements are composed for inclusion in the cumulative effect matrices and in the status\nquo cumulative effect assessment.\n4.13.2.2\nHistorical Review Summary\nThe potential effects of the original BSAI and GOA FMPs and their approved amendments were difficult to\nsubstantiate quantitatively. Given the inherently large fluctuations that occur naturally in fish populations and\nthe complexity of the North Pacific fishery, it is not feasible to identify biological responses to managerial\ndecisions designed to fine-tune fishery harvests under the mandate of both preserving stocks and maximizing\ncommercial exploitation. Therefore, potential effects of past FMP management actions are assessed using the\nfollowing qualitative labels:\nNon-conditional: A potential beneficial, neutral, or adverse effect that is likely to occur with\nreasonable expectation, irrespective of other factors.\nConditional: A potential beneficial, neutral, or adverse effect that is contingent on the accuracy of\nthe scientific rationale supporting the managerial decision and/or availability of data relating to a\ngiven resource.\nThe following sections summarize the results of the historical review of the North Pacific fishery management\nincremental decision-making process. The intended effects of management objectives in the GOA and BSAI\nFMPs and their approved amendments are discussed and the rationale for potential effects are included in\neach section. FMP amendments are denoted in the following manner: GOA FMP amendment 10 is listed as\nGOA 10.\nManagerial Actions: Various GOA and BSAI FMP amendments implemented administrative changes.\nGOA 4 and 34 corrected previous FMP language. GOA 1, 7, 8, and 18 kept the GOA FMP in place,\nconformed the GOA FMP with the BSAI FMP, and removed fishing season dates from the FMP amendment\nprocess. GOA 2, 6, and 11 and BSAI 1 and 2 established the framework and allocated groundfish quotas to\nthe domestic fisheries. GOA 21 and BSAI 16 established procedures for setting interim TACs SO that the\nfisheries could open on January 1. GOA 4, 8, and 22 modified the GOA regulatory districts. Since these\nactions provided for more effective fishery management, they are considered to have had a non-conditional\nbeneficial effect on the groundfish fisheries.\nThe original GOA FMP, GOA 22, and BSAI 17 allowed the issuing of experimental fishing permits for the\npurpose of testing gear efficiency, fishing techniques, bycatch mortality reduction techniques, and other\nmethodologies. It is inferred that information gained from activities conducted under experimental fishing\npermits leads to gains in the effectiveness of the groundfish fisheries. Therefore, these actions are considered\nto have had a conditionally beneficial effect on the groundfish fisheries.\nThe GOA and BSAI FMPs, GOA 4, 7, 11, 14, 15, 16, and 17, and BSAI 9, 11a, and 12 established and\nrevised recordkeeping and reporting requirements for vessels participating in the groundfish fisheries. The\nGOA and BSAI FMPs included provisions for observers on foreign fishing boats while GOA 18 and 30 and\nBSAI 13, 27, and 37 initiated and redefined the domestic fisheries observer program. Data from catch and\nobserver reports are important components of the fisheries management processes. Therefore, the\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-13","establishment of these programs and their continuing implementation are considered to have had a non-\nconditional beneficial effect on the groundfish fisheries.\nGeneral Bycatch Issues: Several FMP amendments were specifically implemented to reduce ghost fishing\nby lost gear. GOA 8 and 21 and BSAI 16 required biodegradable panels on sablefish pots and GOA 12\nprohibited using longline pots in the sablefish fishery. GOA 20 and BSAI 15 implemented the sablefish and\nPacific halibut IFQ programs and reduced derby-style fishing associated with these fisheries, thereby\ndecreasing the prevalence of gear entanglement and gear loss. Any reduction in ghost fishing is considered\nto have a conditionally beneficial effect.\nBSAI 13, 15, and 46 and GOA 3 and 20 increased apportionment of TGF quotas to the longline fleet, which\nequated to a decrease in bottom trawl quotas. BSAI 57 prohibited the use of non-pelagic trawls in the BSAI\npollock fishery. It is inferred that these measures improved the efficiency of groundfish harvest and as a\nconsequence decreased the incidental take of species in bottom trawls. Therefore, these measures are\nconsidered to have had a conditionally beneficial effect.\nBSAI 26 and 50 and GOA 29 and 50 were implemented to reduce post-harvest waste of incidentally-caught\nPacific halibut and salmon in specified groundfish fisheries by donating the bycatch to social service food\nbanks. Since Pacific halibut and salmon bycatch would typically be discarded in federal waters, these actions\nprovide the needy public with a non-conditional beneficial effect. The retention of Pacific halibut and salmon\nbycatch also provides an additional opportunity to collect biological samples and scientific data to support\nlong-term solutions to bycatch of these species. Therefore, these action are also considered to have had a\nnon-conditional beneficial effect on groundfish fisheries.\nGOA and BSAI 49 were implemented to reduce discards in the groundfish fisheries. The amendments\nrequired 100 percent retention of pollock and Pacific cod regardless of how or where the fish were caught\nunless the fish were unfit for human consumption. These measures, begun in 1998, have dramatically reduced\nthe discard rates of pollock and Pacific cod. Therefore, they are considered to have had a conditionally\nbeneficial effect on groundfish fisheries.\nMarine Mammals: Several FMP amendments have been implemented specifically for the direct protection\nand conservation of marine mammals. No-fishing buffer zones were established around habitats deemed\ncritical to walrus (BSAI 13 and 17) and Steller sea lions (BSAI 20 and GOA 25). GOA 45 and BSAI 28\ndispersed both temporally (GOA) and spatially (Aleutian Islands) target groundfish fishing efforts in order\nto reduce concentrated fishing effort, thereby reducing competition between the commercial fleet and marine\nmammals. Forage fish (e.g., capelin, eulachon, and sand lance) are a primary food source for marine\nmammals. GOA 39 and BSAI 36 prohibited the establishment of a commercial fishery targeting forage fish,\nthereby preserving the food resource. All of the above amendments, or pertinent portions thereof, are\nconsidered to have had a conditionally beneficial effect on marine mammals.\nSeabirds: Forage fish (e.g., capelin, eulachon, and sand lance) are an important food source for seabirds.\nGOA 39 and BSAI 36 prohibited the establishment of a commercial fishery targeting forage fish, thereby\npreserving the food resource. These FMP amendments are considered to have had a conditionally beneficial\neffect on seabirds.\nTarget Groundfish (TGF): GOA 21 and 46 deferred demersal shelf, blue, and black rockfish management\nto the State of Alaska. The management shift is considered to have had a conditionally beneficial effect, since\nState management is considered more responsive to the needs of these rockfish species.\nGOA 4 and BSAI 4 and 7 were early measures that opened up larger areas for the foreign fleet to catch their\nallocation of TGF. It is inferred that the increase in geographic area available for fishing has had a\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-14","conditionally neutral effect on groundfish stocks, since the allowable catch was already set under a\nconservation cap.\nGOA 4, 7, 11, and 13 and BSAI 2 and 4 allowed increased harvest of certain TGF (Atka mackerel, Pacific\ncod, and pollock) due to anticipated increases in stock biomass. Available data indicate that the given TGF\nstocks were capable of withstanding increased fishing pressure. Therefore, these actions are considered to\nhave had a conditionally neutral effect on the given TGF stocks.\nGOA 20, 21, 28, 41, 44, 56, and 57 and BSAI 15, 16, 23, 39, 44, 56, and 59 set limits on the harvesting\ncapacity of the groundfish fishery fleet, slowed the rate of catch, and established overfishing definitions for\ngroundfish stocks. It is inferred that these actions also improved conservation of TGF stocks; therefore, they\nare considered to have had a conditionally beneficial effect on TGF stocks.\nGOA and BSAI FMPs, GOA 5, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, and 31 and BSAI 1, 4, 12, 14, 15, and 28\nestablished and/or modified harvest quotas and seasonal allocations. Since these measures were implemented\nspecifically to sustain yields and conserve stocks, they are considered to have had a conditionally beneficial\neffect on TGF stocks.\nGOA 10, 32, and 38 were conservation measures taken to rebuild depressed Pacific ocean perch stocks. GOA\n18 and BSAI 11 and 17 were measures taken to provide protection to spawning pollock populations. Since\nthese measures were implemented specifically to conserve stocks they are considered to have had a\nconditionally beneficial effect on Pacific ocean perch and pollock stocks.\nNon-target Groundfish: BSAI 36 and GOA 39 defined a forage fish species category and prohibited the\nestablishment of commercial fisheries targeting forage fish species. Because these measures were\nimplemented specifically to conserve and safeguard forage fish species, they are considered to have had a\nconditionally beneficial effect on forage fish species.\nBSAI 13, 15, and 46 and GOA 3 and 20 increased apportionment of TGF quotas to the longline fleet, which\nequated to a decrease in bottom trawl quotas. GOA 12 prohibited the use of longline pot gear for the harvest\nof sablefish in favor of hook-and-line gear. It is inferred that these measures may have had offsetting results:\ndecreased grenadier bycatch from bottom trawls, and increased grenadier and skate bycatch in the longline\nfishery. Therefore, these measures are considered to have had a conditionally neutral effect on grenadier and\nskate stocks.\nProhibited Species: GOA and BSAI FMPs, GOA 14, 15, and 16 and BSAI 11, 11a, 21, and 25 defined\nprohibited species and established and refined the procedures for allocating prohibited species catch (PSC).\nSince the allowable PSC limits have decreased over the years, it is inferred that these actions have had a\nconditionally beneficial effect on prohibited species.\nBSAI 16 established herring savings areas and set herring PSC limits for the trawl fisheries to conserve stocks\nand reduce bycatch. The GOA and BSAI FMPs, GOA 9, 15, 18, 21, and 26, and BSAI 3, 10, 12a, 16, 21a,\n37, 40, 41, and 57 contained measures that established restrictions over time to lower bycatch of crab species.\nThese included closure of geographical areas to trawling, gear restrictions, and setting of crab PSC limits.\nThe original GOA and BSAI FMPs, GOA 4, 10, 18, 21, and 24, and BSAI 3, 10, 12a, 16, 16a, 19, 21, and\n57 contained measures that established restrictions over time to lower bycatch of Pacific halibut. This\nincluded closure of geographic areas to trawling, gear restrictions, setting of PSC limits, and most recently\nthe incorporation of Pacific halibut mortality as a measure of bycatch. BSAI 1a, 3, and 8 were early measures\nto control salmon bycatch by reducing salmon PSC limits over time. GOA 45 and BSAI 21b, 35, and 58\nattempted to address salmon bycatch using bycatch trigger amounts and area closures. All of these measures\nattempted to conserve and reduce bycatch; therefore, they are considered to have had conditionally beneficial\neffects on the prohibited species stocks.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-15","Habitat: GOA 14 and 55 and BSAI 9 and 55 defined and established habitat protection policies for the\nfuture conservation of groundfish stocks. It is inferred that these actions will provide a conditionally\nbeneficial effect to marine habitat.\nGOA 3 and 20 and BSAI 15 increased apportionment of TGF quotas to the longline fleet, which equated to\na decrease in bottom trawl quotas. BSAI 10 and 21a and GOA 9, 15, 18, and 26 closed specific geographic\nareas to bottom trawling, primarily for the protection of crab. The reduction of bottom trawling due to these\nmeasures could provide conditionally beneficial effects to benthic habitat in localized areas.\nIn contrast, BSAI 4 allowed fishing within 3 to 12 miles of the Aleutian Islands on the narrow margin of the\nContinental Shelf. The potential offsetting effects would be increased benthic damage around the Aleutian\nIslands and less damage in other areas. With BSAI 4, it is inferred that since more productive fishing grounds\nwere being accessed, fewer trawls would be required to reach harvest quotas resulting in less overall trawl\ndamage to the marine habitat. However, trawl damage tends to most severe in areas of highly localized\nfishing where the benthos is repeatedly disrupted. Decreased but more localized fishing effort might actually\nbe more damaging. The net habitat effect resulting from BSAI 4 could not be determined.\nConclusion: In response to scientific, stakeholder, public interest, and other inputs, the Council and NMFS\nhave rigorously and publicly weighed issues and promulgated changes to the groundfish fishery management\nprocess through a long series of FMP amendments. The decisionmaking process has been slow and\ncumbersome, but it has maintained a constant focus on the principal objectives of the 1976 Magnuson-\nStevens Act, as reauthorized periodically during the past 25 years: to optimize harvest of North Pacific\ngroundfish stocks for the maximum economic benefits to the nation. In the past decade, this focus has\nbroadened to include minimizing environmental effect, maximizing Alaskan coastal village participation, and\ndealing with special problems as they arise. The future of this highly democratic, participatory, and public\nprocess is unclear as the process will be forced to address increasingly complex \"mixtures\" of issues that,\nsynergistically, may not be understood at a level sufficient to allow resolution.\n4.13.3\nExternal Effects\nAs discussed in Section 4.13.1, a cumulative effects analysis takes into account the incremental impact of the\nproposed action when added to other past, present, and reasonablely foreseeable future actions (40 CFR\n1508.7). For the purposes of this SEIS, we have included in the definition of other actions both human\ncontrolled events such as other fisheries, pollution and industrial development, and natural events such as\ndisease, winter mortality, and short and long term climate change.\nIn order to ascertain the importance of the external impacts in the cumulative case, we produced a\ncomprehensive checklist for each resource category (marine mammals, seabirds, target species, non-target\nspecies, prohibited catch species, habitat, socioeconomic characteristics, and ecosystem). Within each\nresource checklist we divided the effects into the two main categories (1) human controlled events and natural\nevents. Due to inherent differences from natural resources, external effects impacting the socioeconomic\ncategory were developed to consider different events and topics (see Section 7 of Appendix J).\nInformation presented in the checklists was obtained from reviewing environmental impact statements,\nreports and resource studies, peer-reviewed literature, and from conferring with expert contributors to the\nSEIS. The checklists will be entered into the administrative record. Information provided in the detailed\nchecklists is used as a tool in conjunction with information obtained from expert contributors to determine\nthe +, or +0 ratings utilized in the Tier 2 matrices (Section 4.13.2 and Appendix J).\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-16","4.13.3.1\nHuman Controlled Events\nThe detailed checklists address the following external actions which could be considered human controlled:\nEffects from other fisheries - Direct catch, bycatch, and direct and indirect mortality from foreign,\njoint venture (JV), State of Alaska and international halibut fisheries, commercial hunting and\nharvesting (as applied to marine mammals), and subsistence harvests.\nAnthropogenic effects - pollution, oil and gas activities, logging, creation of infrastructure (ports and\nharbors), commercial shipping effects, harassment, and introduced mammals (specifically applicable\nto seabirds).\nHistorical Fisheries (Foreign Joint Venture, and Domestic): Other fisheries considered in this cumulative\neffects analysis include foreign fisheries both today and in the past, and past JV fisheries. In addition to the\nbrief summary provided below, Section 2.7.2 of this document provides a detailed discussion of the evolution\nof the fisheries management plans in use today and includes descriptions of the historical foreign, and JV\nfisheries. Figure 2.7-6 shows changes in the balance of domestic, JV, and foreign harvests over time.\nA very robust foreign groundfish fishery operated off Alaska long before the Magnuson-Stevens Act was\npassed in April 1976. The United States had little leverage to restrict the large offshore Japanese and Soviet\noperations during their initial build-up. U.S.-foreign bilateral agreements were the main mechanism for\nmanaging the foreign fisheries. By 1972-1973, foreign operations had spread from Alaska south to the Pacific\nCoast off Washington and Oregon, leaving very depressed stocks in their wake off Alaska. Catches of\nyellowfin sole in the eastern Bering Sea, for example, had fallen sharply following very large removals by\nJapan and the Soviet Union. Pacific ocean perch stocks in the GOA were decimated. Pollock catches were\nincreasing rapidly and were thought likely to follow the same pattern as perch and flatfish. When the\nMagnuson-Stevens Act was passed in 1976, groundfish fisheries were, for all practical purposes, totally\nforeign. Most measures were designed to lessen their impact on domestic fisheries for halibut and crab. U.S.\ncommercial fisheries were limited mainly to red king crab in the GOA and eastern Bering Sea, herring in\ncoastal waters, salmon, and halibut. Very little groundfish, other than sablefish and small amounts of Pacific\ncod off southeast Alaska, were taken by the domestic fleet.\nBy the end of 1985, only minor foreign fisheries, directed on pollock and Pacific cod, were being allowed\nin the GOA. Foreign harvesting continued in the Bering Sea. Even there, foreign trawling had ended within\n20 nautical miles (nm) of the Aleutian Islands, and foreign longlining for cod was restricted to north of 55°N\nand west of 170°W, depending on ice conditions. Foreign harvests dropped to less than 1 million mt in 1985.\nIn contrast, U.S.- foreign JVs had grown rapidly through the early 1980s. They harvested about 880,000 mt\nin 1985, using over 100 U.S. trawlers working within some 28 different company arrangements with such\ncountries as Japan, South Korea, Poland, the Soviet Union, Portugal, and Iceland. Completely domestic\nannual processing (DAP) reached 105,000 mt in 1985, mostly by trawler catcher/processors (a.k.a. factory\ntrawlers).\nDuring the five year period between 1986-1991, the groundfish fisheries became totally domestic. The last\nyears of foreign directed fishing in the GOA and BSAI were 1986 and 1987, respectively. Foreign JV\npeaked in 1987, and their last years of operation in the Gulf of Alaska and the Bering Sea were 1988 and\n1991, respectively. (Source for this entire subsection is Section 2.7.1.)\nCurrent Foreign Fisheries (outside the Exclusive Economic Zone): Agreement between Japan, People's\nRepublic of China, Republic of Korea, Republic of Poland, Russian Federation, and the United States that\nprovides a management structure for the pollock fishery in the central Bering Sea. The Convention was\ninitiated due to concern over the unregulated pollock fishery occurring in the central Bering Sea (\"Donut\nHole\") during the mid-to-late 1980s.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-17","The transboundary nature of pollock in the Bering Sea increases the stock's vulnerability to overfishing.\nCurrently the condition of pollock within the western Bering Sea is difficult to determine due to differences\nin survey approaches. If significant harvest of juvenile pollock that will recruit to the eastern Bering Sea\npopulation occurs in the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) there could be a reduction in the\nexploitable biomass and yield in the U.S. EEZ. Management decisions made on poor knowledge of the\npollock stock could be disastrous for the U.S. and Russian fisheries. (C. Pautzke, NPFMC - personal\ncommunication).\nHigh Seas Drift Net Fisheries: The world community did not consider high seas driftnetting a sustainable\nfishery. High bycatch, discards, and spoiled catch were associated with high seas driftnetting. United Nations\nGeneral Assembly Resolution 46/214 banned large-scale high seas drift net fishing beginning in 1993.\nNations of the world have for the most part complied with this non-binding resolution. With the exception\nof a few rogue vessels, this type of fishing is no longer conducted. The U.S. Coast Guard and Canadian\nMaritime Forces patrol the North Pacific to detect any possible illegal driftnet activity. (Source:\nhttp://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/fishing/)\nState of Alaska Fisheries: Table 4.13-3 summarizes the scope of State of Alaska managed fisheries in the\nBering Sea and Gulf of Alaska. Although not managed by the state, the International Pacific Halibut\nCommission (IPHC) fishery is included on this table.\nCommercial and Subsistence Hunting and Harvesting (Marine Mammals): Hunting has had a major\nimpact on populations of marine mammals in both the Bering Sea and GOA (NRC 1996). Over the past 200\nyears, nearly all species have been harvested for commercial an subsistence purposes. Grey whales, bowhead\nwhales, fur seals, walruses, and sea otters have been severely reduced, but their populations are recovering.\nSpecies of relatively low commercial value such as Steller sea lions, and several species of seals including\nharbor seals were not severely depleted by hunting, but have been consistently hunted for their subsistence\nuse.\nNative Subsistence Fisheries and Harvests: These fisheries have traditionally focused on near-shore\nspecies such as salmon, herring, shellfish (molluscan and crustacean), and a few demersal or groundfish\nspecies such as cod, halibut, and rockfish. These subsistence fisheries account for small amounts of fish\nrelative to the commercial fisheries, and they continue in the present time.\nOther Anthropogenic Effects: Of the anthropogenic effects listed above, pollution, harassment, and\nintroduced mammals were determined to be not significant at the level of population effects for all resource\ncategories (NRC 1996). Oil and gas leasing activities on the outer continental shelf of the GOA and BSAI\nwere considered but are not incorporated into the analysis because such leasing is unlikely in the reasonably\nforeseeable future. Depending on the resource category, logging, creation of infrastructure (ports and\nharbors), and commercial shipping effects are considered in the Tier 2 matrices.\n4.13.3.2\nNatural Events\nNatural events or phenomena considered in the checklists included:\nClimate effects - long and short term remotely forced sea surface temperature anomalies, and\ninterdecadal climactic changes (regime shift);\nLife cycle effects - winter mortality and disease; and\nTrophic interactions - predation, competition and changes in community structure.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-18","JANUARY 2001\n22 February 2000 ADF&G closed directed fishery for thornyhead, shortraker, and\nrougheye in 0 to 3 nm coastal water to SE Outside Subdistrict; 21 June 2000\nADF&G required full retention of rockfish in internal waters.\nNotes\ncurrently closed for species conservation\nTable 4.13-3 Alaska State Fisheries Information\nManaged by the IPHC\nflounder and sole\n4.13-19\ndinglebar, jig, longline, pot, and troll (hand)\ndiving, jig, longline, pots, purse seine\nGear Type(s)\njig, longline, pots, trawl, and troll\nlongline, pots, trawl, and troll\ngill net, purse seine, and troll\nshovel and hydro-diggers\ndiving and hand picking\ngill net and purse seine\njig, longline, and troll\njig, longline, and troll\npost and trawl\njig and troll\nbeam trawl\nlongline\ndredge\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\ndiving\ndiving\ndiving\ndiving\ndiving\ndiving\npots\nSoutheast Region\nOctopus and squid\nSea cucumber\nSea cucumber\nSea urchins\nSea urchins\nPacific cod\nStatewide\nGeoduck\nSablefish\nSablefish\nRockfish\nAbalone\nFishery\nAbalone\nLingcod\nLingcod\nSalmon\nScallop\nHerring\nShrimp\nHalibut\nFlatfish\nClams\nSnails","CHAPTER 4- - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nPrince William Sound. Cook Inlet limited to jig gear.\nNotes\nTable 4.13-3 (Cont.) Alaska State Fisheries Information\n4.13-20\nADF&G - Alaska Department of Fish and Game\nIPHC - International Pacific Halibut Commission\njig, longline, pots, and troll (hand)\nGear Type(s)\ngill net, purse seine, and troll\ngill net, purse seine, and troll\nCentral Region (Prince William Sound, Cook Inlet)\nWestern Region (Kodiak, Alaska Peninsula, BSAI)\nBSAI - Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\ngill net and purse seine\ngill net and purse seine\njig, longline, and pots\nlongline and trawl\npots and trawl\npelagic trawl\njig and pots\nlongline\nnm - nautical miles\njig\njig\nSE - southeast\nPacific cod\nPacific cod\nJANUARY 2001\nSablefish\nSablefish\nRockfish\nRockfish\nFishery\nLingcod\nSalmon\nSalmon\nHerring\nPollock\nShrimp\nHerring\nNotes:","Climate Effects: atmospheric forced sea surface temperature impacts. Two principal modes of remotely\nforced sea surface temperature anomalies include: shorter term El Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events\nand longer term Pacific decadal oscillations (PDO) (Mantua et al. 1997). These anomalies and their\nassociated environmental changes are discussed in detail in Section 3.1.9.\nThe regime shift of 1976/1977 is now widely recognized, as well as its associated far reaching consequences\nfor the large marine ecosystems of the North Pacific. The 50-70 year interdecadal variability (a two-regime\ncycle) has been prevalent from the eighteenth century to the present in North America and the likely cause\nis essentially an internal oscillation in the coupled atmosphere-ocean system. This suggests that the next\nclimatic regime shift is most likely to occur in the coming decade between 2000 and 2007. Long-term\nchanges in fish populations around the North Pacific have apparently been influenced by climatic change of\nthe same 50-70 year variability. Section 3.1.7 of this SEIS describes the regime changes and associated\nenvironmental impacts.\nIn many cases, the effects of climate shifts are scored as a \"+/-\" on the Tier 2 matrices. This score indicates\nthat the climate shift could have positive or negative effects depending on the direction of the shift (colder\nor warmer water) and the species or group under consideration.\nLife Cycle Effects: Disease was determined to be not significant at the level of population effects for all\nresource categories (NRC 1996), and therefore is not included on the Tier 2 matrices. In almost all cases, the\neffects of winter mortality of the species or group in a given resource category is unknown. This effect is\nalso not included in the matrices.\nTrophic Interactions: Where information was available, these interactions and how they shape community\nstructure are included in the checklists. The effects are brought forward to the Tier 2 matrices only in cases\nwhere an indirect cause/effect relationship could be established for a given resource category.\n4.13.4\nCumulative Effects Analyses Summaries\nThe following sections summarize the results of the cumulative effects analysis for each of the eight resource\ncategories. Tables within each subsection depict the results of the analysis for each cumulative effect\ncategory. The following key applies to all summary tables within this section:\nCS- - A conditionally significant adverse cumulative effect was identified.\nCS+ - A conditionally significant beneficial effect was identified.\nNCE - A cumulative effect was not identified.\nNS - A cumulative effect was identified, but it is not significant.\nU - Insufficient information to determine relationship.\n4.13.4.1\nMarine Mammals\nThe marine mammals or marine mammal groups considered in the analysis of cumulative effects include:\nSteller sea lion, northern fur seal, harbor seal, other pinnipeds, sea otters, toothed whales, and baleen whales\nSection 3.4 of the SEIS presents descriptions of these species and their important life history characteristics,\npopulation status, habitat requirements, prey species, and sensitivities to environmental stresses.\nDirect and indirect impacts of the alternatives on marine mammals are evaluated in Section 4.2 of the SEIS.\nFor this analysis, two direct and two indirect effects are evaluated:\nDirect Effects:\nIncidental take or entanglement\ndisturbance\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.13-21","Indirect Effects:\nPrey availability and abundance\nSpatial and temporal harvest of prey\nThe following summaries of cumulative effects for marine mammals or marine mammal groups focus on\nthese four effect categories across Alternatives 1-6. Tables 4.13-4 through 4.13-10 summarize the cumulative\neffects identified for each alternative by species or species group.\nSteller Sea Lions: For details on the following cumulative effects analysis, see Section 1.2 of Appendix J.\nFurther information on Steller sea lion cumulative effects can be found in the 2000 Biological Opinion\n(NMFS 2000c).\nTable 4.13-4 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Steller Sea Lions\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nIncidental take\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nDisturbance\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nIndirect Effects\nEffects on prey\nCS-\nNS\nNS\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nSpatial and temporal\nCS-\nNS\nNS\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nNotes: CS - conditionally significant\nNS - not significant\nIncidental Take\nIncidental take of sea lions is found to be cumulative based on the external effect of other fisheries and\nsubsistence when added to the numbers of sea lions taken by the groundfish fisheries. The cumulative effect\nis considered not significant since the overall take is below (88 percent) the potential biological removal\n(PBR) level of 234 animals per year for this species. The effect of take on sea lion populations is found to\nbe cumulative but considering the overall take is below the PBR, the cumulative effect is considered not\nsignificant across all alternatives.\nDisturbance\nDisturbance from vessel traffic and sound from trawling is an ongoing condition of groundfish fisheries in\nSteller sea lion critical habitat. Steller sea lions appear to be tolerant of at least some anthropogenic\ndisturbances. Overall, disturbance is found to be cumulative based on the contributions of external effects,\nprimarily from other fisheries. However, the cumulative effect is considered to be not significant for the\nstatus quo and across all other alternatives.\nEffects on Prey\nThe effect on prey species of the Steller sea lions is found to be cumulative based on contributions from\nexternal factors and the potential effects of overlaying the direct removal of large amounts of key prey species\n(pollock, Pacific cod and Atka mackerel) in the groundfish fisheries. Considering the direct removal of large\namounts of prey from sea lion foraging habitat and the lack of direct evidence that prey availability is not a\nfactor involved in the precipitous decline in population for the species, the cumulative effect on\nprey\nabundance and availability is considered to be conditionally significant adverse for all alternatives except\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-22","Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2. Under Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2, which are designed specifically to maximize\nprotection to marine mammals, this cumulative effect is found to be not significant. This finding is consistent\nwith that of 2000 Biological Opinion which addresses effect of groundfish fisheries on Steller sea lions\n(NMFS 2000c)\nSpatial and Temporal Harvest of Prev\nThe effect on the spatial and temporal harvest of sea lion prey is considered cumulative, and is found to be\nconditionally significant adverse under all alternatives except Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2, based on the\nunresolved questions concerning the effects of harvest of sea lion prey species within sea lion foraging\nhabitat. Under Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2, which are designed specifically to maximize protection to marine\nmammals, this cumulative effect is found to be not significant. This finding is consistent with the 2000\nBiological Opinion which addresses effects on Steller sea lion critical habitat (NMFS 2000c).\nNorthern Fur Seal: For details on the following cumulative effects analysis, see Section 1.3 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-5 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Northern Fur Seals\nAlternative\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nIncidental take\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nDisturbance\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nIndirect Effects\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nEffects on prey\nCS-\nNS\nNS\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nSpatial and temporal\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nNotes: CS - conditionally significant\nNS - not significant\nIncidental Take\nIncidental take of fur seals is found to be cumulative but the contribution of the groundfish fisheries is very\nsmall and approaches zero. Across all alternatives, the cumulative effect of take is not significant because of\nthe relatively large population size, and since existing take represents a very small portion of the PBR for this\nspecies.\nDisturbance\nA cumulative effect of disturbance is identified. However, lacking any indication of adverse effects from\ndisturbance, the cumulative effect is considered not significant. This was similar across all alternatives.\nEffects on Prey\nThe effect on fur seal prey is found to be cumulative based on external effects in combination with possible\neffects of the groundfish fisheries. Lacking evidence that recent population declines for fur seals are not\nrelated to food availability, fishery effects on prey are considered to be conditionally significant adverse.\nBased on these factors, cumulative effects on prey are also found to be conditionally significant adverse,\nalthough the contribution of the groundfish fisheries to this effect is believed to be small. With the exception\nof Alternatives 2. and 2.2 which were specifically designed to maximize protection to marine mammals, the\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-23","cumulative effect was found to be conditionally significant adverse across all alternatives. For Alternatives\n2.1 and 2.2 the accumulative effect is not significant.\nSpatial and Temporal Harvest of Prey\nA cumulative effect is identified for spatial and temporal harvest of prey based on external effects from other\nfisheries and potentially from climate change. Given the substantial decline in the fur seal population in\nrecent years and the possibility that the decline is food related, the cumulative effect is considered\nconditionally significant adverse under all alternatives except 2.2. For Alternative 2.2 the cumulative effect\nis found to be not significant.\nHarbor Seal: For details on the following cumulative effects analysis, see Section 1.4 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-6 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Harbor Seals\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nIncidental take\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nDisturbance\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nIndirect Effects\nEffects on prey\nCS-\nNS\nNS\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nSpatial and temporal\nCS-\nNS\nNS\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nNotes: CS - conditionally significant\nNS - not significant\nIncidental Take\nCumulative effects are identified for take based on the contribution of external effects from other fisheries\nand subsistence harvests. The contribution from the groundfish fisheries is quite small. Considering that the\ncumulative take is well below the PBR for this species, the cumulative effect is considered not significant\nacross all alternatives.\nDisturbance\nThe effect of disturbance is considered cumulative based on external effects such as other fisheries. However,\nthere is little evidence that suggests present levels of disturbance adversely affects harbor seals, therefore, the\ncumulative effect is considered not significant. This finding was similar across all other alternatives.\nEffects on Prey\nEffect of the fisheries on availability of prey is considered conditionally significant adverse, given uncertainty\nin determining the degree of impact from prey fish removals at more localized scales. Overlap in species\ntargeted by harbor seals and fisheries also occurs with state-managed fisheries such as salmon and herring.\nOther possible external effects can result from climate change (positive or negative) or a regime shift that\naffects prey species availability. With the contribution of external factors, a cumulative effect is identified\nand is rated as conditionally significant adverse for all alternatives except Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2.\nFor\nAlternatives 2.1 and 2.2, which were specifically designed to maximize protection to marine mammals,\nthe\ncumulative effect is found to be not significant.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-24","Spatial and Temporal Harvest of Prey\nTo the extent that a portion of harbor seal foraging may occur in areas fished by the groundfish fisheries,\nadverse effects could potentially occur. Therefore, this effect of the fishery is rated as conditionally\nsignificant adverse, although the level of overlap with fisheries is less pronounced with harbor seals as\ncompared to Steller sea lions. Present and predicted external influences on spatial and temporal harvest are\nidentified from other fisheries such as state-managed fisheries. The effect is found to be cumulative and\nrated as conditionally significant adverse for all alternatives except Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2. For Alternatives\n2.1 and 2.2 which were specifically designed to maximize protection to marine mammals, the cumulative ffect\nis found to be not significant.\nOther Pinnipeds: For details on the following cumulative effects analysis, see Section 1.5 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-7 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Other Pinnepeds\nAlternative\n6.2\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nIncidental take\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNS\nNS\nDisturbance\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nIndirect Effects\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nEffects on prey\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nSpatial and temporal\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNotes: NCE - no cumulative effect\nNS - not significant\nIncidental Take\nA cumulative effect of take is not identified under Alternative 1 based on the lack of a clear effect of the\ngroundfish fisheries on these species. This finding is similar across all other alternatives.\nDisturbance\nThe effects of disturbance on members of the other pinniped group under the status quo is found to be\ncumulative, but not significant. This finding is similar across all other alternatives.\nEffects on Prey\nThe effect on prey species of this diverse group is not found to be cumulative under the status quo since an\neffect from the groundfish fisheries could not be demonstrated. This finding is similar across all other\nalternatives.\nSpatial and Temporal Harvest of Prev\nThe effect of the spatial and temporal harvest of prey on this diverse group is not found to be cumulative since\nan effect from the groundfish fisheries could not be demonstrated. This finding is similar across all other\nalternatives.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-25","Sea Otters: For details on the following cumulative effects analysis, see Section 1.6 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-8 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Sea Otters\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nIncidental take\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nDisturbance\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nIndirect Effects\nEffects on prey\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nSpatial and temporal\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNotes: NCE - no cumulative effect\nIncidental Take\nA cumulative effect of take is not identified under Alternative 1 based on the lack of a clear effect of the\ngroundfish fisheries on these species. This finding is similar across all other alternatives.\nDisturbance\nThe effect of disturbance on sea otters under the status quo is not found to be cumulative due to the lack of\nan effect from the groundfish fisheries. This finding is similar across all other alternatives.\nEffects on Prey\nThe effect on prey species of sea otters is not found to be cumulative under the status quo since an effect from\nthe groundfish fisheries could not be demonstrated. This finding is similar across all other alternatives.\nSpatial and Temporal Harvest of Prey\nThe effect of the spatial and temporal harvest of prey of sea otters is not found to be cumulative since an\neffect from the groundfish fisheries could not be demonstrated. This finding is similar across all other\nalternatives.\nBaleen Whales: For details on the following cumulative effects analysis, see Section 1.7 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-9 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Baleen Whales\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nDirect Effects\nIncidental take\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nDisturbance\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nIndirect Effects\nEffects on prey\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nSpatial and temporal\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNotes: NCE - no cumulative effect\nNS - not significant\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-26","Incidental Take\nA cumulative effect of take is not identified under the status quo based on the lack of a clear effect of the\ngroundfish fisheries on these species. This finding is similar across all other alternatives.\nEffects on Prey\nThe effect on prey species of baleen whales is not found to be cumulative under the status quo since an effect\nfrom the groundfish fisheries could not be demonstrated. This finding is similar across all other alternatives.\nSpatial and Temporal Harvest of Prey\nThe effect of the spatial and temporal harvest of prey on baleen whales is not found to be cumulative under\nthe status quo since an effect from the groundfish fisheries could not be demonstrated. This finding is similar\nacross all other alternatives.\nDisturbance\nThe effect of disturbance on baleen whales is found to be cumulative, but not significant under the status quo.\nThis finding is similar across all other alternatives.\nToothed Whales: For details on the following cumulative effects analysis, see Section 1.8 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-10 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Toothed Whales\nAlternative\n6.1\n6.2\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nIncidental take\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nDisturbance\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nIndirect Effects\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nEffects on prey\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nSpatial and temporal\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNotes: NCE - no cumulative effect\nIncidental Take\nA cumulative effect of take is not identified under Alternative 1 based on the lack of a clear effect of the\ngroundfish fisheries on these species. This finding was similar across all other alternatives.\nDisturbance\nThe effect of disturbance on toothed whales is not found to be cumulative under the status quo due to the lack\nof an effect from the groundfish fisheries. This finding is similar across all other alternatives.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-27","Effects on Prey\nThe effect on prey species of toothed whales is not found to be cumulative under the status quo since an effect\nfrom the groundfish fisheries could not be demonstrated. This finding is similar across all other alternatives.\nSpatial and Temporal Harvest of Prey\nThe effect of the spatial and temporal harvest of prey on the toothed whale group is not found to be\ncumulative under the status quo since an effect from the groundfish fisheries could not be demonstrated. This\nfinding is similar across all other alternatives.\n4.13.4.2\nSeabirds\nStatus Quo\nThe seabirds or seabird groups considered in the analysis of cumulative effects include: northern fulmars,\nshort-tailed albatross, other albatross and shearwaters, piscivorous seabirds, and eiders. Section 3.5 of the\nSEIS presents descriptions of these and other seabirds and their important life history characteristics, habitat\nrequirements, food habits, and sensitivities to environmental stresses.\nDirect and indirect impacts of the alternatives on sea birds are evaluated in Section 4.3 of the SEIS. For this\nanalysis, one direct and three indirect effects are evaluated:\nDirect Effects:\nIncidental take or entanglement\nIndirect Effects:\nPrey availability\nprocessing waste and offal\nBenthic habitat damage\nThe following summaries of cumulative effects for seabirds or seabird groups focus on these four effect\ncategories across Alternatives 1-6. Tables 4.13-11 through 4.13-16 summarize the cumulative effects\nidentified for each alternative by species or species group.\nNorthern Fulmars: For details on the following cumulative effects analysis for northen fulmars, see Section\n2.1 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-11 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Northern Fulmars\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nIncidental take\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nIndirect Effects\nEffects on prey\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nProcessing waste\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nand offal\nNotes: NCE - no cumulative effect\nNS - not significant\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-28","Incidental Take\nTake of northern fulmars in both the BSAI and GOA is considered to be a cumulative effect based on the\ncontribution from the groundfish fisheries and external factors. This cumulative effect is considered not\nsignificant across all alternatives based on the relatively low level of take from all sources compared the\noverall size of the regional population. The external effects from State-managed and halibut fisheries are\nidentified as contributing to the overall mortality of fulmars but this level of take is not found to be sufficient\nto affect northern fulmars at the population level.\nEffects on Prev\nA cumulative effect is not identified on prey availability and abundance of northern fulmars; this finding is\nrelevant across all alternatives. Low volumes of forage fish are caught as bycatch in the groundfish fisheries.\nThere is evidence that the observed levels of bycatch have little overall effect on the availability or abundance\nof prey for seabirds, including fulmars.\nProcessing Waste and Offal\nThe effect of processing waste and offal is found to be cumulative based on contributions from other fisheries.\nThis cumulative effect is found to be not significant across all alternatives due to on the lack of evidence of\nan adverse effect on the seabird populations and the large numbers of fulmars in the BSAI and GOA.\nShort-tailed Albatross: For details on the following cumulative effects analysis for short-tailed albatross,\nsee Section 2.2 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-12 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Short-Tailed Albatross\nAlternative\n6.2\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nIncidental take\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nIndirect Effects\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nEffects on prey\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nProcessing waste\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nand offal\nNotes: CS - conditionally significant\nNCE - no cumulative effect\nIncidental Take\nTake of the endangered short-tailed albatross is considered to be a cumulative effect. While very few albatross\nare taken incidentally in the groundfish fishery, due to the critically small population size of this endangered\nspecies, any longline mortality is of concern. Present and predicted external effects are identified\nfor\nincidental take of albatross by foreign fisheries, State-managed fisheries, and the IPHC halibut fisheries.\nBecause of these added effects of external factors, and the uncertainty regarding the success of the bycatch\nreduction methods, incidental take is considered to be a conditionally significant adverse cumulative effect\nacross all alternatives.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-29","Effects on Prey\nA cumulative effect is not identified on prey availability and abundance for the short-tailed albatross; this\nfinding is true across all alternatives. Low volumes of forage fish and squid are caught as bycatch in the\ngroundfish fisheries but there is evidence than this level of bycatch has little overall effect on the availability\nor abundance of prey for short-tailed albatross due to the birds' extensive range and small numbers in this\nregion.\nProcessing Waste and Offal\nThe effect of processing waste and offal on short-tailed albatross is not found to be cumulative across all\nalternatives. Due to the bird's extensive range and small numbers in this region, foreign fisheries, state-\nmanaged fisheries and IPHC halibut fisheries are not identified as contributing significant amounts of\nprocessing waste and offal which might be eaten by the short-tailed albatross; therefore, no external effects\nare identified.\nOther Albatross and Shearwaters: The species group consists of two non-breeding albatross - the black-\nfooted and Laysan's albatross, and two species of shearwaters - the short-tailed and the sooty shearwaters.\nThese birds cover large distances during their migration. For details on the following cumulative effects\nanalysis for each stock, see Section 2.3 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-13 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Other Albatross and\nShearwaters\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nIncidental take\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nIndirect Effects\nEffects on prey\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nProcessing waste\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nand offal\nNotes: NCE - no cumulative effect\nNS - not significant\nIncidental Take\nTake of the Laysan's and black-footed albatross and shearwaters is considered a cumulative effect based on\ncontribution of the groundfish fisheries and external factors such as halibut fisheries, state-managed fisheries,\nand foreign fisheries in other parts of their range. The contribution of groundfish fisheries to this cumulative\neffect is relatively small. This cumulative effect is not significant across all alternatives due to the relatively\nlow numbers of birds taken compared to the large population size for these species.\nEffects on Prey\nA cumulative effect is not identified across all alternatives for prey availability and abundance. Low volumes\nof forage fish and squid are caught as bycatch in the groundfish fisheries. However, due to the extensive\nrange of these species, and lack of overlap of prey with the catch of the groundfish fisheries, the removals\ndo not affect the availability or abundance of prey for albatross and shearwaters.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-30","Processing Waste and Offal\nAlthough external effects are identified from foreign fisheries, state-managed fisheries and IPHC halibut\nfisheries as contributing processing waste and offal which might be eaten by fulmars, it is uncertain as to\nwhether the groundfish fisheries contribute to the effect. Therefore, a cumulative effect is not identified for\nthis category.\nPiscivorous Seabirds: For this analysis, piscivorous seabirds include common and thick-billed murres, red-\nlegged and black-legged kittiwakes, glaucous-winged gulls, murrelets, tufted and horned puffins, and\nrhinoceros auklets. For details on the following cumulative effects analysis for each stock, see Section 2.4\nof Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-14 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Piscivorous Seabirds\nAlternative\n6.1\n6.2\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nIncidental take\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nIndirect Effects\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nEffects on prey\nU\nU\nU\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nProcessing waste\nNS\nNS\nand offal\nNotes: NS - not significant\nU - unknown\nIncidental Take\nTake of the members of the piscivorous seabird group is considered a cumulative effect based on the\ncontribution of the groundfish fisheries and external factors such as halibut fisheries, state-managed fisheries,\nand foreign fisheries in other parts of their range. The analysis also considers the effects of natural events\nleading to seabird mortality. The contribution of groundfish and other fisheries to this cumulative effect is\nrelatively small as compared to the effects of natural and climatic events. This cumulative effect is not\nsignificant across all alternatives due to the relatively low numbers of birds taken compared to the large\npopulation size for these species.\nEffects on Prey\nA cumulative effect is identified on prey availability and abundance of piscivorous seabirds and is rated as\nunknown across all alternatives. There is a potential for localized reductions in prey around colonies, since\nlow volumes of forage fish and squid are caught as bycatch in the groundfish and other fisheries. However,\nit is not known what effect this the amount of bycatch has overall effect on the availability or abundance of\nprey for these species.\nProcessing Waste and Offal\nThe effect of processing waste and offal is found to be cumulative based on the contribution from other\nfisheries. This cumulative effect is found to be not significant across all alternatives.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-31","Eiders: This species group consists of two species of threatened eiders: the spectacled eider and the Steller's\neider. For details on the following cumulative effects analysis for these species, see Section 2.5\nof\nAppendix J.\nTable 4.13-15 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Spectacled and Steller's\nEider\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nIncidental take\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nIndirect Effects\nEffects on prey\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nEffects on benthic\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nhabitat\nNotes: NCE - no cumulative effect\nNS - not significant\nIncidental Take\nA cumulative effect is not identified for take of either of these eider species based on a lack of effect of the\ngroundfish fisheries. The results are identical for all alternatives. Spectacled and Steller's eiders are not likely\nto be directly affected by the BSAI and GOA groundfish fisheries due to a lack of overlap in their the winter\ndistribution and the groundfish fisheries.\nEffects on Prey\nA cumulative effect is not identified for prey availability and abundance of benthic prey of eiders based on\na lack of a clear effect of the groundfish fisheries on the eider's benthic invertebrate prey during winter. Only\nthe Steller's eider interacts with the groundfish fisheries in any appreciable manner and the overlap of critical\nhabitat is very limited.\nEffect on Benthic Habitat\nThe effect on benthic habitat is found to be cumulative based on the contribution from other fisheries and\nnatural forces. This cumulative effect is found to be not significant regarding eider habitat, and this is the\ncase across all alternatives. Based on the extensive areas set aside as eider critical habitat and the limited\neffects from the groundfish fisheries, this cumulative effect is considered to be not significant.\nOther Seabirds: The species group consists of the remainder of resident seabirds which live in the BSAI and\nGOA at some time during the year and have limited overlap with the groundfish fisheries either by foraging\nbehavior or by their prey base. These include inshore species such as cormorants, several species of sea ducks,\nand pelagic feeding planktivores such as phalaropes, auklets and storm-petrels. For details on the following\ncumulative effects analysis, see Section 2.6 of Appendix J.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-32","Table 4.13-16 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Other Seabirds\nAlternative\n6.1\n6.2\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nIncidental take\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nIndirect Effects\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nEffects on prey\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nEffects on benthic\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nhabitat\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nProcessing waste\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nand offal\nNotes: NCE - no cumulative effect\nIncidental Take\nAlthough individuals within this species group are taken or entangled in gear from the groundfish fishery on\nrare occasions, effects of take are negligible due to the groundfish fisheries and, therefore, a cumulative effect\nis not identified.\nEffects on Prev\nBased on the very limited overlap of prey species of birds in this group and fish targeted by the groundfish\nfisheries or other fisheries, a cumulative effect is not identified.\nBenthic Habitat\nSeveral members of this group are benthic feeders and some overlap of habitat and areas fished with bottom\ntrawls occurs. However, there is a lack of evidence that trawling adversely affects these species through\ndamage to benthic habitat. Based on this lack of effect from groundfish fisheries, a cumulative effect is not\nidentified.\nProcessing Waste and Offal\nMany of the species in this group would not be attracted to processing waste based on their food requirements\n(plankton, benthic organisms, other invertebrates). Therefore, a cumulative effect is not identified relative\nto the discharge of processing waste and offal.\nTarget Groundfish Species\n4.13.4.3\nThe major target groundfish species considered in this analysis include: pollock, Pacific cod, Atka mackerel,\nsablefish, Greenland turbot, arrowtooth flounder, flathead sole, rock sole, other flatfish, and rockfish such\nas Pacific ocean perch, northern rockfish and thornyheads. Section 3.3 of the SEIS presents descriptions of\nmajor target species summarizing important life history traits, their habitat environment, prey base, stock\nassessment and status of the stocks.\nDirect and indirect impacts of the alternatives on all TGF were evaluated in Section 4.4 of the SEIS. Two\ndirect and two indirect effects were considered:\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-33","Direct Effects:\nFishing mortality\nspatial and temporal concentration of the catch\nIndirect Effects:\nPrey availability\nhabitat suitability\nThe following summaries of cumulative effects for individual stocks or assemblages of target groundfish\nfocus on theses four effect categories across Alternatives 1-6. Tables 4.13-17 through 4.13-36 summarize\nthe cumulative effects identified for each alternative by species or species group.\nWalleye Pollock: Walleye pollock is managed as two separate stocks, one under the BSAI Groundfish FMP,\nand the other under the GOA groundfish FMP. For details on the following cumulative effects analysis for\neach stock, see Section 3.2 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-17 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Walleye Pollock in the\nEastern Bering Sea and the Gulf of Alaska\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nFishing mortality\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nSpatial and temporal\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nconcentration\nIndirect Effect\nHabitat suitability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nPrey availability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNotes:\nNCE - no cumulative effect\nNS - not significant\nFishing Mortality\nA cumulative effect is identified for fishing mortality in both the eastern Bering Sea and GOA pollock stocks\nunder the status quo and all alternatives. The cumulative effect is rated as not significant across all\nalternatives since the overfishing level (OFL) of the stocks are not expected to be reached. The external\neffects from state or Russian pollock fisheries are identified but are insufficient in magnitude to push the\nfishing effort close to the OFL threshold\nSpatial and Temporal Concentrations of Catch\nAlthough past external actions that likely affected the stocks are identified for spatial and temporal\nconcentrations of the fishery, it was determined that the effects would not linger and be observable in the\ndistribution of the present populations (AFSC workshop September 2000). No external effects\nwere\nidentified SO there is no cumulative effect under the status quo and all alternatives.\nHabitat Suitability\nA cumulative effect is identified for habitat suitability under the status quo and all alternatives but it is not\nsignificant. Natural events related to climate change were identified, but were not determined to be of the\nmagnitude to jeopardize either stock's ability to sustain itself above the maximum stock's MSST.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-34","Prey Availability\nA cumulative effect is identified on prey availability under the status quo and all alternatives. The external\nfactors have been determined to be of insufficient magnitude to affect the stocks' MSST. Therefore, the\ncumulative effect is not significant under the status quo and all alternatives.\nPacific Cod: Pacific cod is managed as two separate stocks, one under the BSAI groundfish FMP, and the\nother under the GOA Groundfish FMP. For details on the following cumulative effects analysis for each\nstock, see Section 3.3 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-18 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Pacific Cod in the Eastern\nBering Sea and the Gulf of Alaska\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nFishing mortality\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nCS\nSpatial and temporal\nNS*\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nconcentration\nIndirect Effect\nHabitat suitability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nPrey availability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\n*GOA only, there is no cumulative effect on eastern Bering Sea stocks\nNotes:\nNCE - no cumulative effect\nNS - not significant\nFishing Mortality\nA cumulative effect is identified for fishing mortality in both the eastern Bering Sea and GOA Pacific cod\nstocks under the status quo and all alternatives. For Alternatives 1 through 6.1, the cumulative effect is rated\nas not significant since the OFL of the stocks is not expected to be reached. The external effects from halibut\nlongline, crab (direct and bait) and State of Alaska Pacific cod fisheries (GOA only) are identified but are\ninsufficient in magnitude to push the fishing mortality close to the OFL threshold. For Alternative 6.2, the\ncumulative effect is rated as conditionally significant adverse. The effect of the alternative on fishing\nmortality was to push the stocks right to the OFL threshold. The additional external adverse effects from the\nhalibut longline, crab (in the BSAI and GOA) and state fishery (in the GOA only) could move the stocks\nabove OFL.\nSpatial and Temporal Concentrations of Catch\nNo existing past, present or predicted external effects are identified for the BSAI stock SO there is no\ncumulative effect in the BSAI under the status quo or any of the alternatives. The lingering past negative\ninfluence of the localized state fishery contributes to the cumulative case in the GOA. However, the effect\nis insufficient in magnitude to adversely affect the sustainability of the stock MSST. The cumulative effect\nis considered to be not significant in the GOA under the status quo. There is no cumulative effect under all\nother alternatives.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-35","Habitat Suitability\nA cumulative effect is identified for habitat suitability under the status quo and all alternatives but it is not\nsignificant. Natural events related to climate change were identified, but were not determined to be of the\nmagnitude to jeopardize either stock's ability to sustain itself above MSST.\nPrey Availability\nA cumulative effects is identified for prey availability under the status quo and all alternatives. The external\nfactors have been determined to be of insufficient magnitude to affect the stocks' MSST. Therefore, the\ncumulative effect is not significant under the status quo and all alternatives.\nAtka Mackerel: Atka mackerel is managed as two separate stocks, one under the BSAI groundfish FMP,\nand the other under the GOA groundfish FMP For details on the following cumulative effects analysis for\neach stock, see Section 3.4 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-19 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Atka Mackerel in the Bering\nSea and Aleutian Islands\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nFishing mortality\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nSpatial and temporal\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nIndirect Effect\nHabitat suitability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nU\nCS-\nPrey availability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNotes: CS - conditionally significant\nNCE - no cumulative effect\nNS - not significant\nU - unknown\nTable 4.13-20 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Atka Mackerel in the Gulf of\nAlaska\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nFishing mortality\nU\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nSpatial and temporal\nU\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nIndirect Effect\nHabitat suitability\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nPrey availability\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nNotes: NCE - no cumulative effect\nU - unknown\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-36","Fishing Mortality\nDue to past external effects, a cumulative effect is identified for Alternative 1 in the GOA stock, but the\nsignificance of the effect is unknown since the effect on status quo is unknown. For Alternatives 2 through\n6 in the GOA and all alternatives in the BSAI, there are no past, present, or predicted external effects, SO there\nis no cumulative effect.\nSpatial and Temporal Concentrations of Catch\nDue to the past influence in the GOA, a cumulative effect is identified for Alternative 1 for this stock, but the\nsignificance is unknown since the effect on status quo is unknown. There are no past, present, or predicted\nexternal effects, SO there is no cumulative effect on all other alternatives in the GOA and all alternatives in\nthe BSAI.\nHabitat Suitability\nA cumulative effect is identified for habitat suitability across all alternatives in both stocks. However, they\nare not significant under Alternatives 1 through 5 in the BSAI stock and unknown across all alternatives in\nthe GOA stock. For Alternative 6.1 in the BSAI, the effect of the alternative is unknown, therefore the\nsignificance of the cumulative effect is unknown. Under Alternative 6.2 in the BSAI stock, the stock is\npushed to its MSST. External effects of climate could have negative effects on the population leading to a\nconditionally significant adverse effect. However, if the climate effects provided an increase in favorable\nconditions for the fish, the effect would be not significant in the cumulative case.\nPrey Availability\nA cumulative effect is identified for prey availability across all alternatives in both stocks. However, it is not\nsignificant in the BSAI stock and unknown in the GOA stock\nSablefish: Sablefish in Alaskan waters are assessed as a single stock (Sigler et al. 1999). For details on the\nfollowing cumulative effects analysis for the stock, see Section 3.5 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-21 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Sablefish\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nFishing mortality\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nSpatial and temporal\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nconcentration\nIndirect Effect\nNS\nHabitat suitability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nCS+\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nPrey availability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNotes: CS - conditionally significant\nNS - not significant\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-37","Fishing Mortality\nA cumulative effect is identified across all alternatives, but it is not significant. The external effects from\nhalibut longline, State of Alaska sablefish fishery and the Canadian fishery in Canadian waters are identified\nbut are insufficient in magnitude to push the fishing mortality close to the OFL threshold.\nSpatial and Temporal Concentrations of Catch\nA cumulative effect is identified across all alternatives, but it is not significant. The external effect in the form\nof the present day state fishery is insufficient in magnitude to adversely affect the MSST.\nHabitat Suitability\nA cumulative effect is identified across all alternatives, but it is not significant for Alternatives 1, 2, 4, 5, and\n6. The past, present, and predicted external effects from halibut and state fisheries, climate change are\nidentified, but are determined to be of insufficient magnitude to affect the stock's MSST. For Alternative\n3 the cumulative effect is rated as conditionally significant beneficial. The alternative increases habitat\nprotection by 20 percent and the external factors are not expected to negate the positive effect.\nPrey Availability\nA cumulative effect is identified across all alternatives, but it is not significant. Past, present, and predicted\nexternal factors including the state fishery, and climate effects are determined to be of insufficient magnitude\nto affect the stock's MSST.\nGreenland Turbot and Deep Water Flatfish: Greenland turbot is managed as its own stock under the BSAI\ngroundfish FMP. However, in the GOA the species is managed as the deep water flat fish assemblage that\nalso includes Dover sole and deep sea sole (DiCosimo 1998). For details on the following cumulative effects\nanalysis for each stock, see Section 3.6 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-22 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Greenland Turbot in the Bering\nSea and Aleutian Islands\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nFishing mortality\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nSpatial and temporal\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nconcentration\nIndirect Effect\nHabitat suitability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nPrey availability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNotes: NCE - no cumulative effect\nNS - not significant\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-38","Table 4.13-23 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Deep Water Flatfish in the Gulf\nof Alaska\nAlternative\n6.1\n6.2\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nNS\nNS\nNS\nFishing mortality\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nU\nU\nSpatial and temporal\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nconcentration\nIndirect Effect\nU\nU\nU\nHabitat suitability\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nPrey availability\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nNotes: NS - not significant\nU - unknown\nFishing Mortality\nA cumulative effect is identified for each stock due to the existence of a halibut longline fishery in each\nregion that may take some of the flatfish as bycatch. However, the magnitude and intensity of the halibut\nfisheries are not expected to be sufficient to push either stock over its OFL. The cumulative effect across all\nalternatives for each stock is not significant.\nSpatial and Temporal Concentrations of Catch\nThe past influence of the fisheries in the GOA is unknown, the effect of the status quo is unknown, and the\neffect of the halibut fishery is unknown. A cumulative effect is possible across all alternatives for the deep\nwater flatfish stock, but its significance is unknown. There are no lingering past, present, or predicted\nexternal effects in the BSAI Greenland turbot stock, SO there is no cumulative effect under any of the\nalternatives.\nHabitat Suitability\nThe past influence of the fisheries in the GOA is unknown, the effect of the status quo is unknown since\nMSST for the stock is unknown, and the effect of the halibut fishery is unknown. A cumulative effect is\npossible across all alternatives for the deep water flatfish stock, but its significance is unknown. A cumulative\neffect is identified for the BSAI Greenland turbot stock. The halibut longline fishery, and natural events\nrelated to climate change are identified for the stock, but are determined to be of insufficient magnitude to\naffect the Greenland turbot stock's MSST. Therefore the cumulative effect is not significant.\nPrey Availability\nThe past influence of the fisheries in the GOA is unknown, the effect of the status quo is unknown since\nMSST for the stock is unknown, and the effect of the halibut fishery is unknown. A cumulative effect is\npossible across all alternatives for the deep water flatfish stock, but its significance is unknown. A cumulative\neffect is identified for the BSAI Greenland turbot stock. The halibut longline fishery, and natural events\nrelated to climate change are identified for the stock, but we are determined to be of insufficient magnitude\nto affect the Greenland turbot stock's MSST. Therefore the cumulative effect is not significant under all\nalternatives.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-39","Arrowtooth Flounder: Arrowtooth flounder is managed as two separate stocks, one under the BSAI\ngroundfish FMP, and the other under the GOA groundfish FMP. For details on the following cumulative\neffects analysis for each stock, see Section 3.7 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-24 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Arrowtooth Flounder in\nthe Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands and the Gulf of Alaska\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nFishing mortality\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nSpatial and temporal\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nconcentration\nIndirect Effect\nHabitat suitability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nPrey availability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNotes: NCE - no cumulative effect\nNS - not significant\nFishing Mortality\nA cumulative effect is identified across all alternatives, but it is not significant in both the BSAI and GOA\nstocks. The external effects from the halibut longline fishery and natural events are identified but are\ninsufficient in magnitude to push the fishing mortality close to the OFL threshold.\nSpatial and Temporal Concentrations of Catch\nNo lingering past, present, or predicted external effects are identified SO there is no cumulative effect across\nall alternatives in either stock.\nHabitat Suitability\nA cumulative effect is identified across all alternatives, but it is not significant in either stock. The effects\nof the halibut longline fishery and natural events related to climate change are identified as external factors,\nbut are determined to be of insufficient magnitude to affect the stock's MSST.\nPrey Availability\nA cumulative effect is identified across all alternatives, but it is not significant in either stock. Past, present,\nand predicted external factors are identified but have been determined to be of insufficient magnitude to affect\nthe stock's MSST.\nFlathead Sole: Flathead sole is managed as two separate stocks, one under the BSAI groundfish FMP, and\nthe other under the GOA groundfish FMP. For details on the following cumulative effects analysis for each\nstock, see Section 3.8 of Appendix J.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-40","Table 4.13-25 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Flathead Sole in the Bering Sea\nand Aleutian Islands\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nFishing mortality\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nSpatial and temporal\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nconcentration\nIndirect Effect\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nHabitat suitability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nPrey availability\nNS\nNS\nU\nU\nNS\nNS\nU\nU\nU\nNotes:\nNCE - no cumulative effect\nNS - not significant\nU - unknown\nFishing Mortality\nDue to the past influence in the GOA and the presence of the negative effects from the existing halibut\nfishery, a cumulative effect is identified across all alternatives for this stock However, the addition of the\nmortality from the halibut fishery is not expected to be of sufficient magnitude to exceed the stock's OFL.\nTherefore, the cumulative effect is not significant. There are no lingering past influence and no external\neffects in the BSAI stock, SO there is no cumulative effect under any of the alternatives.\nTable 4.13-26 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Flathead Sole in the Gulf of\nAlaska\nAlternative\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nNS\nNS\nNS\nFishing mortality\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nSpatial and temporal\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nconcentration\nIndirect Effect\nU\nU\nU\nU\nHabitat suitability\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nPrey availability\nU\nU\nU\nU\nNotes:\nNS - not significant\nU - unknown\nSpatial and Temporal Concentrations of Catch\nThe past influence of the fisheries in the GOA is unknown, the effect of the status quo is unknown since\nMSST for the stock is unknown, and the effect of the halibut and scallop fisheries is unknown. A cumulative\neffect is possible for the GOA stock, but its significance is unknown across all alternatives. There are no\nlingering past influence and no external effects in the BSAI stock, SO there is no cumulative effect under any\nof the alternatives.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-41","Habitat Suitability\nThe past influence of the fisheries in the GOA is unknown, the effect of the status quo is unknown since the\nstock's MSST is unknown, and the effect of the halibut and scallop fisheries is either positive or negative.\nA cumulative effect is possible for the GOA stock, but its significance is unknown across all alternatives. The\nnatural events related to climate change are identified for the BSAI stock, but are determined to be of\ninsufficient magnitude to affect the flathead sole stock's MSST. A cumulative effect is identified; however,\nit is not significant across all alternatives in the BSAI stock.\nPrey Availability\nIn the GOA stock, the effect of the status quo is unknown since the stock's MSST is unknown, and the effect\nof the climatic factors is either positive or negative. A cumulative effect is possible for the GOA stock, but\nits significance is unknown across all alternatives. For the BSAI stock, natural events related to climate\nchange are identified, but are determined to be of insufficient magnitude to affect the stock's MSST. The\ncumulative effect is not significant for the Alternatives 1, 2.1 1, 4.1, and 4.2 in the BSAI.\nEffects of Alternatives 2.2, 3, 5, 6.1, and 6.2 in the BSAI on prey availability are unknown relative to the\nstatus quo. Although the presence of external effects in the form of climate change indicates that a\ncumulative effect is possible, the significance of the effect under these alternatives is unknown.\nRock Sole: Rock sole is managed as a single stock under the BSAI groundfish FMP. For details on the\nfollowing cumulative effects analysis for the stock, see Section 3.9 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-27 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Rock Sole in the Bering Sea and\nAleutian Islands\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nFishing mortality\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nSpatial and temporal\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nconcentration\nIndirect Effect\nHabitat suitability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nPrey availability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNotes:\nNCE - no cumulative effect\nNS - not significant\nFishing Mortality\nNo past, present, or predicted external effects on fishing mortality have been identified for this stock There\nis no cumulative effect across all alternatives.\nSpatial and Temporal Concentrations of Catch\nNo past, present, or predicted external effects on spatial and temporal concentrations have been identified for\nthis stock. There is no cumulative effect across all alternatives.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-42","Habitat Suitability\nA cumulative effect is identified across all alternatives, but it is not significant. The effects of natural events\nrelated to climate change are identified as external factors, but are determined to be of insufficient magnitude\nto affect the stocks' MSST.\nPrey Availability\nA cumulative effect is identified across all alternatives, but it is not significant. Past, present, and predicted\nexternal factors are identified and have been determined to be of insufficient magnitude to affect the stocks'\nMSST.\nOther Flatfish and Rex Sole: Rex sole is managed as its own stock under the GOA groundfish FMP.\nHowever, in the BSAI, the species is managed in the other flatfish assemblage ( Witherell 2000). For details\non the following cumulative effects analysis for each stock, see Section 3.10 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-28 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Other Flatfish in the Bering\nSea and Aleutian Islands\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nFishing mortality\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nSpatial and temporal\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nconcentration\nIndirect Effect\nNS\nHabitat suitability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nPrey availability\nNS\nNS\nU\nU\nNS\nNS\nU\nNotes:\nNCE - no cumulative effect\nNS - not significant\nU - unknown\nTable 4.13-29 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Rex Sole in the Gulf of Alaska\nAlternatives\n6.1\n6.2\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nFishing mortality\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nSpatial and temporal\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nconcentration\nIndirect Effect\nU\nU\nHabitat suitability\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nPrey availability\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nNotes: NS - not significant\nU - unknown\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-43","Fishing Mortality\nPresent and predicted external effects on fishing mortality are indicated only in the GOA stock due to the\nexistence of the halibut longline fishery that may take some of the rex sole as bycatch. Therefore, a\ncumulative effect is identified across all alternatives for this stock. However, the addition of the mortality\nfrom the halibut fishery is not expected to be of sufficient magnitude to exceed the stock's OFL. Therefore,\nthe cumulative effect is not significant. There are no lingering past influence and no external effects in the\nBSAI stock, SO there is no cumulative effect under any of the alternatives.\nSpatial and Temporal Concentrations of Catch\nThere is no past lingering influence of the fisheries in the GOA; the effect of the status quo is unknown since\nMSST is unknown, and the effects of the halibut and scallop fisheries are unknown. A cumulative effect is\npossible for rex sole stock, but the significance across all alternatives is unknown. There are no lingering past\ninfluence and no external effects in the BSAI other flatfish stock, so there is no cumulative effect under any\nof the alternatives.\nHabitat Suitability\nThe past influence of the fisheries in the GOA is unknown, the effect of the status quo is unknown since the\nstock's MSST is unknown, and the effect of the halibut and scallop fisheries either positive or negative. A\ncumulative effect is possible for the GOA stock, but its significance is unknown across all alternatives. The\nnatural events related to climate change are identified for the BSAI stock, but are determined to be of\ninsufficient magnitude to affect the flathead sole stock's MSST. A cumulative effect is identified; however,\nit is not significant across all alternatives in the BSAI stock.\nPrey Availability\nThe effect of the status quo is unknown since the stock's MSST is unknown, and the effects of the climatic\nfactors are either positive or negative. A cumulative effect is possible for the GOA stock, but its significance\nis unknown across all alternatives. For the BSAI stock, natural events related to climate change are identified,\nbut are determined to be of insufficient magnitude to affect the stock's MSST. The cumulative effect is not\nsignificant for the Alternatives 1, 2.1, 4.1, 4.2, 6.1, and 6.2 in the BSAI.\nEffects of Alternatives 2.2, 3, and 5 on prey availability for BSAI other flatfish are unknown relative to the\nstatus quo. Although the presence of external effects in the form of climate change indicates that a\ncumulative effect is possible, the significance of the effect under these alternatives is unknown.\nYellowfin Sole and Shallow Water Flatfish: Yellowfin sole is managed as its own stock under the BSAI\ngroundfish FMP. However, in the GOA, the species is managed in the shallow water flatfish assemblage that\nincludes several other species of flatfish (DiCosimo 1998). For details on the following cumulative effects\nanalysis for each stock, see Section 3.11 of Appendix J.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-44","Table 4.13-30 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Yellowfin Sole in the Bering\nSea and Aleutian Islands\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nNCE\nFishing mortality\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nSpatial and temporal\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nconcentration\nIndirect Effect\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nHabitat suitability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nPrey availability\nNS\nNS\nNotes:\nNCE - no cumulative effect\nNS - not significant\nTable 4.13-31 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Shallow Water Flatfish in the\nGulf of Alaska\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nFishing mortality\nNS\nNS\nNS\nU\nU\nU\nSpatial and temporal\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nconcentration\nIndirect Effect\nU\nU\nHabitat suitability\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nPrey availability\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nNotes: NS - not significant\nU - unknown\nFishing Mortality\nDue to the past influence of foreign, JV, and halibut longline fisheries, and the presence of the negative\neffects from the present-day halibut fishery, a cumulative effect is identified across all alternatives for the\nshallow water flatfish assemblage in the GOA. However, the magnitude and intensity of the halibut fisheries\nremovals are not expected to be sufficient to push the stock over its OFL. The cumulative effect on shallow\nwater flatfish is not significant. There are no lingering past influence and no external effects in the BSAI\nyellowfin sole stock, SO there is no cumulative effect under any of the alternatives.\nSpatial and Temporal Concentrations of Catch\nThe past influence of the fisheries on the GOA shallow water flatfish assemblage is unknown, the effect of\nthe status quo is unknown since MSST for the stock is unknown, and the effect of the present day halibut and\nscallop fisheries is unknown. A cumulative effect is possible for the shallow water flatfish assemblage, but\nits significance is unknown across all alternatives. There is no lingering past influence and no external effects\nin the BSAI yellowfin stock, SO there is no cumulative effect under any of the alternatives.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-45","Habitat Suitability\nThe past adverse or beneficial influence of the fisheries in the GOA is identified, the effect of the status quo\nis unknown since the stock's MSST is unknown, and the effect of the present-day halibut and scallop fisheries\nis either positive or negative. A cumulative effect is possible for the GOA shallow water flatfish assemblage,\nbut its significance is unknown across all alternatives. The natural events related to climate change were\nidentified as external effects on the BSAI yellowfin stock, but were not determined to be of the magnitude\nto affect the stock's MSST. A cumulative effect is identified; however, it is not significant across all\nalternatives in the yellowfin sole stock.\nPrey Availability\nThe effect of the status quo is unknown since the stock's MSST is unknown, and the effect of the past,\npresent, and predicted climatic factors is either positive or negative. A cumulative effect is possible for the\nshallow water flatfish assemblage in the GOA, but its significance is unknown across all alternatives. For\nthe BSAI yellowfin sole stock, natural events related to climate change are identified, but are of insufficient\nmagnitude to affect the stock's MSST. The cumulative effect is not significant for the all alternatives in the\nBSAI yellowfin sole stock.\nNorthern Rockfish: Northern rockfish are managed as their own stock under the GOA groundfish FMP.\nHowever, in the Bering Sea the species falls under the \"other red rockfish\" complex, and in the Aleutian\nIslands, the species is managed in the sharpchin/northern rockfish assemblage. For details on the following\ncumulative effects analysis for each stock, see Section 3.12 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-32 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Northern Rockfish in the\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands and Gulf of Alaska\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nFishing mortality\nNS\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nSpatial and temporal\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nconcentration\nIndirect Effect\nHabitat suitability\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nPrey availability\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nNotes: NCE - no cumulative effect\nNS - not significant\nU - unknown\nFishing Mortality\nA past adverse influence of external effects is identified for all three northern rockfish stocks and\nassemblages. Present and predicted external effects on fishing mortality are not expected since northern\nrockfish are not expected to be caught as bycatch in the longline halibut fishery. Due to the past lingering\ninfluence from the foreign and JV fisheries, a cumulative effect is identified under Alternative 1 for all stocks\nand assemblages. The cumulative effect, however, is not significant since the OFL is not reached for any of\nthe stocks and assemblages. Under Alternatives 2 through 6, there are no present or predicted external\neffects; therefore, there is no cumulative effect.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-46","Spatial and Temporal Concentrations of Catch\nNo existing external effects are identified for any of the stocks and assemblages. There are no lingering past\ninfluence and no external effects, SO there is no cumulative effect for any of the alternatives.\nHabitat Suitability\nThe effect of the status quo is unknown since the stock's MSST is unknown, and the effect of the past,\npresent, and predicted external effects is either positive or negative. A cumulative effect is possible for the\nnorthern rockfish stock and assemblages, but its significance is unknown across all alternatives.\nPrey Availability\nThe effect of the status quo is unknown since the stock's MSST is unknown, and the effect of the past,\npresent, and predicted external effects is either positive or negative. A cumulative effect is possible for the\nnorthern rockfish stock and assemblages, but its significance is unknown across all alternatives.\nPacific Ocean Perch: Pacific ocean perch are managed as a single stocks in the BSAI and GOA. However,\nseparate acceptable biological catches (ABCs) are assessed in each of the three regions: Bering Sea, Aleutian\nIslands, and GOA (Section 4.4.5.1). For details on the following cumulative effects analysis for each stock,\nsee Section 3.13 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-33 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Pacific Ocean Perch in the\nBering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nAlternative\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nFishing mortality\nNS\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nSpatial and temporal\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nconcentration\nIndirect Effect\nNS\nNS\nNS\nHabitat suitability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS/U\nU\nU\nPrey availability\nNS\nNS/U\nNS/U\nNS/U\nNS/U\nU\nNotes:\nNCE - no cumulative effect\nNS - not significant\nU - unknown\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-47","Table 4.13-34 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Pacific Ocean Perch in the\nGulf of Alaska\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nFishing mortality\nNS\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nSpatial and temporal\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nconcentration\nIndirect Effect\nHabitat suitability\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nCS-\nCS-\nPrey availability\nCS-\nU\nU\nU\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nU\nU\nNotes:\nCS - conditionally significant\nNCE - no cumulative effect\nNS - not significant\nU - unknown\nFishing Mortality\nNo present and predicted external effects on fishing mortality are identified. There is no cumulative effect\nfor Alternatives 2.1 through 6.2. The past influence of foreign and JV fisheries was of sufficient magnitude\nto push both Pacific ocean perch stocks close to the OFL threshold, but not over it. A cumulative effect is\nidentified for the status quo due to the lingering effects of the fisheries. However, the effect is considered\nto be not significant since present-day stocks are above OFL, are in rebuilding plans, and are continuing to\nimprove (AFSC workshop September 2000).\nSpatial and Temporal Concentrations of Catch\nNo past, present, or predicted external effects are identified SO there is no cumulative effect across all\nalternatives in either stock.\nHabitat Suitability\nPast influence of external effects on habitat suitability is found for both BSAI and GOA Pacific ocean perch\nstocks, due to the lingering habitat disruption from the halibut longline fishery (AFSC Workshop September\n2000). Natural events related to climate change are identified along with adverse effects from the present-day\nhalibut fishery. The BSAI stock is sufficiently above MSST to determine that any external past, present, or\npredicted effects will not be of the magnitude to affect the stock's MSST. A cumulative effect is identified,\nbut it is not significant across all alternatives in the BSAI stock.\nThe GOA stock is presently right at the MSST. Any negative effects from external factors could jeopardize\nthe stock's ability to sustain itself. Therefore, a cumulative effect on habitat suitability is identified for\nAlternatives 1, 2, 4, and 6 in the GOA, and it is conditionally significant adverse.\nThe beneficial effects of Alternatives 3 and 5 in the GOA, in the form of habitat protection from bottom\ntrawling, are determined to be sufficient to outweigh the negative effects of the status quo and external events\n(AFSC workshop September 2000). Therefore, in the cumulative case, the effect on habitat suitability for\nthese alternatives is not significant.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-48","Prey Availability\nThe BSAI stock is above MSST and the past, present, and predicted external factors associated with fisheries\nand/or climate change have been determined to be of insufficient magnitude to affect the stocks' MSST.\nTherefore a cumulative effect is identified, but it is not significant for Alternatives 3, 4.2, 5, 6.1, and 6.2 in\nthe Bering Sea, and 4.1, 4.2, 6.1, and 6.2 in the Aleutian Islands substocks. When the alternative is rated as\nunknown (Alternatives 2.1, 2.2, and 4.1 in the Bering Sea and Alternatives 2.1, 2.2, 3, and 5 in the Aleutian\nIslands) the significance of the potential cumulative effect is also rated as unknown.\nThe GOA stock is presently right at the MSST. Any negative effects from external factors could jeopardize\nthe stock's ability to sustain itself. Therefore, a cumulative effect is identified, and it is conditionally\nsignificant adverse for Alternatives 1, 4.1, 4.2, and 5. When the alternative is rated as unknown (Alternatives\n2.1 2.2, 3, 6.1, and 6.2) the significance of the potential cumulative effect is also rated as unknown.\nThornyheads: Thornyheads are managed as a single stock under the GOA groundfish FMP. For details on\nthe following cumulative effects analysis for each stock, see Section 3.14 of Appendix J.\nTable 4.13-35 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for Thornyheads in the Gulf of\nAlaska\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nFishing mortality\nNS\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nSpatial and temporal\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nconcentration\nIndirect Effect\nHabitat suitability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nPrey availability\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNotes: NCE - no cumulative\nNS - not significant\nFishing Mortality\nPresent and predicted external effects on fishing mortality are not expected. However, since there is a\nlingering past influence, a cumulative effect is identified for Alternative 1. The effect is not significant since\nOFL of the stock is not exceeded. For Alternatives 2 through 6, there are no external effects expected, SO\nthere is no cumulative effect.\nSpatial and Temporal Concentrations of Catch\nNo past, present, or predicted external effects are identified SO there is no cumulative effect across all\nalternatives\nHabitat Suitability\nA past influence of external effects is possible, but the magnitude and direction of the effect is unknown\n(AFSC workshop September 2000). The natural events related to climate change are identified for the stock,\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-49","but are not determined to be of the magnitude to affect the thornyhead stock's MSST. Cumulative effects\nare identified. However, they are not significant across all alternatives since the stock is well above MSST\nand the effects are not expected to change this.\nPrey Availability\nA past influence of external effects is possible, but the magnitude and direction of the effect is unknown\n(AFSC workshop September 2000). The natural events related to climate change were identified for the stock,\nbut were not determined to be of the magnitude to affect the Thornyhead stock's MSST. Cumulative effects\nare identified. However, they are not significant across all alternatives since the stock is well above MSST\nand the effects are not expected to change this.\nAll Other Rockfish: Several other rockfish species which fall under Tiers 4 through 6 are also rated for\nstatus quo and alternatives in Section 4.4.7. Management groups and assemblages assessed include: GOA\nand Aleutian Islands shortraker rougheye rockfish, GOA other slope rockfish, GOA pelagic shelf rockfish,\neastern GOA demersal shelf rockfish, and Aleutian Islands other rockfish. Examples of three of the groups\neastern GOA demersal rockfish, GOA shortraker and rougheye and Aleutian Islands and Bering Sea other\nrockfish are summarized below. Analysis of the other rockfish groups would be similar, with the results\nidentical in the cumulative case.\nTable 4.13-36 Summary of Cumulative Effects of Each Alternative for all Other Rockfish\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nFishing mortality\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nSpatial and temporal\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nconcentration of the\ncatch\nIndirect Effect\nHabitat suitability\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nPrey availability\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nU\nNotes:\nNS - not significant\nU - unknown\nFishing Mortality\nFor all Tier 4 to 6 species, the additional mortality from the external factors is determined to be insufficient\nto exceed OFL. Therefore the cumulative effect on fishing mortality is found to be not significant across all\nalternatives for all other rockfish species.\nSpatial and Temporal Concentrations of Catch, Habitat Suitability, Prey Availability\nSince the MSST cannot be estimated for target species in these tiers, the significance of the status quo effects\nand all alternatives on spatial and temporal concentrations, habitat suitability, and prey availability, are all\nunknown. Therefore, the significance of any potential cumulative effects on these categories are also\nunknown.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-50","4.13.4.4\nNon-Target Species\nNon-target groundfish chosen for analyses in Section 4.5 of the SEIS and cumulative effects analyses include:\nskates (other species category) and grenadiers (non-specified species category).\nA conventional cumulative effect analysis was not conducted for squid since the potential significance of the\neastern BSAI and GOA status quo effects on squid populations is unknown due to lack of pertinent\ninformation. A brief discussion of the rationale leading to this decision is included in Section 4.4 of\nAppendix J.\nForage Fish Species were not formally analyzed in Section 4.5.2 of the SEIS or in the cumulative effects\nanalyses, however, a brief discussion on this group is included in Section 4.5 of Appendix J.\nIt was determined in Section 4.5 of the SEIS that \"bycatch,\" as a function of the changes in catch of target\ngroundfish species predicted under each alternative, is the only direct effect that could be assessed for species\nin the non-target groundfish analyses. This is due to limited information and data for a large segment of the\nnon-target groundfish species. The following cumulative effects analysis summaries focus on \"bycatch\" as\nthe only identified direct effect.\nSkate: In the eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands and GOA, skate species are managed within the other\nspecies category with a TAC set for the entire other species complex (squid, skates, sharks, sculpins, and\noctopus, and squid in the GOA). For details regarding the skate cumulative effects analysis, see Section 4.2\nof Appendix J.\nGulf of Alaska Status Quo Skate Bycatch\nThe potential significance of the status quo effects on skate populations in the GOA is unknown due to the\nlack of pertinent information.\nThe combined effects of skate bycatch in past fisheries, present and predicted status quo federal groundfish\nfisheries, and the external fisheries could potentially constitute a cumulative effect. However, since the\nsignificance of the GOA status quo management is unknown, the significance of any potentially cumulative\neffect is also unknown.\nThe significance of potential cumulative effects of the alternatives on GOA skate populations are unknown\nsince the significance of the status quo is unknown.\nEastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Status Quo Skate Bycatch\nThe current management of skates within an aggregate other species complex TAC could mask declines in\nindividual skate species, and, therefore, lead to overfishing of a given skate species. Due to this reason and\nthe fact that the majority of skate bycatch is taken in the eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands groundfish\nfisheries, the status quo is considered to have a conditional significant adverse effect on skate populations in\nthe eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands.\nThe combined effects of skate bycatch in past fisheries, present and predicted status quo federal groundfish\nfisheries, and the external fisheries constitutes a cumulative effect. However, the magnitude of the effects of\nexternal fisheries on skate populations is unknown due to lack of pertinent information. It is inferred that\nexternal fisheries would not provide any beneficial effects on skate bycatch, therefore, the cumulative effect\nis rated as having a conditionally significant adverse effect on skate populations in the eastern Bering Sea and\nAleutian Islands.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-51","Eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Alternatives 2.1, 3, 4.1, 5, 6.1, and 6.2 Skate Bycatch\nThe predicted skate bycatch rates for Alternatives 2.1, 3, 4.1, and 6.1 are similar to the status quo. Therefore,\nthe potential cumulative effect for these alternatives is inferred to be essentially the same as the status quo:\nconditionally significant adverse effects on skate populations in the eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands.\nAlternatives 5 and 6.2 have the highest predicted eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands skate bycatch\nlevels. These alternatives could result in the overfishing of the less common and rarer eastern Bering Sea and\nAleutian Islands skate species. However, due to uncertainty associated with adequate trawl survey\ninformation for these species combined with external fisheries bycatch, it is inferred that the potential\ncumulative effect for these alternatives would be essentially the same as the status quo, or having\nconditionally significant adverse effects on skate populations in the eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands.\nEastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Alternatives 2.2 and 4.2 Skate Bycatch\nAlternatives 2.2 and 4.2 predicted skate bycatches are small enough that overfishing could be prevented for\nboth common and rarer eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands skate species.\nFor each alternative, the combined effects of the alternative and the external fisheries constitutes a cumulative\neffect. It is inferred that the potential to prevent overfishing of these species in the eastern Bering Sea and\nAleutian Islands could provide a buffer to offset any adverse effects from external fisheries bycatch.\nTherefore, the cumulative effects for Alternatives 2.2 and 4.2 are rated as having a potential nonsignificant\neffect on eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands skate populations.\nGrenadiers: Grenadiers are considered part of the non-specified species category in the eastern Bering Sea\nand Aleutian Islands and GOA. Species within the non-specified species category do not have bycatch limits\nor catch reporting requirements. For details regarding the grenadier cumulative effects analysis, see Section\n4.3 of Appendix J.\nEastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Status Quo Grenadier Bycatch\nThe potential significance of the status quo effects on grenadiers in the eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian\nIslands is unknown due to lack of information regarding grenadier biomass.\nThe combined effects of grenadier bycatch in the past fisheries, present and predicted status federal\ngroundfish fisheries, and the external fisheries constitutes a cumulative effect. However, since the\nsignificance of the eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands status quo management is unknown, the\nsignificance of any potential cumulative effect is also unknown.\nThe potential cumulative effects of the alternatives on eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands grenadier\npopulations are unknown since the significance of the status quo is unknown.\nGulf of Alaska Status Quo Grenadier Bycatch\nThe current non-management of grenadiers could mask declines in individual grenadier species and,\ntherefore, lead to overfishing of a given grenadier species. Due to this reason and the fact that the majority\nof grenadier bycatch is taken in the GOA groundfish fisheries, the status quo is considered to have a\nconditionally significant adverse effect on grenadier populations in the GOA.\nThe combined effects of grenadier bycatch in past fisheries, present and predicted status quo federal\ngroundfish fisheries, and the external fisheries constitute a cumulative effect. However, the magnitude of the\neffects of external fisheries on grenadier populations is unknown due to lack of pertinent information. It is\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-52","inferred that external fisheries would not provide any beneficial effects on grenadier bycatch; therefore, the\nsignificance of the cumulative effect is rated as conditionally significant adverse on grenadier populations\nin the GOA.\nGulf of Alaska Alternatives 2.1, 2.2. 3. 4.1, 4.2. 5, 6.1, and 6.2 Grenadier Bycatch\nThe predicted grenadier bycatch rates for Alternatives 2.1, 2.2, 3, 4.1, 4.2, 5, 6.1, and 6.2 are similar to the\nstatus quo. Therefore, the potential cumulative effect for these alternatives is inferred to be essentially the\nsame as the status quo, having conditionally significant adverse effects on grenadier populations in the GOA.\n4.13.4.5\nProhibited Species\nProhibited Species in the BSAI and GOA include Pacific halibut, crab species, Pacific herring, and Pacific\nsalmon species. Prohibited Species cannot be retained when caught in the federal groundfish fisheries and\nmust be returned to sea with minimal harm. The Prohibited Species category is discussed separately from the\nnon-target groundfish species groups since their management strategies differ (Section 4.13.4.4 and of\nSection 4 of Appendix J). A detailed discussion of the approach used for the cumulative effect analyses\npresented in this section is presented in 4.13.1 of the SEIS. Table 4.13-37 summarizes the results of the\ncumulative effects analysis.\nTable 4.13-37 Summary of Identified Prohibited Species Cumulative Effects\nStatus Quo\nBSAI\nGOA\nBSAI & GOA\nBSAI\nGOA\nDirect and\nIndirect\nPacific\nHalibut\nChinook\nChinook\nRed King\nTanner\nRed\nEffects\nSalmon\nCrab\nCrab\nKing\nHerring\nSalmon\nOther King\nOther\nCrab\nOther\nOther\nSalmon\nSalmon\nCrab\nTanner\nU (Alt1)\nNCE\nNCE\nCS (-)\nCS (-)\nBycatch\nNS\nNS\n(Alt 1)\n(Alt 1)\nNCE\n(Alt 2-6)\nU\nU\n(Alt 2-6)\n(Alt 2-6)\nU\nU\nSpatial and\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNCE\nNCE\ntemporal\nconcentration\nof bycatch\nDisruption of\nNS\nU\nNS\nU\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nspawning\nhabitat\nNCE\nU\nU\nPrey\nU\nU\nU\nU\ncompetition\nNotes: BSAI - Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands\nCS - conditionally significant\nGOA - Gulf of Alaska\nNCE - no cumulative effect\nNS - not significant\nU - unknown\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-53","Pacific Halibut: Pacific halibut are managed by the IPHC. Halibut stocks are currently considered healthy\n(Section 4.6.2.1). Halibut bycatch in the federal groundfish fisheries is controlled by the use of PSC limits,\nor bycatch limits. PSC limits are released seasonally and may apply to specific target groundfish fisheries.\nCumulative effects on halibut populations are not identified for the status quo or any of the alternatives. For\ndetails regarding the Pacific halibut cumulative effects analysis, see Section 5.2 of Appendix J.\nCrab: BSAI directed crab fisheries are currently managed by the ADF&G through a federal king and Tanner\ncrab FMP, effective in 1989. NMFS conducts annual trawl surveys for crab stock assessments in the BSAI,\nwith the exception of golden king crab abundance estimates, generated by a model developed by ADF&G\nthat incorporates trawl survey, commercial catch, and observer data, are used to set guideline harvest levels\nfor the crab fisheries (Section 3.7.1). For details regarding the BSAI crab cumulative effects analysis, see\nSection 5.3 of Appendix J.\nThe combined effects of the past, present, and predicted external effects and the status quo groundfish\nfisheries bycatch constitute cumulative effects for BSAI red king crab, other king crab, Tanner crab, and other\nTanner crabs. Past potential adverse influences on BSAI red king crab, other king crab, Tanner crab, and\nother Tanner crab stocks due to direct catch or bycatch have been mitigated over time through groundfish\nfisheries area closures, bycatch limits, direct fishing quota setting, direct fishing area closures, establishment\nof crab rebuilding plans and conservation areas, and other management processes. Therefore, the status quo\ncumulative effects of bycatch on BSAI red king crab, other king crab, Tanner crab, and other Tanner crab\npopulations are rated as not significant.\nThe combined effects of spatial and temporal concentration in past, present, and predicted external fisheries\ncatch and bycatch and the status quo groundfish fisheries bycatch constitute cumulative effects for BSAI red\nking crab, other king crab, Tanner crab, and other Tanner crabs. Past potential adverse effects on BSAI red\nking crab, other king crab, Tanner crab, and other Tanner crab stocks due to spatial and temporal\nconcentration of direct catch and/or bycatch have been mitigated over time through the establishment of\ngroundfish fishery no trawl zones, gear restrictions, and other management processes. Therefore, the status\nquo cumulative effects of spatial and temporal concentration of bycatch on BSAI red king crab, other king\ncrab, Tanner crab, and other Tanner crab populations are rated as not significant.\nThe combined effects of spawning habitat disruption in the past, present, and predicted external fisheries and\nthe status quo groundfish fisheries constitute a cumulative effect on BSAI red king crab and other king crabs.\nPast potential adverse effects on BSAI red king crab and other king crab due to spawning habitat disruption\nhave been mitigated over time through the establishment of no trawl zones and conservation areas. Therefore,\nthe status quo cumulative effects of spawning habitat disruption on BSAI red king crab and other king crab\npopulations are rated as not significant.\nCumulative effects for BSAI Tanner and other Tanner crab status quo spawning habitat disruption and BSAI\nred king crab, other king crab, Tanner crab, and other Tanner crabs status quo prey competition were\nidentified, but their significance is unknown.\nThere is no FMP for GOA crab stocks. The Alaska Board of Fisheries developed GOA crab management\nplans that are implemented by the ADF&G. Minimum stock size thresholds are determined for crab stocks\nwith adequate biological and stock assessment information. Harvest rates are calculated based on estimated\nbased on stock abundance in relation thresholds.\nThe combined effects of the spatial and temporal bycatch concentration in past, present, and predicted\nexternal fisheries catch and bycatch and the groundfish fisheries bycatch constitute a cumulative effect for\nGOA red king crab. Past potential adverse effects on GOA red king crab stocks due to spatial and temporal\nconcentration of direct catch and/or bycatch have been mitigated over time through the establishment of\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-54","groundfish fishery no trawl zones, gear restrictions, and other management processes. Therefore, the status\nquo cumulative effect of the spatial and temporal concentration of bycatch on GOA red king crab populations\nis rated as not-significant.\nThe combined effects of spawning habitat disruption in the past, present, and predicted external fisheries and\nthe groundfish fisheries constitute a cumulative effect for GOA red king crab. Past potential adverse effects\non western GOA red king crab due to spawning habitat disruption have been mitigated over time through the\nestablishment of no trawl zones and conservation areas. Therefore, the status quo cumulative effect of\nspawning habitat disruption on western GOA red king crab populations is rated as not-significant.\nCumulative effects for status quo bycatch and prey competition on GOA red king crab, other king crab,\nTanner crab, and other Tanner crabs were not identified. Cumulative effects for status quo spatial and\ntemporal concentration of bycatch and spawning habitat disruption were not identified for GOA other king,\nTanner, and other Tanner crabs. Cumulative effects for GOA crab stocks were not identified for any of the\nalternatives.\nPacific Herring: Pacific herring are managed by the ADF&G with annual quotas allocated by the Alaska\nBoard of Fisheries. All directed herring fisheries occur in state waters and fluctuate depending on market\ndemands. For details regarding the Pacific herring cumulative effects analysis, see Section 5.4 of Appendix\nPast potential adverse influences on herring populations due to direct catch or bycatch have been mitigated\nthrough management processes and are not thought to have a lingering effect on current herring populations\n(AFSC workshop September 2000). Present and predicted external herring fisheries are not considered as\nhaving any additional beneficial or adverse effect on herring populations due to direct catch. Therefore, there\nis no cumulative effect identified for bycatch.\nStatus quo cumulative effects are not identified for spatial and temporal concentration of bycatch, spawning\nhabitat disruption, or prey competition. Cumulative effects on herring populations were not identified for any\nof the alternatives.\nSalmon: Under the status quo, BSAI and GOA groundfish fisheries salmon bycatch is rated as having a\nconditionally significant adverse effect on chinook salmon stocks. The combined effects of bycatch in the\npast, present, and predicted external fisheries and groundfish fisheries constitute a cumulative effect for BSAI\nand GOA chinook salmon stocks. BSAI FMP amendments limiting bycatch of salmon over time are thought\nto have mitigated any lingering effects from past foreign and JV fisheries. BSAI FMP amendment 21b has\nnot succeeded in controlling chinook salmon bycatch. The procedures set forth in BSAI amendment 21b have\nbeen refined under amendment 58, now awaiting final approval. There are no GOA FMP amendments that\ndirectly deal with chinook salmon bycatch. Present and predicted external state fisheries are rated as +0 or\nnot having any additional beneficial or adverse effect on chinook salmon stocks since the quotas are based\non escapement. Therefore, the status quo cumulative effect of BSAI and GOA salmon bycatch on chinook\nsalmon stocks, specifically western stocks, is rated as having a conditionally significant adverse effect.\nBycatch in the BSAI and GOA under the status quo groundfish fisheries is rated as having a conditionally\nsignificant adverse effect on other salmon stocks. The combined effects of the past, present, and predicted\nexternal fisheries and groundfish fisheries salmon bycatch constitute a cumulative effect for BSAI and GOA\nother salmon stocks. BSAI FMP amendments limiting bycatch of salmon over time are thought to have\nmitigated any lingering effects from past foreign and JV fisheries. However, BSAI FMP amendment 35 has\nnot succeeded in controlling other salmon bycatch. There are no GOA FMP amendments that directly deal\nwith other salmon bycatch. Present and predicted external state fisheries are rated as \"0\" or not having any\nadditional beneficial or adverse effect on other salmon stocks since the quotas are based on escapement.\nTherefore, under the status quo, the cumulative effect of BSAI and GOA salmon bycatch on other salmon\nstocks, specifically western stocks, is rated as having a conditionally significant adverse effect.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.13-55","A cumulative effect for status quo BSAI and GOA chinook or other salmon spawning habitat disruption was\nnot found. The potential of an inferred spatial and temporal bycatch concentration or prey competition\ncumulative effect in the BSAI or GOA on chinook or other salmon is unknown due to lack of information.\nFor all alternatives the potential for any cumulative effects due to chinook or other salmon bycatch in the\nBSAI or GOA is unknown due to lack of information. The significance of potential cumulative effects of\nspatial and temporal concentration of bycatch, spawning habitat disruption, and prey competition on BSAI\nand GOA other salmon stocks are also unknown.\n4.13.4.6\nEssential Fish Habitat\nEssential fish habitat (EFH) is currently defined as those waters and substrate necessary for fish to spawn,\nbreed, feed, or grow to maturity (Section 4.7.1). By definition, EFH encompasses both benthic substrates and\nthe water column, including aquatic areas and their associated physical, chemical, and biological properties\nthat are used by fish. Non-benthic EFH incorporates the physical and chemical properties of the water\ncolumn; its main biological component consists of any non-benthic prey of fish.\nHabitat areas of particular concern (HAPC) are habitat types or areas that may require extra protection.\nHAPC is defined on the following criteria: its ecological importance, sensitivity, exposure, and rarity of the\nhabitat.\nWhile it is recognized that EFH encompasses both benthic and non-benthic habitat, this section deals only\nwith the potential cumulative effects of the alternatives on benthic EFH. Cumulative impacts of the\nalternatives on target and non-target fish which by definition are included as the biological component of EFH\nare considered in Sections 4.13.4.3 and 4.13.4.4, respectively. The impacts of the groundfish fishery on the\nphysical and chemical properties of the water column are discussed in Section 4.11.\nDirect and indirect impacts of the alternatives on benthic EFH in the Bering Sea and GOA have been assessed\nin Section 4.7. Four direct and one indirect effects were considered:\nDirect\nEffects: Destruction of HAPC by mobile gear\nDestruction of HAPC biota by fixed-gear\nModification of non-living substrates by mobile gear\nModification of non-living substrates by fixed-gear\nIndirect Effect: Benthic biodiversity\nThe following summaries of cumulative effects for individual stocks or assemblages of target groundfish\nfocus on theses four effect categories across Alternatives 1 through 6. A detailed discussion of the cumulative\neffects on EFH can be found in Section 6 of Appendix J. Table 4.13-38 summarizes the cumulative effects\nidentified for each alternative. A blank under a given alternative indicates that a cumulative effect was not\nfound.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-56","Table 4.13-38 Essential Fish Habitat Identified Cumulative Effects\nAlternative\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\nCategories\nDirect Effects\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nCS-\nCS-\nDestruction of HAPC\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nby mobile gear\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nDestruction of HAPC\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nCS-\nby fixed-gear\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nModification of non-\nNS\nNS\nliving substances by\nmobile gear\nNS\nNS\nNS\nModification of non-\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nliving substances by\nfixed-gear\nIndirect Effect\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nCS-\nBenthic Biodiversity\nCS-\nCS-\nCS - conditionally significant\nNotes:\nNS - not significant\nAlternative 1 - Status Quo\nNumerous fishery regulations have been implemented to protect benthic habitat in the North Pacific (Section\n4.7.1.1). Most of the management actions were established to address the protection of crab habitat. More\nrecently, consideration has been given to broader scope habitat issues that consider the habitat of groundfish.\nThese recent considerations are the result of EFH provisions require the identification of management actions\nto minimize adverse impacts to EFH caused by fishing. For details on the following cumulative effects\nanalysis for Alternative 1, see Section 7.2 of Appendix J.\nDestruction of HAPC by Mobile Gear\nDamage and mortality of HAPC biota can be directly attributed to the existing and historic bottom trawl\ngroundfish fishery; this effect under the status quo was rated conditionally significant adverse (Section\n4.7.1.1). Other fisheries, such as the State of Alaska managed fisheries employing mobile gear, are identified\nalong with wind and wave action as contributing past, present, and predicted external factors. These external\nfactors contribute incrementally adverse impacts to the HAPC. Therefore, a conditionally significant adverse\ncumulative effect is identified.\nDestruction of HAPC by Fixed-Gear\nAs with fisheries that use bottom trawl gear, damage and mortality to HAPC biota can be directly attributed\nto existing and historic fixed-gear fisheries. The effect of the fisheries is rated as conditionally significant\nadverse for the status quo (Section 4.7.1.1). Other fisheries, in particular the halibut longline fishery and State\nof Alaska crab pot fisheries, and fixed-gear subsistence fisheries are identified along with wind and wave\naction as contributing external factors. Therefore a conditionally significant adverse cumulate effect is\nidentified.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-57","Modification of Non-Living Substrates by Mobile and Fixed-Gear\nThe past effects of foreign and other fisheries and of wind induced waves could have had either beneficial\nor adverse effects on non-living substrate (Section 3.2.1 and Section 7.2.1 of Appendix J). The modification\nof non-living substrate by mobile gear and by fixed-gear are both rated as not significant under the status\nquo. Other fisheries, such as the State of Alaska managed fisheries employing mobile gear, the halibut\nlongline fishery, State of Alaska crab pot fisheries, and fixed-gear subsistence fisheries are identified along\nwith wind and wave action as contributing external factors. Since the additional external factors are not of\nsufficient intensity or magnitude to affect the status quo rating, a cumulate effect is identified for each\ncategory (mobile and fixed) but it is not significant.\nBenthic Biodiversity\nThe adverse effects of bottom trawling and other mobile fishing gears on benthic biodiversity have been\ndocumented for Alaska. Therefore, the effects of the status quo groundfish fishery on benthic biodiversity\nis rated as conditionally significant adverse (Section 4.7.1.1). The status quo management regime has year-\nround bottom trawl closure areas that provide some protection to EFH, but the spatial distribution of these\nclosures is not likely sufficient to protect a wide diversity of habitat types. The external effects of other\nfisheries, those employing bottom trawls in particular, contribute to the cumulative case. Therefore, a\nconditionally significant adverse cumulative effect is identified for the status quo.\nAlternative 2\nThe purpose of Alternative 2 is to provide protection of marine mammals and seabirds by reducing potential\nadverse impacts of groundfish harvesting. Alternative 2.1 includes time and area closures combined with\nTAC reductions. It essentially proposes \"low and slow\" temporally and spatially restricted fishing for those\nspecies. The alternative also increases the Aleutian Islands Pacific ocean perch fishery. Alternative 2.2 also\nreduces the take in all pollock, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel fisheries, with the reduction being greater in\noption 2.2. However, this option has only time closures combined with TAC reductions. It essentially\nproposes a \"short-burst\" fishery for TAC for those species, and also results in a reduction in the yellowfin\nsole fishery in the BSAI. The Aleutian Islands Pacific ocean perch fishery increases and the BSAI undefined\nhook-and-line fishery increases under Alternative 2.2.\nDestruction of HAPC by Mobile Gear\nFor Alternative 2.1, destruction of HAPC biota by mobile gear decreased marginally and is given a rating of\n+1 relative to the status quo rating of conditionally significant adverse. Under Alternative 2.2, destruction\nof HAPC biota by mobile gear is predicted to be much less than the status quo, and is given a rating of +2\nrelative to the status quo rating of conditionally significant adverse. Under Alternative 2.2, there is a large\ndecrease in bycatch of sea pens and sea whips but not as much for other HAPC organisms. The additional\nprotection afforded by Alternative 2.2 may be sufficient in magnitude and intensity to outweigh the status quo\nand external effects. Therefore, the cumulative effect is rated as conditionally significant adverse for\nAlternative 2.1 and as not significant for Alternative 2.2.\nDestruction of HAPC by Fixed-Gear\nAlternative 2.1 marginally reduces destruction of HAPC by fixed-gear, and is rated +1 relative to status quo\nrating of conditionally significant adverse (Section 4.7.1.4). Alternative 2.2 decreases destruction of many\nof the HAPC organisms by over 50 percent; however, there is a large increase predicted in the take of corals\nand sponges in the undefined hook-and-line fishery in the BSAI. Due to the uncertainty of the validity of the\nprediction, a range of -1 to +1 relative to the status quo rating of conditionally significant adverse\nis\ndetermined. The combined effects of the alternatives, along with the additional adverse effects of the other\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-58","pot, longline, and subsistence fisheries, and the natural effects of wind induced waves, result in a\nconditionally significant adverse cumulative effect for both Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2\nModification of Non-Living Substrates by Mobile Gear\nAlternatives 2.1 and 2.2 are rated as +1 and +2, respectively, relative to status quo rating of not significant.\nThe additional protection of either alternative in combination with the external effects results in a\nnonsignificant cumulative effect.\nModification of Non-Living Substrates by Fixed-Gear\nBoth Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 are rated as +2 relative to status quo rating of not significant. The additional\nprotection of either alternative in combination with the external effects results in a nonsignificant cumulative\neffect.\nBenthic Biodiversity\nThe rating for the impacts on benthic biodiversity is based on the amount of area that the alternative closes\nto year-round bottom trawling. Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 do not increase year-round closures for bottom\ntrawling and are rated as +0 relative to the status quo. The external effects of other fisheries, those employing\nbottom trawls in particular, contribute to the cumulative case. Therefore, a conditionally significant adverse\ncumulative effect on benthic biodiversity is identified for the Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2.\nAlternative 3\nThe total BSAI trawling effort under Alternative 3 increased 7 percent from the status quo, whereas the total\nlongline and pot efforts each decreased 14 percent. In the GOA, the total bottom trawling effort was reduced\n3 percent, and the total longline and pot effort was reduced 10 percent and 19 percent, respectively. Overall,\nthe effects of bottom trawling to the benthic environment is expected to be relatively similar to the status quo.\nDestruction of HAPC by Mobile Gear\nFor Alternative 3, the trawl fishery destruction of HAPC biota went down in most fisheries but was predicted\nto increase considerably in certain flatfish trawl fisheries. Therefore, a range of -1 to +1 relative to the status\nquo rating of conditionally significant adverse is assigned (Section 4.7.1.4). In the cumulative case, this\neither positive or negative effect of the alternative, along with the additional adverse effects of the other trawl\nfisheries and the either positive or negative effects of wind induced waves, results in a conditionally\nsignificant adverse cumulative effect.\nDestruction of HAPC by Fixed-Gear\nDestruction of HAPC biota by fixed-gear is marginally less under Alternative 3 and a rating of +1,\nconditionally significant adverse, relative to the status quo is assigned. The combined effects of the marginal\nprotection provided by the alternative, along with the additional adverse effects of the other pot, longline and\nsubsistence fisheries, and the natural effects of wind induced waves, result in a conditionally significant\ncumulative effect.\nModification of Non-Living Substrates by Mobile Gear:\nAlternative 3 results in nearly identical disturbance to non-living substrates from bottom trawl gear as the\nstatus quo and is given a rating of +0. In combination with the external effects, the result is a nonsignificant\ncumulative effect.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-59","Modification of Non-Living Substrates by Fixed-Gear\nAlternative 3 is predicted to marginally reduce the amount of disturbance from fixed-gear and, therefore, is\ngiven a rating of +1, relative to the status quo. The additional protection of the alternative in combination\nwith the external effects results in a nonsignificant cumulative effect.\nBenthic Biodiversity\nAlternative 3 provides a significant increase (103 percent) in the area of year round closure to bottom trawl\nfisheries and is given a score of +2 for benthic biodiversity relative to the status quo. This alternative\nsystematically places a network of closure areas that help to assure that a diversity of habitat is protected.\nIn the cumulative case, additional protection of the alternative may not be sufficient in magnitude or intensity\nto outweigh the status quo and external effects. A nonsignificant cumulative effect is identified.\nAlternative 4\nThe policy objective of Alternative 4 is to prevent overfishing, maintain healthy stocks, and rebuild depressed\nstocks of non-target species. Under Alternative 4.1, each of the five effects analyzed (destruction of HAPC\nby mobile gear, destruction of HAPC by fixed-gear, modification of non-living substrate by mobile gear,\nmodification of mobile substrate by fixed-gear, and changes to benthic biodiversity), are rated as +0 relative\nto the status quo. Therefore, the magnitude and intensity of the effects as rated for the status quo and its\ncumulative case also apply to this alternative (Section 4.14.4.1 for the summary of cumulative effects).\nDue to differences in closure areas and protection measures, several of the effects on EFH are rated differently\nthan the status quo and Alternative 4.1. The following paragraphs summarize the cumulative effects analysis\nfor Alternative 4.2.\nDestruction of HAPC by Mobile Gear\nAlternative 4.2 predicts approximately the same level of HAPC destruction by bottom trawl as the status quo\nand is given a rating of 0 relative to the status quo rating of conditionally significant adverse. The external\neffects of other fisheries that employ bottom trawls contribute to cumulative case. Therefore, a conditionally\nsignificant adverse cumulative effect on HAPC bycatch by mobile gear is identified for the alternative.\nDestruction of HAPC by Fixed-Gear\nThe alternative predicts marginally less removal of HAPC by fixed-gear than the status quo and is given a\nrating of +1 relative to the status quo rating of conditionally significant adverse. The combined effects of the\nmarginal protection provided by the alternative, along with the additional adverse effects of the other pot,\nlongline and subsistence fisheries, and the natural effects of wind induced waves, result in a conditionally\nsignificant adverse cumulative effect.\nModification of Non-Living Substrates by Mobile Gear\nAlternative 4.2 results in nearly identical disturbance to non-living substrates by mobile gear and is given a\n+0 relative to the status quo rating of not significant. In combination with the external effects, the result is\na nonsignificant cumulative effect.\nModification of Non-Living Substrates by Fixed-Gear\nAlternative 4.2 results in significantly less habitat disturbance (non-living substrate) from fixed-gear in the\nBering Sea (48 percent), and about the same disturbance in the GOA. Therefore, the alternative is rated of\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-60","+2 relative to the status quo rating of not significant. The additional protection of the alternative, in\ncombination with the external effects, results in a nonsignificant cumulative effect.\nBenthic Biodiversity\nAlternative 4.2 results in the same area of year round closure as the status quo and is given a rating of +0\nrelative to the status quo rating of conditionally significant adverse. The external effects of other fisheries,\nthose employing bottom trawls in particular, contribute to the cumulative case. The result is a conditionally\nsignificant adverse cumulative effect on benthic biodiversity.\nAlternative 5\nAlternative 5 is the regime specifically designed to protect EFH. It provides extensive habitat protection\nbecause bottom trawling is restricted to specified areas corresponding to the distribution of fishing effort for\nflatfish and Atka mackerel. Accompanying the closure areas are decreases in TAC for flatfish and Atka\nmackerel. The alternative also prohibits all fishing in specified HAPC areas in the vicinity of high gorgonian\ncoral abundance. However, much of the Pacific cod catch currently taken by trawls under status quo would\nbe taken by fixed-gear such as pots and longline.\nDestruction of HAPC by Mobile Gear\nDestruction of HAPC biota by mobile gear was predicted to be much less than the status quo, and is given\na rating of +2 relative to the status quo rating of conditionally significant adverse. In the cumulative case,\nthe additional protection of the alternative is sufficient in magnitude or intensity to outweigh the status quo\nand external effects. Therefore a nonsignificant cumulative effect on HAPC by mobile gear is identified for\nthis alternative.\nDestruction of HAPC by Fixed-Gear\nDestruction of HAPC by fixed-gear is expected to increase under this alternative due to the switching of effort\nin the Pacific cod fishery from bottom trawl to fixed-gear. Therefore, the alternative is given a rating of -2\nrelative to the status quo rating of conditionally significant adverse. The combined effects of the additional\nadverse effect of the alternative, along with the adverse effects of the other pot, longline and subsistence\nfisheries, and the natural effects of wind induced waves, contribute to cumulative case. The result is a\nconditionally significant adverse cumulative effect.\nModification of Non-Living Substrates by Mobile Gear\nAlternative 5 is predicted to reduce the amount of bottom trawling effort by 28 percent, thereby impacting\nmuch less non-living substrate. This alternative is given a rating of +2, relative to the status quo rating of not\nsignificant. The additional protection of the alternative in combination with the external effects result in a\nnonsignificant cumulative effect.\nModification of Non-Living Substrates by Fixed-Gear\nRelative to the status quo, Alternative 5 would increase fixed-gear effort by 57 percent. This alternative is\nrated as -2 relative to the status quo rating of not significant. Even though the alternative could potentially\nimpact much more non-living substrate, the effect, in combination with the external factors of other fisheries\n(could be adverse or beneficial), subsistence (generally adverse) and wind induced waves (adverse or\nbeneficial), is not significant in the cumulative case.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-61","Benthic Biodiversity\nAlternative 5 provides a significant increase (399 percent) in the area of year-round closure to bottom trawl\nfisheries and is scored +2 relative to the status quo. The alternative protects extensive areas from the impacts\nof bottom trawling. Therefore, in the cumulative case, additional protection of the alternative may be\nsufficient in magnitude and intensity to outweigh the status quo and external effects. A nonsignificant\ncumulative effect is identified.\nAlternative 6\nThe policy objective of Alternative 6 is to increase the economic return of the fishery. Under Alternative 6.1,\nthe bycatch model is run with all bycatch rates reduced by 20 percent. There are no similar constraints to\nAlternative 6.2; however, the model does consider market conditions.\nDestruction of HAPC by Mobile Gear\nThe rating for Alternative 6.1 depends on such factors as the validity of the increase in the BSAI rock sole\nand flathead sole fisheries, the assumed 20 percent reduction in bycatch rates, and the relative value of corals\nand sea whips versus anemones and sponges. Because there is considerable uncertainty regarding these\nfactors the alternative was rated as - 1 to +1 relative to the status quo rating of conditionally significant\nadverse. Under Alternative 6.2, destruction of HAPC by mobile gear is expected to greatly increase and a\nrating of -2 relative to the status quo rating of conditionally significant adverse is assigned. The combined\neffects of either alternative, along with the adverse effects of the other bottom trawl fisheries, and the natural\neffects of wind induced waves, contribute to the cumulative case. The result is a conditionally significant\nadverse cumulative effect for both Alternatives 6.1 and 6.2.\nDestruction of HAPC by Fixed-Gear\nBoth Alternatives 6.1 and 6.2 are rated - 1 relative to the status quo rating of conditionally significant adverse.\nIn each case, a cumulative effect is identified due to the effects of other fisheries, subsistence harvests and\nwind induced waves. The combined effects of each alternative, along with the adverse effects of the other\npot, longline and subsistence fisheries, and the natural effects of wind induced waves, contribute to the\ncumulative case. The result is a conditionally significant adverse cumulative effect for both Alternatives 6.1\nand 6.2.\nModification of Non-Living Substrates by Mobile Gear\nAlternatives 6. and 6.2 result in increases in bottom trawl effort of 16 percent and 27 percent, respectively.\nTherefore Alternative 6.1 is rated -1 relative to the status quo rating of not significant, while Alternative 6.2\nis rated as -2. The increases in trawling effort, in combination with the either beneficial or adverse external\nfactors of other fisheries and wind induced waves, is not sufficient in intensity or magnitude to result in a\nsignificant effect in the cumulative case (J. Heifitz NMFS-personal communication). Therefore, a\nnonsignificant cumulative effect is identified for each alternative.\nModification of Non-Living Substrates by Fixed-Gear\nAlternative 6.1 results in nearly identical disturbance to non-living substrates from fixed-gear as the status\nquo and is given a rating of +0 relative to the status quo rating of not significant. In combination with the\nexternal effects, the result is a nonsignificant cumulative effect.\nRelative to the status quo, Alternative 6.2 would increase fixed-gear effort by 31 percent. This alternative\nis rated as -2 relative to the status quo rating of not significant. Even though the alternative could potentially\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-62","impact more non-living substrate that the status quo, the effect, in combination with the external factors of\nother fisheries (could be adverse or beneficial), subsistence (generally adverse) and wind induced waves\n(adverse or beneficial), is not significant in the cumulative case (J. Heifitz-personal communication).\nBenthic Biodiversity\nAlternatives 6.1 and 6.2 result in the same area of year round closure as the status quo and are given a rating\nof +0 relative to the status quo rating of conditionally significant adverse. The external effects of the other\npot, longline and subsistence fisheries, and the natural effects of wind induced waves, contribute to the\ncumulative case. The result is a conditionally significant adverse cumulative effect.\n4.13.4.7 Socioeconomics\nThe cumulative effects socioeconomic analysis summarizes the significance of cumulative effects on the\nfishing industry sectors, regions and communities that participate in the North Pacific groundfish fisheries.\nIt also addresses those who benefit from the consumption of fishery resources, and from non-consumptive\nvalues of marine resources. Industry participants include several categories of catcher vessels,\ncatcher/processors, and onshore processors/motherships. Regions that are affected include the Alaska\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands, Kodiak, southcentral Alaska, southeast Alaska, Washington inland waters,\nand the Oregon coast. A detailed discussion of the material summarized in this section is presented in Section\n7 of Appendix J.\nDirect and Indirect Effects\nDirect and indirect impacts of the alternatives on the socioeconomic environment were evaluated in Section\n4.8. The following direct and indirect effects are considered:\nFishing Industry Sectors and Consumer Values\nRegions and Communities\nLabor payments by catcher vessels\nGroundfish exvessel value\nLabor payments by catcher processors\nTotal exvessel value\nLabor payments by other groundfish\nAverage harvesting cost\nGroundfish product value\nprocessors\nTotal labor payments\nAverage processing cost\nGroundfish exvessel value by region of\nPreemption of processing sectors\nPreemption of vessel classes\nlanding\nTotal exvessel value by region of landing\nNet benefits to domestic seafood\nInshore groundfish product value by\nconsumers\nNonconsumptive and nonuse values\nregion of operation\nInshore groundfish processing labor\nGroundfish discards\npayments by region of operation\nProhibited species catch\nGroundfish exvessel value by region of\nSafety\nvessel owner\nExcess capacity\nTotal exvessel value by region of vessel\nowner\nSubsistence use of living marine\nresources\nMany of these categories of effects have been identified because they can be directly measured or modeled.\nThey also function as surrogates or indicators of other effects of interest, particularly on the regional and\ncommunity level. For example, estimates on labor payments are available and serve as an indicator of\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-63","community employment levels. Similarly, \"total\" and \"groundfish\" exvessel values by region of landing are\nsubject to local and state taxes and are surrogate indicators for fishery-generated tax revenue to local and state\ngovernments. They are also indicators of the demand for support services with individual communities, which\nneed a certain level of fisheries activity to survive economically. Data for other categories, such non-\nconsumptive and non-use values (the perceived value of a healthy and sustainable ocean) and net benefits to\nconsumers (from availability of reliable and high quality seafood products), are not available nor possible to\nquantify at this time; this category is assessed qualitatively.\nExternal Effects\nExternal factors for evaluating cumulative socioeconomic effects are those activities that have synergistic or\ninteractive effects on the primary socioeconomic characteristics of the fishing industry, consumers, or the\nregions and their communities. These activities are primarily related to other fisheries, other economic\nactivities, and other sources of municipal and state revenues:\nOther fisheries may provide fishing opportunities to vessels and processors participating in the\ngroundfish fishery, intercept or otherwise affect groundfish stocks and harvest quotas, and provide\nother sources of employment and tax revenue for local communities. Activities with these fisheries\nmay offset or exacerbate the effects from groundfish management alternatives, in both the harvesting\nand processing sectors. The fisheries that have the greatest potential for cumulative effects are crab\n(tanner and king), salmon, halibut, and state groundfish fisheries. Several classes of catcher vessels\nand inshore processors currently participate in these fisheries to a certain degree, and rely on the\ncombined harvest from these fisheries. In several communities, the processing sector handles a range\nof products (e.g., groundfish, crab, and salmon); in other communities they are more specialized,\nfocusing on one or two products. Where groundfish is a primary or secondary product line, a\nsignificant, long-term decrease (as compared to cyclical) in groundfish availability could jeopardize\nthe economic viability of harvesting and processing other fish. Given projected closures and\nreductions in commercial crab fisheries, and the likely continuation (or further reductions) of the\nArea M chum salmon cap, some participants in these fisheries are likely to experience adverse\ncumulative effects. These other fisheries also affect consumer values; their product availability\nprovides net benefits to domestic seafood consumers. However, the extent and intensity of these other\nfisheries can adversely affect nonconsumptive and nonuse values by contributing to the actual and\nperceived level of fishing activities in the Bering Sea and GOA.\nOther economic development activities may interfere with or compete for labor, services, and\nfacilities; or provide additional employment and revenue opportunities for local communities. Direct\nand indirect employment opportunities associated with economic developments may offset or\nexacerbate the effects from groundfish management alternatives. In addition, employment\nopportunities directly affect the population of a community or region, and increase demand for\nmunicipal services and population based revenue sharing (such as education). The economic\ndevelopment activities that have the greatest potential for cumulative effects are state and federal oil\nand gas exploration/production (primarily potential exploration activities in Cook Inlet and\npotentially Dutch Harbor), military projects (contaminated site clean-up and missile defense projects\nin the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands), Kodiak rocket launch complex, tourism, and\nconstruction and operation of marine or air-related transportation projects. Such economic activities\nmay offset short-term declines in fisheries, but are not likely to substitute for long-term declines,\nparticularly where regional and community economies depend on fishing. In addition, economic\ndevelopment in coastal Alaskan communities, particularly in the Aleutian Islands and Alaska\nPeninsula, may be adversely affected by the designation of critical habitat for Steller's eider. This\nissue is already affecting construction of marine infrastructure projects and may affect other coastal\nactivities.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-64","Other sources of municipal and state revenue help fund local facilities and services. Within Alaska,\nregions and communities participating in the fishing industry generate revenue or receive revenue\nsharing from taxes on fishing (in some cases over 99 percent), and from non-fishing sources.\nChanges in these revenue streams may offset or exacerbate the effects from groundfish management\nalternatives. Changes in revenue streams also may affect the ability of communities to provide\nmunicipal services, fund capital projects, borrow money, and retire or service debt. The programs that\nhave the greatest potential for cumulative effects are landing tax revenues from non-groundfish\nfisheries (such as salmon, crab, and halibut), power cost equalization subsidies, and municipal\nrevenue sharing programs from the state of Alaska (including shared education funding). During\nrecent years, state municipal revenue sharing, power cost equalization, and contribution to education\nprograms have been decreasing.\nOther factors could affect price and demand for groundfish, such as the rising U.S. dollar relative to\ncurrencies of countries with high levels of groundfish imports, and negative effect on exvessel values of all\nvessels and processors, or higher or lower global harvests of fish/seafood and fish inventories that could serve\nas substitutes for groundfish. Similarly, there is a link between availability of seafood industry jobs and\npopulation levels in Alaska coastal communities. These factors are difficult to predict and are not considered\nin this analysis.\nCumulative Effects on Fishing Industry Sectors and Consumer Values\nWithin the catcher vessel, catcher/processor, and onshore processors/motherships sectors, there are different\ngear types, vessel sizes, and processing lines. Many of the catcher vessels and onshore processors participate\nin other commercial fisheries such as crab, salmon, halibut and herring. Given the categories and number of\nindustry participants, and the number of regions where fishing and processing occur, any changes in the\nmanagement of the fishery are likely to benefit some parties while adversely impacting others. If a particular\nindustry sector or consumer value is projected to experience a conditionally significant adverse or beneficial\ncumulative effect or both, the table reflects a CS-, CS+, or CS+/- rating, even if other sectors are not affected.\nWhere a cumulative effect is projected to occur, but is not expected to be significant, a not significant rating\nis used to indicate a nonsignificant effect. A rating of unknown is used where a cumulative effect is expected\nbut the nature and magnitude of the potential effect is unknown.\nThe significance of cumulative effects is based on the finding of significance for direct and indirect effects\nof Alternative 1 on socioeconomic characteristics, as modified by the numerical ratings of each of the\nalternatives and interaction with external effects. Where exvessel values, costs, labor payments, and other\nnumerical values are reduced by 20 percent or more for a specific industry or region, coupled with an\nanticipated reduction in commercial crab and salmon harvest, a rating of significant was assigned. These\nanticipated fisheries reductions also are a factor in assigning significance to safety and capacity\ncharacteristics, as there are more fleet and processors chasing less fish. Table 4.13-39 addresses cumulative\neffects by alternative and direct/indirect effect category.\nGroundfish Exvessel Value\nWhile the State of Alaska manages a limited groundfish fishery for Pacific cod, direct and indirect effects\nfrom federal groundfish fisheries dominate cumulative effects. Alternatives 1, 6.1, and 6.2 maintain or\nincrease significant cumulative beneficial effects on groundfish exvessel value. Alternatives 2.1, 2.2, and 5\nresult in significant adverse cumulative effects on groundfish exvessel value, particularly on catcher vessels\nin the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak regions. Alternatives 3, 4.1, and 4.2 have\nnonsignificant adverse cumulative effects on groundfish exvessel value.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-65","Total Exvessel Value\nTotal exvessel value includes contribution of other fisheries such as salmon, crab and halibut, and measures\nthe relative contribution of groundfish value. Alternatives 1, 6.1, and 6.2 maintain or increase significant\ncumulative beneficial effects for most classes of vessels. Alternatives 2.1, and 2.2 result in significant adverse\ncumulative effects to all catcher vessel, catcher/processors and processing categories. Alternatives 3 and 5\nresult in significant cumulative adverse effects on certain classes of trawl vessels, particularly in the Bering\nSea, Alaska Peninsula, and Aleutian Islands fisheries. However, projected closures and reductions in\ncommercial crab fisheries, and the likely continuation of the Area M chum salmon cap, will result in\nsignificant adverse cumulative effects for catcher vessel and processor participants in these fisheries,\nregardless of the management alternative. Affected groups include Bering Sea pollock onshore processors,\nand Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak region catcher vessels and processors. Alternatives\n4.1, and 4.2 have nonsignificant adverse cumulative effects on total exvessel value.\nAverage Harvesting Cost\nHarvesting costs include fixed costs (e.g., insurance) and variable costs associated with specific fishing efforts\n(e.g., fuel). Cumulative effects consider costs associated with specific alternatives in combination with costs\nassociated or shared with participation in other fisheries. Alternatives 1, 6.1, and 6.2 maintain or increase\nsignificant cumulative beneficial effects by reducing costs through increased groundfish harvests.\nAlternatives 2.1 and 2.2 result in significant adverse cumulative effects by increasing costs for most catcher\nvessels and catcher/processors. Alternative 5 results in significant cumulative adverse effects on certain\nclasses of trawl vessels. However, projected closures and reductions in commercial crab fisheries, and the\nlikely continuation of the Area M chum salmon cap, will result in significant adverse cumulative effects for\ncatcher vessel participants in these fisheries, regardless of the management alternative. Affected groups\ninclude Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak region catcher vessels. Alternatives 3, 4.1, and\n4.2 have nonsignificant adverse cumulative effects on average harvesting costs.\nGroundfish Product Value\nThe primary cumulative effect on groundfish product value come from the state managed Pacific cod fishery.\nHowever, given the limited size of this fishery, the cumulative effect is significant and beneficial for\nAlternatives 6.1 and 6.2, and nonsignificant for Alternatives 1, 3, 4.1, 4.2, and 5. For Alternatives 2.1 and\n2.2, the significant adverse direct and indirect effects not offset, resulting in significant adverse cumulative\neffects.\nAverage Processing Cost\nProcessing costs include fixed costs and variable costs associated with specific processing efforts. Cumulative\neffects consider costs associated with specific alternatives in combination with costs associated or shared with\nparticipation in other fisheries. Alternatives 1, 6.1, and 6.2 maintain or increase significant beneficial\ncumulative effects by reducing costs through increased groundfish harvests. Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 result\nin significant adverse cumulative effects by increasing costs for most processors. Under Alternatives 3, 4.1,\n4.2, and 5, projected closures and reductions in commercial crab fisheries and the likely continuation of the\nArea M chum salmon cap result in significant adverse cumulative effects for processor participants in these\nfisheries. Affected groups include Bering Sea pollock inshore processors, and Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nIslands and Kodiak region processors. Cumulative effects on other processors under these alternatives are\nadverse but not significant.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-66","Preemption of Processing Sectors\nUnder certain alternatives, the combination of reduced groundfish harvests and reduced harvests of crab and\nsalmon likely result in the preemption of certain processors based on economic feasibility of operation.\nAlternatives 1, 6.1, and 6.2 have beneficial but nonsignificant cumulative effects by reducing the likelihood\nof preemption of processors. Alternatives 2.1, 2.2, 4.2, and 5 result in significant adverse cumulative effects\nby reducing harvests and increasing costs for many processors, and likely result in the preemption of certain\nprocessors based on economic feasibility of operation. Alternatives 3 and 4.1 result in nonsignificant adverse\neffects for many processors, primarily in southcentral and southeast Alaska. However, projected closures and\nreductions in commercial crab fisheries, and the likely continuation of the Area M chum salmon cap, result\nin significant adverse cumulative effects for processor participants in these fisheries, regardless of the\nmanagement alternative. Affected groups include Bering Sea pollock onshore processors, and Alaska\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak region processors.\nPreemption of Vessel Classes\nUnder certain alternatives, the combination of reduced groundfish harvests and reduced harvests of crab\nand salmon likely result in the preemption of certain vessel classes based on economic feasibility of\noperation. Alternatives 2.1, 2.2, 4.2, and 5 result in significant adverse cumulative effects by reducing\nharvests and increasing costs for most vessels, and likely result in the preemption of certain vessel classes\nbased on economic feasibility of operation. Alternatives 1, 3, .1, 6.1, and 6.2 result in nonsignificant\nadverse effects for many vessel classes, primarily in southcentral and southeast Alaska. However,\nprojected closures and reductions in commercial crab fisheries, and the likely continuation of the Area M\nchum salmon cap, will result in significant adverse cumulative effects for catcher vessel participants in\nthese fisheries, regardless of the management alternative. Effected groups include Alaska Peninsula and\nAleutian Islands and Kodiak region catcher vessels.\nTable 4.13-39 Cumulative Fishery Sector and Consumer Value Effects\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\nCategories\nINDUSTRY SECTOR AND CONSUMER VALUES\nGroundfish exvessel value\nCS+\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nNS\nNS\nCS-\nCS+\nCS+\nCS-\nCS+/-\nCS+/-\nTotal exvessel value\nCS+\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nNS\nCS+\nCS+\nAverage harvesting cost\nCS+/-\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nNS\nNS\nCS-\nCS+\nGroundfish product value\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nCS+\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS+\nCS+\nAverage processing cost\nCS+\nCS-\nCS-\nPreemption of processing\nNS\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nNS\nPreemption of vessel classes\nNS\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nNS\nNonconsumptive and nonuse\nCS-\nCS+\nCS+\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nCS-\nCS-\nNet benefits to consumers\nCS+\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nCS+\nCS+\nNCE\nNCE\nGroundfish discards\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nProhibited species catch\nNS\nCS+\nCS+\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nCS-\nNS\nNS\nNS\nCS+\nNS\nSafety\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nCS-\nCS-\nCS+\nNS\nExcess capacity\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nNotes:\nCS - conditionally significant\nNS - not significant\nNCE - no cummlative effect\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-67","Nonconsumptive and nonuse value\nIt is not possible to quantify the expected level of non-consumptive and nonuse benefits that will occur under\nthe various management alternatives. Qualitatively, the cumulative effects of fisheries on wild ocean values\ncan be discussed. Alternatives 1, 6.1, and 6.2 result in significant adverse cumulative effects by maintaining\nor increasing the level of groundfish fisheries in conjunction with other North Pacific fisheries. The\nremaining alternatives result in nonsignificant beneficial cumulative effects by providing additional protection\nto fish and wildlife and habitat values that are perceived as components of a healthy and wild ocean.\nNet Benefits to Consumers\nNet benefits to consumers are defined as a stable and high quality supply of fishery products. Alternatives\n1, 6.1, and 6.2 contribute nonsignificant beneficial cumulative effects on the availability and quality of\nseafood products, although benefits could be offset somewhat by the projected reductions in the commercial\ncrab fisheries. Given the volume of groundfish seafood products, Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 create significant\nadverse cumulative effects on the availability and quality of seafood products, which are exacerbated by the\nprojected reductions in the commercial crab fisheries. Alternatives 3, 4.1, 4.2, and 5 have no significant\ncumulative effects.\nGroundfish Discards\nWhile the direct and indirect effects of management alternatives vary for groundfish discards, cumulative\neffects on groundfish discards associated with the state managed groundfish fishery are not significant for\nany of the alternatives.\nProhibited Species Catch\nGroundfish bycatch of prohibited species have nonsignificant cumulative effects with the exceptions of crab\nand salmon. Given current closures and reductions in the commercial crab fisheries, Alternative 6.2 likely\nincrease bycatch and result in a significant cumulative adverse effect for crab. Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 have\na significant beneficial cumulative effect by reducing crab bycatch. Similarly, given the concern over the\nhealth of western Alaska salmon stocks, Alternative 6.2 increase bycatch and result in a significant adverse\ncumulative effect for salmon. Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 have a significant beneficial cumulative effect by\nreducing salmon bycatch. Alternatives 1, 3, 4.1, 4.2, 5, and 6.1 do not have significant cumulative effects\non prohibited species catch.\nSafety\nVessel safety is a function primarily of the race for fish, and of distance to fishing areas and sea conditions\nrelative to vessel size. Alternatives 1, and to a lesser extent 3, 4.1, 4.2, and 5, maintain the current race for\ngroundfish harvest scenario; this situation is aggravated for catcher vessels that participate in the commercial\ncrab fishery and in the commercial salmon fishery in Area M. These alternatives have nonsignificant adverse\ncumulative effects for catcher vessels based in the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak regions.\nAlternative 2.1, and to a lessor extent 2.2, restrict fishing in nearshore waters in critical sea lion habitat. This\nsituation is aggravated for smaller trawl, fixed gear, and pot catcher vessels that participate in the commercial\ncrab fishery and in the commercial salmon fishery in Area M. These alternatives have significant adverse\ncumulative effects for catcher vessels based in the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak regions.\nAlternative 6.1, and to a lesser extent 6.2, reduce the race for fish by allocating groundfish catch or increasing\nthe total allowable catch. These alternatives have a significant beneficial cumulative effect.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-68","Excess Capacity\nExcess capacity in the harvesting and processing sectors occurs both year around and seasonally, when quotas\nhave been harvested and vessels and processing lines are idle. To a certain extent, many vessels and\nprocessors participate in commercial crab, salmon, halibut and other fisheries to maximize use of equipment.\nGiven the current closures and reductions in commercial crab and salmon fisheries, Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2,\nand to a lesser extent Alternative 5, increase excess capacity, and result in significant adverse cumulative\neffects in Bering Sea pollock onshore processors, and catcher vessels and onshore processors in the Alaska\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak regions. Alternatives 6.1, and to a lesser extent 6.2, reduce\nexcess capacity by allocating groundfish catch by increasing the total allowable catch. These alternatives\nhave significant and nonsignificant beneficial cumulative effects. Alternatives 1, 3, 4.1, and 4.2 maintain\ncurrent excess capacity and have a nonsignificant adverse cumulative effect.\nCumulative Effects on Regions and Communities Participating in the North Pacific Groundfish Fishery\nRegions that are affected include the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands, Kodiak, southcentral Alaska,\nsoutheast Alaska, Washington inland waters, and the Oregon coast. Within Alaska, the state and several\nmunicipalities benefit significantly from the employment, economic activity, and revenues generated by\ngroundfish and other commercial fisheries. Commercial fishing is a dominant component of the economies\nof the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands, Kodiak, and southeast Alaska regional economies. Within\nsouthcentral Alaska, Washington inland waters, and the Oregon coast regions, regional economies are more\ndiversified and contributions from commercial fishing are important but do not dominate local economies\nand municipal revenue.\nGiven the number of regions where fishing and processing occur, any changes in the management of the\nfishery are likely to benefit some regions and communities while adversely affecting others. If a particular\nregion or community is projected to experience a conditionally significant adverse or beneficial cumulative\neffect, the table reflects a CS-, CS+, or CS+/-rating, even if other regions and communities are not affected.\nWhere a cumulative effect is projected to occur, but is not expected to be significant, a not significant rating\nis used to indicate a nonsignificant effect. A rating of unknown is used where a cumulative effect is expected\nbut the nature and magnitude of the potential effect is unknown. Table 4.13-40 addresses cumulative effects\nby alternative and direct/indirect effect category. Many of these categories are surrogate indicators for\nregional and community employment, economic activity, and fiscal effects.\nLabor payments by catcher vessels\nAs indicators of employment and income to crew where the catcher vessels are based, Alternatives 1, 6.1, and\n6.2 result in significant beneficial cumulative effect on all regions, but particularly in the Alaska Peninsula\nand Aleutian Islands and Kodiak regions where economies are dependent on commercial fishing. These\nbeneficial effects partially offset reductions in labor payments associated with closures or reductions in crab\nand salmon harvests. Alternative 6.1 provides the added benefit of more stable employment based on quota\nallocation of harvest and spreading it throughout the year. Alternatives 2.1, 2.2, and 5 create significant\nadverse cumulative effects, particularly in the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak regions\nwhere other employment opportunities are not readily available. These adverse effects exacerbate reductions\nin labor payments associated with closures or reductions in crab and salmon harvests. Alternatives 3, 4.1,\nand 4.2 generally have nonsignificant adverse effects, although they exacerbate reductions in labor payments\nassociated with closures or reductions in crab and salmon harvests in the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nIslands and Kodiak regions.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-69","Labor payments by catcher/processors\nBecause catcher/processors exclusively target groundfish, and are based in Washington inland waters where\nthe economy is diversified, all of the alternatives have nonsignificant cumulative effects on catcher/processor\nlabor payments.\nLabor payments by other groundfish processors\nUsing these payments as indicators of employment and income to employees where the processors are based,\nAlternatives 1, 6.1, and 6.2 result in significant beneficial cumulative effect on all regions, but particularly\nin the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak regions where economies are dependent on\ncommercial fishing. These beneficial effects partially offset reductions in labor payments associated with\nclosures or reductions in crab and salmon harvests. Alternative 6.1 provide the added benefit of more stable\nemployment based on quota allocation of harvest and spreading it throughout the year. Alternatives 2.1, 2.2,\nand 5 create significant adverse cumulative effects, particularly in the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nand Kodiak regions where other employment opportunities are not readily available. These adverse effects\nexacerbate reductions in labor payments associated with closures or reductions in crab and salmon harvests.\nAlternatives 3, 4.1, and 4.2 generally have nonsignificant adverse effects, although they exacerbate reductions\nin labor payments associated with closures or reductions in crab and salmon harvests in the Alaska Peninsula\nand Aleutian Islands and Kodiak regions.\nTotal labor payments\nCombining labor payments from catcher vessel, catcher/processor, and processor/mother ship operations,\nAlternatives 1, 6.1, and 6.2 result in significant beneficial cumulative effect on all regions, but particularly\nin the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak regions where economies are dependent on\ncommercial fishing. These beneficial effects partially offset reductions in labor payments associated with\nclosures or reductions in crab and salmon harvests. Alternative 6.1 provides the added benefit of more stable\nemployment based on quota allocation of harvest and spreading it throughout the year. Alternatives 2.1, 2.2\nand 5 create significant adverse cumulative effects, particularly in the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nand Kodiak regions where other employment opportunities are not readily available. These adverse effects\nexacerbate reductions in labor payments associated with closures or reductions in commercial crab and\nsalmon fisheries harvests. Alternatives 3, 4.1, and 4.2 generally have nonsignificant adverse effects, although\nthey exacerbate reductions in labor payments associated with closures or reductions in crab and salmon\nharvests in the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak regions.\nGroundfish exvessel value by region of fisheries landing\nAs an indicator of both regional economic activity and state and community fiscal effects, Alternatives 1, 6.1,\nand 6.2 result in significant beneficial cumulative effect on all regions, but particularly in the Alaska\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak regions where both economies and local municipal revenue are\ndependent on commercial fishing, and other economic activities are limited. These beneficial effects partially\noffset reductions in (1) local economic activity associated with closures or reductions in commercial crab and\nsalmon fisheries harvests and (2) state and municipal tax revenue associated with closures or reductions in\ncrab and salmon harvests and reductions in state revenue sharing. Alternatives 2.1, 2.2, and 5 create\nsignificant adverse cumulative effects, particularly in the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak\nregions where local economies are not diversified and municipal revenue is dependent on fisheries-generated\ntaxes. These adverse effects exacerbate reductions in economic activity and state and municipal revenue\nassociated with closures or reductions in crab and salmon harvests. Alternatives 3, 4.1, and 4.2 generally\nhave nonsignificant adverse effects, although they exacerbate reductions in economic activities and\nstate/municipal revenue associated with closures or reductions in commercial crab and salmon fisheries\nharvests in the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak regions.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-70","Table 4.13-40 Cumulative Regional and Community Socioeconomic Effects\nAlternative\nCumulative Effect\n5\n6.1\n6.2\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\n4.2\nCategories\nREGIONS AND\nCOMMUNITIES\nNS\nNS\nCS-\nCS+\nCS+\nLabor payments -\nCS+\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\ncatcher vessels\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\nLabor payments by\nNCE\nNCE\nNCE\ncatcher/processors\nCS-\nLabor payments by\nCS+\nCS-\nNS\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS+\nCS+\nother groundfish\nprocessors\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nCS+\nTotal labor\nCS+\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nCS\nemployment\nNS\nNS\nCS-\nCS+\nCS+\nGroundfish exvessel\nCS+\nCS-\nCS\nNS\nvalue by region\nCS+\nTotal exvessel value\nCS+\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS+\nby region\nCS+\nCS+\nInshore groundfish\nCS+\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nNS\nNS\nCS-\nproduct value by\nregion of operation\nNS\nCS-\nCS+\nCS+\nInshore groundfish\nCS+\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nNS\nprocessing labor\npayments by region of\noperation\nCS+\nCS+\nGroundfish exvessel\nCS+\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nNS\nNS\nCS-\nvalue by region of\nownership\nCS-\nCS-\nCS+\nCS+\nTotal exvessel value\nCS+\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nby region of ownership\nSubsistence use of\nCS-/U\nCS+/U\nCS+/U\nU\nU\nU\nU\nCS-/U\nCS-/U\nmarine resources\nNotes:\nCS - conditionally significant\nNS - not significant\nU - unknown\nTotal exvessel value by region of fisheries landing\nUsing total exvessel value as an indicator of both regional economic activity and state and community fiscal\neffects, Alternatives 1, 6.1, and 6.2 result in significant beneficial cumulative effect on all regions, but\nparticularly in the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak regions where both economies and local\nmunicipal revenue are dependent on commercial fishing, and other economic activities are limited. These\nbeneficial effects partially offset reductions in (1) local economic activity associated with closures or\nreductions in commercial crab and salmon fisheries harvests and (2) state and municipal tax revenue\nassociated with closures or reductions in commercial crab and salmon fisheries harvests and reductions in\nstate revenue sharing. Alternatives 2.1, 2.2, 3, 4.1, 4.2, and 5 create significant adverse cumulative effects\nin the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak regions where local economies are not diversified\nand municipal revenue is dependent on fisheries-generated taxes. These adverse effects exacerbate reductions\nin economic activity and state and municipal revenue associated with closures or reductions in commercial\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-71","crab and salmon fisheries harvests. Adverse cumulative effects in other regions are not significant, because\nof their reliance on other commercial fisheries.\nInshore groundfish product value by region of operation\nGroundfish product value, by itself or in combination with other fisheries products such as crab and salmon,\nis an indicator of the economic viability of operating an inshore processing plant. Prolonged reductions in\ngroundfish harvests could remove processors from operation through shutdown or bankruptcy, with\nassociated adverse local economic effects. Alternatives 1, 6.1, and 6.2 result in significant beneficial\ncumulative effects for all inshore processors; Alternative 6.1 in particular provides a certain amount of\neconomic stability through allocating quotas to participants and allowing harvesting throughout the year.\nThese alternatives partially offset potential reductions on availability of crab and salmon in Alaska Peninsula\nand Aleutian Islands and Kodiak regions. Alternatives 2.1, 2.2, and 5 create significant adverse cumulative\neffects, particularly in the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands (including Bering Sea pollock inshore\nprocessors) and Kodiak regions, where reductions in crab and salmon harvests and limited opportunities to\nprocess other fish products exacerbate the adverse effects. Alternatives 3, 4.1, and 4.2 generally have\nnonsignificant adverse cumulative effects on the economic viability of inshore processor operation, although\nthey exacerbate reductions in processing activity associated with closures or reductions in commercial crab\nand salmon fisheries harvests in the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak regions.\nInshore groundfish processing labor payments by region of operation\nCumulative effects are similar to those associated with labor payments by other groundfish processors.\nAlternatives 1, 6.1, and 6.2 result in significant beneficial cumulative effects for all inshore processors, with\nAlternative 6.1 providing a certain amount of employment stability. Alternatives 2.1, 2.2, and 5 create\nsignificant adverse cumulative effects, particularly in the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak\nregions. Alternatives 3, 4.1, and 4.2 generally have nonsignificant adverse cumulative effects.\nGroundfish exvessel value by region of owner\nAs an informal indicator of the economic viability of operating a vessel, prolonged reductions in groundfish\nexvessel value could reduce vessel related economic activity, or remove vessels from the local economy\nthrough bankruptcy or participation in another fishery, with associated adverse local economic effects.\nAlternatives 1, 6.1, and 6.2 result in significant beneficial cumulative effect on all regions where vessels are\nowned; Alternative 6.1 in particular provides a certain amount of economic stability through allocating quotas\nto participants, whereas Alternative 6.2 increase the levels of harvest. Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 create\nsignificant adverse cumulative effects, particularly in the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak\nregions, where reductions in commercial crab and salmon fisheries harvests and limited opportunities to enter\nother fisheries exacerbate the adverse effects. Alternatives 3, 4.1, and 4.2, and 5 generally have nonsignificant\nadverse effects on the economic viability of vessel operation, although they exacerbate reductions in exvessel\nvalue associated with closures or reductions in commercial crab and salmon fisheries harvests in the Alaska\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak regions.\nTotal exvessel value by region of owner\nAs an informal indicator of the economic viability of operating a vessel, prolonged reductions in total\nexvessel value could reduce vessel related economic activity, or remove vessels from the local economy\nthrough bankruptcy or participation in another fishery, with associated adverse local economic effects.\nAlternatives 1, 6.1, and 6.2 result in significant beneficial cumulative effect on all regions where vessels are\nowned; Alternative 6.1 in particular provides a certain amount of economic stability through allocating quotas\nto participants, whereas Alternative 6.2 increases the levels of harvest. Alternatives 2.1, 2.2, and 5 create\nsignificant adverse cumulative effects, particularly in the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-72","regions, where reductions in commercial crab and salmon fisheries harvests and limited opportunities to enter\nother fisheries exacerbate the adverse effects. Alternatives 3, 4.1, and 4.2 generally have nonsignificant\nadverse effects on the economic viability of vessel operation, although they exacerbate reductions in exvessel\nvalue associated with closures or reductions in commercial crab and salmon fisheries harvests in the Alaska\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands and Kodiak regions.\nSubsistence use of living marine resources\nSubsistence resources of concern include Steller sea lions and salmon. Beyond the direct take of sea lions\nduring fishing activities, the relationship between groundfish fisheries and decline in sea lion population is\nunknown, as are the effects of regime shifts and other natural cycles. With regard to direct take of sea lions\nfrom the groundfish fishery, all alternatives have no or nonsignificant cumulative effects on subsistence\nharvest of sea lions. With regard to relationships between groundfish fisheries and decline in sea lions based\non harvesting food sources, disturbance through fishing activities, or other ecosystem relationships, the\nsignificance of cumulative effects is unknown but potentially adverse. Other fisheries, particular commercial\nsalmon and herring, could contribute to cumulative effects. Alternatives 1, 6.1, and 6.2 have the greatest\npotential for adverse cumulative effects, because they continue harvest activities at current or increased levels\nin areas identified as critical habitat. Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 have the greatest potential for beneficial\ncumulative effects, based on reduced harvests and levels of disturbance within critical habitat. The\ncumulative effects of the other alternatives are unknown.\nSubsistence salmon harvests in western Alaska are currently threatened by poor runs in the Yukon\nKuskokwim River system; of greatest concern are the chinook and chum salmon stocks. A certain amount\nof salmon bycatch occurs in the groundfish fisheries, although they are governed by PSC limits. The direct\nand indirect effects of salmon bycatch under all alternatives are not significant, based on their percentage of\nthe overall commercial and subsistence harvests. Activities with potential cumulative effects consist of\nintercept of western Alaska salmon stocks in high seas foreign fisheries and state commercial salmon\nfisheries; the significance of these effects are unknown, as are the effects of regime shifts and other natural\ncycles.\n4.13.4.8 Ecosystem\nEcosystem health has been defined in a variety of ways, but most of the definitions have two concepts in\ncommon: diversity and stability. The term biological diversity (or biodiversity) has come into common usage\nas an all encompassing definition fo the diversity of life and its processes (CEQ 1993). Preserving\nbiodiversity at the genetic, species, ecosystem, and landscape levels is analogous to protecting ecosystem\nintegrity. Simple diversity (as measured by the richness and equatability of species and other biological\nelements) is a useful indicator of ecosystem condition when compared to the diversity of natural references.\nThe second factor, stability, must also be taken into account, because it indicates a vigorous, resilient\ncondition that is resistant to environmental stress (Mageau et al. 1995). As defined by the United Nations\nEnvironmental Programme, \"a healthy ecosystem is one whose parameters do not vary outside predetermined\nlimits from a predetermined level within a given period of time\" (UNEP 1997). Ecosystem stability is a\nnecessary precondition for sustainable fisheries (Sherman 1995).\nThis section briefly summarizes the alternatives with respect to their potential, in combination with external\nfactors, to produce cumulative effects at the ecosystem level. The cumulative effects analysis followed the\napproach described in Section 4.13.1 and was based on the potential direct and indirect effects of the\nalternatives identified in Section 4.9.2, acting in an additive or synergistic fashion with external influences.\nA detailed discussion of the material summarized in this section is presented in Appendix J, Section 8.0.\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.13-73","As explained in Section 4.13.3, external influences considered for the cumulative effects analysis fall into\ntwo categories: (1) human-controlled events and (2) natural events. The human controlled events considered\nin the ecosystem analysis are:\nState of Alaska-managed and international fisheries;\nSubsistence hunting and fishing; and\nCommercial shipping.\nNatural events considered are:\nShort-term climate change (e.g., the ENSO phenomenon);\nLong-term climate changes (e.g., PDO and global warming); and\nRegime shifts (influenced primarily by long-term climate changes).\nFour categories of conditionally significant cumulative effects on the GOA and BSAI ecosystems are\nidentified for some or all of the alternatives:\nPelagic forage availability;\nSpatial and temporal concentration of the fishery on forage;\nIntroduction of non-indigenous species; and\nSpecies diversity.\nThese are the same impact categories previously evaluated in Section 4.9.2 with respect to predicted direct\nand indirect effects of the alternatives on the BSAI and GOA ecosystems. They are the parameters relevant\nto marine ecosystem diversity and stability that are most likely to be affected by the alternatives acting in\ncombination with the human-controlled and natural events also listed above.\nFor the ecosystem analysis, a significant cumulative effect is defined as one that would alter the diversity or\nstability of the BSAI or GOA ecosystem by (1) affecting predator-prey relationships; (2) adding or removing\nenergy and redirecting pathways of energy flow; or (3) increasing or decreasing biodiversity as measured by\nspecies, trophic function, or genetics.\nAs explained in Section 4.13.1, cumulative effects that satisfy significance criteria are labeled as conditionally\nsignificant, because our ability to demonstrate existing cumulative effects or to predict such effects in the\nfuture, especially where climatic forcing agents are involved, is not reliable enough to allow any degree of\ncertainty to be attached to the outcome. Moreover, available data regarding predator-prey relationships,\nenergy flow and balance, and diversity are suggestive in some cases but insufficient to allow firm conclusions\nto be made at the ecosystem level.\nConditionally significant cumulative effects of the alternatives on the BSAI and GOA ecosystems are\nsummarized in Table 4.13-41:\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-74","Table 4.13-41 Ecosystem Cumulative Effect Summary\nAlternative\n4.2\n5\n6.1\n6.2\nCumulative Effect\n1\n2.1\n2.2\n3\n4.1\nCategories\nPredator-Prey Relationships\nCS+/-\nCS+/-\nCS+/-\nCS+/-\nPelagic forage\nCS+/-\nCS+/-\nCS+/-\nCS+/-\nCS+/-\navailability\nCS-\nCS-\nNS\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nSpatial and\nCS-\nNS\ntemporal\nconcentration of\nfishery on forage\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nRemoval of top\nNS\nNS\npredators\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nIntroduction of non-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nCS-\nnative species\nEnergy flow and balance\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nEnergy removal\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\n(catch)\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nEnergy redirection\nNS\nNS\n(discards)\nDiversity\nCS+/-\nCS-\nCS+/-\nCS+/-\nCS+/-\nCS+/-\nSpecies diversity\nCS+/-\nCS+/-\nCS+/-\nNS\nNS\nNS\nFunctional (trophic)\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\ndiversity\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nNS\nGenetic diversity\nNS\nNS\nNS\nCS - conditionally significant\nNotes:\nNS - not significant\nCumulative Effects on Predator-Prey Relationships\nThe characteristics of predator-prey interactions with the food web are an important determinant of ecosystem\nstability and diversity. If changes occur with respect to the amount of food (forage) available to predators\nat each level (or within each trophic guild) of the food web, the species composition and abundance of the\npredators can change. If fisheries concentrate their effort on specific locations and at specific times of the\nyear, over-fishing of particular groups of forage fish can occur and in this way alter predator-prey\nrelationships. Removal of top predators, continued by \"fishing down the food web\" to reduce predator\npopulations at successively lower levels, can deplete predator populations and indirectly change the prey\npopulations exploited by those predators. And the introduction of new prey or, more often, predatory species\nfrom other parts of the world can lead to the introduced species out-competing and ultimately replacing the\nindigenous ones. Consequently, the analysis of predator-prey relationships is structured into the four main\ncategories shown in Table 4.13-41:\nChanging the availability of important forage (prey) species by selectively removing key predator\nor competing forage species from the food web;\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-75","Overfishing of important forage species by concentrating the fishing effort in space (geographic\nlocation) and/or time;\nRemoval of predators from the top and from successively lower levels of the food web (fishing down\nthe food web); and\nIntroducing new (e.g., non-indigenous) competitor species into the food web.\nPelagic Forage Availability\nAs shown in Table 4.13-41, all of the alternatives were concluded to have the potential for conditionally\nsignificant cumulative effects on pelagic forage availability. The best alternative from the standpoint of\nprotecting pelagic forage is Alternative 2.2, because it would provide the highest degree of protection\nto\npollock, cod, and Atka mackerel through large TAC reductions, making these fish more available to predators\nsuch as the Steller sea lion and seabirds. Thus, Alternative 2.2 would do the best job of maximizing pelagic\nforage availability against the background of the external influences, which would be the same under all of\nthe alternatives.\nThe main source of human-controlled external influence in this regard is the State of Alaska-managed herring\nfishery, which reduces the availability of Pacific herring, a key component of pelagic and nearshore food\nwebs in the GOA and BSAI and an important food source for a wide variety of fishes, mammals, and birds.\nAlthough the herring fishery exerts an adverse influence, available evidence does not indicate that an adverse\ncumulative effect on forage availability (i.e, depletion of predators as a result of fewer herring) has actually\nresulted from its operation. Background influences from the larger ecosystem drivers, short-term and long-\nterm climatic changes and regime shifts, are much more likely to determine the overall availability of pelagic\nforage in the GOA and BSAI. Because these powerful forcing agents far outweigh the effect of any human-\ncontrolled activity such as a fishery, they are concluded to exert the controlling external influence on forage\navailability. Therefore, the conditionally significant cumulative effect on pelagic forage associated with any\nof the alternatives could be beneficial or adverse (+/-), depending on largely unpredictable climatic trends.\nSpatial and Temporal Concentration on Forage\nWith respect to the spatial and temporal concentration of the groundfish fishery on forage species such as\npollock, climatic trends would not be a major external influence. Instead, the additive or synergistic effect\nof the herring fishery would be more influential. As noted above, an adverse external influence is exerted\nby the herring fishery because it reduces the availability of an important ecosystem forage component.\nAgainst this background, Alternatives 2.1 and 2.2 fare best because they would go farthest in spreading out\nthe groundfish fishing effort in space and time. Therefore, the adverse cumulative effect with the external\ninfluence of the herring fishery is concluded not to be significant for these two alternatives. In contrast,\nAlternatives 3 through 6.2 would all have the potential to produce conditionally significant cumulative\nadverse effects on predator/prey relationships in the GOA and BSAI ecosystems by adding incrementally to\nthe total spatial and/or temporal concentration of fishing effort on forage. This adverse cumulative effect\nwould potentially have a greater magnitude in the case of Alternatives 3 and 6.2, because the external\ninfluences of other fisheries, particularly for herring, would act in the same adverse direction as the\nalternatives themselves. Alternatives 4.1 through 6.1 would introduce new groundfish fishery management\nregimes with potentially beneficial effects in relaxing spatial and/or temporal fishing pressures, but these\nbenefits would still be offset, to a varying extent, by the external adverse influences of other fisheries.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-76","Removal of Top Predators\nThe potential direct and indirect effects of the status quo in removing top predators are not considered to be\nsignificant, and although other fisheries remove salmon and halibut, all predatory species, there is no evidence\nthat regulated fishing removals of these predators would interact with any of the alternatives to alter predator-\nprey relationships within the GOA and BSAI food webs. Therefore, any adverse cumulative effect that might\nresult from such interactions is not considered to be significant.\nIntroduction of Non-Native Species\nAs shown in Table 4.13-41, all of the alternatives are concluded to have conditionally significant cumulative\neffects associated with the introduction of non-native, or non-indigenous, species. This is because non-\nindigenous species have already been introduced to Alaskan waters, and their eventual cumulative effect on\nthe BSAI and GOA ecosystems will have little, if any, relationship to the groundfish management alternative\nselected for future implementation. Under the status quo, non-indigenous species such as the predatory\nseastar (Asterias amurensis) have already been introduced through ballast water discharges from fishing\nvessels that participate in the federally managed groundfish fishery (Section 4.9.2.1).\nAlthough there is no available evidence that marine species introduced into Alaskan waters have had an\nadverse effect on predator/prey relationships, there is always the potential that an introduced species could\nout-compete an indigenous species occupying the same ecological niche and eventually replace or endanger\nthe indigenous species. It is also possible that an introduced species could exploit an unoccupied niche and\nchange the food web by consuming previously unexploited or lightly utilized food sources. With respect to\nexternal factors, ballast water is discharged into Alaskan waters by vessels participating in fisheries managed\nby the State of Alaska and the IPHC, and by commercial tankers and cargo ships. Since the concern with\nnon-indigenous species is their potential (for now, hypothetical) to increase in abundance and disrupt the food\nweb-a possibility that could occur regardless of the fishery management regime in effect-there is a\nconditionally significant adverse cumulative effect associated with all of the alternatives.\nCumulative Effects on Energy Flow and Balance\nHigh-volume fishing and fish processing can alter the amount and flow of energy in an ecosystem by\nremoving energy (e.g., large numbers of fish) and by altering pathways of energy flow through the return of\ndiscards and processing waste to the sea. When fish are removed from the marine ecosystem, the total energy\ncontent of the ecosystem is reduced. And when bycatch and processed wastes are returned to the sea, energy\nis redirected to different parts of the marine ecosystem relative to the natural state. If the quantities of\nbiomass removed from the sea and/or returned in different form are large enough relative to the total biomass\nof the ecosystem, the energy balance of the system could be destabilized.\nEnergy Removal (Catch)\nIt is not likely that any of the alternative groundfish fishery management regimes would produce a significant\ndirect or indirect effect on the energy budgets of the GOA and BSAI ecosystems. Total fishing removals of\ngroundfish biomass are such a small proportion of the total system energy budget, and are SO small relative\nto interannual variability in production, that variations in biomass removal resulting from the fishery\nmanagement regime would not be significant.\nWith regard to potential cumulative effects, energy removals by other fisheries and natural influences from\nclimatic forcing agents would continue under all of the alternatives. The cumulative increase or decrease in\ntotal catch biomass under any alternative, however, would not be significant against the background of total\nBSAI and GOA biomass levels and would be negligible in comparison to the influences that natural forcing\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-77","agents would exert on these ecosystems in the absence of fishing. With respect to energy removal, therefore,\nthe potential cumulative effects of all of the alternatives are considered not to be significant.\nEnergy Redirection (Discards)\nA similar situation applies to the discarding of bycatch and fish processing wastes to the sea. Available\nevidence indicates that energy flow pathways are not significantly re-directed by fish processing waste, and\nestimates regarding the level of discarded material relative to natural sources of detritus indicate that the\naggregate of discarded biomass is insignificant in comparison to the background level of dead organic matter.\nIt is assumed that discards and processing waste discharges attributable to other fisheries would continue at\nexisting levels under all of the alternatives. Since none of the alternatives would be likely to increase the\nlevel of discards back to levels observed before improved retention requirements were implemented, and\nsince adverse effects of discards were not observed at the ecosystem level before the new requirements came\ninto effect, it was concluded that the cumulative effects of the alternatives with respect to energy re-direction\nwould not be significant against the background of the total BSAI and GOA ecosystem energy budgets.\nThe picture that emerges is that the effects of the groundfish fishery in removing energy by catching fish and\nin redirecting energy by returning dead bycatch and processing waste to the sea are too small to make a\nsignificant difference against the background of vastly larger natural processes. Adding the incremental\ninfluence of other fisheries and of fish processing facilities still does not lead to the conclusion that there\nwould be a significant (i.e., destabilizing) effect on energy flow and balance at the ecosystem level.\nCumulative Effects on Diversity\nBiological diversity, the third index of ecosystem health in addition to predator-prey relationships and\nenergetics, is approached here in three ways. First, the richness (number) of species in an ecosystem can\nchange if fishing removes all individuals belonging to a single species from the system. Equitability of\nspecies, another aspect of species diversity, can change if fishing alters the numbers of individual\nrepresentatives of one or more species relative to a defined baseline condition. Second, functional or trophic\ndiversity can change if a member of a trophic guild is removed or if the comparative abundance of the guild\nmember greatly increases or decreases. This can change the way biomass is distributed within the trophic\nguild and can affect the functional contribution of the trophic guild to the total ecosystem. Third, the selective\nremoval of organisms that share a particular characteristic, such as, rapid growth, can alter genetic diversity\nwithin a species. Removal of spawning aggregations also has the potential to alter genetic diversity if the\nparticular aggregation of fish removed from the system is genetically different from other aggregations. In\ngeneral, the evolutionary advantage of a species increases with genetic diversity, because the population is\nbetter prepared to respond to variations in natural conditions such as temperature, salinity, and water quality\nchanges.\nSpecies Diversity\nAs shown in Table 4.13-41, all of the alternatives are concluded to have conditionally significant cumulative\neffects associated with species diversity. Available baseline information on fish species diversity in the BSAI\nand GOA ecosystems is incomplete, and little survey and systematic information is available on other\necosystem components such as the benthic fauna. Therefore, it was not feasible to assess fully the cumulative\neffects of the alternatives on species diversity. Species with slow growth characteristics or low reproductive\npotential, such as skates, sharks, and grenadiers, are considered to be at risk, particularly in light of evidence\nthat indicates extinctions or near-extinctions of similar Atlantic species. To the extent that bycatch from the\ngroundfish fishery and other fisheries continues to remove individuals belonging to these sensitive species,\nthere will continue to be a potential for their gradual depletion. Also, as noted above in the discussion on\npredator/prey relationships, the species diversity of the BSAI and GOA ecosystems has been lastingly, and\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\nJANUARY 2001\n4.13-78","probably permanently, altered by the introduction of non-indigenous species through ballast water discharges\nfrom vessels participating in the groundfish fishery and from other fishing vessels, cargo ships, and cruise\nships. Finally, long-term climate changes and regime shifts will always have the potential to alter species\ndiversity, as poorly adapted species are gradually replaced by those more suited to the changed conditions.\nBecause these same factors-including bycatch depletions, long-term climatic rends such as global warming,\nregime shifts, and the introduction and population growth of non-indigenous species-would all continue to\nexert their beneficial or adverse influences regardless of the groundfish management plan in effect, all of the\nalternatives are concluded to have conditionally significant cumulative effects.\nFunctional (Trophic) Diversity\nThere is no documented indication that the functional, or trophic, diversity of the BSAI and GOA ecosystems\nhas been affected by the groundfish fishery or other fisheries, although climatic trends and regime shifts,\nthought to be the major forcing agents driving these ecosystems, could produce this type of cumulative effect.\nChanges in the relative abundance of species within trophic guilds in the BSAI and GOA have been attributed\nto natural background fluctuations in recruitment. These changes, however, have been within the historical\nlimits of natural fluctuations and would presumably occur in the complete absence of fishing. Therefore, they\nare not viewed as a conditionally significant cumulative effect for any of the alternatives.\nGenetic Diversity\nGenetic diversity within species, the third type of biodiversity indicator, may have received past cumulative\ninfluences from other U.S. and foreign fisheries. For example, concern about the depletion of pollock stocks\nin the Donut Hole region of the central Bering Sea led to an international moratorium on fishing in the region\nsince 1993 and to the 1994 Convention on the Conservation of the Pollock Resources in the central Bering\nSea. In general, however, there is little evidence to suggest that genetic diversity has been affected by\ncumulative influences acting on the BSAI and GOA, and it is concluded that this cumulative effect, if any,\nis not significant.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-79","This page intentionally left blank.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.13-80","4.14 SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES\n4.14.1 Introduction\nChapter 4 is the heart of this SEIS analysis. This section evaluates the effects of groundfish fishing on the\nenvironment and how those effects might be altered by changes to the current fisheries management regime.\nSection 4.1 begins with a description of the process NMFS undertook to develop a range of alternative fishery\nmanagement regimes to illustrate the general environmental effects of implementing an FMP. Agency analysts\nwith expertise in fishery science and fisheries management were tasked with developing one or more\nhypothetical, or model, regimes for each programmatic policy alternative. Using the current FMPs as the\nbaseline, analysts reviewed all of the management tools of the BSAI and GOA Groundfish FMPs and tailored\na hypothetical suite of actions that could reasonably serve as one method of achieving a particular set of policy\nobjectives. Analysis of these model regimes, and contrasting them with the current, or status quo, regime,\nillustrates the general environmental effects of each programmatic policy alternative.\nBeginning with Section 4.2, and through Section 4.9, the effects of the current status quo regime, and the\nalternative management regimes are evaluated from the perspective of each of the key issue areas (e.g.,marine\nmammals, target species, socioeconomic characteristics). Sections 4.10 through 4.12 provide general\ninformation on the effects of the alternative regimes on enforcement and management programs, on other\nenvironmental issues, and whether they provide any opportunity for energy conservation potential. Section 4.13\npresents results from the cumulative impacts analysis.\nThe potential environmental consequences of the six programmatic policy alternatives in this SEIS have been\nanalyzed in terms of potential fisheries management actions that could be taken to implement each of the policy\nalternative. At least one hypothetical, or model management regime was developed for Alternatives 2 through\n6 for purposes of analysis and comparison to Alternative 1 the current, or status quo, regime. Each alternative\nmodel regime contains a number of specific management actions that could serve as a potential amendment to\nthe groundfish FMPs. These model regimes were developed by agency analysts with expertise in a particular\nenvironmental issue, for the purpose of illustrating at least one strategy for achieving a particular policy\nemphasis. A description on how these regimes were developed, modeled, and the results of their analysis can\nbe found in Chapter 4.1 of the SEIS.\nAnalysis of these model regimes is intended to illustrate the types of environmental effects that can be\nanticipated should specific fisheries management actions be pursued in the future. Many potential combinations\nof management actions could comprise an alternative management regime. Relying on agency experts and\npublic comments received during the scoping of this SEIS led to the development of these alternative regimes\nfor analytical purposes; they are not intended to represent all possible combinations of actions. As a planning\ndocument, this programmatic SEIS provides the decision-makers and the public with a broad range of potential\npolicy objectives and potential management actions. The direct, indirect, and cumulative effects analyzed in\nthis SEIS illustrate the environmental consequences associated with emphasizing certain policy objectives more\nheavily than others. However, the SEIS does not prevent the Council or NMFS from taking other management\nactions. In such cases, the accompanying NEPA analysis would fully evaluate a specific proposed action and\nits environmental impacts.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.14-1","4.14.2 Analytical Approach to Evaluating Alternatives\nThe analytical approach for simulating current groundfish management in the North Pacific U.S. EEZ involves\nconsidering interactions among a large number of species, areas, and gear types. To evaluate the consequences\nof alternative management regimes selected in this SEIS, modeling was used to predict the likely outcome of\nmanagement decisions using statistics on historical catch of different species by gear types and areas.\nManagement of the Alaska groundfish fisheries is complex given the large numbers of species, areas, and gear\ntypes. The managers schedule fisheries openings and closures to maximize catch subject to catch limits and\nother constraints. These management actions are based on expectations about the array of species likely to\nbe\ncaptured by different gear types and the cumulative effect that each fishery has on the allowable catch of each\nindividual target species and other species groups. Management decisions were simulated by an in-season\nmanagement model that predicts capture of target and non-target species by different fisheries based on\nhistorical catch data by area and gear type. The groundfish population abundance for each alternative regime\nwas forecast for a five-year period beginning from the present. This approach (described in more detail in\nSection 4.1.6) provides a reasonable representation of the current fisheries management practice for dealing\nwith the multi-species nature of catch in target fisheries. In addition to the model and its projected results,\nagency analysts also used the scientific literature, ongoing research, and the professional opinion of fishery\nexperts in their respective fields to perform qualitative assessments.\n4.14.3 Summary of Environmental Consequences\nTable 4.14-1 presents a summary of the environmental consequences for each of the six alternatives. The table\nformat is organized by categories of effects on the natural environment and human environment (e.g., marine\nmammals, seabirds, target species, non-target species, prohibited species, habitat, ecosystem and\nsocioeconomic characteristics), and allows for a comparison of potential effects between alternatives. For each\ncategory of the natural and socioeconomic environment, a number of potential effects was chosen for analysis,\nbased on issues identified during scoping, and the expertise of the SEIS analysts. The potential direct and\nindirect effects are summarized, followed by a summary of cumulative effects. For Alternative 1 (the status quo\nalternative), potential effects were described as either significant (beneficial or adverse), conditionally\nsignificant (beneficial or adverse), not significant, or unknown. The term conditionally significant is used\nbecause in many cases, the likelihood and magnitude of effects is based on specific assumptions and limited\ndata. The term unknown is used when not enough information is available to reach a conclusion of any kind\non the likelihood and magnitude of effects. Alternatives 2 through 6 are evaluated in comparison to the status\nquo alternative, and whether conditions for each of the natural and socioeconomic environment categories were\nbetter, worse, or similar. In Chapter 4.0, a ranking system using values from +2 to -2 was used compare to\nAlternatives 2 through 6 with the status quo alternative.\nThe basic concept behind cumulative effects assessment is that proposed fishery management actions are\nevaluated in association with other events, providing a bigger picture that includes the additive result of other\nactions, each exerting its beneficial or adverse environmental influence over time. Cumulative effects take into\naccount the accumulation and/or combination of all identified direct and indirect effects generated by two or\nmore actions affecting a given resource, ecosystem, or human community. Identifying relevant external factors\n(including human activities and natural events, such as other fisheries, subsistence harvests, commercial\nshipping, oil and gas leasing, climatic shifts, etc.) that could act in combination with the direct and indirect\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.14-2","effects of the alternatives being considered is a key step in assessing cumulative effects. For more information\non the cumulative effects analysis, see Chapter 4.13 and Appendix J of the Programmatic SEIS.\n4.14.4 Comparison of Effects of Management Alternatives Compared to Status Quo.\nTable 4.14-2 provides a summary of the rankings for each effect relative to status quo by alternative and class\nof resources or human use characteristic.(i.e., marine mammals, seabirds, target species, non-target species,\nprohibited species, habitat, ecosystem and socioeconomic). The marine mammal class was further partitioned\ninto two sub-classes to distinguish effects of the alternative on primary pinnipeds that more frequently interact\nwith groundfish fisheries (Steller sea lion, northern fur seal and harbor seal) from effects on other marine\nmammals. The socioeconomic class was divided into effects on fishing industry sectors and consumers, and\neffects on regions and communities.\nThe rankings for each resource or characteristic class are presented in the table. A single ranking value was\nused for three analysis classes: habitat, ecosystem and socioeconomic. The remaining analysis classes included\nseveral species groups (species or species complexes), as a result the table reflects the percentage of groups\nthat were ranked as being worse than status quo (value less than 0), similar to status quo (0), or better than\nstatus quo (value greater than 0). The rankings in Table 2 should not be confused with statements regarding\nthe significance of the effects, they only represent a direction of change relative to status quo. The table is color\ncoded to highlight the direction of change between each of Alternatives 2 through 6, and the status quo\n(conditions worse than status quo = orange, conditions similar to status quo = yellow, and conditions better\nthan status quo = green). Where an analysis class contained several species groups, cells were color coded\nwhen 40 percent or more of the species or resources fell into one of the three possible ranking categories (<0,\n0, or >0).\nThe use of colors in Table 4.14-2 for each of the alternatives illustrates that there are environmental\nconsequences for any management action taken. Management of the groundfish fisheries off Alaska under the\nFMPs is a reflection of the Council's attempt to strike a balance among sound conservation of living marine\nresources, socially and economically viable fisheries, protected species, and maintaining a healthy marine\necosystem. This is the fundamental premise of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. Given the diversity of the\nenvironment and the complexity of the fisheries, any change in fisheries management is likely to benefit certain\naspects of the natural and human environment, and adversely affect other aspects to some degree.\nJANUARY 2001\nCHAPTER 4 - DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SEIS\n4.14-3","TABLE 4.14-1 SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES\nPAGE OF 8\nALTERNATIVE 6.2\nALTERNATIVE 3\nALTERNATIVE 4.1\nALTERNATIVE 4.2\nALTERNATIVE 5\nALTERNATIVE 6.1\nALTERNATIVE 1\nALTERNATIVE 2.1\nALTERNATIVE 2.2\nAGGREGATE TAC\nRARE SPECIES TAC\nINCREASE IN LONG-TERM\nINCREASE IN SHORT-TERM\nINCREASED\n(No ACTION)\nLow & SLOW HARVESTING\nSHORT-BURST HARVESTING\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nPROTECTION TO HABITAT\nSOCIOECONOMIC BENEFITS\nSOCIOECONOMIC BENEFITS\nSTRATEGY-INCREASED\nTO TARGET\nSTRATEGY- INCREASED\nCONTINUE WITH EXISTING\nTO NON-TARGET\nTO NON-TARGET\nPROTECTION TO MARINE\nPROTECTION TO MARINE\nGROUNDFISH SPECIES\nMANAGEMENT POLICY\nAND FORAGE SPECIES\nAND FORAGE SPECIES\nMAMMALS AND SEABIRDS\nMAMMALS AND SEABIRDS\nDESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVES\nThe policy emphasis of Alternative 4.1\nThe policy emphasis for Alternative 4.2\nThe policy emphasis of the Alternative 5\nThe policy emphasis of Alternative 6.1\nThe policy emphasis of Alternative 6.2\nAlternative represents the management\nThe policy objective of the Alternative 2\nThe policy objective of the Alternative 2\nThe policy emphasis of Alternative is\nis to prevent overfishing, maintain\nmodel regime is to protect and restore\nis to:\nto prevent overfishing, maintain healthy\nis to prevent overfishing, maintain\nis\nto:\nregime currently in place in the year\nmodel regime is to emphasize protection\nmodel regime is to emphasize protection\nhealthy stocks. and rebuild depressed\nhealthy stocks, and rebuild depressed\nessential fish habitat and accrue benefits\n2000. This alternative maintains the\nof marine mammals and seabirds by\nof marine mammals and seabirds by\nstocks, and rebuild depressed stocks of\nstocks of non-target species while\nto marine ecosystems, while providing\nIncrease the long-term net economic\nIncrease the short-term net economic\nexisting fishery management plan (FMP)\nreducing potential adverse impacts of\nreducing potential adverse impacts of\ntarget species, while maximizing yield\nstocks of non-target species while\nproviding for sustainable groundfish\nfor sustainable groundfish fisheries.\nbenefits from commercial groundfish\nbenefits from commercial groundfish\nproviding for sustainable groundfish\nconstraints designed to meet variety of\ngroundfish harvesting, including direct\ngroundfish harvesting which may\nfrom the groundfish fishery on a\nEssential fish habitat (EFH) is defined in\nfisheries to those who harvest and\nfisheries to those who harvest and\nsustainable basis. The specific\nfisheries.\nfisheries.\nobjectives. Model simulations under\ntake, competition for prey, disturbance,\ninclude direct take. competition for prey,\nthe Magnuson-Stevens Act as \"those\nprocess groundfish, the associated\nprocess groundfish, the associated\ndisturbance, and degradation of habitat.\nmanagement tools implemented for\nAlternative ((and for the other\nand degradation of habitat.\nSimilar to Alternative 4.1, Alternative\nwaters and substrate necessary to fish for\nfishing communities, and those who\nfishing communities, and those who\nAlternative 3 are TAC setting, time-area\nA method for prioritizing management\nAlternatives) are generated by\nactions is introduced. This method calls\n4.2 uses procedure for prioritizing\nspawning, breeding, feeding, or growth\nconsume groundfish seafood\nconsume groundfish seafood\nAlternative 2.1 is premised on fisheries\nThe \"short burst\" management approach\nclosures, and gear restrictions.\ncomputing the year 2000 fishing\nfor consideration of the sensitivity of the\nmanagement actions. This method\nto maturity.\"\nproducts;\nproducts.\nmortality rate, assuming that\nremoving only limited amounts of prey\nof Alternative 2.2 would limit the\nrequires consideration of the sensitivity\nPrevent preemption of one sector or\nrecruitments of new fish into the fishery\nper day, over long periods, so that daily\nnumber of instances where Steller sea\norganism to exploitation, the spatial\ndistribution of bycatch. and the ability to\nof the organism to exploitation, the\nfishing community by another; and\nin 1998 and 1999 are equal to the values\nremovals are low enough such that it is\nlions would interact with the fisheries by\nmonitor catch. In situations where\nspatial distribution of bycatch, and the\nMaintain or increase levels of\ngiven in the 1999 Stock Assessment and\nunlikely to result in localized depletion\ntailoring fisheries removals in\ncatch can be monitored and reliable\nability to monitor catch. In situations\nprotection for protected species, target\nFishery Evaluation (SAFE) report, and\nof fish stocks. The pace of fishing is\naccordance with Steller sea lion foraging\nbiomass estimates for fish stocks are\nwhere catch can be monitored and\nspecies, non-target species, and their\nassuming that 2000 catch will equal the\nkept slow over prolonged periods, hence\nbehavior. Instead of creating long\navailable, Alternative 4.1 designates\nreliable biomass estimates for fish stocks\nhabitats.\nactual 2000 total allowable catch (TAC).\nthe \"low and slow\" approach (Section\nperiods of limited fishery removals, as in\nacceptable biological catch (ABC) and\nare available, Alternative 4.2 designates\nAlternative 2.1, this alternative begins\nThe fishing mortality rate in each year\n4.1.1 of the SEIS). Alternative 2.1 also\ntotal allowable catch (TAC) limits on\nacceptable biological catch (ABC) and\nbeyond 2000 was set equal to the\nincorporates system of enlarged fishery\nwith lower TACs which are distributed\nspecies complexes. When catch or\ntotal allowable catch (TAC) limits based\nminimum of the following two rates: 1)\nexclusion zones to provide complete\nin four short periods of fishing effort.\nbiomass cannot be estimated,\non the biomass of the least abundant\nthe recommended 2000 fishing mortality\npartitioning between foraging areas used\nThe rationale for beginning with lower\nAlternative 4.1 provides for area\nstock within the species complexes.\nrate and 2) the maximum allowable\nby Steller sea lions and commercial\nTACs is based specifically on limiting\nrestrictions in regions of high bycatch.\nWhen catch or biomass cannot be\nharvest rate of all species (FABC) in that\nfisheries.\nthe intensity and duration of few,\nestimated, Alternative 4.2 provides for\ntemporally-spaced fishing pulses. Each\nyear.\narea restrictions in regions of high\nseason is kept very short to minimize the\nextent to which Steller sea lions would\nbycatch.\nencounter fisheries activities during\nindividual or consecutive foraging\nexcursions.\nDESCRIPTION OF MANAGEMENT ACTION\nThe primary management measures of\nThe primary management measures of\nThe primary management measures of\nThe primary management measures of\nThe primary management measures of\nThe primary management measures for\nThe primary management measures of\nThe primary management measures of\nThe primary management measures of\nAlternative include:\nthe Alternative 6.1 regime include:\nthe Alternative 6.2 regime include:\nAlternative 4.1 include:\nAlternative 4.2 include:\nAlternative are the current FMP\nthe Alternative 2.1 regime include:\nAlternative 2.2 include:\nAlternative include:\nregimes for the Bering Sea/Aleutians\nArea restrictions are imposed on the\nArea restrictions are imposed on the\nArea restrictions on the bottom trawl\nImposition of rights based\nThe TAC is set at level equal to the\nIslands and the Gulf of Alaska in their\nTemporal allocation of TAC for\nDevelop TACs consistent with\nFormally incorporate uncertainty in\nfisheries were imposed to reduce\nover-fishing level (fishing mortality\nmanagement programs;\nentirety, as specified in regulations\nselected target species;\nachieving the short season;\nbiomass estimates into the harvest\nEastern Bering Sea pollock fishery to\nEastern Bering Sea pollock fishery to\nreduce the bycatch of squid; and\nimpacts to benthic habitat:\nElimination of the vessel incentive\nrate is less than the maximum\neffective January 2000, with the addition\nSpatial allocation of TAC for selected\nDistribute TAC spatially;\nrecommendation by estimating the\nreduce the bycatch of squid; and\nAn aggregate TAC is imposed on the\nAn ABC and TAC are imposed on the\nThe TAC is reduced for species taken\nprogram; and\nsustainable yield);\nof major actions in the process of being\ntarget species;\nEstablish season start and end dates\ncoefficient of variation (CV) for each\nwith bottom trawl gear;\nElimination of the improved retention\nThe prohibited species catch limits are\nimplemented as of May 2000. These\nDesignate closed areas in Steller sea\nand apply TACs to these periods;\nstock using survey data;\nskate complex in the BSAI and the\nskate complex in the BSAI and the\nand utilization program.\neliminated: and\nmeasures are described in detail in\nlion critical habitat;\nRequire use of seabird scaring devices\nSet the lower bound of the 90 percent\ngrenadier complex in the GOA.\ngrenadier complex in the GOA with\nSpecific areas are closed to all fishing\nABC limits based on the biomass of\nfor protection of gorgonian coral: and\nThe OY caps are eliminated in both\nChapter 2.7.\nReduce the TAC to account for\nand gear handling protocols;\nconfidence interval for log-normal\nthe least abundant stock of the species\nWhere possible, bottom trawl\nthe BSAI and GOA.\nforegone catch in the closed areas:\nPrevent attraction of birds to vessel\ndistribution with this CV. and estimate\nfisheries were shifted to pelagic trawl\nRequire mandatory use of seabird\ndischarges of processing wastes and\na median of unity for each stock: the\ncomplex.\nor fixed gear.\nlower bound value is the specified\nscaring devices and gear handling\noffal:\nReduce the bycatch limit for short-\nfraction by which maximum harvest\nprotocols;\nPrevent attraction of birds to vessels\ntailed albatross;\nrate for all species (typically F 40% is\nwhich discharge processing wastes\nEstablish bycatch limits for seabirds;\nreduced in the projection model to\nand offal:\nand\naccommodate survey imprecision:\nReduce the incidental catch limit for\nMake every reasonable effort to\nTwenty percent time-area closures to\nshort-tailed albatross;\nensure that birds brought aboard alive\nprotect fish habitat:\nEstablish bycatch limits for seabirds;\nare released alive and that, wherever\nTwenty percent time-area closures to\npossible, hooks are removed without\nand\nprotect spawning habitat, if habitat\nEmploy every reasonable effort to\njeopardizing the life of the bird.\nclosures do not overlap with spawning\nensure that birds brought aboard alive\nhabitat;\nare released alive, and that wherever\nFormal designation of minimum\npossible hooks are removed without\nstock size threshold (MSST):\njeopardizing the life of the bird.\nGear modification to adjust the age at\n50 percent selectivity to the age at 50\npercent maturity, plus one year;\nadjustments are only made to the\nascending limb of the selectivity\ncurve:\nRemoval of bycatch limits for\nprohibited species; and\nRemoval of optimum yield (OY)\ncaps.\nALASKA GROUNDFISH FISHERIES\nDRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SUPPLEMENTAL\nENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT","TABLE 4.14- SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES\nPAGE 2 OF 8\nALTERNATIVE 4.1\nALTERNATIVE 4.2\nALTERNATIVE 5\nALTERNATIVE 6.1\nALTERNATIVE 6.2\nALTERNATIVE 1\nALTERNATIVE 2.1\nALTERNATIVE 2.2\nALTERNATIVE 3\nAGGREGATE TAC\nRARE SPECIES TAC\nINCREASED\nINCREASE IN LONG-TERM\nINCREASE IN SHORT-TERM\n(No ACTION)\nLow & SLOW HARVESTING\nSHORT-BURST HARVESTING\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nPROTECTION TO HABITAT\nSOCIOECONOMIC BENEFITS\nSOCIOECONOMIC BENEFITS\nSTRATEGY- INCREASED\nSTRATEGY INCREASED\nTO TARGET\nCONTINUE WITH EXISTING\nTO NON-TARGET\nPROTECTION TO MARINE\nPROTECTION TO MARINE\nGROUNDFISH SPECIES\nTO NON-TARGET\nMANAGEMENT POLICY\nAND FORAGE SPECIES\nAND FORAGE SPECIES\nMAMMALS AND SEABIRDS\nMAMMALS AND SEABIRDS\nEFFECTS ON THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - MARINE MAMMALS\nSection 4.2 of the SEIS considers the impacts of alternatives on the following marine mammals or marine mammal complexes: Steller sea lions, northern fur seals, harbor seals, other pinnipeds, baleen whales toothed whales, and sea otters. Four main issues are examined:\nDirect take of mammals in fisheries:\nHarvest of prey species;\nSpatial/temporal concentration of fisheries on prey; and\nDisturbance of pinniped rookeries and haul-outs by vessels.\nDirect and indirect effects under\nUnder Alternative 6.1, direct and\nUnder Alternative 6.2 direct and indirect\nDirect and indirect effects include:\nDirect and indirect effects of Alternative\nDirect and indirect effects of Alternative\nDirect and indirect effects under\nUnder Alternative 4.1. direct and\nUnder Alternative 4.2, direct and\nindirect effects are similar to Alternative\neffects are similar to Alternative 1 for\nindirect effects are similar to Alternative\nindirect effects are similar to Alternative\nAlternative 5 are similar to Alternative 1\n2.1 are similar to Alternative for\n2.2 are similar to Alternative for\nAlternative 3 are similar to Alternative 1\n1 for Steller sea lions, northern fur seals,\nbaleen whales, toothed whales, sea\n1 for baleen whales, toothed whales, sea\n1 for baleen whales, toothed whales, sea\nfor baleen whales, toothed whales. sea\nNo significant impacts on marine\nbaleen whales, toothed whales. sea\nbaleen whales, toothed whales, sea\nfor baleen whales, toothed whales, sea\notters, and the \"other\" pinniped species\notters, and the \"other\" pinniped species\notters, and the \"other\" pinniped species\nharbor seals, other pinnipeds, baleen\nmammals due to direct take or marine\notters, and the \"other\" pinniped species\notters, and the \"other\" pinniped species\notters, and the \"other\" pinniped species\notters, and the \"other' pinniped species\ngroup. Direct take is similar to\ngroup. Direct take is similar to\ngroup. Direct take is similar to\ngroup. Direct take is similar to\ngroup. Direct take is similar to\ngroup. Under Alternative 5. direct take\nwhales, toothed whales, and sea otters.\ngroup. Direct take is similar to\ndebris:\nis similar to Alternative for the three\nDirect take is similar to Alternative for\nAlternative for the three primary\nAlternative for the three primary\nAlternative for the three primary\nAlternative for the three primary\nConditionally significant adverse\nAlternative for Steller sea lions,\nAlternative for the three primary\npinnipeds (Steller sea lions, northern fur\npinnipeds (Steller sea lions, northern fur\nprimary pinnipeds (Steller sea lion,\nthe three primary pinnipeds (Steller sea\npinnipeds (Steller sea lions. northern fur\npinnipeds (Steller sea lions, northern fur\npinnipeds (Steller sea lions, northern fur\nimpacts on the three primary pinniped\nnorthern fur seals, and harbor seals. The\nseals, and harbor seals). The effects of\nseals. and harbor seals). The effects of\nnorthern fur seal. and harbor seal). The\nlions, northern fur seals, and harbor\nseals, and harbor seals). The effects of\nspecies (Steller sea lions, northern fur\neffects of Alternative 2.1 include:\nseals, and harbor seals). The effects of\nseals, and harbor seals). The effects of\nAlternative 4.2 include:\neffects of Alternative 5 include:\nseals). The effects of Alternative 6.1\nAlternative 6.2 include:\nAlternative 2.2 include:\nAlternative include:\nAlternative 4.1 include:\nseals, harbor seals) due to harvest of\ninclude:\nprey species;\nMeasurable reduction in the harvest of\nMeasurable reduction in the harvest of\nMeasurable reduction in the harvest of\nMeasurable reduction in the harvest of\nMeasurable reduction in the harvest of\nMeasurable increases in the harvest of\nConditionally significant adverse\nprey species consumed by Steller sea\nMeasurable reduction in the harvest of\nprey species consumed by Steller sea\nprey species consumed by Steller sea\nprey species consumed by Steller sea\nNo change in the harvest of prey\nprey species consumed by Steller sea\nprey species consumed by Steller sea\nprey species consumed by Steller sea\nimpacts on the primary pinniped\nlions (greater than 20 percent),\nlions (5-20 percent), northern fur\nlions percent);\nspecies consumed by Steller sea lions,\nlions (greater than 20 percent),\nlions (greater than 20 percent),\nlions (greater than 20 percent),\nlions (5-20 percent), northern fur seals\nspecies are identified due to\nnorthern fur seals (5-20 percent), and\nLess temporal and spatial\nnorthern fur seals, and harbor seals;\nnorthern fur seals -20 percent), and\nspatial/temporal concentration of the\nharbor seals (5-20 percent);\nnorthern fur seals (5-20 percent), and\nnorthern fur seals percent), and\n(5-20 percent), and harbor seals (5-20\nseals (5-20 percent), and harbor seals\nharbor seals (5 20 percent);\ncompression of prey removals for\nNo change in the temporal and spatial\nharbor seals -20 percent);\npercent);\n(5-20 percent);\nfishery; and\nMuch less temporal and spatial\nharbor seals (5-20 percent);\ncompression of prey removals for\nMuch greater temporal and spatial\nMore temporal and spatial\nLess temporal and spatial\nLess temporal and spatial\nSteller sea lion and harbor seal: and\nNo significant impacts on marine\ncompression of prey removals for\nMuch less temporal and spatial\ncompression of prey removals for\ncompression of prey removals for\nLess disturbance for Steller sea lions\nSteller sea lions, northern fur seals\ncompression of prey removals for\nmammals due to disturbance are\nSteller sea lions, and marginally less\ncompression of prey removals for\ncompression of prey removals for\nSteller sea lions, and marginally\nSteller sea lions, and marginally less\nSteller sea lions and harbor seals: and\nnorthern fur seals: and\nnorthern fur seals; and\nand northern fur seals.\nand harbor seals: and\nidentified.\nfor harbor seals: and\ngreater temporal and spatial\nLess disturbance for Steller sea lions\nLess disturbance for Steller sea lions\nLess disturbance for Steller sea lions\nNo changes in disturbance for Steller\nMuch less disturbance for Steller sea\nfor northern fur seals and harbor\ncompression of prey removals for\nand northern fur seals\nCumulative effects for prey availability\nsea lions, northern fur seals, and\nCumulative effects are identified for\nlions, and marginally less disturbance\nseals: and\nand northern fur seals.\nand northern fur seals.\nand spatial/temporal removal of prey for\nharbor seals.\nnorthern fur seals and harbor seals:\nMuch less disturbance for Steller sea\nprey availability and spatial/temporal\nfor northern fur seals and harbor seals.\nlions, and marginally less disturbance\nCumulative effects for prey availability\nCumulative effects for prey availability\nCumulative effects for prey availability\nSteller sea lion. northern fur seal and\nand\nremoval of prey for Steller sea lion.\nNo changes in disturbance for Steller\nand spatial/temporal removal of prey for\nharbor seal are rated conditionally\nCumulative effects for prey availability\nnorthern fur seal. and harbor seal. These\nCumulative effects for prey availability\nfor northern fur seals.\nand spatial/temporal removal of prey for\nand spatial/temporal removal of prey for\nand spatial/temporal removal of prey for\nsea lions, northern fur seals, and\nSteller sea lions, northern fur seals, and\nSteller sea lions, northern fur seals, and\nSteller sea lions, northern fur seals, and\nsignificant adverse based primarily on\neffects are conditionally significant\nand spatial/temporal harvest of prey for\nharbor seals are rated conditionally\nharbor seals are rated conditionally\ncompetition for prey between these\nSteller sea lions, northern fur seals, and\nharbor seals.\nadverse based primarily on competition\nSteller sea lions. northern fur seals, and\nCumulative effects for prey availability\nharbor seals are rated as conditionally\nsignificant adverse. based primarily on\nmarine mammals and the groundfish\nharbor seals are rated conditionally\nand spatial/temporal harvest of prey for\nsignificant adverse. based primarily on\nsignificant adverse, based primarily on\nfor prey between these marine mammals\nharbor seals are rated as not significant\nsignificant adverse, based primarily on\nCumulative effects for prey availability\nSteller sea lions, northern fur seals, and\ncompetition for prey between these\ncompetition for prey between these\ncompetition for prey between these\nfisheries, and past external factors.\nand the groundfish fisheries, and past\nmarine mammals and the groundfish\ncompetition for prey between these\nand spatial/temporal removal of prey for\nharbor seals are rated as not significant.\nmarine mammals and the groundfish\nmarine mammals and the groundfish\nexternal factors.\nSteller sea lions, northern fur seals, and\nfisheries, and past external factors.\nfisheries, and past external factors.\nfisheries, and past external factors.\nmarine mammals and the groundfish\nfisheries, and past external factors.\nharbor seals are rated conditionally\nsignificant adverse, based primarily on\ncompetition for prey between these\nmarine mammals and the groundfish\nfisheries, and past external factors.\nEFFECTS ON THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - SEA BIRDS\nSection 4.3 of the SEIS considers the impacts of alternatives on the following seabirds or seabird complexes: northern fulmars, short-tailed albatross, other albatross and shearwaters, piscivorous (fish-eating) seabirds, eiders, and other seabirds. Four main issues were examined:\nDirect take of seabirds by fishing activity;\nHarvest of prey species;\nDisturbance of benthic habitat: and\nDischarge of processing waste and offal.\nThe effects of Alternative 5 include:\nThe effects of Alternative 6.1 include:\nThe effects of Alternative 6.2 include:\nThe effects of Alternative 3 include:\nThe effects of Alternative 4.1 include:\nThe effects of Alternative 4.2 include:\nUnder Alternative 1. there is a\nThe effects of Alternative 2.1 include:\nThe effects of Alternative 2.2 include:\nconditionally significant adverse effect\nDirect take of most species remain\nDirect takes of northern fulmar\nDirect take of northern fulmar is\nDirect take of northern fulmar is\nDirect takes of most species remains\nDirect take of most species remains\non short-tailed albatross due to direct\nDecreased direct take of short-tailed\nDirect take decreases for short-tailed\nincrease slightly in both the BSAI and\nreduced slightly in the BSAI and\nincreased slightly in the BSAI and\nalbatross and three other bird groups;\nunchanged from Alternative 1:\nunchanged from Alternative 1;\nunchanged from Alternative 1:\ntake. The effects on piscivorous seabirds\nalbatross and three seabird groups;\nTakes are slightly reduced for\nTake is slightly reduced for northern\nTake is much reduced for northern\nGOA:\nincreased substantially in the GOA:\nincreased substantially in the GOA:\nare unknown due to uncertainties about\nIncreased prey availability for\nPrey availability for piscivorous\nTake is slightly increased for\nfulmars in the BSAI. and slightly\nfulmars in the BSAI, and slightly\nTake is slightly reduced for\nTake is increased substantially for\nfishery effects on non-target species of\npiscivorous seabirds and three seabird\nseabirds and three other bird groups is\nnorthern fulmars in the BSAI, and\nincreased for northern fulmars in the\npiscivorous seabirds under this\npiscivorous seabirds:\npiscivorous seabirds: and\nsquid and forage fish. No significant\nincreased;\nslightly increased for northern fulmars\nincreased for northern fulmars in the\ngroups;\nPrey availability is slightly increased\nImpact is reduced for benthic habitat\nin the GOA:\nGOA:\nalternative:\nPrey availability is unchanged from\nimpacts on seabirds are identified for\nReduction in impacts to eider benthic\nGOA;\nPrey availability and attraction to\nfor the \"other\" albatross and\nAlternative for all species, but\nPrey availability remains unchanged\nPrey availability is improved and the\nPrey availability is improved and the\ndisturbance of benthic habitat or the\nhabitats: and\nused by eiders; and\nprocessing waste and offal are\nfrom Alternative 1 for all groups;\ndischarge of processing waste and\ndischarge of processing waste and\nshearwater group; and\nattraction to processing waste and\ndischarge of processing waste and offal.\nSubstantially reduced availability of\nThe availability of processing wastes\noffal are reduced for three of the six\noffal are reduced for three of the six\nunchanged relative to Alternative 1\nNo change in impacts to eider benthic\noffal is increased minimally for three\nprocessing wastes for three species of\nthat attract seabirds is substantially\nImpact is reduced for benthic habitat\nfor all six seabird species; and\nspecies; and\nhabitats.\nof the six seabird groups.\nA cumulative effect identified for take of\nreduced for three species.\nseabirds.\nused by eiders; and\nspecies; and\nThe availability of processing wastes\nNo change in impacts to eider benthic\nNo change in impacts to eider benthic\nSubstantially reduced impact to eider\nthe endangered short-tailed albatross is\nbenthic habitat is expected.\nfound to be conditionally significant\nthat attract seabirds is reduced for\nhabitat is expected, relative to\nhabitat is expected relative to\nAlternative 1\nthree species\nAlternative\nALASKA GROUNDFISH FISHERIES\nDRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SUPPLEMENTAL\nENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT","TABLE 4.14-1 SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES\nPAGE 3 OF 8\nALTERNATIVE 1\nALTERNATIVE 2.1\nALTERNATIVE 2.2\nALTERNATIVE 3\nALTERNATIVE 4.1\nALTERNATIVE 4.2\nALTERNATIVE 5\nALTERNATIVE 6.1\nALTERNATIVE 6.2\n(No ACTION)\nLow & SLOW HARVESTING\nSHORT-BURST HARVESTING\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nAGGREGATE TAC\nRARE SPECIES TAC\nINCREASED\nINCREASE IN LONG-TERM\nINCREASE IN SHORT-TERM\nSTRATEGY- INCREASED\nSTRATEGY- INCREASED\nTO TARGET\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nPROTECTION TO HABITAT\nSOCIOECONOMIC BENEFITS\nSOCIOECONOMIC BENEFITS\nCONTINUE WITH EXISTING\nPROTECTION TO MARINE\nPROTECTION TO MARINE\nGROUNDFISH SPECIES\nTO NON-TARGET\nTO NON-TARGET\nMANAGEMENT POLICY\nMAMMALS AND SEABIRDS\nMAMMALS AND SEABIRDS\nAND FORAGE SPECIES\nAND FORAGE SPECIES\nEFFECTS ON THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN SEA BIRDS (CONTINUED)\nadverse primarily from past external\nA conditionally significant adverse\nA conditionally significant adverse\nA conditionally significant adverse\nA conditionally significant adverse\nA conditionally significant adverse\nA cumulative effect is identified for take\nA conditionally significant adverse\nA conditionally significant adverse\nfactors of commercial harvest on their\ncumulative effect is identified for take of\ncumulative effect is identified for take of\ncumulative effect is identified for take of\ncumulative effect is identified for take of\ncumulative effect is identified for take of\nof the endangered short-tailed albatross\ncumulative effect identified for take of\ncumulative effect is identified for take of\nbreeding grounds The contribution to\nthe endangered short-tailed albatross.\nthe endangered short-tailed albatross,\nthe endangered short-tailed albatross,\nthe endangered short-tailed albatross,\nthe endangered short-tailed albatross,\nand found to be conditionally significant\nthe endangered short-tailed albatross,\nthe endangered short-tailed albatross,\nthis effect from groundfish fisheries is\nprimarily from past external factors of\nprimarily due to past external factors of\nprimarily due to past external factors of\nprimarily due to past external factors of\nprimarily due to past external factors of\nadverse primarily from past external\nprimarily due to past external factors of\nprimarily due to past external factors of\nvery small.\ncommercial harvest on their breeding\ncommercial harvest on their breeding\ncommercial harvest on their breeding\ncommercial harvest on their breeding\ncommercial harvest on their breeding\nfactors of commercial harvest on their\ncommercial harvest on their breeding\ncommercial harvest on their breeding\ngrounds. The contribution of groundfish\ngrounds. The contribution of groundfish\ngrounds. The contribution of groundfish\ngrounds. The contribution of groundfish\ngrounds. The contribution of groundfish\nbreeding grounds. Contribution to this\ngrounds. The contribution of groundfish\ngrounds. The contribution of groundfish\nfisheries to this effect is very small.\nfisheries to this effect is very small.\nfisheries to this effect is very small.\nfisheries to this effect is very small.\nfisheries to this effect is very small.\neffect from groundfish fisheries is very\nfisheries to this effect is very small.\nfisheries to this effect is very small.\nsmall\nEFFECTS ON THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - TARGET SPECIES\nThirty-two target species groups (i.e., stocks or stock complexes) are analyzed in Section 4.4 of the SEIS.\nNo significant impacts on target species\nWith few exceptions, Alternative 2.1\nFishing mortality under Alternative 2.2\nUnder Alternative fishing mortality is\nUnder Alternative 4.1 fishing mortality\nUnder Alternative 4.2, fishing mortality\nReductions in fishing mortality in excess\nFor eighteen target species stocks (56\nUnder Alternative 6.2, the fishing\ndue to fishing mortality are expected for\ndoes not substantially change the mean\nis expected to be more than 10 percent\nreduced more than 10 percent for sixteen\nis reduced by more than 10 percent for\nis reduced by more than 10 percent for\nof 10 percent are expected for (44\npercent) the change in fishing mortality\nmortality rate is expected to increase by\nthirty-one target species groups, and the\nfishing mortality rate of target species\nlower for nineteen target species groups\nof the target groundfish stocks (50\ntwo of the target groundfish stocks (6\nthree of the target groundfish stocks (9\npercent) of the target groundfish stocks.\nunder Alternative 6.1 is expected to be\nmore than 10 percent for twenty-two (69\nsignificance of Alternative on GOA\ngroups. Eighteen stocks of target\n(59 percent). Fishing mortality levels\npercent). Reduced fishing mortality\npercent). For majority of target\npercent). For the majority of target\nFishing mortality is expected to be\nwithin +/- 10 percent of the Alternative\npercent) of the target species stocks. For\nAtka mackerel is unknown. For\nspecies (56 percent) are expected to be\nare expected to be similar to Alternative\nresults from combination of\nspecies stocks (28 stocks, 88 percent of\nspecies stocks (27 stocks, 84 percent of\nwithin +/- 10 percent of the Alternative\n1 level. For the majority of target\nthe majority of target species groups,\nseventeen target species groups,\nwithin +/- 10 percent of Alternative 1.\n1 for eleven target species groups (34\nmanagement tools including the\ntarget species), the change in fishing\ntarget species) the change in fishing\n1 level for 14 additional stocks. For the\nspecies groups, Alternative 6.1 is not\nAlternative 6.2 not expected to change\nAlternative is not expected to have\nwith respect to direct take expressed as\npercent). The expected direction of\nuncertainty correction and, in some\nmortality under Alternative 4.1 is within\nmortality under Alternative 4.2 is within\nmajority (63 percent) of target species\nexpected to change levels of habitat\nlevels of spatial/temporal concentration\nsignificant adverse or beneficial effects\nmean fishing mortality. The twelve\nchange in fishing mortality is unknown\ncases, the shift in selectivity. A greater\n+/- 10 percent of the Alternative 1 level.\n+/- 10 percent of the Alternative level.\ngroups this alternative is expected to\ndisturbance and prey availability. A\nof the fishery and prey availability. A\nresulting from spatial/temporal\nremaining target species stocks are\nfor GOA Atka mackerel and GOA\nthan 10 percent increase in fishing\nreduce the level of habitat disturbance.\nrights-based fisheries management\nrights-based fisheries management\nconcentration, changes in prey\nexpected to benefit from reduced fishing\nPacific ocean perch.\nmortality is expected for nine of the\nFor the majority of target species groups\nFor 94 percent of the target species\nThe expected level of prey availability\nregime is expected to have similar levels\nregime is expected to have levels of\navailability, or habitat suitability. Of the\nmortality under Alternative 2.1 (Table\ntarget species groups (28 percent). For\n(94 percent), this alternative is not\ngroups, this alternative is not expected to\nand spatial/temporal concentration of the\nof spatial/temporal concentration of the\nhabitat disruption similar to Alternative\nremaining fifteen groups, the\n2). The impacts are unknown for two\nThe level of spatial/temporal\neight flatfish species groups, the increase\nexpected to change levels of habitat\nchange the levels of habitat disturbance\nfishery is expected to be similar to\nfishery for majority (56 percent) of the\n1 for 75 percent of the target species\nsignificance of Alternative on\nstocks of target species.\nconcentration of the fishery is expected\nin fishing mortality resulted from the\ndisturbance. Prey availability (72\nThe expected level of prey availability\nAlternative for majority of stocks.\ntarget species groups. However, this\ngroups. However, this alternative is\nspatial/temporal concentration, prey\nto be similar to Alternative 1 for the\nremoval of prohibited species bycatch\npercent) and spatial/temporal\nand spatial/temporal concentration of the\nalternative is expected to reduce spatial/\nexpected to increase habitat disruption in\navailability, and habitat suitability is\nThe spatial/temporal concentration of\nmajority of target species groups (59\ncaps. The expected direction of change\nconcentration of the fishery (94 percent)\nfishery is similar to Alternative for a\nCumulative effects are identified for\ntemporal concentration of the fishery for\nsix of the target species groups (19\nunknown (Section 4.4.7 of the SEIS).\nthe catch under Alternative 2.1 is\npercent). A notable decrease is expected\nin fishing mortality is unknown for one\nare similar to Alternative for a\nmajority of the target species stocks.\nhabitat suitability and prey availability\nseven of the target species groups (25\npercent).\nexpected to be similar to Alternative 1\nfor two groups, and marginal increase\nstock.\nmajority of the target species stocks.\nfor Pacific ocean perch are rated as\npercent).\nCumulative effects identified for habitat\nfor 50 percent of the target species\nin spatial/temporal concentration is\nCumulative effects are identified for\nconditionally significant adverse for the\nCumulative effects are identified for\nsuitability and prey availability for\ngroups (Table 2). Six target species\nexpected for four groups. The direction\nRelative to all other alternatives, habitat\nCumulative effects are identified for\nhabitat suitability and prey availability\nGOA stock because it is presently at the\nCumulative effects are identified for\nhabitat suitability and prey availability\nPacific ocean perch are rated as\ngroups are expected to benefit from\nof change in spatial/temporal\nsuitability is expected to increase for 66\nhabitat suitability and prey availability\nfor Pacific ocean perch. These effects\nsustainability threshold (MSST). Any\nhabitat suitability and prey availability\nfor Pacific ocean perch. These effects\nconditionally significant adverse for the\nreduced levels of spatial/temporal\nconcentration of the fishery is unknown\npercent of the target species groups.\nfor Pacific ocean perch. These effects\nare rated as conditionally significant\nnegative effects from external factors\nfor Pacific ocean perch. These effects\nare rated as conditionally significant\nGOA stock because it is presently at the\nconcentration of the catch, while\nfor seven groups.\nCompared with other alternatives,\nare rated as conditionally significant\nadverse for the GOA stock because it is\ncould jeopardize the ability of the stock\nare rated as conditionally significant\nadverse for the GOA stock because it is\nminimum stock size threshold (MSST).\ndetrimental effects are expected for one\nAlternative has the highest percentage\nadverse for the GOA stock because it is\npresently at the minimum stock size\nto sustain itself.\nadverse for the GOA stock because it is\npresently minimum stock size threshold\nAny negative effects from external\nstock. The impact of Alternative 2.1 on\nAlternative 2.2 is not expected to impact\nof stocks showing increased habitat\npresently at the minimum stock size\nthreshold Any negative effects from\npresently at the minimum stock size\nAny negative effects from external\nfactors could jeopardize the ability of the\nthe spatial/temporal concentration of the\ntarget species prey availability for 47\nsuitability. Improved habitat suitability\nthreshold. Any negative effects from\nexternal factors could jeopardize the\nthreshold Any negative effects from\nfactors could jeopardize the ability of the\nstock to sustain itself.\ncatch is unknown for seven stocks.\npercent of the target species groups.\nis expected because Alternative 3\nexternal factors could jeopardize the\nability of the stock to sustain itself.\nexternal factors could jeopardize the\nstock to sustain itself.\nimposes spawning and habitat closures\nability of the stock to sustain itself.\nability of the stock to sustain itself.\nAlternative 2.1 is expected to result in a\nExceptions include piscivorous seabird\nfor all target species.\nA cumulative effect identified for Pacific\nsimilar level of prey availability for 53\nspecies where build-up of adult\ncod is considered conditionally\npercent of the target species groups\nbiomass may lead to reduced abundance\nUnder Alternative 3, the level of\nsignificant adverse for fish mortality\n(Table 2). Beneficial effects are\nof juvenile fish. A reduction in prey\nspatial/temporal concentration of the\nsince the stock would be approaching\nexpected for two groups, while\navailability is expected for three groups\nfishery and the level of prey availability\nthe overfishing level (OFL).\ndetrimental effects are expected for three\n(9 percent), and an increase in prey\nis expected to be similar to Alternative 1\ngroups. The impact of Alternative 2.1\navailability is expected for two groups.\nfor majority of stocks. Fifty-three\non prey availability is unknown for ten\nThe effect of Alternative 2.2 on prey\npercent of the target species groups are\nstocks of target species.\navailability is unknown for twelve target\nexpected to exhibit similar levels of\nspecies groups (38 percent).\nspatial/temporal concentration of the\nAlternative 2.1 is expected to result in\nfishery. Prey availability levels are\nthe same level of habitat suitability as\nFor 67 percent of target species groups,\nexpected to be similar to Alternative\nAlternative for 50 percent of the target\nhabitat suitability under Alternative 2.2\nfor 66 percent of the target species\nspecies groups (Table 2). A beneficial\nis similar to Alternative 1. In the\ngroups. The direction of change in prey\neffect to habitat suitability is expected\nremaining groups, the level of habitat\navailability is unknown for twelve target\nfor the remaining fifteen target species\nsuitability is expected to increase.\nspecies groups.\ngroups. The direction of change under\nAlternative 2.1 is unknown for one\nConditionally significant adverse\nA cumulative effect is identified for\ntarget species group.\ncumulative effects are identified for\nsablefish and is considered conditionally\nhabitat suitability and prey availability\nsignificant beneficial for habitat, based\nNo significant cumulative effects due to\nfor Pacific ocean perch for the GOA\non 20 percent increase in protection for\ndirect take are expected for target\nstock because is presently at the\nsablefish habitat under Alternative 3.\nspecies under Alternative 2.1. No\nminimum stock size threshold. Any\nsignificant cumulative effects due to\nnegative effects from external factors\nchanges in the spatial/temporal\ncould jeopardize the ability of the stock\ndistribution of catch are expected for 80\nto sustain itself.\npercent of the groundfish stocks.\nALASKA GROUNDFISH FISHERIES\nDRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SUPPLEMENTAL\nENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT","TABLE 4.14-1 SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES\nPAGE 4 OF 8\nALTERNATIVE 1\nALTERNATIVE 2.1\nALTERNATIVE 2.2\nALTERNATIVE 3\nALTERNATIVE 4.1\nALTERNATIVE 4.2\nALTERNATIVE 5\nALTERNATIVE 6.1\nALTERNATIVE 6.2\n(No ACTION)\nLow & SLOW HARVESTING\nSHORT-BURST HARVESTING\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nAGGREGATE TAC\nRARE SPECIES TAC\nINCREASED\nINCREASE IN LONG-TERM\nINCREASE IN SHORT-TERM\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nSTRATEGY- INCREASED\nSTRATEGY- INCREASED\nTO TARGET\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nPROTECTION TO HABITAT\nSOCIOECONOMIC BENEFITS\nSOCIOECONOMIC BENEFITS\nCONTINUE WITH EXISTING\nTO NON-TARGET\nPROTECTION TO MARINE\nPROTECTION TO MARINE\nGROUNDFISH SPECIES\nTO NON-TARGET\nMANAGEMENT POLICY\nMAMMALS AND SEABIRDS\nMAMMALS AND SEABIRDS\nAND FORAGE SPECIES\nAND FORAGE SPECIES\nEFFECTS ON THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT I TARGET SPECIES (CONTINUED)\nCumulative impacts on spatial/temporal\nconcentrations of target species are\nunknown for the remaining 20 percent of\nthe stocks. No significant cumulative\neffects are expected for 56 percent of the\nstocks, and the cumulative effects are\nunknown for 44 percent of the target\nspecies stocks. A significant cumulative\neffect due to habitat suitability is\nexpected for GOA Pacific ocean perch.\nNo significant cumulative effects due to\nhabitat suitability are expected for 60\npercent of the stocks, and cumulative\neffects are unknown for 36 percent of\nthe target species stocks. Conditionally\nsignificant adverse cumulative effects\nare identified for habitat suitability and\nprey availability for Pacific ocean perch\nfor the GOA stock because it is\npresently at the minimum stock size\nthreshold. Any negative effects from\nexternal factors could jeopardize the\nability of the stock to sustain itself.\nEFFECTS ON THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - NON-TARGET SPECIES\nSection 4.5 of the SEIS analyzed twenty-seven species or species complexes. The primary issue examined was the direct effect of fishing mortality on non-target species.\nConditionally significant adverse impact\nThe catch of non-target species under\nUnder Alternative 2.2. the bycatch of\nAlternative 3 is expected to have a\nThe catch of the majority of non-target\nThe catch of the majority of non-target\nUnder Alternative 5, the catch of 52\nUnder Alternative 6.1 bycatch of non-\nUnder Alternative 6.2 bycatch is\non the skate complex in the BSAI, and\nAlternative 2.1 is expected to decrease\nnon-target species is expected to decline\nminor impact (+/- 10 percent of\nspecies groups (85 percent) is expected\nspecies groups (74 percent) is expected\npercent of non-target species groups is\ntarget species is reduced by greater than\nexpected to increase by more than 10\nthe grenadier complex in the GOA is\nby more than 10 percent for eighteen\nfor 85 percent of the non-target species\nAlternative 1) on the catch of non-target\nto be within +/- 10 percent of\nto be within +/- 10 percent of\nexpected to be within +/- 10 percent of\n+/- 10 percent of Alternative for 67\npercent for 96 percent of the non-target\nexpected due to direct take. Impact on\nnon-target species groups (Table 2).\ngroups. These declines result from TAC\nspecies for 63 percent of the non-target\nAlternative 1.\nAlternative 1.\nAlternative 1.\npercent of the non-target species groups.\nspecies groups.\nthe GOA skate complex, the BSAI\nCatch levels for the nine remaining non-\nreductions in high volume groundfish\ngroups.\ngrenadier complex, and the BSAI and\ntarget species groups are expected to fall\nfisheries.\nCumulative effects of bycatch on the\nCumulative effects of bycatch on the\nCumulative effects of bycatch on the\nCumulative effects of bycatch on the\nCumulative effects of bycatch on the\nGOA squid complex are unknown.\nbetween +/- 10 percent under\nCumulative effects of bycatch on the\nskate complex in the Eastern Bering\nskate complex in the Eastern Bering\nskate complex in the eastern Bering\nskate complex in the eastern Bering\nskate complex in the eastern Bering\nAlternative 2.1, an effect similar to\nCumulative effects of bycatch on the\nskate complex in the Eastern Bering\nSea/Aleutian Islands and the grenadier\nSea/Aleutian Islands and the grenadier\nSea/Aleutian Islands and the grenadier\nSea/Aleutian Islands and the grenadier\nSea/Aleutian Islands and the grenadier\nCumulative effects of bycatch on the\nAlternative 1.\nskate complex in the Eastern Bering\nSea/Aleutian Islands and the grenadier\ncomplex in the Gulf of Alaska are\ncomplex in the Gulf of Alaska are\ncomplex in the Gulf of Alaska are\ncomplex in the Gulf of Alaska are\ncomplex in the Gulf of Alaska are\nskate complex in the Eastern Bering\nSea/Aleutian Islands and the grenadier\ncomplex in the Gulf of Alaska are\nidentified as conditionally significant\nidentified as conditionally significant\nidentified as conditionally significant\nidentified as conditionally significant\nidentified as conditionally significant\nSea/Aleutian Islands and the grenadier\nThe cumulative effects of bycatch on the\ncomplex in the Gulf of Alaska are\nconditionally significant adverse since\nadverse, since they are managed\nadverse, since they are managed\nadverse, since they are managed\nadverse, since they are managed\nadverse since they are managed\ncomplex in the Gulf of Alaska are\nskate complex in the Eastern Bering\nconditionally significant adverse since\nthey are managed collectively, and have\ncollectively and have no bycatch limits\ncollectively and have no bycatch limits\ncollectively and have no bycatch limits\ncollectively and have no bycatch limits\ncollectively and have no bycatch limits\nidentified as conditionally significant\nSea/Aleutian Islands and the grenadier\nthey are managed collectively and have\nno bycatch limits or catch reporting\nor catch reporting requirements.\nor catch reporting requirements.\nor catch reporting requirements.\nor catch reporting requirements.\nor catch reporting requirements.\nadverse since they are managed\ncomplex in the Gulf of Alaska are\nno bycatch limits or catch reporting\nrequirements. External factors, when\nExternal factors, when added to the\nExternal factors, when added to the\nExternal factors, when added to the\nExternal factors, when added to the\nExternal factors, when added to the\ncollectively and have no bycatch limits\nidentified as conditionally significant\nrequirements. External factors, when\nadded to the effects of current non-\neffects of current non-management,\neffects of current non-management,\neffects of current non-management,\neffects of current non-management,\neffects of current on-management,\nor catch reporting requirements.\nadverse since they are managed\nadded to the effects of current non-\nmanagement, could mask declines in\ncould mask declines in individual\ncould mask declines in individual\ncould mask declines in individual\ncould mask declines in individual\ncould mask declines in individual\nExternal factors, when added to the\ncollectively and have no bycatch limits\nmanagement, could mask declines in\nindividual species and potentially lead to\nspecies and potentially lead to\nspecies and potentially lead to\nspecies and potentially lead to\nspecies and potentially lead to\nspecies and potentially lead to\neffects of current non-management,\nor catch reporting requirements.\nindividual non-target species and\noverfishing\noverfishing.\noverfishing.\noverfishing.\noverfishing.\noverfishing\ncould mask declines in individual\nExternal factors, when added to the\npotentially lead to overfishing.\nspecies and therefore lead to overfishing\neffects of current non-management,\ncould mask declines in individual non-\ntarget species and potentially lead to\noverfishing\nALASKA GROUNDFISH FISHERIES\nDRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SUPPLEMENTAL\nENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT","TABLE 4.14-* SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES\nPAGE 5 OF 8\nALTERNATIVE 4.1\nALTERNATIVE 1\nALTERNATIVE 4.2\nALTERNATIVE 5\nALTERNATIVE 6.1\nALTERNATIVE 6.2\nALTERNATIVE 2.1\nALTERNATIVE 2.2\nALTERNATIVE 3\n(No ACTION)\nLow & SLOW HARVESTING\nSHORT-BURST HARVESTING\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nAGGREGATE TAC\nRARE SPECIES TAC\nINCREASED\nINCREASE IN LONG-TERM\nINCREASE IN SHORT-TERM\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nSOCIOECONOMIC BENEFITS\nSOCIOECONOMIC BENEFITS\nSTRATEGY- INCREASED\nSTRATEGY- INCREASED\nTO TARGET\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nPROTECTION TO HABITAT\nCONTINUE WITH EXISTING\nTO NON-TARGET\nPROTECTION TO MARINE\nPROTECTION TO MARINE\nGROUNDFISH SPECIES\nTO NON-TARGET\nMANAGEMENT POLICY\nAND FORAGE SPECIES\nAND FORAGE SPECIES\nMAMMALS AND SEABIRDS\nMAMMALS AND SEABIRDS\nEFFECTS ON THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - PROHIBITED SPECIES\nSection 4.6 of the SEIS analyzed fourteen prohibited species groups including: eight crab or species complexes; four salmon species or species complexes; Pacific herring; and Pacific halibut.\nThe catch of prohibited species groups\nThe bycatch of prohibited species is\nNo significant impact is expected on\nUnder Alternative 2.1, the catch of\nReductions in catch are expected for 93\nReductions in catch are expected for six\nProhibited species bycatch under\nProhibited species bycatch under\nProhibited species bycatch under\nPacific herring or Pacific halibut.\nAlternative 4.2 is expected to be similar\nAlternative 5 is similar to Alternative 1\nunder Alternative 6.1 is reduced by more\nexpected to increase by more than 10\nprohibited species is reduced by more\npercent of the prohibited species groups.\n(43 percent) of the prohibited species\nAlternative 4.1 is similar to Alternative\nConditionally significant adverse\nthan 10 percent for nine groups (67\nThese reductions result from the sharp\ngroups. These reductions result from\n1 for majority of the groups. However,\nto Alternative for majority of the\nfor 57 percent of the prohibited species\nthan 10 percent for half of the prohibited\npercent under Alternative 6.2 for all of\nspecies groups. Of the remaining stocks,\nthe prohibited species groups. Levels of\nimpacts are expected on BSAI chinook\npercent), and will fall within +/- 10\ndecreases in TAC for three high volume\nreductions in catch of target groundfish\nreductions in catch greater than 10\nprohibited species groups (79 percent).\ngroups. However, more than 10 percent\nHowever, reductions in catch greater\nincreases in bycatch are projected for\nbycatch is expected to be similar to\nhabitat disturbance, prey availability,\nsalmon and other BSAI salmon due to\npercent of Alternative levels for five\ngroundfish fisheries. Alternative 2.2 is\nfisheries. In the case of BSAI tanner\npercent are expected for Pacific herring,\ncrab, BSAI red king crab. GOA red king\nBSAI chinook salmon, and BSAI other\nthan 10 percent are expected for Pacific\nBSAI and GOA red king crab, other\nAlternative for 43 percent of the\nand spatial/temporal concentration of the\nbycatch in groundfish target fisheries.\nprohibited species groups (Table 2).\nexpected to result in levels of habitat\nThe impact on GOA chinook salmon is\ndisruption, prey availability, and\ncrab. and other BSAI tanner crab, a\nsalmon. These changes in bycatch result\nherring, BSAI chinook salmon, and\nBSAI king crab, and GOA Tanner crab.\nstocks. Levels of habitat disturbance,\nfishery are expected to be similar to\nprey availability, and spatial/temporal\nAlternative for majority of prohibited\nunknown. No significant impact, or\nWith respect to the spatial/temporal\nspatial/temporal concentration of the\ngreater than 10 percent increase in\nfrom reductions in the eastern Bering\nBSAI other salmon. These changes in\nThese increases in bycatch result from\nSea walleye pollock fishery. The level\nbycatch result from reductions in the\nconcentration of fishing by pot gear\nconcentration of the fishery are similar\nspecies groups. None of the prohibited\nunknown impact, is identified for BSAI\nconcentration of bycatch, Alternative 2.1\nfishery similar to Alternative for most\nprohibited species bycatch is expected\nand GOA crabs.\nis expected to result in the same level of\nspecies groups. However, the direction\nunder Alternative 3. The level of habitat\nof habitat disruption, prey availability,\neastern Bering Sea walleye pollock\nwhere crab bycatch is high. Levels of\nto Alternative for majority of\nspecies groups are expected to\nexperience lower levels of habitat\nconcentration as observed under\nof change in spawning habitat\ndisruption prey availability, and\nand spatial/temporal concentration of the\nfishery. The level of habitat\nspatial/temporal concentration of the\nprohibited species groups. None of the\nConditionally significant adverse\nAlternative for 64 percent of the\ndisturbance is unknown for six of the\nspatial/temporal concentration of the\ncatch is similar to Alternative for a\ndisturbance, prey availability, and\nfishery, prey availability, and habitat\nprohibited species groups are expected\ndisturbance. higher prey availability, or\nmajority of the prohibited species\nspatial/temporal concentration of the\ndisturbance are similar to Alternative\ncumulative effects are identified for\n1\nto experience higher levels of habitat\nreduced concentration of the fishery.\nprohibited species (nine groups);\ncrab species groups (43 percent).\ncatch is expected to be similar to\nAlternative for majority of the\ngroups. However, the direction of\nfishery is similar to Alternative for a\nfor majority of prohibited species\ndisturbance, lower prey availability, or\nHowever, the direction of change in\nbycatch of chinook salmon and other\nbeneficial effects are anticipated for the\nNo cumulative effects were identified\nprohibited species groups. However, the\nchange in spawning habitat disturbance\nmajority of prohibited species groups.\ngroups. However, the direction of\nincreased concentration of the fishery.\nspawning habitat disturbance is\nsalmon in the BSAI: effects on other\nremaining stocks (Table 2).\nfor prohibited species, with the\ndirection of change in spawning habitat\nis unknown for six of the crab species\nHowever, the direction of change in\nchange in spawning habitat disturbance\nHowever, the direction of change in\nunknown for six crab species groups (43\nspecies are unknown.\nUnder Alternative 2.1, fifty percent of\nexception of salmon For all alternatives\ndisturbance is unknown for six of the\ngroups (43 percent).\nspawning habitat disturbance is\nis unknown for six of the crab species\nspawning habitat disturbance is\npercent).\nthe potential for any cumulative effects\nprohibited species (7 groups) will\ncrab species groups (43 percent)\nunknown for six of the crab species\ngroups (43 percent).\nunknown for six of the crab species\nexperience levels of habitat disruption\ndue to chinook or other salmon bycatch\nNo cumulative effects were identified\ngroups (43 percent).\ngroups (43 percent).\nNo cumulative effects were identified\nthat are similar to the levels experienced\nin the BSAI or GOA is unknown due to\nNo cumulative effects were identified\nfor prohibited species, with the\nNo cumulative effects were identified\nunder Alternative 1. The impact of\nlack of information The significance of\nfor prohibited species, with the\nexception of salmon. For all alternatives\nNo cumulative effects were identified\nfor prohibited species, with the\nNo cumulative effects were identified\nfor prohibited species, with the\nAlternative 2.1 on habitat disruption is\npotential cumulative effects of spatial\nexception of salmon For all alternatives\nthe potential for any cumulative effects\nfor prohibited species, with the\nexception of salmon For all alternatives\nfor prohibited species, with the\nexception of salmon For all alternatives\nunknown for six of the crab species\nand temporal concentration of bycatch,\nthe potential for any cumulative effects\ndue to chinook or other salmon bycatch\nexception of salmon. For all alternatives\nthe potential for any cumulative effects\nexception of salmon. For all alternatives\nthe potential for any cumulative effects\nspawning habitat disruption, and prey\ndue to chinook or other salmon bycatch\nin the BSAI or GOA is unknown due to\nthe potential for any cumulative effects\ndue to chinook or other salmon bycatch\nthe potential for any cumulative effects\ndue to chinook or other salmon bycatch\ngroups (43 percent).\ncompetition on BSAI and GOA other\nin the BSAI or GOA is unknown due to\nlack of information. The significance of\ndue to chinook or other salmon bycatch\nin the BSAI or GOA is unknown due to\ndue to chinook or other salmon bycatch\nin the BSAI or GOA is unknown due to\nExpected impacts of Alternative 2.1 on\nsalmon stocks are also unknown.\nlack of information. The significance of\npotential cumulative effects of spatial\nin the BSAI or GOA is unknown due to\nlack of information. The significance of\nin the BSAI or GOA is unknown due to\nlack of information. The significance of\nprey competition include substantial\npotential cumulative effects of spatial\nand temporal concentration of bycatch,\nlack of information The significance of\npotential cumulative effects of spatial\nlack of information. The significance of\npotential cumulative effects of spatial\nreduction for two groups, marginal\nand temporal concentration of bycatch,\nspawning habitat disruption, and prey\npotential cumulative effects of spatial\nand temporal concentration of bycatch,\npotential cumulative effects of spatial\nand temporal concentration of bycatch,\nreduction for three groups, and the same\nspawning habitat disruption, and prey\ncompetition on BSAI and GOA other\nand temporal concentration of bycatch,\nspawning habitat disruption, and prey\nand temporal concentration of bycatch,\nspawning habitat disruption, and prey\nlevel of prey competition as Alternative\ncompetition on BSAI and GOA other\nsalmon stocks are also unknown.\nspawning habitat disruption, and prey\ncompetition on BSAI and GOA other\nspawning habitat disruption, and prey\ncompetition on BSAI and GOA other\ncompetition on BSAI and GOA other\nsalmon stocks are also unknown.\ncompetition on BSAI and GOA other\n1 for nine groups.\nsalmon stocks are also unknown.\nsalmon stocks are also unknown.\nsalmon stocks are also unknown.\nsalmon stocks are also unknown.\nNo cumulative effects were identified\nfor prohibited species, with the\nexception of salmon. The potential for\nsignificance of cumulative effects of\nspatial and temporal concentration of\nbycatch, spawning habitat disruption\nand prey competition on BSAI and GOA\nother salmon stocks are also unknown.\nEFFECTS ON THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - HABITAT\nSection 4.7 of the SEIS analyzed four categories of biota in habitat areas of particular concern (HAPC): corals: anemones; sponges; and sea pens/whips. Three main issues were examined:\nDestruction of HAPC by mobile gear and fixed-gear;\nPotential for modification of non-living substrate by mobile and fixed gear; and\nBenthic biodiversity improvements (measured by the amount of area closed to bottom trawling).\nUnder Alternative 5. the bycatch of\nAlternative 6.1 predicts mixed changes\nUnder Alternative 1, conditionally\nReductions in the catch of biota in\nAlternative 2.2 exhibits relatively large\nAlternative 3 exhibits mixed direction\nAlternative 4.1 produced no changes\nAlternative 4.2 produced some reduction\nAlternative 6.2 predicts much higher\nreductions in catches of some HAPC\nsignificant adverse impact to habitat\nhabitat areas of particular concern\nof change in the catches of some HAPC\nrelative to Alternative with respect to\nin HAPC biota bycatch by fixed gear,\nHAPO biota by bottom trawl gear is\nin HAPC biota bycatch by bottom trawl\nbycatch of HAPC biota by bottom trawl\nbiota, particularly sea pens/whips. The\ncomplexity is expected due to bycatch of\n(HAPC) are expected under Alternative\nbiota. depending on region and gear\nHAPC biota bycatch, non-living\nand substantially reduced modification\npredicted to substantially decrease, and\ngear, depending on the area and HAPC\ngear, and marginally higher bycatch by\nthe bycatch of HAPC biota by fixed gear\nbiota group. This alternative results in\nHAPC biota by bottom trawl gear and\n2.1. along with reduction in the\nmodification of non-living substrate by\ntype. Adverse impacts on benthic\nsubstrate modification. or benthic\nof non-living substrate by fixed gear\nfixed gear. Under Alternative 6.2 there\nfishing gear is predicted to decrease.\nfixed gear. No significant impact is\ndisturbance to non-living substrate\nbiodiversity are minimized under this\nbiodiversity.\nrelative to Alternative 1.\nis predicted to substantially increase.\nmarginally higher removal/bycatch of\nis much greater modification of non-\nexpected on non-living substrates.\nattributable to the use of both mobile\nUnder Alternative 2.2. benthic\nalternative due to the large areas which\nSimilarly, substantial reduction in\nHAPC biota by fixed gear, and\nliving substrate by bottom trawl and\nConditionally significant adverse impact\nand fixed gear types. Benthic\nbiodiversity is unchanged from\nare protected from bottom trawling.\nCumulative effects are identified for\nCumulative effects are identified for\nmodification of non-living substrates by\nmarginally higher modification of non-\nfixed gear, and no change in benthic\ndamage to HAPC biota from trawl gear\ndamage to HAPC biota from trawl gear\nbottom trawl gear is predicted, along\nliving substrate by bottom trawl gear.\nbiodiversity as measured by area\nto benthic biodiversity is expected under\nbiodiversity impacts under Alternative\nAlternative 1.\nCumulative effects are identified for\nclosures.\nAlternative 1.\n2.1 are unchanged from Alternative 1.\nand from fixed gear. These effects are\nand from fixed gear. These effects are\nwith substantial increases in\nConditionally significant adverse\ndamage to HAPC biota from trawl gear\nrated as conditionally significant adverse\nrated as conditionally significant adverse\nmodification of non-living substrates by\nCumulative effects are identified for\nCumulative effects are identified for\nCumulative effects are identified for\ncumulative effects are identified for\nand from fixed gear. These effects are\nbased on the direct effect of fishing, and\nbased on the direct effect of fishing and\nfixed gear. Large improvements to\ndamage to HAPC biota from trawl gear\nCumulative effects are identified for\ndamage to HAPC biota from trawl gear\ndamage to HAPC biota from trawl gear\ndamage to HAPC biota from trawl gear\nrated as conditionally significant adverse\nexternal factors that contribute\nexternal factors that contribute\nbenthic biodiversity are anticipated due\nand from fixed gear. These effects are\ndamage to HAPC biota from trawl gear\nand from fixed gear. These effects are\nand from fixed gear. These effects are\nbased on the direct effects of fishing and\nbased on the direct effects of fishing and\nincrementally adverse impacts to the\nincrementally adverse impacts to the\nto extensive area closures to bottom\nrated as conditionally significant adverse\nand from fixed gear. These effects are\nrated as conditionally significant adverse\nrated as conditionally significant adverse\nexternal factors that contribute\nexternal factors that contribute\nHAPC. The cumulative effects of\nHAPC. The cumulative effects of\ntrawling under Alternative 5.\nbased on the direct effect of fishing and\nrated as conditionally significant\nAlternative 4.2 on benthic biodiversity\nbased on the direct effects of fishing and\nbased on the direct effects of fishing and\nincrementally adverse impacts to the\nincrementally adverse impacts to the\nAlternative 4.1 on benthic biodiversity\nexternal factors that contribute\nadverse, based on the direct effect of\nexternal factors that contribute\nexternal factors that contribute\nHAPC. The cumulative effects of\nHAPC.\nare conditionally significant adverse\nare conditionally significant adverse\nincrementally adverse impacts to the\nfishing and external factors that\nALASKA GROUNDFISH FISHERIES\nDRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SUPPLEMENTAL\nENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT","TABLE 4.14-1 SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES\nPAGE 6 OF 8\nALTERNATIVE 1\nALTERNATIVE 4.1\nALTERNATIVE 4.2\nALTERNATIVE 2.1\nALTERNATIVE 2.2\nALTERNATIVE 3\nALTERNATIVE 5\nALTERNATIVE 6.1\nALTERNATIVE 6.2\nAGGREGATE TAC\n(No ACTION)\nLow & SLOW HARVESTING\nSHORT-BURST HARVESTING\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nRARE SPECIES TAC\nINCREASED\nINCREASE IN LONG-TERM\nINCREASE IN SHORT-TERM\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nSTRATEGY- INCREASED\nSTRATEGY- INCREASED\nTO TARGET\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nPROTECTION TO HABITAT\nSOCIOECONOMIC BENEFITS\nSOCIOECONOMIC BENEFITS\nCONTINUE WITH EXISTING\nPROTECTION TO MARINE\nPROTECTION TO MARINE\nGROUNDFISH SPECIES\nTO NON-TARGET\nTO NON-TARGET\nMANAGEMENT POLICY\nAND FORAGE SPECIES\nMAMMALS AND SEABIRDS\nMAMMALS AND SEABIRDS\nAND FORAGE SPECIES\nEFFECTS ON THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - HABITAT (CONTINUED)\nbased on lack of spatial distribution of\nincrementally adverse impacts to the\nbased on lack of spatial distribution of\nCumulative effects are identified for\nHAPC. The cumulative effects of\nincrementally adverse impacts to the\nAlternative 2.2 on benthic biodiversity\ncontribute incrementally adverse\nHAPC. The cumulative effects of\nHAPC. The cumulative effects of\nare conditionally significant adverse\nfishing closures sufficient to protect a\nfishing closures sufficient to protect a\ndamage to HAPC biota from fixed gear\nAlternative 6.1 on benthic biodiversity\nimpacts to the HAPC. The cumulative\nAlternative on benthic biodiversity are\nAlternative 2.1 on benthic biodiversity\nbased on lack of spatial distribution of\nwide diversity of benthic habitat types.\nwide diversity of benthic habitat types.\nThese effects are rated as conditionally\nare conditionally significant adverse,\neffects of Alternative 6.2 on benthic\nconditionally significant adverse based\nare conditionally significant adverse\nfishing closures sufficient to protect a\nsignificant adverse based on the direct\nbased on lack of spatial distribution of\nbiodiversity are conditionally significant\non lack of spatial distribution of\nbased on lack of spatial distribution of\nwide diversity of benthic habitat types.\neffect of fishing, and external factors\nfishing closures sufficient to protect a\nadverse based on lack of spatial\nthat contribute incrementally adverse\nfishing closures sufficient to protect a\nfishing closures sufficient to protect a\nwide diversity of benthic habitat types.\ndistribution of fishing closures\nimpacts to the HAPC.\nsufficient to protect wide diversion of\nwide diversity of benthic habitat types.\nwide diversity of benthic habitat types.\nbenthic habitat types.\nEFFECTS ON THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - ECOSYSTEM IMPACTS\nSection 4.9 of the SEIS analyzes the effects of the alternatives on the ecosystem using three general categories of issues:\nPredator/prey relationships;\nEnergy flow and balance; and\nDiversity.\nUnder Alternative 1, significant\nAlternative 2.1 is expected to result in a\nAlternative 2.2 is expected to result in a\nAlternative provides some\nAlternative 4.1 is expected to result in\nAlternative 4.2 is expected to result in\nAlternative 5 is expected to result in\nAlternative 6.1 substantially reduces the\nAlternative 6.2 is expected to result in\nbeneficial impact on forage fish due to\nmarginal improvement in pelagic forage\nsubstantial improvement in pelagic\nimprovement in pelagic forage\nimprovement in pelagic forage\nimprovement in pelagic forage\nimprovement in pelagic forage\nspatial/temporal concentration of the\nreductions in pelagic forage abundance.\nincreased production is expected.\navailability, species diversity, and\nforage availability, species diversity, and\navailability and genetic diversity.\navailability, reduction in spatial/temporal\navailability, reduction in spatial/temporal\navailability, reduction in spatial/temporal\nfishery on forage, but substantially\nsubstantial increases in spatial/temporal\nConditionally significant adverse\ngenetic diversity. Substantial\ngenetic diversity. Substantial\nSubstantial improvements are expected\nconcentration of the fishery on forage,\nconcentration of fishery on forage, less\nconcentration of the fishery on forage,\nincreases energy re-direction (discards).\nconcentration of the fishery on forage,\nimpacts are expected due to the\nimprovements are expected for the\nimprovements are expected for\nfor introduction of non-native species,\nless removal of top predators, and\nremoval of top predators, and largely\nand reduced possibility of introduction\nand considerably increased possibility\nspatial/temporal concentration of fishery\nspatial/temporal concentration of\nspatial/temporal concentration of\nenergy removals (total catch), and\nreduced possibility for introduction of\nreduced possibility of introduction of\nof non-native species. Energy re-\nPelagic forage fish availability is rated\nof the introduction of non-native species\nimpact on forage species, the\nfisheries on prey, introduction of non-\nfisheries on prey, introduction of non-\nspecies diversity. Alternative 3 exhibits\nnon-native species. Energy removals are\nnon-native species. Energy removals\ndirection (discards) are reduced relative\nas conditionally significant cumulative\nBoth energy re-direction (discards) and\nintroduction of non-native species, and\nnative species, and energy flow and\nnative species, and energy flow and\neffects that are similar to Alternative 1\nsubstantially reduced relative to\n(total catch) are substantially reduced.\nto Alternative 1. Substantial\neffect which could be beneficial or\nenergy removals (total catch) show large\nreductions in species diversity. No\nbalance (total catch and discards).\nbalance (total catch and discards).\nfor removal of top predators, energy re-\nAlternative 1. Substantial improvements\nand energy re-direction (discards) are\nimprovements in species diversity are\nadverse (+/-), depending on largely\nincreases relative to Alternative 1.\nsignificant impact is identified for\nAlternative 2.1 is expected to result in\nAlternative 2.2 is expected to result in\ndirection (discards), and functional\nin species diversity are predicted, and\nsomewhat reduced relative to\npredicted, and some improvement in\nunpredictable climatic trends.\nLarge negative impacts on species\nremoval of top predators, energy flow\neffects that are similar to Alternative 1\neffects similar to Alternative for\ndiversity.\nsome improvements in functional and\nAlternative 1. Substantial improvements\nfunctional diversity is also anticipated.\nSpatial/temporal concentration of\ndiversity are anticipated, along with\nand balance (total catch and discard), or\nfor the removal of top predators and\nremoval of top predators and functional\ngenetic diversity are anticipated\nin species diversity are predicted, and\nfisheries on forage species is rated as\nsome reductions in genetic diversity.\nfunctional diversity and genetic\nPelagic forage fish availability is rated\nfunctional diversity.\ndiversity.\nFor ecosystem effects, pelagic forage\nsome improvements in functional and\nconditionally significant adverse due to\ndiversity.\nfish availability is rated as a\nPelagic forage fish availability is rated\ngenetic diversity are anticipated\nas conditionally significant cumulative\nan adverse external influence exerted by\nPelagic forage fish availability is rated\nFor ecosystem effects. pelagic forage\nFor ecosystem effects, pelagic forage\nconditionally significant cumulative\nas conditionally significant cumulative\neffect which could be beneficial or\nthe herring fishery. This fishery reduces\nas conditionally significant cumulative\nFor ecosystem effects, pelagic forage\nfish availability is rated as a\nfish availability is rated as a\neffect: it could be beneficial or adverse\neffect which could be beneficial or\nPelagic forage fish availability is rated\nadverse (+/-), depending on largely\nthe availability of an important\neffect which could be beneficial or\nfish availability is rated as a\nconditionally significant cumulative\nconditionally significant cumulative\n(+/-), depending on largely unpredictable\nadverse (+/-), depending on largely\nas conditionally significant cumulative\nunpredictable climatic trends.\necosystem forage component.\nadverse (+/-), depending on largely\nconditionally significant cumulative\neffect: it could be beneficial or adverse\neffect: it could be beneficial or adverse\nclimatic trends. Spatial/temporal\nunpredictable climatic trends.\neffect which could be beneficial or\nSpatial/temporal concentration of\nIntroduction of non-indigenous species\nunpredictable climatic trends.\neffect on pelagic forage, but could be\n(+/-) depending on largely unpredictable\n(+/-), depending on largely unpredictable\nconcentration of fisheries on forage\nSpatial/temporal concentration of\nadverse (+/-), depending on largely\nfisheries on forage species is rated as\nis rated as conditionally significant\nSpatial/temporal concentration of\nbeneficial or adverse (+/-) depending on\nclimatic trends. The spatial/temporal\nclimatic trends. Spatial/temporal\nspecies is rated as conditionally\nfisheries on forage species is rated as\nunpredictable climatic trends.\nconditionally significant adverse due to\nadverse due to the potential effects on\nfisheries on forage species is rated as\nlargely unpredictable climatic trends.\nconcentration of fisheries on forage\nconcentration of fisheries on forage\nsignificant adverse due to an adverse\nconditionally significant adverse due to\nSpatial/temporal concentration of\nan adverse external influence exerted by\nthe food web. Cumulative effects on\nconditionally significant adverse due to\nThe spatial/temporal concentration of\nspecies is rated as conditionally\nspecies is rated as conditionally\nexternal influence exerted by the herring\nan adverse external influence exerted by\nfisheries on forage species is rated as\nthe herring fishery. This fishery reduces\nspecies diversity are found to be\nan adverse external influence exerted by\nfisheries on forage species is rated as\nsignificant adverse due to an adverse\nsignificant adverse due to an adverse\nfishery. This fishery reduces the\nthe herring fishery. This fishery reduces\nconditionally significant adverse due to\nthe availability of an important\nconditionally significant adverse due to\nthe herring fishery. This fishery reduces\nconditionally significant adverse due to\nexternal influence exerted by the herring\nexternal influence exerted by the herring\navailability of an important ecosystem\nthe availability of an important\nan adverse external influence exerted by\necosystem forage component.\nfactors associated with the groundfish\nthe availability of an important\nan adverse external influence exerted by\nfishery. This fishery reduces the\nfishery. This fishery reduces the\nforage component. Introduction of non-\necosystem forage component.\nthe herring fishery. This fishery reduces\nIntroduction of non-indigenous species\nfishery, and external environmental\necosystem forage component.\nthe herring fishery. This fishery reduces\navailability of an important ecosystem\navailability of an important ecosystem\nindigenous species is rated as\nIntroduction of non-indigenous species\nthe availability of an important\nis rated as conditionally significant\nfactors that continue to exert both\nIntroduction of non-indigenous species\nthe availability of an important\nforage component. Introduction of non-\nforage component. Introduction of non-\nconditionally significant adverse due to\nis rated as conditionally significant\necosystem forage component.\nadverse due to the potential effects on\nbeneficial and adverse influences on the\nis rated as conditionally significant\necosystem forage component.\nindigenous species is rated as\nindigenous species is rated as\nthe potential effects on the food web.\nadverse due to the potential effects on\nIntroduction of non-indigenous species\nthe food web. Cumulative effects on\nadverse due to the potential effects on\nsystem.\nIntroduction of non-indigenous species\nconditionally significant adverse due to\nconditionally significant adverse due to\nCumulative effects on species diversity\nthe food web. Cumulative effects on\nis rated as conditionally significant\nspecies diversity are conditionally\nthe food web. Cumulative effects on\nis rated as conditionally significant\nthe potential effects on the food web.\nthe potential effects on the food web.\nare found to be conditionally significant\nspecies diversity are conditionally\nadverse due to the potential effects on\nsignificant adverse due to factors\nspecies diversity are found to be\nadverse due to the potential effects on\nadverse due to factors associated with\nsignificant adverse due to factors\nthe food web. Cumulative effects on\nassociated with the groundfish fishery,\nconditionally significant adverse due to\nthe food web.\nCumulative effects on species diversity\nCumulative effects on species diversity\nthe groundfish fishery and external\nassociated with the groundfish fishery,\nspecies diversity are conditionally\nand external environmental factors that\nfactors associated with the groundfish\nare conditionally significant adverse due\nare conditionally significant adverse due\nenvironmental factors that continue to\nand external environmental factors that\nsignificant adverse due to factors\ncontinue to exert both beneficial and\nfishery, and external environmental\nCumulative effects on species diversity\nto factors associated with the groundfish\nto factors associated with the groundfish\nexert both beneficial and adverse\ncontinue to exert both beneficial and\nassociated with the groundfish fishery,\nadverse influences on the system.\nfactors that continue to exert both\nare conditionally significant adverse due\nfishery, and external environmental\nfishery and external environmental\ninfluences on the system.\nadverse influences on the system.\nand external environmental factors that\nbeneficial and adverse influences on the\nto factors associated with the groundfish\nfactors that continue to exert both\nfactors that continue to exert both\ncontinue to exert both beneficial and\nsystem.\nfishery, and external environmental\nbeneficial and adverse influences on the\nbeneficial and adverse influences on the\nadverse influences on the system.\nfactors that continue to exert both\nsystem.\nsystem.\nbeneficial and adverse influences on the\nsystem.\nALASKA GROUNDFISH FISHERIES\nDRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SUPPLEMENTAL\nENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT","4.14-1 SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES\nTABLE\nPAGE 7 OF 8\nALTERNATIVE 1\nALTERNATIVE 2.1\nALTERNATIVE 2.2\nALTERNATIVE 3\nALTERNATIVE 4.1\nALTERNATIVE 4.2\nALTERNATIVE 5\nALTERNATIVE 6.1\nALTERNATIVE 6.2\n(No ACTION)\nLow & SLOW HARVESTING\nSHORT-BURST HARVESTING\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nAGGREGATE TAC\nRARE SPECIES TAC\nINCREASED\nINCREASE IN LONG-TERM\nINCREASE IN SHORT-TERM\nSTRATEGY- INCREASED\nSTRATEGY- INCREASED\nTO TARGET\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nPROTECTION TO HABITAT\nSOCIOECONOMIC BENEFITS\nSOCIOECONOMIC BENEFITS\nCONTINUE WITH EXISTING\nPROTECTION TO MARINE\nPROTECTION TO MARINE\nGROUNDFISH SPECIES\nTO NON-TARGET\nTO NON-TARGET\nMANAGEMENT POLICY\nMAMMALS AND SEABIRDS\nMAMMALS AND SEABIRDS\nAND FORAGE SPECIES\nAND FORAGE SPECIES\nEFFECTS ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT - OVERALL SOCIOECONOMIC EFFECTS\nUnder Alternative 1, overall groundfish\nUnder Alternative 2.1, total annual\nUnder Alternative 2.2. the total annual\nUnder Alternative 3, total annual\nUnder Alternative 4.1, total annual\nUnder Alternative 4.2, total annual\nThere would be little change in total\nThere would be no change in pollock or\nUnder Alternative 6.2, there would be\nharvests are projected to approach 1.9\ngroundfish harvests would decline by\ngroundfish harvest would decline by\ngroundfish harvests would decline by\ngroundfish harvests would decline by\ngroundfish harvests would decline by\nannual groundfish harvest between\nPacific cod harvests under Alternative\nlarge increases in harvest of all species.\nmillion mt annually, including more\n485,000 mt. 25.7 percent of the\nmore than 1.45 million mt. 77 percent\nmore than 224,000 mt. 12 percent of the\nmore than 225,000 mt. nearly 12 percent\nmore than 282,000 mt, nearly 15 percent\nAlternative 5 and Alternative (two\n6.1 compared to Alternative 1..\nHarvest increases would be 250,000 mt\nthan 1.3 million mt of pollock.\nAlternative total. Projected harvest\nof the Alternative total. Harvest\nAlternative total. Harvest declines\nof the Alternative total; however only\nof the Alternative total. Most of the\npercent overall reduction ), with 11.000\nIncreased harvests of flatfish and\nfor pollock, almost 60,000 mt for\nCollectively, the 1,184 fish harvesting\ndeclines are 26.5 percent for pollock,\ndeclines would be 85 percent for\nwould be 15 percent for pollock, 8\npollock would be affected. The\ndecline would be in pollock harvests, but\nfewer tons from the Atka mackerel.\nslightly reduced harvests in the Atka\nflatfish, and 40,000 mt for Pacific cod\nand processing operations involved in\n32,4 percent for Pacific cod. 37.4\npollock; 83 percent for Pacific cod: 49\npercent for Pacific cod. and 38 percent\nprojected harvest decline for pollock is\nconstraints on skate catches would cause\nsablefish, rockfish, and other groundfish\nmackerel. sablefish, rockfish, and other\nand species in the Atka mackerel,\nthe fishery are projected to generate\npercent for the Atka mackerel. sablefish,\npercent for the Atka mackerel. sablefish,\nfor the Atka mackerel, sablefish,\n15 percent. Ex-vessel payments would\ndeclines of 21.8 percent for Pacific cod\nspecies group and 9,000 fewer tons of\ngroundfish species group (primarily\nsablefish rockfish. and other groundfish\nmore than $1.2 billion in wholesale\nrockfish, and other groundfish group\nrockfish, and other groundfish species\nrockfish, and other groundfish species\ndecline by nearly 5 percent, relative to\nharvests and percent for the Atka\nflatfish The primary impacts would be\n\"other groundfish\") would increase total\ngroup. A 9 percent increase in total ex-\nproduct value and more than $570\n(mostly Atka mackerel), and 4.3 percent\ngroup (mostly Atka mackerel); and 39\ngroup (mostly Atka mackerel). Flatfish\nAlternative 1. for all species including\nmackerel, sablefish, rockfish, and other\nfelt in industry classes as harvests are\nharvests by 21,300 mt, 1.1 percent above\nvessel payments (groundfish and non-\nmillion in labor income for an estimated\nfor flatfish. Ex-vessel payments would\npercent for flatfish. Ex-vessel payments\nharvests would increase by 35 percent.\nnon-groundfish. The wholesale value of\ngroundfish species group. Ex-vessel\nreapportioned among gear types to\nthe Alternative total. Changes in ex-\ngroundfish species) is projected.\n10,000 persons. Overall these values\ndecline by 11.6 percent and wholesale\nwould decline by 32.7 percent, and\nEx-vessel payments would decline by 7\nproduction would fall by 11.3 percent,\npayments would decline by nearly 5\nprotect benthic habitat. Reductions and\nvessel payments would be negligible,\nProduct values and payments to labor\nreflect significant beneficial effect to\nvalue would fall by 25.3 percent.\nwholesale value of production would fall\npercent. The wholesale value of\nand payments to labor would decrease\npercent of the Alternative projection\nreapportionments in harvests would\nand the wholesale value of production\nwould increase by 20 percent.\nthe human environment.\nPayments to labor would decrease by 25\nby 74.2 percent. Payments to labor\nproduction would fall by 12.5 percent,\nby 10.7 percent.\nfor all species, including non-groundfish\nresult in 2.2 percent decline in total\nwould increase by percent. Payments\nwould decrease by 71 percent.\nand annual payments to labor would\nspecies. The wholesale value of\npercent.\nannual ex-vessel payments for all\nto labor would increase by 1.7 percent.\ndecrease by 12.7 percent.\nproduction would fall by 14.5 percent,\nspecies, including non-groundfish\nWhile it appears that Alternative 6.1\nand payments to labor would decrease\nspecies. The wholesale value of\nwould have little impact, it expected to\nby 13.4 percent.\nproduction would fall by 0,9 percent,\nreduce operational costs, and create\nand payments to labor would decrease\ngains in efficiency, factors for which\nby 1.6 percent.\nnecessary information is currently\nunavailable.\nEFFECTS ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT - DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTS AMONG INDUSTRY SECTORS\nUnder Alternative 1. catcher vessels\nChanges in output value would be\nProjected effects are significantly\nUnder Alternative 3. effects on\nImpacts would be generally limited to\nImpacts would be generally limited to\nDistribution of effects would show\nUnder Alternative 6.1 projected effects\nUnder Alternative 6.2. every class and\nwould generate nearly $280 million in\nnegative for all fishing and processing\nnegative for almost all fishing and\nharvesting and processing sectors would\nharvesters and processors that rely on\nharvesters and processors that rely on\nextreme variation, with significant\nare insignificant for all industry sectors\nsector except trawl catcher vessels less\nex-vessel revenue from groundfish.\nsectors. The trawl sector would be\nprocessing sectors. Exceptions are\ngenerally be distributed evenly, with\nBering Sea pollock fisheries. These\nBering Sea pollock fisheries, with one\nnegative impacts for several classes and\nexcept head and gut trawl catcher\nthan 60 feet in length are expected to\nApproximate percentages are 70 percent\naffected most negatively, while longline\nlongline catcher vessels and fixed gear\noutput value decreases ranging from 7 to\nclasses would experience output value\nmajor exception; longline catcher\nsignificant positive impacts for others.\nprocessors; output values are\nrealize significant output value\nfor trawl vessels. 3.5 percent for pot\ncatcher vessels and Southeast Alaska\ncatcher vessels 33 to 59 feet in length,\n20 percent. A notable exception is the\ndeclines from 15 to 19 percent, while all\nprocessors would experience 46\nTrawl catcher vessels in the GOA, and\nsignificantly higher for these vessels\nincreases, ranging from 13 to 35 percent.\nvessels, and 10 percent for longline\nshore plants would suffer least. The\nand Southcentral and Southeast Alaska\nhead and gut trawl catcher processor\nother classes would experience minimal\npercent decline in output value because\nshore plants in the Alaska Peninsula and\nthan for other classes. Potential\nTrawl catchers less than 60 feet would\nvessels which focus primarily on\ndisproportional effects occur because\nregion shore plants where negative\nsector, with an percent increase in\nimpacts.\nof restrictions on skate harvests.\nAleutian Islands region, would\nreductions in operational costs and gains\nexperience 1.200-ton decline in Pacific\nsablefish. The other two fixed gear\nthis alternative reduces the total\neffects on output value would not exceed\noutput value. This increase is directly\nexperience severe negative impacts.\nin efficiency are difficult to quantify\ncod harvests. The decline is result of\ncatcher vessel classes, which tend to\nallowable catch of GOA pollock and\n18 percent.\nlinked to the higher flatfish harvests that\nSimilar to Alternative 3, cumulative\nCumulative effects on harvesting and\nOther vessels and processors that rely on\nwith available data.\nmuch higher overall catches of flatfish in\nparticipate in the groundfish fishery to\nPacific cod more than it affects other\nwould be major result of this\neffects under Alternative 4.1 would be\nprocessing sectors would generally not\ntrawl-caught Pacific cod would have\nthe GOA, in which relatively high levels\naugment other fisheries income, would\nspecies and areas.\nConditionally significant adverse\nalternative.\nnot significant on harvesting and\nbe significant. There would be\nslight negative impacts. Fixed gear\nSignificant beneficial cumulative effects\nof Pacific cod bycatch decrease the\ngenerate more than $46 million,\ncumulative effects would occur for most\nprocessing sectors, with the exception of\nconditionally significant adverse effects\ncatcher vessels. catcher processors that\nassociated with fisheries harvest levels\namount of Pacific cod available for the\nprimarily from high-value species, with\nConditionally significant adverse\nof the fish harvesting and processing\nCumulative effects on harvesting and\nconditionally significant adverse effects\non processing costs, preemption of\ntarget Pacific cod. and Southcentral\nwould be maintained or increased by\ntrawl target fishery. Other trawl vessels\nmore than 95 percent of this amount\ncumulative effects occur for most of the\nsectors. particularly for those based in\nprocessing sectors would generally not\non processing costs for the Alaska\nvessel and processing classes, and\nAlaska region shore plants would realize\nreducing harvesting and processing\nin the Gulf of Alaska are more likely to\nattributable to vessels 33 to 59 feet in\nfish harvesting and processing sectors.\nthe Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian\nbe significant. There would be\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands region,\nexcess capacity in the Alaska Peninsula\nsignificant positive impacts under\ncosts, reducing excess capacity, and\ntarget flatfish and compensate for lower\nlength.\nparticularly for those based in the Alaska\nIslands region and Kodiak region,\nconditionally significant adverse effects\nwhere many of the processors also rely\nand Aleutian Islands region, which relies\nAlternative 5.\nincreasing vessel safety. Continuation of\ntargeted harvests with bycatch.\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands region\nbecause they fish in nearshore waters\non processing costs. preemption of trawl\non crab and salmon fisheries which are\non crab and salmon fisheries that are\ncurrent fishing levels maintains\nUnder Alternative 1. shore plants and\nand Kodiak regions, because they fish in\nthat would be restricted under this\nvessel classes, and excess capacity in the\ncurrently depressed or restricted.\ncurrently depressed or restricted.\nCumulative effects on harvesting and\nconditionally significantly adverse\nConditionally significant beneficial\nmotherships would generate more than\nnearshore waters that would be restricted\nalternative. Many of the harvesters and\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nprocessing sectors would generally not\neffects on non-consumptive and non-use\ncumulative effects on ex-vessel value,\n$612 million in wholesale product\nunder this alternative. Many of the\nprocessors also rely on crab and salmon\nregion and Kodiak region, which rely on\nbe significant, with one exception. There\nvalues due to perceived effects on Steller\ngroundfish product value. benefits to\nrevenue, with nearly 60 percent from\nharvesters and processors also rely on\nfisheries which are currently depressed\ncrab and salmon fisheries that are\nwould be conditionally significant\nsea lions and the Bering Sea ecosystem\nconsumers, reductions in harvesting and\nBering Sea pollock inshore plants\ncrab and salmon fisheries which are\nor restricted, and would likely\ncurrently depressed or restricted\nadverse effects on ex-vessel value for\nprocessing costs, and reductions in\nShore plants in the Alaska Peninsula and\ncurrently depressed or restricted, and\nexperience some preemption from\ntrawl catcher vessels participating in the\nexcess capacity would increase under\nAleutian Islands would generate $64\nwould likely experience some\nparticipation in the fisheries due to\nPacific cod fishery, increases in\nAlternative 6.2. Conditionally\nmillion. Kodiak shore plants $60\npreemption from participation in the\neconomic impacts of restrictions. Vessel\nharvesting and processing costs,\nsignificant adverse cumulative effects on\nmillion. and Southcentral and Southeast\nfisheries due to economic impacts of\nsafety and excess harvesting and\npreemption of trawl vessel and processor\nnon-consumptive and non-use values\nAlaska shore plants (together) $58\nrestrictions. Vessel safety and excess\nprocessing capacity would experience\nclasses. and excess capacity in the\ndue to perceived effects on Steller sea\nmillion. Motherships would generate\nharvesting and processing capacity\nconditionally significant cumulative\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nlions and the Bering Sea ecosystem\nabout 9 percent of total wholesale value.\nwould experience conditionally\nadverse effects.\nregion, which relies on crab and salmon\nwould increase.\nsignificant adverse cumulative effects.\nfisheries that are currently depressed or\nCatcher processors would generate $594\nrestricted\nmillion in total wholesale value. Of this\ntotal, surimi vessels would generate\nmore than 47 percent, fillet vessels 11\npercent, head and gut trawlers 26\npercent, longline catcher processors 11\npercent, and pot catcher processors less\nthan percent.\nAlternative maintains conditionally\nsignificant beneficial cumulative effects\non ex-vessel and groundfish product\nvalue, harvesting and processing costs,\nand net benefits to consumers. With\ncontinuation of the race for fish and\nALASKA GROUNDFISH FISHERIES\nDRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SUPPLEMENTAL\nENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT","TABLE 4.14-1 SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES\nPAGE 8 OF 8\nALTERNATIVE 1\nALTERNATIVE 2.1\nALTERNATIVE 2.2\nALTERNATIVE 3\nALTERNATIVE 4.1\nALTERNATIVE 4.2\nALTERNATIVE 5\nALTERNATIVE 6.1\nALTERNATIVE 6.2\n(No ACTION)\nLow & SLOW HARVESTING\nSHORT-BURST HARVESTING\nAGGREGATE TAC\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nRARE SPECIES TAC\nINCREASED\nINCREASE IN LONG-TERM\nINCREASE IN SHORT-TERM\nSTRATEGY- INCREASED\nSTRATEGY- INCREASED\nTO TARGET\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nINCREASED PROTECTION\nPROTECTION TO HABITAT\nSOCIOECONOMIC BENEFITS\nSOCIOECONOMIC BENEFITS\nCONTINUE WITH EXISTING\nPROTECTION TO MARINE\nPROTECTION TO MARINE\nGROUNDFISH SPECIES\nTO NON-TARGET\nTO NON-TARGET\nMANAGEMENT POLICY\nMAMMALS AND SEABIRDS\nMAMMALS AND SEABIRDS\nAND FORAGE SPECIES\nAND FORAGE SPECIES\nEFFECTS ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT - DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTS AMONG INDUSTRY SECTORS (CONTINUED)\ncurrent restrictions on crab and salmon\nharvests in the Alaska Peninsula and\nAleutian Islands, significant adverse\neffects occur for excess capacity and\nvessel safety. Continuation of current\nfishing levels maintains conditionally\nsignificantly adverse effects on non-\nconsumptive and non-use values due to\nreal and perceived effects on Steller sea\nlions and the Bering Sea ecosystem.\nEFFECTS ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT - DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTS AMONG REGIONS\nUnder Alternative 1, the Alaska\nImpacts would be felt strongly in the\nUnder Alternative 2.2. impacts would be\nImpacts in the Alaska Peninsula and\nImpacts to the Alaska Peninsula and\nImpacts in the Alaska Peninsula and\nUnder Alternative 5. impacts in the\nImpacts in the Alaska Peninsula and\nUnder Alternative 6.2, the Alaska\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands region\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nextremely severe in the Alaska\nAleutian Islands region and the Kodiak\nAleutian Islands region would be\nAleutian Islands region would be\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nAleutian Islands region under\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands region\naccounts for more than four times the\nregion and the Kodiak region due to\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands region,\nregion would be significant under\nsignificant, with decreases in relevant\nsignificant under Alternative 4.2, with\nregion would be significant with\nAlternative 6.1 would be minimal and\nwould experience positive impacts that\ncombined volume of groundfish\nrelatively high dependency on\nand profound in the Kodiak region. The\nAlternative 3, with decreases in relevant\nindicators in the range of 10 to 20\ndecreases in relevant indicators in the\ndecreases in most relevant indicators in\nrelated to reorganization of the fishery.\nwould be significant for the processing\nprocessed inshore in the other Alaska\ngroundfish. Impacts to the Southcentral\ngroundfish fishery in its present form\nindicators in the range of 10 to 20\npercent. Significant impacts from\nrange of 10 to 20 percent. Significant\nthe range of to 15 percent. Regional\nFor the Kodiak, Southcentral Alaska,\nsectors. Because present regional\nregions. Kodiak is dominant for GOA\nAlaska and Southeast Alaska regions\nwould be virtually eliminated in these\npercent. Significant impacts from\nreduced fish taxes and processor and\nimpacts from reduced fish taxes and\ncatcher vessel operations would be\nand Southeast Alaska regions, impacts\ncapacity (which was built up during\ngroundfish. accounting for 30 to 45\nwould be minimal. In the Washington\nregions Southcentral and Southeast\nreduced fish taxes, processor and\nharvester changes may affect\nprocessor and harvester changes may\naffected the most. Significant impacts\nwould be neutral overall, and the\nrace-for-fish conditions) could handle\npercent of local seafood processing\nInland Waters region, likely significant\nAlaska impacts would be relatively\nharvester changes, and population shifts\nparticipants, but not the fundamental\naffect participants, but not the\nfrom reduced fish taxes and processor\nimpacts would arise primarily from\nthese increases, little or no negative\nvalue. Groundfish fishing and\nimpacts to individual firms and the\nslight because of greater dependence on\nmay affect participants but not the\nstructure of the regional economy.\nfundamental structure of the regional\nand harvester changes may affect\ndecisions on how to implement this\neffects such as increased population or\nprocessing is much more limited in the\ncommercial fishing sector would be\nother fisheries or industries. Impacts to\nfundamental structure of the regional\nKodiak regional impacts would be slight\neconomy. Kodiak impacts would be\nparticipants, but not the fundamental\nalternative. For the Washington Inland\ndemand for infrastructure are expected\nSouthcentral and Southeast Alaska\nmuted by the size of the region. Impacts\nthe Washington Inland Waters region\neconomies. For the Southcentral Alaska\nand concentrated among catcher vessel\nconcentrated among catcher processors\nstructure of the regional economy.\nWaters region and the Oregon Coast\nIn the Kodiak region, similar positive\nregions. In terms of vessel and processor\nto the Oregon Coast region would be\neconomy would be muted by the size of\nand Southeast Alaska regions,\noperations. Southcentral and Southeast\nand catcher vessels. While individual\nKodiak regional impacts would be\nregion, changes would be slight and\nimpacts would be experienced, and\nownership, Washington Inland Waters\nlimited to catcher vessel operations.\nthe region, but involved enterprises\ncommunity impacts would be significant\nAlaska regional impacts would be\noperations may be affected adversely,\nmixed across sectors, with some\nrelated to decisions on how to\npresent regional capacity could absorb\nregion has the most involvement of any\nwould suffer extremely negative\nand in the range of variation commonly\ninsignificant. For the Washington Inland\noverall regional impacts would be\nnegative and some positive impacts.\nimplement Alternative 6.1.\nall anticipated increases. Southcentral\nregion. The Oregon Coast region has a\nConditionally significant adverse\nimpacts. In the Oregon Coast region,\nexperienced in Alaska fisheries. In the\nWaters region, relevant indicators show\nminimal. For the Southcentral Alaska\nSouthcentral Alaska region impacts\nand Southeast Alaska regional impacts\nlong history of significant involvement\ncumulative effects would occur with\nimpacts to catcher vessel operations\nWashington Inland Waters region,\ndeclines in the range of 10 to 15 percent.\nregion, some impacts would be felt\nwould be positive, reflecting the non-\nConditionally significant beneficial\nwould be positive, but not as marked as\nthrough catcher vessels that participate\nregard to labor payments and\nwould be severe.\ndecreases in relevant variables would be\nWhile impacts to the economy would be\namong catcher processors and catcher\ntrawl nature of the groundfish fishery in\ncumulative effects on labor payments\nregion-wide impacts on the Alaska\nin various fisheries across Alaska.\nemployment, and related effects on\nin the range of 5 to 15 percent. Impacts\nmuted by the size of the region, some\nvessels, but potential regional impacts\nthe region. Southeast Alaska region\nand total employment by harvesting and\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands and\neconomic activity and tax revenue for\nConditionally significant adverse\nto the economy would be muted by the\neconomic adjustments are expected. In\nwould likely be insignificant. Southeast\nimpacts would be positive and slight.\nprocessing sectors, regional ex-vessel\nKodiak regions. For the Washington\nAlternative maintains conditionally\nsome of the Alaskan regions and\ncumulative effects would occur with\nsize of the region, but some economic\nthe Oregon Coast region, declines\nAlaska regional impacts would be\nImpacts on the Washington Inland\nand product value by both region and\nInland Waters region, relevant indicators\nsignificant beneficial cumulative effects\ncommunities participating in the\nregard to labor payments and\nadjustments would be expected. Oregon\nexperienced by catcher vessel operations\nconfined to the longline catcher\nWaters region would not be profound\nownership, and related regional and\nshow an increase of approximately 15 to\non labor payments and total employment\ngroundfish fisheries. This is particularly\nemployment, and related effects on\nCoast regional impacts would be\nwould be relatively small and within the\nprocessor sector. In the Washington\nand would be mixed by sector. Oregon\ncommunity effects on economic activity\n20 percent, benefitting wide range of\nby harvesting and processing sectors,\ntrue for communities in the Alaska\neconomic activity and tax revenue for\nconcentrated among catcher vessel\nvariability common in Alaska fisheries.\nInland Waters region, reduction of 10\nCoast region impacts would be\nand tax revenue would be maintained\nsectors: however, this increase would be\nregional ex-vessel and product value by\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands region\nsome of the Alaskan regions and\noperations.\nto 20 percent for relevant indicators is\nsignificant and concentrated among\nThis alternative would even out some of\nmuted by the size of the region. The\nboth region and ownership, and related\nand Kodiak regions where many of the\ncommunities participating in the\nSimilar to Alternative 3, cumulative\nprojected for several sectors. Impacts to\ncatcher vessel operations.\nthe seasonal peaks in economic activities\nOregon Coast region would experience\nregional and community effects on\nharvesters and processors also rely on\ngroundfish fisheries. This is particularly\nCumulative effects would generally not\neffects under Alternative 4.1 would be\nthe economy would be muted by the size\nassociated with short openings of the\npositive impacts concentrated in the\neconomic activity and tax revenue\ncrab and salmon fisheries which are\ntrue for communities in the Alaska\nbe significant on communities and\nnot significant on communities and\nof the region, but some economic\nCumulative effects would generally not\nfisheries. There would be conditionally\ncatcher vessel sector.\nThere is conditionally significant\ncurrently depressed or restricted, and\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands region\nregions, with the exception of\nregions, with the exception of\nadjustments are expected. In the Oregon\nbe significant on communities and\nsignificant adverse or unknown effects\nadverse or unknown effect on\nother economic opportunities are\nand Kodiak region, where many of the\nconditionally significant adverse effects\nconditionally significant adverse effects\nCoast region, declines experienced by\nregions, with the exception of\non subsistence harvests of Steller sea\nConditionally significant beneficial\nsubsistence harvests of Steller sea lions\nlimited. There would be related\nharvesters and processors also rely on\non total ex-vessel value by region in the\non total ex-vessel value and processing\ncatcher vessel operations would be\nconditionally significant adverse effects\nlions and salmon.\ncumulative effects on labor payments\nand salmon.\nsignificant adverse effects on municipal\ncrab and salmon fisheries which are\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\ncosts by region for the Alaska Peninsula\nrelatively small and within the\non total ex-vessel value by region in the\nand total employment by harvesting and\ntax revenue. There would be\ncurrently depressed or restricted, and\nregion and Kodiak region, where many\nand Aleutian Islands region, where many\nvariability common in Alaska fisheries.\nAlaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands\nprocessing sectors, regional ex-vessel\nconditionally beneficial or unknown\nother economic opportunities are\nof the harvesters and processors also rely\nof the harvesters and processors also rely\nregion, where many of the harvesters\nand product value by both region and\neffects on subsistence harvests of Steller\nlimited. There would be related\non crab and salmon fisheries, which are\non crab and salmon fisheries that are\nSimilar to Alternative 4.1, cumulative\nand processors also rely on crab and\nownership, and related regional and\nsea lions and salmon.\nsignificant adverse effects on municipal\ncurrently depressed or restricted.\ncurrently depressed or restricted.\neffects under Alternative 4.2 would be\nsalmon fisheries which are currently\ncommunity effects on economic activity\ntax revenue. There would be\nCumulative effects on subsistence would\nCumulative effects on subsistence would\nnot significant on communities and\ndepressed or restricted. There would be\nand tax revenue would increase under\nconditionally beneficial or unknown\nbe unknown.\nbe unknown\nregions, with the exception of\nrelated significant adverse effects on\nAlternative 6.2 This alternative would\neffects on subsistence harvests of Steller\nconditional significant adverse effects on\nmunicipal tax revenue. Cumulative\neven out some of the seasonal peaks in\nsea lions and salmon.\ntotal ex-vessel by region for the Alaska\neffects on subsistence would be\neconomic activities associated with short\nPeninsula and Aleutian Islands and\nunknown.\nopenings. There would be conditionally\nKodiak regions, where many of the\nsignificant adverse or unknown effects\nharvesters and processors also rely on\non subsistence harvests of Steller sea\ncrab and salmon fisheries that are\nlions and salmon.\ncurrently depressed or restricted.\nCumulative effects on subsistence would\nbe unknown.\nALASKA GROUNDFISH FISHERIES\nDRAFT PROGRAMMATIC SUPPLEMENTAL\nENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT","Table 4.14-2 Comparison of effects by alternative for analysis categories used in the SEIS. Percentages represent the percent of species in the analysis category that exhibited negative (orange), neutral (yellow) or positive (green) scores.\nAlternative 1\nCumulative\n2.1\n2.2\n6.2\nSpecies Group\nEffects\n3\n4.1\n4.2\n5\n6.1\nStatus Quo\nEffects\nPercent of Scores\nPercent of Scores\nPercent of Scores\nPercent of Scores\nPercent of Scores\nPercent of Scores\nPercent of Scores\nPercent of Scores\n<0\n0\n>0\n<0\n0\n>0\n<0\n0\n0\n>0\n<0\n0\n>0\n<0\n0\n>0\n<0\n0\n>0\n<0\n>0\n<0\n0\n>0\n100%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\nNS\nNS\nAbundant Pinnipeds\nDirect Take\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n67%\n33%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\nCS-\nCS-\nPrey\n33%\n67%\n0%\n100%\nSpatial-Temporal\n0%\n33%\n67%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n67%\n33%\n0%\n0%\n67%\n33%\n0%\n67%\n33%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\nCS-\nCS-\n0%\n100%\nDisturbance\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n33%\n67%\n0%\n33%\n67%\n0%\n33%\n67%\n0%\n33%\n67%\n0%\n33%\n67%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\nNS\nNS\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\nOther Marine Mammais\nDirect Take\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\nNS\nNS\nPrey\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\nNS\nNS\n0%\nSpatio-Temporal\n0%\n100%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\nNS\nNS\nDisturbance\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\nNS\nNS\nDirect Take\n3%\n59%\n6%\n0%\n50%\n50%\n0%\n50%\n50%\n0%\n50%\n50%\n0%\n50%\n50%\n0%\n50%\n50%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\nCS-\nCS-\nSeabirds\n17%\n83%\n0%\n17%\n67%\n17%\n33%\n67%\n0%\n33%\n67%\n0%\nPrey\n0%\n33%\n67%\n0%\n33%\n67%\n17%\n83%\n0%\n17%\n83%\n0%\nCS-\nNS\n100%\n0%\n0%\n83%\n17%\n0%\n100%\n0%\nBenthic habitat\n0%\n33%\n67%\n0%\n33%\n67%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n33%\n67%\n0%\n33%\n67%\n0%\nNS\nNS\n0%\nProcessing Waste &Offal\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n83%\n17%\n0%\n83%\n17%\n0%\n83%\n17%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n83%\n17%\nNS\nNS\n38%\n0%\nDirect Take\n0%\n56%\n34%\n59%\n28%\n19%\n50%\n0%\n88%\n6%\n0%\n84%\n9%\n3%\n44%\n44%\n13%\n56%\n25%\n69%\n9%\n19%\nNS\nNS\nTarget\n75%\n0%\n0%\n50%\n47%\n0%\n67%\n33%\n0%\n34%\n0%\n94%\n66%\n0%\n94%\n6%\n6%\n0%\n38%\n63%\n3%\n84%\n0%\n19%\nNS\nNS\nHabitat\n3%\n9%\n53%\n6%\n9%\n47%\n6%\n3%\n66%\n0%\n3%\n72%\n3%\n3%\n75%\n3%\n0%\n69%\n0%\n0%\n72%\n0%\n0%\n69%\nNS\nCS-\nPrey\nSpatial-Temporal\n3%\n56%\n19%\n13%\n59%\n6%\n19%\n53%\n3%\n3%\n94%\n0%\n6%\n91%\n0%\n6%\n66%\n6%\n0%\n50%\n22%\n3%\n59%\n6%\nNS\nNS\nDirect Take\n0%\n33%\n67%\n4%\n11%\n85%\n11%\n63%\n26%\n0%\n85%\n15%\n0%\n74%\n26%\n33%\n52%\n15%\n0%\n33%\n67%\n96%\n4%\n0%\nCS-/U\nCS-/U\nNon-target\n0%\n79%\n21%\n0%\n36%\n64%\n0%\n7%\n93%\n29%\n29%\n43%\n0%\n79%\n21%\n29%\n57%\n14%\n7%\n43%\n50%\n100%\n0%\n0%\nCS-/U\nCS-/U\nProhibited\nDirect Take\n7%\n50%\n0%\n0%\n57%\n0%\n50%\n7%\n0%\n57%\n0%\n0%\n57%\n0%\n0%\n0%\n57%\n0%\n0%\n57%\n0%\n0%\n57%\n0%\nNS\nNS\nHabitat\n64%\n36%\n0%\n64%\n36%\n0%\n86%\n14%\n0%\n79%\n21%\n0%\n79%\n21%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n79%\n21%\n36%\n64%\n0%\nNS\nNS\nPrey\n0%\nSpatial-Temporal\n0%\n64%\n36%\n0%\n64%\n36%\n36%\n64%\n0%\n0%\n93%\n7%\n0%\n93%\n7%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n71%\n29%\n29%\n71%\n0%\nNS\nNS\nScore\nScore\nScore\nScore\nScore\nScore\nScore\nScore\nHAPC damage (bottom trawl)\n1.00\n2.00\nor -1\n0,00\n0,00\n2.00\nor -1\n-2.00\nCS-\nCS-\nHabitat\nHAPC damage (fixed gear)\n-1.00\n1.00\n1 or -1\n1.00\n0.00\n1.00\n-2.00\n-1.00\nCS-\nCS-\nNon-living substrate mod (bottom trawl)\n1.00\n2.00\n0.00\n0,00\n0,00\n2.00\n-1.00\n-2.00\nNS\nNS\nNon-living substrate mod. (fixed gear)\n2.00\n2.00\n1.00\n0,00\n2.00\n-2.00\n0,00\n-2.00\nNS\nNS\nBenthic biodiversity\n0.00\n0,00\n2.00\n0.00\n0.00\n2.00\n0,00\n0.00\nCS-\nCS-\n0.00\nPelagic forage\n1.00\n2.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n-1.00\nCS+\nCS+/-\nEcosystem\nSpatial-Temporal\n2.00\n2.00\n-1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n2.00\n-2.00\nCS-\nCS-\nRemoval of top predators\n0.00\n0.00\n0,00\n1.00\n1.00\n0.00\n0,00\n0,00\nNS\nNS\nIntrod non-native species\n2,00\n2.00\n2.00\n1.00\n2.00\n1.00\n0,00\n-2.00\nCS-\nCS-\nEnergy re-direction\n2.00\n2.00\n0,00\n0.00\n1.00\n1.00\n-2.00\n-2.00\nNS\nNS\n2.00\nEnergy removal\n2.00\n2.00\n2.00\n2.00\n0.00\n0,00\n-2.00\nNS\nNS\n1.00\n1.00\n2.00\n2.00\n2.00\n2.00\n0.00\n-2.00\nCS-\nCS-\nSpecies diversity\nFunctional diversity\n0,00\n0.00\n0.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n0,00\n0.00\nNS\nNS\nGenetic diversity\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n1.00\n0.00\n0,00\n-1.00\nNS\nNS\nHarvesting and Processor\nGroundfish ex-vessel value for catcher vessels\n75%\n25%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n25%\n75%\n0%\n25%\n75%\n0%\n50%\n13%\n38%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n13%\n88%\nS+\nCS+\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\nSector Effects\nGroundfish product value for catcher processors\n100%\n40%\n0%\n80%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n80%\n20%\n0%\n40%\n60%\n0%\n60%\n40%\n0%\n40%\n20%\n20%\n0%\n0%\n100%\nS+\nCS+\nGroundfish product value for other groundfish processors\n100%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n33%\n67%\n0%\n33%\n67%\n0%\n33%\n50%\n17%\n0%\n0%\n0%\n0%\n100%\nS+\nCS+\nLabor payments by catcher vessels\n75%\n25%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n25%\n75%\n0%\n25%\n75%\n0%\n50%\n13%\n38%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n13%\n88%\nS+\nCS+\nLabor payments by catcher processors\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n80%\n20%\n0%\n40%\n60%\n0%\n60%\n40%\n0%\n40%\n20%\n40%\n0%\n80%\n20%\n0%\nS+\nNCE\nLabor payments by other groundfish processors\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n33%\n67%\n0%\n33%\n67%\n0%\n33%\n50%\n17%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n0%\n100%\nS+\nCS+\nTotal employment for catcher vessels\n75%\n25%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n25%\n75%\n0%\n25%\n75%\n0%\n50%\n13%\n38%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n13%\n88%\nS+\nCS+\nTotal employment for catcher processors\nS+\nCS+\n100%\n0%\n0%\n100%\n0%\n0%\n80%\n20%\n0%\n40%\n60%\n0%\n60%\n40%\n0%\nTotal employment for other groundfish processors\n100%\n0%\n0%\nS+\nCS+"]}