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Scientific Considerations Informing Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act Reauthorization

AFS Special Committee

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39 The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (hereafter MSFCMA or the
40 Act), which has been reauthorized twice since it was originally passed by the Congress in 1976, is the
41 principal federal legislation governing fisheries management in the United States. The Act has promoted
42 the application of an open and transparent process for developing scientific advice, regional flexibility in
43 policy processes, and more accountable management. Together, foundational requirements of the
44 fishery management process established by the Act have led to decreases in the levels of exploitation
45 (proportion of the biomass harvested) and increases in biomass of fished stocks so that targeted species
46 are overall in a healthier and more sustainable state than they were 40 years ago when the Act first
47 passed (Figure. 1). The 1996 reauthorization of the Act formally defined and prohibited overfishing, and
48 the 2006 reauthorization established annual catch limits as an additional tool to end overfishing. In its
49 most recent report, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) reported that 30 of 317 stocks with
50 known status (9%) continued to experience overfishing (National Oceanic and Atmospheric
51 Administration 2018). This represents a decline in the number of stocks experiencing overfishing by
52 more than 10 in the last decade (Figure 1). As a direct results of requirements in the Act and its
53 supporting technical guidance, the U.S. system ranks among the most successful in the world at
54 preventing overfishing and rebuilding overfished stocks (Worm et al. 2009; Ricard et al. 2012). But, even
55 as stock status has improved, landings of seafood in the USA have remained relatively stable at 4.4
56 million metric tons for the last 27 years. In some fishery sectors and in some regions, concerns about

57 overly-constrained annual catch limits and allocations have led to a lack of trust in the management
58 system and calls for substantial changes to the Act. Now, we are facing new challenges that are not well
59 covered by the Act. For example, changes in the ocean environment, including warming and
60 acidification, are altering ecosystems, changing stock productivities, and causing widespread shifts in the
61 distribution of many exploited species (Hare et al. 2016). Also, recreational fisheries are becoming
62 increasingly important in many regions (Ihde et al. 2011), which creates new challenges because the
63 motivation and hence the utility of the harvest, the ability to collect accurate data in a timely manner,
64 and the approaches for managing harvests from recreational fisheries differ from those in the
65 commercial sector. In combination, these changing features of the fisheries landscape suggest the need
66 for a thorough examination and reauthorization of the MSFCMA.

67 In January 2018, the American Fisheries Society empaneled a special committee of members
68 with expertise in fisheries science and management to provide scientific input into the current policy
69 debate surrounding the proposed reauthorization and amendment of the Act. This committee was
70 charged with providing recommendations for a policy statement that could be endorsed by the Society.
71 There is a precedent for the Society to engage in this policy debate. In 1993, the Society published a
72 similar legislative policy briefing in *Fisheries* (American Fisheries Society 1993). The present Committee
73 membership included scientists and managers from all regions of the nation, and represented state and
74 federal agencies, retired federal scientists, NGOs, and academia. The Committee met regularly by
75 conference call over the next six months with this article constituting the consensus recommendations
76 of the Committee to the Society. We quickly recognized that the Committee could not explore every
77 policy option within fisheries management. Rather, the Committee decided to focus on policy options
78 that specifically addressed questions surrounding assessment and management.

79 The special committee shared its recommendations and revised based on input from the
80 Society's Marine Fisheries Section. The committee provided a final report for debate to the Society's
81 Governing Board. Following this debate, The American Fisheries Society provides the following science-
82 based policy statement.

83
84 AFS notes the critical importance of scientific information as the cornerstone of fisheries management.
85 The Society also recognizes however, that the ocean, our science, and our management systems are
86 changing more rapidly today than they have in recent memory, making incorporation of adaptable and
87 responsive policies in a future revision of the Act essential. AFS makes the following recommendations
88 in the areas of: (i) best scientific information available, ii) catch levels and rebuilding, (iii) habitat and

89 ecosystems, and iv) adapting to environmental change. Each subsequent section provides necessary
90 background to understand the Society's recommendations, which are shown in bold face type.

91

92 **Best Scientific Information Available (BSIA)**

93 AFS focuses on application of the best scientific information available principle first because the
94 advances in fisheries management and the application of science to management have gone hand in
95 hand. By using clearly defined and accepted principles of what constitutes scientifically collected and
96 reviewed information in analyses, management bodies have been able to focus their discussions on the
97 benefits and risks of alternative policies or management actions rather than questioning underlying
98 data. AFS further believes that continued application of these principles allows identification of key gaps
99 in information and knowledge that, when filled, will lead to an improvement in the reliability of the
100 resulting management decisions.

101 A best scientific information available (BSIA) standard is required to guide management in
102 several environmentally-related acts of the U.S. Congress, including the MSFCMA. The National
103 Academies of Science (National Research Council 2004) and the American Fisheries Society (Sullivan et
104 al. 2006) have evaluated the application of the BSIA standard within fisheries.

105 AFS views four components of BSIA to be of particular importance. All information entering the
106 assessment process must:

- 107 • *Be collected objectively.* The objectivity criterion implies an unbiased foundation for data
108 collection (NRC 2004). Reported values should also be quantifiable and methods assessed for
109 their accuracy.
- 110 • *Have a clear statistical foundation.* The statistical foundation criterion implies that information
111 from all sources is appropriately weighted and combined to produce the reported estimate for
112 the population being studied (NRC 2004; Sullivan et al. 2006). This can be a difficult standard to
113 meet because it requires the careful consideration of how to collect information if the
114 inferences drawn from the sampling or analysis are to be reliable.
- 115 • *Be peer-reviewed.* The information collected using these principles must subsequently be
116 documented and subject to peer-review as an ultimate check on quality and reliability (NRC
117 2000). The peer-review criterion is an essential, but often misunderstood, cornerstone of the
118 application of science in fisheries management. It has not been established to serve as a
119 gatekeeper to block information from outside of fishery management agencies from entering
120 the process, but as a way of ensuring, regardless of source, that best practices have been used

121 throughout the collection and synthesis of the information, and that these best practices are
122 described in sufficient detail that others can understand the assumptions and limitations of the
123 information that has been gathered (Lee and Moher 2017). Peer review is not without error
124 (Bohannon 2011), but it remains the single best guarantee of meeting the BSIA standard
125 required under the Act.

- 126 • *Be timely.* Information is collected to inform management decisions. Thus, to be effective, the
127 scientific information generated by the three steps above must be available when needed.
128 Timeliness should scale with the life history of the species under management, or the desired
129 responsiveness of the management system. For example, information that is timely for an
130 Ocean Quahog (life span > 200 yrs.) may be of limited use for the management of Northern
131 Anchovy (life span <4 yrs.).

132 AFS recognizes that citizen science is becoming more widespread and is providing important
133 ecological and biological insights. Information from people who fish, both commercially and
134 recreationally, can be vitally important in recording changes in the distribution, population structure,
135 and potentially movement rates of the species they target. Such changes, particularly in terms of
136 distribution, are becoming more frequent, and stakeholder-collected data can provide an important
137 early warning system. Cooperative research, in which stakeholders and scientists jointly design surveys
138 or sample collection as well as share in responsibilities of data collection, is often an ideal approach to
139 tapping the expertise of both groups to collect needed data while ensuring BSIA standards are met.

140 AFS supports the inclusion of citizen science into fisheries. Indeed, stakeholder-generated
141 information and data are critical to the assessment and management of many species, but these data
142 must still adhere to the four principles of BSIA noted above if they are to be of highest utility. AFS
143 recommends an active and enhanced outreach and education effort by NMFS and the regional fishery
144 management councils (RFMC), and their Scientific and Statistical Committees (SSCs), to encourage
145 people who fish to actively participate in data collection, assessment, and management processes. In
146 addition to the various cooperative research programs ongoing regionally in the USA, organizations such
147 as the National Science Foundation-funded Science Center for Marine Fisheries (www.scemfis.org) may
148 represent one approach to the collaborative and cooperative collection of information. The involvement
149 of stakeholders in setting objectives through facilitated management strategy evaluations (MSE) also
150 provides a direct pathway to increase stakeholder involvement in the fisheries management process
151 (Miller et al. 2010).

152 Implementation of BSIA is covered by National Standard 2 (NS2) of the MSFCMA. Based on the
153 most recent reauthorization of the Act, NS2 was extensively revised (78 FR 43066) and relied heavily on
154 the National Academy and AFS recommendations on characteristics of BSIA. The reliance on BSIA in
155 fisheries management since the passage of the MSFCMA has served the nation, the nation's fishers, and
156 managers well. AFS strongly endorses a continued reliance on BSIA, and the best practice inherent in its
157 application, in managing the nation's fisheries. However, the principles of BSIA should not stifle
158 innovation and development of new data collection, analyses, and approaches to management; on the
159 contrary, additional resources are needed for innovation as we face changes in climate, markets, and
160 fishing practices.

161 AFS also recognizes that the BSIA requirement and its practical implementation can lead to
162 frustration, conflict, and a desire to remove or temporally sidestep this requirement through political
163 means. NMFS, RFMCs, and SSCs should develop and strengthen a comprehensive communication
164 strategy with stakeholders about the principles and application of BSIA. Communication may include
165 outreach, review, and analysis of information collected by stakeholders in the light of BSIA
166 requirements.

167 Suggested revisions to MSFCMA promote the use of self-reported recreational harvest data
168 through cell phone applications (apps) as a prime example of adherence to the BSIA principles is critical.
169 Stakeholder reporting via mobile technologies seems attractive and ideally suited to collecting large
170 volumes of data efficiently, particularly over large spatial scales. In their review of the Marine
171 Recreational Information Program (MRIP) the National Academies addressed the issue of electronic data
172 reporting and emphasized the necessity of having a valid sampling frame (our second BSIA principle -
173 National Research Council 2017). The use of electronic reporting in for-hire fisheries was encouraged by
174 the NAS report (National Research Council 2017) because there is a list of permit holders, sometimes
175 with limited access, allowing mandatory reporting to be more feasible; thus, there is a valid statistical
176 basis for the implementation of electronic reporting. However, in the absence of a complete national
177 database of recreational anglers, the voluntary data obtained from angler phone apps would lack a
178 sampling frame and pose daunting challenges to providing valid data upon which recreational fisheries
179 can be managed. The National Academies report (National Research Council 2017) pointed out that bias
180 can be substantial if these data are used without meeting BSIA principles. The difficulty in evaluating
181 self-reported data has been recognized by the statistics community and is an area of ongoing research.
182 Methods to estimate recreational catch from self-reported sources (i.e., phone apps) are not sufficiently
183 reliable to be codified in legislation. However, AFS encourages development of innovative survey

184 sampling methods to meet these challenges to enable collection of reliable and unbiased data from
185 people who fish, because such programs would increase the involvement of stakeholders in the
186 assessment and management process (NAS 2017). On the contrary, without following statistical
187 principles, self-reported data may be unusable, causing more angst and frustration in the fishing
188 community.

189

190 **Catch Levels and Rebuilding**

191 Fisheries management involves two central decisions: how much should we catch? And how should that
192 catch be allocated? Given the economic, social, and political consequences of these decisions, both are
193 often contentious. There is considerable pressure to increase the size of the harvest because of the
194 immediate benefits that accrue to those who gain from the catch, which must be balanced against the
195 risk to future generations of fish and fishers should sustainable harvest levels be exceeded.

196 Failure to end overfishing, despite the requirement of the original 1976 Act, led to a
197 strengthening of management accountability in subsequent reauthorizations of the Act. The most recent
198 reauthorization required each RFMC to set stock-specific annual catch levels that are lower than that
199 associated with overfishing—the overfishing limit (OFL; Methot et al. 2014). Specifically, the 2006
200 Reauthorization required the SSC of each RFMC to establish both an OFL and to provide advice on an
201 Acceptable Biological Catch (ABC) for each managed fishery, which must be lower than the OFL to
202 account for scientific uncertainty. The Council then sets an Annual Catch Level (ACL), which can be no
203 greater than the ABC but may be lower to account for management uncertainty. Finally, the Optimum
204 Yield (OY) can be determined by the RFMC to be equivalent to ACL or a fraction below it, termed the
205 Annual Catch Target (ACT), to account for uncertainties in management or scientific information,
206 societal needs, or, increasingly, ecosystem needs and uncertainty in environmental conditions (Patrick
207 and Link 2015). If annual catches exceed the ACL, accountability measures are triggered for future years.

208 Overall, the structure of the Act, and the associated technical guidance, effectively separates the
209 establishment of sustainable harvest levels meant to avoid overfishing from the allocation of that
210 harvest. Establishing the OFL and the ABC are technical and scientific processes undertaken by the SSC
211 by using BSIA; allocating that harvest is a socio-economic decision undertaken by the Council. This
212 separation of roles has contributed to a continued reduction in the number of stocks experiencing
213 overfishing over the last decade. As a foundational principle, AFS strongly recommends that the current
214 separation of roles be maintained in any future legislation.

215 Variability is an inherent feature of fish population dynamics, their life histories and biological
216 characteristics, and their abundance estimates. This variability means that estimates of OFL should really
217 be considered probability distributions around the true point estimate. Most stock assessments likely
218 underestimate the uncertainty inherent in OFL estimates (Ralston et al. 2011), and this negatively
219 impacts the performance of many of the control rules used to manage fisheries (Wiedenmann et al.
220 2017; Punt et al. 2018). NMFS revised the guidelines for National Standard 1 (74 FR 3178 and 81 FR
221 7185873) in 2009 and again in 2016 to provide guidance to SSCs and the RFMCs on how the inherent
222 management and scientific uncertainty should be incorporated into establishing annual catch limits
223 (OFLs, ABCs, and ACLs) and associated accountability measures. National Standard 1 guidelines require
224 that each RFMC establish risk policies that specify the probability of exceeding the OFL (legally
225 restrained to being less than a 50% probability) to be used in setting the ABC. The risk policy and control
226 rules for implementing the policy are developed by the RFMC with scientific and stakeholder input prior
227 to ABC determination. The SSC uses the risk policy to recommend the ABC given the OFL. AFS recognizes
228 that the explicit recognition of uncertainty is a strong feature of the implementation of the Act. It
229 provides RFMCs some latitude to express the specific characteristics of how the fishery operates; the
230 socio-economic importance of the fishery to the region; and the current status of the stock. It allows a
231 RFMC to take on more risk when the stock is at a high level of abundance, and assume less risk when the
232 stock is more depleted. This flexibility is an important factor in the success of the current Act.
233 Specifically, Council risk policies are an exemplar of how flexibility and adaptability can and should be
234 built into future revisions of the Act. There is considerable scope for working within the current risk
235 policy structure. Nevertheless, AFS emphasizes the importance of maintaining the constraint that ABC
236 must be less than the OFL.

237 The Act places great emphasis on avoiding thresholds for exploitation (overfishing) and
238 abundance (overfished). When these thresholds are exceeded, the Act mandates specific and often
239 strict responses by the RFMCs. The responses can be *a priori* in that setting an ACT << ACL can represent
240 an accountability measure (AM). When ABCs are exceeded, the AMs can include a “pay back” of the
241 quota exceedance in subsequent years. Accountability measures have been a source of significant
242 controversy in select fisheries, particularly in recreational fisheries in the Southeast but also in some
243 commercial fisheries. For example, a combination of ACTs and payback AMs in several recreational and
244 commercial fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico have led to very short seasons in some fisheries and complete
245 harvest closures in recent years, primarily for rebuilding species. Other regional AMs include trip limit
246 reductions to slow fishing down, gear requirements, and area closures. In some cases, seasons have

247 been extended when observed catch rates were lower than projected. In part, accountability measures
248 have helped maintain catch within limits preventing overfishing in many cases. But, while AFS recognizes
249 that accountability measures can help maintain catch within overfishing limits, their use indicates an
250 inadequacy of current harvest control rules employed by many RFMCs. Rather, AFS strongly
251 recommends increased use of harvest control rules that have been simulation tested in a management
252 strategy evaluation (MSE) framework to ensure the risk of exceeding ABCs is controlled within the
253 RFMC's risk policy and to reduce the likelihood of implementing AMs.

254 MSFMCA requires that the RFMCs establish catch levels for all stocks under their jurisdiction
255 that are not considered simply ecosystem components, or which have life cycles of a year or less. As
256 described above, the development of annual catch levels for assessed species is a data and model-
257 intensive process. When data are available and informative, stock assessments can yield estimates of
258 current abundances and exploitation rates that are unbiased and relatively accurate. The intended result
259 is that as the amount and information content of the data decreases, assessments continue to provide
260 unbiased estimates of abundance and exploitation rates, albeit less accurate ones. However, at some
261 point the data are simply insufficient or uninformative to support the application of modern,
262 sophisticated assessments. Such data-poor or model-resistant stocks challenge the ability of RFMCs to
263 set ACLs. Indeed, Berkson and Thorson (2015) estimated that more than half of the stocks assessed by
264 the RFMCs are considered data-poor stocks. Driven by the requirements of the Act, approaches to
265 setting catch advice for data-poor stocks have advanced over the last decade (Carruthers et al. 2014;
266 Newman et al. 2015). Wiedenmann et al. (2013) used an MSE framework to explore the utility of data-
267 poor approaches and concluded that many perform poorly in simulation testing. This has led to calls for
268 continued research to improve data-poor assessment approaches (Berkson and Thorson 2015). AFS
269 supports this call for continued research to improve assessment approaches for data-poor species and
270 recommends increased flexibility in the Act with regard to the need to define the suite of OFLs, ABCs,
271 and ACLs for every stock.

272 But even when adaptive and flexible approaches are implemented for the management of single
273 stocks, problems will remain. For example, many species are caught in mixed stock fisheries. In these
274 fisheries, management is limited by the dynamics of the least productive stock (so-called "choke"
275 species). In other cases, landings of one species in a mixed stock fishery are limited because the ACL of a
276 second species has already been landed. This can give rise to excessive discarding. The new European
277 Common Fisheries Policy bans discarding, and implements an obligation to land the entire catch.
278 Managing species complexes in mixed stock fisheries inherently involves trade-offs for both individual

279 fishers and agencies (Mackinson et al. 2018; Mortensen et al. 2018). AFS recommends that revisions to
280 the Act should pay attention to the role of mixed stock fisheries and approaches to managing for
281 “choke” species, which can restrict harvest through dynamic time-area closures and other policies
282 (Scales et al. 2017; Hazen et al. 2018).

283 The Act requires that the RFMCs act to end overfishing immediately (within two years) and,
284 when a stock is determined to be overfished, to enact a rebuilding plan. The requirement to implement
285 rebuilding plans for stocks determined by NMFS to be in an overfished state is arguably the strongest
286 accountability measure included in the Act. Rebuilding plans supersede the normal management
287 sequence leading to an ACL. The rebuilding process creates a forcing mechanism to return the
288 abundance of individual species to a healthy level in a relatively short time (typically ten years), while
289 providing limited flexibility for biology and environmental factors. In achieving the objective of a healthy
290 stock, rebuilding plans limit the flexibility of the RFMCs to adjust management for socio-economic
291 factors—and as a result have been widely criticized by some stakeholders. Indeed, some have criticized
292 the focus on rebuilding processes in current management, which they argue create a culture in which
293 the number of stocks that have been rebuilt is emphasized, rather than avoiding the need to implement
294 a rebuilding plan in the first place. While there is certainly scope for improvement in the triggering,
295 structure, and implementation of rebuilding plans, there is no doubt that rebuilding plans, in general,
296 have provided an important tool in ensuring fisheries today are healthier and more sustainable than
297 they were 40 years ago.

298 However, thresholds introduce discontinuities into the management process that can be a
299 challenge for managers and stakeholders alike (National Research Council 2014). They place a demand
300 for precision in estimates of the levels of exploitation and abundance that are difficult to achieve. The
301 transition into and out of a period of overfishing or rebuilding can be particularly challenging. To
302 overcome these issues, the NAS study committee called for an adaptive and flexible approach (National
303 Research Council 2014). AFS supports that call, but notes that increased flexibility is neither an excuse
304 for delaying action, nor for ignoring scientific advice. AFS recommends using well-designed harvest
305 control rules as a best practice to avoid overfishing stocks or allowing them to become overfished. Such
306 harvest control rules would reduce rates of exploitation adaptively prior to reaching the threshold.
307 Ideally, the performance of such HCRs would be tested in a management strategy evaluation (MSE) prior
308 to implementation. A focus on management of exploitation rates is likely to be more effective than a
309 focus on abundance, because exploitation rates are estimated more reliably and can be related to the
310 inherent productivity of the stock (i.e., generation time, fecundity, and maturation rate) more directly.

311 Additionally, for failed rebuilding plans, more stringent requirements should be considered to ensure
312 catch levels are set appropriately to ensure rebuilding in the new timeframe.

313 Recreational fisheries are becoming more and more important (Ihde et al. 2011). The MSFCMA
314 was originally drafted primarily with commercial fisheries in mind, and one of the key criticisms of the
315 Act has been the perception that it does not adequately serve the needs of recreational fisheries. These
316 criticisms are based in part on the inherent difficulties of estimating recreational catches and managing
317 such fisheries to stay within catch limits. Three questions are important in addressing recreational
318 fisheries: do marine recreational fisheries differ fundamentally from commercial fisheries; what are
319 appropriate management reference points for recreational fisheries; and how can management of these
320 fisheries be operationalized given the difficulties of estimating catches accurately and in a timely
321 manner?

322 It has been suggested that recreational fishing is a fundamentally different activity from
323 commercial fishing and that it therefore cannot be and should not be managed within the same
324 framework (and by the same methods). Indeed, recreational fishing can differ in terms of the
325 motivations of participants and the way they obtain value. Rather than generating an income from the
326 harvesting of fish as in commercial fishing, recreational anglers expend money for a recreational
327 experience that involves attempting to catch and possibly harvest fish. The opportunity to harvest fish
328 can be an important motivation in some fisheries but may be very unimportant in others. In the latter
329 case, catch-and-release fishing may be common or mandatory. Such fisheries can be sustainable without
330 active regulation of fishing, particularly if the released fish suffer little additional mortality. On the other
331 hand, recreational fisheries in which harvesting of fish is an important motivation and/or released fish
332 suffer significant mortality, the potential to affect stocks exists in much the same way as commercial
333 fishing, and these fisheries generally need to be managed to avoid overfishing and degradation of the
334 resource and the fishing experience. Many federally-managed recreational marine fisheries, e.g., the
335 highly contentious Gulf of Mexico reef fisheries, require active management.

336 AFS holds that two sectors cannot be managed separately because, from a first principles
337 viewpoint, commercial and recreational harvests are both caught from the same population. Resolving
338 the conflicting interests among the sectors will require a more flexible approach to defining OY in the
339 individual fisheries. AFS recognizes that alternative approaches to managing catch limits and
340 exploitation rates, such as direct measurement of exploitation rates, exist and encourages the full
341 exploration and pilot testing of such approaches. Where such approaches are shown to be effective,

342 they can likely be implemented without a need to seek exemption from the catch limit provision of the
343 Act.

344 The MSFCMA broadly stipulates the goal of managing fisheries such they generate the maximum
345 sustainable yield, or the greatest possible long-term average catch. While this may not be the most
346 appropriate management target or limit for every recreational fishery, it is clearly relevant to the
347 management of harvest-oriented recreational fisheries. In recreational fisheries that are not strongly
348 harvest-oriented, stakeholders often show a preference for restricting fishing to levels below those that
349 would generate maximum sustainable yield, to benefit from higher stock abundance and therefore,
350 higher catch rates. The opposite situation where fishing pressure exceeds the level that would yield
351 maximum sustainable yield and stock abundance and catch rates are low is generally viewed as a poor
352 management outcome and one that is explicitly outlawed on the Act. It is possible, but seems unlikely,
353 that this outcome would be economically optimal and/or preferred by stakeholders in some recreational
354 fisheries. Catch limits are relevant to marine recreational fisheries management in principle and that
355 exemption of recreational fisheries from the catch limit requirement carries a risk of degrading fisheries
356 and the recreational fishing experience. AFS therefore recommends retaining a catch limit requirement
357 for recreational fisheries. But, AFS also recommends the management community and stakeholders
358 systematically explore alternative options for regulating fishing activities that may maximize recreational
359 utility while remaining within catch limits (e.g., options that allow greater opportunities to fish without
360 exceeding catch limits).

361 **Environmental Change**

362 Global warming, ocean acidification, and increased competing uses (e.g., offshore energy, commerce)
363 are changing rapidly coastal oceans. These changes can have profound effects on marine fish and
364 invertebrate species, with implications for most of the National Standards specified by the MSFCMA.
365 Consideration of these changes on fisheries were largely absent from previous reauthorizations.

366 Changes in productivity and distribution of fish and invertebrate species, both positive and
367 negative, are widely documented and are expected to continue with climate change (Nye et al. 2009;
368 Pinsky et al. 2013). These changes influence fisheries management in a variety of ways. First, the
369 scientific advice that grounds fisheries management can be affected by both shifts in productivity and
370 distribution. As species distributions change, catchability of the species in surveys and fisheries may be
371 affected (Kohut et al. 2012), thereby altering perceptions of relative abundance and biomass in time
372 series indices. Spatial distribution changes can also result in a misalignment with stock area delineations;
373 stock assessments that are based on these delineations may become less representative as the

374 misalignment increases (Link et al. 2011). In addition, population vital rates (e.g., recruitment, growth,
375 mortality) can be directly affected by warming, acidification, and other physical changes, and they may
376 also be indirectly affected by changes in predator-prey overlap and trophic relationships as species shift
377 their distributions at different rates (Friedland et al. 2013; Pershing et al. 2015a; Selden et al. 2017).
378 Estimates of stock productivity and potential productivity may be inaccurate if these effects are not
379 considered, resulting in stock reference points, catch limits, and rebuilding timeframes that may need to
380 be adjusted periodically under directional trends in ecosystem conditions (e.g., Mueter et al. 2011;
381 Pershing et al. 2015b). Given the many potential influences of climate change on resource populations
382 and stock assessments, the importance of monitoring and evaluating the effects of climate-related
383 factors on population structure and biological rates, and as needed, incorporating these factors into
384 stock assessments and science advice.

385 Changes in spatial and temporal distribution of species also influence the operation, economic
386 efficiency, and management of fisheries. As species' distributions shift, their availability and accessibility
387 from different ports and by vessel categories change (Kleisner et al. 2017). As species move into new
388 areas, fishers often do not have permits or quota allocations to target them, as both are typically based
389 on historical participation in a fishery. In addition, a lack of infrastructure may constrain the
390 development of fisheries for emerging species. These changes can impact the economic efficiency of
391 individual fishers as well as social and economic benefits that accrue to fishing communities. Ongoing
392 social and economic analyses that evaluate the outcomes of different fishery management options
393 applied under climate change scenarios will be important for achieving several of the National Standards
394 defined in MSFCMA. Distributional shifts of species may cause them to cross over into other
395 management jurisdictions—from international boundaries (Miller and Muncro 2004) to domestic RFMCs
396 or into areas that have not previously been actively managed, such as the Arctic (Stram and Evans 2009).
397 As these cases occur, it is unclear whether and how management authority will be modified or
398 information will be provided to manage newly accessible ecosystems effectively (Stram and Evans
399 2009). In addition, the efficacy of some approaches that are commonly used to achieve fishery
400 management goals—including spatial closures, spawning closures, and season opening dates—will be
401 altered by changing spatial and temporal shifts of species they are designed to protect (Peer and Miller
402 2014). Taking these influences together, AFS recommends that procedures used to collect both fishery-
403 independent and fishery-dependent information and to manage fisheries must be responsive to these
404 environmental changes.

405 Studies have demonstrated the value of fisheries management measures that preserve stock
406 size and age structure, protect reproductive females and spawning congregations, and maintain
407 abundance for enhancing the resilience of fish and invertebrate populations to climate impacts
408 (Pershing et al. 2015; Le Bris et al. 2018). As such, recognition that climate conditions can play a role in
409 stock outcomes should not be viewed as an opportunity to relax the management standards established
410 by the MSFCMA. In the case of Gulf of Maine Cod, warmer temperatures have contributed to lower
411 stock productivity, which allowed unintentional overfishing on the stock initially, followed by a drastic
412 reduction in the allowable catch level and a longer stock rebuilding timeframe (Pershing et al. 2015). As
413 the climate changes, fisheries and fishery management will operate more and more under non-
414 stationary conditions. Management tools may become less or more effective; goals may be attained
415 more easily or may become more difficult; recovery timeframes may be lengthened or shortened. These
416 conditions create situations in which greater uncertainty should be expected, the roles of fishing and
417 climate may need to be distinguished, and precaution should be heightened when considering
418 management measures for stocks being negatively affected by climate conditions. AFS recommends that
419 the MSFCMA should continue to support achievement of stock status standards through precautionary
420 catch limits and realistic rebuilding timeframes that account for uncertainty and change in the climate
421 and ecosystem.

422 **Habitats and Ecosystems**

423 It is universally accepted that healthy and sustainable fisheries require healthy habitats and associated
424 ecosystems. The 1996 reauthorization of the MSFCMA required NMFS to identify “essential” fish
425 habitat as a precursor to ensuring that management agencies can target their actions on those habitats
426 that will be most supportive of fish populations. The intent of this habitat focus was certainly laudable.
427 Except for the establishment of marine protected areas (e.g., South Atlantic deep-water snapper
428 grouper complex marine protected areas, West Florida Gag Grouper *Mycteroperca microlepis* marine
429 protected areas) and some gear restrictions (e.g., prohibition of bottom trawls in sensitive coral
430 habitats), the implementation of the habitat protections have lagged those envisioned by the drafters of
431 the Act. Many reasons account for the lack of progress. A primary reason may be attributed to the
432 simple fact that much ocean habitat is dynamic in space and time. Many species use ocean currents as
433 they complete their life cycles. Similarly, seasonal frontal zones can be important source of primary and
434 secondary production on which fished species may rely for forage. In such a dynamic environment, it is
435 difficult to imagine management having the jurisdiction to be able to influence the multidimensional
436 drivers of ocean habitat. However, management can respond to this dynamic landscape (Hazen et al.

437 2018). It is also true that fisheries are not the sole use of the nation's coastal oceans. The need to
438 balance multiple, sometimes competing users inevitably crosses federal and state jurisdictional lines,
439 which may be better understood through the approach of marine spatial planning. A single piece of
440 fisheries legislation may be insufficient to motivate protection of fisheries habitats in this complex
441 arena. Moreover, many stocks managed under the MSFCMA use nearshore and estuarine habitats for
442 reproduction and juvenile growth (Minello et al. 2003). These coastal and estuarine nursery habitats are
443 among the most threatened aquatic ecosystems and are also outside the jurisdiction of the federal
444 agency charged with implementing the MSFCMA. As a result, the Act has been largely ineffective at
445 protecting these habitats from further decline.

446 Progress has been made in expanding our understanding of the interaction between fishing
447 practices that directly impact the habitat and the productivity of those areas (National Research Council
448 2002). For example, Bellman et al. (2005) reported that restrictions on trawl footropes and trawl effort
449 implemented by the Pacific Management Council in 2000 were effective in protecting rocky seafloor
450 habitats on Oregon fishing grounds.

451 The recognition of the importance of habitat in the 1996 Reauthorization is early evidence of the
452 move to embrace ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM). EBFM is a holistic approach to
453 fisheries management that explicitly recognizes the trade-offs that exist when multiple species are
454 exploited at the same time (Link 2010). EBFM tries to account for the diverse factors that influence
455 production (see Link 2010). When fully enacted, EBFM can include the entire socio-ecological system
456 and can lead to complex management challenges (Leslie and McLeod 2007; Fletcher et al. 2010; Gaichas
457 et al. 2016), but offering the potential for increased value, less risk, improved stability, and better
458 fisheries (Minello et al. 2003).

459 Ecosystem factors, such as habitat noted above, are already being considered in fisheries
460 management under the existing MSFCMA. But RFMCs are increasingly exploring more holistic
461 approaches to EBFM. Many RFMCs are focusing on forage fish as an essential element in the fishery
462 ecosystem, because of the direct and indirect ecosystem services they provide. Since marine ecosystems
463 are so strongly size-structured, it has been suggested that managing small-bodied forage species is an
464 essential step toward EBFM (Pikitch et al. 2014). Essington et al. (2015) have shown such stocks are
465 vulnerable to fishing, with important consequences for overall ecosystem structure, function, and
466 productivity. But while many would agree on the importance of managing forage species, approaches to
467 managing these species within an EBFM context has become controversial (see Hilborn et al. 2017;

468 Pikitch et al. 2018). There are important scientific issues arising from this controversy, but AFS believes
469 broader issues still need to be addressed. AFS suggests that much of the challenge in implementing
470 EBFM reflects the lack of a clear definition of the management objectives of EBFM that parallels OY in
471 the single species case. More specifically, AFS suggest there is limited recognition that, because of the
472 trade-offs at the heart of EBFM, setting objectives is a socio-economic political decision as much as a
473 scientific one. Only when stakeholders and managers can agree on the objectives can science help
474 inform which harvest control rules are best suited to achieve the stated objectives. Examples of the
475 contribution of science to assessing the performance of management strategies under climate and
476 ecosystem scenarios are only now starting to be considered in a few demonstration cases (Punt et al.
477 2014). As climate change can influence many elements that are critical to the success of a management
478 option, routine evaluation of management strategies for robustness under climate and ecosystem
479 conditions may become increasingly important as conditions move away from stationary historical
480 baselines. AFS suggests that clarity regarding objectives for EBFM in the Act or in its related national
481 standards would be an important step forward.

482 **Conclusions**

483 Like other signature environmental legislation of the same era, the MSFCMA has forced scientific
484 advances in fisheries assessment and management since its first passage in 1976. Much of the original
485 act was aspirational, seeking expansion of domestic fisheries, supported by rigorous and transparent
486 scientifically-based management. Some of the act's goals have been achieved; fisheries science and
487 management has advanced rapidly to support the demands of MSFCMA and both are more transparent
488 and participatory than they were prior to the Act. However, after an initial increase, fishery landings
489 have not continued to increase. Current constraints on harvest, which are leading to stakeholder
490 concerns and external drivers of change—such as climate change—combine to suggest that a re-
491 examination of the goals of the MSFCMA with an eye to a potential reauthorization by the U.S. Congress
492 is appropriate.

493 In reviewing issues affecting the nation's fisheries, AFS suggests policy makers focus on certain
494 key attributes and gaps in the current legislation. First, and foremost, AFS strongly endorses the current
495 focus on "Best Scientific Information Available" as the foundation of fishery resource assessment and
496 management advice. AFS also strongly endorses the separation of the determination of the catch level
497 by the SSCs from the allocation of the catch by the RFMCs themselves—the former is a scientific
498 question, the latter a policy one. AFS notes that important drivers of change in fishery ecosystems have
499 changed since the original MSFCMA was enacted. AFS believes that this new dynamism requires an

500 increased focus on adaptability and flexibility in the Act. Such adaptability and flexibility should not be
501 taken as a way to avoid hard conservation decisions, but rather reflect the fact that fisheries
502 productivity is changing at time scales in line with the management process, such that medium term
503 projections will likely have to be updated regularly. AFS supports a focus on catch levels and
504 management accountability in the Act, but notes the need to develop and test harvest control rules that
505 avoid the discontinuities in management currently imposed by the existing canalized approach. Finally,
506 AFS recommends continued focus on habitat and EBFM as ways of improving stability and value of the
507 nation's fisheries, but notes that clearer policy guidance regarding the objectives of EBFM is necessary
508 before it will yield the gains, which have been ascribed to the approach.

509 *The findings and viewpoints expressed in this article represent a consensus opinion of the AFS*
510 *Special Committee on Magnuson-Stevens Re-Authorization and do not necessarily reflect the opinion or*
511 *position(s) of the authors' respective institutions.*

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
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Figure 1. Trends in the number and percentage of U.S. fisheries stocks that have been assessed as overfished, experiencing overfishing or rebuilt over time. Data from NMFS.



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