

**Climate change in the human environment: Indicators and impacts
from the Fourth National Climate Assessment**

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1 **Climate change in the human environment: Indicators and impacts**
2 **from the Fourth National Climate Assessment**

3 The Fourth National Climate Assessment (NCA4) is the most comprehensive
4 report to date assessing climate change science, impacts, risks, and adaptation in
5 the United States. The 1,500 page report covers a breadth of topics, ranging from
6 foundational physical science to climate change response options. Here we
7 present information on indicators and impacts of climate change in the human
8 environment featured in NCA4 Volume II, focusing on: air quality, forest
9 disturbance and wildfire, energy systems, and water resources. Observations,
10 trends, and impacts of these aspects of our changing climate will be discussed,
11 along with implications for the future.

12 **Introduction**

13 The National Climate Assessment (NCA) reports released by the U.S. Global Change
14 Research Program (USGCRP) represent the official U.S. Government assessment of
15 climate change and its impacts in the United States. These reports are called for by the
16 Global Change Research Act, which was passed by Congress in 1990. The Fourth NCA
17 (NCA4) was released in two volumes in 2017 and 2018. Volume I, the *Climate Science*
18 *Special Report*, focused on scientific understanding of the climate system and observed
19 and projected changes for the United States. Volume II, *Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation*
20 *in the United States*, is a larger report providing a sectoral and regional perspective on
21 climate change risks and impacts, as well as options for limiting climate change and
22 adapting to its effects. Another recent USGCRP report, *The Impacts of Climate Change*
23 *on Human Health in the United States: A Scientific Assessment* (the “Climate and
24 Health Assessment,” or CHA), assessed the state of knowledge on impacts and risks for
25 human health and well-being.

26 These reports were written by hundreds of authors, including federal scientists,
27 academic researchers, and other experts from across the country, and underwent an

28 extensive review process, including reviews by the National Academies of Sciences,
29 Engineering, and Medicine and a public comment period. They are intended to inform
30 policy choices and decision-making at all levels but are explicitly required to avoid
31 advocating for or prescribing any particular policy choices.

32 **Climate Change in the United States**

33 Over the past century, temperature has been measured on land and sea and in the
34 atmosphere around the globe on a daily basis. These observations tell us with high
35 confidence that the planet is warming at a faster rate than at any point in the history of
36 modern civilization (Jay et al. 2018). Temperature is just one indicator of a warming
37 world, however, and observations of many other climate variables support the
38 conclusion that our climate is changing. Although Earth's climate is influenced by both
39 natural variability and human activities, these changes can be attributed primarily to
40 human influences, in particular the addition of carbon dioxide (CO₂) and other heat-
41 trapping greenhouse gases (GHG) to the atmosphere (Hayhoe et al. 2018).

42 Global annually averaged temperature has increased by about 1.8°F (1°C) since
43 1880 (USGCRP 2021a), and 2011–2020 was the warmest decade on record (NOAA
44 2021). For the contiguous United States (CONUS), temperatures this century have been,
45 on average, 1.5°F (0.8°C) warmer than during the last century (Figure 1; USGCRP
46 2021c).

47 Precipitation exhibits a large amount of variability, but globally, the average
48 amount of precipitation over land has increased slightly over the past century
49 (Wuebbles et al. 2017). Annual precipitation averaged across CONUS has also
50 increased, with important regional and seasonal differences (see Easterling et al. 2017).
51 Extreme precipitation events typically occur when the atmospheric water vapor content
52 is near its saturated value. The saturated value of atmospheric water vapor increases by

53 about 6% to 7% for each degree Celsius of temperature increase (Easterling et al. 2017)
54 as described by the Clausius–Clapeyron relation (Lawrence 2005). Hence, extreme
55 precipitation events are generally observed to increase in intensity by about 6% to 7%
56 for each degree Celsius of temperature increase (Kunkel et al. 2020). In a warmer
57 world, increased evaporation rates when liquid water is unlimited (e.g., over the oceans
58 or moist soils) can lead to atmospheric water vapor levels approaching saturation, which
59 in turn lead to more frequent and intense precipitation events in many areas (Hayhoe et
60 al. 2018). An increase in evaporation, however, can lead to drier soils and often less
61 runoff, increasing the risk of drought in some regions (Wehner et al. 2017).

62 People of the United States are impacted by many other types of extreme events
63 that affect air quality, water quality, and other aspects of the human environment. Such
64 events include heat and cold waves, floods, wildfire, hurricanes, and heavy snowfalls.
65 Some of these events (e.g., heat waves, floods, wildfire) are projected to increase in
66 magnitude and/or frequency in a warming climate, but others (e.g., cold waves) are
67 expected to decrease in intensity (Peterson et al. 2014). Other elements are more
68 complex, such as changes in hurricanes and other severe storms. No matter the event
69 type, impacts on both the natural and human environment can vary both temporally and
70 spatially, and complexities can occur when multiple events combine, often amplifying
71 risks and vulnerabilities.

72 Each U.S. region is experiencing a unique set of challenges resulting from our
73 changing climate. One such concern is coastal flooding. Along many U.S. coastlines,
74 high tide flooding is increasing in frequency due to sea level rise, as is severe flooding
75 associated with coastal storms such as hurricanes and nor'easters (Hayhoe et al. 2018).
76 Sea level rise is closely linked to global temperatures (Sweet et al. 2017), and global

77 mean sea level has risen by about 8 inches since 1880, with the rate of increase
78 becoming greater in recent years (USGCRP 2021b).

79 The extent to which these changes continue in the future will depend primarily
80 on GHG emissions and the response of Earth’s climate system to this human-induced
81 warming (Hayhoe et al. 2018). “With significant reductions in emissions, global
82 temperature increase could be limited to 3.6°F (2°C) or less compared to preindustrial
83 temperatures. Without significant reductions, annual average global temperatures could
84 increase by 9°F (5°C) or more by the end of this century compared to preindustrial
85 temperatures” (Hayhoe et al. 2018). These projections of future climate are based on
86 climate model simulations that use various possible futures, or scenarios, “that capture
87 the relationships between human choices, emissions, concentrations, and temperature
88 change” (Hayhoe et al. 2017). These scenarios, called Representative Concentration
89 Pathways (RCPs; Moss et al. 2010), are numbered according to changes in radiative
90 forcing (a measure of the influence that a factor, such as atmospheric GHG
91 concentrations, has in changing the global balance of incoming and outgoing energy) in
92 2100 relative to preindustrial conditions (Hayhoe et al. 2018). In this paper, we
93 reference both a higher scenario (RCP8.5: +8.5 watts per square meter in 2100) and a
94 lower scenario (RCP4.5: +4.5 watts per square meter in 2100). The higher scenario
95 (RCP8.5) represents a future where annual GHG emissions increase significantly
96 throughout the 21st century before leveling off by 2100, whereas the lower scenario
97 (RCP4.5) represents a substantial mitigation by midcentury, with greater reductions
98 thereafter. Current global trends in annual GHG emissions are consistent with the higher
99 scenario (Jay et al. 2018).

100 For more information on the physical drivers of climate change, future climate
101 scenarios, and the uncertainties associated with these findings, see the *Climate Science*
102 *Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume I* (USGCRP 2017).

103 This review article provides an overview of selected findings from NCA4
104 Volume II, supplemented by information from the literature underpinning that
105 assessment, as well as findings from CHA, with a focus on topics affecting human
106 welfare and society in the United States. These topics, of particular interest to *Journal*
107 *of the Air & Waste Management Association* readers, include air quality, forest
108 disturbance and wildfire, energy systems, and water resources. We discuss weather and
109 climate interactions across each of these sectors, as well as observed changes, impacts,
110 and implications for the future. Select regional highlights are also presented. Such
111 information is highly valuable for informing decision-makers, including utility
112 managers, emergency planners, and other stakeholders, about climate risk assessment,
113 adaptation, and mitigation options.

114 **Air Quality**

115 *Climate, Weather, and Air Quality*

116 Air quality generally refers to the presence or absence of pollutants and other substances
117 in the air that can adversely affect human health and the ability to work outdoors or
118 enjoy outdoor recreation. These substances can result from human activities, as with the
119 ozone precursors methane, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen oxides (NO_x) produced by
120 burning fossil fuels, or they can be of natural origin, including dust, pollen, and volatile
121 organic compounds (VOCs) from trees.

122 The production, longevity, and geographic distribution of air pollutants and
123 airborne allergens are strongly influenced by weather conditions, including temperature,

124 cloud cover, precipitation, and atmospheric circulation patterns (Figure 2). For example,
125 ground-level ozone is the result of chemical reactions between NO_x and VOCs in the
126 presence of sunlight (Fann et al. 2016). Higher temperatures, sunny days, and stagnant
127 air conditions are associated with higher concentrations of ground-level ozone, while
128 higher levels of water vapor or stronger winds can reduce ozone concentrations (Fann et
129 al. 2016). Concentrations of small particulate matter (PM)—solid or liquid particles in
130 the atmosphere, including dust and sea salt from natural sources and sulfates, black
131 carbon, and other substances emitted by burning fossil fuels and other human
132 activities—are strongly influenced by both wind speed and precipitation (Nolte et al
133 2018).

134 Climate change is thus expected to influence air quality through changes in both
135 average weather conditions and in the frequency and severity of extreme events,
136 including heavy rainfall events and drought. These climate influences will act
137 concurrently with changes in the human activities that produce air pollutants.
138 Meanwhile, many air pollutants also have direct or indirect warming or cooling
139 influences on the climate. In addition, some aeroallergens are expected to be directly
140 influenced by increasing CO₂ concentrations (Fann et al. 2016).

141 Climate change can have other indirect effects on exposure to air pollution by
142 driving changes in human behaviors and natural processes that in turn affect air quality.
143 As a result, “climate-driven changes in weather, human activity, and natural emissions
144 are all expected to impact future air quality across the United States” (Nolte et al. 2018).

145 *Ozone*

146 While ozone in the stratosphere provides protection from harmful ultraviolet radiation,
147 ground-level ozone is a significant health threat and is associated with “premature
148 death, respiratory hospital admissions, cases of aggravated asthma, lost days of school,

149 and reduced productivity among outdoor workers” (Nolte et al. 2018). At current levels,
150 ground-level ozone is estimated to cause “tens of thousands of hospital and emergency
151 room visits, millions of cases of acute respiratory symptoms and school absences, and
152 thousands of premature deaths each year in the United States” (Fann et al. 2016).

153 Efforts to reduce air pollution, including the Clean Air Act and its amendments
154 (e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990), resulted in a 22% decrease in ozone
155 concentrations between 1990 and 2016, but as of 2015, almost 1 in 3 Americans still
156 experienced ozone concentrations that exceeded standards set by the U.S.
157 Environmental Protection Agency (Nolte et al. 2018, EPA 2017a).

158 Climate change may have already offset some of the reductions in ozone
159 concentrations that would have otherwise been expected from reductions in emissions
160 of ozone precursors (Nolte et al. 2018). For example, one study found that reductions in
161 the frequency of summer mid-latitude cyclones in the eastern United States between
162 1980 and 2006 may have offset half of the improvements in ozone air quality in the
163 Northeast from reductions in air pollutant emissions (Leibensperger et al. 2008).
164 “Temperature is often the largest single driver” of ozone levels (Camalier et al. 2007),
165 and there is high confidence that unless offset by additional reductions of ozone
166 precursor emissions, “climate change will increase ozone levels over most of the United
167 States, particularly over already polluted areas” (Nolte et al. 2018).

168 There is some evidence that higher temperatures can exacerbate the risk of
169 ozone-related premature deaths (e.g., Ren et al. 2008, Jhun et al. 2014), although
170 increases in the use of air conditioning in response to rising temperatures may offset
171 some of the increased risk (Nolte et al. 2018).

172 The Climate and Health Assessment (CHA) concluded that “ozone-related
173 human health impacts attributable to climate change are projected to lead to hundreds to

174 thousands of premature deaths, hospital admissions, and cases of acute respiratory
175 illnesses per year in the United States in 2030” (Fann et al. 2016).

176 *Particulate Matter*

177 Particulate matter smaller than 2.5 microns (PM_{2.5}) is responsible for “most of the
178 health impacts due to air pollution in the United States” (Fann et al. 2012), including
179 “lung cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, cardiovascular disease, and
180 asthma development and exacerbation” (EPA 2009). “More than 100 million people in
181 the United States live in communities where air pollution exceeds health-based air
182 quality standards,” and “exposure to high concentrations can result in serious health
183 impacts, including premature death, nonfatal heart attacks, and adverse birth outcomes”
184 (Nolte et al. 2018).

185 Weather conditions—particularly winds and precipitation—have a strong effect
186 on PM concentrations, and climate change is expected to directly influence PM
187 concentrations in multiple ways, including through increases in both stagnant air
188 conditions and heavy precipitation events and changes in weather fronts, as well as
189 indirectly through changes in emissions from plants (Nolte et al. 2018). Due to the
190 complex interactions involved and remaining uncertainties about future changes in
191 weather patterns, CHA reports that “there is no consensus yet on whether
192 meteorological changes will lead to a net increase or decrease in PM_{2.5} levels in the
193 United States” (Fann et al 2016). Without considering the impacts of climate change,
194 reductions in air pollutant emissions resulting from policies aimed at improving air
195 quality would be expected to decrease concentrations of PM_{2.5} through 2040 (EPA
196 2016).

197 *Wildfire*

198 Wildfires and prescribed fires (both of which also contribute to ozone) are major
199 sources of PM, particularly in the West and Southeast, and exposure to smoke from
200 wildfires results in increased incidences of respiratory illnesses, premature death, and
201 visits to hospitals and emergency rooms (Nolte et al. 2018, Fann et al. 2016). More
202 severe and possibly longer droughts are projected, particularly in the Southwest and
203 Southern Great Plains (Hayhoe et al. 2018), and these changes would be expected to
204 produce longer wildfire seasons and larger wildfires, increase the amount of wildfire
205 smoke and dust in drought-affected areas and “reduce the amount and quality of time
206 spent in outdoor activities” (Nolte et al. 2018). In a warming climate, the future health
207 impacts of wildfires will depend on a variety of other factors, including changes in the
208 intensity and frequency of wildfires and patterns of human habitation, particularly at the
209 interface between urban and wildland environments.

210 *Aeroallergens*

211 Climate change is also expected to exacerbate the adverse health impacts of plant-based
212 pollens. Elevated CO₂ levels have been directly associated with stronger pollen
213 production for some important sources of allergenic pollen, including ragweed, pine
214 trees, and oak trees. Changes consistent with warming, including warmer winters and
215 longer growing seasons, have also been associated with increased exposure to
216 aeroallergens. However, research so far is less conclusive as to whether these changes
217 have or will lead to changes in health outcomes (Nolte et al. 2018). Conversely,
218 warming may reduce exposure in some cases, for example, drier conditions expected in
219 some areas may reduce pollen exposure (Fann et al. 2016).

220 Nonetheless, “the frequency and severity of allergic illnesses, including asthma
221 and hay fever, are likely to increase as a result of a changing climate. Earlier spring

222 arrival, warmer temperatures, changes in precipitation, and higher carbon dioxide
223 concentrations can increase exposure to airborne pollen allergens” (Nolte et al. 2018).
224 There is evidence that prior or simultaneous exposure to other air pollutants (e.g., ozone
225 and PM_{2.5}) may exacerbate the risks of aeroallergen exposure (Fann et al. 2016).

226 *Indoor Air Quality*

227 Air quality concerns aren’t limited to the outdoors; climate change also has the potential
228 to influence indoor air quality. Any changes in exposure to outdoor pollutants will result
229 in changes to indoor exposure to those pollutants, although changes in heating and air
230 conditioning in response to rising temperatures may result in seasonal and regional
231 changes in the rate at which outdoor pollutants infiltrate indoor spaces (Fann et al. 2016,
232 Ilacqua et al. 2015). Increases in humidity, heavy precipitation events, flooding,
233 droughts, severe tropical storms, and dust storms could also increase exposures to
234 indoor molds, carbon monoxide poisoning during more frequent or longer power
235 outages (see “Impacts on the Nation’s Energy Sector”), and illnesses such as Valley
236 fever, Legionnaires’ disease, and Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome, although these and
237 other indoor air quality concerns are emerging issues requiring further research (Fann et
238 al. 2016).

239 *Changes in Health Outcomes*

240 Policies aimed at reducing air pollution have improved air quality in the United States,
241 but climate change threatens to offset some of the benefits of air-quality regulations.
242 “Unless counteracting efforts to improve air quality are implemented, climate change
243 will worsen existing air pollution levels. This worsened air pollution would increase the
244 incidence of adverse respiratory and cardiovascular health effects, including premature
245 death. Increased air pollution would also have other environmental consequences,

246 including reduced visibility and damage to agricultural crops and forests” (Nolte et al.
247 2018).

248 Changes in actual health outcomes will be influenced by many other factors,
249 including urbanization, emissions of pollutants, and changing land-use patterns, as well
250 as by social determinants of health, proximity to sources of emissions, and access to air
251 conditioning, air filtration, and other factors (Figure 3; Fann et al. 2016). These
252 interactions and interdependencies complicate the challenge of understanding how
253 climate change has and will affect exposures and health outcomes.

254 ***Climate Change Mitigation and Air Quality Co-Benefits***

255 Efforts to limit future climate change by reducing GHG emissions could result in
256 significant co-benefits in the form of improved air quality. Figure 4 shows projected
257 changes in summer ozone for CONUS. Both scenarios show increases across much of
258 the country, with generally smaller increases under the lower scenario (RCP4.5). These
259 changes are consistent with the general expectation that higher temperatures result in
260 higher ozone levels, although parts of the South and Southeast do show decreases, as
261 other meteorological changes (e.g., in precipitation and winds) may make conditions
262 less favorable for ozone. Furthermore, projections indicate 1,700 additional deaths per
263 year by 2090 attributable to the impact from climate change under RCP8.5, compared to
264 1,200 per year under RCP4.5—a difference of 500 fewer premature deaths per year
265 under the lower scenario (Nolte et al. 2018, EPA 2017b).

266 Policies aimed directly at improving air quality can have varying effects on
267 climate change. For example, reductions in emissions of black carbon, which has a
268 warming influence, could have a relatively rapid and strong cooling influence,
269 particularly on regional scales, in addition to providing health benefits (DeAngelo et al.
270 2017). However, other aerosols and aerosol precursors exert a cooling influence on the

271 climate that has masked some of the GHG-driven warming effect, and policies aimed at
272 reducing emissions of these substances to improve air quality have already contributed
273 to a leveling off of this cooling influence (Fahey et al. 2017).

274 ***Future Uncertainties***

275 Rising temperatures and other manifestations of climate change will have multiple,
276 sometimes counteracting, and regionally varying effects on the meteorological,
277 chemical, and biological processes that influence air pollution. Societal choices,
278 including future emissions of GHGs, policies aimed at reducing air pollution, patterns
279 of urbanization and regional migration, and changes in air conditioning usage all
280 introduce significant uncertainty as to the net effects of climate change on exposure to
281 air pollutants. The impacts of changes in exposure on human health and well-being will
282 depend in part on future trends in the underlying health status of the population and
283 other socioeconomic factors.

284 All of these factors complicate projections about the impacts of climate change
285 on air quality and pose challenges for managing air quality in a rapidly changing
286 climate. However, other considerations aside, climate change is expected to have an
287 overall negative influence on air quality. “Despite the potential variability in regional
288 impacts of climate change, there is evidence that climate change will increase the risk of
289 unhealthy air quality in the future across the Nation in the absence of further air
290 pollution control efforts” (Nolte et al. 2018).

291 **Forests**

292 ***Climate, Weather, and Forests***

293 Forests cover about 33% of land in the United States and provide benefits to the natural
294 environment as well as economic benefits and ecosystem services (such as recreational

295 opportunities and carbon storage) to people. They provide opportunities for recreation
296 and spiritual renewal and serve as a source of water, fiber, and wood products (Vose et
297 al. 2018). Additionally, forests serve as a critical carbon sink, offsetting about 12% of
298 U.S. carbon emissions in 2018 (EPA 2020).

299 Rapid changes in forests have been driven by increasing temperatures, severe
300 drought, insect outbreaks, and wildfires. Climate and environmental changes pose risks
301 to the health of forests and threaten their ability to continue providing goods and
302 services (Figure 5). Climate extremes, such as heat waves and severe drought, can cause
303 heat-related stress in vegetation, resulting in reduced forest productivity and increased
304 tree mortality, leaving forests more susceptible to wildfires and insect outbreaks (Vose
305 et al. 2018). Warming and increased concentrations of atmospheric CO₂ can also affect
306 below-ground processes, such as nitrogen and carbon cycling, potentially impacting
307 forest productivity (Campbell et al. 2009).

308 *Heat and Drought*

309 The rate of warming influences the rate and magnitude of changes in forest health.
310 Negative effects on some species will benefit others. Overall changes in the structure of
311 forest communities depend on the ability of local vegetation populations to migrate to
312 new areas that become suitable as climate continues to change (Vose et al. 2018).

313 As the climate warms, future droughts are expected to be stronger and last
314 longer (Lall et al. 2018). Drought can cause forest productivity loss and plant mortality
315 by inducing hydraulic failure. Trapped gas emboli form in the water transport system of
316 plants in response to drought stress. This reduces a plant's ability to supply water to its
317 leaves, which can ultimately result in desiccation and mortality (Choat et al. 2012). The
318 slow response times of some tree species is likely to mask the direct effects of climate
319 change on tree mortality. Modeling studies suggest that increases in drought and

320 prolonged dry periods in the future will also exacerbate fire risk, threatening both
321 forests and local communities (Vose et al. 2018).

322 *Insects and Pathogens*

323 Recent tree mortality caused by insect infestations appears to be far outside documented
324 historical ranges and is likely related to climate change (Vose et al. 2018). Elevated
325 temperatures can speed up bark beetle reproductive and growth cycles and reduce cold-
326 induced beetle mortality, increasing the overall beetle population. A combination of
327 drought and warm temperatures can lead to extreme or prolonged water stress,
328 weakening trees and making them more susceptible to bark beetle attacks (Bentz et al.
329 2005).

330 In the West, tree mortality caused by bark beetles has outpaced tree mortality
331 caused by wildfires over the past three decades. In the East, the southern pine beetle is
332 the only bark beetle species that causes extensive tree mortality. And while there is no
333 evidence of drought-related outbreaks of this beetle, higher winter temperatures have
334 facilitated a recent expansion of its range into the Northeast. As a result, the beetle now
335 threatens pine barrens in New York and Massachusetts. Large-scale dieback in forests
336 with commercially valuable trees can negatively affect timber prices and the economic
337 well-being of forest landowners and wood processors.

338 The hemlock woolly adelgid (HWA), an aphid-like insect, is a nonnative species
339 that attacks eastern hemlock trees from Georgia to Maine. HWAs drain trees of their
340 stored sugars, causing needle loss and branch death. An increase in winter minimum
341 temperatures has facilitated a northward expansion of its habitat in the Northeast
342 (Dunckel et al. 2017), as well as a habitat expansion of the mountain pine beetle in
343 high-elevation forests of the West (Vose et al. 2018). Studies project continued
344 northward expansion of the HWA into the full range of hemlock in New England and

345 southern Canada, with the potential to eliminate the species in the coming decades
346 (Boucher et al. 2020). High-elevation pine species are expected to suffer significant
347 mortality in the future due to a combination of warmer temperatures, white pine blister
348 rust, and mountain pine beetle infestations (Krist et al. 2014).

349 “Fungal pathogens, especially those that depend on stressed plant hosts for
350 colonization, are expected to perform better and have greater effects on forests as a
351 result of climate change” (Vose et al. 2018), as increases in annual temperatures and
352 precipitation create ideal conditions for disease outbreaks. Most forest pathogens are
353 expected to be able to migrate at a faster rate than tree species to areas where climate
354 conditions are suitable for their survival and reproduction (Sturrock et al. 2011).

355 Insect and disease outbreaks can interact with other forest disturbances, such as
356 wildfire, worsening the overall impact on ecosystem services. For example, mountain
357 pine beetle outbreaks alter forest fuels, affecting the frequency and intensity of
358 wildfires. Conversely, trees injured by fire can promote bark beetle attacks,
359 consequently increasing beetle populations (Jenkins et al. 2013).

360 *Wildfire*

361 Climate and fuels are the main factors that control wildfire patterns. Climate controls
362 the frequency of weather conditions that are conducive to wildfire, while fuel quantity
363 and distribution are responsible for fire intensity and spread. Climate also influences
364 fuels by shaping forest composition and productivity, as well as susceptibility to
365 disturbance (Ayres et al. 2013). Most fire-prone forests have the ability to persist as the
366 occurrence of wildfires increases, but the resilience of the underlying ecosystems
367 depends on the continued presence of fire-adapted species, intensity and frequency of
368 future fires, and societal response (Vose et al. 2018).

369 Fire exclusion of fire-prone forest ecosystems over the past century has left
370 behind highly flammable landscapes of dense forests with heavy fuel loads (Keene et al.
371 2002). And a warm, dry climate has led to an increase in the area burned across the
372 West over recent decades (Abatzoglou and Kolden 2013), although it is unclear if this
373 increase is outside the range of what has been observed over centuries of fire
374 occurrence.

375 Large, intense wildfires have been difficult to suppress in some locations,
376 leading to an increased risk to life and property, as well as increased spending on fire
377 suppression (operations used to extinguish, prevent, modify, or manage a fire; DOI
378 2021). Wildfires burned at least 5 million acres nationwide in 7 of the last 10 years,
379 including a record 10.1 million acres in 2015 and 2020. Over this same time span,
380 annual federal wildfire suppression expenditures ranged from \$1.6 billion to \$3.2 billion
381 (Figure 6). Some of the increased spending on fire suppression is due to the increasing
382 cost of protecting property in the wildland–urban interface (Vose et al. 2018).

383 Increased temperatures and earlier onset of spring snowmelt has lengthened the
384 wildfire season in the West since the 1970s. Over the same time period, the average
385 burn time, frequency, and area burned by large wildfires (> 400 hectares) have also
386 increased (Westerling 2016). Increases in frequency and area burned by large wildfires
387 are projected to continue across the West in the coming decades, with the area burned
388 increasing by as much as two to six times over the 1970–2006 average by midcentury
389 (Gergel et al. 2017, Litschert et al. 2012). “More frequent and larger wildfires,
390 combined with increasing development at the wildland–urban interface (where people
391 live in and near forested areas), portend increasing risks to property and human life”
392 (Vose et al. 2018).

393 Wildfire risk can be reduced in some forests. For conifer forests in the southern
394 U.S. and low-elevation, dry conifer forests in the western U.S., wildfire risk can be
395 reduced by decreasing stand density (the amount of tree material per unit area), using
396 prescribed burning, and letting some fires burn in cases where they will not affect
397 people. Frequent prescribed burning has been a socially accepted practice for decades in
398 fire-prone and fire-dependent southern forests, illustrating how wildfire risk can be
399 reduced by forest-management practices. However, smoke produced by prescribed
400 burning is a growing concern in the wildland–urban interface (Vose et al. 2018),
401 creating substantial public health impacts to large populations living near heavily
402 forested areas (Nolte et al. 2018).

403 *Ecosystem Services and Forest Management*

404 Forests provide many and varied benefits to people, such as recreation, wildlife habitat,
405 biodiversity, cultural values, and non-timber forest products. It is very likely that the
406 impacts of climate change, such as those described above, will decrease the ability of
407 many forest ecosystems to provide these important ecosystem services. “Ensuring the
408 continuing health of forest ecosystems and, where desired and feasible, keeping
409 forestland in forest cover are key challenges for society” (Vose et al. 2018).

410 A better understanding of the potential risks of climate change in the context of
411 forest management can help inform decisions related to managing resources (Vose et al.
412 2018). For example, risks posed by ecological disturbances can be reduced by first
413 assessing specific disturbance components (e.g., wildfire exposure) and then identifying
414 forest management activities that can be implemented to reduce risk (Ojima et al. 2014).
415 However, both risk assessment and risk management in the context of how forests will
416 respond to climate change are complex issues. Identifying interactions among all types
417 of risks at both local and regional scales will provide land managers with the

418 information needed to manage forests sustainably across large landscapes (Vose et al.
419 2018).

420 **Energy**

421 *Climate, Weather, and Energy*

422 Energy systems and infrastructure, including energy production, distribution, and
423 demand, underpin every sector of the economy, and “the Nation’s economic security is
424 increasingly dependent on an affordable and reliable supply of energy” (Zamuda et al.
425 2018). These systems, including their vulnerabilities and resilience, differ across the
426 United States, however, and will all be impacted by a changing climate.

427 Some of the most apparent impacts of climate change on the energy industry are
428 those caused by extreme weather. Extreme events (e.g., heat waves, snow and ice
429 storms, heavy precipitation) are the main contributors to power outages. As described
430 above in “Climate Change in the United States,” some event types, such as extreme heat
431 and intense precipitation, are projected to increase in a warming climate. As a result,
432 power outages are projected to become more frequent and longer lasting. Such events
433 can interrupt energy supplies, disrupt infrastructure and distribution systems, and lead to
434 fuel and electricity shortages (Figure 7), causing cascading impacts on other critical
435 sectors and potentially affecting economic and national security (Zamuda et al. 2018).
436 “At the same time, the energy sector is undergoing substantial policy, market, and
437 technology-driven changes that are projected to affect these vulnerabilities” (USGCRP
438 2018).

439 *Extreme Weather*

440 “The Nation’s energy system is already affected by extreme weather events, and due to
441 climate change, it is projected to be increasingly threatened by more frequent and

442 longer-lasting power outages affecting critical energy infrastructure and creating fuel
443 availability and demand imbalances” (Zamuda et al. 2018). The Nation’s energy system
444 is also aging, so longer and more frequent power interruptions are projected to occur if
445 attention is not given to aging infrastructure and equipment (ASCE 2017). Extreme
446 rainfall is projected to increase in the future, including an increase in the amount of
447 precipitation produced by hurricanes and atmospheric river events (long, narrow
448 streams of concentrated moisture that transport water vapor from the tropics; NOAA
449 2017), which can result in flash floods. Such events, along with river flooding, have
450 been known to wash out infrastructure important for the transportation of energy
451 products and to undermine the foundations of power lines, power plants, and other
452 energy facilities (DOE 2015). Extreme heat events result in the reduced capacity and
453 increased disruption of regional power supplies while simultaneously increasing energy
454 demand for cooling. In our changing climate, U.S. heat waves have the potential to
455 become more common, more severe, and longer in duration, which could lead to an
456 increase in the number of local blackouts and power outages, potentially resulting in
457 increased risks to public health and safety (Zamuda et al. 2018). Increased demand for
458 cooling is also likely to increase emissions of air pollutants such as nitrogen oxide and
459 sulfur dioxide (see “Climate, Weather, and Air Quality”). Extreme cold outbreaks, on
460 the other hand, can damage power lines and affect the supply and transportation of fuel;
461 however, such events are expected to decrease in the future. Another potential cause of
462 power outages is high winds, which can damage electricity transmission and
463 distribution lines as well as buildings and other structures associated with energy
464 infrastructure and operations (DOE 2015). Projections of changes in thunderstorms and
465 strong wind events are uncertain (Hayhoe et al. 2018).

466 *Coastal Flooding*

467 Coastal flooding is another major threat to energy infrastructure. Seawater incursion
468 from waves or storm surge “can affect gas and electric asset performance, cause asset
469 damage and failure, and disrupt energy generation, transmission, and delivery” (Zamuda
470 et al. 2018). Hazardous spills can occur if flooding damages petroleum tanks in above-
471 ground storage facilities (DOE 2015). Power plants and oil refineries along the
472 Southeast Atlantic and Gulf Coasts are especially vulnerable to hurricane storm surge
473 (Maloney and Preston 2014), and this risk is projected to increase as sea levels rise. It is
474 extremely likely that U.S. sea levels will continue to rise throughout the 21st century
475 (Sweet et al. 2017).

476 *Reduced Water Availability*

477 Another factor affecting energy production is reduced water availability. During periods
478 of drought, which are projected to intensify (Hayhoe et al. 2018), fuel refining
479 operations will need alternative water supplies or may be shut down temporarily,
480 resulting in increased costs and ultimately increased consumer prices (DOE 2013).
481 Drought can also “increase the risk of wildfires that threaten transmission lines and
482 other energy infrastructure” (Zamuda et al. 2018).

483 *Future Scenarios*

484 Continued GHG emissions are projected for the future, and if a higher scenario is
485 followed, both electricity costs and demand would increase due to rising temperatures.
486 Nationwide, electricity demand is projected to increase by 2%–9% by 2040 (Larsen et
487 al. 2017). This projection includes both the reduction in electricity used for space
488 heating in states with warming winters and the increase in electricity demand for
489 cooling as overall temperatures increase. Increases in cooling demand are projected

490 across the Nation (Zamuda et al. 2018) and will only be marginally offset by the
491 relatively small decline in heating demand that is met with electric power (Clarke et al.
492 2018a). Although buildings and appliances are becoming more energy efficient, costs
493 would still increase due to the reduced efficiency of power generation and delivery. By
494 2040, nationwide, residential, and commercial electricity expenditures are projected to
495 increase by 4%–18% (Larsen et al. 2017), with an increase in annual average energy
496 expenditures of \$32–\$87 billion by the end of the century, due to increased energy
497 demand (Larsen et al. 2017, Hsiang et al. 2017). Energy generation and storage capacity
498 will need to meet the highest peak load demand, so a warming climate may necessitate
499 the construction of up to 25% more power plant capacity by 2040, compared to a
500 scenario without rising global temperatures (Larsen et al. 2017).

501 *Energy Sector Vulnerabilities*

502 As outlined above, the energy sector is susceptible to the adverse effects of climate
503 change, such as extreme weather events, coastal flooding, and reduced water
504 availability. Energy sector vulnerabilities to climate change depend in part on factors
505 such as changes in energy technologies, markets, and policies. “These changes offer the
506 opportunity to diversify the energy generation portfolio and require planning for
507 operation and reliability of power generation, transmission, and delivery to maximize
508 the positive effects and avoid unintended consequences” (Zamuda et al. 2018). Energy
509 system flexibility, reliability, and resilience are also being enhanced by the growing
510 adoption of energy efficiency programs, demand response programs, transmission
511 capacity increases, and microgrids with energy storage technologies (DOE 2017).

512 Many efforts are underway to address the challenges of our changing climate in
513 terms of the energy sector and to improve energy system resilience. These efforts
514 include “planning and operational measures that seek to anticipate climate impacts and

515 prevent or respond to damages more effectively, as well as hardening measures
516 (including physical barriers, protective casing, or other upgrades) to protect assets from
517 damage during extreme weather events, multi-institutional and public–private
518 partnerships for coordinated action, and development and deployment of new
519 technologies to enhance system resilience” (Zamuda et al. 2018).

520 Access to the latest data and improved modeling and analysis are also essential
521 for energy companies, utilities, and system operators in order to support assessment and
522 planning activities and to help stakeholders plan for the future. For example, coastal
523 infrastructure plans should take into account rising sea levels and the associated
524 increased risk of flooding (Zamuda et al. 2018). Uncertainties still exist, however, and
525 “an escalation of the pace, scale, and scope of efforts is needed to ensure the safe and
526 reliable provision of energy and to establish a climate-ready energy system to address
527 present and future risks” (USGCRP 2018).

528 **Water**

529 *Climate, Weather, and Water*

530 “Ensuring a reliable supply of clean freshwater to individuals, communities, and
531 ecosystems, together with effective management of floods and droughts, is the
532 foundation of human and ecological health” (Lall et al. 2018). Water also plays a
533 significant role in the resilience of other sectors, such as agriculture, energy, urban
534 environments, and industry (Lall et al. 2018).

535 Our changing climate has a profound effect on water. Increases in the frequency
536 and magnitude of extreme precipitation events will pose challenges in many regions of
537 the United States (Lall et al. 2018). Such events often lead to flooding, as well as
538 disruptions to infrastructure and the built environment, especially when combined with
539 rising sea levels in coastal areas (Fleming et al. 2018, Carter et al. 2018). Other parts of

540 the United States are experiencing intensified droughts or reduced snowpack, which are
541 being exacerbated by rising temperatures (May et al. 2018, Gonzalez et al. 2018). These
542 impacts, combined with increasing water demand from a growing population, can
543 reduce the future reliability of water supplies (Gonzalez et al. 2018).

544 *Increasing Temperatures*

545 Climate change presents a variety of challenges in terms of water resources. Rising
546 winter temperatures affect the proportion of precipitation falling as snow, resulting in
547 declines in the end-of-season snow water equivalent (the amount of water contained
548 within the snowpack) in the West since the 1980s (Pederson et al. 2013). Observations
549 indicate that rising temperatures are causing earlier snowmelt runoff (Lall et al. 2018).
550 This is especially important in areas where water supply is dominated by spring snow
551 melt (Easterling et al. 2017). Increasing temperatures are also causing glaciers to melt,
552 which can alter stream water volume, water temperature, and runoff timing in Alaska
553 and the western United States. “As temperatures continue to rise, there is a risk of
554 decreased and highly variable water supplies for human use and ecosystem
555 maintenance” (Lall et al. 2018).

556 Increasing temperatures also result in increased water consumption, particularly
557 in the agriculture sector. Irrigated agriculture is one of the Nation’s main consumers of
558 water, with irrigation being used for crop production in most of the West (Gowda et al.
559 2018) and the northern part of the Midwest, where coarse soils of lower water-holding
560 capacity are more vulnerable to drying (Angel et al. 2018). Rising temperatures
561 combined with insufficient precipitation and the resulting increases in irrigation
562 requirements will likely result in substantial groundwater depletion in the coming
563 decades (Döll 2009). Groundwater currently provides more than 40% of the water used
564 for agriculture (irrigation and livestock), as well as for domestic water supplies across

565 the United States (Lall et al. 2018). In many locations, groundwater is being depleted
566 due to increased pumping during dry spells and concentrated demands in urban areas
567 (Russo and Lall 2017). The depletion of groundwater exacerbates drought risk, as the
568 ability to meet water needs is diminished (Lall et al. 2018).

569 *Precipitation*

570 Historical changes in annual precipitation amounts vary both regionally and seasonally.
571 Nationally, the total amount of precipitation has increased since the beginning of the
572 20th century, with the largest increases occurring in the fall season and the smallest in
573 winter (Easterling et al. 2017). Regionally, increases in annual precipitation have been
574 observed in the Northeast, Midwest, and Great Plains regions, with decreases seen over
575 parts of the Southwest and Southeast (Hayhoe et al. 2018). In some U.S. regions,
576 continued warming and increasing consumption will increase stress on and adversely
577 affect the reliability of water supplies. In addition, increased water demand due to a
578 growing population could exceed future supply in areas experiencing decreasing
579 amounts of precipitation (Lall et al. 2018), particularly if efforts are not made to
580 increase water-use efficiency in rural and urban areas (Sankarasubramanian et al. 2017).

581 Extreme precipitation events have increased in both frequency and magnitude
582 since the beginning of the 20th century across most of the United States and are
583 projected to continue to increase over this century under both lower and higher
584 scenarios. One example to consider is heavy precipitation events above the 99th
585 percentile of daily values. Since 1901, the amount of precipitation occurring in these
586 heaviest 1% of events has increased in all regions of CONUS, with the exception of the
587 Southwest. The Northeast and Midwest regions experienced the greatest increases and
588 are projected to see continued increases under both a lower and higher scenario (Figure
589 8). The upward trends in such extreme precipitation events are also linked to increases

590 in the occurrence and intensity of organized thunderstorm clusters across the northern
591 and central United States (Hayhoe et al. 2018). Isolated thunderstorms and other severe
592 phenomena such as tornadoes occur over smaller areas and much shorter time periods,
593 making it difficult to detect trends or develop future projections (Kossin et al. 2017).
594 However, “there is some indication that, in a warmer world, the number of days with
595 conditions conducive to severe thunderstorm activity is likely to increase” (Hayhoe et
596 al. 2018). Increases in extreme precipitation are projected to occur in all regions of the
597 United States, even those where the total amount of precipitation is expected to decline,
598 such as the Southwest. For instance, under a higher scenario the number of 2-day
599 duration extreme events exceeding a 5-year return period is projected to increase by two
600 to three times the historical average in every region of the contiguous United States
601 (Easterling et al. 2017).

602 *Floods*

603 Flooding can occur in many forms, including, but not limited to, flash floods from
604 smaller rivers and creeks, prolonged flooding along major rivers, urban flooding
605 unassociated with riverways, high tide flooding in coastal towns, and larger-scale
606 coastal flooding from storm surge (which may be exacerbated by sea level rise).

607 Major flooding across the United States is often related to extreme precipitation
608 events. Flash floods are associated with extreme precipitation events that occur along
609 rivers, upstream of at-risk locations. Activities such as deforestation, urbanization,
610 dams, and floodwater management techniques can affect streamflow rates and
611 potentially alter the effects of such flooding.

612 Major rivers in the West are fed by snowmelt from mountain snowpack.
613 Substantial snow accumulations, especially those followed by a “rain on snow” event,
614 can lead to flooding in late winter or spring. Such flooding can also occur due to a

615 sudden increase in temperature that results in rapid snow melt within a river basin
616 (Wehner et al. 2017). Mountain snowpack in western coastal states can also be
617 substantially increased by extreme precipitation events known as atmospheric rivers
618 (ARs). ARs transport water vapor from the tropics. When they reach the United States,
619 the water vapor rises and condenses to create heavy precipitation in the form of rain or
620 snow (NOAA 2017). ARs account for 30%–40% of the typical snowpack in the Sierra
621 Nevadas (Guan et al. 2010), as well as a significant amount of annual precipitation
622 along the West Coast, and are an essential summertime source of water for agriculture,
623 consumption, and ecosystem health (Kossin et al. 2017). They are also associated with
624 severe flooding when adding large amounts of rainfall to existing snow cover (Guan et
625 al. 2016) but can be critical in ending droughts (Dettinger, 2013). Projections of ARs
626 indicate that they are likely to increase in both frequency and intensity; however, there
627 is no clear consensus on whether these changes will translate to increased precipitation
628 (Kossin et al. 2017). Also, “as winter temperatures increase, the fraction of precipitation
629 falling as snow will decrease, potentially disrupting western U.S. water management
630 practices” (Wehner et al. 2017).

631 Hurricanes and tropical storms also lead to major flooding events in the East
632 (Wehner et al. 2017), and climate models project an increase in tropical cyclone
633 intensity, as well as an increase in the number of major hurricanes (Category 4 and 5
634 storms). The overall number of tropical storms is not projected to increase; however, the
635 most intense storms may become more frequent and produce more rainfall in a warming
636 world (Knutson et al. 2015). As a result, socially and economically vulnerable coastal
637 residents are particularly at risk from freshwater flooding, as well as secondary effects
638 such as landslides (Hayhoe et al. 2018). The long-term impacts on these communities
639 are somewhat unclear. Fleming et al. (2018) note that the effects of a storm can extend

640 far beyond the directly affected areas, as with Hurricane Katrina, which resulted in
641 people relocating to all 50 states with economic and social impacts felt nationwide. Sea
642 level rise could also lead to the migration of large populations, with 13.1 million people
643 potentially at risk of needing to migrate due to a 6-foot rise in sea level by the year 2100
644 (Hauer 2017).

645 America's coasts are increasingly threatened by tidal flooding due to coastal
646 storms, high tides, and sea level rise, which is increasing in frequency, depth, and
647 extent. These trends are projected to continue, with some regions more vulnerable than
648 others (Hayhoe et al. 2018). "Since the 1960s, sea level rise has already increased the
649 frequency of high tide flooding by a factor of 5 to 10 for several U.S. coastal
650 communities" (Sweet et al. 2014). Risks are exacerbated by storm surge, which may
651 occur due to extreme precipitation events and rising sea levels. Even under a lower-
652 emissions future, coastal communities will suffer financial impacts as flooding leads to
653 higher costs and lower property values. "Actions to plan for and adapt to more frequent,
654 widespread, and severe coastal flooding would decrease direct losses and cascading
655 impacts" (Fleming et al, 2018).

656 In a changing climate, flood-prone regions of the United States are becoming
657 increasingly vulnerable to compound events—"the combination of two or more hazard
658 events or climate variables over space and/or time that leads to an extreme impact" (Lall
659 et al. 2018). When such events occur, risks to both the natural and the human
660 environment are amplified. Infrastructure is especially vulnerable, as many systems are
661 interconnected, and the failure of one component can in turn lead to the failure of
662 critical facilities such as water and wastewater treatment plants, refineries, and even
663 hospitals. Hurricane Katrina (2005), Superstorm Sandy (2012), and Hurricane Harvey
664 (2017) are all examples of compound extreme events that led to widespread flooding

665 with cascading effects on crucial infrastructure. For further details, see *NCA4 Chapter*
666 *17: “Sector Interactions, Multiple Stressors, and Complex Systems”* (Clarke et al.
667 2018b).

668 Although there is a clear link between flooding and extreme rainfall, trends in
669 flood occurrence are much harder to discern (Hirsch et al. 2014, Hodgkins et al. 2017).
670 “Although extreme precipitation is one of the controlling factors in flood statistics, a
671 variety of other compounding factors, including local land use, land-cover changes, and
672 water management also play important roles” (Easterling et al. 2017). The relationship
673 between human-induced warming and riverine flooding is still unclear, with regards to
674 both observed and projected changes (Wehner et al. 2017). However, “extreme
675 precipitation events are projected to increase in a warming climate and may lead to
676 more severe floods and greater risk of infrastructure failure in some regions” (Lall et al.
677 2018).

678 *Drought*

679 Drought affects water availability in many parts of the United States, and the
680 combination of variable precipitation and increasing temperatures is intensifying
681 drought in many regions. Changes in precipitation and runoff, combined with changes
682 in withdrawal and consumption, have led to reduced surface and groundwater supplies.
683 Surface soil moisture is projected to decrease across much of the United States due to
684 increased evaporation rates in a warming world. “This means that, all else being equal,
685 future droughts in most regions will likely be stronger and potentially last longer”
686 (Hayhoe et al. 2018). Despite recent droughts of record intensity, there is no detectable
687 trend in long-term drought for the country as a whole, and the 1930s Dust Bowl era still
688 remains the benchmark for drought and extreme heat in the United States (Lall et al.
689 2018).

690 ***Water Quality***

691 Each of the extreme events described above can have complex effects on water quality
692 (Peterson et al. 2014), and a changing climate can impact water conditions in a variety
693 of additional ways. For example, projected increases in water temperatures, when
694 combined with projected increases in the intensity of extreme precipitation events and
695 changes in runoff, can lead to degraded water quality as contaminants are released into
696 waterways at greater rates (Jastram and Rice 2015). Such changes, “pose challenges
697 related to the cost and implications of water treatment, and they present a risk to water
698 supplies, public health, and aquatic ecosystems” (Lall et al. 2018). Saltwater intrusion
699 into coastal rivers and aquifers threatens the supply of drinking water and coastal
700 infrastructure, as well as local ecosystems (Kolb et al. 2017). Saltwater intrusion is
701 often exacerbated by storm surge, altered freshwater runoff, and sea level rise, which is
702 projected to continue in the future (Sweet et al. 2017). Water management, as well as
703 both agricultural and urban land-use changes, also impacts water conditions in a
704 changing climate, and terrestrial ecosystem changes such as wildfire and the increased
705 frequency of forest pest and disease outbreaks can have indirect impacts on water
706 quality (Lall et al. 2018).

707 ***Water Infrastructure and Management***

708 Impacts to the water sector are exacerbated by aging and deteriorating infrastructure. In
709 some parts of the United States, critical water infrastructure is nearing the end of its
710 design life, increasing the risk of failure (Lall et al. 2018). The estimated combined cost
711 of reconstruction and maintenance for dams, levees, aqueducts, sewers, and water and
712 wastewater treatment systems totals trillions of dollars (Lall et al. 2018). Many public
713 water systems (which provide safe drinking water) are at risk, and public health could
714 potentially be affected if issues with wastewater treatment facilities and stormwater

715 management systems are not addressed. Vast losses could also result from dam failures;
716 as of 2019, 15,600 U.S. dams are listed as high risk (ASCE 2021).

717 Infrastructure is also at risk from the projected increases in the intensity of
718 extreme precipitation events, which may lead to more severe floods. Dams and levees
719 could also be compromised if erosion or subsidence (sinking) occurs, if there is a
720 reduction in soil strength, or if the ground cracks due to drying because of long-lasting
721 droughts and/or heat waves (Lall et al. 2018). These infrastructure risks currently
722 remain unquantified, however, as to date there has been no comprehensive assessment
723 of the climate-related vulnerability of U.S. water infrastructure (Lall et al. 2018). Also,
724 “there are no common design standards or operational guidelines that address how
725 infrastructure should be designed and operated in the face of changing climate risk”
726 (Lall et al. 2018), and many risk assessment procedures rely on out-of-date information
727 related to the frequency and severity of extreme events (Cheng et al. 2014). Statistical
728 methods incorporating observed and projected changes in climate extremes have been
729 developed for analyzing climate risk; however, these still need to be incorporated into
730 infrastructure design and operations (Lall et al. 2018).

731 Water planning and management strategies also need to address risk in our
732 changing climate. Adapting to future climate conditions that are broader in scope than
733 experienced in the past is a key challenge, with much action occurring at the local level
734 (Lempert et al. 2018). “Doing so requires approaches that evaluate plans over many
735 possible futures instead of just one, incorporate real-time monitoring and forecast
736 products to better manage extremes when they occur, and update policies and
737 engineering principles with the best available geoscience-based understanding of global
738 change” (Lall et al. 2018). Figure 9 shows an example of a challenge faced by water
739 managers in many U.S. locations—a potential imbalance between future supply and

740 demand but with considerable long-term variability that is not well understood for the
741 future.

742 Developing new approaches may also involve updates to regulatory and legal
743 aspects of water management, community planning, and infrastructure design.
744 Sufficient funding and maintenance related to adapting water policy and infrastructure
745 would also help overcome the challenges posed by climate change. Such challenges are
746 heightened for smaller, rural, and other communities with limited financial or technical
747 resources (Lall et al. 2018).

748 **Regional Highlights**

749 Every region of the United States is impacted differently by climate change, but the
750 following examples are of particular significance.

751 Although energy resources are abundant across the central United States, energy
752 infrastructure is at risk from climate change and extreme weather (Conant et al. 2018).
753 Diverse land use and variable climate across the Northern Great Plains pose challenges
754 for the sustainable use of water, land, and energy resources by competing urban,
755 suburban, rural, and tribal populations (Conant et al. 2018). Water-related challenges in
756 particular will be exacerbated by future changes in precipitation and the potential for
757 more extreme precipitation events. People and economies in the Southern Great Plains
758 are at risk from a variety of extreme weather, such as hurricanes, flooding, severe
759 storms with large hail, tornadoes, blizzards, ice storms, relentless winds, heat and cold
760 waves, and drought. Several of these climate-related extremes (such as heat, drought,
761 flooding, and severe storms) are expected to increase in intensity and frequency. Others,
762 such as extreme cold events, are projected to decrease (Kloesel et al. 2018). Rising sea
763 levels will make the built environment of the Texas Gulf Coast increasingly vulnerable
764 to disruption, especially as infrastructure ages (Kloesel et al. 2018).

765 Residents in the Northeast, particularly those in urban areas, face multiple
766 climate hazards, including extreme temperatures, episodes of poor air quality, recurrent
767 waterfront and coastal flooding due to sea level rise and storm events, and heavy
768 downpours that can lead to increased flooding on urban streams (Dupigny-Giroux et al.
769 2018).

770 In the Midwest, many communities are at risk from climate change impacts such
771 as increases in urban heat islands, drought, and flooding. Critical infrastructure,
772 including stormwater management systems, are already experiencing impacts from
773 changing precipitation patterns and elevated flood risks (Angel et al. 2018).

774 Flooding is a major concern in the Southeast due to the combined effects of
775 increases in extreme rainfall and rising sea levels, with coastal and low-lying regions
776 being particularly vulnerable (Fleming et al. 2018, Carter et al. 2018). Air pollution is
777 also a significant concern in the region, which experiences stagnant air masses on 40%
778 of summer days (Schnell and Prather 2017), with major urban centers already being
779 impacted by poor air quality during warmer months (Carter et al. 2018). Rising
780 temperatures are expected to increase ozone levels, and drier fall conditions could result
781 in longer ozone-exposure seasons (Zhang and Wang 2016). However, there is more
782 uncertainty related to changes in cloud cover, precipitation, and winds (Nolte et al.
783 2018). Changes in wind patterns and an increase in precipitation could actually reduce
784 overall ozone health impacts (EPA 2017b). Meanwhile, the region is experiencing a
785 rapid urbanization trend, which is expected to increase aeroallergens through localized
786 increases in temperature and CO₂ levels. Projections of more frequent and larger
787 wildfires, combined with increasing development at the wildland–urban interface, also
788 pose significant risks to communities of the Southeast (Vose et al. 2018).

789 Increasing storm intensity and flooding are concerns in the Northwest, where
790 existing water, transportation, and energy infrastructure also face challenges from heat
791 waves, wildfire, drought, and landslides (May et al. 2018). Alaska is one of the fastest-
792 warming regions on Earth and faces a multitude of climate-related impacts.
793 Communities and infrastructure are affected by thawing permafrost, melting glaciers,
794 and flooding and coastal erosion resulting from changes in sea ice, as well as increases
795 in wildfire frequency and extent (Markon et al. 2018). Frontline communities, including
796 tribes and Indigenous peoples, are often disproportionately affected by climate change
797 and are often less able to adapt (May et al. 2018).

798 The Southwest is particularly vulnerable to drought, which may occur more
799 frequently in the future due to rising air temperatures (Lall et al. 2018). The
800 intensification of drought events, as well as heavy downpours and reduced snowpack,
801 combine with increasing water demands from a growing population, groundwater
802 depletion, and deteriorating infrastructure to reduce the reliability of water supplies and
803 decrease the ability of hydropower and fossil fuel electricity generation to meet growing
804 energy use (Gonzalez et al. 2018). Human health in the region is affected not only by
805 low water quality and availability but also extreme heat, ground-level ozone pollution,
806 aeroallergens, and particulate air pollution from wildfires and dust storms (USGCRP
807 2017). Wildfire is a major concern in the Southwest, as it increasingly threatens people
808 and homes (Abatzoglou and Williams 2016). Forests are more susceptible to burning in
809 a changing climate, and an increasing number of residents and communities are
810 threatened as building expands in fire-prone areas (Gonzalez et al. 2018).

811 Dependable water supplies are a concern for communities of the U.S. Caribbean,
812 Hawai'i, and the U.S.-Affiliated Pacific Islands, which are each threatened by
813 increasing temperatures, rising seas, saltwater intrusion, and the increased risk of both

814 extreme drought and flooding (Gould et al. 2018, Keener et al. 2018). The U.S.
815 Caribbean, in particular, is highly vulnerable to disaster-related risks and is already
816 experiencing an increasing frequency of extreme events, such as hurricanes, that
817 threaten life, property, and the economy (Gould et al. 2018).

818 **Conclusions and Implications for the Future**

819 The impacts and implications of climate change, such as those described in this paper,
820 are already being felt across the United States and are projected to intensify. The
821 severity of these future impacts will depend largely on actions taken to reduce GHGs, as
822 well as Americans' ability to adapt to the changes that occur. "Decisions made today
823 determine risk exposure for current and future generations and will either broaden or
824 limit options to reduce the negative consequences of climate change" (Jay et al. 2018).
825 As climate-related risks continue to grow, Americans increasingly recognize the
826 impacts to their everyday lives and livelihoods and are beginning to respond.
827 Information on observed changes and impacts that affect human welfare and society,
828 along with projections for the future, is therefore highly valuable for informing
829 decision-makers, including utility managers, emergency planners, and other
830 stakeholders as they plan for the future.

831 Risks posed by a changing climate vary by region and sector and also by the
832 vulnerability of those experiencing impacts. "Social, economic, and geographic factors
833 shape the exposure of people and communities to climate-related impacts and their
834 capacity to respond" (Jay et al. 2018). Low-income communities, some communities of
835 color, children, and the elderly often experience the greatest level of risk (Ebi et al.
836 2018).

837 Adaptation, of both short- and long-term risks, is one form of risk management.
838 Individuals, communities, businesses, and governments can take adaptation actions at

839 many different scales, with a large amount occurring at the local level. “Adaptation
840 actions can yield beneficial short-term and/or longer-term outcomes in excess of their
841 costs, based on economic returns, ecological benefits, and broader concepts of social
842 welfare and security” (Lempert et al. 2018).

843 Integrating climate risk management into existing design, planning, and
844 operations practices can provide many benefits and is more likely to succeed because it
845 augments already-familiar processes with new information and tools. However,
846 dedicated, stand-alone adaptation approaches are also important to address the full
847 range of climate impacts. For more on climate change adaptation and risk management,
848 see *NCA4 Chapter 28: “Reducing Risks Through Adaptation Actions”* (Lempert et al.
849 2018).

850 Climate change mitigation efforts can also be implemented to reduce the long-
851 term risks of climate change. Both adaptation and mitigation responses to climate
852 change are likely to occur as part of an iterative risk management strategy in which
853 learning occurs and actions are modified over time. For more on climate change
854 mitigation-related activities see *NCA4 Chapter 29: “Reducing Risks Through
855 Emissions Mitigation”* (Martinich et al. 2018).

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863 The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not
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865 Administration (NOAA), the United States Global Change Research Program
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