

**INTEREST GROUPS AND THE GOVERNANCE
OF GALVESTON BAY**

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INTEREST GROUPS AND THE GOVERNANCE OF GALVESTON BAY

A large number of political interest groups--organizations of individuals which make demands upon governmental institutions for particular policies and programs--are involved in Galveston Bay issues and politics. Given their potential importance, an assessment of the role of these groups is essential if one is to develop an adequate understanding of how the bay is governed. The purpose of this paper is to describe and analyze the activities of interest groups as they attempt to influence public policy and management decisions which impact upon Galveston Bay.

It should be emphasized at the outset that salient political and management decisions impacting the bay are made at all levels of government--federal, state and local. A complete examination of the role of groups in bay policy-making would include analysis of the bay-related lobby systems at all three governmental levels. However, in an attempt to make the study presented here more manageable, we will focus our attention upon interest group activities at the local and state levels. In particular, this study will take into account the broader state level interest group and lobbying context within which Galveston Bay issues are debated and public policy decisions made.

What follows is an examination of interest group activities in Galveston Bay issues as they occur within the Texas political milieu. More specifically, our attention will be directed toward a delineation of the interest group population, the key tactics that interest groups employ in attempting to influence bay-related policy decisions, and an evaluation of interest group effectiveness.

INTEREST GROUP POPULATIONS

David Truman's definition of interest group in The Governmental Process will be employed in this paper:

An interest group is a shared-attitude group that makes certain claims upon other groups in society. If and when it makes its claims through or upon any of the institutions of government, it becomes a political interest group.¹

When these shared attitude groups organize we call them organized interest groups or, more commonly, pressure groups. Truman argues that the behaviors that constitute the process of government cannot be adequately understood apart from interest group inputs. He states, "Organized groups are as clearly a part of the governmental institution as are the political parties or the branches formally established by law or constitution."² If this is accepted as true, then the composition of this nation's interest group population becomes a very important consideration, for public policy is apt to be significantly shaped to some degree by the types of "claims" put forth by these groups.

Unfortunately, even though interest groups have great potential importance, it is often difficult to give a good delineation of interest group populations. This is particularly true of Galveston Bay's interest group population for a number of reasons. One, bay issues tend to lack any real durability. Two, the decision-making structure is very fragmented. Three, official, or public, record keeping on group activities is at times less than adequate.

Issue Durability

Bay issues tend to lack durability. Issues seem to come and go. Interest groups briefly

¹David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 37.

²Ibid., p. 503.

mobilize, focus in on some particular proposal, and then largely disband once the issue is seemingly settled. Few groups appear to have an extensive agenda that requires a long-standing association. As a result, the population is not stable. Studying the interest group population of the bay offers some of the challenges that one finds when attempting to study the "homeless." Both are to a large extent constantly evolving, shifting populations. An interest group that was prominent in one year, may not in any practical sense exist the next year. Specific examples of this in the Bay are practically endless.

A particularly good example is offered by PISCES, or Political Involvement of Seafood Concerned Enterprises. During the late 1970's and early 1980's, Texas legislative and administrative agencies dealt with a number of fishing issues involving the bay. Legislation was adopted which was designed to prevent the perceived overharvesting of the bay's red drum and spotted seatrout populations. PISCES played the lead role in seeking to modify H.B. 1000 which outlawed the sale of red drum and speckled trout caught in Texas waters. At the time of the bill's passage, May 19, 1981, PISCES had a membership of about 700. By May of 1986, the group's membership had declined to around 365.³ At the time of passage of H. B. 1000, the group was a high profile actor on the bay scene. C. L. Stanley, the current PISCES president, is now making an effort to keep the organization alive. Furthermore, the organization does maintain a political consultant, David Steed, in Austin to monitor events in the capitol.⁴ However, interviews with state legislators and assistants, state administrators and close observers of bay issues over the last year indicate that the group has had a low profile. It has been suggested that the H. B. 1000 loss caused the commercial fishing community to lose faith in PISCES.⁵ Despite its small number of members, there continues to be a core of members who are apparently still devoted to promoting commercial fishing issues on the Texas Coast.

A Fragmented Decision-Making Structure

An extremely fragmented decision-making structure at the state and local level deals with Galveston Bay. There is no one single agency upon which interest groups focus their attention. Administrative authority in the bay is best described as being fragmented and dispersed. King and Kendall described the state situation in terms of institutional factors:

The institutional consequence--in large measure, the result of a cumbersome state constitution--was a number of executive agencies, most only under nominal control of the Governor, and responsible for a single specific resource. For example, the General Land Office manages submerged lands, the Railroad Commission regulates the oil industry, the Department of Parks and Wildlife enforces policy for coastal fisheries, and the Texas Water Commission monitors water quality. There is no department of natural resources or the environment.⁶

In addition to the above agencies, the Texas Department of Health, the Texas Water Development Board, the Texas Department of Agriculture, and the Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation also have jurisdiction in various issues that affect the bay.

³Richard T. Christian, "Decision Making in Coastal Fisheries Conflict: The Case of the Red Drum and Spotted Seatrout Legislation in Texas," Thesis. Texas A&M University 1986, pp. 126-127.

⁴Lauraine Miller, "Bay Shimpers Resent Strict Policing," The Houston Chronicle, 10 July 1988, 6:1.

⁵Christian, p. 125.

⁶Lauriston R. King and James J. Kendall, "State Capacity For Estuarine Management: The Case Of Galveston Bay, Texas," Paper prepared for Oceans '87 Conference and Exposition, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, September 27-30, 1987, p. 8.

Various bodies have been established in the past to provide some coordination to state policy, such as the Natural Resource Council (NRC) established in 1977. In 1979, the NRC was combined with the Texas Energy Advisory Council and renamed the Texas Energy and Natural Resources Advisory Council (TENRAC). TENRAC was abolished in 1983 as a result of the sunset process. Seemingly, a void has existed since 1983. The Texas Coastal and Marine Council was supposed to have been abolished in 1985, but recent Texas Parks and Wildlife literature suggests that a remnant of it still remains.⁷ This void makes it even more difficult to monitor interest group activity at the state level, for it is difficult to know where groups will focus their activities in such a convoluted setting. There is hope that the structure designed to implement the National Estuary Program will provide a focal point.

Interviews with state officials reveal that lobbyists are active to some degree at all levels of the policy-making process in the various agencies. The Lt. Governor, the Speaker, board members of the various state agencies, high ranking administrators, relevant committee members and staff and the Governor's Office are some of the prime targets of the interest groups, for all of them can under the proper circumstances apparently aid their cause.

Interest group activity also takes place at the local level. John H. Baker in Urban Politics In America writes:

Operating under the often pejorative label of "pressure group," it may directly affect the distribution of power within the community the intervening in the decision-making process and altering to some degree the authorities' decisions.⁸

Undoubtedly, local issues can be greatly affected by the local interest group population. Unfortunately, local lobbying has not attracted much research so not a great deal is known about local lobbying populations.

Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson in 1963 offered a "generic description" of local interest group populations. They described a population primarily comprised of various civic organizations, city employees, businesses, organized labor and minorities.⁹ The paucity of research in this area may be attributable to the personalized nature of much local lobbying. Rather than operating within the framework of groups, much local lobbying appears to be performed on an individual basis. Examples include a local businessman calling his council member for special zoning considerations or an animal rights advocate calling on the mayor complaining about the operating procedures of the local dog pound. Such lobbying does not leave much of a "trail" for researchers to uncover. As a result, the scope and magnitude of local lobbying is largely unknown.

However, every once in a while local issues will receive a great deal of publicity. With such publicity it is sometimes possible to get a handle on the extent of interest group activity present. The controversy surrounding the recently proposed road through the Armand Bayou Park is an example of local lobbying in the Galveston Bay area. The active parties appeared to be the Friendswood Development Co., the City of Pasadena, the Mayor of Pasadena, the Armand Nature Bayou Center, U.S. Representative Mike Andrews and the owners of part of the route in question, the Kaneka Texas Corp. The proponents--primarily the Friendswood Development Co. and Pasadena Mayor John Ray Harrison--sought the construction of a road through the Armand Bayou Park that would

⁷Texas Oyster Fishery Management Plan (Austin, TX: Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, 1988), p. 4.

⁸John H. Baker, Urban Politics In America (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), p. 153.

⁹Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press and M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 207-312.

reportedly alleviate traffic snarls in the area. The opponents, primarily the Armand Nature Bayou Center and Rep. Andrews, opposed the road site for fear that the new road would have a negative impact on the area's environment. Discussions were held on the subject between the interested parties. Apparently, the road will be constructed on a new route that will have a minimal impact on the park.¹⁰

It is difficult to assess the effects of local lobbying on bay issues. Surely, local lobbying helps to shape the policies of local governments in the bay. The road issue discussed above is such an example. Above all, local lobbying activities serve to further fragment the bay's decision-making framework.

Inadequate Public Record Keeping

Inadequate public record keeping also makes it difficult to accurately describe the bay's interest group activity. To the author's knowledge, no local jurisdictions require lobbyists to register. Registration laws are in effect at the state level, but they are in some respects inadequate to the needs of individuals who would like to monitor interest group activity.

The lobby control act at the state level requires lobbyists to provide information to the Secretary of State's Office concerning their activities. The following individuals are required to register:

- a person who makes a total expenditure in excess of \$200 in a calendar quarter, not including his own travel, food, or lodging expenses, or his own membership dues, for communicating directly with one or more members of the legislature or executive branch to influence legislation or administration action; and
- a person who receives compensation or reimbursement in excess of \$200 in a calendar quarter from another to communicate directly with a member of the legislature or executive branch to influence legislation or administrative action. This subsection requires the registration of a person, other than a member of the judicial, legislative, or executive branch, who, as a part of his regular employment, has communicated directly with a member of the legislative or executive branch to influence legislation on behalf of the person by whom he is compensated or reimbursed, whether or not any compensation in addition to the salary for that regular employment is received for the communication.¹¹

Individuals who register are required to provide their name, address, organization's name and address, names and addresses of contributors, and a description of their area(s) of interest. If possible, the registrants are also to provide specific bill number and their positions on the bills.¹²

The registration provisions seems somewhat thorough in many respects. However, there is some dissatisfaction with the way the law works in practice. Hamm and Wiggins described three specific deficiencies. One, individuals who lobby for Texas state agencies are exempted from registration. Two, it appears that lobbyists who are lawyers tend not to register contending that they are representing clients, not lobbying. Three, only the chief lobbyist registers where teams of

¹⁰Bill Dawson, "Andrews opposes nature center road; new plan developed," Houston Chronicle, 8 Feb. 1989, A 13.

¹¹H.B. No. 169, 67th Leg., Regular Session (1981). Article 6252-9c, 3, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes.

¹²Wilbourn E. Benton, Texas Politics: Constraints and Opportunities (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1984), p. 134.

lobbyists have been assembled.¹³ Pettus and Bland contend that the information provided "only gives us a hint of the extent of the lobbying activity and deals with only one resource (money) that is important in elections."¹⁴

The registration provisions have helped in providing information on the state level interest group population. However, the provisions have been deficient in some respects. At times, the intentions of the registrant is stated in somewhat vague terms. This vagueness can make it difficult to ascertain what the group's goal actually is. Furthermore, it appears that many lobbyists go unregistered. These aspects make it difficult to use the state's records to provide a thorough description of the bay's state-level interest group community.

INTEREST GROUP TYPOLOGY AND DELINEATION

Given the limitations and difficulties described above, delineating and classifying the bay area interest group population is a challenging task. Nevertheless, a knowledge of this type is critical in understanding interest group influence.

Interest groups for the most part are organized around the nine primary uses of the bay. These include:

1. Transportation. The bay is used for both oceanic and barge shipping. Furthermore, pipelines employed to transport oil and gas line the bay's bottom.
2. Petroleum production. Oil and gas wells are scattered throughout the bay waters.
3. Industrial production. Many industries such as petroleum refineries and chemical producers ring the bay.
4. Waste disposal. Municipal and industrial wastes have long been discharged into the bay.
5. Commercial fishing. The bay has been shown to produce spawning and nursery grounds for eighty percent of the total catch from the Texas Gulf Coast. Each year the bay ranks near the top in both finfish and shell fish production in Texas.
6. Sport fishing. Large numbers of people use the bay for boat, wade and bank fishing.
7. Recreation. This includes hunting, boating, sailing, sightseeing, birdwatching and swimming.
8. Wildlife and fisheries management. The bay waters and adjacent wetlands are highly productive spawning and nursery areas for marine life. Large numbers of waterfowl move through or spend the winter in the bay area.
9. Preservation of Galveston Bay as an ecological system. Focus here is on the bay as a natural resource rather than an economic resource.¹⁵

From the groups concerned with this assortment of uses, five possible major types of interest groups emerge:

1. Business. This type includes interest groups that make claims that will enhance their businesses' interests. It excludes commercial fishing groups and is primarily

¹³Keith E. Hamm and Charles W. Wiggins, "The Transformation of Texas Interest Group Politics: From Personal To Informational Lobbying," unpublished article (Texas A&M University) 1987, p. 8.

¹⁴Beryl E. Pettus and Randall W. Bland, Texas Government Today (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1986), p. 207.

¹⁵Charles W. Wiggins and James E. Anderson, "The Governance of Galveston Bay," A paper prepared for presentation at the 49th National Conference of the American Society of Public Administration, Portland, Oregon. (April 16-20, 1988) pp. 3-4.

- concerned with the first four uses listed above.
2. Commercial fishing. This type is similar to the above group but includes only those groups engaged in a type of activity designed to gain economically from the marine life resources that the bay has to offer.
3. Sporting and recreation. This group is primarily concerned with uses 4, 6, 7 and 8.
4. Environmental. This type of interest group seeks to maintain a "healthy" bay. All uses are of interest to them.
5. Governmental. Different governmental agencies have interests in different uses. Some agencies, such as the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, have an interest in many of the above uses. The Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority, on the other hand, is primarily interested only in use number 4. The vast majority of the operations of governmental entities are not interest group activities. The author is including agencies as a type of interest group only in a very qualified sense, that is when they seek to influence the actions of other agencies.

Not all groups fit neatly into this typology. Although sporting and recreation are its major interests, the Gulf Coast Conservation Association is apt to take a stand on issues involving any of these uses. Furthermore, some general groups, such as the League of Women Voters, really do not have niches in this typology; however, the League has taken stances and been active on issues involving many of these uses. Nevertheless, the bulk of the interest groups do fall roughly into one of the five categories.

Table 1 shows a delineation of major interest groups by type. It is based on multiple sources, such as newspaper accounts of bay issues, personal interviews with state and local officials, as well as interest group representatives, and relevant government documents. The list is not exhaustive. The goal is to identify only those groups which are prominent and have a relatively stable presence on the "Bay scene". Table 2 shows a delineation of governmental agencies which were identified as playing an important role in policy making on the bay.

The above description is largely based on a reputational approach to delineating the interest group population. Another approach to ascertaining interest group populations is the case study approach. It involves the thorough analysis of a single issue or piece of legislation. The aim of the analysis is to reveal the composition of the involved interest group population and to shed some light on interest group dynamics.

A good case study opportunity was recently offered as a result of a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers proposal. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has proposed several enhancements to the ship channels which cross Galveston Bay. The plan is for the Houston Ship Channel to be deepened to fifty feet from the present forty feet and widened to 600 feet from the present 400 feet from the confluence of the Channel and Texas City Channel to the vicinity of the Shell Docks at Boggy Bayou in Houston. Other enhancements are proposed for Clinton Island Turning Basin and the Galveston Channel.¹⁶ The plan has generated a tremendous amount of controversy. From the typology offered previously, the business group category has for the most part supported the plan in a somewhat weak fashion. However, Shell Oil and Exxon have expressed opposition to the Channel enlargement. The port authorities are about the only non-business groups to support the plan. Environmental and sport and recreation groups have largely condemned the plan. Many governmental agencies have expressed serious reservations.

The current status of the proposal is uncertain. The Port of Houston is the local sponsor of the project. The leading congressional proponent of the Port of Houston is U.S. Representative Jack Fields. He has urged the Corps to negotiate with the opposing groups in order that a compromise might be reached. He has however expressed the opinion that the enhancements of the project

¹⁶"Channel Noise," Texas Shores, (Spring 1987), p. 13.

appear desirable, but consideration of the environment of the bay is necessary. He states, "To me, the main thing is to see that Galveston Bay is environmentally preserved but that it is also commercially developed."¹⁷ Representative Fields has strong spokespersons for both sides of the issue residing in his district. Recent comments by the civilian chief of the Corps suggest that the future of the enlargement is in doubt.¹⁸ It is presently unknown whether the enlargements will take place; however, the environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared by the Corps for the proposal in July of 1987 provides an excellent source for a case study concerning interest group involvement and input.

The Corps held a public meeting on September 29, 1986 to discuss the proposal. All interested parties were given five minutes for an oral presentation. Written and mail-in statements were also accepted. Mail-in statements were to be provided to the Corps within thirty days. Extensions were permissible upon request to the Corps within the allotted thirty days.¹⁹

What follows is an analysis of the written comments offered by interested groups. (Table 3 in the appendix lists all of the commentors classified by the typology earlier offered.) The position of each commentor was classified into one of four categories--for the project, had reservations, against, or no position. The position was extrapolated from the written comments presented to the Corps. Figure 1 shows the percentage distribution of commentors by category of interest group. There were 174 total comments. Eighty percent of the comments came from the category of business. No other category even came close. The next largest group was governmental with only twelve percent of the comments.

Table 4 provides a category by category analysis. Ninety-four percent of the business commentors supported the proposal, while only three percent expressed reservations and two percent were against. Only nine percent of governmental agencies were for the proposal. Thirty-one percent had reservations, and the largest percent of the governmental agencies, thirty-six percent, were against the project. No environmental group was for the project. Fifty-five percent had reservations, and forty-five percent were against the proposal. Only one sport and recreation group commented, and it was against the proposal. No written comments included in the EIS were from a commercial fishing group member.

Upon initial examination, the business community appears strongly committed to the project. It submitted eighty percent of the comments, ninety-four percent of which were supportive. However, a closer look casts some uncertainty upon the actual commitment of many of the business commentors. Over fifty-eight percent of the commentors from the business group submitted form letters. The letters were all composed of the identical language, with only minor variations from time to time. The overwhelming majority of the form letters contained absolutely identical language. Exhibit 1 in the appendix is a copy of one of the form letters submitted. Figure 2 is identical to Figure 1 except that the submitters of form letters have been segregated into a separate slice of the pie. Some submitters of form letters may have a real commitment to the project; nevertheless, their large numbers cast some doubt on the depth of support present within the business category. In addition, the average length of letters from the business category overall was 1.06 pages. The average length of letters from the environmental group category was 5.55 pages. This difference may be indicative to some degree of the intensity of support or opposition.

From this analysis, some broad observations about interest group involvement in the ship

¹⁷Lori Rodriguez, "Ship Channel Plan Alternative Sought," The Houston Chronicle, 25 Sept. 1988, p. 8A.

¹⁸Kate Thomas, "Corps chief suspends work on enlarging of ship channel," The Houston Post, 5 March 1989, A7.

¹⁹Galveston Bay Area Navigation Study, Volume 5 Appendix E. Public Involvement, pp. 1-4.

Table 1

Major Interest Groups of Galveston Bay

Business

- Texas Chemical Council
- Mid-Continent Oil and Gas
- Mitchell Energy and Development
- The Mischer Corporation
- Brown and Root
- Exxon Co. USA
- Shell Oil Co.
- Mobil Oil Co.
- Dow Chemical
- Houston Chamber of Commerce
- Galveston Chamber of Commerce
- National Association of Home Builders

Commercial Fishing

- Texas Shrimpers Association
- PISCES
- Texas Oyster Association
- Seafood Producers Association
- Texas Seafood Distributors Association

Environmental

- The Sierra Club
- The Audubon Society
- The Galveston Bay Foundation
- The League of Women Voters
- The Texas Committee of Natural Resources
- The Environmental Defense Fund
- The Center for Marine Conservation
- The Wildlife Society
- The Texas Organization of Endangered Species
- The Texas Nature Conservancy

Sports & Recreation

- Gulf Coast Conservation Association
- The Sportsmen's Club of Texas
- Sport Political Action Committee
- Houston Sportsmen's Club

channel issue may be made. One, business groups predominate. Two, level of support is not always observable from superficial statistics. Although business groups commented favorably in large numbers, the intensity of their support is uncertain. Three, the category of the typology which is presumably comprised of the lowest SES members--commercial fishing--offered no written comments. Even though this category had a stake in the matter, its failure to offer comments supports the body of literature which holds that lower socio-economic status (SES) generally translates into lower political participation.²⁰ Four, the process is competitive. It is very difficult for just one party to prevail. Five, many of the interviews conducted in connection with this paper revealed that there is a growing perception that environmental groups are becoming more sophisticated. The emotional approach is becoming a less-frequently employed tool. The thorough and technical approach evidenced in their comments confirms this perception.

What can be learned from the reputational and case study approaches used here to describe the interest group population? One, some dynamics of the interest group activity were revealed. Two, many of the major actors were identified. However, not all groups identified as prominent under the reputational approach were identified as active in the case study issue. This once again calls to mind the issue-specific nature of much of the interest group community. Many of the groups which commented on the ship channel issue often take no position on other bay issues.

TACTICS

Texas political histories are filled with stories and descriptions of the activities and predations of lobbyists. One account portrays the lobbyists at work in this manner:

Low salaries didn't bother many of the legislators, for it was not legislators but lobbyists--lobbyists for oil companies, railroads, banks, utilities--who did the presiding in Austin: in the capitol's bars and brothels, where they dispensed "beefsteak, bourbon and blondes" so liberally that some descriptions of turn-of-the-century legislative sessions read like descriptions of one long orgy; in its backrooms, where the decisions were made; even on the floor of the Legislature, which lobbyists roamed at will, often sitting at legislators' desks and sometimes casting votes on behalf of absent Representatives.²¹

Interest groups have long used a variety of means to further their interests in the state capitol. During the time that Sam Johnson, Lyndon B. Johnson's father, served in the Texas House of Representatives, many of the lobbyists were said to have, "maintained charge accounts at Austin warehouses for their legislator friends."²² Most observers believe the bulk of lobbyists today have gotten away from the crudity of the above tactic. New forms of lobbying have, however, emerged to keep the lobbyists' "arsenal" of tactics full. These tactics and some examples of their "deployment" on bay issues are discussed in this section.

Lobbying

Lobbying has been defined "the process wherein group representatives interact with public decision makers in hope of influencing policy."²³ Lobbying is generally perceived as featuring a good deal of interpersonal communication, but political scientist Samuel C. Patterson suggests that there are at least three lobbyist role orientations:

²⁰Betty H. Zisk, American Political Interest Groups: Readings in Theory and Research (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 300-314.

²¹Robert A. Caro, The Path to Power (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), p. 46.

²²Caro, p. 79.

²³Anderson et al., p. 101.

Table 2

Governmental Agencies

Federal Agencies

- US Fish and Wildlife Service
- US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
- US Environmental Protection Agency
- US Army Corps of Engineers

State Agencies

- Texas Parks and Wildlife Department
- Texas Water Commission
- Texas Water Development Board
- Texas General Land Office
- Texas Department of Health
- Texas Railroad Commission
- Texas A&M Sea Grant
- University of Texas' Bureau of Economic Geology

Regional/Local Agencies

- Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority
- Houston Port Authority
- Houston-Galveston Area Council
- Galveston Port Authority
- Texas City Port Authority
- Liberty Port Authority
- Trinity River Authority
- San Jacinto River Authority
- The Cities of Houston, Pasadena, Liberty, Galveston, Clear Lake City, Anchorage and scores of others
- The Counties of Harris, Chambers, Galveston, and Liberty
- Many Special Districts

Note:

Government entities are not interest groups. However, they at times perform certain activities that resemble typical interest group functions.

1) The Contact Man: this type of lobbyist emphasizes the interpersonal communication mentioned above. He or she tries to "get in that door" and get to know the legislators personally. Per many close observers, the lead Sierra Club lobbyist in Austin for the last few years could be said to fit this description. He puts a great emphasis on interpersonal communication skills.

2) The Informant: this lobbyist tries to promote the cause by distributing information to legislators by means of written or spoken testimony before hearings. He or she seeks to persuade with "facts", not personality.

3) The Watchdog: This lobbyist observes the decision-making process from a distance. He or she closely watches legislative and agency calendars for important events. The membership is alerted if crucial issues arise.²⁴

Few lobbyists or interest groups employ only one orientation in reality. Most use a combination of the three. Most interest groups hire (at least occasionally) at least one person with "contact" skills. The informant role appears to have become more important in recent years in Texas.²⁵ Groups such as the Center for Marine Conservation put a great deal of emphasis on putting together informative pieces on bay-related issues. The group has been recently active in researching ocean dumping off the coast.²⁶ The watchdog role is also frequently used as a means to mobilize "the troops". As was discussed earlier, the fulfillment of this role by parties sympathetic to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' proposed ship channel enlargement project, has resulted in a shallow, yet extensive show of support from the business community around the bay. Whatever role is used, interest groups can provide lawmakers with clear, concise messages that are often difficult to ascertain from their constituency.

These three role orientations are not just used to persuade legislators, but they are used to also lobby the Texas administrative agencies, courts and governor's office.²⁷ In fact, Hamm and Wiggins found a significant amount of communication between interest groups and the state agencies.²⁸ This would appear to be a significant finding. For in the absence of close legislative attention to bay policy, sizable discretion may rest with the agencies with bay responsibilities. This is certain to attract the attention of interest groups. The eagerness (or reluctance) with which the Texas Water Commission issues discharge permits would certainly be a cause of concern for bay industries. Particularly in Texas, it would be inaccurate to think of lobbying as an activity that only seeks to persuade legislators.

Informing the Public

Groups seek to inform and persuade the public on issues in the hope that this will lead to favorable public policy. Furthermore, bay issues tend to be complex, and interest groups can present easily-understood explanations. Per political scientists Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, "reaching out to the public" can serve one or both of two purposes. One, it can lead the audience to become favorable to an organization. Two, it can lead the audience to adopt a position similar to that

²⁴Samuel C. Patterson, "The Role of the Lobbyist: The Case of Oklahoma," Journal of Politics, 25 (1963), p. 83.

²⁵Hamm and Wiggins, p. 20.

²⁶Norman Martin, "The Ties That Bind," Texas Shores, (Summer 1987), p. 18.

²⁷Anderson et al., p. 107.

²⁸Hamm and Wiggins, p. 20.

**Table 4 Positions Of Groups On
Houston Ship Channel Issue**

Category	Position			
	For	Res	Against	No Pos
BUS	131(94%)	5(3.5%)	3(2.1%)	0(0%)
GOV	2(9%)	7(32%)	8(36%)	5(23%)
ENV	0(0%)	5(55%)	4(45%)	0(0%)
S&R	0(0%)	0(0%)	1(100%)	0(0%)
OTH	3(100%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)

BUS - Business

GOV - Governmental

ENV - Environmental

S&R - Sport and Recreation

OTH - Other

For - for proposal

Res - has reservations

Against - against
proposal

No Pos - took no
position

Source: GBAN, Volume 5, Appendix E.

of the organization on an issue or group of issues.²⁹ The efforts can take many forms: seminars, television or radio spots, billboards, mailouts, newspaper advertisements, etc. In 1988, at least two interest groups made significant use of the television medium. One, the Texas A&M Sea Grant Program ran a few spots in order to bring an awareness to the litter problems facing Texas beaches and waters. Two, Ducks Unlimited ran a number of spots emphasizing the need for wetlands preservation.

Electioneering

Interest groups often seek to influence the election process. "Organized groups have found they get more favorable responses from public officials they have helped get elected."³⁰ There are three major ways that groups attempt to help their candidate: ratings, endorsements and campaign assistance.³¹

Many groups put together scorecards to rate candidates on various criteria. Most look at votes on key issues throughout the candidate's most recent term of office. A typical scorecard displays an incumbent's voting record on a dozen to two dozen measures and attempts to rate the candidate on a scale of some sort. Many environmental groups prepare such scorecards.

Endorsements allow groups to explicitly declare their preference. Endorsements have been frequently employed by labor groups, but other types of groups also engage in this activity from time to time. For example, the Sierra Club endorsed Texas State Representative Terral Smith in 1986. He is the chair of the Committee on Natural Resources. The effectiveness of such endorsements is largely unknown.³²

There are legal restrictions on the amount of financial aid a group can provide to a candidate in Texas. This has led to the creation of many political action committees (PAC's). PAC's, with their greater campaign contributions flexibility, have grown phenomenally in Texas. There are close to a thousand PAC's tied to interest groups in Texas.³³ About half of these PAC's represent business. The ramifications of PAC growth are unknown. One theory is that PAC money is merely the money that was once provided to candidates in a disguised form. However, if it is "new" contributions, as a second theory contends, business donations have increased and are apt to affect public policy in a manner favorable to business. In the 1980 U.S. Congressional races, about sixty percent of PAC money originated from business.³⁴ Little research exists to date on the effects of PAC money at the state level.

Litigation

Litigation is a frequently employed tool to force agencies to implement programs in ways more acceptable to interest group members. Anderson, et. al. state: "Following a national trend,

²⁹Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and American Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), p. 170.

³⁰Anderson et al., p. 106.


³¹Schlozman and Tierney, pp. 210-219.

³²Ibid., p. 215.

³³Hamm and Wiggins, p. 14.

³⁴Schlozman and Tierney, p. 249.

Figure 1
Distribution of Commentors
by Category




S&R had one comment-.06%.
CF had no comments

Source: GBAN, Volume 6, Appendix E.

*BUS-Business, ENV Environmental, GOV-governmental, OTH-Other,
S&R-Sport and Recreation, CF-Commercial Fishing

Figure 2
Distribution of Commentors by
Category/Form Letters Isolated



Source: GBAN, Volume 6, Appendix E.

Texas groups have increasingly turned to the courts to resolve political issues.³⁵ However groups are often reluctant to take their cases to court. As Schlozman and Tierney have observed:

Although the benefits may be substantial in the event of a legal victory, the planning and execution of litigation can be extraordinarily difficult, expensive, and time-consuming. Moreover, the consequences of an unfavorable court decision may be great, since it represents an immediate setback for the organization and also helps set a precedent that may serve to frustrate the organization's policy aspirations for years to come.³⁶

Even though litigation appears to have some serious disadvantages, the bay scene has featured a sizable amount of litigation. Litigation has played a prominent role in the Wallisville Dam controversy. The U.S. Army Corp of Engineers started the Wallisville Dam in 1966. The goal was mainly a 19,000 acre water supply reservoir to serve the City of Houston. Environmentalists were able to obtain a federal court injunction to stop work on the dam in 1973 as it neared completion. The injunction was finally lifted in 1987 by a three-judge panel from the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals. The completion of the dam is now dependent upon the supporters of the project being able to line up financing. Apparently, the project will now require a greater financial commitment from the City of Houston.³⁷ However, future court action may be on the horizon, for the Sierra Club, the Houston Audubon Society, the Houston Sportsmen's Club and other environmental groups are seeking a rehearing of the case before the full 15-judge appeals court in New Orleans.³⁸

Not only environmental groups use litigation; other types of groups in the bay area have also been known to employ it. House Bill 1000 took effect on September 1, 1981. The law prohibited the sale of redfish and speckled trout caught in Texas waters. George Solis, owner of Gulf Queen Seafoods in Houston, and Pat Pace, owner of Pace Seafoods in Brownsville, sought an injunction in federal court in Brownsville against House Bill 1000 just before it was scheduled to take effect. The two assembled a knowledgeable group of people to testify for their cause. While admitting some possible deficiencies of information existed during the legislative process, Judge James DeAnda refused to overturn the ban. He stated that it was up to the legislature to decide which species should be protected.³⁹

Coalitions

Groups often seek to maximize their influence by forming coalitions with other like-minded groups. Jeffery M. Berry defines coalitions as, "explicit working relationships among groups for the purpose of achieving a public policy goal."⁴⁰ Because interest group activities are often expensive, there is quite an incentive to pool resources and efforts.

Coalitions vary in two major respects. One, they vary in terms of how much the partners have in common. Two, the duration of the coalition varies greatly. Some coalition are ad hoc,

³⁵Anderson et al., p. 107.

³⁶Schlozman and Tierney, p. 364.

³⁷Stephen Harrigan, "Worked to Death," Texas Monthly, October 1988, p. 198.

³⁸Harold Scarlett, "Reservoir Opponents to Request Hearing," The Houston Post, 16 May 1987, A 18:1.

³⁹Richard T. Christian, "Decision Making in Coastal Fisheries Conflict: The Case of Red Drum and Spotted Seatrout Legislation in Texas," Thesis. Texas A&M University 1986, pp. 94-97.

⁴⁰Jeffrey M. Berry, Lobbying for the People (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 254.

"coalitions of the moment." Some are of longer duration.⁴¹

Some groups have enough in common that they can coalesce on almost every major issue. The environmental groups concerned with the bay often act in concert. The Wallisville Dam case cited earlier illustrates coalition activity among interest groups. It is apparent that the environmental groups were also in close contact during the selection of members to the committees that are to participate in the Galveston portion of the National Estuary Program.⁴² Sport and recreational groups can often form coalitions with environmental groups, but not always. The two groups' agendas sometimes differ or even conflict.

An interview with an Audubon Society representative revealed that the group is in frequent contact with other groups. Lasting relationships are forged over the years. Ken Kramer of the Sierra Club was cited as being particularly effective at coalition building. Recreation groups have also forged coalitions of lasting duration. The Sportsmen Club of Texas is a long-standing coalition comprised of sixty-four affiliated clubs in Texas. Coalitions, however, are not always long standing. Recreational and commercial fishermen are usually at odds with each other. Nevertheless, they have formed temporary, although somewhat distant, coalitions on fresh-water inflow issues.⁴³ The fiscal conservatives-environmentalists coalition to support the Coastal Barriers Act of 1982 is another example of a temporary coalition. The coalition felt that federal flood and disaster insurance, which subsidizes coastal development with low-cost insurance, is an unwise use of taxpayers' money and a threat to valuable natural resources.⁴⁴

Other Tactics

Groups use a wide variety of other tactics. Groups may try to influence the appointment of sympathetic members to relevant boards or commissions in Texas. McCleskey reports that attempts are made to influence legislative committee chair selections.⁴⁵ Groups may establish ex-officio memberships for individuals who occupy various governmental or industry posts. The Galveston Bay Foundation has employed this tactic in an attempt to get government officials active in their organization. Groups may attempt to use a twist on the opponents' arguments to support their cause. Many letters written to the Corps by members of the business category supporting the proposed ship channel enlargement cited the environmental risk of spills (from ship collisions) present due to the narrow width of the ship channel.⁴⁶

EFFECTIVENESS

Are the above tactics effective? Would Texas public policy be measurably different if there were no interest groups? These questions focus attention on a fundamental problem of political

⁴¹Schlozman and Tierney, p. 48.

⁴²Bill Dawson, "Environmental Leaders Angry Over Nominee," The Houston Chronicle, 21 Oct. 1988, p. 25A.

Harold Scarlett, "Clement's Picks for Bay Committee Draw Generally Favorable Reviews," The Houston Post, 19 Nov. 1988, A 16:1.

⁴³Dotty Curtsinger, "Water," Texas Shores, (Summer 1985), p. 22.

⁴⁴Lona Dearmont, p. 19.

⁴⁵McCleskey et al., p. 133.

⁴⁶The Galveston Bay Area Navigation Study (EIS prepared by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) Volume 5 Appendix E. Public Involvement, July 1987.

science. It is very difficult to measure the effectiveness of interest groups. As Wiggins states:

As with other types of influence, interest group influence within most political contexts has been most difficult to measure. This is partially because group lobbying initiatives serve both influential and information ends, partially because lobbying takes place within a decisional context, and partially because the "quantity of change" produced in the object of a particular initiative (a lawmaker's voting propensity, for example) is not only difficult to measure, but its exact source or cause is difficult to isolate.⁴⁷

Substantive literature concerning the impacts of interest groups is scarce, particularly at the state level. In terms of water resources, Wayne Francis found that interest groups are very frequently contacted by legislators on matters of this subject. His fifty state study found that water resource issues ranked second on his list of policy areas that sought to rank policy areas by the frequency of consultation of interest groups by legislators.⁴⁸

Most literature concerning Texas indicates that interest groups are strong. Anderson et al. contend, "Comparatively, interest groups are probably more important in the Texas legislative process than they are in the U.S. Congress or most other state legislatures."⁴⁹ McCleskey states that the lobby is one of the most important influences on legislative behavior.⁵⁰ Hamm and Wiggins found interest groups to be still very powerful in Texas, but no group or combination of groups seems to "call the shots" on a consistent basis.⁵¹ The last statement introduces an important point: the interest group community is very diverse. It is counter-productive to discuss interest groups as though they were a whole, a "monolith" of sorts. Rather, it appears very difficult to make many meaningful generalizations about the interest group community active in Texas and on bay issues in particular.

The resources available to a group will help shape its actions.⁵² Television spots and full-time Austin lobbyists are available to the "wealthier" groups. "Poorer" groups may have to operate out of garages or the like. Correspondence by mail may be the only communication medium available to such groups. One Texas representative explained in a personal interview that the smaller impact that environmental groups appear to have in Texas is attributable to the smaller amount of resources. Nevertheless, larger resources do not always translate into victory. In 1981, the Texas Medical Association (TMA) was perceived as "stonewalling" over a gentlemen's agreement associated with the Medical Practices Act under which the medical doctors had agreed to permit the governor to appoint three doctors of osteopathy to the medical board. The Texas Osteopathic Medical Association had only one lobbyist to get its message across. The TMA had twelve lobbyists. Numbers or resources did not matter in this case. The speaker, Billy Clayton, got so upset with the TMA, that he went out of his way to get some pro-D.O. legislation drafted.⁵³

Now the above case may be the exception, but interest group contests are far from "cut and

⁴⁷Charles W. Wiggins, "Interest Group Involvement and Success Within a State Legislative System," in Norman Luttbeg, Public Opinion and Public Policy, (1981), p. 227.

⁴⁸Francis, pp. 709-710.

⁴⁹Anderson et al., p. 142.

⁵⁰McCleskey et al., p. 145.

⁵¹Hamm and Wiggins, pp. 23-24.

⁵²Berry, p. 204.

⁵³Pettus and Bland, pp. 100-101.

dried". In fact, when Charles W. Wiggins, Keith E. Hamm and Charles G. Bell looked at interest groups' effectiveness in Texas in 1983, the groups had a seemingly mediocre performance. In looking at various legislation, groups got their way only 23.5% of the time when their desires conflicted with the governor. Groups got their way 25.0% of the time when their desires conflicted with the majority leadership. The groups succeeded 96.2% and 73.0% when the governor and the majority leadership concurred with their position respectively.⁵⁴ The most difficult question that these figures raise is, how much of the governor's and majority leadership's support stems from interest group activity? This is a very difficult question to answer.

Some speculation is possible about the relative strength of some of the interest groups which are at least sometimes active on bay-related issues. It would be possible to list some pertinent data, such as number of members and size of resources, for each of the groups. These data could be compared to assess the relative strength of each group. However, this approach could lead to some faulty conclusions. If strength is defined as the ability of the group to affect political outcomes in a manner more favorable to it, then such "logistical" data may be misleading.

Although a large membership and abundant resources may contribute to success, it does not by any means ensure success. It may be best then to speculate on the relative strength of interest groups on the basis of the results of the reputational approach employed in the compilation of tables 1 and 2. In putting those lists together, certain groups were mentioned as being influential far more than the rest.

Although the term "business groups" was frequently used to describe a powerful segment of interest groups interested in the bay, two were most often mentioned--The Texas Chemical Council and the Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association. It was widely stated that these two groups were very influential on matters of interest to the petroleum or chemical industry. One source suggested that the Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association played a significant role in Texas' failure to participate in the Coastal Zone Management Program (CZMP).⁵⁵ Georgia is the only other coastal state aside from Texas that does not participate in the program. However, other observers stated that Texas did not participate in the CZMP because it did not have sufficient authority over privately-held wetlands to meet the criteria as specified by the CZMP guidelines.

Of the many environmental groups active on bay matters, three are recognized far more often than the others as being influential--the Sierra Club, the Audubon Society, and the Galveston Bay Foundation. The Sierra Club and the Audubon Society were very important in the Wallisville Dam controversy. Furthermore, they have had a high profile in protesting the ship channel enlargement project. The Galveston Bay Foundation has been very active in the National Estuary Program and on the Houston Ship Channel issue.

The Gulf Coast Conservation Association and the Sportsmen's Club of Texas are the two most recognized as being influential in the sport and recreation category. Both groups are said to have played instrumental roles in the passage of House Bill 1000. Furthermore, the two groups have been active on fresh water inflow issues.⁵⁶

PISCES, the Texas Oyster Association and the Texas Shrimp Association are the three

⁵⁴Charles W. Wiggins, Keith E. Hamm and Charles G. Bell, "Interest Group and Party Influence Agents in the Legislative Process: A Comparative State Analysis," unpublished paper, (Texas A&M University and the University of California-Davis), table 6.

⁵⁵The Coastal Zone Management Program is a federal assistance program offered to the states run by NOAA's Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management. Its goal is to assist states in managing their coastal resources through the provision of various grants and technical assistance.

⁵⁶Dotty Curtsinger, p. 22.

commercial fishing groups most widely mentioned as being influential. Relative to the interest groups listed above, however, these groups appear to have significantly less influence. Several commentators suggested that these groups' constituencies are comprised of "independent types" who find it difficult to act in concert. PISCES played a major role in the House Bill 1000 debate. The Texas Oyster Association had some impact on the Texas Oyster Fishery Management Plan adopted by the TPWD in 1988. Both the Texas Shrimp Association and PISCES have had some input on TPWD's Texas Oyster and Shrimp Fisheries Management Plans. The two groups have different constituencies, however, which limit their ability to coalesce. PISCES represents the bay shrimpers, and the Texas Shrimp Association represents the Gulf shrimpers. The Texas Shrimp Association typically seeks to limit the allowable catch for the bay shrimpers because Gulf shrimpers contend that the more shrimp caught in the bay, the less there will be to catch in the Gulf. The bay shrimpers claim that there is no relationship between what is caught in the bay and what is caught in the Gulf.⁵⁷

The above groups are the ones most frequently mentioned as being generally influential. However, other groups are seen as being powerful on particular issues. For instance, the National Association of Realtors and the National Association of Home Builders appear to be somewhat influential on federal flood and disaster insurance debates.⁵⁸ Furthermore, sometimes a group's power is not demonstrated by its power to get a particular piece of legislation passed but rather its ability to see that it never gets on the agenda, or is killed if it does. For instance, the state's lack of authority over privately-held wetlands is of major concern to most marine biologists in the state. Wetlands preservation is critical to both the water fowl population and the marine life present in the bay. Yet it appears that this issue has not received serious consideration by the legislature. It is not apparent whether this lack of consideration can be linked to a particular interest group's activities. The presence of "niche influence" and "hidden influence" further compound the difficulties encountered when speculating on the relative strengths of interest group communities.

CONCLUSION

As Truman noted, groups are an integral part of "the government institution."⁵⁹ Galveston Bay is no exception, for interest groups appear to play an integral part in the governance of the bay. Much information comes to light as a result of their presence. Legislators and their staffs are given clear messages through their efforts. Many of the groups are given opportunities to help shape public policy towards the bay through commenting and testimony on legislation, as well as less formal interactions with policy makers. As a result, they do have input into the policy process. An understanding of the interest group population and its activities is necessary in order to fully understand the policy-making processes through which the public programs and management policies of Galveston Bay are determined.

⁵⁷Lauraine Miller, 6:2.

⁵⁸Lona Dearmont, p. 19.

⁵⁹Truman, p. 503.

Appendix

Table 3 - Interest Groups which
Commented on Corps' Proposal
Exhibit 1 - Sample of Form Letter

Table 3

Interest Groups Which Commented on the Corps' Proposal

Sources : Volume 5 of the GBAN
Commentors by group type

	FOR	RES	AGN	NO
1. Governmental				
City of Crystal Beach			1	
US Housing and Urban Dev.				1
US Nat'l Marine Fisheries Ser.			1	
US Nat'l Oceanic and Atmos. A			1	
US Dept. of the Int.			1	
US Env. Protection Agency			1	
Texas Water Commission		1		
General Land Office			1	
Bureau of Eco. Geology			1	
Texas Historical Comm.		1		
Texas Water Development Bd.		1		
Texas Dept. of Health				1
Gov. White's Office		1		
Texas Air Control Board				1
TX Dept. of Highways & Pub. Trans.				1
TX Economic Development Comm.				1
Texas Parks & Wildlife Dept.		1		
Port of Freeport	1			
County of Galveston			1	
Houston-Galveston Area Coun.		1		
Gulf of Mexico Fisheries Coun.		1		
U of Houston-Ind. Technology	1			
2. Sport and Recreation				
Sportman's Club of Texas, Inc.			1	
3. Environmental				
National Wildlife Federation			1	
Environmental Defense Fund		1		
Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter		1		
Outdoor Nature Club			1	
Center for Environmental Educ.		1		
McFarland and Associates			1	
Sierra Club, Lower Rio Grande			1	
James B. Blackburn, Jr.		1		
League of Women Voters of Houston		1		
4. Commercial Fishing				
No Commenters				

5. Business	FOR	RES	AGN	NO
LaPorte-Bayshore C of Commerce	1			
Superior Packing, Inc.	1			
FET International, Inc.	1			
E. R. Hawthorne & Co., Inc.	1			
Commercial Cartage Co., Inc.	1			
Hou-Tex Transportation, Inc.	1			
Schenkers, Forwards, Inc.	1			
Panalpina Houston	1			
Salinas Forwarding Co., Inc.	1			
Vamco, Virginia Miller & Co.	1			
Care Shipping, Inc.	1			
N/J International Inc.	1			
Putnam International Cargo Ser.	1			
The 7 Santini Brothers, Movers	1			
Consolidated Freight Forwarding	1			
Express Trucking, Inc.	1			
Gulf and Eastern Steamship	1			
Quality Customs Broker	1			
Normco Leasing, Inc.	1			
Dominion Shipping Corp.	1			
RAM, Restricted Art. Management	1			
Marko	1			
H. E. Ripple & Co.	1			
S'Western Barge Fleet Service	1			
Dow Chemical, USA	1			
Paktank Corp.	1			
Glendale Boat Works, Inc.	1			
Houston Fuel Oil Terminal Co.	1			
International Marine Associates	1			
Sea Gulf Maritime, Inc.	1			
R. S. Platou, Inc.	1			
CBE USA International, Inc.	1			
Dickson Weatherproof Nail Co.	1			
Fritz Companies, Inc.	1			
Buffalo Marine Service, Inc.	1			
Atrahersa/Intertransit, Inc.	1			
Christi Flanagan & Co.	1			
Feinstein & Morris, Inc.	1			
Central Forwarding, Inc.	1			
T.H.E. Packaging Co., Inc.	1			
Phoenix Motor Express, Inc.	1			
Import Terminal Service	1			
Stolt-Nielson, Inc.	1			
Burlington Northern Intermodal	1			
England Transportation Co.	1			
Dynamic Ocean Services Intern'l.	1			
Morris Export Crating Co.	1			
Mistletoe Express Service	1			
Oiltanking of Texas, Inc.	1			
Walton & Son	1			
E. N. Henson and Associates	1			
J. W. Jones, Inc.	1			
Navios Shi. Agencies, Inc. (LA)	1			
Young & Company	1			
Armanda Shipping Inc.	1			
Four Winds	1			

	FOR	RES	AGN	NO
Gleneagle Ship Management Co.	1			
Evans and Wood & Co., Inc.	1			
Volkswagon of America, Inc.	1			
Haltermann	1			
Chemical Tankers of America	1			
Dravo Mechling Corporation	1			
Terminal Services Houston, Inc.	1			
Interpipe, Inc.	1			
Brown & Root Marine	1			
Navios Ship Agencies, Inc.	1			
Don Love, Inc.	1			
Kainer Export Crating, Inc.	1			
Expeditors International Inc.	1			
Texas Petrochemicals Corp.	1			
Denka Chemical Corp.	1			
Barwil	1			
Baytank (Houston) Inc.	1			
Odjell Wesfal-Larsen (USA) Inc.	1			
Stone Forwarding Co.	1			
McLean Cargo Specialists, Inc.	1			
Ethyl Corporation-Houston Plant	1			
Burlington Northern Ocean Forward	1			
Evergreen Line/Evergreen Marine	1			
Interfirst Bank Houston, N.A.	1			
E.S. Binnings, Inc.	1			
Constable & Madison, Inc.	1			
Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc.	1			
J. R. Bencal & Associates	1			
The Houston World Trade Asso.	1			
Export Packing Operations	1			
Coopers & Lybrand, C.P.A.'s	1			
Stair Cargo Service, Inc.	1			
Caesar J. Thibodeaux, Inc.	1			
W. W. Trucking, Inc.	1			
SCAC Texas, Inc.	1			
Containership Agency, Inc.	1			
Stapp Towing Company, Inc.	1			
Houston West Chamber of Comm.	1			
B&D Customhouse Brokers, Inc.	1			
Teh Tung Steamship (Houston)	1			
Jacintoport Corporation	1			
Bludworth Bond Shipyard, Inc.	1			
Rayan-Walsh Stevedoring Co.	1			
Southern Pacific Trans. Co.	1			
Suderman and Young	1			
Port Terminal Railroad	1			
World Freight Services	1			
M Bank Houston	1			
Watson Van & Storage Co.	1			
Enterprise	1			
GEO, Catus Pipe & Supply Co.	1			
Maritime Survey Agency, Inc.	1			
Baldor Topsoe, Inc.	1			
Burlington Northern Railroad	1			
Magnolia Towing Co., Inc.	1			
Cooper Industries	1			

	FOR	RES	AGN	NO
C & H Transportation Co.	1			
Gulf Motorships, Inc.	1			
The Lemm Corporation	1			
Toyota	1			
World Commerce Forwarding, Inc.	1			
Port Serv. Transportation Co.	1			
Merchants Fast Motor Lines	1			
Central Freight Lines, Inc.	1			
Smith Air, Inc.	1			
Intercontinent Terminal Co.	1			
Sipomarine	1			
Port Services Company of Houston	1			
Hou. Customhouse Brokers & Freight	1			
Swede's Real Estate			1	
Crystal Beach Tourist Asso.			1	
Brown & Root, Inc.	1			
Marlin Fleeting & Services	1			
General Stevedores Inc.	1			
Freight Brokers International	1			
Suater Corporation	1			
Frank P. Dow Div. of FW Myers	1			
Chevron Pipe Line Co.		1		
Shell Pipe Line Co.		1		
Amoco Gas Co.		1		
ARCO Piper Line Co.		1		
Exxon Pipe Line Co.		1		
Tenn-USS Chemicals			1	

6. Other

Denver Harbor Civic Club	1			
Nat'l Defense Trans. Asso.	1			
Steamship Clerks Local 1351	1			

TOTALS	136	17	16	5
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FOR - Expressed Support
 RES - Expressed Reservations
 AGN - Expressed Oposition
 NO - No Position Taken

Positions were interpereted
 from comments sent to Corps.

Armada Shipping Inc.

Armada House 14227 Fern Dr. Houston Texas 77055-5522
Telephone (713) 870-1133 Telegram Armadaship
Telex 203261 Fax (713) 870-1571

October 31, 1986

Colonel Gordon M. Clarke
District Engineer
U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
P. O. Box 1229
Galveston, Texas 77553-1229

Dear Colonel Clarke:

I would like to express my support for the proposed deepening and widening of the Houston Ship Channel. This project will ensure Houston's competitive position in the future as a world-class port. International and domestic commerce have built Houston and Harris County into one of the nation's largest metropolitan complexes.

Three times since 1870, the ship channel has been improved without measurable effect on the fishing industry. In fact, the shipping, fishing and recreational industries have grown side by side. I believe, based on the Corps' findings, that we can expect mutual growth in the future.

The proposed project, as I understand it, will not only allow larger and more fully laden ships to call at our port, but would also ensure a greater safety margin. Even though the port has a good safety record, a wider channel would lessen the chance for a collision which may cause spills which could have some environmental impact.

I support continued consideration of this project least we be at a competitive disadvantage with other U.S. ports in the future.

Respectfully,

ARMADA SHIPPING INC.


John Moyell
Vice President

c.c.: Mr. Richard P. Leach
Port of Houston Authority
JM/jb

