

1 **“Is global warming affecting the weather?” Evidence for increased attribution beliefs**
2 **among coastal versus inland U.S. residents.**

3
4 Increasingly, researchers studying public beliefs about global warming have turned to the question
5 of whether individuals have begun to perceive changes to their local climate conditions and to what
6 extent they attribute these changes to the phenomenon of global warming. Perceptions of particular
7 types of extreme events, i.e., extreme heat and droughts, have attracted the most attention, whereas the
8 possible effects of place (such as proximity to coastal areas vulnerable to sea level rise) on public beliefs
9 about the link between changes to weather patterns and global warming have been largely neglected. This
10 study matches geo-located responses to a nationally-representative survey of U.S. residents with climate
11 extremes data in order to investigate the social and physical factors shaping public views about the links
12 between global warming and extreme weather. Specifically, regional-level Climate Extremes Indices (CEI)
13 are modeled together with individual-level socio-demographic characteristics and an indicator of coastal
14 residence to test whether the incidence of extreme events and proximity to the coasts, net of social and
15 economic factors, correspond to increased perceptions that global warming has affected the weather.
16 Results indicate that coastal shoreline county residence significantly predicts individuals’ beliefs about the
17 extent to which global warming is affecting the weather.

18
19 **Keywords:** Climate change; risk perceptions; coastal communities; survey research; climate
20 extremes

21 **Word count:** 8,910

22
23
24
25
26

27 **Introduction**

28 The 2014 National Climate Assessment found that “Human-induced climate change has
29 already increased the number and strength of some of these extreme events,” and that “[o]ver the
30 last 50 years, much of the United States has seen an increase in prolonged periods of excessively
31 high temperatures, more heavy downpours, and in some regions, more severe droughts,” (Melillo
32 et al. 2014). While the scientific consensus about the reality and human causes of global
33 warming has been well documented (Cook et al. 2016), the increasing scientific evidence linking
34 meteorological events with global warming, or attribution science – does not have a similar level
35 of certainty associated with it in the scientific literature (Trenberth et al. 2015; Stott et al. 2016).
36 Climate scientists generally favor an approach that emphasizes how anthropogenic climate
37 change may be magnifying extreme weather events, and recent studies point to changes in large-
38 scale thermodynamic environments (i.e., anomalous sea surface temperatures) as fueling extreme
39 temperatures and atmospheric moisture associated with extreme weather events, such as the 2012
40 superstorm Hurricane Sandy and the 2013 Colorado floods (Trenberth et al. 2015). That said,
41 extreme weather events are by definition infrequent and a single event is not replicable so the
42 attribution of anthropogenic climate change to any single extreme event, or even any extreme
43 event type, is generally only possible through simulation (Trenberth et al. 2015).

44 Since attribution science is still relatively new and public understanding of the difference
45 between weather and climate is limited (Capstick and Pidgeon 2014), it is likely that most
46 individuals interpret local trends in weather-related phenomena through their own social
47 circumstances, relative exposures to events, and evaluative predispositions about environmental
48 issues and hazards. Individuals living near the U.S. coasts in particular have been and may
49 become increasingly more exposed to the adverse impacts of severe weather events than many

50 inland residents, but the extent to which and why individuals in these highly vulnerable areas
51 perceive (or do not perceive) these impacts has not been comprehensively studied. Past research,
52 however, has found some evidence suggesting that proximity to the coasts in other countries is
53 correlated with beliefs about global warming and support for policies to address it (Milfont et al.
54 2014; Zahran et al. 2006; Carlton and Jacobson 2013). For example, a recent study using a
55 national probability sample of New Zealanders found that people living nearest to the shoreline
56 “expressed greater belief that [global warming] is real and greater support for government
57 regulation of carbon emissions,” controlling for age, education, gender, political orientation, and
58 wealth status (Milfont et al. 2014).

59 Although there have been local and regional studies examining the link between risk
60 perceptions, beliefs and attitudes, and proximity to the coasts (e.g., Zahran et al. 2006; Carlton
61 and Jacobson 2013), there has been a relative dearth of research efforts aimed at examining the
62 influence of geographic proximity to the coasts on residents’ perceptions of the link between
63 global warming and weather on a national scale in the United States. This research aims to
64 investigate whether and the extent to which beliefs about the link between global warming and
65 weather emerge from place-specific contexts rather than simply corresponding to ideological or
66 sociodemographic characteristics of individuals alone. Specifically, this study will test three
67 interrelated hypotheses about the nature of individual-level environmental risk perception
68 formation:

69 H1: Individual-level sociodemographic characteristics exert a direct influence on
70 individuals’ perceptions about the link between global warming and weather events. Specifically,
71 younger, higher educated, lower income, non-white, and politically liberal individuals will be
72 more likely to attribute global warming to changes in weather events. Additionally, those who

73 are more worried about global warming will be more likely to attribute weather changes to the
74 phenomenon.

75 H2: Climate extremes, as measured by regional climate extremes indices, exert a direct
76 influence on individuals' perceptions of the link between global warming and weather events.
77 Specifically, individuals residing in regions with greater climate extremes will be more likely to
78 attribute changes in weather events to global warming.

79 H3: There is geographic variation in individual-level perceptions about the link between
80 global warming and weather events. Specifically, individuals residing nearest to the coasts will
81 be more likely to attribute changes in weather events to global warming.

82

83 **Review of Literature**

84 In *Environmental Sociology*, John Hannigan argues for "an approach to environment and
85 society that pivots on the concept of *emergence*," (2014). Emergence in the social sciences is
86 understood as the concept "...that social organization and the production of knowledge are
87 fundamentally fluid, dynamic, and adaptive," and "...that they percolate from the grassroots
88 rather than pass from the top downwards," (Hannigan 2014). This concept provides a useful
89 framework for understanding human-environmental interactions by framing perceptions of
90 climate- and weather-related events as emergent properties stemming from place-specific, social,
91 economic and physical characteristics. Guagnano and Markee (1995, 137) proposed the useful
92 notion that "...attitudes, values, and beliefs have historical and cultural roots, and these roots may
93 be specific to different regions of the United States, each of which has its own unique cultural
94 heritage and tradition." Others have conceptualized similar constructs to place-based emergence
95 in the social sciences, such as Gieryn's (2000) argument for an understanding of social

96 phenomena as “emplaced,” or rooted in the social, economic, and cultural aspects of geographic
97 locations.

98 As concept in sociological theory and practice, place has generally has been defined and
99 utilized in terms of three mutually necessary characteristics: 1) geographic location; 2) physical
100 or material forms; and 3) meaning and value (Gieryn 2000). Place is embedded in geographic
101 space, associated with material culture and the built or natural environment, and imbued with
102 socially constructed meanings and values. As it relates to environmental attitudes and
103 perceptions, prior research has most often utilized place by investigating the influence of
104 individuals’ sense of place or place attachments (Stedman 2002; Scannell and Gifford 2010(a);
105 Scannell and Gifford 2013). Many studies examining place attachment have found significant
106 and positive associations between various dimensions place attachment (i.e., natural vs.
107 civic/built environment attachments) and environmental concern and conservation behaviors
108 (e.g., Vorkinn and Riese 2001; Brehm et al 2006; Gosling and Williams 2010; Scannell and
109 Gifford 2010(b)), but other efforts to examine place attachments have also revealed that deeper,
110 place-based meanings and values exert an even stronger influence over environmental concern
111 than attachments to place alone (Brehm et al. 2011).

112 Individuals’ perceptions of place have also been construed in terms of “sense of place,”
113 which has been defined as a “collection of symbolic meanings, attachment, and satisfaction with
114 a spatial setting held by an individual or group,” (Stedman 2002; Stedman 2003). Such sense of
115 place attributes have been found to contribute to pro-environmental attitudes and behaviors
116 (Jorgensen and Stedman 2006; Brown and Raymond 2007; Walker and Ryan 2008; Larson et al.
117 2013). Deep attachment to place can also be rooted in biophilia, i.e., the innate or learned
118 attraction to habitation in healthy and abundant environments, and/or topophilia, i.e., value- and

119 meaning-laden attachments of individuals and social groups to place, and these two senses of
120 place can either reinforce or challenge one another, particularly when changes to landscape
121 features or the built environment are under consideration, i.e., green-space development in urban
122 places (Stedman and Ingalls 2014). Sense of place and place attachment likely play substantial
123 roles in the formation of individuals' perceptions of environmental risks, especially when those
124 risks are related to hazards that can fundamentally alter the natural or physical characteristics of
125 lived environments and thereby affecting individuals' continued sense of place and associated
126 attachments to it. Perceptions of climate- and weather-related phenomena are particularly
127 relevant to this discussion, especially in the context of climate change and the link between
128 extreme weather event magnitude and global climatic change.

129 Past efforts to understand perceptions of climate- and weather-related phenomena have
130 largely focused on single event-types and case studies, e.g., hurricanes, droughts, and floods
131 (Kasperson and Dow 1993; Clark et al. 1998; Bullad and Wright 2009; Goebbert et al. 2012;
132 Howe et al. 2014; Klinenberg 2015; Hamilton et al.. 2016b), or particular indicators of climate
133 and weather, e.g., temperature, precipitation, or weather extremes (Hamilton and Keim 2009;
134 Brulle et al. 2012; Howe and Leiserowitz 2013; Marquart-Pyatt et al. 2014; Cutler 2015; Shao
135 2016; Shao and Goidel 2016; Hamilton et al. 2018; Fownes and Allred 2019), and their social
136 and biophysical correlates. Studies investigating the correlates of beliefs about global warming
137 have incorporated local weather events and climatic data in order to understand whether and to
138 what extent severe events have influenced individuals' perceptions about the reality and risks
139 posed by global warming. Exploiting short-term variation in local weather conditions, a growing
140 set of studies link climate beliefs and attitudes to temperature shifts (Hamilton and Keim 2009;
141 Egan and Mullin 2012; Hamilton and Stampone 2013; Zaval et al. 2014; Shao et al. 2014; Shao

142 et al. 2016; Fownes and Allred 2019); many fewer have considered coastal flooding (e.g., Spence
143 et al. 2011). Physical vulnerability to climate-related impacts appears to increase global warming
144 risk perceptions. Brody, Zahran, Vedlitz, and Grover (2008), for example, found that respondents
145 residing in places most vulnerable to inundation from sea level rise perceived a greater risk from
146 global warming than did those living on relatively higher ground or further away from the
147 coastline. Additionally, Milfont et al. (2014) demonstrated a significant effect of proximity to the
148 shore on beliefs about the reality of global warming and support for policies to address it.

149 Perceptions and experiences of actual weather may not always align as some segments of
150 the public have become more sensitized to global environmental change than others. On the one
151 hand, individuals' perceptions of unusual local weather may exert a stronger influence on their
152 global warming risk perceptions than objectively-measured abnormal weather trends at the local-
153 level (Shao 2016). This suggests that public perceptions of climate impacts may sometimes
154 outpace local-level changes to weather patterns. On the other hand, strong socio-cultural filters
155 can reduce or even override one's ability to detect local weather changes (e.g., Brulle et al. 2012;
156 Myers et al. 2012; Kahan 2012; Howe and Leiserowitz 2013; McCright et al. 2014; Marquart-
157 Pyatt et al. 2014; Howe 2018). Other studies (e.g. Goebbert et al. 2012) demonstrate that
158 instrumental changes in the weather are better predictors of perceptions of drought and flooding
159 than perceptions of local temperature changes. Changes in precipitation patterns also appear to
160 be more easily detected by residents than changes in temperature (Marlon et al. 2018). Moreover,
161 a number of studies find that individual-level political orientations overshadow regional-level
162 climatic conditions in models predicting public beliefs about the immediacy and seriousness of
163 global warming and climatic phenomena (Marquart-Pyatt et al. 2014, Hamilton et al. 2016a, and
164 Hamilton et al. 2016b).

165 Using nationally-representative survey data, other recent studies have employed
166 multilevel regression and post-stratification (MRP) to “downscale” or predict beliefs and
167 perceptions at various sub-national levels. MRP models accurately predict global warming
168 beliefs, risk perceptions, and policy preferences at the state, congressional district, metropolitan,
169 and county levels (Howe et al 2015; Mildenerger et al. 2016; Mildenerger et al. 2017).
170 Geographic variation in perceptions of both local events or phenomena and broader global
171 warming has proven critically important to explaining potential differences in public attitudes
172 about the immediacy of global warming as a threat and its impact on current trends in localized
173 climatic or meteorological events. This place-based variation has been found to be related to
174 variation in political support and local economic contexts, such as in places associated with the
175 mining, oil, and gas industry (Olson-Hazboun et al. 2018). This indicates that local economic,
176 social, and cultural circumstances are also critical to our understanding of risk perception
177 formation.

178 Many past studies on subjects ranging from human health and public safety, to the
179 environment and other domains, show that personal experience of a hazard significantly
180 increases beliefs about the likelihood of future incidence and seriousness of such events
181 (Kunreuther 1978; Smith and Tobin 1979; Mitchell 1984; Weinstein 1989). The link between
182 personal experiences of climatic events and perceptions of risks associated with global warming,
183 however, has found relatively limited support (McCright et al. 2014; Hornsey et al. 2016), and is
184 likely due in part to the perceived spatial and temporal distance of global warming among the
185 general public in the United States. On the international level, however, evidence suggests that
186 changes to local climates have influenced perceptions of local change. Howe et al. (2013)
187 investigated measured temperature changes alongside public perceptions of changes across 89

188 countries and found that those residing in places with rising average temperatures were more
189 likely to perceive local warming.

190 Physical vulnerabilities to climate- and weather-related hazards have also been associated
191 with climate change risk perceptions: people residing in places most vulnerable to inundation
192 from sea level rise perceive a greater risk from global warming than do those living on relatively
193 higher ground or further away from the coastline (Brody et al. 2008; Milfont et al. 2014). The
194 subjective experience of climate-related extreme events is also related to the proximity to
195 impacts as well as the magnitude of the impacts (Howe et al. 2014). Additionally, other research
196 has found a multiplicative effect between county-level property damage from severe weather and
197 individual-level household income on individuals' perceptions of climate risks and extreme
198 weather, such that lower-income individuals living in places hardest hit by severe weather were
199 much more likely to perceive climate impacts than their higher-income neighbors (Cutler 2015;
200 2016).

201 Though there have been many studies on individual beliefs and attitudes about
202 environmental phenomena and their sociodemographic correlates, these studies have
203 overwhelmingly focused on identifying and explaining what Van Liere and Dunlap (1980)
204 referred to as the "social bases of environmental concern." From the "age, social class, residence,
205 political, and sex hypotheses" (see Van Liere and Dunlap 1980) emerged a myriad of studies
206 over the following decades charting the sociodemographic correlates of individual beliefs,
207 attitudes, perceptions of risks, and norms of behavior with respect to environmental issues and
208 problems, most notably in recent years the social and political dimensions of global warming
209 beliefs. Less attention, however, has been given to the potential place-level socioeconomic
210 factors, especially in conjunction with biophysical indicators that put some individuals in

211 positions of increased risk for harm. Perceptions are an important determinant of responses to
212 risks, so an improved understanding of the drivers of risk perceptions can clarify how severe
213 climate- and weather-related event impacts may affect individuals and populations (Leiserowitz
214 2005; Thomas et al. 2007; Whitmarsh 2008; Weber 2010; Wilhelmi and Hayden 2010).

215 Individual-level values are also embedded in place-specific contexts and connected to
216 locally-relevant phenomena, such as cultural milieu, history, economic vibrancy, and patterns of
217 integration or segregation, among other factors (Guagnano and Markee 1995; Lorenzoni and
218 Pidgeon 2006; Shwom et al. 2008; Hamilton and Keim 2009; Hamilton et al. 2010; Safford et al.
219 2012; Sampson 2012; Hamilton and Safford 2014). As has been shown above, place-based
220 values and attachments relate to environmental beliefs and concerns, but to what extent
221 individuals understand and perceive their own relative vulnerabilities is an important factor for
222 policymakers and organizations involved in disaster preparation and response to consider. The
223 link between perceived and measured vulnerabilities to environmental hazards has also been
224 relatively underexplored (Brody et al. 2008; Wolf et al. 2010; Spence et al. 2011). Perceptions
225 about climate change have been analyzed as correlates of personal values, worldviews, and other
226 culturally-rooted cognitive processes at the individual level, but place-level factors have received
227 relatively less attention. Where place-level factors have been assessed in prior research on
228 perceptions of environmental risks, these studies have often focused on specific regions, such as
229 perceptions of weather conditions among U.S. Gulf Coast residents or perceptions of
230 environmental risk among Floridians (Shao and Goidel 2016; Carlton and Jacobson 2013).

231 This research will link these insights from sociological and psychological studies
232 exploring the individual-level influences on environmental attitudes and perceptions to the
233 geographic literature on place-level differences in attitudes and perceptions by combining

234 national survey data with multiple sets of data on place-level physical contextual factors and
235 indicators of residence in communities along the U.S. coasts. In doing so, this study will address
236 a gap in the literature, namely that coastal residence, in particular, may be an important yet
237 previously unexplored factor influencing how certain among those in the general public have
238 come to attribute local weather extremes to global warming. .

239

240 **Methods**

241 Data utilized in this research comes from the Climate Change in the American Mind
242 (CCAM) surveys conducted by the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication and the
243 George Mason University Center for Climate Change Communication. CCAM surveys have
244 tracked public beliefs and attitudes about global warming and a wide range of associated issues
245 and topical areas, such as risk perceptions, media consumption habits, policy preferences, and
246 many others. Samples were drawn from GfK's KnowledgePanel®, an online panel recruited
247 using probability sampling via random digit dialing and address-based mail techniques which
248 cover essentially all resident phone numbers and mail addresses in the United States. Survey
249 questionnaires were self-administered by respondents through a web-based environment. Those
250 sampled who chose to join the panel but did not have access to the internet at home were loaned
251 personal computers and provided with internet access in order to participate so that the web-
252 based design would not systematically exclude certain segments of the population. Post-survey
253 weights were applied to demographic variables to match the US Census Bureau's norms. Survey
254 weights were also applied to the statistical analyses presented in this study.

255 There have been eighteen waves of CCAM data collected since the fall of 2008. While
256 some items have been tracked throughout CCAM's deployment, most survey questions have

257 been asked more selectively. In this study, two survey items are used to construct a single ordinal
258 indicator of belief about the link between global warming and the weather. The two survey
259 questions read as follows:

260 2. *Which statement below best reflects your view? [Global warming is affecting the*
261 *weather in the United States, Global warming is not affecting the weather in the United States,*
262 *Global warming isn't happening, Don't know, Prefer not to answer].*

263 3. *[If "Global warming is affecting the weather"] How much do you think global*
264 *warming is affecting the weather in the United States? [A lot, Some, A little, Don't know, Prefer*
265 *not to answer].*

266 These items were assessed on six CCAM survey waves – April 2013, December 2013, April
267 2014, March 2016, November 2016, and May 2017. Sample sizes and response rates for all
268 waves are reported in Table 1. Survey waves were pooled for the purposes of these analyses, but
269 an indicator for survey wave was included in order to test any potential temporal effects. The
270 dependent variable derived from these items was treated as ordered categorical, with categories
271 ordered as follows:

- 272 1. *Global warming isn't happening.*
- 273 2. *Global warming is not affecting the weather.*
- 274 3. *Don't know.*
- 275 4. *Global warming is affecting the weather. Don't know (how much).*
- 276 5. *Global warming is affecting the weather – a little.*
- 277 6. *Global warming is affecting the weather – some.*
- 278 7. *Global warming is affecting the weather – a lot.*

279 [Table 1 near here]

280 Individual-level independent variables included respondents' age, (1, 18-29; 2, 30-44; 3,
281 45-59; 4, 60+), gender (0, Male; 1, Female), educational attainment (1, less than high school; 2,

282 high school or equivalent; 3, some college/2-year Associate’s degree; 4, Bachelor’s degree or
283 higher), household income (1, less than \$25,000; 2, \$25,000-\$34,999; 3, \$35,000-\$49,999; 4,
284 \$50,000-\$74,999; 5, \$75,000-\$99,999; 6, \$100,000+) race and ethnicity (1, White, non-Hispanic;
285 2, Hispanic; 3, Black, non-Hispanic; 4, Other race or multiracial, non-Hispanic), and political
286 ideology (1, very liberal; 2, somewhat liberal; 3, moderate; 4, somewhat conservative; 5, very
287 conservative). Descriptive statistics for survey-based, individual-level characteristics are
288 provided in Tables 2 and 3. Place-level independent variables included two indicators of weather
289 extremes derived from NOAA’s Climate Extremes Index (CEI) and an indicator of coastal
290 shoreline county residence developed using data from the National Geodetic Survey’s
291 Continually Updated Shoreline Project (CUSP). CUSP data is available for download at the
292 regional level through NOAA’s Shoreline Data Explorer online and captures all national
293 shoreline boundaries, including Alaska, Pacific Islands, Great Lakes, Gulf of Mexico, North
294 Atlantic, Southeast and Caribbean, and West Coast.

295 [Table 2 near here]

296 NOAA’s CEI was accessed and data downloaded via the National Centers for
297 Environmental Information (NCEI) website. The CEI is defined as follows:

298 *“the arithmetic average of the following five of six indicators of the percentage of the*
299 *conterminous U.S. area: 1) The sum of (a) percentage of the United States with maximum*
300 *temperatures much below normal and (b) percentage of the United States with maximum*
301 *temperatures much above normal, 2) The sum of (a) percentage of the United States with*
302 *minimum temperatures much below normal and (b) percentage of the United States with*
303 *minimum temperatures much above normal, 3) The sum of (a) percentage of the United States in*
304 *severe drought (equivalent of the lowest tenth percentile) based on the Palmer Drought Severity*
305 *Index (PDSI) and (b) percentage of the United States with severe moisture surplus (equivalent to*

306 *the highest tenth percentile) based on the PDSI, 4) Twice the value of the percentage of the*
307 *United States with a much greater than normal proportion of precipitation derived from extreme*
308 *(equivalent to the highest tenth percentile) 1-day precipitation events, 5) The sum of (a)*
309 *percentage of the United States with a much greater than normal number of days with*
310 *precipitation and (b) percentage of the United States with a much greater than normal number of*
311 *days without precipitation, and 6) The sum of squares of U.S. landfalling tropical storm and*
312 *hurricane wind velocities scaled to the mean of the first five indicators,” (Gleason et al 2008).*

313 Beginning in 2011, NCEI introduced a regional CEI measure (RCEI), which calculates CEI
314 values for each of the nine Standard U.S. Regions (Northeast, Southeast, Ohio Valley, Upper
315 Midwest, South, Upper Rockies and Plains, Southwest, Northwest, and West). Two RCEI
316 indicators included in this preliminary analysis are the 3-month average RCEI value attached to
317 each respondent for the three months preceding the date of survey administration and the 30-year
318 anomaly of the average RCEI for that same period. Descriptive statistics for climate extremes
319 data are reported in Table 4. Geocoded survey responses were matched to the 3-month average
320 and RCEI anomalies by locating respondents by region and assigning the RCEI metrics to their
321 case identifiers in the survey data set through a data merge and matching by region.

322 CUSP data were accessed online using NOAA’s Shoreline Data Explorer. Shoreline
323 shapefiles were matched to the U.S. Census TIGER/Line® county boundary shapefiles using
324 ArcMap software. Geolocated CCAM survey responses enabled the identification of survey
325 respondents who resided in counties that either overlapped or shared boundaries with CUSP
326 national shoreline data. Using this information, a dichotomous indicator was created for
327 shoreline county residence. Finally, dummy variables for survey wave were included to control
328 for potential temporal effects of the month and year in which the surveys were administered.

329 Additionally, a CCAM-specific nine-region variable was included to handle the potential for
330 spatially autocorrelated data and take into account additional geographic variation.

331 [Table 3 near here]

332 A mixed effects ordered logistic regression was conducted to assess the effects of
333 individual characteristics on belief that global warming is affecting the weather (Model 1),
334 individual characteristics, risk perceptions, and ideology on the DV (Model 2), and the factors in
335 Model 2 plus place characteristics (Model 3). A mixed effects model was chosen to account for
336 variation in the potential relationships between place-based climate indicators and the DV in
337 different parts of the country. Analyses were re-run using a multilevel mixed-effects linear
338 regression and results remained largely unchanged. The strength of effects decreased slightly, but
339 significance and directionality were unaffected, suggesting that results are sufficiently robust.

340

341 [Table 4 near here]

342 **Results**

343 Respondent socio-demographic characteristics are detailed in Table 2. Median age for
344 respondents was 54 years of age, with a range of 18 to 94. About half of respondents were male
345 (50.30%) and half female (49.7%). About seventy-five percent of respondents were white, non-
346 Hispanic (74.95%), roughly ten percent Hispanic (9.74%), slightly under nine percent black,
347 non-Hispanic, and less than five percent other, non-Hispanic or two or more races, non-Hispanic.
348 Slightly more than one-third of respondents had a Bachelor's degree or higher, while about thirty
349 percent had some college or an Associate's degree, about twenty-seven percent had a high school
350 diploma or equivalent, and about seven percent had less than a high school diploma. Roughly
351 seventeen percent of respondents had household incomes of \$125,000 or more, twelve percent

352 between \$100,000 and \$124,999, fifteen percent between \$75,000 and \$99,999, nineteen percent
353 between \$50,000 and \$74,999, twenty-two percent between \$25,000 and \$49,999, and fifteen
354 percent had less than \$25,000 in household incomes.

355 Results from the mixed effects ordered logistic regression are presented in Table 4. Odds
356 ratios are reported for the ease of interpretation. Odds ratios are relative to 1.0, where a positive
357 effect is indicated by an odds ratio greater than 1.0 and a negative effect is indicated by an odds
358 ratio below 1.0. Positive associations refer to the multiplicative effects of a “global warming is
359 affecting the weather - a lot” response for a single unit increase in the independent variable
360 versus any other response to the dependent variable, holding other independent variables
361 constant, whereas negative associations refer to the multiplicative effects on the odds of a
362 “global warming isn’t happening” response on the other end of the spectrum versus any other
363 response to the dependent variable. Respondents’ region of residence is set as the second-level
364 random effect in order to test for spatial variability unaccounted for among the fixed effects and
365 to handle the potential spatial autocorrelation of place-based indicators in the first level of the
366 model.

367

368 [Table 5 near here]

369 Among demographic characteristics, respondents’ age, gender, education, and race and
370 ethnicity were all significantly associated with their beliefs about whether and to what extent
371 global warming is affecting the weather (Model 2; Table 5). Odds of a “global warming is
372 affecting the weather a lot” response was higher among older respondents (3.4% increased odds
373 for a unit increase in age), female respondents (33.8% increased odds for female versus male),
374 more highly educated respondents (12% increased odds for a unit increase in education),

375 Hispanic respondents (60.7% increased odds for Hispanic versus White, non-Hispanic), Black or
376 African American respondents (22.2% increased odds for Black, non-Hispanic versus White,
377 non-Hispanic), and non-White, non-Hispanic respondents identifying with another race (33.6%
378 increased odds for Other, non-Hispanic versus White, non-Hispanic). Interestingly, the effect of
379 Hispanic ethnicity echoes recent research that indicates Hispanics and Latinx are much more
380 engaged with the issue of global warming than non-Hispanic/Latinx, have greater climate risk
381 perceptions, and that their risk perceptions also correspond to higher levels of civic engagement
382 on the issue (Leiserowitz et al. 2017; Ballew et al. 2019). Moreover, the effects of Black and
383 other non-White racial identities are also mirrored by past research that has indicated higher
384 climate change health risk perceptions among racial and ethnic minorities, whom are also
385 generally more vulnerable to the harms posed by climate change (Akerlof et al. 2015; Harlan et
386 al. 2015).

387 After their addition in Model 3, however, worry about global warming and political
388 ideology were the strongest predictors of beliefs that global warming is affecting the weather and
389 these variables mediate some of the demographic effects in Model 2 (Table 5). The political
390 ideology finding is consistent with a rich literature on political orientation, values, and beliefs
391 and attitudes about global warming (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980; Slovic 1993; Dietz et al 2005;
392 Leiserowitz 2005; Wood and Vedlitz 2007; Hamilton 2008; Malka et al. 2009; Kahan et al.
393 2011; Mildemberger et al. 2017). On the other hand, the result that worry about global warming
394 influences belief that global warming is affecting the weather raises a “chicken-and-egg”
395 problem (whether worry influences belief that global warming is affecting the weather, or vice
396 versa), which this research is not able to unpack and investigate further due to the constraints of
397 the cross-sectional survey design and sampling strategy (but see Myers et al. (2012) for a

398 structural equation modeling approach to understanding the “chicken-and-egg” problem of
399 directional influence between climate change belief, belief certainty, and personal experience
400 with climate change.

401 Among the place-level indicators, coastal shoreline county residence significantly
402 predicted beliefs about the effect of global warming on the weather. The odds of a “global
403 warming is affecting the weather a lot” response was 14.8% higher among individuals living in
404 coastal shoreline counties versus all other counties represented in the sample. On the other hand,
405 neither the 3-month RCEI value nor the 30-year RCEI anomaly had any significant impacts on
406 beliefs about the effect of global warming on the weather. Therefore, the significant association
407 of coastal shoreline county residence, net of ideological and sociodemographic factors and actual
408 climate and weather extremes, suggests that residents of coastal areas believe they are
409 experiencing the effects of climate- and weather-related phenomena in ways that relate to factors
410 that are not captured by the sociodemographic and biophysical characteristics included in this
411 study. However, this effect of coastal shoreline county residence is limited insofar as it does not
412 provide any context about how specifically coastal shoreline county residents actually experience
413 the impacts of weather and climate change in their everyday lives.

414 This finding may indicate that physical proximity to coasts may be an important predictor
415 of global warming risk perceptions due perhaps to the unique issues facing coastal communities,
416 such as extreme high winds, storm surges, coastal flooding, and coastal erosion. Identifying the
417 different perceptions found in coastal versus inland areas is particularly important given the
418 existing and worsening risks posed by global warming to coastal communities, towns, and cities
419 across the United States. Interestingly, however, this effect is not moderated by ideological
420 orientation – the interaction between ideology and coastal shoreline residence was not

421 significantly predictive of attribution beliefs. In other words, coastal shoreline residence
422 influences attribution beliefs about equally across the ideological spectrum (Figure 1). However,
423 the coastal proximity effect appears to dissipate among those who identify as “somewhat” or
424 “very” liberal – both coastal shoreline and inland liberals had similarly high mean responses to
425 the attribution scale.

426 [Figure 1 here]

427

428 **Discussion**

429 The combined sociological concepts of place and emergence can provide a useful
430 framework for understanding how individuals perceive the environment, changes to it, and the
431 potential risks of environmental hazards. Specifically, individuals’ perceptions of the
432 environment and environmental hazards or risks may emerge out of a combination of place-
433 specific contexts and individual characteristics. While the methodological approach and results
434 of this research cannot address all of the possible place-level factors that influence perceptions
435 of environmental risks, it is worthy of note for future research that the significant effect of
436 coastal shoreline residence, net of political-ideological and other sociodemographic factors, may
437 indicate that coastal communities have experienced the effects of a changing climate. Future
438 studies should consider mixed method approaches, including qualitative or ethnographic
439 methods, to better understand all of the place-level factors that contribute to this coastal
440 proximity effect, including how coastal residents may have already begun to perceive these
441 impacts and why they are attributing at least some of the changes to global warming.

442 Several results in this analysis verify the extant literature on the correlates of
443 environmental beliefs and attitudes. First, political ideology significantly influences perceptions

444 about the link between global warming and the weather. Those who identify as politically liberal
445 are much more likely to believe that global warming has had an impact on the weather than their
446 politically conservative counterparts. This is consistent with numerous studies across social
447 science disciplines and decades of research on beliefs and attitudes about the environment in
448 general and global warming specifically (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980; Stern and Dietz 1994;
449 Leiserowitz 2006; Hamilton 2008; Kahan 2012; McCright and Dunlap 2013). This research
450 extends this established link between political ideology and environmental perceptions by
451 demonstrating that political-ideological characteristics also relate to how much individuals
452 attribute global warming to changes in local weather. Interestingly, however, this research also
453 adds to the literature finding less consistent effects of sociodemographic factors by providing
454 evidence that older, female, and Hispanic individuals are more likely to link global warming to
455 changes in local weather patterns, controlling for political ideology. While a “white male
456 conservative” effect on environmental risk perceptions has been established (Finucane et al.
457 2000; Flynn et al. 1994; Kahan et al. 2007; Kalof et al. 2002; McCright and Dunlap 2013), this
458 study adds new insight to research on race, ethnicity, and environmental perceptions by
459 suggesting that apart from other racial and ethnic groups, Hispanics are much more likely to
460 perceive a causal link between global warming and local weather (Macias, 2016). Future
461 research might extend this line of inquiry by investigating how and why Hispanic individuals and
462 communities seem to be more concerned about the impacts of global warming, particularly with
463 respect to weather events at the local level.

464 In addition to these individual-level effects, this study also finds an important association
465 between place of residence and individual perceptions of the relationship between global
466 warming and weather. Those living in coastal counties bordering national shorelines are more

467 likely than their inland-residing counterparts to attribute changes to local weather to the broader
468 phenomenon of global warming. This result remains significant even after controlling for strong
469 individual-level predictors of environmental perceptions such as political ideology. Importantly,
470 the effect among coastal shoreline residents cannot not be entirely attributed to higher
471 populations of more politically liberal or left-leaning individuals, since the analysis controls for
472 political ideology. Individuals living nearest to the coasts may be experiencing global warming
473 differently or more immediately than inland residents and therefore attribute a larger effect of
474 global warming on changes to local weather patterns. On the other hand, no significant effect is
475 observed from the 3-month average RCEI or the 30-year RCEI anomaly on perceptions of the
476 link between global warming and weather. Past studies utilizing other types of measures of RCEI
477 were also unable to demonstrate any significant effect of RCEI on beliefs about global warming,
478 or that any effect fades quickly in the aftermath of extreme weather events (Brulle et al. 2012;
479 Marquart et al. 2012; Konisky et al. 2016; Lyons et al. 2018). These results indicate either 1) that
480 RCEI is not the most appropriate measure for assessing local impacts of extreme or unusual
481 weather and/or 2) that residents of coastal communities bordering shorelines may experience
482 local climatic changes through factors in their everyday lives not captured by a biophysical
483 indicator such as RCEI, such as “sunny day flooding,” rapid loss of marshlands, erosion, and
484 property or infrastructure damage from increased sea level rise and tidal action.

485 Future research should consider incorporating measures that capture some of these
486 specific examples of phenomena affect the coasts, but may also consider selecting particular
487 coastal locations for case studies and more in-depth qualitative work. It may also suggest that
488 social and economic circumstances particular to coastal communities have a role in increasing
489 their residents’ risk perceptions surrounding the issue global warming. For instance, coastal

490 communities bordering shorelines often host industries and sectors of employment that may be
491 more vulnerable to the impacts of extreme or unusual weather events, such as tourism,
492 commercial and recreational fishing, or domestic and international trade. While this research was
493 not able to unpack these possibilities, future studies might consider more in-depth field work or
494 ethnographic methods of research to better understand the particular characteristics of coastal
495 shoreline communities that may play a role in influencing coastal residents' perceptions of the
496 risks associated with extreme weather and global warming.

497 Returning to the sociological concepts of place and emergence, future research should
498 consider using this combined framework to understand how place-to-place variation in
499 environmental risk perceptions is formed despite (or perhaps in compliment to) the powerful
500 influence of individual-level values and political predispositions. For example, individual
501 ideological and sociodemographic characteristics clearly play a major role in determining
502 individuals' beliefs and attitudes about environmental phenomena, but such individual-level
503 characteristics are embedded in place-specific contexts, such as local sociocultural and political
504 milieus, economic vitality, infrastructure, or the aesthetics of the natural and/or built
505 environment, and thus emerge out of the interplay between individuals' personal characteristics
506 and the conditions of the larger community. In coastal communities in particular, residents may
507 have a unique sense of place that is related to the intersection between the aesthetic quality of the
508 natural environment and the cultural or material quality of the coastal economy.

509 This sense of place may be augmented, however, by individuals' relative position in
510 terms of socioeconomic status, race/ethnicity, or political-ideological orientation, such that these
511 individual-level, socio-demographic characteristics influence choices to interact in different ways
512 with the natural and built environments of the coasts. Therefore, research investigating

513 perceptions of environmental risks should correspondingly assess the potential local-level
514 impacts to vulnerable populations, communities, and economies. One key limitation of this study
515 is that the coastal shoreline county indicator does not itself provide any detailed information
516 about how coastal residents experience global warming and local weather. While it appears that
517 coastal shoreline residence is related to increased perceptions of a causal link between global
518 warming and weather, more research is needed to identify the specific place-based characteristics
519 relevant to coastal residents' experiences of global warming and extreme or unusual weather.
520 There is enormous diversity and heterogeneity among the places represented within the coastal
521 shoreline county indicator and this research cannot unpack any of the intricacies related to this
522 specific place-to-place variation. Therefore, future research should aim to illuminate the lived
523 experiences of coastal shoreline residents and their communities in the context of a changing
524 climate.

525

526 **Acknowledgements**

527 This research utilizes data from the Climate Change in the American Mind surveys, conducted
528 by the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication and the George Mason University
529 Center for Climate Change Communication. Survey data collection was funded by 11th Hour
530 Project, the Energy Foundation, the Grantham Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, and the
531 V.K. Rasmussen Foundation.

532

533 **References**

- 534
535 Akerlof, K., Delamater, P., Boules, C., Upperman, C., & Mitchell, C. 2015. "Vulnerable
536 populations perceive their health as at risk from climate change." *International Journal of*
537 *Environmental Research and Public Health*. 12(12): 15419-15433.
- 538 Ballew, M. T., Goldberg, M. H., Rosenthal, S. A., Cutler, M. J., & Leiserowitz, A. 2019.
539 "Climate Change Activism Among Latino and White Americans." *Frontiers in*
540 *Communication*. 3: 58.
- 541 Borick, Christopher P. and Barry G. Rabe. 2010. "A Reason to Believe: Examining the Factors
542 That Determine Individual Views on Global Warming." *Social Science Quarterly*.
543 91(3):777-800.
- 544 Brehm, J. M., Eisenhauer, B. W., & Krannich, R. S. 2006. "Community attachments as
545 predictors of local environmental concern: The case for multiple dimensions of
546 attachment." *American behavioral scientist*. 50(2): 142-165.
- 547 Brehm, J. M., Eisenhauer, B. W., & Stedman, R. C. 2013. "Environmental concern: Examining
548 the role of place meaning and place attachment." *Society & Natural Resources*. 26(5):
549 522-538.
- 550 Brody, Samuel D., Sammy Zahran, Arnold Vedlitz and Himanshu Grover. 2008. "Examining the
551 Relationship between Physical Vulnerability and Public Perceptions of Global Climate
552 Change in the United States." *Environment and Behavior*. 40(1):72-95.
- 553 Brown, G., & Raymond, C. 2007. "The relationship between place attachment and landscape
554 values: Toward mapping place attachment." *Applied geography*. 27(2): 89-111.

555 Brulle, Robert J., Jason Carmichael and J. Craig Jenkins. 2012. "Shifting Public Opinion on
556 Climate Change: An Empirical Assessment of Factors Influencing Concern over Climate
557 Change in the Us, 2002–2010." *Climatic Change*. 114(2):169-88.

558 Bullard, Robert D. and Beverly Wright. 2009. *Race, Place, and Environmental Justice after*
559 *Hurricane Katrina: Struggles to Reclaim, Rebuild, and Revitalize New Orleans and the*
560 *Gulf Coast*: Westview Press.

561 Carlton, S. J., & Jacobson, S. K. 2013. "Climate change and coastal environmental risk
562 perceptions in Florida." *Journal of environmental management*. 130: 32-39.

563 Clark, George E., Susanne C. Moser, Samuel J. Ratick, Kirstin Dow, William B. Meyer, Srinivas
564 Emani, Weigen Jin, Jeanne X. Kasperson, Roger E. Kasperson and Harry E. Schwarz.
565 1998. "Assessing the Vulnerability of Coastal Communities to Extreme Storms: The Case
566 of Revere, Ma., USA." *Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change*. 3(1):59-
567 82.

568 Cook, John, Naomi Oreskes, Peter T. Doran, William R.L. Anderegg, Bart Verheggen, Ed W.
569 Maibach, J. Stuart Carlton, Stephan Lewandowsky, Andrew G. Skuce and Sarah A.
570 Green. 2016. "Consensus on Consensus: A Synthesis of Consensus Estimates on Human-
571 Caused Global Warming." *Environmental Research Letters*. 11(4):048002.

572 Cutler, Matthew J. 2015. "Seeing and Believing: The Emergent Nature of Extreme Weather
573 Perceptions." *Environmental Sociology*. 1(4):293-303.

574 Cutler, Matthew J. 2016. "Class, Ideology, and Severe Weather: How the Interaction of Social
575 and Physical Factors Shape Climate Change Threat Perceptions among Coastal Us
576 Residents." *Environmental Sociology*:1-11.

577 Dietz, T., A. Fitzgerald and R. Shwom. 2005. "Environmental Values." *Annual Review of*
578 *Environment and Resources*. 30:335-72. doi: 10.1146/annurev.energy.30.050504.144444.

579 Egan, Patrick J. and Megan Mullin. 2012. "Turning Personal Experience into Political Attitudes:
580 The Effect of Local Weather on Americans' Perceptions About Global Warming." *The*
581 *Journal of Politics*. 74(3):796-809.

582 Fownes, J. R., & Allred, S. B. 2019. "Testing the Influence of Recent Weather on Perceptions of
583 Personal Experience with Climate Change and Extreme Weather in New York State."
584 *Weather, Climate, and Society*. 11(1): 143-157.

585 Gieryn, Thomas F. 2000. "A Space for Place in Sociology." *Annual Review of Sociology*.
586 26(1):463-96.

587 Goebbert, Kevin, Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Kim Klockow, Matthew C. Nowlin and Carol L. Silva.
588 2012. "Weather, Climate, and Worldviews: The Sources and Consequences of Public
589 Perceptions of Changes in Local Weather Patterns." *Weather, Climate, and Society*.
590 4(2):132-44.

591 Gosling, E., & Williams, K. J. 2010. "Connectedness to nature, place attachment and
592 conservation behaviour: Testing connectedness theory among farmers." *Journal of*
593 *environmental psychology*. 30(3): 298-304.

594 Guagnano, Gregory A. and Nancy Markee. 1995. "Regional Differences in the
595 Sociodemographic Determinants of Environmental Concern." *Population &*
596 *Environment*. 17(2):135-49.

597 Hamilton, L. C. 2008. "Who Cares About Polar Regions? Results from a Survey of Us Public
598 Opinion." *Arctic Antarctic and Alpine Research*. 40(4):671-78. doi: 10.1657/1523-
599 0430(07-105)[Hamilton]2.0.Co;2.

600 Hamilton, L. C., C. R. Colocousis and C. M. Duncan. 2010. "Place Effects on Environmental
601 Views." *Rural Sociology*. 75(2):326-47. doi: 10.1111/j.1549-0831.2010.00013.x.

602 Hamilton, L. C., J. Hartter, T. G. Safford and F. R. Stevens. 2014. "Rural Environmental
603 Concern: Effects of Position, Partisanship, and Place." *Rural Sociology*. 79(2):257-81.
604 doi: 10.1111/ruso.12023.

605 Hamilton, L. C., J. Hartter, B. D. Keim, A. E. Boag, M. W. Palace, F. R. Stevens and M. J.
606 Ducey. 2016a. "Wildfire, Climate, and Perceptions in Northeast Oregon." *Regional
607 Environmental Change*. 16(6):1819-32. doi: 10.1007/s10113-015-0914-y.

608 Hamilton, L. C. and B. D. Keim. 2009. "Regional Variation in Perceptions About Climate
609 Change." *International Journal of Climatology*. 29(15):2348-52. doi: 10.1002/joc.1930.

610 Hamilton, L. C. and T. G. Safford. 2014. "Environmental Views from the Coast: Public Concern
611 About Local to Global Marine Issues." *Society & Natural Resources*. 28(1):57-74. doi:
612 10.1080/08941920.2014.933926.

613 Hamilton, L. C. and M. D. Stampone. 2013. "Blowin' in the Wind: Short-Term Weather and
614 Belief in Anthropogenic Climate Change." *Weather, Climate, and Society*. 5(2):112-19.
615 doi: 10.1175/Wcas-D-12-00048.1.

616 Hamilton, Lawrence C., Cameron P. Wake, Joel Hartter, Thomas G. Safford and Alli J.
617 Puchlopek. 2016b. "Flood Realities, Perceptions and the Depth of Divisions on Climate."
618 *Sociology*. 50(5):913-33.

619 Hamilton, L. C., Lemcke-Stampone, M., & Grimm, C. 2018. "Cold winters warming?
620 Perceptions of climate change in the North Country." *Weather, Climate, and Society*.
621 10(4): 641-652.

622 Hannigan, John. 2014. *Environmental Sociology*: Routledge.

623 Harlan, S. L., Pellow, D. N., Roberts, J. T., Bell, S. E., Holt, W. G., & Nagel, J. 2015. "Climate
624 justice and inequality." *Climate change and society: Sociological perspectives*. 127-163.

625 Hornsey, Matthew J., Emily A. Harris, Paul G. Bain and Kelly S. Fielding. 2016. "Meta-
626 Analyses of the Determinants and Outcomes of Belief in Climate Change." *Nature*
627 *Climate Change*. 6(6):622-26.

628 Howe, P. D., H. Boudet, A. Leiserowitz and E. W. Maibach. 2014. "Mapping the Shadow of
629 Experience of Extreme Weather Events." *Climatic Change*. 127(2):381-89. doi:
630 10.1007/s10584-014-1253-6.

631 Howe, P. D. and A. Leiserowitz. 2013. "Who Remembers a Hot Summer or a Cold Winter? The
632 Asymmetric Effect of Beliefs About Global Warming on Perceptions of Local Climate
633 Conditions in the Us." *Global Environmental Change-Human and Policy Dimensions*
634 23(6):1488-500. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.09.014.

635 Howe, Peter D., Ezra M. Markowitz, Tien Ming Lee, Chia-Ying Ko and Anthony Leiserowitz.
636 2013. "Global Perceptions of Local Temperature Change." *Nature Climate Change*.
637 3(4):352-56.

638 Howe, Peter D., Matto Mildenerger, Jennifer R. Marlon and Anthony Leiserowitz. 2015.
639 "Geographic Variation in Opinions on Climate Change at State and Local Scales in the
640 USA." *Nature Climate Change*. 5(6):596-603. doi: 10.1038/nclimate2583
641 <http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v5/n6/abs/nclimate2583.html#supplementary->
642 information.

643 Howe, Peter D. 2018. "Perceptions of seasonal weather are linked to beliefs about global climate
644 change: evidence from Norway." *Climatic Change*. 148(4): 467-480.

645 Jorgensen, B. S., & Stedman, R. C. 2006. "A comparative analysis of predictors of sense of place
646 dimensions: Attachment to, dependence on, and identification with lakeshore properties."
647 *Journal of environmental management*. 79(3): 316-327.

648 Kahan, Dan M., Hank Jenkins-Smith and Donald Braman. 2011. "Cultural Cognition of
649 Scientific Consensus." *Journal of Risk Research*. 14(2):147-74.

650 Kahan, D. 2012. "Why we are poles apart on climate change." *Nature News*. 488(7411): 255.

651 Kasperson, Roger E. and Kirstin Dow. 1993. "Hazard Perception and Geography." *Advances in*
652 *Psychology*. 96:193-222.

653 Klinenberg, Eric. 2015. *Heat Wave: A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago*: University of
654 Chicago Press.

655 Konisky, D. M., Hughes, L., & Kaylor, C. H. 2016. "Extreme weather events and climate
656 change concern." *Climatic change*. 134(4): 533-547.

657 Kunreuther, Howard. 1978. *Disaster Insurance*. New York: Wiley.

658 Larson, S., De Freitas, D. M., & Hicks, C. C. 2013. "Sense of place as a determinant of people's
659 attitudes towards the environment: Implications for natural resources management and
660 planning in the Great Barrier Reef, Australia." *Journal of environmental management*.
661 117: 226-234.

662 Leiserowitz, Anthony A. 2005. "American Risk Perceptions: Is Climate Change Dangerous?".
663 *Risk Analysis*. 25(6):1433-42.

664 Leiserowitz, Anthony. 2006. "Climate Change Risk Perception and Policy Preferences: The Role
665 of Affect, Imagery, and Values." *Climatic Change*. 77(1):45-72.

666 Leiserowitz, A., Cutler, M., & Rosenthal, S. 2017. "Climate Change in the Latino Mind." Yale
667 University. New Haven, CT: Yale Program on Climate Change Communication.

668 Lorenzoni, Irene and Nick F. Pidgeon. 2006. "Public Views on Climate Change: European and
669 USA Perspectives." *Climatic Change*. 77(1):73-95.

670 Lyons, B. A., Hasell, A., & Stroud, N. J. 2018. "Enduring extremes? Polar vortex, drought, and
671 climate change beliefs." *Environmental Communication*. 12(7): 876-894.

672 Macias Thomas. 2016. "Environmental risk perception among race and ethnic groups in the
673 United States." *Ethnicities*. 16: 111-129.

674 Marlon, Jennifer R., Sander van der Linden, Peter D. Howe, Anthony Leiserowitz, Lucia S.H.
675 Woo, and Kenneth Broad. 2018. "Detecting local environmental change: the role of
676 experience in shaping risk judgments about global warming." *Journal of Risk
677 Research*: 1-15.

678 Malka, Ariel, Jon A. Krosnick and Gary Langer. 2009. "The Association of Knowledge with
679 Concern About Global Warming: Trusted Information Sources Shape Public Thinking."
680 *Risk Analysis*. 29(5):633-47.

681 Marquart-Pyatt, S. T., A. M. McCright, T. Dietz and R. E. Dunlap. 2014. "Politics Eclipses
682 Climate Extremes for Climate Change Perceptions." *Global Environmental Change-
683 Human and Policy Dimensions*. 29:246-57. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.10.004.

684 McCright, A. M. and R. E. Dunlap. 2013. "Bringing Ideology In: The Conservative White Male
685 Effect on Worry About Environmental Problems in the USA." *Journal of Risk Research*.
686 16(2):211-26. doi: 10.1080/13669877.2012.726242.

687 McCright, A. M., R. E. Dunlap and C. Y. Xiao. 2014. "The Impacts of Temperature Anomalies
688 and Political Orientation on Perceived Winter Warming." *Nature Climate Change*.
689 4(12):1077-81. doi: 10.1038/Nclimate2443.

690 Melillo, Jerry M., T.T. Richmond and G. Yohe. 2014. "Climate Change Impacts in the United
691 States." *Third National Climate Assessment*.

692 Mildenberger M, Howe P, Lachapelle E, et al. 2016. "The distribution of climate change public
693 opinion in Canada." *PloS one* 11: e0159774.

694 Mildenberger, Matto, Jennifer R. Marlon, Peter D. Howe and Anthony Leiserowitz. 2017. "The
695 Spatial Distribution of Republican and Democratic Climate Opinions at State and Local
696 Scales." *Climatic Change*:1-10.

697 Mitchell, James K. 1984. "Hazard Perception Studies: Convergent Concerns and Divergent
698 Approaches During the Past Decade," in T.F. Saarinen, D. Seamon and J.L. Sell (eds.).
699 *Environmental Perception and Behavior: An Inventory and Prospect*. Research Paper No.
700 209. Department of Geography, University of Chicago, Chicago: 33-59.

701 Myers, T. A., E. W. Maibach, C. Roser-Renouf, K. Akerlof and A. A. Leiserowitz. 2012. "The
702 Relationship between Personal Experience and Belief in the Reality of Global Warming."
703 *Nature Climate Change*. 3(4):343-47. doi: 10.1038/Nclimate1754.

704 Olson-Hazboun, Shawn K., Peter D. Howe, and Anthony Leiserowitz. 2018. "The Influence of
705 Extractive Activities on Public Support for Renewable Energy Policy." *Energy Policy*
706 123 (December): 117–26. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.08.044>.

707 Sampson, Robert J. 2012. *Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring Neighborhood*
708 *Effect*: University of Chicago Press.

709 Safford, T. G., J. D. Ulrich and L. C. Hamilton. 2012. "Public Perceptions of the Response to the
710 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Personal Experiences, Information Sources, and Social
711 Context." *Journal of Environmental Management*. 113:31-39. doi:
712 10.1016/j.jenvman.2012.08.022.

713 Safford, T. G. and L. C. Hamilton. 2012. "Demographic Change and Shifting Views About
714 Marine Resources and the Coastal Environment in Downeast Maine." *Population and*
715 *Environment*. 33(4):284-303. doi: 10.1007/s11111-011-0146-0.

716 Scannell, L., & Gifford, R. 2010(a). "Defining place attachment: A tripartite organizing
717 framework." *Journal of environmental psychology*. 30(1): 1-10.

718 Scannell, L., & Gifford, R. 2010(b). "The relations between natural and civic place attachment
719 and pro-environmental behavior." *Journal of environmental psychology*. 30(3): 289-297.

720 Scannell, L., & Gifford, R. 2013. "Personally relevant climate change: The role of place
721 attachment and local versus global message framing in engagement." *Environment and*
722 *Behavior*. 45(1): 60-85.

723 Shao, Wanyun. 2016. "Are Actual Weather and Perceived Weather the Same? Understanding
724 Perceptions of Local Weather and Their Effects on Risk Perceptions of Global
725 Warming." *Journal of Risk Research*. 19(6):722-42.

726 Shao, Wanyun, James C. Garand, Barry D. Keim and Lawrence C. Hamilton. 2016. "Science,
727 Scientists, and Local Weather: Understanding Mass Perceptions of Global Warming."
728 *Social Science Quarterly*. 97(5):1023-57.

729 Shao, W. Y., B. D. Keim, J. C. Garand and L. C. Hamilton. 2014. "Weather, Climate, and the
730 Economy: Explaining Risk Perceptions of Global Warming, 2001-10." *Weather, Climate,*
731 *and Society*. 6(1):119-34. doi: 10.1175/Wcas-D-13-00029.1.

732 Shao, W., & Goidel, K. 2016. "Seeing is believing? An examination of perceptions of local
733 weather conditions and climate change among residents in the US Gulf Coast." *Risk*
734 *Analysis*. 36(11): 2136-2157.

735 Shwom, R., A. Dan and T. Dietz. 2008. "The Effects of Information and State of Residence on
736 Climate Change Policy Preferences." *Climatic Change*. 90(4):343-58. doi:
737 10.1007/s10584-008-9428-7.

738 Smith, Keith and Graham A. Tobin. 1979. "Human Adjustment to the Flood Hazard." School of
739 Geosciences Faculty and Staff Publications. 43.
740 http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/geo_facpub/43.

741 Slovic, Paul. 1993. "Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy." *Risk Analysis*. 13(6):675-82.

742 Spence, Alexa, Wouter Poortinga, Catherine Butler and Nicholas Frank Pidgeon. 2011.
743 "Perceptions of Climate Change and Willingness to Save Energy Related to Flood
744 Experience." *Nature Climate Change*. 1(1):46-49.

745 Stedman, R. C. 2002. "Toward a social psychology of place: Predicting behavior from place-
746 based cognitions, attitude, and identity." *Environment and behavior*. 34(5): 561-581.

747 Stedman, R. C. 2003. "Is it really just a social construction?: The contribution of the physical
748 environment to sense of place." *Society & Natural Resources*. 16(8): 671-685.

749 Stedman, R. C., & Ingalls, M. 2014. "Topophilia, biophilia and greening in the red zone." Pp
750 129-144 in *Greening in the red zone*, edited by Keith G. Tidball and Marianne E. Krasny.
751 Springer, Dordrecht.

752 Stern, P. C. and T. Dietz. 1994. "The Value Basis of Environmental Concern." *Journal of Social*
753 *Issues*. 50(3):65-84.

754 Thomas, David S.G., Chasca Twyman, Henny Osbahr and Bruce Hewitson. 2007. "Adaptation to
755 Climate Change and Variability: Farmer Responses to Intra-Seasonal Precipitation
756 Trends in South Africa." *Climatic Change*. 83(3):301-22.

757 Van Liere, Kent D. and Riley E. Dunlap. 1980. "The Social Bases of Environmental Concern: A
758 Review of Hypotheses, Explanations and Empirical Evidence." *Public Opinion*
759 *Quarterly*. 44(2):181-97.

760 Vorkinn, M., & Riese, H. 2001. "Environmental concern in a local context: The significance of
761 place attachment." *Environment and behavior*. 33(2): 249-263.

762 Walker, A. J., & Ryan, R. L. 2008. "Place attachment and landscape preservation in rural New
763 England: A Maine case study." *Landscape and urban planning*. 86(2): 141-152.

764 Weber, Elke U. 2010. "What Shapes Perceptions of Climate Change?". *Wiley Interdisciplinary*
765 *Reviews: Climate Change*. 1(3):332-42.

766 Weinstein, Neil D. 1989. "Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks." *Science*. 246(4935):1232-
767 34.

768 Whitmarsh, Lorraine. 2008. "Are Flood Victims More Concerned About Climate Change Than
769 Other People? The Role of Direct Experience in Risk Perception and Behavioural
770 Response." *Journal of Risk Research*. 11(3):351-74.

771 Wilhelmi, Olga V. and Mary H. Hayden. 2010. "Connecting People and Place: A New
772 Framework for Reducing Urban Vulnerability to Extremeheat." *Environmental*
773 *Research Letters*. 5(1):014021.

774 Wolf, Johanna, W. Neil Adger, Irene Lorenzoni, Vanessa Abrahamson and Rosalind Raine.
775 2010. "Social Capital, Individual Responses to Heat Waves and Climate Change
776 Adaptation: An Empirical Study of Two Uk Cities." *Global Environmental Change*.
777 20(1):44-52.

778 Wood, B. Dan and Arnold Vedlitz. 2007. "Issue Definition, Information Processing, and the
779 Politics of Global Warming." *American Journal of Political Science*. 51(3):552-68.

780 Zaval, Lisa, Elizabeth A. Keenan, Eric J. Johnson and Elke U. Weber. 2014. "How Warm Days
781 Increase Belief in Global Warming." *Nature Climate Change*. 4(2):143-47.
782
783

784 Table 1. Survey Wave Information

Survey wave	Sample	N (unweighted)	Response Rate
April 2013	2,222	1,045	47%
December 2013	3,453	830 ¹	48%
April 2014	3,389	1,384	48%
March 2016	2,459	1,317	55%
November 2016	2,636	1,226	51%
May 2017	2,506	1,266	51%

785 1. In December 2013 the sample was split for experimental design purposes. The sample we retained for these
786 analyses were surveyed using the term “global warming,” which is the standard language used across all CCAM
787 surveys. The other half of the sample were surveyed using the term “climate change” for experimental purposes.
788

789 Table 2. Respondent socio-demographics.

Demographic characteristic	N	Descriptive Statistics
Age	5,286	Mean = 52, Median = 54, Range = 18-94
Gender	5,286	49.7% Female, 50.3% Male
Race/Ethnicity	5,286	74.95% White, 9.74% Hispanic, 8.91% Black, 3.58% Other, 2.82% Two or more races
Education	5,286	6.87% Less than high school, 26.73% High school/GED, 29.53% Some college/Associate's, 36.87% Bachelor's or higher
Income	5,286	< \$25k - 14.95% \$25-\$49k - 21.6% \$50-74k - 19.32% \$75-99k - 14.68% \$100-124k - 12.32% \$125k or > - 17.14%

790
791
792

793 Table 3. Independent Variables from CCAM Surveys.

Variable	Range	Mean (Standard Deviation)	N
Individual-level Characteristics			
Age	1 (18-24), 2 (25-34), 3 (35-44), 4 (45-54), 5 (55-64), 6 (65-74), 7 (65+)	4.22 (1.70)	5,286
Gender	0 (Male), 1 (Female)	1.50 (0.50)	5,286
Education	1 (<high school), 2 (high school), 3 (some college), 4 (Bachelor's or higher)	2.95 (0.95)	5,286
Household Income	1 (<\$25,000), 2 (\$25,000-\$34,999), 3 (\$35,000-\$49,999) 4 (\$50,000-\$74,999), 5 (\$75,000-\$99-999), 6 (\$100,000+)	3.38 (1.68)	5,286
Race/ethnicity	1 (White, non-Hispanic), 2 (Hispanic), 3 (Black, non-Hispanic), 4 (Other/Multiracial)	1.56 (1.12)	5,286
Ideology	1 (Very conservative), 2 (Somewhat conservative), 3 (Moderate), 4 (Somewhat liberal), 5 (Very liberal)	2.87 (1.07)	5,286
Worried about GW	1 (Not at all worried), 2 (Not very worried), 3 (Somewhat worried), 4 (Very worried)	2.53 (0.966)	5,286
Coastal Shoreline County, Census Division, and CCAM Survey Wave			
Coastal Shoreline County	0 (non-coastal shoreline), 1 (coastal shoreline)	0.36 (0.48)	5,286
Census Division	1 (New England), 2 (Mid-Atlantic), 3 (East-North Central), 4 (West-North Central), 5 (South Atlantic), 6 (East-South Central), 7 (West-South Central), 8 (Mountain), 9 (Pacific)	N/A	5,286
Survey Wave	Six dichotomous indicators for each wave of participation	--	--

794

795 Table 4. Climate Extremes Index (CEI) Indicators

Variable	Range	Mean (Standard Deviation)	N
3-month average CEI	2.42 – 66.84	31.62 (16.67)	5,247
30-year CEI anomaly	-15.8 – 47.64	12.101 (17.15)	5,247


796

797 Table 5: Weighted Mixed Effects Ordered Logistic Regression of “Global Warming Affecting the Weather” on Individual- and Place-
 798 level Factors
 799

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Odds Ratio (95% conf.)</i>	<i>Odds Ratio (95% conf.)</i>	<i>Odds Ratio (95% conf.)</i>
Individual characteristics			
Age	1.035** (1.006 - 1.065)	1.034* (1.005 - 1.064)	1.110*** (1.077 - 1.144)
Gender (Female)	1.336*** (1.212 - 1.472)	1.338*** (1.214 - 1.475)	1.158* (1.045 - 1.283)
Education	1.127*** (1.068 - 1.190)	1.120*** (1.062 - 1.183)	.979 (.925 - 1.037)
Household Income	.986 (.954 - 1.018)	.983 (.952 - 1.015)	.983 (.950 - 1.017)
Hispanic	1.656*** (1.422 - 1.928)	1.607*** (1.378 - 1.873)	1.144 (.973 - 1.344)
Black, non-Hispanic	1.293*** (1.105 - 1.513)	1.222** (1.042 - 1.432)	1.060 (.894 - 1.258)
Other, non-Hispanic	1.415*** (1.153 - 1.736)	1.336** (1.086 - 1.644)	.942 (.757 - 1.173)
Multiracial, non-Hispanic	1.031 (.668 - 1.590)	.984 (.632 - 1.532)	.864 (.545 - 1.370)
Worried about GW			4.923*** (4.575 - 5.297)
Ideology			1.504*** (1.421 - 1.592)
Survey Wave	NS	NS	NS
Place characteristics			
Coastal Shoreline County		1.324*** (1.184 - 1.482)	1.148** (1.027 - 1.284)
3-month RCEI		.950 (.909 - .993)	.979 (.939 - 1.023)
30-year RCEI anomaly		1.053 (1.007 - 1.100)	1.022 (.980 - 1.022)
Random Intercept			
	<i>Std. Dev. (95% conf.)</i>	<i>Std. Dev. (95% conf.)</i>	<i>Std. Dev. (95% conf.)</i>
Census Division	.025*** (.007 - .088)	.010** (.002 - .057)	.003+ (.000 - .044)
N	5,286	5,247	5,247
Wald chi ²	104.15***	132.81***	2,559.44***
+-p<0.1 *-p<.05, **-p<.01, ***-p<.001			

800

801 Figure 1. Mean Scale Responses to “Global Warming Affecting the Weather” by Ideological
802 Orientation and Coastal Shoreline versus Inland Residence
803



804